Features
Sri Lanka’s Foreign Policy amid Geopolitical Transformations: 1990-2024 – Part V
Foreign Policy and Peace process under Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe
Soon after Ranil Wickremesinghe became the Prime Minister following the snap parliamentary elections in December 2001, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) unilaterally declared a ceasefire. The newly formed the United National Front (UNF) government under the leadership of the Prime Minister responded positively to this gesture of goodwill. On February 22, 2002, the government and the LTTE signed the Ceasefire Agreement (CFA). As part of the agreement, an International Monitoring Mission was established to oversee and ensure the implementation of the ceasefire.
The shift in the international situation, particularly following 9/11, played a crucial role in compelling the LTTE to agree to a ceasefire and enter negotiations with the Sri Lankan Government. By this time, the LTTE had already been designated as a terrorist organisation by several countries. In this context, continuing the war posed significant risks, with potential consequences that the LTTE would likely be unable to withstand. The changing demographics of the North and East posed a significant challenge to the LTTE. The mass exodus of Tamils from these regions led to the migration of approximately 500,000 Tamils abroad, while an additional 200,000 relocated to the south of Sri Lanka. As a result, the Tamil population, which had constituted 12% of the total population at the onset of the conflict, was reduced to just 8% (Smith, 2003). Another crucial factor was the rise of a pro-LTTE Tamil business community—comprising professionals and entrepreneurs operating internationally. These individuals were far more attuned to global political shifts and pressures, making them more responsive to international dynamics.
The hastily inked UNF-LTTE Ceasefire Agreement had several significant weaknesses. Many of these could have been avoided had the Government of Sri Lanka (GOSL) engaged in more careful pre-ceasefire agreement bargaining with the LTTE, instead of rushing to sign the agreement. It granted numerous concessions without receiving any reciprocation. Additionally, the agreement lacked a clear time frame and established an open-ended ceasefire without committing to a political settlement. These flaws hindered the progress of negotiations.
After six rounds of talks, the LTTE unilaterally withdrew from peace negotiation in April 2023. Despite repeated efforts by Norwegian facilitators, supported by Japan and other international stakeholders, to bring the LTTE back to the table, all attempts failed. The LTTE adamantly refused even to attend the Tokyo Conference on Reconstruction and Development of Sri Lanka (Tokyo Aid Confab) to be held in June 2003.
It was clear that the peace process with international facilitation was frozen on the brink. Meanwhile, the LTTE maneuvered the UNF government to present three sets of proposals for an interim arrangement one after another and rejected them all. At this point, the LTTE presented its own proposal for an Interim Self-Governing Authority (ISGA) and insisted that any future peace discussions be based on it. The sharp political brinkmanship of LTTE in the face of naivety of the UNF Government was clearly evident by the way the ISGA was presented and made it to be a condition for any future peace talks. In November 2023, when the peace process reached an impasse, President Kumaratunga exercised her executive power to dissolve Parliament, effectively ending the UNF-led peace process. The final attempt to revive the stalled peace talks by the Norwegian facilitators led to the Geneva talks in February 2006 to realize that both sides were no longer willing to politically invest in the negotiations.
Sri Lanka’s foreign policy under the UNF government, (December 2001- November 2013, largely shaped by Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe, was primarily focused on facilitating peace negotiations with the LTTE. The country’s international relations were predominantly framed around these negotiations, with diplomatic efforts concentrated on garnering both regional and global support for the peace process.
Eelam War-IV and Foreign Policy
Sri Lanka’s domestic political landscape underwent a profound transformation following the parliamentary elections on April 2, 2004, which saw the rise of Mahinda Rajapaksa to the position of Prime Minister. By now, the peace process initiated by Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe with international mediation was stuck in limbo. The LTTE’s intransigence became apparent as efforts by international facilitators and other stakeholders to revive peace talks repeatedly faltered. Simultaneously, a tide of Sinhala nationalist forces, with some vocal Buddhist monks playing a prominent role, gained increasing prominence. This political wind in the South was particularly evident in the strong opposition to the Post-Tsunami Operational Management Structure (P-TOMS) presented by President Kumaratunga. The gulf between the LTTE and the Government was intensified following the assassination of Foreign Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar by the LTTE. Against this backdrop of growing instability, Mahinda Rajapaksa, backed by Sinhala nationalist forces, won the presidential election on November 17, 2005, defeating Ranil Wickremesinghe.
When Mahinda Rajapaksa became President, the ceasefire was just limited to a paper, presenting no obstacle to military action between the parties. The violence had escalated to full-scale war, marking the beginning of Eelam War IV in August 2006. From the very beginning, the winds on the battlefield blew decisively in favour of the GOSL forces. After acquiring the territory in the Eastern province controlled by the LTTE in September 2007, the GOSL forces embarked on the second phase of its military offensive against the LTTE in the Mannar District in the Northern Province. In the face of the advancing GOSL forces, the territory held by the LTTE in the Wanni area contracted rapidly confining it to a narrow strip of land in the Mullaitivu district.
During Eelam War IV, international opinion turned against the LTTE, largely due to the global backlash against terrorism following 9/11. The group’s designation as a terrorist organisation by multiple countries severely hindered its operations, particularly in fundraising, arms trafficking, and recruitment. Additionally, the second generation of the Tamil diaspora, more attuned to evolving social and political dynamics, became less willing to jeopardize their stability and future for the LTTE.
After the collapse of all LTTE military strongholds, the LTTE sought to create a humanitarian crisis that they believed would prompt international intervention. They hoped this would eventually lead to the establishment of a transitional authority under UN supervision, followed by a plebiscite within a specified timeframe. To set this scenario in motion, the LTTE took over 250,000 ordinary people, planning to hold them until the situation unfolded as expected. The LTTE was convinced until the last moment that these Tamil civilians would stay with them. However, once the GOSL forces broke the siege, the civilians abandoned the LTTE, leaving them vulnerable to attack. The total military defeat of the LTTE at the Nanthikadal lagoon marked the dramatic end of nearly three decades of armed conflict in May 2009.
Sri Lanka’s foreign policy during the Eelam War IV was primarily focused on managing international pressure and addressing India’s concerns. International Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) regularly issued reports highlighting human rights violations committed by both sides of the conflict. In September 2008, there was an attempt to broker a ceasefire through the UN. However, the Government of Sri Lanka (GOSL) stood firm in its demand for the total surrender of the LTTE (Salter, 2015: 324). In response to mounting international pressure over civilian casualties, the government declared the establishment of a “No Fire Zone” on January 21, 2009. Five days later, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon met with Minister Basil Rajapaksa in New York, expressing deep concern over the humanitarian situation in the Wanni. He urged both parties to respect the No Fire Zone and facilitate the movement of civilians out of the conflict zone.
The Sri Lankan government failed to recognise that international concern extended beyond the LTTE to the plight of civilians trapped in conflict zones. It frequently accused international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) of being pro-LTTE, alleging they were influenced by the pro-LTTE Tamil Diaspora. During the final stage of Eelam War IV, the co-chairs of the Sri Lankan peace process—the European Union, Japan, Norway, and the United States—issued a statement urging an end to shelling in the no-fire zone. They called on the LTTE to negotiate an end to hostilities, surrender arms, renounce violence, accept an amnesty, and participate in a political process for a lasting solution. However, the Sri Lankan government viewed this as an attempt to protect the LTTE and rejected the co-chairs’ ceasefire proposal. As a result, the Co-Chairs found themselves with few viable options—trapped between Scylla and Charybdis.
Another critical factor that emerged in the final stage of the war was India’s role. From the outset of the ethnic conflict, the LTTE maintained a strong presence in Tamil Nadu. However, the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi in May 1991 dramatically altered the political landscape, leading both the DMK and AIADMK—the two major political parties in Tamil Nadu—to distance themselves from the LTTE. The situation shifted again with the onset of Eelam War IV. A key turning point was the Sri Lankan airstrike on the Sencholai orphanage on 14 August 2006, which triggered widespread public outcry in Tamil Nadu. As D.B.S. Jeyaraj (2008) observed, the public unrest during this period should not be mistaken for support for the LTTE. Rather, it reflected the deep concern of Tamil Nadu’s 70 million Tamils for their ethnic counterparts across the Palk Strait.
In late 2008, the situation in Sri Lanka significantly influenced Tamil Nadu politics. In response to mounting pressure from Tamil Nadu, the Indian National Security Advisor, M.K. Narayanan, summoned the Sri Lankan Deputy High Commissioner to express India’s deep concern and dissatisfaction over the rising number of Tamil civilian casualties. Shortly thereafter, Sri Lankan President Mahinda Rajapaksa met with Indian High Commissioner to Sri Lanka, Alok Prasad, assuring him that Sri Lanka was doing everything possible to address India’s concerns.
Both the US and India continued to support Sri Lanka’s armed forces while urging all parties to minimise civilian casualties and adhere to International Humanitarian Law. Despite the suspension of direct US military aid in December 2008 due to human rights concerns, US-Sri Lanka military cooperation persisted, focusing on naval capabilities, including firepower, radar systems, and intelligence sharing. India’s assistance included intelligence sharing, air force training, radar systems, and anti-aircraft guns, with satellite communication via INSAT playing a crucial role in coordinating ground and air operations.
New Delhi appeared to prioritise strong Indo-Sri Lanka relations over Tamil Nadu’s demands from a regional and global political perspective. This was evident in India’s decision to vote against the 2009 UNHRC resolution on Sri Lanka, underscoring Tamil Nadu’s peripheral role in shaping India’s Sri Lanka policy.
by Gamini Keerawella
(To be continued)
Features
Power crept into the Sangha and is now tearing it apart
For more than a century, Sri Lankan society has lived with a quiet contradiction at the heart of its religious life. On the one hand, the Buddhist monk is revered as the embodiment of moral discipline, selfrestraint, and renunciation. On the other, the modern monk has become a public figure, political actor, administrator, media personality, and in some cases power broker whose influence extends far beyond the temple. This contradiction has been tolerated, even celebrated, for decades. But recent events, most notably a widely publicised case involving a senior monk accused of grave moral misconduct, have forced the country to confront a painful truth: the institutional conditions that make such scandals possible are not new. They are the predictable outcome of a long historical process that H. L. Seneviratne described with remarkable clarity in The Work of Kings. The moral deterioration visible today is not an aberration. It is the culmination of a centurylong transformation in the identity, function, and authority of the Sangha.
To understand how we arrived at this moment, it is necessary to revisit the argument Seneviratne made nearly three decades ago. His thesis was simple but profound: the modern Sri Lankan monkhood has taken on the ‘work of kings.’ By this he meant that monks, instead of confining themselves to the renunciant life prescribed by the Vinaya, have assumed the secular responsibilities once associated with precolonial kingship, such as protecting the religion, organising society, guiding the nation, and enforcing moral order. This shift, he argued, was not a natural evolution of Buddhist tradition but a modern invention shaped by colonialism, nationalism, and the anxieties of a society struggling to redefine itself in the face of foreign domination. The monk became a symbol of national identity, a guardian of cultural authenticity, and a leader in the struggle for political autonomy. In the process, the boundaries that once separated the monastic from the worldly began to dissolve.
Transformation
The consequences of this transformation were not immediately visible. For decades, the activist monk was celebrated as a patriot, a reformer, and a moral guide. His involvement in education, social welfare, and nationalist mobilisation was seen as a necessary response to colonial pressures and missionary competition. But beneath the surface, the foundations of monastic discipline were slowly eroding. The Vinaya, which had served for centuries as a rigorous framework for regulating monastic life, was increasingly overshadowed by the demands of public engagement. The communal structures that once ensured accountability, senior supervision, collective confession, and the daily rhythms of monastic routine, were weakened by the pressures of modernity. Monks who travelled constantly, managed institutions, or lived independently in urban temples found themselves outside the traditional systems of oversight that had long protected the integrity of the Sangha.
Scandal
It is within this historical context that the recent scandal must be understood. The case shocked the nation not only because of the severity of the allegations but because it shattered the public’s assumption that the monkhood remains a bastion of moral purity. Yet the shock itself reveals a collective denial. For years, Sri Lankan society has been aware, sometimes quietly, sometimes openly—of the growing gap between the ideal of the monk and the realities of modern monastic life. Stories of misconduct, financial irregularities, political manipulation, and abuse of authority have circulated with increasing frequency. But each incident has been treated as an isolated failure, a personal weakness, or an unfortunate exception. What has been missing is recognition that these incidents are symptoms of a deeper structural problem.
Seneviratne’s analysis helps illuminate this problem. When monks take on the work of kings, they inevitably enter domains of power that expose them to temptations the Vinaya was designed to avoid. Handling money, managing institutions, cultivating political patrons, and exercising authority over laypeople create opportunities for ego, ambition, and moral compromise. The monk who becomes a public figure is no longer shielded by the anonymity and humility of the renunciant life. Instead, he becomes a celebrity, a leader, and in some cases an object of uncritical devotion. This elevation brings with it a dangerous form of immunity. Laypeople who revere a monk for his public achievements may hesitate to question his behaviour. Politicians who rely on monastic support may protect him from scrutiny. The media, which often treats monks as moral authorities, may be reluctant to investigate allegations that challenge the sanctity of the robe.
The recent scandal illustrates how these dynamics can converge. The monk at the centre of the case was not an obscure figure. He was a respected preacher, charismatic leader, and head of a prominent institution. His public image was built on years of service, teaching, and community engagement. Yet it was precisely this public stature that allowed him to operate without meaningful oversight. The institutional structures around him, administrators, lay supporters, and junior monks, were either unwilling or unable to challenge his authority. The very qualities that made him a respected figure in the eyes of the public also made him untouchable within his own institution. When allegations finally emerged, they revealed not only personal wrongdoing but a systemic failure of accountability.
Failure that is not unique
This failure is not unique to one temple or one monk. It reflects a broader pattern within the modern Sangha. As monastic institutions have grown in size, wealth, and influence, their internal governance has struggled to keep pace. Many temples operate as semiautonomous entities controlled by a single monk or a small group of monks. Financial transparency is limited, administrative oversight is weak, and the mechanisms for addressing misconduct are often informal or ineffective. The traditional structures of monastic discipline, such as the Sangharama procedures for adjudicating offences, are rarely used in modern contexts, partly because they require collective participation and partly because they are illsuited to the complexities of contemporary institutional life. In practice, this means that monks who wield significant authority can act with little fear of internal sanction.
The politicisation of the Sangha has further complicated matters. Since the midtwentieth century, monks have played an increasingly prominent role in electoral politics, nationalist movements, and public policy debates. This involvement has given them access to political networks that can be mobilised to protect their interests. It has also created a culture in which monks are valued not for their adherence to the Vinaya but for their ability to influence public opinion, mobilise voters, or lend moral legitimacy to political causes. In such an environment, the monk who is politically useful may be shielded from criticism, while the monk who adheres strictly to the renunciant ideal may find himself marginalised or ignored.
The result is a profound distortion of monastic identity. The monk who once sought liberation from worldly attachments is now encouraged to cultivate influence, authority, and public recognition. The monk who once lived under the strict supervision of senior elders now operates in a world where independence is celebrated and oversight is minimal. The monk who once relied on laypeople for basic sustenance now controls vast resources, manages institutions, and commands the loyalty of thousands of followers. This inversion of traditional roles has created a fertile ground for moral deterioration.
Yet it would be a mistake to interpret this deterioration as evidence that the Sangha as a whole is corrupt. Many monks continue to live lives of remarkable discipline, humility, and spiritual dedication. In remote forest monasteries, small village temples, and meditation centres across the country, monks quietly uphold the ancient ideals of the renunciant life. They are not the ones who appear on television, lead political rallies, or manage large institutions. Their work is invisible, their influence subtle, and their commitment unwavering. The crisis facing the Sangha today is not a crisis of individual morality but a crisis of institutional identity. It is the product of a centurylong transformation that has blurred the boundaries between the monastic and the secular, the spiritual and the political, the renunciant and the worldly.
If Sri Lanka is to address this crisis, it must begin by acknowledging the structural nature of the problem. The temptation to treat each scandal as an isolated incident must be resisted. Instead, the country must confront the uncomfortable reality that the modern configuration of monastic life is fundamentally at odds with the principles of the Vinaya. The Sangha cannot simultaneously function as a political force, a social service provider, a media institution, and a spiritual community without compromising its integrity. The more monks are drawn into the world, the more vulnerable they become to the moral dangers that the Buddha warned against.
Reform, therefore, must focus not only on punishing individual offenders but on rethinking the institutional structures that enable misconduct. This includes strengthening internal governance, enhancing financial transparency, restoring the authority of senior elders, and reestablishing the communal practices that once ensured accountability. It also requires a broader cultural shift in how laypeople relate to monks. Blind devotion must give way to informed respect. Reverence must be balanced with responsibility. The robe must be honoured, but it must not be used as a shield against scrutiny.
Seneviratne’s work offers a valuable starting point for this rethinking. His analysis reminds us that the crisis facing the Sangha is not the result of moral decline alone but of historical forces that reshaped the identity of the monkhood. By tracing the evolution of the activist monk, he shows how the Sangha became entangled in the political and social structures of the modern nationstate. This entanglement has brought both benefits and dangers. It has allowed monks to play important roles in education, social welfare, and national development. But it has also exposed them to the corrupting influences of power, wealth, and public acclaim.
The challenge now is to disentangle the Sangha from these influences without undermining its ability to serve society. This will not be easy. The activist monk has become deeply embedded in the cultural and political fabric of the country. Many laypeople expect monks to be leaders, reformers, and guardians of national identity. Politicians rely on monastic support to legitimise their agendas. Media institutions depend on monks for content, commentary, and moral authority. Reversing this trend will require a collective effort from monks, laypeople, and political leaders alike.
Ultimately, the future of the Sangha depends on its ability to reclaim the renunciant ideal that lies at the heart of Buddhist monasticism. This does not mean withdrawing from society entirely, but it does mean reestablishing the boundaries that protect the monk from the dangers of worldly involvement. It means recognising that the true strength of the Sangha lies not in its political influence or institutional power but in its moral authority, its spiritual discipline, and its commitment to the path of liberation. The recent scandal, painful as it is, may serve as a catalyst for this reevaluation. It has exposed the vulnerabilities of the modern monastic system and forced the country to confront the consequences of a centurylong transformation.
To understand how the Vihara Devalegam Act relates to the perceived moral deformation of the clergy, it is necessary to examine how property management, state law, and monastic discipline intersect in the modern era. Historically stemming from the Buddhist Temporalities Ordinance No. 19 of 1931, this act serves as the primary legal framework governing the ‘temporalities’—meaning the secular wealth, extensive landholdings, and material donations belonging to Buddhist temples and shrines. While ancient kings granted these vast tracts of land to support the monkhood’s spiritual pursuits, the modern codification of this law has inadvertently fostered a system where property rights frequently supersede spiritual accountability.
The core of the crisis lies in the commercialisation of the monastic order that this legal framework enables. By treating temple lands as economic assets and vesting absolute administrative power in individual chief monks or lay trustees, the act has contributed to the rise of what critics term a monastic middle class. Access to vast, unregulated financial resources, rent from lands, and corporate donations has fundamentally shifted the focus of certain segments of the clergy away from the traditional path of worldly renunciation and spiritual guidance. Instead, it has driven a preoccupation with business investments, the accumulation of private capital, and luxury lifestyles, which deeply alienates a public looking to the Sangha for moral leadership.
The institutional flaws embedded in the Vihara Devalegam Act find a stark, real-world manifestation in the recent criminal case involving Venerable Pallegama Hemarathana Thero. As the chief priest of Anuradhapura and the custodian of the Atamasthana—the eight highly venerated Buddhist shrines, including the sacred Jaya Sri Maha Bodhi—Hemarathana Thero occupied one of the most powerful and wealthy positions within the Sri Lankan Sangha. His arrest on charges of sexual abuse of a minor girl perfectly illustrates how the structural defects of the Act facilitate not only moral decay but also the systemic obstruction of justice.
The core of this intersection lies in the vast, unaccountable wealth generated by the temporalities of the Anuradhapura shrines. Under the Vihara Devalegam Act, the chief custodian exercises immense, virtually unchecked control over temple revenues, state-backed land management, and millions of rupees in daily donations from millions of global pilgrims. It is precisely this immense financial liquidity that enabled the alleged deployment of vast sums of money to the victim’s family.
Furthermore, the situation underscores the profound policy failures cited regarding the helplessness of the monastic hierarchy and state enforcement. When child protection authorities initially attempted to act, the National Child Protection Authority noted severe delays and institutional resistance, stating they practically had to force the police to execute the arrest. The monk’s immediate retreat to a private hospital in Colombo upon the advancement of the criminal probe, followed by his release on bail, mirrors the exact loop described where wealthy monastics deploy high-priced legal defence teams funded directly or indirectly by their institutional positions. Because the Vihara Devalegam Act does not provide a mechanism for the immediate, unconditional forfeiture of temporal administrative rights upon a criminal indictment, the accused retains his structural power throughout the legal process. The Pallegama Thero scandal stands as definitive proof that without a fundamental overhaul of how temple wealth is legally governed and disciplined, the material benefits guaranteed by ancient temporalities will continue to shield the worst elements of moral deformation from the rule of law.
If Sri Lanka can learn from this moment and if it can recognise the structural roots of the crisis and commit to meaningful reform, then the Sangha may yet emerge stronger, more disciplined, and more faithful to its ancient ideals. But if the country continues to treat each scandal as an isolated failure and if it continues to ignore the deeper institutional problems that Seneviratne identified, then the moral deterioration we see today will only deepen. The work of kings, when performed by monks, carries a heavy price. It is time to decide whether that price is worth paying.
by Professor Amarasiri de Silva
Features
Kondachchi wind farm and battery storage project to boost energy security, says Power Ministry Secretary
The Power and Energy Ministry’s drive towards energy security and renewable energy expansion received a major boost yesterday with the signing of a tripartite cooperation agreement for the development of the 150 MW Kondachchi Wind Power Project and an integrated Battery Energy Storage System (BESS) in Mannar.
The agreement was signed at the Ministry of Power auditorium under the patronage of Power Minister Anura Karunatilaka and Deputy Power Minister Arkam Ilyas.
Speaking at the event, Ministry Secretary G. M. R. D. Aponsu described the project as a transformative investment that would strengthen the country’s electricity network while supporting Sri Lanka’s transition towards cleaner energy sources.
“The Kondachchi Wind Power Project represents a significant milestone in Sri Lanka’s renewable energy journey. By combining large-scale wind generation with advanced battery energy storage technology, we are creating a more resilient and reliable power system capable of meeting future energy demands while reducing dependence on imported fossil fuels,” Aponsu said.
The project will be developed at Silavathurai in the Kondachchi area of Mannar on lands owned by the Sri Lanka Cashew Corporation. It is expected to utilise some 31 modern wind turbines with a total installed capacity of at least 150 MW.
Aponsu said the inclusion of an integrated battery storage facility would help address the variability associated with wind power generation and ensure stable electricity supply to the national grid.
“The battery energy storage component is a key feature of this project. It will enable the efficient integration of renewable energy into the grid and enhance overall system stability, which is essential as Sri Lanka increases the share of renewables in its energy mix,” he said.
According to the Ministry, the wind farm is expected to generate nearly 525 gigawatt-hours of electricity annually, significantly reducing the country’s expenditure on imported fuel and strengthening national energy security.
The project is also expected to contribute to Sri Lanka’s climate commitments by reducing carbon dioxide emissions by an estimated 372,750 tonnes annually.
“This investment delivers both economic and environmental benefits. It will reduce greenhouse gas emissions, support sustainable development objectives and help Sri Lanka move closer to achieving its renewable energy and climate targets,” Aponsu noted.
The project will be implemented under a Public-Private Partnership (PPP) arrangement using the Build, Own and Operate (BOO) model. The Asian Development Bank is providing technical and financial advisory support through its Transaction Advisory Services programme.
The signing ceremony was attended by Pradeep Perera, Chairman of the National System Operator (Pvt) Ltd., and Takeyo Koike, Head of Market Development and Public-Private Partnership Division of the ADB, among other distinguished guests.
The Ministry said comprehensive Environmental Impact Assessments and avifaunal studies have been undertaken to ensure minimal impacts on bird populations, nearby communities and agricultural lands. A dedicated 220-kilovolt transmission system will also be constructed to connect the project to the national grid.
“The Kondachchi Wind Farm is a strategic national project that will help secure Sri Lanka’s energy future while accelerating the country’s transition towards sustainable and affordable electricity generation,” Aponsu said.
Energy sector experts view the project as one of the most important renewable energy initiatives currently being pursued in Sri Lanka, combining utility-scale wind generation with modern energy storage technology to enhance grid reliability and long-term energy sustainability.
By Ifham Nizam
Features
Saudi Arabia sets new benchmark in Hajj management as 1.7 million pilgrims complete sacred journey
Interview with Khalid Hamoud Al-Kahtani, Ambassador of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to Sri Lanka
Saudi Arabia has once again demonstrated its unparalleled capacity to manage one of the world’s largest annual religious gatherings, with this year’s Hajj pilgrimage concluding successfully despite extreme temperatures and the immense logistical challenge of accommodating more than 1.7 million pilgrims from around the world.
In an exclusive interview with The Island, Khalid Hamoud Al-Kahtani, Ambassador of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to Sri Lanka, described the 2026 Hajj season as a resounding success, crediting the achievement to the visionary leadership of the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques, His Royal Highness the Crown Prince and Prime Minister, and the coordinated efforts of multiple government agencies working around the clock to serve pilgrims.
The Ambassador noted that nearly 3,500 Sri Lankan pilgrims participated in this year’s Hajj under the quota allocated to Sri Lanka, benefiting from enhanced healthcare services, sophisticated crowd-management systems, expanded shaded areas and cutting-edge digital solutions introduced by the Kingdom.
With Saudi Arabia continuing to invest heavily in infrastructure, technology and pilgrim services under Vision 2030, Ambassador Al-Kahtani said the Kingdom remains committed to ensuring that pilgrims from around the world perform their religious duties in safety, comfort and tranquility.
The Saudi envoy also highlighted the growing partnership between Saudi Arabia and Sri Lanka, emphasising expanding cooperation not only in Hajj affairs but also in trade, investment, education, culture and institutional exchanges.
Following are excerpts of the interview:
Q: How do you assess this year’s Hajj season?
Ambassador Al-Kahtani: This year’s Hajj season was a resounding success, thanks to the Almighty Allah and the integrated efforts of the government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, led by the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques and His Royal Highness the Crown Prince and Prime Minister. This success was reflected in the efficiency of crowd management, the quality of services provided to the Hajj pilgrims and the effective coordination among the various relevant authorities, which enabled pilgrims to perform their rituals in an atmosphere of security, tranquility and ease.
Q: How many Sri Lankan pilgrims performed Hajj this year?
Ambassador Al-Kahtani: The number of Hajj pilgrims from the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka reached approximately 3,500, within the quota allocated to Sri Lanka for this season.
Q: Are there any discussions regarding increasing Sri Lanka’s quota in the future?
Ambassador Al-Kahtani:Hajj quotas are determined according to approved regulatory mechanisms that take into account a range of considerations. The relevant authorities in the Kingdom continue to study various aspects related to developing Hajj services and accommodating the allocated numbers for all countries, in coordination with the concerned parties.
Q: What were the most prominent special arrangements implemented this year?
Ambassador Al-Kahtani: The operational plans for this season focused on enhancing the safety and comfort of the Hajj pilgrims, especially given the climatic conditions and high temperatures. Measures included expanding shaded areas, increasing water distribution points and enhancing health and ambulance services, in addition to developing the transportation system and traffic management within the holy sites.
Q: What are the most prominent digital systems and smart services that were provided?
Ambassador Al-Kahtani:The Kingdom continues to implement its digital transformation objectives for the Hajj and Umrah system. The scope of electronic services offered through the Nusuk platform and application has been expanded, along with the development of digital systems for issuing permits, managing crowds, guidance and health services. This contributes to increasing the efficiency of services and improving the pilgrim’s experience at all stages of their journey.
Q: How were the challenges of overcrowding and heat addressed?
Ambassador Al-Kahtani: The relevant authorities adopted an integrated crowd-management system based on modern technologies and real-time data analysis. This was coupled with intensified health-awareness campaigns, expanded organised movement routes and increased deployment of field, medical and emergency teams. These measures support the safety of the Hajj pilgrims and reduce the risks associated with crowd density and climatic conditions.
Q: Were there special services for the elderly and sick?
Ambassador Al-Kahtani: Yes. The Kingdom paid special attention to the elderly and people with special health needs by providing specialized medical services, assistive transportation and facilities equipped to meet their needs, in addition to field teams working to provide humanitarian support and necessary healthcare throughout the Hajj period.
Q: How successful was the Kingdom in combating irregular Hajj permits?
Ambassador Al-Kahtani: The relevant authorities in the Kingdom continued to rigorously implement the regulations and instructions governing Hajj, utilising modern technologies and advanced monitoring procedures to reduce violations related to irregular Hajj. These efforts contributed to enhancing the safety of pilgrims, improving crowd-management efficiency and maintaining the smooth flow of movement within the holy sites.
Q: How would you describe Saudi-Sri Lankan cooperation in organising Hajj?
Ambassador Al-Kahtani: Cooperation between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Republic of Sri Lanka is characterised by continuous and constructive coordination in all matters related to Hajj. The relevant authorities in both countries work jointly to ensure the provision of the best services for Sri Lankan pilgrims and enable them to perform their rituals with ease and peace of mind.
Q: How many Hajj pilgrims were there globally, and what were the main challenges?
Ambassador Al-Kahtani: According to official statistics, the number of Hajj pilgrims this year reached 1,707,301 from various countries around the world. The main challenges included managing large crowds, ensuring public safety and providing health, transportation and accommodation services within a specific geographical and temporal scope. These challenges were addressed through advanced and integrated operational plans, which contributed to the smooth and successful completion of the Hajj season.
Q: Are there any future expansion projects?
Ambassador Al-Kahtani: The Kingdom continues to implement strategic development projects within the framework of Vision 2030, including developing the infrastructure in Makkah and the Holy Sites, and enhancing transportation networks and smart services. This contributes to raising the quality of services provided to pilgrims and Umrah performers and improving their long-term experience.
Q: How are Saudi-Sri Lankan relations strengthened outside the context of Hajj?
Ambassador Al-Kahtani: Relations between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Republic of Sri Lanka are witnessing continuous development in many areas, including political, economic, trade, cultural and educational cooperation, in addition to developing exchanges between institutions and the private sector. This reflects the two countries’ keenness to strengthen the bilateral partnership and achieve common interests.
Q: What message would you like to convey to Sri Lankan Muslims?
Ambassador Al-Kahtani: We extend our sincere congratulations to the Hajj pilgrims who have completed their Hajj rituals, and we ask Almighty Allah to accept their pilgrimage. We also assure Muslims in Sri Lanka that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia places serving the Two Holy Mosques and the guests of Almighty Allah at the forefront of its priorities and continues to develop the Hajj and Umrah system to achieve the highest standards of quality and safety.
By Ifham Nizam
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Business5 days agoSri Lankan scientist-innovator Milinda Edirisinghe introduces AI-integrated gem testing system to gemological world
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Features6 days agoAre threats to Buddha Sasana external or from within?
