Features
IPKF’S Withdrawal: Correspondence between Premadasa and Rajiv Gandhi
2 June 1989
My dear Prime Minister,
I am writing to you on some matters of urgent importance. The most immediate matter relates to the presence of Indian Forces in Sri Lanka. After I assumed the Presidency of Sri Lanka, the Government of India initiated the withdrawal of troops. We are grateful for your prompt action in this regard.
One of the important campaign pledges made by me at both the Presidential and Parliamentary Elections was the withdrawal of the IPKF on being elected to office. I assumed the office of President of Sri Lanka-on the 2nd of January 1989. Five months have elapsed since then. The complete withdrawal of the IPKF will, hopefully, contribute to stabilizing the situation in Sri Lanka, where the presence of the IPKF has become a deeply divisive and resentful issue. It is also in keeping with your often expressed sentiments that the IPKF will be withdrawn when requested by the President of Sri Lanka.
I am thankful for the efforts of the IPKF during the time it has been in our country. I have often paid tribute to the bravery of the many officers and men who lost life and limb in the discharge of their duties. The tragedy of violence has not only affected your soldiers, it has destroyed many Sri Lankans as well. Our Armed Forces and large numbers of civilians, innocent and uninvolved, have suffered beyond description. Their sacrifices must not be in vain. I am confident that a complete withdrawal of the IPKF will enable me to secure the trust and confidence of my people. Therefore, I would like all IPKF -personnel to be withdrawn from Sri Lanka by July 31st 1989.
The withdrawal of the IPKF will also enable Sri Lanka to host the SAARC Summit in November this year in a climate of tranquility. As you are aware, we could not undertake our obligation to do this in. 1988. You will appreciate how difficult it is to hold a regional gathering of this nature with foreign forces on our soil. Our people are most enthusiastic about welcoming leaders of our own region, particularly our closest neighbours. However, their anxieties must also be satisfied, especially in relation to their deep patriotic and, nationalist sensitivities.
In this context, we have submitted several proposals regarding an Indo-Lanka Friendship Treaty. I believe that, in the long term, such an agreement will further strengthen relations between India and Sri Lanka. I await your response to our proposals in this regard.
We have always appreciated your sincere interest in the unity and the territorial integrity of our country. our own efforts to this end need the understanding and goodwill of our neighbours. I believe, that your people and you yourself, share these objectives and will contribute to their realization.
I have just seen the Aide Memoire which was handed over to me by your High Commissioner, this evening. As the Aide Memoire refers to the need for consultations between our Governments, I am designating my Foreign Secretary to personally clarify our position on these matters.
With assurances of my high consideration and esteem.
Yours sincerely,
His Excellency Shri Rajiv Gandhi
Prime Minister of India
Prime Minister’s Office
New Delhi
INDIA
Dear Mr. President,
I have your letter of the 2nd June, which was handed over to me by your Special Envoy, Foreign Secretary Tilakaratne.
India is committed to preserving the unity and integrity of Sri -Lanka, under the terms of the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement. It was as a. result of this commitment and. our responsibility as a guarantor for the implementation of the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement that we responded to the request of the Government of Sri Lanka to send the IPKF. This was at a time when the situation seemed headed inexorably towards the break-up of Sri Lanka. During its presence, the IPKF has striven, with considerable success but at heavy cost to itself, to prevent such an outcome and safeguard the unity and integrity of Sri Lanka.
Three successive elections have been held peacefully despite threats of terrorist violence in the North-East, and all Tamil-groups, barring one, have joined the democratic process. All the Tamil groups, barring one, had given up the demand for Eelam. If the process of devolution of powers to the Provincial Council had been implemented in time and had the deliberate attempt by the Sri Lankan Government to alter the population balance in the Tamil areas by the continued State-sponsored colonisation of Tamil areas been stopped, the extremists s would have been further isolated and marginalised, and the violence ended.
As you have yourself stated, we had started the withdrawal of the IPKF even before you requested for it. A broad time frame for the IPKF’s withdrawal was also discussed at our initiative, based on which your Foreign Minister had made a statement in your Parliament on the 31st March, 1989. All this was being done on the basis of assurances given by the Sri Lankan Government and the assumption that the implementation of the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement especially the devolution of powers to the Provincial Councils – would proceed simultaneously, so that the legitimate aspirations of the Tamils could be met within the framework of the unity and integrity of Sri Lanka. It is pertinent to recall that it was precisely because these aspirations were not being met that a situation was created which threatened the unity and integrity of Sri Lanka.
I have always maintained that the IPKF will not stay in Sri Lanka a day longer than necessary. But we cannot be unmindful of the responsibilities and obligations of the two countries under the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement. Tamil militant groups were persuaded to support the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement and to join the democratic process within the framework of a united Sri Lanka only on the basis of assurances that the Tamil majority North-Eastern Province will be given substantial devolution of powers. Our two Governments are, therefore, morally and legally obliged to ensure that the Tamils are given the autonomy they were promised, both in the 13th Amendment to the Sri Lankan Constitution, as also in the additional areas promised in the Agreement signed between former President Jayewardene and myself on the 7th November, 1987. Failure to do so will only lend credence to the claims made by some Tamil groups that Tamils cannot expect justice within a united Sri Lanka. We have to be fully conscious of the dangers of a return to a situation which may be worse than that prevailing prior to the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement.
We believe that, in the spirit of traditional friendship between our two countriesp we must jointly draw up a mutually agreed schedule for the full implementation of the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement and the complete withdrawal of the IPKF. The two have to be joint, parallel exercises.
We have no objection to your proposal for a Friendship Treaty. I had told your Special Envoy that we could set dates for commencing discussions with a view to finalising the text of the proposed treaty.
Yours sincerely,
His Excellency
Mr. Ranasinghe Premadasa
President of the Democratic
Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka
Colombo
MOST IMMDT CONFIDENTIAL
No.292
For Kalpage From Tilakaratna
Grateful transmit following message first thing tomorrow morning.
From H.E.President of Sri Lanka
To H.E. Prime Minister of India
Excellency,
I am glad to inform you that the LTTE has announced a complete cessation of hostilities against the Sri Lanka Government with immediate effect.The LTTE which is no longer a proscribed group has in the course of recent discussions with the Government of Sri Lanka agreed to settle whatever problems they have through a process of negotiation.
Under the circumstances it will be appreciated if your Excellency will ensure that the IPKF does not take any offensive action against the LTTE which will tend to prejudice the negotiations that are currently. in progress.Accept Excellency the assurances of my highest consideration.
R. PREMADASA, PRESIDENT

Dear Prime Minister,
I am in receipt of your letter of 20 June in reply to my letter of 2 June 1989.I thank you for reiterating India’s commitment to preserve the unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Sri Lanka as was stated in the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement.
We appreciate ‘the assistance given by the Indian Government in providing the personnel to assist in the acceptance of arms surrendered by the militants as envisaged by- Article 2.9 of the Agreement. We are also thankful for the assistance provided at our request, in terms of Article 2.16(c) of the Agreement and paragraph 6 of the Annexure in affording military assistance to ensure the cessation of hostilities.
I am unable however to accept the contention that the implementation of the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement, including the devolution of powers to the Provincial Councils, is in any way linked with the withdrawal of the Indian Armed Forces. They had been invited to Sri Lanka for the specific purpose of guaranteeing and enforcing the cessation of hostilities. The Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement does not provide for continued military activities by the Indian Armed Forces in Sri Lanka after a request has been made by me to have them withdrawn. Continuation of such military activities would also be a violation of peremptory norms of international law.
The Indian Peace Keeping Force came to Sri Lanka at the request of the President of Sri Lanka. Due to the circumstances that arose thereafter the IPKF was requested by the President to afford military assistance to ensure the cessation of hostilities. The only condition that should be satisfied for the withdrawal of the Indian Armed Forces is a decision by the President of Sri Lanka that they should be withdrawn. The request made by me to withdraw the Indian Armed Forces has satisfied this condition. It is therefore incumbent on the Government of India to withdraw the Indian Armed Forces from Sri Lanka.
The proposals for the political settlement of the ethnic problem negotiated from 4.5.1986 to 19.12.1986 as well as the residual matters to be finalised between the Government of Sri Lanka and the Government of India have all been accepted and incorporated in the relevant amendments to our Constitution and the Provincial Councils Act. The delay in -giving effect to certain proposals within the time frame envisaged by the Agreement had been occasioned by the inability of the Indian Armed Forces to ensure a cessation of hostilities and violence in the North and the East.
The actual functioning of the Provincial Councils in the new system of administration is applicable not only to the North and the East -but to all the Provinces of Sri Lanka. This is entirely a political process in which the military has no role whatsoever. You will no doubt agree that it has been an experience common in many other jurisdictions that the establishment of an entirely. new structure of administration based on devolution, is essentially a long term process. There is neither a legal nor any other rational basis for the presence of any military force to ensure that the administrative structure is fully in place in any Province of Sri Lanka. I have, in consultation with the Ministers of the Cabinet and Chief Ministers of the Provincial Councils, taken all steps to ensure that the administrative structure necessary for the effective exercise of devolved powers is in place as expeditiously as possible.
As I have already intimated to you in my letter of 2 June 1989 one of the important pledges made by me both at the Presidential and at the Parliamentary Elections was to ensure the withdrawal of the Indian Forces. To quote the Manifesto
‘We will seek a Friendship Treaty with India on the lines of the Indo-Soviet Friendship Treaty. If by the time our candidate is elected President the Indian Forces have not left, we will ensure that they are withdrawn.’
The main Opposition Party, the Sri Lanka Freedom Party, in their election manifesto had stated that the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement would be abrogated and the Indian Forces asked to leave. Thus it will be seen that over 95% of the voters clearly mandated the withdrawal of the Indian Forces. The majority appeared the UNP proposal for the conclusion of a Friendship Treaty with India.
I would also like to mention a most significant development, which may not have been brought to your notice, namely that the majority of the people of all three communities in the North and the East demand the immediate withdrawal of the Indian Forces.
In your letter you have mentioned that there has been a deliberate attempt by the Government of Sri Lanka to alter the Population balance in the Tamil areas by continuing state-sponsored colonisation. I must emphatically refute this. There has been no colonisation whatsoever in these areas since the signing of the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement.
The ground is now set for the Government to resolve any Outstanding issues relating to the ethnic problem on the basis of consultation, compromise and consensus with all communities and groups concerned. As I have already informed you, the LTTE has announced the cessation of hostilities against the Government of Sri Lanka. They have also resolved to settle any outstanding issues through negotiations and discussions. It is in this context that I have requested you to issue the necessary instructions to the Indian Armed Forces to refrain from offensive operations against the LTTE. The LTTE has already expressed its willingness to put an end to such activities against the Indian Armed Forces on a reciprocal basis. The withdrawal of the Indian Forces within the time frame visualised by me is an essential pre-condition for the Government to proceed with the consolidation .of a political settlement.
Far from being of any assistance in the complete resolution of the ethnic problem, the presence of the Indian Forces is now a serious impediment. In this connection, I must bring to your notice an alarming development that has been taking place in the -Northern and Eastern Provinces. There are complaints that youths mostly of tender age are being forcibly conscripted by certain political groups and are being trained at the hands of the Indian Forces. I need not elaborate on the possible consequences that will follow if this is. not checked forthwith.
Therefore, in consideration of all these circumstances, I again earnestly request an immediate recommencement of the withdrawal of the Indian Armed Forces and an acceleration of this process.
I am glad at your favourable response to my proposal for a Friendship Treaty with India. We have already given our draft to the Ministry of External Affairs in New Delhi. I would request that
discussions should commence without delay, so that this Treaty could give concrete and expeditious expression to the traditional bonds of friendship between our two countries.
Yours sincerely,
High Commissioner for India
Colombo, Sri Lankan
No. COL/SCR/551/48/89
30th June, 1989.
My dear Foreign Secretary,
Please refer to your letter No.DA/MISC/1, of 29th June, 1989 forwarding to me a copy of a message from His Excellency Mr. R. Premadasa, President of Sri Lanka, to His Excellency Sri Rajiv Gandhi, Prime Minister of India.
2. I have pleasure in attaching a message from His Excellency Shri Rajiv Gandhi, Prime Minister of India, to His Excellency Mr. R. Premadasa, President of Sri Lanka, in reply.
3. I shall be grateful if the message is transmitted to its high destination most immediately.
With kind regards,
Yoursi sincerely,
(L.L. Mehrotra)
Mr. B.P.Tilakaratna,
Foreign Secretary,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Public Building,
Colombo-1.
Text of message received by the High Commissioner for India in Colombo, telephonically from His Excellency Shri Ravijv Gandhi, Prime Minister of India, to His Excellency Mr. R. Premadasa President of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka.
June 30, 1989.
Dear Mr. President,
I have your message of the 29th June sent through Your High Commissioner.
The Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement provides for a cessation of hostilities between the Tamil militant groups and the Sri Lankan Forces, and also for the Sri tankan Forces to stay in barracks in the North East Province. Both these were achieved on the 30th July, 1987. Thus there has already been an effective cessation of hostilities between the Sri Lankan Forces and the LTTE. I am glad that the LTTE has now formally conceded this reality.
We hope that the formal agreement of the LTTE to cease hostilities clearly implies their commitment to the unity and integrity of Sri Lanka and to renounce violence and to respect democratic processes. We trust that, consequent to giving up violence, the LTTE will resume surrender of arms through the Sri Lankan Government a process which had started on the 5th of August, 1987 and is not yet complete. Unless the LTTE have undertaken to hand over their arms and to renounce violence not only towards the Sri Lankan Government but towards the other citizens of the North Eastern Province, their announcement of cessation of hostilities would be meaningless.
Since the IPKF has a mandate in terms of India’s role as a guarantor, for ensuring the physical safety and security of all communities of the North Eastern Province, I would appreciate clarifications, on the points I have mentioned above. These clarifications will facilitate an immediate decision on the IPKF’s cessation of offensive action to disarm the LTTE. The earlier we receive your response, the quicker will be the process of initiating suitable action.
Yours sincerely,
H.E. Mr. R. Premadasa,
President,
Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka,
Colombo.
ANNEXURE “G”
CALLING LANKACOM NEW DELHI DATE 4.7.89. MOST IMMEDIATE
MOST IMMEDIATE
CONFIDENTIAL
No. 302
For Kalpage From Tilakaratna.
Please transmit message given below from H.E. the President to H.E. Rajiv Gandhi Prime Minister.Please transmit this tomorrow morning and inform me when you have done so.
QUOTE
Dear Prime Minister,
I have your message of 30th June tent through your High-Commissioner in response to my message requesting you to ensure that the Indian Armed Forces in Sri Lanka do not take any offensive action against the LTTE. Such action or any intensification of operations is liable to prejudice the negotiations currently in progress and prolong the armed conflict.
Your statement that cessation of hostilities took place on 30th July 1987 does not accord with facts. The LTTE ceased hostilities against the Sri Lanka Security only for a few days but resumed violence on 2nd August 1987 and continued until they announced a cessation of hostilities in June – 1989. During the interim 148 service and police personnel were killed and 80 were wounded, 481 cilvilians were killed and 115 were injured.
The LTTE announced a cessation of hostilities’ only in June this year after the commencement of the dialogue With the Government. This cessation covers not only the Government but also the people in the North and the East and in fact the people in the whole of Sri Lanka. At the same time the LTTE re-iterated its commitment to resolve all outstanding problems through negotiation and discussion and indicated their readiness to enter the democratic process.
As stated in your message you have been seeking to disarm the LTTE for the past two years and this process is not yet complete nor have you been able to bring them to the negotiating table. I am confident that I will be able to ensure that the LTTE give up their arms after the Indian Armed Forces have been withdrawn.
The political solution which I seek to provide will not only be within the frame work of our Constitution but must also preserve the sovereignty of our people, the unitary character and the territorial integrity of our country.
The responsiblity of providing safety and security for its citizens within Sri Lanka is solely the responsibility of the Government of Sri Lanka. The Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement does not and indeed cannot in International Law provide a mandate’ for the Government of India or Armed Forces to assume any responsibility for this function otherwise than at the express request of the Lanka Government. In any event during the past two years when the Indian Armed Forces were operating in a the Northern and Eastern Provinces they were unable to prevent the killings of a number of civilians and the displacement of even a larger number from their homes beside the casualties refered to above.
Any interpretation of the Agreement which seeks to provide a mandatory role for the Government of India or its Armed Forces within Sri Lanka otherwise than at express request of the Government of Sri Lanka would constitute a serious interference in the internal affairs a friendly sovereign country and a gross violation of the peremptory norms of International Law. I am sure that such is not your intention.
I trust these clarifications will enable you to ensure that the Indian Armed Forces do not continue any offensive operations against the LTTE.
Yours sincerely,
Features
The Digital Underground
Illegal Foreign Exchange, Undiyal, Hawala and Money Laundering, A Four-Part Investigative Series
Forex Platforms, Cryptocurrency, AI and the New Financial Battlefield
THE INVISIBLE FINANCIAL EMPIRE – PART III
The Boyfriend Who Was Never Real
Priya, a 34-year-old professional in Colombo, met “David” on LinkedIn. He claimed to work in fintech in Singapore. For six weeks they exchanged messages daily, about work, about life, about a recent trip he had taken to the Maldives. Eventually, the conversation turned, gently and naturally, to money.
“I’ve been trading on this platform, let me show you,” he said, sharing a screenshot of a sleek trading dashboard showing consistent, impressive returns.
Priya invested a small amount first, $500. Within days, her dashboard showed it had grown to $650. She withdrew $100 successfully, just to test it. It worked. Encouraged, she invested more. Then more. Over two months, she transferred a total of $42,000 into the platform.
When she tried to withdraw her full balance, the platform demanded a “regulatory release fee” of $8,000 before funds could be unlocked. She paid it. Then another fee appeared. Then the platform stopped responding altogether. “David” vanished. The trading dashboard, the customer support chat, the entire brokerage, all of it had never been real.
This is what investigators now call “pig butchering”, and, in 2026, the most disturbing development is not the scam itself, which has existed for years, but what now powers it: artificial intelligence has industrialised the entire operation.
From Manual Fraud to Machine-Generated Deception
For most of the past decade, romance-and-investment scams, like the one that targeted Priya, required enormous manual labour. Scam operations, many of them staffed by trafficked workers held against their will in compounds across Myanmar, Cambodia, and Laos, needed real humans to build relationships with victims over weeks, manage fake trading platforms, and respond convincingly to questions.
That labour-intensive model has now been substantially automated. According to financial-crime researchers tracking this shift through 2026, threat actors are standing up entire AI-generated “brokerage” experiences end-to-end, complete with KYC onboarding, branded customer-service chat, animated portfolio dashboards, and falsified live market data feeds, and operating them at industrial scale against multiple victims simultaneously. Generative-AI relationship managers now front the WhatsApp and Telegram conversations that once required real human scammers. AI-cloned regulator letters are generated on demand to justify the fake “release fees” that drain victims a final time before the platform disappears.
What has changed is not the deception itself, it is the production economics. The cost of running a credible synthetic brokerage against one additional victim has collapsed, meaning a single criminal network can now run hundreds of “Davids” simultaneously, each one indistinguishable from a genuine fintech professional until it is too late. (Figure 01)

Sri Lanka: From Victim Pool to Operating Base
Sri Lanka’s relationship to this global scam economy has shifted in an alarming direction over the past two years. The country is no longer only a source of victims, it has become an operating base for the criminal networks themselves.
In April, 2026, Sri Lankan police raided a five-star hotel property, in Ambakandavila, and arrested 150 individuals, including 133 Chinese nationals, 13 Vietnamese nationals, and one Malaysian national, allegedly running a cyber fraud centre with links to international criminal syndicates, based in Myanmar and Cambodia. Investigators say the operation followed a now-familiar regional pattern: recruiters advertise “online marketing” or “data entry” jobs on social media to lure foreign workers to Sri Lanka, confiscate their passports on arrival, and force them to operate scam campaigns under threat.
The Central Bank of Sri Lanka has formally flagged pig-butchering scams as a “developing threat,” warning that foreign scam networks are increasingly targeting overseas nationals through scam farms operating from Sri Lankan soil. A 2026 United Nations report estimated that at least 300,000 people have been trafficked into scam centres across Southeast Asia.
This is not an abstract international problem. It is unfolding in hotels and rented properties across the country, exploiting the same infrastructure, high-speed internet, affordable accommodation, accessible tourist visas, that Sri Lanka has built to attract legitimate digital businesses and tourists.
Where the Money Actually Goes: The Stablecoin Pipeline
Behind every successful pig-butchering scam sits a laundering pipeline that has been transformed almost as dramatically as the scams themselves, and the transformation has a single dominant feature: stablecoins.
According to the Financial Action Task Force’s March 2026, report, drawing on analysis from blockchain intelligence firms Chainalysis and TRM Labs, stablecoins accounted for 84% of the USD 154 billion in illicit virtual asset transaction volume recorded in 2025, the highest share ever observed, and a dramatic jump from just 15% only a few years earlier. TRM Labs separately found that illicit entities received USD 141 billion in stablecoins, in 2025 alone, the highest level observed in five years. (See Table 01)

The scale of state-level abuse is striking. A Russian sanctions-evasion network built around the ruble-pegged stablecoin A7A5 processed more than USD 72 billion in total volume in 2025.
Fighting Fire with Fire: AI on the Defensive Side
The same artificial intelligence reshaping financial crime is also, out of necessity, reshaping the defence against it. Legacy anti-money laundering systems, built on static, rule-based thresholds, have proven badly outmatched by AI-generated fraud operating at machine speed. Research cited by compliance technology analysts suggests that between 90% and 95% of alerts generated by legacy AML systems are false positives, consuming enormous investigator time while genuinely suspicious activity slips through.
This is not a frictionless transition. AI models are notoriously difficult to explain to regulators and examiners in the way traditional rule-based systems are. The practical compromise emerging across the industry is a hybrid model: AI handles the initial scoring and prioritisation of risk, while documented rule-based logic still governs the final decision that must be defensible to a regulator.
The Regulatory Response: Catching Up to the Digital Frontier
Regulators worldwide have begun moving to close the most dangerous gaps exposed by this digital transformation of financial crime. (See Table 02)

What Comes Next
We have now traced this investigation from the centuries-old mechanics of Hawala and Undiyal, through the three-stage architecture that turns criminal proceeds into apparently legitimate wealth, to the AI-generated frontier of digital financial crime reshaping all of it at machine speed.
In our concluding instalment, Part IV: “Sri Lanka at the Crossroads: Economic Consequences, Organised Crime and the Road Ahead”, we bring this series home. We examine precisely what all of this costs Sri Lanka in hard economic terms: lost remittances, exchange rate pressure, tax revenue forgone, and the 2026 FATF evaluation that will determine whether the country’s institutions can demonstrate, with evidence rather than legislation alone, that they are equal to this challenge. We close with a practical policy roadmap.
(The writer, a senior Chartered Accountant and professional banker, is Professor at SLIIT, Malabe.
Views expressed in this article are personal.)
Features
‘There are no private universities in Sri Lanka’ – some considerations for higher education reform
Academics involved in education policy like to say that there is no such thing as a private university in Sri Lanka. The only ‘universities’ in the country are state universities; anything else offering degrees is a private higher education institution (HEI). This position is technically accurate. Yet, in the discourse and imagination of the public, private universities are very real – people teach in them, students register in them, families pay fees, and such degree holders enter job markets in Sri Lanka and outside.
For decades, activists concerned for public higher education have ignored or resisted looking at private HEIs, as if such scrutiny would taint them. Others have worked in both types of institutions, carrying practices from each to the other. The apex body governing state universities, the UGC, has, meanwhile, ignored the concept of conflict of interest and appointed individuals in private higher education in committees and leadership positions. It is unsurprising then that some of the ideologies informing private higher education appear in reform agendas in the state sector.
This is a good time then to consider the varying types of private HEIs around us, and to take a look at some of the issues within them in the hope that higher education reform agendas will include private, as well as state higher education.
What is a ‘private university’?
First, some clarifications. In the public imaginary, a ‘private university’ is typically an institution that provides a foreign or local degree for which the student makes a payment. But this broad classification encompasses a host of diverse institutions and types of degrees which I detail below.
The Non-State Higher Education Division (NSHE) of the Ministry of Education has recognised 295 degrees by 32 institutions. Most of these are private companies and include a handful of established, well-known private HEIs that are ‘university like’. The degrees are local degrees conferred by the institutions accredited by the NSHE Division. While private HEIs conferring local degrees must be accredited by the NSHE Division, there appears to be no legal consequence for not doing so. In addition, there are several permutations of the private degree that miss the net of this Division and the Standing Committee on Accreditation and Quality Assurance (SCAQA) that assists this Division.
For one, degrees conferred by foreign universities offered, via these same private HEIs, are not vetted by the NSHE Division. Secondly, there is a growing plethora of private HEIs which have either no physical presence locally or only a dubious presence. The University Grants Commission has notified the public, through their website, that foreign universities listed in the Commonwealth Universities Yearbook and the World Higher Education Database are recognised, but refrained from giving any other details – which degrees? Offered by what modes? These details are not known. Some of the foreign universities in the lists may be legitimate entities in their own land but the degrees conferred locally, in their name, may not adhere to curriculum or teaching specifications of the NSHE Division or the UGC.
Another troubling phenomenon is the ‘top up degree’, which appears to work on the same principle as that of a pre-paid mobile connection: if I have a Diploma or an HND of a sort, I am eligible to complete a course of study which provides me with a degree, usually from a foreign university. The idea that someone who does not initially qualify for a degree programme should be able to work their way towards one is a progressive notion. This is the concept that open and distance learning (ODL) was based on initially, but which is now sadly exploited. ODL models are expected to provide opportunity for learning for those who may be excluded from traditional learning institutions. In Sri Lanka, however, we have seen ODL become a marketplace offering easy to obtain, for-fee qualifications by institutions with little commitment to superior teaching and learning.
Finally, a perusal of the many types of private HEIs and their varied degrees bring to mind another question – how should the private degrees, provided by state institutions (that are not educational institutions), be regulated? Who should do so?
All of these create a host of problems for the public – for hopeful students and parents and trusting employers. For the higher education sector, recruitment of academic staff, too, has become difficult due to this plethora of ambiguous higher education qualifications, as I discussed in a previous Kuppi article (‘Recruiting academics to state universities’).
Some issues in private HEIs – a bellwether for change in state universities
In this second part of this article, I will discuss some aspects of work in private HEIs – albeit the more established institutions – given that such issues may appear in reform agendas in future.
Across state universities, all permanent staff of a specific category are paid according to the same criteria. The picture is not so clear when it comes to private HEIs since they are different entities legally, typically companies. Private HEIs have salary scales and financial incentives that are different to each other. The more established private HEIs reportedly have attractive renumeration packages, possibly a reason for academics of state universities migrating eagerly to such institutions during sabbatical years and on retirement. This may not of course be the case with other less established, or improperly registered HEIs of which we know little. Academic staff of these more accepted private HEIs seem to value the high financial remuneration they receive (in comparison to state universities) as something that makes their work rewarding.
Attractive remuneration is important to sustain the good life and is at times seen as the institution’s way of encouraging good work. Yet, this has implications for the future of the institution: to continue to deliver on promised financial packages, institutions must continue to have large profit margins. One strategy has been to enroll multiple cohorts of students per year, even up to three or four intakes per year. This can result in exploitative work conditions, since staff must cater to all these cohorts in that same year. If there is inadequate staff, employees are further burdened. On the other hand, if there is a sudden drop in enrolments (degrees can go out of fashion) unexpected layoffs occur. Similar to other sectors that employ short-term contract staff – including state universities – in private HEIs, too, individual teachers, who are on short term contracts that need regular renewal, can feel pressured to work under difficult or exploitative conditions.
At the same time, even in the more established private HEIs, work norms differ from those of state universities in that they include promotional work that keeps the institution’s name in the eye of the public. The Marketing (or similarly named) unit comes up in conversations as one of the most important departments. It appears to weigh in on decision-making related to the number of staff, the amount of re-sits per exams, and other pedagogically important matters. This is a worrying example of how financial rationales interfere with pedagogically or academically sound processes, resulting in problematic results in the classroom. On the plus side, junior colleagues, who had experience in both state and private HEIs, also felt that they faced less harassment in private HEIs – primarily due to the private HEIs ability to take swift action in reported cases of harassment. This is a real indictment on state institutions and their reluctance to address chronic issues of harassment in our universities.
Yet, while we hear much about problems in state universities, we hardly hear of problems that staff in private HEIs face. One rationale for a lack of public expressions by staff is that expressions of discontent might lead to trouble given the importance of reputation for private HEIs. The worry about reputational damage is a growing concern in state universities, too, as evidenced by social media policies and internal conversations on reputational damage, consequent to negative publicity. Institutional worries of reputational damage are harmful in the long run since these impact not only freedom of expression by student and staff, but also research that is possible in and about the education sector.
Some thoughts at the end…
A close look at the private higher education sector is important given its strong presence in the country. Impending reform needs to regulate this diverse array of higher education offerings in the private sector, as well as the state institutions that offer privately-funded options of higher education (a topic for a separate Kuppi on its own). It is time we carefully considered how to build a whole system of higher education out of this broken mess.
Kaushalya Perera is a senior lecturer at the University of Colombo.
Kuppi is a politics and pedagogy happening on the margins of the lecture hall that parodies, subverts, and simultaneously reaffirms social hierarchies.
Features
Ready for solo spotlight
Singer Nish Peiris is set to take the next big step in her music journey.
The talented vocalist, who has been seen and heard in the scene here for a short while, and was also featured with the now-defunct band, Inner Vision, has announced that she will be fully committing to her solo career, after completing her degree this year.
“I’m finishing my degree this year, and after that I’ll be fully committing to my solo music career,” Nish told The Island.
“I’ve already got a few tours lined up for next year, so I’m really excited for what’s ahead.”
Fans, no doubt, will remember Nish for her smooth voice and stage presence, and the good news is that she is now ready to chart her own path and bring new music to audiences at home and abroad.
With tours already planned for 2027, the year 2026 promises to be an exciting year for the young artiste as she steps into the spotlight on her own.
We wish Nish every success in this new chapter!
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