Features
Promoting Reconciliation and Accountability in Sri Lanka

By Neville Ladduwahetty
From 2012, Reconciliation and Accountability have been the twin pillars of the series of Resolutions that emerged from the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva. Perhaps, the thinking of those who developed the formula of linking Reconciliation with Accountability was guided by the notion that an effective accountability process that holds some members of the security forces and the associated leaders accountable and punished would somehow ease the humiliation of defeat, and make the painful processes of healing and eventual reconciliation more tolerable.
In general, this notion presumes that retributive justice would promote reconciliation. The presumption of such an outcome is not an assured given because the possibility exists for the positions of the parties hoping to reconcile to harden to a point of defeating the intended objective of reconciliation if retributive processes and their outcomes are perceived as being vindictive. Thus, the contemplated accountability exercise has the potential to be counterproductive depending on the context in which it is conducted.
SRI LANKAN EXPERIENCE
In the case of Sri Lanka, this theory could not be put to the test because the retributive process could not even get started. The reason for this being that those who devised the process overextended themselves and wanted the accountability process to be so effective that they conceived only a judicial mechanism that involved foreign judges, prosecutor etc. would achieve the intended objectives. The fact that such an arrangement would involve amending existing Laws and provisions in the Constitution, to the extent of requiring a two-third approval by Parliament and approval by the People at a referendum, escaped their attention.
This was brought to the attention of the Human Rights Council in March 2019 by the then Foreign Minister Tilak Marapana.
“The Government of Sri Lanka at the highest political levels, has both publicly and in discussions with the present and former High Commissioner for Human Rights and other interlocutors, explained the constitutional and legal challenges that preclude it from including non-citizens in its judicial processes. It has been explained that if non-citizen judges are to be appointed in such a process, it will not be possible without an amendment to the Constitution by 2/3 of members of the Parliament voting in favour and also the approval of the people at a referendum”.
This gave the present Government legitimate grounds to withdraw from the co-sponsorship of UNHRC Resolution 30/1 in terms of Article 46 of the Vienna Convention 1969, which in essence states that a State may invalidate its consent to a Treaty if it violates a rule of its internal law of fundamental importance such as a Constitution of a sovereign State.
CURRENT SITUATION
Currently, the accountability process is at a stand-still because of the failure of the approach adopted. However, what exists is a collective body of material available in Reports prepared externally by the Panel of Experts appointed by the UN Secretary General and by the Office of the Human Rights Commission in Geneva together with internal Reports of Commissions of Inquiry appointed by the Government of Sri Lanka such as the Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission (LLRC), and the Paranagama Commission that included International Experts.
This body of material has been reviewed from two distinct perspectives. Since the mandate to the LLRC was primarily to promote national unity and reconciliation among communities, its Report gives emphasis to Human Rights as reflected in paragraphs 5.2 and 5.3 cited below. On the other hand, the other Reports reflect a perspective that is based on International Humanitarian Law (IHL) as the applicable Law since the conflict had reached the threshold of a non-International Armed Conflict. Consequently, the material reviewed from a Human Rights perspective is bound to be different to a review based on IHL. Of the several reasons for this difference the most significant is that the LLRC viewed the conflict as between a State (GoSL) and a non-state actor (LTTE), thereby holding the State to a higher level of accountability than the LTTE, while under the perspective of IHL, responsibilities are shared equally as parties to an Armed Conflict. This makes the conclusions drawn from the respective perspectives different.
Paragraph 5.2 states: “Being a party to the following seven core international human rights instruments, Sri Lanka has given obligations under these Conventions through legislative measures, including the Constitution as well as executive and administrative measures”
Paragraph 5.3 states: “Sri Lanka therefore has constitutional and international obligations for the effective national implementation of these core conventions both during times of peace and war, and in the latter situation, together with applicable International Humanitarian Law…”.
It is therefore evident from the foregoing that the LLRC emphasis is on Human Rights with “applicable International Humanitarian Law’ during times of war. Had the LLRC recognized that it was a non-International Armed Conflict from the day the Cease Fire Agreement was signed as two parties recognized nationally and internationally to the conflict, the accepted applicable Law should have been International Humanitarian Law coupled with seriously derogated Human Rights during an Armed Conflict. This interpretation is reflected in the Sri Lankan Constitution and in the relevant Conventions during an Emergency as in the case of an Armed Conflict. The failure of the LLRC to recognize that it was a non-International Armed Conflict is the significant reason for its perspective to be different to the other Reports cited above.
LLRC’s INTERPRETATION of ACCOUNTABILITY
The material presented below are extracts from Chapter 9 of the LLRC Report titled “Summary of Principal Observations and Recommendations”. Since the two primary charges against the Government and the Security Forces are the excessive use of force and the inadequacies in the delivery of humanitarian aid, the two related sub-section from the LLRC Report presented below are: (1) “Measures to safeguard civilians and avoid civilian casualties” and (2) “Supply of humanitarian relief, including food and medicine to civilians in conflict zone”.
“Measures to safeguard…and No-Fire Zones”:
Paragraph 9.4: “In evaluating the Sri Lankan experience in the context of allegations of violations of IHL, the Commission is satisfied that the military strategy that was adopted to secure the LTTE held areas was one that was carefully conceived, in which the protection of the civilian population was given the highest priority…”
9.7 Having reached the above conclusion, it is also incumbent on the Commission to consider the question, while there is no deliberate targeting of civilians by the Security Forces, whether the action of the Security Forces of returning fire into the NFZs was excessive in the context of the Principle of Proportionality…”
COMMENT: The two fundamental principles of International Humanitarian Law are: Distinction and Proportionality. Without Distinction as to who is a combatant and who is a civilian to question whether the military response was proportionate or excessive cannot be ascertained. Since the LLRC Report admits that the LTTE shed their uniforms during the final states of the conflict, the question of distinguishing a civilian from a combatant is not possible, which means the principle of Proportionality cannot be applied. Furthermore, the comment that the Security Forces were “RETURNING fire to the NFZs” makes clear that it was the LTTE in the NFZs that initiated the firing. Despite the obvious presence of LTTE combatants, the LLRC Report makes no reference to them and refers to ALL as civilians.
Therefore, to categorize ALL in the NFZs as civilians and to question whether the return of fire was excessive in the context of the Principle of Proportionality that has no applicability in the particular circumstances, is seriously flawed.
In regard to “Hospitals/Makeshift Hospitals paragraph 9.12 (b) of the LLRC report states: “None of the persons making representations was able to state with certainty that they were in a position to definitely confirm that the shells which fell on the hospitals, originated exclusively from the side of the Sri Lankan Army or from the LTTE…Another ex-LTTE cadre…stated that the Puthumatthalan hospital was in fact accidentally shelled by the LTTE for which they had subsequently apologized”.
Supply of Humanitarian Relief
Paragraph 9.15: “The Commission notes that the supply of food to the civilians held by the LTTE up to early 2009 was at reasonably adequate levels…However, these adequacy levels appear to have declined during the months of February, March, April and the first half of May 2009…”
Paragraph 9.16: “It must be acknowledged that the maximum quantities of food supplies, that were possible…due to the collective efforts of the Government of Sri Lanka, in particular the GAs and the Security Forces as well as international agencies such as the ICRC and WFP, and other volunteers who had provided selfless service on the spot in the No Fire Zone”.
The impression conveyed in the above comments is that the Government of Sri Lanka was responsible for and obligated to supply humanitarian relief to All in the No Fire Zone. Since it was not possible to separate combatants from civilians, this meant supplying humanitarian aid including medical supplies to the LTTE and engaging with them in an Armed Conflict, simultaneously. Such a flawed expectation is a result of the confused perspective adopted by the Commission as to the role of the Government. How could the Government be a party to the conflict and be a provider of humanitarian aid both at the same time?
COMMENT: Had the LLRC accepted IHL as the applicable Law, they would not have held the Government of Sri Lanka accountable for the “decline” in the supply of relief. The reason for including the Government in the list of those responsible for the supply of humanitarian relief is because their understanding of the Government’s responsibilities was misplaced. The Commission fails to acknowledge that the Government as a party to the Armed Conflict, should not be expected to supply aid of any kind to the LTTE. Instead, what the Government was expected to do was ONLY to facilitate free passage of humanitarian aid to those affected by the Armed Conflict as per ICRC Rules 55 and 56 (Vol. 87, Number 857 March 2005).
Rule 55: “The parties to the conflict must allow and facilitate rapid and unimpeded passage of humanitarian relief for civilians in need, which is impartial in character and conducted without any adverse, distinction, subject to their right of control”
Rule 56: “The parties to the conflict must ensure the freedom of movement of authorized humanitarian relief personnel essential to the exercise of their functions. Only in the case of imperative necessity may their movements be temporarily restricted”.
PROPOSED STRATEGY
There are two basic approaches that Sri Lanka could take in presenting its case before the forthcoming sessions in Geneva. One approach is to plead its case by presenting all the available evidence from sources such as that of Lord Naseby, UN Reports, opinions of experts in the Paranagama Commission Report and any other sources challenging the alleged claims in the UNHRC Resolution 30/1. The other is to challenge the alleged violations on the basis of International Humanitarian Law, backed up with support material referred to above. Of these two approaches there is a greater likelihood of the latter approach being more acceptable because it has a more credible basis than the former.
CONCLUSION
When Sri Lanka placed on record at the March 2019 UNHRC sessions that it was withdrawing from the co-sponsorship of UNHRC Resolution 30/1, it undertook, among other undertakings, to appoint a Commission of Inquiry “to review the reports of previous Sri Lankan COIs which investigated alleged violations of Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law, to assess the status of implementation of their recommendations and to propose deliverable measures to implement them in keeping with the new Government’s policy”.
The plea to anyone engaged in fulfilling the commitment stated above is to declare at the very outset that its review of reports of previous COIs is based on the fact that the conflict in Sri Lanka that ended in May 2009 was a non-International Armed Conflict, as recognized by international law. Consequently, the review process should bear in mind that the applicable Law is International Humanitarian Law together with derogated Human Rights Laws as reflected in International Covenants and in Sri Lanka’s Constitution during an Emergency. Therefore, the alleged violations presented in these Reports should be assessed in the context of these Laws, backed up with support material such from UN Reports, evidence presented by Lord Naseby, opinions of experts in the Paranagama Commission Report, and by the ICRC, etc.. Since the Additional Protocol II of 1977 is accepted as part of Customary Law and the fact that it embodies all recognized provisions of non-International Armed Conflict, the provisions of the Protocol should guide the review process of alleged violations committed collectively or individually.
The review process should also identify which recommendations in the Commission of Inquiry Reports relating to Reconciliation are deliverable in keeping with Government policy. In this regard one measure that would make a significant difference to Reconciliation is to demand tangible outcomes from the Office of Missing Persons, bearing in mind that their work could be constrained by the non-cooperation of Member States if they fail to disclose the identities of persons missing from Sri Lanka and who are now living in their countries under altered identities.
The forthcoming sessions in Geneva would be a defining moment for Sri Lanka in its relations with the UNHRC. Therefore, the Government should conclude its review process well in time, in order to enable it to canvas support among the members of the UN Human Rights Council on the basis of the legitimacy of the approach taken and bring closure to Accountability. At the same time the UN Human Rights Council should permit Sri Lanka the time and space to address Reconciliation through processes that each country has to fashion because its uniqueness is special to every country, and no country or International Agency has a universal formula to bring about Reconciliation among communities in a country.
Neville Ladduwahetty
November 15, 2020.
Features
Celebrating 25 Years of Excellence: The Silver Jubilee of SLIIT – PART I

SLIIT is a degree-awarding higher education institute authorized and approved by the University Grants Commission (UGC) and Ministry of Higher Education under the University Act of the Government of Sri Lanka. SLIIT is also the first Sri Lankan institute accredited by the Institution of Engineering & Technology, UK. Further, SLIIT is also a member of the Association of Commonwealth Universities (ACU) and the International Association of Universities (IAU).
Founded in 1999, with its main campus in Malabe and multiple centers across the country—including Metro Campus (Colombo), Matara, Kurunegala, Kandy (Pallekele), and Jaffna (Northern Uni)—SLIIT provides state-of-the-art facilities for students, now celebrating 25 years of excellence in 2025.
SLIIT continues to expand its academic, research, and industry connections, ensuring its graduates are well-prepared for global challenges while maintaining high standards of education and innovation.
Since its establishment in 1999, the Sri Lanka Institute of Information Technology (SLIIT) has played a transformative role in shaping the nation’s technological and educational landscape. Operating as a company limited by guarantee, SLIIT reinvests all surpluses into academic and institutional development, maintaining independence from government ownership and funding since its inception, except for an initial BOI grant and temporary financial support from the Mahapola Trust Fund, which was fully repaid by 2015.
Officially delisted from any government ministry in 2017, SLIIT stands as a fully self-sustaining, non-state higher education institution. Over the years, it has grown from a pioneering IT-focused institute into a multidisciplinary university, offering programs in engineering, business, architecture, and humanities. With a strong emphasis on research, industry collaboration, and global academic partnerships, SLIIT continues to produce highly skilled graduates, reinforcing its reputation as a center of academic excellence and innovation.
Academic Excellence & Global Recognition
* Ranked Sri Lanka’s No. 1 non-state university and 3rd overall in the Times Higher Education World University Rankings 2025.
* Ranked No. 1 in Sri Lanka in the AD Scientific Index World Young University Ranking 2025.
* Secured 5th place in the 2024 Scimago Institutional Ranking (first quartile).
* Maintains an active research culture through grants, research integration into curricula, and a dedicated research center.
Programs, Faculty & Employability
* 25,000+ students, 96% employment rate, and an alumni base of over 40,000 graduates.
* Offers undergraduate, postgraduate, and PhD programs in IT, Engineering, Business, Law, Psychology, Architecture, Quantity Surveying, Nursing, Hospitality & Tourism, Education, and more. Plans to introduce a Medicine program.
* 400+ eminent academics, many with PhDs and international research backgrounds, with a combined 5,000+ years of experience.
Industry & Global Partnerships
* 50+ industry partners, providing internships and job placements.
* Collaborations with leading global universities such as Curtin, Liverpool John Moores, University of Edinburgh, University of Western Australia, and University of Queensland.
Achieving Global Recognition: SLIIT’s World University Ranking
A defining achievement in SLIIT’s journey has been its recognition on the global stage. Today, SLIIT proudly stands as the 3rd highest-ranked university in Sri Lanka among both state and non-state institutions in world university rankings in the Times Higher Education World University Rankings 2025. Notably, it holds the prestigious position of being the highest-ranked non-state university in the country. This recognition is a testament to SLIIT’s unwavering dedication to academic excellence, research contributions, and strong industry partnerships. By continuously improving its academic framework, research output, and international collaborations, SLIIT has firmly established itself as a leading institution in higher education, both locally and globally.
SLIIT Ranked Sri Lanka’s No. 1 Non-State University, Secures 3rd Place Nationally
SLIIT’s Vice-Chancellor, Prof. Lalith Gamage, expressed pride in the institution’s achievement, emphasizing its commitment to academic quality, research impact, and industry collaboration. Prof. Nimal Rajapakse echoed this sentiment, reaffirming SLIIT’s dedication to institutional excellence and global engagement. Looking forward, SLIIT aims to further strengthen its academic and research capabilities while positioning itself as a top choice for students seeking international-standard education.
Academic Excellence and Research Contributions
SLIIT has consistently maintained high academic standards, fostering an environment that encourages critical thinking, creativity, and technological innovation. Its research contributions in artificial intelligence, data science, cybersecurity, and other emerging fields have significantly impacted the academic and industrial spheres. Collaborations with international universities and institutions have further strengthened its research capabilities, allowing students and faculty to engage in groundbreaking projects that address global challenges.
Industry Partnerships and Global Recognition
One of the hallmarks of SLIIT’s success has been its strong industry partnerships. By working closely with leading corporations, startups, and government agencies, the institution has ensured that its graduates are well-equipped with the skills and knowledge required to excel in the modern workforce. Internship programs, industry-led workshops, and career placement initiatives have solidified SLIIT’s reputation as a premier institution for producing job-ready professionals. The university’s global collaborations have also positioned it as a key player in international education, further enhancing its credibility and influence.
Empowering Future Leaders

SLIIT Vice Chancellor, Professor Lalith Gamage, presents the winners’ trophy
Beyond academics, SLIIT has nurtured a vibrant student community that thrives on extracurricular activities, leadership development, and social responsibility. Student-led clubs, hackathons, entrepreneurship initiatives, and community service projects have created a holistic learning experience, empowering students to become well-rounded individuals and future leaders in their respective fields.
The Future
To be a globally recognized leader in higher education, research, and innovation, driving technological advancements and academic excellence to empower future generations. SLIIT envisions itself as a transformative force in shaping the future of education, fostering a culture of creativity, critical thinking, and industry collaboration to address emerging global challenges.
As SLIIT embarks on its next 25 years, SLIIT is looking forward to:
Expand academic offerings to align with the evolving demands of industry and society, ensuring students are equipped with future-ready skills.
Strengthen research capabilities by fostering innovation, interdisciplinary collaboration, and real-world impact in fields such as artificial intelligence, cybersecurity, engineering, and business.
Cultivate a dynamic learning environment that nurtures intellectual curiosity, critical thinking, and ethical leadership.
Enhance global partnerships with universities, industries, and research institutions to promote knowledge exchange and technological advancements.
Contribute meaningfully to national and global progress by developing a generation of professionals, entrepreneurs, and researchers who drive sustainable development and innovation.
Winning National and International Competitions
SLIIT has demonstrated excellence not only in academics and sports but also in various national and international competitions. Students and faculty have participated and triumphed in globally recognized contests, including programming competitions, hackathons, robotics championships, and business case challenges. These victories highlight SLIIT’s emphasis on innovation, problem-solving, and technical expertise. The university’s commitment to nurturing talent and providing competitive exposure has enabled students to showcase their capabilities on prestigious global platforms, bringing recognition to both themselves and the institution.
Conclusion
The Silver Jubilee of SLIIT is not just a celebration of its past achievements but also a recognition of its continued commitment to shaping the future of education and technology. As we commemorate this significant milestone, we extend our gratitude to the visionary leaders, dedicated faculty, industrious students, and supportive industry partners who have contributed to SLIIT’s remarkable journey. With a strong foundation and an inspiring vision, SLIIT is poised to achieve even greater heights in the years to come.
(The writer, a senior Chartered Accountant and professional banker, is Professor at SLIIT University, Malabe. He is also the author of the “Doing Social Research and Publishing Results”, a Springer publication (Singapore), and “Samaja Gaveshakaya (in Sinhala). The views and opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the institution he works for. He can be contacted at saliya.a@slit.lk and www.researcher.com)
Features
Notes from AKD’s Textbook

Small State Diplomacy:
There is a vast and increasingly interesting body of literature on the ways in which small and militarily and economically not so powerful countries, such as Sri Lanka, could deal with more powerful countries such as India and China, the United States and Canada and much of Western Europe, with whom Sri Lanka has trade and political links. In general, small state diplomacy is understood in the context of and in opposition to great power diplomacy. Until the Cold War came to an end, small states were generally seen as ‘rule-takers’ or those following diktats set by powerful nations, the ‘rule-makers’. Along the same vein, such small nations were also seen as mere consumers of security products and military alliances rather than initiators of these things.
But in contemporary times, there are many studies that have attempted to explain how and under what conditions it would be possible for the foreign policies of small states and their diplomatic efforts to influence and impact international affairs. Ideally, like more powerful countries, the goals of smaller and less powerful nations should also reflect their own core national interests, including safeguarding territorial integrity, advancing prosperity, and protecting the rights of their citizens beyond their borders. But these interests should be advanced in tandem with broader global concerns, focused on influencing the international environment in general.
It is in this context that Sri Lanka has spectacularly failed as a small state, particularly after the collapse of the Non-Aligned Movement and the abysmal failure of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation. Sri Lanka’s failure has also resulted from very specific local ruptures directly linked to dismantling democratic practices in the country since the late 1970s. These include the steady politicization and the resultant mediocratization of the country’s Foreign Service and the negative impact of the long lineage of elected but unenlightened political leaders from Presidents to Prime Ministers, Foreign Ministers and others who have undisputedly compromised Sri Lankan foreign policy and global standing. The country has not produced diplomats in a long time who have steadfastly looked after Sri Lanka’s interests in the world without pandering to the diktats of autocratic governments at home, with the assurance that they will be protected in return.
Similarly, Sri Lanka has been very unfortunate to not have leaders at the apex of local power who could intelligently and sensibly speak their mind to global and regional powers with a clear understanding of how international politics work and how the country can protect its national interest within this rubric.
So far, there has been an utter compromise of such interests through personal greed, the lack of preparedness and absence of intelligence. This is the reason Sri Lankan diplomacy and foreign policy have often failed or become very ordinary, even when it comes to crucial elements of the field, such as negotiations. I include in this category both political leaders and weak-willed and unenlightened foreign service officers. This has resulted in Sri Lanka ending up agreeing to be part of woefully inadequate and nationally unprofitable agreements, thereby constantly relegated to being on the proverbial backfoot; the longstanding Human Rights Council resolution in Geneva being a case in point, while the Indo-Sri Lanka Free Trade Agreement is another problematic example from the region. As a nation, we have shown our incapability in negotiating not only with more powerful countries, but even with private entities from such countries.
Against this backdrop, President Anura Kumara Dissanayake’s state visit to India, in December 2024, can be seen as a breath of fresh air on how one may engage in a more refined foreign policy that will look after local interests at the global level. Given our usual pusillanimity, the stand taken by President Disanayake when India’s Minister of External Affairs S. Jaishankar called on him, becomes interesting. Of course, Jaishankar is a seasoned career diplomat who has always stood for India’s interests internationally, while Dissanayake is a man without experience in dealing with global leaders. After all, this was his first state visit with a motley crew, equally lacking experience in international relations.
However, by all reports reaching us from the discourse on this visit, Dissanayake did well even though much of this has not been adequately reported in the press, barring the solitary intervention by Minister Sunil Handunnetti in Parliament, in February 2025. President Dissanayake’s success came from his political acumen and extreme confidence emanating from the powerful local mandate he had been given by the Sri Lankan people. He expressed what he had to say without floundering, in clear Sinhala, which was translated into English. At one point, Jaishankar had engaged Dissanayake on the perennial fishermen’s issue involving the two countries. He said it would be good to find a solution that made sense to Sri Lanka, but it also needed to convince the political interests in Tamil Nadu.
In his response, President Dissanayake minced no words, articulating where his responsibility lies, stating that for the first time people from northern Sri Lanka showed confidence in a political party from the south, which he represented, and it was essential to build on this trust and safeguard their rights, livelihood and security. In other words, he resisted the usual official Indian refrain and raised without reservations the issue of Indian poaching in Sri Lankan waters. Sri Lanka’s firm position on this controversial issue was thus elucidated very clearly by President Dissanayake to Dr Jaishankar.
For me, used to seeing nationally counter-productive positions and agreements shoved down Sri Lanka’s throat by powerful nations and organizatipns at international meetings, this was a refreshing textbook example of how a small country should conduct its foreign relations with a powerful neighbour with a reasonable degree of self-respect and core national interest at heart. But this is merely one example of Dissanayake’s numerous successful engagements with Jaishankar. It is understood that other such instances include Dissanayake’s stand on India’s interest in constructing a land bridge between the two countries and its persistent pressure on the 13th Amendment to Sri Lanka’s Constitution.
This brings to my mind a comparatively different example from the Yahapalanaya era. In 2015, while preparing to meet the Dalai Lama in Dharamsala with a small group of academics and friends, I was informed by one of his staff members that he longed to visit the Temple of the Tooth in Kandy, at least once in his life, the only significant Buddhist temple connected directly to the life of the Buddha he had not been able visit. The reason being he would not be given a visa by the Sri Lankan government due to its needless deference to the Chinese government. This had become an unquestioned and established practice of Sri Lankan foreign policy with regard to the Dalai Lama. The irony is that this is a highly respected global personality who continues to be welcomed openly by countries which have robust trade and political relations with China. I took it upon myself to write to President Maithirpala Sirisena and Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe that Sri Lanka should allow the Dalai Lama to visit and expounded on why this would not dent our relations with China. I never heard from them. I was also told by Sri Lankan diplomats at the time both in Delhi and Colombo this would never happen.
This is a telling example of the mediocrity and non-independence of our foreign policy, even at a fundamental level. It is, and not only in this instance, often dictated by what other nations might think, or how they may feel or react, rather than what Sri Lanka wants to do in keeping with its convictions, and that, too, without properly evaluating the merits of each case. Consecutive post-Independence Sri Lankan governments have not issued a visa to the Dalai Lama. Juxtapose this to the instance when in 2014, the Mahinda Rajapaksa government allowed the violent Burmese Buddhist monk, Ashin Wirathu, who once identified himself as ‘the Burmese bin Laden’ to visit Sri Lanka to attend a public meeting in Colombo.
This needs to be considered in terms of realpolitik. That is, would the Chinese want to lose out on the far greater advantages of their considerable investments and structures of influence by withdrawing from Sri Lanka, because the Sri Lankan government allowed the elderly Dalai Lama a deeply personal spiritual visit? At most, they would issue an irate statement conveying their displeasure as they have done consistently on all such occasions involving other countries. But on the Sri Lankan government’s part, depriving a visit to the Dalai Lama to the Temple of the Tooth located in the UNESCO World Heritage Site of Kandy no less, is utterly un-Buddhist for a state that accords the foremost place to Buddhism in its constitution. I do hope President Dissanayake would be able to see the frivolity of the reasoning of his successors and advance the possibilities in his newfound textbook on small state diplomacy.
But, in the long term, this new textbook approach will be successful only if more concrete work is put into the process. A visit by the Dalai Lama would be one aspect that can send a much needed signal to the world that finally our foreign policy is standing on its own feet without compromising the country’s relations with other nations. More can be done when Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi visits Sri Lanka on 5th April 2025. One hopes that Dissanayake will engage with his foreign visitor to make clear what the national interests are.
After all, the land bridge idea consistently pushed by India is vehemently opposed by both the country’ powerful Buddhist clergy and many ordinary Sri Lankans who happen to have brought President Dissanayake and his party to power. The 13th Amendment, forced into the Sri Lankan Constitution with direct Indian intervention, albeit under an Indian National Congress (INC) government, should never be part of any future constitution. After all, President Dissanayake’s own party, the JVP, has consistently opposed the 13th Amendment. This does not mean, however, that regional socio-political interests within the island should not be addressed in a future constitution-making process within a local paradigm; they certainly should be.
On the other hand, while we should be open to Indian investments and any others in keeping with the laws of the land, allowing backdoor and illegal entry of projects of the kind that Adani attempted, should be out of the question. This can be part of the conversation during the upcoming visit of Mr Modi. It would behoove the Sri Lankan government to be mindful that Indian foreign policy in the region has in recent times run into spectacular failures as exemplified by the cases of Bangladesh, Nepal and the Maldives as well as India’s general inability to counter Chinese influence in the region.
One hopes that President Dissanayake will continue to engage with his visitor and others like him in times to come in the manner he has already established during his 2024 state visit to India.
Features
Removing obstacles to development

Six months into the term of office of the new government, the main positive achievements continue to remain economic and political stability and the reduction of waste and corruption. The absence of these in the past contributed to a significant degree to the lack of development of the country. The fact that the government is making a serious bid to ensure them is the best prognosis for a better future for the country. There is still a distance to go. The promised improvements that would directly benefit those who are at the bottom of the economic pyramid, and the quarter of the population who live below the poverty line, have yet to materialise. Prices of essential goods have not come down and some have seen sharp increases such as rice and coconuts. There are no mega projects in the pipeline that would give people the hope that rapid development is around the corner.
There were times in the past when governments succeeded in giving the people big hopes for the future as soon as they came to power. Perhaps the biggest hope came with the government’s move towards the liberalisation of the economy that took place after the election of 1977. President J R Jayewardene and his team succeeded in raising generous international assistance, most of it coming in the form of grants, that helped to accelerate the envisaged 30 year Mahaweli Development project to just six years. In 1992 President Ranasinghe Premadasa thought on a macro scale when his government established 200 garment factories throughout the country to develop the rural economy and to help alleviate poverty. These large scale projects brought immediate hope to the lives of people.
More recently the Hambantota Port project, Mattala Airport and the Colombo Port City project promised mega development that excited the popular imagination at the time they commenced, though neither of them has lived up to their envisaged potential. These projects were driven by political interests and commission agents rather than economic viability leading to debt burden and underutilisation. The NPP government would need to be cautious about bringing in similar mega projects that could offer the people the hope of rapid economic growth. During his visits to India and China, President Anura Kumara Dissanayake signed a large number of agreements with the governments of those countries but the results remain unclear. The USD 1 billion Adani project to generate wind power with Indian collaboration appears to be stalled. The USD 3.7 billion Chinese proposal to build an oil refinery also appears to be stalled.
RENEWED GROWTH
The absence of high profile investments or projects to generate income and thereby take the country to a higher level of development is a lacuna in the development plans of the government. It has opened the door to invidious comparisons to be drawn between the new government’s ability to effect change and develop the economy in relation to those in the opposition political parties who have traditionally been in the seats of power. However, recently published statistics of the economic growth during the past year indicates that the economy is doing better than anticipated under the NPP government. Sri Lanka’s economy grew by 5 percent in the year 2024, reversing two years of contraction with the growth rate for the year of 2023 being estimated at negative 2.3 percent. What was particularly creditable was the growth rate for the fourth quarter of 2024 (after the new government took over) being 5.4 percent. The growth figures for the present quarter are also likely to see a continuation of the present trend.
Sri Lanka’s failure in the past has been to sustain its economic growth rates. Even though the country started with high growth rates under different governments, it soon ran into problems of waste and corruption that eroded those gains. During the initial period of President J R Jayawardene’s government in the late 1970s, the economy registered near 8 percent growth with the support of its mega projects, but this could not be sustained. Violent conflict, waste and corruption came to the centre stage which led to the economy getting undermined. With more and more money being spent on the security forces to battle those who had become insurgents against the state, and with waste and corruption skyrocketing there was not much left over for economic development.
The government’s commitment to cut down on waste and corruption so that resources can be saved and added to enable economic growth can be seen in the strict discipline it has been following where expenditures on its members are concerned. The government has restricted the cabinet to 25 ministers, when in the past the figure was often double. The government has also made provision to reduce the perks of office, including medical insurance to parliamentarians. The value of this latter measure is that the parliamentarians will now have an incentive to upgrade the health system that serves the general public, instead of running it down as previous governments did. With their reduced levels of insurance coverage they will need to utilise the public health facilities rather than go to the private ones.
COMMITTED GOVERNMENT
The most positive feature of the present time is that the government is making a serious effort to root out corruption. This is to be seen in the invigoration of previously dormant institutions of accountability, such as the Bribery and Corruption Commission, and the willingness of the Attorney General’s Department to pursue those who were previously regarded as being beyond the reach of the law due to their connections to those in the seats of power. The fact that the Inspector General of Police, who heads the police force, is behind bars on a judicial order is an indication that the rule of law is beginning to be taken seriously. By cost cutting, eliminating corruption and abiding by the rule of law the government is removing the obstacles to development. In the past, the mega development projects failed to deliver their full benefits because they got lost in corrupt and wasteful practices including violent conflict.
There is a need, however, for new and innovative development projects that require knowledge and expertise that is not necessarily within the government. So far it appears that the government is restricting its selection of key decision makers to those it knows, has worked with and trusts due to long association. Two of the committees that the government has recently appointed, the Clean Lanka task force and the Tourism advisory committee are composed of nearly all men from the majority community. If Sri Lanka is to leverage its full potential, the government must embrace a more inclusive approach that incorporates women and diverse perspectives from across the country’s multiethnic and multireligious population, including representation from the north and east. For development that includes all, and is accepted by all, it needs to tap into the larger resources that lie outside itself.
By ensuring that women and ethnic minorities have representation in decision making bodies of the government, the government can harness a broader range of skills, experiences, and perspectives, ultimately leading to more effective and sustainable development policies. Sustainable development is not merely about economic growth; it is about inclusivity and partnership. A government that prioritises diversity in its leadership will be better equipped to address the challenges that can arise unexpectedly. By widening its advisory base and integrating a broader array of voices, the government can create policies that are not only effective but also equitable. Through inclusive governance, responsible economic management, and innovative development strategies the government will surely lead the country towards a future that benefits all its people.
by Jehan Perera
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