Features

Death of Lalith Kotelawala, Karu J’s resignation and winning the Vanni

Published

2 months ago

2026/04/19

Thilina Walpola

With Lalith and his wife

Lalith Kotelawala

As I write this I get news of the death of Lalith Kotelawala, an outstanding entrepreneur. He was born with a silver spoon in his mouth as he was the only son of Justin Kotelawala, a pioneer Sri Lankan businessman and the younger brother of Sir John Kotelawala. Justin K started a successful insurance company in the face of competition from British insurers who dominated the field before independence. He also set up a finance company which catered to the rising native middle class in addition to owning large swathes of real estate partly acquired by his marriage to an heiress from one of Colombo’s richest families.

Gamani Corea was his nephew being his aunt’s only son. However with the change of regime in 1956 Lalith K, Justin’s son, lost most of his fortune due to the take over of the family insurance company and other assets. He had to start from scratch and build up his own companies including a Bank – the Seylan Bank and a finance company-Golden Key – both of which became very successful. His diversified group named Ceylinco entered into tourism, gem and jewellery, health and many other fields which had not been exploited by Sinhala businessmen.

His great success and penchant for publicity brought challenges to the Kotelawala business house for the second time. Lalith’s publicly declared appetite for political leadership either as President or Minister of Finance in a UNP regime brought on him the wrath initially of Nivard Cabraal and later the Rajapaksas who were in no mood to brook such a rich and powerful rival who had impeccable UNP credentials.

I had no qualms about supporting him as Investment Minister especially when he wished to set up a five star hotel in the “golden mile” of hotels on Galle road. He had successfully negotiated with the Hyattt group to partner him in this enterprise. Since his businesses were cash rich at this stage he saw no difficulty in financing this mega venture. He invited me and a few others to inaugurate this venture by participating in the groundbreaking ceremony. The building was just intruding onto the Colombo skyline when calamity hit him.

When the real economy contracts and legitimate business returns decline, small time savers are badly affected and they tend to go to get rich schemes and risky financial institutions which give them a bigger return. Lalith’s Finance company “Golden Key” provided such a refuge with high interest payments and a trustworthy name (Kotelawala) to guarantee the safety of their investments. Another problematic factor was that many politicians of the MR government saw in Lalith’s company a safe haven for their ill gotten gains away from the prying eyes of the tax authorities.

It must be said that he too was complicit in that he would have pandered to those crooks happy in the knowledge that big money was flowing into his coffers which would help to sustain his ever increasing promises of interest payments which were way higher than what was offered by the regular banking system. It soon became a Ponzi scheme. No wonder then that the Governor of the Central Bank was apprehensive of these developments. His objections were summarily dismissed by Lalith leading to a verbal battle between him and Cabraal. That undid him in the end. MR preferred to stand by Cabraal.

Lalith’s bravado irked many powerful politicians who were afraid he would take to “the family business” of politics like his uncle Sir John. MR who first befriended him, abandoned him when the Central Bank warned him of a possible financial catastrophe. This became a reality when a senior politician who had amassed a large sum of ill gotten money and deposited it with “Golden Key” was assassinated by the LTTE. Soon after that tragedy his relatives pulled out their money sending the finance company into a liquidity crisis.

The manager of the company whom Lalith trusted had released the money without informing him. There was a run on the company as soon as news of a large scale withdrawal became public. On previous such occasions the Central Bank would intervene to prevent a collapse. But in this case they did not and Golden Key had to be liquidated leaving tens of thousands of small depositors penniless. It was a mega scandal and with his wife embroiled in a money laundering charge Lalith fell from grace.

He was remanded in Welikada prison with his health ruined and his reputation in tatters. Later I visited him several times in his home to find that he was a broken man. With his premature death a pioneer mega local investor was lost and the local investment scenario received a heavy blow.

Karu resigns

At about this time a dispute flared up between the President and Karu Jayasuriya. Numerous complaints were directed to MR that Karu as Minister of Public Administration was favouring UNP official, particularly Grama Sevakas, who were appointees of the UNP from the time of JRJ and Premadasa. If there was one thing MR was sensitive about it was the need to keep his backbenchers happy. On the other hand, Ranil succeeded in luring Karu back with the promise of making him the Deputy leader of the UNP.

Karu who was a great believer in Sai Baba and other assorted soothsayers, realized that he could not make much headway in the PA which was already full of ambitious and unscrupulous politicians. Karu’s departure led to a mini reshuffle and I was sent back to the Ministry of Public Administration while my friend, Anura Yapa, became the new Minister of Investment Promotion.

Back in my old Ministry I found that the northern war was intensifying with our armed forces regaining the initiative for the first time. This was largely due to the efforts of Gotabaya and Sarath Fonseka who at that time had the confidence of the President. MR used all his famous PR skills to ensure that he got the adulation of the public for the advances of the army. He visited the newly liberated areas and encouraged the soldiers for which he deserved the highest praise as none of his predecessors had visited the battle front.

Says Chandraprema, “The President visited Vakarai on February 3, 2007 soon after the area had been cleared. This ready willingness to visit the war zone despite the risk of attacks from infiltration teams was what gave the armed forces the feeling that this was a President to whom the war was a national priority and not just a regrettable necessity”. He posed for a photo op with the Special Forces that liberated Vakarai and visited a Kovil. The Hindu priest who garlanded him was shot dead a few days later by the LTTE showing that MR had bravely taken a mighty risk.

The rolling successes of the army meant that my Ministry had to bend its energies to maintain civil administrations in the North and East. It became challenging because the LTTE were forcing the inhabitants in the contested northern areas to follow them while retreating in the Vanni leaving “ghost towns” behind. The LTTE had even carried away furniture and roofing from homes in order to create a mobile “human shield” to save themselves from attacks by the armed forces. They also used civilians to dig large trenches along the way to impede the advance of heavy weapons and transports of the army moving into the LTTE held areas.

I was in touch with my Government Agents who had a difficult time often caught in the crossfire between the army and the LTTE. The I TTE brutalized the public servants. For instance the AGA of Tirukkovil in the east was murdered by the LTTE because he did not help the insurgents. But once the army secured strategic points like Kilinochchi and Vauniya the local administration was able to function effectively again. The Tamil parties raised issues in Parliament, probably on the instigation of the LTTE, and I had to answer them in the House after consulting my GAs and Defence Secretary Gotabaya Rajapaksa.

Gota was always courteous and keen to brief us about the latest developments in the theatre of battle. We had to keep in mind that the LTTE was keen to recruit public servants to their cause. When a joint committee was to be setup after the signing of the Indo-Lanka agreement, the LTTE insisted on appointing an AGA of ‘Trincomalee – Pathmanathan, who was a hall mate of mine at Peradeniya, as their nominee and Chairman of the committee. Since we refused to recognize a public servant as a nominee of the LTTE this project was abandoned despite the best efforts of the Indian High Commission.

Winning in the Vanni

After the clearing of the east and establishing the local administration there, the army launched a pincer attack on the extensive LTTE held territory in the Vanni. One army group extended the defence line from the west of Vavuniya towards Mannar bringing that area under government control. The army initially faced stiff resistance from LTTE fighters. The traditional army approach of moving in large formations on a broad front which was the “Sandhurst trained” army leaders strategy was not working since the LTTE could break through the thinly manned army lines.

Chandraprema describes well the change of tactics under SF and GR which brought success to the army; “The army had learnt the hard way during the ‘decade of darkness’ in the 1990s that moving in large formations presents an easy target for LTTE artillery. After assessing where they went wrong in the past operations, the army stopped operating in traditional formations like platoons, companies and battalions and split up instead into small groups, the eight-man team being the norm. After the monsoon ‘stand still’ the army resumed its advance along the hinterland of western Vanni. Another task force operated along the coastal belt and captured the strategic town of Silavaturai which had earlier been a major camp of the army to prevent smuggling and illicit immigration, being the closest to the Port of Colombo.”

However the next objective of capturing LTTE bases Adampan and Anandakulam in the “rice bowl” was an arduous undertaking. To break the impasse the army followed the tactic of opening up many fronts to break up the LTTE forces which earlier had the opportunity of deploying in strength on a few strategic points. After heavy fighting, Adampan was captured in May 2008. By the end of November 2008 the vital point of Pooneryn was captured and the threat to the Jaffna encampment from LTTE long range artillery was eliminated thereby releasing the troops in Jaffna fort for the Mullaitivu offensive.

On January 2, 2009 the symbolically crucial town of Kilinochchi was captured and the fighting moved to Muhamalai which was considered a “jinx” for the army which had in the past failed to go beyond it. This time around the army adopted a strategy of attrition wearing down the LTTE formations through RPG attacks and close range encounters. Another set of troops came down from Jaffna and breached the LTTEs second line of defence of Muhamalai. By the first week of January 2009 Muhamali was in army hands and troops could move down to Elephant Pass via Palai where the LTTEs resistance was overcome. The LTTE cadres then retreated towards the jungles of Mullaitivu where the final battles were destined to take place.

Diplomatic games

Once the LTTE together with their hostage Tamil civilians, were driven into an increasingly small quadrant in Mullaitivu, they launched a publicity and diplomatic campaign to stop hostilities and rescue the remaining leaders and their families including Prabhakaran and his wife and children. It was a multipronged effort which included mobilizing the UN, the diaspora and NGOs, the UK and USA and especially India. It was a formidable combination and it stands to the credit of MR and GR that they dlid not succumb to their threats as well as blandishments.

In many ways it was MR’s finest hour. Each of these interlocutors were fully engaged and it was made clear that no compromise was possible. Credit must be given also to the Foreign Minister Rohitha Bogollagama who resisted the advice of his officials and fully backed MR in his approach to the interlocutors. The biggest pressure came from India. Fortunately the Indian High Commissioner in Colombo Alok Prasad stood by the Sri Lankan government and the “Troika” of three representatives of each side which met regularly kept each other informed of the ground situation.

The Secretary-General of the UN sent his special envoy Satish Nambiar to broker a ceasefire. MR and GR stood firm against it and dismissed the possibility of sending a UN fact finding mission to Mullaitivu. The NGOs were represented by a high level delegation led by Bernard Kouchner of France and David Milliband of the UK. Fortunately MR was able to call their bluff by taking a tough stand that their advice was not warranted by the facts on the ground.

An interesting side line was MR’s decision not to dignify their visit. He moved to Chandrikawewa which was close to his ancestral home in Medamulana. In this he was influenced by his experiences with Gaddafi in Libya. When he visited Libya, Gaddafi, a Bedouin, had pitched camp in the desert and MR was received in that encampment. He emulated Gaddafi and the visiting firemen from Europe had to be driven, sweating profusely in their western clothes to the humid dry zone hotel veranda for their audience with MR.

It was not a lesson that they would easily forget. By a coincidence both these selfish do gooders were not able to achieve their ambitions of high office in their countries and faded ultimately from public view. All these interlocutors were under the impression that the civilians trapped in the quadrant were attacked by our army. Actually the reverse was the case. The army literally held their fire and when the civilians began to cross the lagoon they were welcomed and even fed on army rations which were meant for the soldiers.

It was the LTTE that tried to prevent the civilians from leaving them as their human shield was being eroded. Fortunately Indian officials who monitored the evacuation saw this and stood by us even though Tamilnadu which was facing an election, as expected, used the Sri Lanka situation as a popular rallying cry. To help in this dire situation we agreed to issue a statement that heavy artillery would not be used to fire on the shrinking LTTE quadrant. These were astute and professionally sound Foreign Ministry moves for which MR, GR and Bogollagama should be given the credit.

There is another “inside story” which attests to MR’s luck during this period. When the post of Sec. Gen. of the UN fell vacant with the retirement of Kofi Annan, Jayantha Dhanapala was a candidate to succeed him. He had the backing of the west because he had handled discussions on the non -proliferation of strategic weapons to their satisfaction. US President Bill Clinton supported him. “This pro west tilt alarmed the Non Aligned countries and India promoted Sashi Tharoor as a rival candidate. Jayantha’s candidature was dead in the water as MR had been persuaded by local businessmen to throw our country’s support behind Ban Ki Moon who eventually got the job. It was no secret that the South Koreans threw a lot of money around to get this job for their countryman since they had been poorly received in the UN system.

MRs decision turned out to be a lucky one as Ban Ki Moon adopted a soft line with our government. After he and MR issued a joint statement the UN did not bully the Sri Lankan government. All in all this episode was handled astutely and the war was concluded on our terms. Prabhakaran and nearly all of the top leadership were killed together with large numbers of their terrorist fighters. It was the only instance at that time in the whole world where terrorism was comprehensively defeated.

Speaking at a meeting to felicitate GR at that time I drew attention to the need to tell the world about the humane way in which the civilians who crossed the lagoon were treated. The Sunday Observer of May 27, 2012 reported the following: “Senior Minister of International Monetary Cooperation said Sri Lanka’s humanitarian mission of rescuing over 150,000 Tamil civilians from the clutches of the LTTE’ was the greatest humanitarian operation in modern times. He said, “our heroic forces crossed the lagoon at Pudumathalan and went through difficult terrain to cross the earth bund built by the LTTE. Then they facilitated the crossover of 150,000 civilians to the government controlled area. It was a heroic effort and one of t he greatest of humanitarian operations”.

He said that our case has not been properly presented to the global community. “We are only talking about what happened at the Nandikadal lagoon. Nobody talks about what happened at the lagoon in Pudumathalan”.

(This book is available at the Vijitha Yapa Bookshop)

(Excerpted from vol. 3 of the Sarath Amunugama autobiography)

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Features

Power crept into the Sangha and is now tearing it apart

Published

11 hours ago

2026/06/5

Thilina Walpola

A file photo of Buddhist monks engaged in a protest

For more than a century, Sri Lankan society has lived with a quiet contradiction at the heart of its religious life. On the one hand, the Buddhist monk is revered as the embodiment of moral discipline, selfrestraint, and renunciation. On the other, the modern monk has become a public figure, political actor, administrator, media personality, and in some cases power broker whose influence extends far beyond the temple. This contradiction has been tolerated, even celebrated, for decades. But recent events, most notably a widely publicised case involving a senior monk accused of grave moral misconduct, have forced the country to confront a painful truth: the institutional conditions that make such scandals possible are not new. They are the predictable outcome of a long historical process that H. L. Seneviratne described with remarkable clarity in The Work of Kings. The moral deterioration visible today is not an aberration. It is the culmination of a centurylong transformation in the identity, function, and authority of the Sangha.

To understand how we arrived at this moment, it is necessary to revisit the argument Seneviratne made nearly three decades ago. His thesis was simple but profound: the modern Sri Lankan monkhood has taken on the ‘work of kings.’ By this he meant that monks, instead of confining themselves to the renunciant life prescribed by the Vinaya, have assumed the secular responsibilities once associated with precolonial kingship, such as protecting the religion, organising society, guiding the nation, and enforcing moral order. This shift, he argued, was not a natural evolution of Buddhist tradition but a modern invention shaped by colonialism, nationalism, and the anxieties of a society struggling to redefine itself in the face of foreign domination. The monk became a symbol of national identity, a guardian of cultural authenticity, and a leader in the struggle for political autonomy. In the process, the boundaries that once separated the monastic from the worldly began to dissolve.

Transformation

The consequences of this transformation were not immediately visible. For decades, the activist monk was celebrated as a patriot, a reformer, and a moral guide. His involvement in education, social welfare, and nationalist mobilisation was seen as a necessary response to colonial pressures and missionary competition. But beneath the surface, the foundations of monastic discipline were slowly eroding. The Vinaya, which had served for centuries as a rigorous framework for regulating monastic life, was increasingly overshadowed by the demands of public engagement. The communal structures that once ensured accountability, senior supervision, collective confession, and the daily rhythms of monastic routine, were weakened by the pressures of modernity. Monks who travelled constantly, managed institutions, or lived independently in urban temples found themselves outside the traditional systems of oversight that had long protected the integrity of the Sangha.

Scandal

It is within this historical context that the recent scandal must be understood. The case shocked the nation not only because of the severity of the allegations but because it shattered the public’s assumption that the monkhood remains a bastion of moral purity. Yet the shock itself reveals a collective denial. For years, Sri Lankan society has been aware, sometimes quietly, sometimes openly—of the growing gap between the ideal of the monk and the realities of modern monastic life. Stories of misconduct, financial irregularities, political manipulation, and abuse of authority have circulated with increasing frequency. But each incident has been treated as an isolated failure, a personal weakness, or an unfortunate exception. What has been missing is recognition that these incidents are symptoms of a deeper structural problem.

Seneviratne’s analysis helps illuminate this problem. When monks take on the work of kings, they inevitably enter domains of power that expose them to temptations the Vinaya was designed to avoid. Handling money, managing institutions, cultivating political patrons, and exercising authority over laypeople create opportunities for ego, ambition, and moral compromise. The monk who becomes a public figure is no longer shielded by the anonymity and humility of the renunciant life. Instead, he becomes a celebrity, a leader, and in some cases an object of uncritical devotion. This elevation brings with it a dangerous form of immunity. Laypeople who revere a monk for his public achievements may hesitate to question his behaviour. Politicians who rely on monastic support may protect him from scrutiny. The media, which often treats monks as moral authorities, may be reluctant to investigate allegations that challenge the sanctity of the robe.

The recent scandal illustrates how these dynamics can converge. The monk at the centre of the case was not an obscure figure. He was a respected preacher, charismatic leader, and head of a prominent institution. His public image was built on years of service, teaching, and community engagement. Yet it was precisely this public stature that allowed him to operate without meaningful oversight. The institutional structures around him, administrators, lay supporters, and junior monks, were either unwilling or unable to challenge his authority. The very qualities that made him a respected figure in the eyes of the public also made him untouchable within his own institution. When allegations finally emerged, they revealed not only personal wrongdoing but a systemic failure of accountability.

Failure that is not unique

This failure is not unique to one temple or one monk. It reflects a broader pattern within the modern Sangha. As monastic institutions have grown in size, wealth, and influence, their internal governance has struggled to keep pace. Many temples operate as semiautonomous entities controlled by a single monk or a small group of monks. Financial transparency is limited, administrative oversight is weak, and the mechanisms for addressing misconduct are often informal or ineffective. The traditional structures of monastic discipline, such as the Sangharama procedures for adjudicating offences, are rarely used in modern contexts, partly because they require collective participation and partly because they are illsuited to the complexities of contemporary institutional life. In practice, this means that monks who wield significant authority can act with little fear of internal sanction.

The politicisation of the Sangha has further complicated matters. Since the midtwentieth century, monks have played an increasingly prominent role in electoral politics, nationalist movements, and public policy debates. This involvement has given them access to political networks that can be mobilised to protect their interests. It has also created a culture in which monks are valued not for their adherence to the Vinaya but for their ability to influence public opinion, mobilise voters, or lend moral legitimacy to political causes. In such an environment, the monk who is politically useful may be shielded from criticism, while the monk who adheres strictly to the renunciant ideal may find himself marginalised or ignored.

The result is a profound distortion of monastic identity. The monk who once sought liberation from worldly attachments is now encouraged to cultivate influence, authority, and public recognition. The monk who once lived under the strict supervision of senior elders now operates in a world where independence is celebrated and oversight is minimal. The monk who once relied on laypeople for basic sustenance now controls vast resources, manages institutions, and commands the loyalty of thousands of followers. This inversion of traditional roles has created a fertile ground for moral deterioration.

Yet it would be a mistake to interpret this deterioration as evidence that the Sangha as a whole is corrupt. Many monks continue to live lives of remarkable discipline, humility, and spiritual dedication. In remote forest monasteries, small village temples, and meditation centres across the country, monks quietly uphold the ancient ideals of the renunciant life. They are not the ones who appear on television, lead political rallies, or manage large institutions. Their work is invisible, their influence subtle, and their commitment unwavering. The crisis facing the Sangha today is not a crisis of individual morality but a crisis of institutional identity. It is the product of a centurylong transformation that has blurred the boundaries between the monastic and the secular, the spiritual and the political, the renunciant and the worldly.

If Sri Lanka is to address this crisis, it must begin by acknowledging the structural nature of the problem. The temptation to treat each scandal as an isolated incident must be resisted. Instead, the country must confront the uncomfortable reality that the modern configuration of monastic life is fundamentally at odds with the principles of the Vinaya. The Sangha cannot simultaneously function as a political force, a social service provider, a media institution, and a spiritual community without compromising its integrity. The more monks are drawn into the world, the more vulnerable they become to the moral dangers that the Buddha warned against.

Reform, therefore, must focus not only on punishing individual offenders but on rethinking the institutional structures that enable misconduct. This includes strengthening internal governance, enhancing financial transparency, restoring the authority of senior elders, and reestablishing the communal practices that once ensured accountability. It also requires a broader cultural shift in how laypeople relate to monks. Blind devotion must give way to informed respect. Reverence must be balanced with responsibility. The robe must be honoured, but it must not be used as a shield against scrutiny.

Seneviratne’s work offers a valuable starting point for this rethinking. His analysis reminds us that the crisis facing the Sangha is not the result of moral decline alone but of historical forces that reshaped the identity of the monkhood. By tracing the evolution of the activist monk, he shows how the Sangha became entangled in the political and social structures of the modern nationstate. This entanglement has brought both benefits and dangers. It has allowed monks to play important roles in education, social welfare, and national development. But it has also exposed them to the corrupting influences of power, wealth, and public acclaim.

The challenge now is to disentangle the Sangha from these influences without undermining its ability to serve society. This will not be easy. The activist monk has become deeply embedded in the cultural and political fabric of the country. Many laypeople expect monks to be leaders, reformers, and guardians of national identity. Politicians rely on monastic support to legitimise their agendas. Media institutions depend on monks for content, commentary, and moral authority. Reversing this trend will require a collective effort from monks, laypeople, and political leaders alike.

Ultimately, the future of the Sangha depends on its ability to reclaim the renunciant ideal that lies at the heart of Buddhist monasticism. This does not mean withdrawing from society entirely, but it does mean reestablishing the boundaries that protect the monk from the dangers of worldly involvement. It means recognising that the true strength of the Sangha lies not in its political influence or institutional power but in its moral authority, its spiritual discipline, and its commitment to the path of liberation. The recent scandal, painful as it is, may serve as a catalyst for this reevaluation. It has exposed the vulnerabilities of the modern monastic system and forced the country to confront the consequences of a centurylong transformation.

To understand how the Vihara Devalegam Act relates to the perceived moral deformation of the clergy, it is necessary to examine how property management, state law, and monastic discipline intersect in the modern era. Historically stemming from the Buddhist Temporalities Ordinance No. 19 of 1931, this act serves as the primary legal framework governing the ‘temporalities’—meaning the secular wealth, extensive landholdings, and material donations belonging to Buddhist temples and shrines. While ancient kings granted these vast tracts of land to support the monkhood’s spiritual pursuits, the modern codification of this law has inadvertently fostered a system where property rights frequently supersede spiritual accountability.

The core of the crisis lies in the commercialisation of the monastic order that this legal framework enables. By treating temple lands as economic assets and vesting absolute administrative power in individual chief monks or lay trustees, the act has contributed to the rise of what critics term a monastic middle class. Access to vast, unregulated financial resources, rent from lands, and corporate donations has fundamentally shifted the focus of certain segments of the clergy away from the traditional path of worldly renunciation and spiritual guidance. Instead, it has driven a preoccupation with business investments, the accumulation of private capital, and luxury lifestyles, which deeply alienates a public looking to the Sangha for moral leadership.

The institutional flaws embedded in the Vihara Devalegam Act find a stark, real-world manifestation in the recent criminal case involving Venerable Pallegama Hemarathana Thero. As the chief priest of Anuradhapura and the custodian of the Atamasthana—the eight highly venerated Buddhist shrines, including the sacred Jaya Sri Maha Bodhi—Hemarathana Thero occupied one of the most powerful and wealthy positions within the Sri Lankan Sangha. His arrest on charges of sexual abuse of a minor girl perfectly illustrates how the structural defects of the Act facilitate not only moral decay but also the systemic obstruction of justice.

The core of this intersection lies in the vast, unaccountable wealth generated by the temporalities of the Anuradhapura shrines. Under the Vihara Devalegam Act, the chief custodian exercises immense, virtually unchecked control over temple revenues, state-backed land management, and millions of rupees in daily donations from millions of global pilgrims. It is precisely this immense financial liquidity that enabled the alleged deployment of vast sums of money to the victim’s family.

Furthermore, the situation underscores the profound policy failures cited regarding the helplessness of the monastic hierarchy and state enforcement. When child protection authorities initially attempted to act, the National Child Protection Authority noted severe delays and institutional resistance, stating they practically had to force the police to execute the arrest. The monk’s immediate retreat to a private hospital in Colombo upon the advancement of the criminal probe, followed by his release on bail, mirrors the exact loop described where wealthy monastics deploy high-priced legal defence teams funded directly or indirectly by their institutional positions. Because the Vihara Devalegam Act does not provide a mechanism for the immediate, unconditional forfeiture of temporal administrative rights upon a criminal indictment, the accused retains his structural power throughout the legal process. The Pallegama Thero scandal stands as definitive proof that without a fundamental overhaul of how temple wealth is legally governed and disciplined, the material benefits guaranteed by ancient temporalities will continue to shield the worst elements of moral deformation from the rule of law.

If Sri Lanka can learn from this moment and if it can recognise the structural roots of the crisis and commit to meaningful reform, then the Sangha may yet emerge stronger, more disciplined, and more faithful to its ancient ideals. But if the country continues to treat each scandal as an isolated failure and if it continues to ignore the deeper institutional problems that Seneviratne identified, then the moral deterioration we see today will only deepen. The work of kings, when performed by monks, carries a heavy price. It is time to decide whether that price is worth paying.

by Professor Amarasiri de Silva

Features

Kondachchi wind farm and battery storage project to boost energy security, says Power Ministry Secretary

Published

11 hours ago

2026/06/5

Thilina Walpola

The Power and Energy Ministry’s drive towards energy security and renewable energy expansion received a major boost yesterday with the signing of a tripartite cooperation agreement for the development of the 150 MW Kondachchi Wind Power Project and an integrated Battery Energy Storage System (BESS) in Mannar.

The agreement was signed at the Ministry of Power auditorium under the patronage of Power Minister Anura Karunatilaka and Deputy Power Minister Arkam Ilyas.

Speaking at the event, Ministry Secretary G. M. R. D. Aponsu described the project as a transformative investment that would strengthen the country’s electricity network while supporting Sri Lanka’s transition towards cleaner energy sources.

“The Kondachchi Wind Power Project represents a significant milestone in Sri Lanka’s renewable energy journey. By combining large-scale wind generation with advanced battery energy storage technology, we are creating a more resilient and reliable power system capable of meeting future energy demands while reducing dependence on imported fossil fuels,” Aponsu said.

The project will be developed at Silavathurai in the Kondachchi area of Mannar on lands owned by the Sri Lanka Cashew Corporation. It is expected to utilise some 31 modern wind turbines with a total installed capacity of at least 150 MW.

Aponsu said the inclusion of an integrated battery storage facility would help address the variability associated with wind power generation and ensure stable electricity supply to the national grid.

“The battery energy storage component is a key feature of this project. It will enable the efficient integration of renewable energy into the grid and enhance overall system stability, which is essential as Sri Lanka increases the share of renewables in its energy mix,” he said.

According to the Ministry, the wind farm is expected to generate nearly 525 gigawatt-hours of electricity annually, significantly reducing the country’s expenditure on imported fuel and strengthening national energy security.

The project is also expected to contribute to Sri Lanka’s climate commitments by reducing carbon dioxide emissions by an estimated 372,750 tonnes annually.

“This investment delivers both economic and environmental benefits. It will reduce greenhouse gas emissions, support sustainable development objectives and help Sri Lanka move closer to achieving its renewable energy and climate targets,” Aponsu noted.

The project will be implemented under a Public-Private Partnership (PPP) arrangement using the Build, Own and Operate (BOO) model. The Asian Development Bank is providing technical and financial advisory support through its Transaction Advisory Services programme.

The signing ceremony was attended by Pradeep Perera, Chairman of the National System Operator (Pvt) Ltd., and Takeyo Koike, Head of Market Development and Public-Private Partnership Division of the ADB, among other distinguished guests.

The Ministry said comprehensive Environmental Impact Assessments and avifaunal studies have been undertaken to ensure minimal impacts on bird populations, nearby communities and agricultural lands. A dedicated 220-kilovolt transmission system will also be constructed to connect the project to the national grid.

“The Kondachchi Wind Farm is a strategic national project that will help secure Sri Lanka’s energy future while accelerating the country’s transition towards sustainable and affordable electricity generation,” Aponsu said.

Energy sector experts view the project as one of the most important renewable energy initiatives currently being pursued in Sri Lanka, combining utility-scale wind generation with modern energy storage technology to enhance grid reliability and long-term energy sustainability.

By Ifham Nizam

Features

Saudi Arabia sets new benchmark in Hajj management as 1.7 million pilgrims complete sacred journey

Published

11 hours ago

2026/06/5

Thilina Walpola

Ambassador Al-Kahtani

Interview with Khalid Hamoud Al-Kahtani, Ambassador of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to Sri Lanka

Saudi Arabia has once again demonstrated its unparalleled capacity to manage one of the world’s largest annual religious gatherings, with this year’s Hajj pilgrimage concluding successfully despite extreme temperatures and the immense logistical challenge of accommodating more than 1.7 million pilgrims from around the world.

In an exclusive interview with The Island, Khalid Hamoud Al-Kahtani, Ambassador of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to Sri Lanka, described the 2026 Hajj season as a resounding success, crediting the achievement to the visionary leadership of the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques, His Royal Highness the Crown Prince and Prime Minister, and the coordinated efforts of multiple government agencies working around the clock to serve pilgrims.

The Ambassador noted that nearly 3,500 Sri Lankan pilgrims participated in this year’s Hajj under the quota allocated to Sri Lanka, benefiting from enhanced healthcare services, sophisticated crowd-management systems, expanded shaded areas and cutting-edge digital solutions introduced by the Kingdom.

With Saudi Arabia continuing to invest heavily in infrastructure, technology and pilgrim services under Vision 2030, Ambassador Al-Kahtani said the Kingdom remains committed to ensuring that pilgrims from around the world perform their religious duties in safety, comfort and tranquility.

The Saudi envoy also highlighted the growing partnership between Saudi Arabia and Sri Lanka, emphasising expanding cooperation not only in Hajj affairs but also in trade, investment, education, culture and institutional exchanges.

Following are excerpts of the interview:

Q: How do you assess this year’s Hajj season?

Ambassador Al-Kahtani: This year’s Hajj season was a resounding success, thanks to the Almighty Allah and the integrated efforts of the government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, led by the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques and His Royal Highness the Crown Prince and Prime Minister. This success was reflected in the efficiency of crowd management, the quality of services provided to the Hajj pilgrims and the effective coordination among the various relevant authorities, which enabled pilgrims to perform their rituals in an atmosphere of security, tranquility and ease.

Q: How many Sri Lankan pilgrims performed Hajj this year?

Ambassador Al-Kahtani: The number of Hajj pilgrims from the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka reached approximately 3,500, within the quota allocated to Sri Lanka for this season.

Q: Are there any discussions regarding increasing Sri Lanka’s quota in the future?

Ambassador Al-Kahtani:Hajj quotas are determined according to approved regulatory mechanisms that take into account a range of considerations. The relevant authorities in the Kingdom continue to study various aspects related to developing Hajj services and accommodating the allocated numbers for all countries, in coordination with the concerned parties.

Q: What were the most prominent special arrangements implemented this year?

Ambassador Al-Kahtani: The operational plans for this season focused on enhancing the safety and comfort of the Hajj pilgrims, especially given the climatic conditions and high temperatures. Measures included expanding shaded areas, increasing water distribution points and enhancing health and ambulance services, in addition to developing the transportation system and traffic management within the holy sites.

Q: What are the most prominent digital systems and smart services that were provided?

Ambassador Al-Kahtani:The Kingdom continues to implement its digital transformation objectives for the Hajj and Umrah system. The scope of electronic services offered through the Nusuk platform and application has been expanded, along with the development of digital systems for issuing permits, managing crowds, guidance and health services. This contributes to increasing the efficiency of services and improving the pilgrim’s experience at all stages of their journey.

Q: How were the challenges of overcrowding and heat addressed?

Ambassador Al-Kahtani: The relevant authorities adopted an integrated crowd-management system based on modern technologies and real-time data analysis. This was coupled with intensified health-awareness campaigns, expanded organised movement routes and increased deployment of field, medical and emergency teams. These measures support the safety of the Hajj pilgrims and reduce the risks associated with crowd density and climatic conditions.

Q: Were there special services for the elderly and sick?

Ambassador Al-Kahtani: Yes. The Kingdom paid special attention to the elderly and people with special health needs by providing specialized medical services, assistive transportation and facilities equipped to meet their needs, in addition to field teams working to provide humanitarian support and necessary healthcare throughout the Hajj period.

Q: How successful was the Kingdom in combating irregular Hajj permits?

Ambassador Al-Kahtani: The relevant authorities in the Kingdom continued to rigorously implement the regulations and instructions governing Hajj, utilising modern technologies and advanced monitoring procedures to reduce violations related to irregular Hajj. These efforts contributed to enhancing the safety of pilgrims, improving crowd-management efficiency and maintaining the smooth flow of movement within the holy sites.

Q: How would you describe Saudi-Sri Lankan cooperation in organising Hajj?

Ambassador Al-Kahtani: Cooperation between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Republic of Sri Lanka is characterised by continuous and constructive coordination in all matters related to Hajj. The relevant authorities in both countries work jointly to ensure the provision of the best services for Sri Lankan pilgrims and enable them to perform their rituals with ease and peace of mind.

Q: How many Hajj pilgrims were there globally, and what were the main challenges?

Ambassador Al-Kahtani: According to official statistics, the number of Hajj pilgrims this year reached 1,707,301 from various countries around the world. The main challenges included managing large crowds, ensuring public safety and providing health, transportation and accommodation services within a specific geographical and temporal scope. These challenges were addressed through advanced and integrated operational plans, which contributed to the smooth and successful completion of the Hajj season.

Q: Are there any future expansion projects?

Ambassador Al-Kahtani: The Kingdom continues to implement strategic development projects within the framework of Vision 2030, including developing the infrastructure in Makkah and the Holy Sites, and enhancing transportation networks and smart services. This contributes to raising the quality of services provided to pilgrims and Umrah performers and improving their long-term experience.

Q: How are Saudi-Sri Lankan relations strengthened outside the context of Hajj?

Ambassador Al-Kahtani: Relations between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Republic of Sri Lanka are witnessing continuous development in many areas, including political, economic, trade, cultural and educational cooperation, in addition to developing exchanges between institutions and the private sector. This reflects the two countries’ keenness to strengthen the bilateral partnership and achieve common interests.

Q: What message would you like to convey to Sri Lankan Muslims?

Ambassador Al-Kahtani: We extend our sincere congratulations to the Hajj pilgrims who have completed their Hajj rituals, and we ask Almighty Allah to accept their pilgrimage. We also assure Muslims in Sri Lanka that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia places serving the Two Holy Mosques and the guests of Almighty Allah at the forefront of its priorities and continues to develop the Hajj and Umrah system to achieve the highest standards of quality and safety.

By Ifham Nizam