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Part I: Constitutional Principles, Legislature and the Executive

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Collective for Democracy and Rule of Law

Principles and Proposals for Political and Constitutional Reform for Democracy

The year 2024 is a election year to choose a new President and possibly a new Parliament. In that context, the theme of political and constitutional reforms has once again begun to draw the attention of the citizens, civil society movements and political parties. It is necessary to recognise that any constitutional reform effort should have two main goals. They are (a) restoring the country’s parliamentary democracy and (b) replacing, not just reforming, the existing 1978 Constitution with a new and democratic constitution. A new constitution should also give effect to the democratising hopes of the people of Sri Lanka.

Therefore, an agenda for restoring democratic government calls for major changes in the Constitution as well as the system of government.

The proposals for constitutional change and democratisation offered in this document embody the following principles and goals:

Restoring parliamentary democracy and freeing it from the control of the President and the executive.

Restoring the public trust and faith in the Constitution, Parliament, institutions of government and democracy.

Ensuring people’s right to hold the government and the elected representatives accountable through new mechanisms. The aim is to make the principle of popular sovereignty meaningful to the people who are the bearers of sovereignty in a democracy.

Preventing the government from using the political power to misuse the Constitution and the law for arbitrary and tyrannical objectives.

Deepening democracy through citizens’ participation in the process of government.

Constitutional Principles and Sovereignty

The proposed official name of the country is ‘Sri Lanka’ instead of the long name, ‘Democratic, Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka.’

The republican character of the state of Sri Lanka is to be retained with the new description: ‘Sri Lanka is one, free, sovereign, democratic, and independent Republic.’

The Sri Lankan people are sovereign and free citizens of a modern republic. They are equal members of an independent and democratic political community, valuing their ethnic, cultural, and social diversity.

A set of ‘Constitutional Principles’ will be included in the Constitution. They will be described as ‘immutable and inviolable values of democratic republicanism.’ These principles will embody the fundamental constitutional values that guide the new Constitution as well as future judicial interpretation of any of its clauses.

The following are proposed as Founding Constitutional Principles and Values in accordance with which the Constitution is founded and interpreted:

Sri Lanka is one, free, sovereign, democratic and independent Republic founded on the following immutable and inviolable values of democratic republicanism and consociationalism:

= human dignity, social justice, economic justice, equality and the advancement of human rights and freedoms;

(b) ethnic, gender and social equality;

(c) the supremacy of the Constitution and the Rule of Law;

(d) regular, uninterrupted, free and fair elections and a multi-party system of democratic government;

(e) non-concentration of state power in one individual or institution;

(f) the assurance of accountability, responsiveness and transparency at all levels of governance;

(g) public authorities hold and exercise powers in accordance with the doctrine of public trust.

The new Constitution will embody a framework that will facilitate the shift of political power from the Executive President to Parliament. This will ensure that the abolition of the executive presidential system should lead to restoring parliamentary democracy.

We agree in principle with the proposal that was made during the Aragalaya that citizens should have the right to initiate legislation. The proposal merits a deeper study as there is also the possibility of abuse, as was the case in the initiative to ban the construction of minarets in mosques in Switzerland.

The new Constitution will create a Second Chamber, a Senate. It will augment the Parliament’s representative function. The Second Chamber will also strengthen the principle of power-sharing by giving representation to the provinces in Parliament. This will lead to establishing closer linkages between the Centre and the periphery.

The House of Representatives consists of 200 members elected on the following basis:

One hundred and thirty members will be elected from territorial constituencies. They will include multi-member and smaller constituencies carved out to facilitate the representation of social groups of shared interest.

Sixty members will be elected based on proportional representation at a national or provincial level.

Ten seats would be filled through national-level proportional representation from among parties that have not secured a seat through territorial constituencies or the sixty seats mentioned above. This will enable small parties with significant national presence without local concentration to secure parliamentary representation.

Appropriate provisions will be made to ensure adequate representation of women, youth and underrepresented’ interest groups.’

In order to prevent undemocratic manipulation of the process of government formation after an election, it is proposed that if the Prime Minister appointed after the conclusion of a general election does not win a vote of confidence at the first sitting of the new House of Representatives, s/he will be deemed to have resigned.

The Prime Minister will also be considered to have resigned if, at any time during the duration of Parliament, a vote of no-confidence is passed against her/him, the Budget is defeated, or the Statement of Government Policy is defeated. Both cases will result in a new Prime Minister being appointed. If the new Prime Minister does not win a vote of confidence within fourteen days, the House of Representatives shall be dissolved by the President as the House is no longer viable.

The House of Representatives will also stand dissolved if a motion in the name of the Prime Minister to that effect is passed. Such a motion will need the agreement of the Leader of the Opposition and the leader of the third-largest party in the House of Representatives, the latter’s agreement being required to prevent a ‘deal’ between the other two.

The PM should not have the power to advise the President to dissolve the legislature as s/he would do so when it best suits them.

Right of recall, cross-overs, expulsions, by-elections

Restoration of public trust in Parliament, as well as Members of Parliament, is another key task in rebuilding parliamentary democracy in Sri Lanka. The existing practices concerning crossovers of MPs are seen by the people as being enmeshed with the pervasive culture of political corruption. Generally, it is a practice resorted to by leading parties to secure parliamentary majorities by unethical and unlawful means.

Rectifying this distortion of Sri Lanka’s parliamentary democracy is a significant reform expectation of the citizens. It requires a mechanism for the MP’s accountability and moral obligation to the party and the voters.

An issue that was raised during the Aragalaya is the right of voters to recall an MP who has violated the mandate given to him/her. We agree in principle and suggest that a deeper study be done on how this could be incorporated into the Constitution while preventing its abuse.

We propose the following:

A Member of the House of Representatives will lose her/his seat when:

The MP votes in violation of a decision of the Party, or without permission of the Party, or,

Declares his/her support for or joins another party, the seat of such Member shall become vacant.

However, there would be safeguards for those MPs who have contested as coalition partners or under a memorandum of understanding.

Where a Member elected from a constituency ceases to be a member of the party that nominated her/him, the seat will become vacant. If this happens due to expulsion, the MP may challenge her/his expulsion in the Supreme Court within one month. The Supreme Court must rule on the application within two months.

When the seat of a Member elected from a constituency becomes vacant, a by-election will be held to fill the vacancy.

When the seat of a Member elected based on proportional representation becomes vacant, it can be filled by the Party only from among those nominated on the original PR list.

The Senate

In many countries, a Second Chamber serves as an institution of power-sharing, ensuring representation of the provinces. It also promotes closer linkages between the Centre and the periphery.

The Senate can also function as a mechanism to rectify possible imbalances of representation in the House of Representatives. Acting as an in-built mechanism against arbitrary or hasty legislation and legislation that may adversely affect the provinces will enhance the role of the Senate as an institution of democratic checks and balances.

The Senate will consist of fifty members. Each Provincial Council will elect five members who have distinguished themselves in public life, based on proportional representation. This would facilitate the representation of different communities and political parties. At least two such members shall be women.

Five members shall be appointed to the Senate by the President to represent unrepresented or underrepresented group interests or identities. Their appointment will be on the joint nomination of the Prime Minister and the Leader of the Opposition in the House of Representatives.

All Bills would be referred to the Senate to obtain its views before the Second Reading. When the Senate does not agree to a Bill other than a Money Bill, the Bill would be referred to a Joint Parliamentary Legislative Committee for consideration. The Committee will submit its report to both Houses within one month.

A Bill seeking to lay down national policy or standards on a subject or matter in the Provincial Council List that would be binding on Provincial Councils must be passed by the Senate as well, with at least two Senate members representing each province voting in favour. This will function as a safeguard to protect the powers of the Provincial Councils from the unilateral intervention of the Centre.

A Constitutional Amendment must be passed by both the House of Representatives and the Senate with a two-thirds majority. This will give the provinces a say in constitution-making and constitutional reforms.

The public and citizens’ organisations must be afforded more opportunities to be involved in the activities of the legislature. The Constitution should mandate public participation in law-making through mechanisms such as opportunities to comment on draft legislation, consultation meetings, and public hearings. Proceedings of Sectoral Oversight Committees should be broadcast online. This should be extended to Provincial Councils as well.

The Executive

Abolishing the ‘Executive Presidential’ system of government and its associated constitutional order is a longstanding and unfulfilled demand of the people of Sri Lanka. It has also generated widespread agreement among the people and political parties. As clearly articulated during the Aragalaya in 2022, the ‘executive presidency’ is the main obstacle to democracy and democratisation in Sri Lanka. Thus, an agenda for returning to parliamentary democracy in Sri Lanka calls for re-constituting the balance of power between the President and the legislature.

Making the President the nominal head of the executive while retaining the position of Head of State is a critical democratising measure proposed in this reform package.

It is proposed that the President be elected by an electoral college comprising members of the House of Representatives and the Senate.

Sri Lanka’s democratic consolidation as a multi-ethnic and pluralist democracy calls for sharing higher-level political office between ethnic communities. Therefore, a position of Vice President from a community other than the community to which the President belongs, elected by the same electoral college, is proposed.

The President and Vice-President shall be responsible and accountable to the national legislature.

While the President will be the nominal head of the executive, the Cabinet of Ministers will exercise such executive power and be answerable to the People via Parliament. The President would exercise powers on the advice of the Cabinet of Ministers conveyed to him/her by the Prime Minister, who will be the Head of the Cabinet of Ministers. The Constitution will expressly provide any exception to this rule.

The President would appoint as Prime Minister the Member of Parliament who, in the President’s opinion, is most likely to command the confidence of the House of Representatives. However, the President would not have the power to remove the Prime Minister.

Reducing the size of the Cabinet of Ministers and the number of other ministers is also a long-unfulfilled popular demand to reduce political corruption and inefficient governance. Therefore, the maximum number of Ministers proposed is twenty. Of them, at least five are to be women. Also, not less than five ministers need to belong to communities other than the majority community. There will be a Deputy Prime Minister chosen from among the ministers. However, she/he must belong to a community other than the community to which the Prime Minister belongs.

The total number of State Ministers and Deputy Ministers will be limited to twenty. Among them, not less than five will be women. Similarly, not less than five should belong to communities other than the majority community.

Secretaries of Ministries will be appointed by the National Public Service Commission in consultation with the Prime Minister.

Geoffrey Alagaratnam, President’s Counsel

Dr. A.M. Navaratne Bandara, Former Professor in Political Science, University of Peradeniya

Bhavani Fonseka, Attorney-at-law, Senior Researcher, Centre for Policy Alternatives

Dr. Mario Gomez, Executive Director, International Centre for Ethnic Studies

Dr. Sakuntala Kadirgamar, Executive Director, Law & Society Trust

Saliya Pieris, President’s Counsel

Dr. Pakiasothy Saravanamuttu, Executive Director, Centre for Policy Alternatives

Dr. Kalana Senaratne, Department of Law, University of Peradeniya

M.A. Sumanthiran, President’s Counsel

Professor Deepika Udagama, Chair Professor of Law, University of Peradeniya

Professor Jayadeva Uyangoda, Emeritus Professor of Political Science, University of Colombo

Dr. Jayampathy Wickramaratne, President’s Counsel

Lal Wijenayake, Attorney-at-law



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Opinion

IMF’s failure to tackle corruption in Sri Lanka

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Anti-corruption and governance reforms are central pillars of Sri Lanka’s $2.9 billion bailout agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). This was the first time in Asia that an IMF programme was explicitly linked to a comprehensive anti-corruption diagnostic and specific legislative measures.

At the press conference announcing the deal, Senior Mission Chief Peter Breuer said that the IMF had emphasised that anti-corruption and governance reforms are central pillars of the programme. He added that the IMF would subject Sri Lanka to a comprehensive governance diagnostic exercise, making it the first Asian economy to undergo such an exercise, which will assess corruption and governance vulnerabilities in Sri Lanka and provide prioritised and sequenced recommendations. “Sri Lanka will be the first country in Asia to undergo a governance diagnostic exercise by the IMF. We look forward to further engagement and collaboration with stakeholders and civil society organisations on this critical reform area,” the IMF official said.

An extract from the Technical Assistance Report on Governance Diagnostic Assessment, Sri Lanka  (September 30, 2023) is as follows; “The report highlights immediate and short-term measures to address key corruption issues, as well as structural reforms that require more time and resources but are essential to strengthen governance and initiate lasting change. The recommendations are designed as a coherent approach to improving governance through a focus on: clarity of authority and responsibility for core functions; financial and operational independence of essential accountability and law enforcement institutions; transparency in government practices and performance, especially relating to the planning, spending, and accounting for the use of public funds and assets; inclusive, accessible, and rule-based means to enforce private agreements and challenge official behaviour; and efficient mechanisms for making information public and holding organisations and individuals to account for their performance and behaviour”.

Further, the agreement required Sri Lanka to implement several specific, actionable measures to curb corruption vulnerabilities:

New Anti-Corruption Legislation: The government passed the landmark Anti-Corruption Act in 2023, which expanded the powers of the Commission to Investigate Allegations of Bribery or Corruption (CIABOC), required electoral candidates and officials to declare their assets, and introduced protections for whistleblowers.

Fiscal and Procurement Reforms: The IMF programme included commitments to improve public financial management, increase tax transparency, and advance public procurement laws to eliminate political interference and cronyism in government contracts.

The IMF Executive Board is supposed to continuously track these anti-corruption and governance benchmarks during its periodic programme reviews to ensure compliance. The IMF officials’ last visit to Sri Lanka was from March 26th to April 9th when they reviewed the progress of the programme, decided that it was going well and approved the release of the final tranche. Their statement did not carry any reference to the activities of the government regarding control of corruption.

The Letter of Intent submitted by the government at the conclusion of the review becomes relevant under these circumstances. It was officially released on May 29, 2026. One of the critical undertakings by the government, according to the Letter of Intent, relates to cost-recovery pricing, the government has reaffirmed its commitment to maintaining cost-recovery pricing for fuel and electricity.

Going by available communications, apparently the IMF has not inquired into what caused the increase of cost of production of electricity. Cost of electricity production has gone up due to increased use of diesel, as low quality coal is not producing the required amounts. The coal that has been recently imported has been found to be of low quality and the government has said the losses due to this misadventure will not be shifted to the people. The irregularities in the coal procurement process that has happened recently is no secret, the Auditor General’s report has pointed out the flaws in the said procedure. Ironically, the IMF programme highlights the need to have fool proof procurement and tender procedures, and emphasises “holding organisations and individuals to account for their performance and behaviour” as the above quoted Technical Assistance Report mentions, yet it is silent on this matter showing its lack of responsibility. And it wants cost-recovery pricing for electricity! This may be taken as proof that the IMF is not very much concerned about the plight of the poor.

Further, these policies and recommendations of the IMF may substantiate the accusations made by left oriented organisations that the IMF insists on austerity measures, often at the expense of welfare expenditure, in order to serve neoliberalism. The clauses on corruption control in its agreement with the government appear to be mere lip service and window dressing. If no follow-up action is taken on these requirements, such clauses have no meaning and serve no useful purpose. If it is a responsible organisation, the IMF should have called for an impartial inquiry into the coal procurement procedure, for it is mandated to ensure transparency and integrity in these procedures. Moreover, if it is concerned about the welfare of the public it should not have asked for cost-recovery pricing of electricity when the reason for the increased cost could be corruption. Instead of going into the matter of corruption the IMF asks the government to recover the losses from the people. Cannot it think of a fairer means of recovering these losses instead of burdening the already impoverished people?

Thus, the question arises whether the IMF is a tool of imperialism. Many critics, particularly in the Global South, argue that the IMF functions as an instrument of financial imperialism or neo-colonialism. Structural Adjustment Programmes of the IMF ties its emergency loans to strict conditions like austerity, privatisation, and deregulation. Critics argue these demands dismantle local welfare systems, strip developing nations of their sovereignty, and open their markets to exploitation by multinational corporations. Further, the wealthy nations, particularly the United States and European powers, hold the majority of voting shares and effectively control the institution, dictating economic policy to weaker states. Critics claim that IMF-mandated currency devaluations artificially lower the cost of raw materials and natural resources in developing countries, benefiting wealthy creditor nations which amount to resource extraction.

Another matter of concern is that the interest rate for IMF loans to Sri Lanka, contrary to common belief that it is concessionary, is 5% which is pretty high and may be unbearable to a poor country like Sri Lanka. The country was in a woeful state in 2022 and was forced to declare bankruptcy, and seek IMF assistance. If we seriously examine the cause of this economic disaster, we will see that it was due to the economic policies the country had been following since independence. We import more than we export and take loans to meet the shortfall. This practice has gone on and on and is continued at present. No government, including the present one, despite its left leaning claims, had attempted to correct this colossal mistake. Our debt burden is frightening, less said about it the better.

The obvious solution to this problem would have been to achieve self-sufficiency in our essential needs, like food, and reduce reliance on imports. Most of our needs in food and other essentials could be locally produced. The IMF may not recommend such a course of action. It would want us to remain a poor country, struggling in the vicious cycle of import-export-debt quagmire.

by N. A. de S. Amaratunga

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Opinion

When the decisive vote changes hands: Sri Lanka’s next electoral shift may already be underway

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In the summer of 1789, as the French Revolution gathered momentum, delegates of the National Assembly assembled in Versailles to debate the future of France. The seating arrangement inside the chamber was not planned to shape political vocabulary for centuries to come. Yet it did. Those who favoured sweeping political change, greater equality, and the dismantling of inherited privilege gravitated to the left side of the hall. Those who defended the monarchy, established institutions, and traditional social hierarchies took their seats on the right. What began as a matter of convenience soon became a political metaphor. More than two centuries later, we still speak of the “left” and the “right” to describe competing visions of society.

Since then, the terms have evolved and acquired different meanings across countries and historical periods. Yet, the broad distinction remains remarkably durable. Ideologies associated with the left generally place greater emphasis on social, political, and economic equality, often advocating a more active role for the state in addressing disparities and expanding collective welfare. Ideologies associated with the right tend to place greater value on tradition, market mechanisms, authority, and various forms of social hierarchy, arguing that stability and prosperity emerge from preserving established institutions and incentives. Most political movements, of course, occupy positions somewhere between these poles, combining elements of both traditions in different proportions.

Few elections have altered the course of Sri Lankan politics as dramatically as the general election of 1977. Sweeping to power with an unprecedented five-sixths majority in Parliament, the United National Party ushered in a new political and economic era under the leadership of J. R. Jayewardene. He would later become the country’s first Executive President under a constitutional framework that vested extensive powers in the office. The changes that followed reflected a decisive move towards market-oriented reforms and a political outlook that leaned more to the right than anything Sri Lanka had previously experienced.

Yet even a political machine as formidable as the UNP’s could not hold power indefinitely. After nearly seventeen years of dominance, its grip on the electorate weakened. In 1994, the pendulum swung once again, bringing Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga. The victory was widely interpreted as a return to a more socially conscious and centre-left political vision.

What followed was not merely a change of government but the emergence of a recurring pattern in Sri Lankan political landscape. Since 1994, governments of varying compositions and personalities have risen to power with crucial support from parties and constituencies positioned on the left of the political spectrum. Whether through formal coalitions, strategic alliances, or ideological influence, the left has often provided the decisive electoral weight needed to secure victory. In many cases, without that support, the arithmetic of power would have looked very different.

Yet it is equally important to recognise what Sri Lanka has not become. Despite the enduring influence of left-wing thought, the country has never embraced an uncompromising far-left political project. Instead, successive governments have largely occupied a centre-left space, balancing market economics with welfare commitments, nationalism with social reform, and political pragmatism with egalitarian aspirations. The result has been a political landscape where power changes hands, parties rise and fall, and personalities dominate headlines, but the centre of gravity remains remarkably leftist. Sri Lanka’s electorate has repeatedly rewarded those who speak the language of social justice, even while stopping short of endorsing political extremes.

One possible explanation for this enduring centre-left tendency lies not in political parties themselves, but in the cultural formation of the electorate. For much of the period between the 1960s and the liberalisation of the economy in 1977–78, Russian literature occupied a prominent place in Sri Lanka’s reading culture. Affordable translations of the works of writers such as Tolstoy, Dostoevsky, Gorky, Chekhov and Pushkin circulated widely among students, teachers and ordinary readers. Alongside their literary value, these works exposed generations of Sri Lankans to questions of social justice, class inequality, collective responsibility and the moral obligations of society toward the vulnerable.

By the early 1990s, the generation that had grown up reading this literature had come of age politically. As they entered the electorate in larger numbers, they helped shape the contours of public opinion. Their voting preferences did not necessarily favour revolutionary socialism or radical left-wing politics. Rather, they appeared to support governments that combined commitments to welfare, social protection and egalitarian ideals with the practical realities of governing a developing nation. In this sense, the centre-left orientation that has characterised much of Sri Lanka’s political landscape since 1994 may owe as much to the country’s literary and intellectual culture as to the strategies of political parties themselves.

Yet there is an apparent paradox at the heart of this story. While successive governments often drew legitimacy from centre-left political ideals, their economic policies frequently moved in a different direction. Confronted by fiscal constraints, global economic pressures and shifting geopolitical realities, they operated within an international economic order largely shaped by market-oriented principles. Institutions such as the International Monetary Fund exerted considerable influence over economic policymaking, encouraging reforms associated more closely with liberalisation, fiscal discipline and market efficiency than with traditional left-wing economics.

It was thus a balancing act that defined Sri Lankan governance for decades after 1994: governments elected on promises of social justice and collective welfare, yet compelled to pursue economic strategies shaped by the imperatives of a global market economy. Politically, the country remained centre-left. Economically, it often travelled along a more market-oriented path.

Sri Lanka may have settled its political direction for the next few years, but the next truly decisive moment may arrive closer to 2030. By then, the composition of the electorate will have changed once again. A growing share of voters will belong to Generation Z and Generation Alpha, generations whose intellectual and cultural worlds differ markedly from those that came before them.

If the electorate that emerged in the 1990s was shaped, in part, by the values encountered in Russian literature and a reading culture that emphasised questions of social responsibility, collective welfare and inequality, the generations now entering political maturity have been formed by a different landscape altogether. Their influences are increasingly digital, global and instantaneous, are shaped more by algorithms and by social media feeds, content creators and transnational cultural currents. Many have grown up in a world where entrepreneurship, individual success, innovation and market-driven solutions occupy a far more visible place in public discourse.

This generational shift is unfolding alongside broader transformations in global politics. Across much of the world, including major powers such as the United Kingdom and the United States, contemporary political movements that emphasise markets, national interests, economic competitiveness, and stronger state authority have gained momentum. Whether these trends will find a lasting echo in Sri Lanka remains a question that deserves careful attention, not merely as an electoral matter, but as one intertwined with some of the defining challenges of our time.

Today, concerns of national sovereignty, security, strategic influence and even soft power are increasingly mediated through economic strength and market performance. Nations are judged not only by their political ideals but also by their ability to compete, innovate and secure their place within an interconnected global economy. Sri Lanka, still navigating the aftermath of economic crisis and charting its future development path, finds itself at the centre of these debates.

Against this backdrop, if the decisive vote is gradually passing from a generation shaped by the books that once filled the nation’s shelves to one shaped by the screens that now fill its hands, the question therefore does not simply become who will win the next election. It is whether the intellectual and cultural influences that shaped Sri Lanka’s centre-left political consensus can retain their hold on a new electorate formed by different experiences, different technologies, and different aspirations.

If every era is ultimately defined by the stories it tells itself, what story is the next generation of Sri Lankan voters already beginning to write? Will it move the centre of gravity towards a more market-oriented, centre-right vision? The answer may well determine not only the outcome of future elections, but the ideological direction of Sri Lanka itself.

By Viran Maddumage PhD (Reading), Macquarie University,
and Sanduni Rathnayake, AAL

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Opinion

For attention of Education Minister

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Reimagining Sri Lanka’s Old Boys’ Unions into Lifelong Alumni Ecosystems A National Call for Ethical Citizenship, Educational Transformation and Social Renewal

For more than a century, Sri Lanka’s schools and colleges have produced generations of citizens who contributed immensely to the nation’s administration, education, medicine, engineering, law, agriculture, business, military service, arts, and leadership. Alongside these institutions emerged Old Boys’ Unions and alumni associations that represented far more than ceremonial organisations. They symbolised loyalty, institutional pride, brotherhood, continuity, and shared values that transcended generations. In many ways, these alumni associations became the emotional and moral extension of school life itself.

However, Sri Lanka now stands at a crossroads. While annual dinners, jubilees, and big matches continue to preserve nostalgia and tradition, many alumni organisations are increasingly struggling to remain relevant to younger generations. The modern world has changed rapidly, yet many alumni systems have remained largely unchanged. Today’s youth face digital disruption, migration pressures, economic uncertainty, social fragmentation, mental stress, and intense competition. As a result, younger alumni increasingly seek practical value from institutional networks through mentorship, career guidance, entrepreneurship support, emotional wellbeing systems, digital networking, and lifelong learning opportunities. Unfortunately, many traditional alumni associations continue functioning mainly as event-driven organisations rather than dynamic ecosystems capable of supporting individuals throughout life.

Globally, leading educational institutions in countries such as Singapore, the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, Japan, and India have transformed their alumni organisations into sophisticated lifelong engagement ecosystems. These institutions maintain integrated digital platforms that support graduates from the moment they leave school until retirement and beyond. Their alumni systems provide mentorship, startup incubation, executive education, mental health assistance, professional networking, welfare support, diaspora engagement, retirement communities, and AI-driven alumni management systems. These modern ecosystems have evolved into strategic human capital development platforms that strengthen institutions, economies, and societies.

Sri Lanka possesses one of the strongest school identity cultures in Asia. The emotional attachment Sri Lankans maintain toward their alma mater remains exceptionally powerful even decades after leaving school. This cultural strength presents a historic national opportunity. If properly restructured, professionally governed, digitally transformed, and strategically managed, Sri Lankan alumni associations could become one of the country’s strongest long-term mechanisms for shaping ethical citizenship, reducing corruption, strengthening social cohesion, and nurturing morally grounded future generations.

One of the major weaknesses in modern society is that moral guidance and ethical accountability often decline sharply after formal schooling ends. During school life, students operate within structured environments shaped by discipline, institutional culture, accountability, and values. Yet, once individuals leave school, many gradually disconnect from those value systems and become increasingly exposed to political manipulation, unethical business cultures, social isolation, corruption, and declining civic responsibility. The absence of long-term moral ecosystems contributes significantly to the erosion of social ethics within society.

This is where modern Alumni Ecosystems can play a transformative role. A properly functioning alumni system should not merely preserve memories of the past. It should reinforce ethical citizenship and moral accountability throughout adulthood. Alumni communities can continuously remind individuals where they came from, what values shaped them, and what responsibilities they carry toward society. Such ecosystems can cultivate leadership ethics, civic consciousness, professional integrity, and social responsibility across generations. In this context, alumni associations become not merely educational bodies, but important instruments of national governance and social development.

A well-managed alumni ecosystem can therefore contribute meaningfully toward building a corruption-free society. Ethical peer influence, mentorship from respected senior alumni, intergenerational accountability, and strong institutional identity can discourage unethical behaviour and reinforce integrity in professional and public life. Sri Lanka should envision a future where every student entering adulthood remains connected to a structured lifelong support network. School leavers could receive career guidance and mentorship, entrepreneurs could access ethical business networks and investment opportunities, migrant professionals could reconnect globally through alumni platforms, and retired alumni could continue contributing through mentoring and community service. Elderly alumni could receive welfare support, companionship, and dignity during the later stages of life.

Another important concept is the “1950 Generation Acid Test” for alumni organisations. The true strength of an alumni association should not be measured merely by the number of events conducted or sponsorships obtained. Instead, institutions must ask how many of their oldest surviving alumni — particularly those born around 1950 or earlier — remain actively connected, respected, cared for, and meaningfully engaged by the institution. The demographic profile, wellbeing, engagement, and continued institutional connectivity of the oldest surviving members should be recognized as one of the most important indicators of the true strength, ethical legitimacy, and long-term sustainability of any alumni ecosystem.

Sri Lanka now urgently requires a National Alumni Transformation Framework under the Ministry of Education. Such a framework should modernise alumni constitutions, establish professional alumni offices, digitise databases, introduce transparent governance standards, integrate youth representation, strengthen diaspora engagement, establish welfare and wellness units, and create lifelong mentorship ecosystems. A structured tripartite partnership involving the College Alumni Association, the Principal of the respective college, and the Provincial Education Authorities could become a transformative governance mechanism to ensure continuity, accountability, intergenerational engagement, and value-based citizenship development.

Sri Lanka’s long-term transformation will not be achieved through infrastructure development alone. It will be achieved through people — and people are shaped not only during schooling, but through the lifelong communities they remain connected to afterward. The next decade may therefore determine whether Sri Lanka’s Old Boys’ Unions gradually decline into ceremonial nostalgia-driven organisations or evolve into intelligent, intergenerational Alumni Ecosystems capable of shaping ethical citizenship, corruption-free leadership cultures, and national transformation itself.

by Dammike Kobbekaduwe
FIPM (SL), Member-CIPM (SL), MBA (HRM)Founder Director of the Proprietary Planters Alliance (Pvt) Ltd

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