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The tusker from 5th lane

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by Maheen Senanayake

‘St. Peter denied Jesus no less than three times before he went on to start the Catholic church –’JOHN 18:25-27 Luke 22:58-62, The Holy Bible

It is no secret that it is fairly lonely at the top. Leadership comes with sacrifice and burden. And this be the case even in the animal world. I saw the national list as too demeaning an avenue to return to the legislature for someone of Ranil Wickremasinghe’s reputation and stature. I had met too many people who are today angry bystanders only wishing that he did something to ‘wake up the sleeping elephant’. This and this alone prompted me to come out of retirement to do a piece on the one man whose enigmatic political presence I felt deserved no less than to use a pun – a ‘soldier’s death’… though I must admit the man himself is unlikely to appreciate an end to a career spanning in excess of three generations.

Through the intercession of my editor, I had a meeting with the former four-time prime minister within 48 hours of the request. While I appreciated the speed with which with this happened, I was sorry there was so little time for preparation. I pored over election results of the previous decades, a host of annual reports from the central bank, reports from the ADB, IMF and other pieces written on the gentleman by local and foreign scribes for want of an approach. It was in the early morning hours that I decided on a different strategy.

I decided to ask three people who would not mind being named in print to raise one question each. Thereafter I planned to fill in the blanks and come about with a structure for the interview.

We arrived at Siri Kotha (coined as I had come to understand from the caretaker on location from Sir John Kotelawela’s with Sir becoming Siri followed by Kotha for Ketelawela) three minutes past the appointed hour a few days ago, with more security in attendance than green men we were personally ushered into the leader;s room at his party headquarters and affably greeted.

Some excerpts of an over hour-long discussion:

Do you mind making a few comments on the current political scenario and where the UNP as a one MP party stands?

The current political scenario is that we are in a big transition. At the last presidential elections, a large number of people, specially among the Sinhalese, Voted for Mr. Gotabaya Rajapaksa expecting a change, thinking that he will be different. Promises made included inquiry into the Easter Sunday bombings etc. Public confidence is therefore broken and (this) has not been captured by any of the other parties either.

Though the Samagi Jana Balavegaya (SJB) as a party received the largest number of non-SLPP votes i.e. 2.7 million at the parliamentary elections, this was much less than the 5.56 million votes Sajith Preamadasa polled at the presidential election, (explainable by the minority votes that Premadasa polled at the presidential election going to minority parties who ran at the parliamentary election – Maheen Senanayake) People who were against the former government had come together.

Sajith Premadasa polled 5,564,239 amounting to 41.99% of the votes at the presidential Election 2019.

At the Parliament Election 2020 the SJB polled  2,77 million votes accounting for 23% of the total polled votes. In Colombo where I believe Mr. Premadasa contested the SJB polled  0.39 million or 32.79% of the total Colombo votes.

People have demonstrated that they have no faith in political parties whether in government or opposition. So we have all got to start from the beginning. There has to be a new political party, new thinking in political parties, about political parties, about elected representatives, about the economy and policy. That is where we stand.

In this context it matters very little whether you are a one MP or 25 MP party. If the people don’t accept you, you are not political ‘tender’ any more. This however, doesn’t affect the UNP. Naturally this means a lesser presence in parliament. People don’t always look at parliament anymore. The other disadvantage is that the media doesn’t give you publicity unless you are a sitting MP.

Meanwhile, traditional media is losing readership/viewership which is shifting to social media. In this transition, whether you are one or 40 doesn’t make a difference. One has to look at the future, and its an open field for anyone in parliament or outside. It can also be a movement outside parliament that can win the confidence of the people. Today people expect more than just ‘negative slogans’.

Long time ago Dr. Colvin R de Silva told me that all of us make the mistake of looking for successors among incumbents. He said ‘look at the political history of this country. In 1960, March, nobody knew who Felix Dias was, except that he was the son of a Supreme Court Judge briefed by Julius and Creasy. But then came July 1960 and Mrs. Bandaranaike, as a tenderfoot prime minister first let Felix be the de facto leader of government (until she gained experience and found her feet). Rohana Wijeweera also showed up just before the JVP’s 1971 insurrection. So Colvin contended that it was a cardinal error to look for successors from among incumbents.

Since this is open, I say that he or she can come from within parliament or from a political movement outside’. It is more open now than at any other time in Sri Lanka.

You were criticized when the UNP was reduced to zero and you had said that you would resign in a few months time. But that did not happen. What would you say now?

I said ‘let the party decide who they want’ and then to go ahead and that I will move out. But then a lot of pressure came up that I should go to parliament and not anyone else, specially because we were all in a crisis. I said ‘alright’, but then it is up to you to organize the party. So as party leader other than going to parliament I leave it to them to organize and implement party affairs.

In fact I don’t come here (to Siri Kotha) much now. I don’t give many media interviews or go around the country making statements. Whatever I say I say in parliament now. They feel that they want to discuss future plans specially government policy with me because of my experience. So its basically becoming a school. In fact some of the next generation of leaders – those in their early twenties and going up to thirty will be presented to the public very soon. In fact more are coming in.

We meet once or twice a week, but I must emphasize that it is a drastic recast that is happening now. The challenge is convincing the conventional thinker, because they have to understand that the whole thing is changing.

How many years have you been in parliament?

Since 1977.

How would you rate your performance as an MP?

That’s for the country to do, not for me.

How would you rate your performance as a UNPer ( if I may use the term)?

I have always stood by the UNP. Long before I joined. My first vote was for the UNP in 1970. I have upheld the values, the main values that D S Senanayake had put down in the constitution. The opening of the economy, the 13th amendment to the constitution, and as time goes by, we ensure that whatever policies we make are in accordance with these basic principles.

How would you rate yourself as a party leader?

I don’t rate myself. The whole question is ‘is there anything called self’. If you are a Buddhist that is a very philosophical matter. I don’t rate myself, others can decide whether I am good, bad or ugly.

As a member of parliament you are responsible for an electorate. How do you course correct yourself? Specially being so experienced in these affairs. How do you see the subject of accountability as a member of parliament to an electorate?

Two things. Any member of parliament is accountable to the whole country. If he or she does not follow the principles of his or her party then there is a violation and he or she can be removed. So I continue to look at Sri Lanka as a full electorate. And I take up issues of the people within the confines of the party policy.

I brought with me a question from a Mrs Sitha Wickremanayake from Yatiyantota. She hails from a family which has actively supported Hon. D S Senanayake, Dudley Senanayake, and even president Premadasa with her father actively supporting the UNP at one time while providing accommodation to a young and active NM Perera in Yatiyantota. Her question to you is ‘Why could you not keep the UNP together’?

All parties change and sometimes people misjudge you. The UNP is the only party that has remained in Parliament since 1947. We have done that. At the last election we had people who thought Mahinda is the king after 2009. Then there are people who thought they can forge ahead with the SJB. They took those decisions. Whether those decisions were correct or not, I cannot tell you. You have to change with the people.

With respect to UNP membership, where do the SJB members stand? Are they UNPers today?

Some of the members of the SJB are members of the UNP who have now been suspended until disciplinary enquiries are over. One member has gone to court also.

Are you seeking their expulsion?

We cannot expel them from parliament. As far as we are concerned they did not contest (the last election) under the UNP. We have left the doors open for discussions to take place which in fact have taken place at different times on how we can work together. We have only pursued minimum disciplinary action because we have to be flexible in this endeavor. Anyone else however, who has worked against us we are taking full disciplinary action against.

You maintain that people change. However, we find that at each election the people are easily persuaded by the same old scheme or promise – as it were? In this light, how do you see the people of this country?

Look! You have to accept the electorate that is there. You can’t import another electorate. After 1970 there was a complete break in the system and something completely newhappened. It was something positive. Similarly you are coming to that stage now. The economy is breaking down, your political structures are breaking down, Social systems are breaking down and this is the case with every country in the world while Covid-19 is also having its impact around the world. Something new has to come up. We are also proposing that the new ideas that we put forth are positive. There will be others who will put up negative ones. That clash has to take place and people are thinking now.

In light of the fact that many voted for repealing the 19th amendment. What would your comments be on this subject?

I contend that the people did not vote to repeal the 19th amendment. Mr. Gotabaya Rajapaksa was elected while the 19th amendment was in force. Elections were held on the basis of the 19th amendment. No one brought up the matter. The government did not campaign to repeal the 19th amendment. They did not say that. As far as the ‘pohottuwa’ was concerned they did not say that either.

On the subject of people, what is your position on Sinhala Only?

My position is reflected in the present circumstances. Sinhala and Tamil are official languages. Sinhala and Tamil are national languages. And English is a co-ordinating language. This co-ordinating language is nonsense. No country has a co-ordinating language so you might as well make English a national language. Then more and more people can learn English. Why are we so frightened of English? In China they are teaching English, In India they are teaching English. Also English now has a Asian version. The Chinese and Indians will dominate the English market and not the Americans or the English.

All those who are saying they don’t want English are educating their children in English here and abroad. So I say, let us not be shy. We have two official languages. I must point out that India does not have Tamil as an official language. It is we, Singapore and I think Mauritius who have Tamil as a official language. Let there be three national languages – Sinhala, Tamil and English. English affects all our lives, all our cultures. Today when you are using a hand phone you are using it in English. So all I am saying is make English a national language’.

You have been in parliament for more than 40 years. What has the UNP done to bring that about?

We are the ones who brought in the 13th Amendment ( to the constitution ) which defines the language policy. I as education minister pushed for teaching of English but there were challenges like training English teachers. For instance the last government pushed for English and IT. All I am saying is make English a national language.

Do we call English a co-ordinating language?

We call it a co-ordinating or link language. All I am saying is let’s make It a national language. More than 20% of this country speak English. In fact the number of Tamil speakers equals the number of English speakers.

(I did the math in my mind. Do 4.6 mln people actually speak English? Not even some English teachers that I know can speak it. I had my reservations. I wondered)

I feel that the people of Lanka, the people within our territory have an identity crisis. What is your view on the matter of the national identity?

We have a Sri Lankan identity.

Do we actually have a Sri Lankan Identity (not a Sinhala, Tamil or Muslim identity)?

We have. We have it in our national anthem.. ‘Eka mawakage daru kela bavina’..’ [children of one mother]. But within it some people are trying to say ‘Tamil must be a separate state’, some others are saying it must be a ‘Sinhala Buddhist state’. Therefore there are different views on the subject. A majority may avoid the Sri Lankan identity saying they are being discriminated. It is not only ethnicity, people of different religion and even women who say they are discriminated as against men. So within our identity this debate will continue and it will never stop. We have to accept that we are all Sri Lankan and that all have to be treated equally subject to Article 9 of the constitution.

Furthermore we must impose it. We had the national anthem being sung in Sinhala and Tamil. Now you change that it and you have unnecessary problems.

Within that construct how would you describe the identity of a UNPer today? And are you as a party relevant today and how do you plan to make the party relevant or more relevant to the young ( 18+) voter?

A UNPer is someone who believes in the policies that we maintain including democracy, a Sri Lankan identity, a social market economy, social democracy which are our accepted views. On the question of whether ‘we are relevant?’ I don’t think that any political party today is relevant. So we have to make ourselves relevant to all those voters.

Right now there are discussions that are going on and in fact very soon we will be presenting our new leaders to the public – about ten who are all within their early thirties to forties. And more are joining. The UNP has been working in the background and the reason you don’t see us making too many public appearances is because we are working in the background and want to be prepared before we bring them out.

For instance I was interviewed by a group of young people from Royal College and I can tell you that the questions that they asked me are quite different to what you are asking me. And we did have a very useful discussion.

Do you think that the provincial councils are relevant?

We are a country of 20 million people. Between the division of the local authority and the top there has to be a intermediate player. Originally we came with the District Development Councils (DDC). After that you have the provincial councils. The issue is this – if you go to dismantle the provincial structure and put in place 22 district structures there will be utter chaos in the country. I accept the fact that there are three layers of government. They are duplicating expenditure unnecessarily. Let us look at a structure, which will ensure that this doesn’t take place.

The council is a body that is needed to pass legislation. There also we can use the American tradition where assemblies at the state level only meet two or three times a year. Once to pass the budget and they meet again once in four months. Then we must look at how the administration can cut off any expenditure. Right now we have a problem because the local authority digs drains, The provincial council also wants money for drains and the MP also wants money for drains. So finally what is the result? ‘All the money is going down the drain’ (laughter)

That is why I say that we have to radically transform it. You take that proposition to the national level, secondly you retain the powers of the thirteenth amendment. In the last parliament we appointed a committee by our constitutional committee. I think it was Susil Premjayanth who chaired it. The seven Chief ministers of the Southern provinces, That is excluding the North and East, and their leaders of the opposition gave a common report on what they want. So after obtaining the views at the provincial level, Susil Premjayanth put everything together and there is an exhaustive report on this. We can discuss this and see how we can go along. I believe that up to about 80% of the report can be agreed with. The rest, the parties with different views may have to come to consensus on and decide.

(To be continued next week)



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Power crept into the Sangha and is now tearing it apart

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A file photo of Buddhist monks engaged in a protest

For more than a century, Sri Lankan society has lived with a quiet contradiction at the heart of its religious life. On the one hand, the Buddhist monk is revered as the embodiment of moral discipline, selfrestraint, and renunciation. On the other, the modern monk has become a public figure, political actor, administrator, media personality, and in some cases power broker whose influence extends far beyond the temple. This contradiction has been tolerated, even celebrated, for decades. But recent events, most notably a widely publicised case involving a senior monk accused of grave moral misconduct, have forced the country to confront a painful truth: the institutional conditions that make such scandals possible are not new. They are the predictable outcome of a long historical process that H. L. Seneviratne described with remarkable clarity in The Work of Kings. The moral deterioration visible today is not an aberration. It is the culmination of a centurylong transformation in the identity, function, and authority of the Sangha.

To understand how we arrived at this moment, it is necessary to revisit the argument Seneviratne made nearly three decades ago. His thesis was simple but profound: the modern Sri Lankan monkhood has taken on the ‘work of kings.’ By this he meant that monks, instead of confining themselves to the renunciant life prescribed by the Vinaya, have assumed the secular responsibilities once associated with precolonial kingship, such as protecting the religion, organising society, guiding the nation, and enforcing moral order. This shift, he argued, was not a natural evolution of Buddhist tradition but a modern invention shaped by colonialism, nationalism, and the anxieties of a society struggling to redefine itself in the face of foreign domination. The monk became a symbol of national identity, a guardian of cultural authenticity, and a leader in the struggle for political autonomy. In the process, the boundaries that once separated the monastic from the worldly began to dissolve.

Transformation

The consequences of this transformation were not immediately visible. For decades, the activist monk was celebrated as a patriot, a reformer, and a moral guide. His involvement in education, social welfare, and nationalist mobilisation was seen as a necessary response to colonial pressures and missionary competition. But beneath the surface, the foundations of monastic discipline were slowly eroding. The Vinaya, which had served for centuries as a rigorous framework for regulating monastic life, was increasingly overshadowed by the demands of public engagement. The communal structures that once ensured accountability, senior supervision, collective confession, and the daily rhythms of monastic routine, were weakened by the pressures of modernity. Monks who travelled constantly, managed institutions, or lived independently in urban temples found themselves outside the traditional systems of oversight that had long protected the integrity of the Sangha.

Scandal

It is within this historical context that the recent scandal must be understood. The case shocked the nation not only because of the severity of the allegations but because it shattered the public’s assumption that the monkhood remains a bastion of moral purity. Yet the shock itself reveals a collective denial. For years, Sri Lankan society has been aware, sometimes quietly, sometimes openly—of the growing gap between the ideal of the monk and the realities of modern monastic life. Stories of misconduct, financial irregularities, political manipulation, and abuse of authority have circulated with increasing frequency. But each incident has been treated as an isolated failure, a personal weakness, or an unfortunate exception. What has been missing is recognition that these incidents are symptoms of a deeper structural problem.

Seneviratne’s analysis helps illuminate this problem. When monks take on the work of kings, they inevitably enter domains of power that expose them to temptations the Vinaya was designed to avoid. Handling money, managing institutions, cultivating political patrons, and exercising authority over laypeople create opportunities for ego, ambition, and moral compromise. The monk who becomes a public figure is no longer shielded by the anonymity and humility of the renunciant life. Instead, he becomes a celebrity, a leader, and in some cases an object of uncritical devotion. This elevation brings with it a dangerous form of immunity. Laypeople who revere a monk for his public achievements may hesitate to question his behaviour. Politicians who rely on monastic support may protect him from scrutiny. The media, which often treats monks as moral authorities, may be reluctant to investigate allegations that challenge the sanctity of the robe.

The recent scandal illustrates how these dynamics can converge. The monk at the centre of the case was not an obscure figure. He was a respected preacher, charismatic leader, and head of a prominent institution. His public image was built on years of service, teaching, and community engagement. Yet it was precisely this public stature that allowed him to operate without meaningful oversight. The institutional structures around him, administrators, lay supporters, and junior monks, were either unwilling or unable to challenge his authority. The very qualities that made him a respected figure in the eyes of the public also made him untouchable within his own institution. When allegations finally emerged, they revealed not only personal wrongdoing but a systemic failure of accountability.

Failure that is not unique

This failure is not unique to one temple or one monk. It reflects a broader pattern within the modern Sangha. As monastic institutions have grown in size, wealth, and influence, their internal governance has struggled to keep pace. Many temples operate as semiautonomous entities controlled by a single monk or a small group of monks. Financial transparency is limited, administrative oversight is weak, and the mechanisms for addressing misconduct are often informal or ineffective. The traditional structures of monastic discipline, such as the Sangharama procedures for adjudicating offences, are rarely used in modern contexts, partly because they require collective participation and partly because they are illsuited to the complexities of contemporary institutional life. In practice, this means that monks who wield significant authority can act with little fear of internal sanction.

The politicisation of the Sangha has further complicated matters. Since the midtwentieth century, monks have played an increasingly prominent role in electoral politics, nationalist movements, and public policy debates. This involvement has given them access to political networks that can be mobilised to protect their interests. It has also created a culture in which monks are valued not for their adherence to the Vinaya but for their ability to influence public opinion, mobilise voters, or lend moral legitimacy to political causes. In such an environment, the monk who is politically useful may be shielded from criticism, while the monk who adheres strictly to the renunciant ideal may find himself marginalised or ignored.

The result is a profound distortion of monastic identity. The monk who once sought liberation from worldly attachments is now encouraged to cultivate influence, authority, and public recognition. The monk who once lived under the strict supervision of senior elders now operates in a world where independence is celebrated and oversight is minimal. The monk who once relied on laypeople for basic sustenance now controls vast resources, manages institutions, and commands the loyalty of thousands of followers. This inversion of traditional roles has created a fertile ground for moral deterioration.

Yet it would be a mistake to interpret this deterioration as evidence that the Sangha as a whole is corrupt. Many monks continue to live lives of remarkable discipline, humility, and spiritual dedication. In remote forest monasteries, small village temples, and meditation centres across the country, monks quietly uphold the ancient ideals of the renunciant life. They are not the ones who appear on television, lead political rallies, or manage large institutions. Their work is invisible, their influence subtle, and their commitment unwavering. The crisis facing the Sangha today is not a crisis of individual morality but a crisis of institutional identity. It is the product of a centurylong transformation that has blurred the boundaries between the monastic and the secular, the spiritual and the political, the renunciant and the worldly.

If Sri Lanka is to address this crisis, it must begin by acknowledging the structural nature of the problem. The temptation to treat each scandal as an isolated incident must be resisted. Instead, the country must confront the uncomfortable reality that the modern configuration of monastic life is fundamentally at odds with the principles of the Vinaya. The Sangha cannot simultaneously function as a political force, a social service provider, a media institution, and a spiritual community without compromising its integrity. The more monks are drawn into the world, the more vulnerable they become to the moral dangers that the Buddha warned against.

Reform, therefore, must focus not only on punishing individual offenders but on rethinking the institutional structures that enable misconduct. This includes strengthening internal governance, enhancing financial transparency, restoring the authority of senior elders, and reestablishing the communal practices that once ensured accountability. It also requires a broader cultural shift in how laypeople relate to monks. Blind devotion must give way to informed respect. Reverence must be balanced with responsibility. The robe must be honoured, but it must not be used as a shield against scrutiny.

Seneviratne’s work offers a valuable starting point for this rethinking. His analysis reminds us that the crisis facing the Sangha is not the result of moral decline alone but of historical forces that reshaped the identity of the monkhood. By tracing the evolution of the activist monk, he shows how the Sangha became entangled in the political and social structures of the modern nationstate. This entanglement has brought both benefits and dangers. It has allowed monks to play important roles in education, social welfare, and national development. But it has also exposed them to the corrupting influences of power, wealth, and public acclaim.

The challenge now is to disentangle the Sangha from these influences without undermining its ability to serve society. This will not be easy. The activist monk has become deeply embedded in the cultural and political fabric of the country. Many laypeople expect monks to be leaders, reformers, and guardians of national identity. Politicians rely on monastic support to legitimise their agendas. Media institutions depend on monks for content, commentary, and moral authority. Reversing this trend will require a collective effort from monks, laypeople, and political leaders alike.

Ultimately, the future of the Sangha depends on its ability to reclaim the renunciant ideal that lies at the heart of Buddhist monasticism. This does not mean withdrawing from society entirely, but it does mean reestablishing the boundaries that protect the monk from the dangers of worldly involvement. It means recognising that the true strength of the Sangha lies not in its political influence or institutional power but in its moral authority, its spiritual discipline, and its commitment to the path of liberation. The recent scandal, painful as it is, may serve as a catalyst for this reevaluation. It has exposed the vulnerabilities of the modern monastic system and forced the country to confront the consequences of a centurylong transformation.

To understand how the Vihara Devalegam Act relates to the perceived moral deformation of the clergy, it is necessary to examine how property management, state law, and monastic discipline intersect in the modern era. Historically stemming from the Buddhist Temporalities Ordinance No. 19 of 1931, this act serves as the primary legal framework governing the ‘temporalities’—meaning the secular wealth, extensive landholdings, and material donations belonging to Buddhist temples and shrines. While ancient kings granted these vast tracts of land to support the monkhood’s spiritual pursuits, the modern codification of this law has inadvertently fostered a system where property rights frequently supersede spiritual accountability.

The core of the crisis lies in the commercialisation of the monastic order that this legal framework enables. By treating temple lands as economic assets and vesting absolute administrative power in individual chief monks or lay trustees, the act has contributed to the rise of what critics term a monastic middle class. Access to vast, unregulated financial resources, rent from lands, and corporate donations has fundamentally shifted the focus of certain segments of the clergy away from the traditional path of worldly renunciation and spiritual guidance. Instead, it has driven a preoccupation with business investments, the accumulation of private capital, and luxury lifestyles, which deeply alienates a public looking to the Sangha for moral leadership.

The institutional flaws embedded in the Vihara Devalegam Act find a stark, real-world manifestation in the recent criminal case involving Venerable Pallegama Hemarathana Thero. As the chief priest of Anuradhapura and the custodian of the Atamasthana—the eight highly venerated Buddhist shrines, including the sacred Jaya Sri Maha Bodhi—Hemarathana Thero occupied one of the most powerful and wealthy positions within the Sri Lankan Sangha. His arrest on charges of sexual abuse of a minor girl perfectly illustrates how the structural defects of the Act facilitate not only moral decay but also the systemic obstruction of justice.

The core of this intersection lies in the vast, unaccountable wealth generated by the temporalities of the Anuradhapura shrines. Under the Vihara Devalegam Act, the chief custodian exercises immense, virtually unchecked control over temple revenues, state-backed land management, and millions of rupees in daily donations from millions of global pilgrims. It is precisely this immense financial liquidity that enabled the alleged deployment of vast sums of money to the victim’s family.

Furthermore, the situation underscores the profound policy failures cited regarding the helplessness of the monastic hierarchy and state enforcement. When child protection authorities initially attempted to act, the National Child Protection Authority noted severe delays and institutional resistance, stating they practically had to force the police to execute the arrest. The monk’s immediate retreat to a private hospital in Colombo upon the advancement of the criminal probe, followed by his release on bail, mirrors the exact loop described where wealthy monastics deploy high-priced legal defence teams funded directly or indirectly by their institutional positions. Because the Vihara Devalegam Act does not provide a mechanism for the immediate, unconditional forfeiture of temporal administrative rights upon a criminal indictment, the accused retains his structural power throughout the legal process. The Pallegama Thero scandal stands as definitive proof that without a fundamental overhaul of how temple wealth is legally governed and disciplined, the material benefits guaranteed by ancient temporalities will continue to shield the worst elements of moral deformation from the rule of law.

If Sri Lanka can learn from this moment and if it can recognise the structural roots of the crisis and commit to meaningful reform, then the Sangha may yet emerge stronger, more disciplined, and more faithful to its ancient ideals. But if the country continues to treat each scandal as an isolated failure and if it continues to ignore the deeper institutional problems that Seneviratne identified, then the moral deterioration we see today will only deepen. The work of kings, when performed by monks, carries a heavy price. It is time to decide whether that price is worth paying.

by Professor Amarasiri de Silva

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Kondachchi wind farm and battery storage project to boost energy security, says Power Ministry Secretary

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The Power and Energy Ministry’s drive towards energy security and renewable energy expansion received a major boost yesterday with the signing of a tripartite cooperation agreement for the development of the 150 MW Kondachchi Wind Power Project and an integrated Battery Energy Storage System (BESS) in Mannar.

The agreement was signed at the Ministry of Power auditorium under the patronage of Power Minister Anura Karunatilaka and Deputy Power Minister Arkam Ilyas.

Speaking at the event, Ministry Secretary G. M. R. D. Aponsu described the project as a transformative investment that would strengthen the country’s electricity network while supporting Sri Lanka’s transition towards cleaner energy sources.

“The Kondachchi Wind Power Project represents a significant milestone in Sri Lanka’s renewable energy journey. By combining large-scale wind generation with advanced battery energy storage technology, we are creating a more resilient and reliable power system capable of meeting future energy demands while reducing dependence on imported fossil fuels,” Aponsu said.

The project will be developed at Silavathurai in the Kondachchi area of Mannar on lands owned by the Sri Lanka Cashew Corporation. It is expected to utilise some 31 modern wind turbines with a total installed capacity of at least 150 MW.

Aponsu said the inclusion of an integrated battery storage facility would help address the variability associated with wind power generation and ensure stable electricity supply to the national grid.

“The battery energy storage component is a key feature of this project. It will enable the efficient integration of renewable energy into the grid and enhance overall system stability, which is essential as Sri Lanka increases the share of renewables in its energy mix,” he said.

According to the Ministry, the wind farm is expected to generate nearly 525 gigawatt-hours of electricity annually, significantly reducing the country’s expenditure on imported fuel and strengthening national energy security.

The project is also expected to contribute to Sri Lanka’s climate commitments by reducing carbon dioxide emissions by an estimated 372,750 tonnes annually.

“This investment delivers both economic and environmental benefits. It will reduce greenhouse gas emissions, support sustainable development objectives and help Sri Lanka move closer to achieving its renewable energy and climate targets,” Aponsu noted.

The project will be implemented under a Public-Private Partnership (PPP) arrangement using the Build, Own and Operate (BOO) model. The Asian Development Bank is providing technical and financial advisory support through its Transaction Advisory Services programme.

The signing ceremony was attended by Pradeep Perera, Chairman of the National System Operator (Pvt) Ltd., and Takeyo Koike, Head of Market Development and Public-Private Partnership Division of the ADB, among other distinguished guests.

The Ministry said comprehensive Environmental Impact Assessments and avifaunal studies have been undertaken to ensure minimal impacts on bird populations, nearby communities and agricultural lands. A dedicated 220-kilovolt transmission system will also be constructed to connect the project to the national grid.

“The Kondachchi Wind Farm is a strategic national project that will help secure Sri Lanka’s energy future while accelerating the country’s transition towards sustainable and affordable electricity generation,” Aponsu said.

Energy sector experts view the project as one of the most important renewable energy initiatives currently being pursued in Sri Lanka, combining utility-scale wind generation with modern energy storage technology to enhance grid reliability and long-term energy sustainability.

By Ifham Nizam

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Saudi Arabia sets new benchmark in Hajj management as 1.7 million pilgrims complete sacred journey

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Ambassador Al-Kahtani

Interview with Khalid Hamoud Al-Kahtani, Ambassador of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to Sri Lanka

Saudi Arabia has once again demonstrated its unparalleled capacity to manage one of the world’s largest annual religious gatherings, with this year’s Hajj pilgrimage concluding successfully despite extreme temperatures and the immense logistical challenge of accommodating more than 1.7 million pilgrims from around the world.

In an exclusive interview with The Island, Khalid Hamoud Al-Kahtani, Ambassador of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to Sri Lanka, described the 2026 Hajj season as a resounding success, crediting the achievement to the visionary leadership of the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques, His Royal Highness the Crown Prince and Prime Minister, and the coordinated efforts of multiple government agencies working around the clock to serve pilgrims.

The Ambassador noted that nearly 3,500 Sri Lankan pilgrims participated in this year’s Hajj under the quota allocated to Sri Lanka, benefiting from enhanced healthcare services, sophisticated crowd-management systems, expanded shaded areas and cutting-edge digital solutions introduced by the Kingdom.

With Saudi Arabia continuing to invest heavily in infrastructure, technology and pilgrim services under Vision 2030, Ambassador Al-Kahtani said the Kingdom remains committed to ensuring that pilgrims from around the world perform their religious duties in safety, comfort and tranquility.

The Saudi envoy also highlighted the growing partnership between Saudi Arabia and Sri Lanka, emphasising expanding cooperation not only in Hajj affairs but also in trade, investment, education, culture and institutional exchanges.

Following are excerpts of the interview:


Q: How do you assess this year’s Hajj season?

Ambassador Al-Kahtani: This year’s Hajj season was a resounding success, thanks to the Almighty Allah and the integrated efforts of the government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, led by the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques and His Royal Highness the Crown Prince and Prime Minister. This success was reflected in the efficiency of crowd management, the quality of services provided to the Hajj pilgrims and the effective coordination among the various relevant authorities, which enabled pilgrims to perform their rituals in an atmosphere of security, tranquility and ease.

Q: How many Sri Lankan pilgrims performed Hajj this year?

Ambassador Al-Kahtani: The number of Hajj pilgrims from the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka reached approximately 3,500, within the quota allocated to Sri Lanka for this season.

Q: Are there any discussions regarding increasing Sri Lanka’s quota in the future?

Ambassador Al-Kahtani:Hajj quotas are determined according to approved regulatory mechanisms that take into account a range of considerations. The relevant authorities in the Kingdom continue to study various aspects related to developing Hajj services and accommodating the allocated numbers for all countries, in coordination with the concerned parties.

Q: What were the most prominent special arrangements implemented this year?

Ambassador Al-Kahtani: The operational plans for this season focused on enhancing the safety and comfort of the Hajj pilgrims, especially given the climatic conditions and high temperatures. Measures included expanding shaded areas, increasing water distribution points and enhancing health and ambulance services, in addition to developing the transportation system and traffic management within the holy sites.

Q: What are the most prominent digital systems and smart services that were provided?

Ambassador Al-Kahtani:The Kingdom continues to implement its digital transformation objectives for the Hajj and Umrah system. The scope of electronic services offered through the Nusuk platform and application has been expanded, along with the development of digital systems for issuing permits, managing crowds, guidance and health services. This contributes to increasing the efficiency of services and improving the pilgrim’s experience at all stages of their journey.

Q: How were the challenges of overcrowding and heat addressed?

Ambassador Al-Kahtani: The relevant authorities adopted an integrated crowd-management system based on modern technologies and real-time data analysis. This was coupled with intensified health-awareness campaigns, expanded organised movement routes and increased deployment of field, medical and emergency teams. These measures support the safety of the Hajj pilgrims and reduce the risks associated with crowd density and climatic conditions.

Q: Were there special services for the elderly and sick?

Ambassador Al-Kahtani: Yes. The Kingdom paid special attention to the elderly and people with special health needs by providing specialized medical services, assistive transportation and facilities equipped to meet their needs, in addition to field teams working to provide humanitarian support and necessary healthcare throughout the Hajj period.

Q: How successful was the Kingdom in combating irregular Hajj permits?

Ambassador Al-Kahtani: The relevant authorities in the Kingdom continued to rigorously implement the regulations and instructions governing Hajj, utilising modern technologies and advanced monitoring procedures to reduce violations related to irregular Hajj. These efforts contributed to enhancing the safety of pilgrims, improving crowd-management efficiency and maintaining the smooth flow of movement within the holy sites.

Q: How would you describe Saudi-Sri Lankan cooperation in organising Hajj?

Ambassador Al-Kahtani: Cooperation between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Republic of Sri Lanka is characterised by continuous and constructive coordination in all matters related to Hajj. The relevant authorities in both countries work jointly to ensure the provision of the best services for Sri Lankan pilgrims and enable them to perform their rituals with ease and peace of mind.

Q: How many Hajj pilgrims were there globally, and what were the main challenges?

Ambassador Al-Kahtani: According to official statistics, the number of Hajj pilgrims this year reached 1,707,301 from various countries around the world. The main challenges included managing large crowds, ensuring public safety and providing health, transportation and accommodation services within a specific geographical and temporal scope. These challenges were addressed through advanced and integrated operational plans, which contributed to the smooth and successful completion of the Hajj season.

Q: Are there any future expansion projects?

Ambassador Al-Kahtani: The Kingdom continues to implement strategic development projects within the framework of Vision 2030, including developing the infrastructure in Makkah and the Holy Sites, and enhancing transportation networks and smart services. This contributes to raising the quality of services provided to pilgrims and Umrah performers and improving their long-term experience.

Q: How are Saudi-Sri Lankan relations  strengthened outside the context of Hajj?

Ambassador Al-Kahtani: Relations between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Republic of Sri Lanka are witnessing continuous development in many areas, including political, economic, trade, cultural and educational cooperation, in addition to developing exchanges between institutions and the private sector. This reflects the two countries’ keenness to strengthen the bilateral partnership and achieve common interests.

Q: What message would you like to convey to Sri Lankan Muslims?

Ambassador Al-Kahtani: We extend our sincere congratulations to the Hajj pilgrims who have completed their Hajj rituals, and we ask Almighty Allah to accept their pilgrimage. We also assure Muslims in Sri Lanka that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia places serving the Two Holy Mosques and the guests of Almighty Allah at the forefront of its priorities and continues to develop the Hajj and Umrah system to achieve the highest standards of quality and safety.

By Ifham Nizam

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