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Constitution making:

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A layman’s view

by ROHANA R. WASALA

‘At least since Rousseau’s Social Contract and the end of the divine right of kings, the state has been seen as party to a contract with the people – a contract to guarantee or supply the necessary order in society. Without the state’s soldiers, police and the apparatus of control, we are told, gangs or brigands would take over our streets. Extortion, rape, robbery and murder would rip away the last threads of the “thin veneer of civilization.”’ – Alvin Toffler, Powershift, 1990.

The late Alvin Toffler (American writer, journalist, educator, and businessman) says this while reflecting on the nature of power as one of the most basic social phenomena. ‘Power……implies a world that combines both chance, necessity, chaos and order.’ According to him, we humans ‘share an irrepressible, biologically rooted craving for a modicum of order in our daily lives, along with a hunger for novelty. It is the need for order that provides the main justification for the very existence of government’.

Sri Lankans are currently experiencing, in the raw, a taste of the evils that Toffler says the absence of order would breed, which makes constitution making interesting for them. But what is a constitution? Google offers a simple definition of the term: ‘a body of fundamental principles or established precedents according to which a state or other organization is acknowledged to be governed’.

Now, Professor Jayadeva Uyangoda (‘A very wrong approach to Constitution-making’/The Island/September 29, 2020) opines that the proposed 20A has ‘several major defects’. One key fault, according to him, is that the approach adopted for drafting the amendment is ‘very wrong’. JU offers a number of reasons to explain this alleged wrongness of the ‘approach’: the ‘sponsors and framers’ (I suppose the phrase means the politicians and the legal experts behind the drafting of 20A) refuse to learn ‘constructive lessons from past constitutional reform experiments’, but they have learned some ‘partisan, narrow-minded, politically short-sighted ones’. What he probably means by this becomes clear (not clear enough though) in the rest of his article, but it is doubtful whether his sense of right and wrong in the context is shared by many outside the now diminished anti-nationalist coterie, who occupied the parliament for four and a half years and hexed it with the controversial 19A.

It is not necessary to read further into JU’s article to be able to infer where his own inexcusable biases lie. He is obviously in favour of 13A and 19A forced on the nation from outside, and is against the present government’s sincere effort to remove the obstacles placed on its path by the departing yahapalanaya through its ill-conceived constitutional mixed bag that is 19A, where what is bad is by choice, and what is good is by chance. This is not to argue that the new 20A is perfect in comparison. I share many objections raised in different quarters against the proposed 20A, but I believe that the moot points will be satisfactorily sorted out by the present leaders before they manage to get it through parliament.

The Opposition critics of 20A quite well know that it is, after all, only a stopgap measure to clear the way for the unhindered implementation of the government’s development plans. The government will introduce a completely new Constitution within a year or two. JU’s advice as a political scientist will come in handy then.

The proposed 20A is not an arbitrary piece of legislation that the government is introducing behind the back of the people. There is considerable opposition to some of its articles even within the government ranks. Unlike in the case of 19A, the passage of 20A will be a democratic, above-board affair. The Minister of Justice on behalf of the government issued it as a draft bill for public view and review in all three languages on September 2, 2020. The document clearly specifies what is to be amended, repealed, or replaced. The yahapalana constitutional fraud in the form of 19A is not being repeated. Over this four-week period, some thirty-nine petitions have been filed challenging 20A’s constitutionality before the Supreme Court and they were being heard for the third day (October 2) by a bench of five judges, at the time of writing. The government has already declared that it will abide by the court decision by duly adjusting its response to it. JU’s alarms and warnings are uncalled for.

By the phrase ‘past constitutional reform experiments’, JU must be referring to the making of the first and second republican Constitutions (of 1972 and 1978 respectively) and the substantial number of opportune as well as ad hoc amendments introduced by successive governments since, some of them questionable and controversial, where 19A stands in a class by itself as the best example of the worst type of constitutional reform introduced in Sri Lanka to date. What prompts him to describe them as experiments is probably the fact that he is a political scientist with his indispensable toolkit of academic analysis. My interest as a lay citizen, modestly informed of the original construction and subsequent reform of a constitution, is concerned with how good it is going to be for the largest number of the people of the country, as its supreme law, in the context of the more or less stable social and political realities that are prevailing.

As a Constitution is not holy writ, it is open to appropriate amendments from time to time, in compliance with the will of the people, as and when these realities change; a constitution specifies the legal way to reform or replace it as the case may be. The current 1978 republican constitution as amended up to 2015 (Chapter XII/Articles 82-84) specifies the procedure for amending or repealing the constitution. The people whose memory of the yahapalana misadventure is still fresh are anxiously aware of the necessity of passing the 20A.

Contrary to what JU asserts, the political leaders and the legal luminaries responsible for drafting the proposed 20A, have not forgotten the constructive lessons left by their respective predecessors in the form of Sirimavo Bandaranaike and Colvin R. de Silva (1972), and J.R. Jayewardene and J.A. Wilson (1978). Both Bandaranaike and Jayewardene cared about the country, the people, and the culture. Both displayed firm leadership in governing, and a high level of intellect in statecraft. Sirimavo Bandaranaike had her native wit, and Jayewardene possessed a good education. In April 1971, Bandaranaike nipped the JVP terrorism in the bud, not without some violence, though, that she never intended. Opposition leader Jayewardene approved of her actions, saying, ‘yes, a government must rule’. For her courage, firmness, and composure, she was described then as the only male in her cabinet. The contribution of the inspiration provided by Bandaranaike’s political leadership to the making of the first Republican Constitution, the principal architect of which was de Silva, must have been immense and indispensable. Later, hadn’t Jayewardene got Wilson to write the powerful institution of executive presidency into the second republican constitution (1978) as the main anchor to the unitary state, the sovereign Sri Lankan republic that Bandaranaike and de Silva created for the people would have disintegrated and drifted into wilderness and oblivion by now.

Back to the point.

The second alleged defect that JU asserts, without any evidence to support his opinion, is that ‘the framers of the 20A are not motivated by the broader democratic interests of all Sri Lankan people, but the ‘political self-interest’ (of someone or group that JU avoids mentioning). A third defect, JU identifies the Amendment’s supposed lack of ‘a democratic formative framework relevant to our society and its own progressive-modernist legacies of constitutionalism .. (together with the fact that).. it builds itself on one or two dreadful and destructive experiments of constitution-making in the recent past’. This is as close to clear as I can get in interpreting JU here. To illustrate the ‘one or two dreadful and destructive experiments of constitution-making in the recent past’, I think, he draws upon what he, assuming a kind of arbitrary academic license, calls the ‘relatively long history of unmaking, making, and amending constitutions’ that includes the 1972 and 1978 exercises on the one hand, and the 1978C and 18A on the other. JU’s adjectives ‘dreadful and destructive’ could be justifiably applied to the passage of 19A and other such ‘experiments’ in constitutional reform, as contained, for example, in Chapter IV of the Constitution of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka (As amended up to 15th May 2015) (Revised Edition – 2015) issued by the Parliamentary Secretariat. Chapter IV – Language covers Articles 18-25. One is bewildered by what the crafty, ill-meaning, ‘sponsors and framers’ have from time to time done to degrade Sinhala in its official status with the uncomprehending concurrence of some self-seeking Sinhala MPs in the House. This, of course, would be an iconic piece of constitution-making for a theorist with one’s head in the clouds.

The practical reality is that the operative meaning of any Article (whether this is legally contested or not) is implicitly embodied in the English text (though, according to the present constitution Sinhala and Tamil are both official languages, while English is the link language.). So, it is vitally important to translate the draft document that is the Constitution into precise, unambiguous, formal and legally acceptable and uncontestable Sinhala and Tamil. I detected a couple of stark discrepancies between the original English draft and the Sinhala translation (not relating to the particular context – Chapter IV – mentioned above) when I made a very random comparison between the two versions while researching an article at the time, but I don’t remember whether I dwelt on the subject long enough for it to be taken notice of by the reader as something important, though beyond the central scope of that article. Apart from this, those sufficiently informed did not fail to see how some Tamil lawmakers wanted to openly hoodwink the Sinhalas with the word ‘akeeya’ stripped of its intended original meaning of unitary, but falsely insisting that the English term ‘unitary’ was not its equivalent and was not suitable as a translation, and started talking about an ‘Orumiththa Nadu’, reminiscent of Tamil Nadu. How the question which version should prevail in case of an incongruence between the Sinhala and Tamil texts should be resolved, I can’t remember having been discussed. But the last item (58) of the published draft of 20A runs: ‘In the event of any inconsistency between the Sinhala and Tamil texts of this Act, the Sinhala text shall prevail.’

Having outlined the lessons to be learnt from constitution-making, -unmaking, and -reforming exercises up to 18A, JU moves on to the many lessons that he thinks may be drawn from the ‘much maligned’ 19A. He identifies four key lessons. The first lesson he mentions is that wide public consultation is useful, and helps ‘improve the level of democratic health in the polity’. I cannot agree with him that this was true about the drafting of 19A. It was claimed that the constitutional experts including Jayampathy Wickremaratne, presumably its principal drafter, toured the country meeting with individuals and representatives of many minority civil groups during a short period of two or three months. They had to rush the job, they said, as they were in a hurry to finish it within a stipulated time frame. About two thousand people were consulted nevertheless, they claimed. It was obvious that they roamed the country making it their main aim to pay more attention to the minorities that they had decided were discriminated against by the majority Sinhalese, as they wanted the meddling foreign powers to believe in order to justify their interventionist excesses in the internal and external politics of the country. Meanwhile they paid only symbolic attention to the Sinhalese majority. Wickremaratne, the chief architect of the fraudulent document, is now rumoured/reported to have found or is seeking political asylum in Australia or somewhere (though there is absolutely no possibility of his being targeted for persecution in Sri Lanka). He has reportedly admitted that 19A is problematic.

The second lesson that JU asserts he can learn from the making of 19A is that it is ‘better to build consensus across all political parties in Parliament for a major amendment or a new Constitution’. If he means that 19A set a negative example of that principle, then he has a case. But in actuality, 19A destroyed the burgeoning interparty consensus in Parliament and the growing intercommunal goodwill in the broader society that the MR government achieved in the wake of victory over terrorism. It was because of this that ‘for partisan political reasons, some might later withdraw from the consensus’ as JU laments.

I agree with JU on the third lesson he derives from his seemingly iconic amendment, which is that ‘If the consultation and consensus-building in constitution-making is not politically managed with clarity of purpose, the overall goals of the constitutional compromise may run the risk of producing a constitutional scheme with potentially harmful internal anomalies and contradictions’. Yes, in other words, 19A is a very good illustration of a very bad constitutional amendment.

The fourth lesson that 19A offers, according to JU, is that ‘a democratic constitution-making exercise today needs, more than ever, an unwavering political leadership to champion it through to the end by innovative and imaginative democratic means’. In my opinion, this is what the pre-2015 government achieved. 19A, by dismantling it, demonstrated how ill the nation fared in the absence of such unwavering, innovative, and democratic leadership. Then, JU starts chewing his own tail, by suggesting a ‘paradoxical’ reason: ‘Alternatives to democracy are also competing with democracy, with enormous material resources, to gain popular support and loyalty through democratic means. In this age of right-wing populism, media-manufactured popular consent and manipulation of public perceptions through information pollution, post-democratic alternatives tend to gain easy currency and public legitimacy’. Frankly, I can’t make head or tail of this, but it makes me wonder whether JU is trying to make light of the very real persecution of the majority community that is hardly recognized by most mainstream politicians, who feel obliged to find refuge behind political correctness.



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Opinion

Defeat of Terrorism and Triumph of Hypocrisy – another view

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Gotabaya, Mahinda, Basil, Chamal and Namal

This is regarding the editorial of The Island on 19 May 2026, titled “Defeat of Terrorism- Triumph of hypocrisy”.

I fully agree with the Editor when he says that Terrorism needs to be eliminated in all its forms and manifestations. Terrorism is generally defined as “massacring innocents to achieve a political aim”. Whether the cause for terrorism is justifiable or not, terrorism per se, cannot be justified and thus, should be eliminated.

However, I have different views with the rest of the editorial.

The editor says what Rajapaksas did to the country was like saving a damsel in distress and abusing her thereafter. Elaborating the same, he says that Rajapaksas have thought leadership to defeat terrorism was a special license to do as they pleased and sought to politicise and monopolise war victory to accelerate their dynasty building projects. He continues to say that the post war Mahinda Rajapaksa (MR) admininstration became a government of Rajapaksas by the Rajapaksas and for Rajapaksas. In short, the implication was that MR, after defeating LTTE, has done nothing except furthering his and his family’s political interests.

MR, even during the critical period in the war against LTTE, handled the economy professionally. There was an upward trend in SL economy from 2005–2009 showing GDP growth from 24.4 billion dollars in 2005 to 42.5 billion dollars in 2009, doubling the 2005 GDP. During 2010–2015 showed Sri Lanka’s strongest economic performance with the economy growing from US $ 56.7 billion to US $ 80.6 billion.

The annual growth rate was over 7.4%, per capita income more than tripled (from US $ 1200 to over US $ 3,600) elevating SL to lower-middle income status. National poverty level declined significantly, dropping from over 15% in 2006 to below 7% by 2012. Unemployment declined to 4 %. Transport and energy sectors received a significant boost. Massive power generation projects such as Norochcholai coal power plant and Upper Kothmale Hydro power plant were completed.

The expansion of Colombo port, development of Hambantota port, Mattala International Airport and building of expressways (Southern and Colombo-Katunayake) greatly improved the country’s transportation capacity and brought SL clear to a goal of being a dynamic Maritime and Aviation Hub.

The above statistics of the Central Bank does not prove the fact that Rajapaksas only looked after their interests after the war. Hence the proverbial “Damsel” that the editor was referring to, was not abused as he claimed, but had been looked after very well.

Excesses may have happened and it happens everywhere in every field. But the fact remains that MR defeated the most ruthless terrorist organisation in the world and developed the country with roads, rails, ports, airports, expressways, bridges, power plants, stadiums etc. which deserves appreciation.

The editor then says MR suffered a humiliating electoral defeat in 2015, again came to power in 2019, but mismanaged the economy, indulged in corruption and bankrupted the country. That too is far from the truth.

The foreign exchange crisis that culminated in 2002 was not due to mismanagement /corruption of Gotabaya Rajapaksa (GR) government but mainly due to excessive foreign borrowings during 2015-2019. By 2019 Nov, the economy was already in a precarious state, with the IMF itself warning that SL was highly vulnerable to external shocks.

The editorial never mentions Covid 19, the worst global pandemic the GR government had to face. During this period the government revenue fell by approx. Rs 534 billion. (revenue lost from import restriction of motor vehicles, Covid lockdown and closure of liquor shops were Rs 136 billion, 323 billion and 75 billion respectively.) At the end of the MR regime in 2014, the outstanding ISBs were US $ 5.3 billion and the reserves were US $ 8.2 billion. By the time GR came to power, the outstanding ISBs were US $ 15.2 billion and the reserves were US $ 7.6 billion. In 2020-2021, the GR government did not issue any ISBs but settled them in time.

The decision to maintain debt servicing was not just about protecting the country’s image in financial markets but to ensure critical health and humanitarian support including vaccines, medicines, and essential supplies continued to flow into the country during the worst global health crisis in the country.

It’s a pity that the public who remained silent when foreign debt was piling up, launched an Aragalaya to expel the leader who settled the debts without obtaining fresh loans. Was it hypocrisy or treason?

The claim that the tax reduction implemented in Dec 2019 caused a significant loss of revenue was also not correct. When economic activity is deliberately halted by a global pandemic, with borders shut, businesses closed, citizens confined to their residences, production at the lowest, no tax rate high or low, can generate revenue from transactions that are simply not occurring.

The economic downfall was not due to mismanagement or corruption but due to the promulgation of bankruptcy (debt standstill) by Central Bank (CB) on the advice of former CB governor Dr. Indrajth Coomaraswamy and consultant Prof. Shantha Devaraja. That decision undermined the on-going efforts to stabilise the economy. I consider allowing such an announcement was a mistake done by GR. It halted IMF staff level already agreed loan, Indian Credit Line of US $ 3 billion and suspended WB and ADB loans. Also, China had to halt the loans already requested as China Secure (the government insurance company) could not insure loans to a bankrupt country.

The reserves were carefully used by GR to buy vaccines giving priority to human lives, and due to lack of foreign exchange, procurement of gas and fuel was critically effected. In the final stages there was an organised campaign by saboteurs to steal and hoard fuel. The JVP members publicly appealed to Sri Lankans abroad not to send any dollars to the country. A hate campaign was carried out against the Rajapaksas.

A protest called Aragalaya was held at Galle face. The entire episode was a grand conspiracy to oust GR, who was sworn in as the President at Ruwanwelisaya, the great symbol of Sinhalese Buddhist culture. Black Vesak lanterns, ridiculing Buddhist sacred symbols, insulting the Mahanayakas, anti-unitary slogans and glorifying federalism and free biriyani for the entire crowd by “unknown” sponsors were ample evidence of its hidden agenda.

Aragalaya, which forcibly took over the Presidential Secretariat, was obviously illegal. The other mistake done by GR was to allow protesters to operate without chasing them away using force if necessary. Finally, GR, the Commander in Chief of the three forces, left the country without hurting anyone.

The editor says that Rajapaksas squandered an opportunity that presented itself after the war to bring about national reconciliation and defeat LTTE ideology politically. He says reconciliation has become a victim of hypocrisy.

MR, after the war, launched a large number of development projects in the North constructing roads, bridges, grounds, schools, hospitals, etc. All the roads were carpeted. During the period 2010-2012 the growth rate in Jaffna was 22% compared to 7% in the rest of the country. That was the first step he took towards reconciliation.

Reconciliation needs an equal contribution from both sides. Unfortunately, the goodwill shown and the enormous economic support provided by MR were never reciprocated by the Tamil politicians. MR held PC elections (without abolishing 13A even with two-thirds majority in parliament) and allowed them to elect their own leaders. That was the second step towards reconciliation.

Mr. C. V. Vigneswaran studied at Royal college and Colombo Law College, became a Magistrate, High Court judge, a judge in the Court of Appeal and in the Supreme Court. Having lived among Sinhalese for more than 65 years, after being elected as the Chief Minister in the Northern Province, he declared that the Sinhalese had no right to live in Jaffna. Every year he returned most of the funds allocated for Northern development back to the Treasury without utilising it fully, to indicate that there was no support from the government. That was how Tamil politicians contributed towards reconciliation.

After 2009, hundreds of Tamil students in the North have become doctors, engineers, lawyers, top government officials, etc., due to unhindered education. The civilians who suffered under LTTE facing abductions, paying ransom, etc., now live in peace without any fear. Most of the Tamils have migrated to areas outside the North and the East. More than 52% of the Tamils are now living among Sinhalese without any problem. Main businesses in Colombo are dominated by the Tamils. What else is required Mr. Editor for the so-called reconciliation? Granting a separate state on a platter?

With all the above, the Tamils in the North annually commemorate the very person who made their lives miserable for 30 years. How would the Sinhalese feel when they see the terrorists who killed pregnant women, monks, infants, devotees being garlanded and felicitated in the North every year?

Yes, the editor was correct. Reconciliation has become a victim of hypocrisy.

Retired Rear admiral (Dr) Sarath Weerasekera VSV RWP USP

Former Public Security Minister

 

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Opinion

IMF’s failure to tackle corruption in Sri Lanka

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Anti-corruption and governance reforms are central pillars of Sri Lanka’s $2.9 billion bailout agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). This was the first time in Asia that an IMF programme was explicitly linked to a comprehensive anti-corruption diagnostic and specific legislative measures.

At the press conference announcing the deal, Senior Mission Chief Peter Breuer said that the IMF had emphasised that anti-corruption and governance reforms are central pillars of the programme. He added that the IMF would subject Sri Lanka to a comprehensive governance diagnostic exercise, making it the first Asian economy to undergo such an exercise, which will assess corruption and governance vulnerabilities in Sri Lanka and provide prioritised and sequenced recommendations. “Sri Lanka will be the first country in Asia to undergo a governance diagnostic exercise by the IMF. We look forward to further engagement and collaboration with stakeholders and civil society organisations on this critical reform area,” the IMF official said.

An extract from the Technical Assistance Report on Governance Diagnostic Assessment, Sri Lanka  (September 30, 2023) is as follows; “The report highlights immediate and short-term measures to address key corruption issues, as well as structural reforms that require more time and resources but are essential to strengthen governance and initiate lasting change. The recommendations are designed as a coherent approach to improving governance through a focus on: clarity of authority and responsibility for core functions; financial and operational independence of essential accountability and law enforcement institutions; transparency in government practices and performance, especially relating to the planning, spending, and accounting for the use of public funds and assets; inclusive, accessible, and rule-based means to enforce private agreements and challenge official behaviour; and efficient mechanisms for making information public and holding organisations and individuals to account for their performance and behaviour”.

Further, the agreement required Sri Lanka to implement several specific, actionable measures to curb corruption vulnerabilities:

New Anti-Corruption Legislation: The government passed the landmark Anti-Corruption Act in 2023, which expanded the powers of the Commission to Investigate Allegations of Bribery or Corruption (CIABOC), required electoral candidates and officials to declare their assets, and introduced protections for whistleblowers.

Fiscal and Procurement Reforms: The IMF programme included commitments to improve public financial management, increase tax transparency, and advance public procurement laws to eliminate political interference and cronyism in government contracts.

The IMF Executive Board is supposed to continuously track these anti-corruption and governance benchmarks during its periodic programme reviews to ensure compliance. The IMF officials’ last visit to Sri Lanka was from March 26th to April 9th when they reviewed the progress of the programme, decided that it was going well and approved the release of the final tranche. Their statement did not carry any reference to the activities of the government regarding control of corruption.

The Letter of Intent submitted by the government at the conclusion of the review becomes relevant under these circumstances. It was officially released on May 29, 2026. One of the critical undertakings by the government, according to the Letter of Intent, relates to cost-recovery pricing, the government has reaffirmed its commitment to maintaining cost-recovery pricing for fuel and electricity.

Going by available communications, apparently the IMF has not inquired into what caused the increase of cost of production of electricity. Cost of electricity production has gone up due to increased use of diesel, as low quality coal is not producing the required amounts. The coal that has been recently imported has been found to be of low quality and the government has said the losses due to this misadventure will not be shifted to the people. The irregularities in the coal procurement process that has happened recently is no secret, the Auditor General’s report has pointed out the flaws in the said procedure. Ironically, the IMF programme highlights the need to have fool proof procurement and tender procedures, and emphasises “holding organisations and individuals to account for their performance and behaviour” as the above quoted Technical Assistance Report mentions, yet it is silent on this matter showing its lack of responsibility. And it wants cost-recovery pricing for electricity! This may be taken as proof that the IMF is not very much concerned about the plight of the poor.

Further, these policies and recommendations of the IMF may substantiate the accusations made by left oriented organisations that the IMF insists on austerity measures, often at the expense of welfare expenditure, in order to serve neoliberalism. The clauses on corruption control in its agreement with the government appear to be mere lip service and window dressing. If no follow-up action is taken on these requirements, such clauses have no meaning and serve no useful purpose. If it is a responsible organisation, the IMF should have called for an impartial inquiry into the coal procurement procedure, for it is mandated to ensure transparency and integrity in these procedures. Moreover, if it is concerned about the welfare of the public it should not have asked for cost-recovery pricing of electricity when the reason for the increased cost could be corruption. Instead of going into the matter of corruption the IMF asks the government to recover the losses from the people. Cannot it think of a fairer means of recovering these losses instead of burdening the already impoverished people?

Thus, the question arises whether the IMF is a tool of imperialism. Many critics, particularly in the Global South, argue that the IMF functions as an instrument of financial imperialism or neo-colonialism. Structural Adjustment Programmes of the IMF ties its emergency loans to strict conditions like austerity, privatisation, and deregulation. Critics argue these demands dismantle local welfare systems, strip developing nations of their sovereignty, and open their markets to exploitation by multinational corporations. Further, the wealthy nations, particularly the United States and European powers, hold the majority of voting shares and effectively control the institution, dictating economic policy to weaker states. Critics claim that IMF-mandated currency devaluations artificially lower the cost of raw materials and natural resources in developing countries, benefiting wealthy creditor nations which amount to resource extraction.

Another matter of concern is that the interest rate for IMF loans to Sri Lanka, contrary to common belief that it is concessionary, is 5% which is pretty high and may be unbearable to a poor country like Sri Lanka. The country was in a woeful state in 2022 and was forced to declare bankruptcy, and seek IMF assistance. If we seriously examine the cause of this economic disaster, we will see that it was due to the economic policies the country had been following since independence. We import more than we export and take loans to meet the shortfall. This practice has gone on and on and is continued at present. No government, including the present one, despite its left leaning claims, had attempted to correct this colossal mistake. Our debt burden is frightening, less said about it the better.

The obvious solution to this problem would have been to achieve self-sufficiency in our essential needs, like food, and reduce reliance on imports. Most of our needs in food and other essentials could be locally produced. The IMF may not recommend such a course of action. It would want us to remain a poor country, struggling in the vicious cycle of import-export-debt quagmire.

by N. A. de S. Amaratunga

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Opinion

When the decisive vote changes hands: Sri Lanka’s next electoral shift may already be underway

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In the summer of 1789, as the French Revolution gathered momentum, delegates of the National Assembly assembled in Versailles to debate the future of France. The seating arrangement inside the chamber was not planned to shape political vocabulary for centuries to come. Yet it did. Those who favoured sweeping political change, greater equality, and the dismantling of inherited privilege gravitated to the left side of the hall. Those who defended the monarchy, established institutions, and traditional social hierarchies took their seats on the right. What began as a matter of convenience soon became a political metaphor. More than two centuries later, we still speak of the “left” and the “right” to describe competing visions of society.

Since then, the terms have evolved and acquired different meanings across countries and historical periods. Yet, the broad distinction remains remarkably durable. Ideologies associated with the left generally place greater emphasis on social, political, and economic equality, often advocating a more active role for the state in addressing disparities and expanding collective welfare. Ideologies associated with the right tend to place greater value on tradition, market mechanisms, authority, and various forms of social hierarchy, arguing that stability and prosperity emerge from preserving established institutions and incentives. Most political movements, of course, occupy positions somewhere between these poles, combining elements of both traditions in different proportions.

Few elections have altered the course of Sri Lankan politics as dramatically as the general election of 1977. Sweeping to power with an unprecedented five-sixths majority in Parliament, the United National Party ushered in a new political and economic era under the leadership of J. R. Jayewardene. He would later become the country’s first Executive President under a constitutional framework that vested extensive powers in the office. The changes that followed reflected a decisive move towards market-oriented reforms and a political outlook that leaned more to the right than anything Sri Lanka had previously experienced.

Yet even a political machine as formidable as the UNP’s could not hold power indefinitely. After nearly seventeen years of dominance, its grip on the electorate weakened. In 1994, the pendulum swung once again, bringing Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga. The victory was widely interpreted as a return to a more socially conscious and centre-left political vision.

What followed was not merely a change of government but the emergence of a recurring pattern in Sri Lankan political landscape. Since 1994, governments of varying compositions and personalities have risen to power with crucial support from parties and constituencies positioned on the left of the political spectrum. Whether through formal coalitions, strategic alliances, or ideological influence, the left has often provided the decisive electoral weight needed to secure victory. In many cases, without that support, the arithmetic of power would have looked very different.

Yet it is equally important to recognise what Sri Lanka has not become. Despite the enduring influence of left-wing thought, the country has never embraced an uncompromising far-left political project. Instead, successive governments have largely occupied a centre-left space, balancing market economics with welfare commitments, nationalism with social reform, and political pragmatism with egalitarian aspirations. The result has been a political landscape where power changes hands, parties rise and fall, and personalities dominate headlines, but the centre of gravity remains remarkably leftist. Sri Lanka’s electorate has repeatedly rewarded those who speak the language of social justice, even while stopping short of endorsing political extremes.

One possible explanation for this enduring centre-left tendency lies not in political parties themselves, but in the cultural formation of the electorate. For much of the period between the 1960s and the liberalisation of the economy in 1977–78, Russian literature occupied a prominent place in Sri Lanka’s reading culture. Affordable translations of the works of writers such as Tolstoy, Dostoevsky, Gorky, Chekhov and Pushkin circulated widely among students, teachers and ordinary readers. Alongside their literary value, these works exposed generations of Sri Lankans to questions of social justice, class inequality, collective responsibility and the moral obligations of society toward the vulnerable.

By the early 1990s, the generation that had grown up reading this literature had come of age politically. As they entered the electorate in larger numbers, they helped shape the contours of public opinion. Their voting preferences did not necessarily favour revolutionary socialism or radical left-wing politics. Rather, they appeared to support governments that combined commitments to welfare, social protection and egalitarian ideals with the practical realities of governing a developing nation. In this sense, the centre-left orientation that has characterised much of Sri Lanka’s political landscape since 1994 may owe as much to the country’s literary and intellectual culture as to the strategies of political parties themselves.

Yet there is an apparent paradox at the heart of this story. While successive governments often drew legitimacy from centre-left political ideals, their economic policies frequently moved in a different direction. Confronted by fiscal constraints, global economic pressures and shifting geopolitical realities, they operated within an international economic order largely shaped by market-oriented principles. Institutions such as the International Monetary Fund exerted considerable influence over economic policymaking, encouraging reforms associated more closely with liberalisation, fiscal discipline and market efficiency than with traditional left-wing economics.

It was thus a balancing act that defined Sri Lankan governance for decades after 1994: governments elected on promises of social justice and collective welfare, yet compelled to pursue economic strategies shaped by the imperatives of a global market economy. Politically, the country remained centre-left. Economically, it often travelled along a more market-oriented path.

Sri Lanka may have settled its political direction for the next few years, but the next truly decisive moment may arrive closer to 2030. By then, the composition of the electorate will have changed once again. A growing share of voters will belong to Generation Z and Generation Alpha, generations whose intellectual and cultural worlds differ markedly from those that came before them.

If the electorate that emerged in the 1990s was shaped, in part, by the values encountered in Russian literature and a reading culture that emphasised questions of social responsibility, collective welfare and inequality, the generations now entering political maturity have been formed by a different landscape altogether. Their influences are increasingly digital, global and instantaneous, are shaped more by algorithms and by social media feeds, content creators and transnational cultural currents. Many have grown up in a world where entrepreneurship, individual success, innovation and market-driven solutions occupy a far more visible place in public discourse.

This generational shift is unfolding alongside broader transformations in global politics. Across much of the world, including major powers such as the United Kingdom and the United States, contemporary political movements that emphasise markets, national interests, economic competitiveness, and stronger state authority have gained momentum. Whether these trends will find a lasting echo in Sri Lanka remains a question that deserves careful attention, not merely as an electoral matter, but as one intertwined with some of the defining challenges of our time.

Today, concerns of national sovereignty, security, strategic influence and even soft power are increasingly mediated through economic strength and market performance. Nations are judged not only by their political ideals but also by their ability to compete, innovate and secure their place within an interconnected global economy. Sri Lanka, still navigating the aftermath of economic crisis and charting its future development path, finds itself at the centre of these debates.

Against this backdrop, if the decisive vote is gradually passing from a generation shaped by the books that once filled the nation’s shelves to one shaped by the screens that now fill its hands, the question therefore does not simply become who will win the next election. It is whether the intellectual and cultural influences that shaped Sri Lanka’s centre-left political consensus can retain their hold on a new electorate formed by different experiences, different technologies, and different aspirations.

If every era is ultimately defined by the stories it tells itself, what story is the next generation of Sri Lankan voters already beginning to write? Will it move the centre of gravity towards a more market-oriented, centre-right vision? The answer may well determine not only the outcome of future elections, but the ideological direction of Sri Lanka itself.

By Viran Maddumage PhD (Reading), Macquarie University,
and Sanduni Rathnayake, AAL

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