Features

Caught between devil and troubled waters

Published

5 years ago

2021/10/25

Bizarre story of fishers hit by X-Press Pearl disaster

MV X-Press Pearl, which sank in the western Sri Lankan coastal waters in late May, led to huge environmental destruction and losses of fishing livelihoods and incomes. The most directly affected party was the fishing community, from Kalutara to Chilaw, following the imposition of the fishing ban on May 21, 2021, which continues to date, keeping fishers away from their productive environment. An initial payment of Rs. 5,000 was paid to fishing-related stakeholder families, while a part-payment is now being made from indemnities paid for the initial claims. Yet, the human suffering is tremendous and this article attempts at highlighting some of these impacts on fishing livelihoods, which cannot be easily compensated by payments, calculated on the basis of lost incomes. “Things will have to be seen as ‘they are’, not as ‘we are’” (Anais Nin, French Writer).

A 186-metre-long container ship, called X-Press Pearl, registered in Singapore, arrived in Colombo on the night of May 19, 2021 carrying 1,486 containers. On May 20, it was reported that the ship caught fire, which was only 9.5 nautical miles (17.6 km; 10.9 miles) away, north-west of the Colombo Port. On May 25, a large explosion occurred inside the vessel, and by late afternoon containers were dropping from the vessel into the sea. The ship sank on June 2, while it was being towed to the deeper seas, after burning for 12 days. The incident was deemed the worst marine ecological disaster in Sri Lankan history. The ship’s cargo included, among others, 12,085 MT of plastics and polymers, 8,252 MT of chemicals and 3,081 MT of metals. Since the time the ship caught fire, ship debris, burnt goods and plastic pellets washed into the shore in large quantities. Dead fish, turtles, whales and dolphins were found along the western coast and plastic pellets were observed trapped in the gills of fish. While such debris was initially noticed in the Negombo coast, other areas from Kalpitiya up to Matara also reported ship debris, dead fish and turtles, indicating wider spread damage.

Impact of oceanic pollution on fisheries

When various kinds of debris washed up on the coastal areas of the Western Province and large numbers of dead fish were found, the Department of Fisheries decided to ban fishing in the coastal districts of Kalutara and Negombo on May 21, 2021, which continues to date. The major impact area was demarcated as the coastal strip between Wadduwa (FI division) of the Kalutara District to Kochchikade (FI division) of the Negombo coastal district.

Fishing community actors affected by disaster

The coastal fishing fleet of the three districts, that cover the impact area, consists of 51 multiday craft (IMUL), 204 day boats with inboard engines (IDAY), 2,504 FRP boats with outboard motor (OFRP), three Mechanised traditional boats (MTRB), 1,905 Non-mechanised traditional boats (NTRB) and 75 Non-Mechanised Beach Seine boats (NBSB), totalling 4,612 craft. Altogether 12,731 fishers were affected by the ship disaster (both skippers and crew). Apart from those who are directly involved in fishing, there are large numbers of diverse stakeholders, fish value chain actors, involved in ancillary services and other fishing related activities, who include fish vendors, sellers, dry fish vendors, dry fish producers, ice producers, ice distributors, fibreglass repairers, engine repairers, fuel distributors, net menders, bait producers, vessel cleaners, food suppliers, dry fish sellers on bicycle, beach seine helpers, landing site helpers, divers, women engaged in marketing and fish processing and more. Altogether 3,995 such actors were identified in the HIA, which added up to a total of 16.727 affected persons. Assuming a family size of 3.8 persons (in 2020), the total affected population is estimated as 63,563 (this study).

Shocks and threats

With the enforcement of the fishing ban on May 21, 2021, which prevented fishers from going to the sea, especially because of the mounds of ship debris scattered in the coastal waters posing threats of damage and loss of fishing equipment on the one hand, and the uncertainty of the impact of ship’s cargo on fish, on the other, the fishing community suffered several shocks overnight. These included, loss of income, loss of supplementary income (female employment), drop in demand (drop in consumption of fish for fear of contamination), loss of assets (gear), well-being loss and loss of traditional sources of insurance (because the fishing ban affected all [collective shock] no assistance was available within the community).

COVID-19 impact

The ship disaster hit the coastal fishing community of the western coast, at a time when they were suffering from the COVID-19 pandemic. During the first wave of the pandemic, all links in the fish value chain were seriously affected, dismantling almost all of them; fish landings, marketing, distribution and processing. Due to the imposition of curfews, low demand, low prices and disruption of the marketing system, fishing was seriously affected (45 to 65 percent less than normal). The second wave of the pandemic hit the country on October 4, 2020, when COVID-19 cases were reported from a private garment factory (Brandix) at Minuwangoda in the Gampaha District. Following this cluster, emerged another COVID-19 cluster at the Peliyagoda fish market when 19 cases were reported on October 21, 2020. Many people believed that fish was a Coronavirus carrier and stopped consuming fish for fear of COVID-19 infection. Consequently, prices came down drastically. Quite alarmingly, before the affected population started to recover, the third wave of COVID-19 hit the country, which rose to prohibitive levels after the Sinhala and Tamil New Year, in late April, with deaths rising to 198 per day ( August 20, 2021). While the weak economy and stagnant incomes hit the poorer groups badly, fishing restrictions and poor demand for fish resulted in reduced fishing incomes and livelihood threats to fishers, especially the small-scale fishers who cater to the local market.

The X-Press Pearl ship disaster hit the fishing community at a time when they were confronted with the vagaries and threats of the COVID-19 pandemic.

Market impact

Analysis of price behaviour, which took into account average weekly prices in May and beginning of June 2021, revealed a drop in the wholesale prices in the fourth week of May when the impact of the X-Press Pearl disaster was felt. Dead fish and other marine animals washed up on the shore, along with tons of debris, which contained, among other things, huge amounts of plastic pellets. Later, it was made known that the ship’s cargo contained certain hazardous chemicals, which caused a significant drop in fish consumption, which further reduced wholesale prices. Low demand is also a result of loss of employment and income by those self-employed groups. In respect of the retail trade, many retail outlets remained closed and normal distribution (by motorcycle traders, bicycle traders) was also disrupted. Only a few retailers were present to distribute fish. This led to increases in consumer prices of fish. At a time when wholesalers were complaining of low fish prices, consumers were complaining that the price of fish was too high. Communication with officials of the Fish Wholesalers Association at Peliyagoda fish market revealed that nearly 60 percent of the fish, such as skipjack, were sold for dry fish making, due to lack of demand for fresh fish.

Fishing community’s response to ship disaster

The fishing ban which was imposed on May 21, 2021 posed severe livelihood threats to the affected families. Nevertheless, a payment of Rs. 5,000 was made, by the government, to affected families, which was the payment made to all those self-employed families hit by the COVID-19 pandemic. This amount was equal to 10 percent of the mean monthly expenditure of an average Sri Lankan household in 2016 (which was Rs. 54,999). Since then a payment has been channelled to fishing communities only once (recently), from monies received from the ships insurance companies (an interim payment of Rs. 720 million), of which about Rs. 400 million has been allocated to fisheries. Yet, the process has not been completed. The long payment intervals and the smaller size of the payment would have caused mammoth adversities for households striving hard to make the ends meet.

Of course the immediate response of the fishing community was to reduce consumption, tightening the belt, which often puts more weight on women fisher folk, who have been traditionally accustomed to shouldering the burden of consumption shortfalls in ensuring that men are kept physically fit to carry out fishing operations. Nevertheless, food insecurity could be only one of the immediate impacts of the ship disaster, which often leads to nutritional insecurity, which has more injurious impacts on the nutrition of children. A quite painful impact would have been the inability of affected households to pay regular bills (house rent, electricity, water and goods taken on installments). In a study carried out in 2020 by the author, it was revealed that debt repayment obligations of an average fishing household to be around Rs. 20,000 per month (Samudra Report, No. 85). Of course, such debts will accumulate if a fishing household has no other source of income, which is usually the case. Parental care too is an issue because parents usually live with children in their old age, a practice that is quite characteristic of Sri Lankan society. Expenses related to such care-giving could be excessively high. Cries of children to have a bite of sweets or a lick of ice cream would remain ‘unheard’. The whole family will be cut off from involvement in leisure activities, films, pleasure trips and social and religious obligations. All this could mean colossal psychological stress on all members of the family, which cannot be expressed in value terms.

In the absence of insurance markets for fishing related risks, people resort to credit. In fishing societies, exchange of small loans is very common. Because of high catch variability, incomes of all fishers do not correlate. One who is lucky will offer part of his earnings to an unlucky one, knowing that one is not lucky or unlucky every day. However, the ship disaster hit everyone equally and the fishing community’s insurance function was lost. In such a context people tend to mortgage jewellery, sell assets or borrow from outside money lenders, who sometimes charge exorbitant rates of interest, which could be as high as 180 percent per year. Since the day the fishing ban was imposed (May 21, 2021), debt repayments (interest and principal on loans) of fishing households would have accumulated adding to the existing pressure on household chores, leading to great human suffering.

Contextual issues: Blue justice

In analysing the impact of the ship disaster on the fishing community, one cannot refrain from underlining the context in which small-scale fisheries take place. Some of the most notable impacts observed recently have been the injustices caused by the process of Blue Economic Growth. Complaints of exclusion of communities from development related decision making, absence of any community consultation in implementing development projects, coastal land grabbing by tourism interests (land tenure issues) and marginalization of small scale fishers, were heard from all around the country. Conflicts among fisheries and tourism stakeholders have risen to prohibitive levels. Many fishers have lost their beach seining sites, craft anchorage sites and fish drying sites, first, as a result of climate-induced sea erosion and second, as a result of land grabbing by tourism interests. While coastal waters traditionally provided livelihoods to thousands of small-scale fishers who had customary rights to fish resources in such waters, today the ‘small fry’ has been chased away and the coastal waters have become the arena of sea sports and leisure. The public beaches have become private and some beach access roads have become private property of tourism stakeholders. These are all injustices emerging from the unregulated growth of the blue economy which have pushed the small scale fishers to the margins.

Evidently, there is tremendous suffering among diverse fishing related households. Livelihoods and incomes are lost, ill-being is quite pervasive, food insecurity and nutritional insecurity is on the rise, drops in consumption and expenditure is causing misery, households are unable to attend to parental and child care and debts have accumulated. The government has tried to redress the situation by providing the affected households with Rs. 5,000 initially and now by making an interim payment. Unfortunately, there have been huge delays in making these payments due to delays in making claims and payment of indemnities by the ship’s insurance agents. The longer the delays in payment, the higher would be the human suffering. The fishing ban will continue until the debris is cleared from the bottom of the sea by the responsible party, and thus the agony and misery will continue to grow. Two things are worthy of mention at this juncture. First, what has been paid so far has been hardly sufficient to meet the family subsistence needs. Apart from making a payment equal to lost daily wages, a premium that covers the various costs incurred by the affected parties in resorting to borrowing, in mortgaging assets and psychological stress, will have to be paid. Second, it is of paramount importance in developing strategies to improve the resilient capacity of fishers to external shocks, which would involve, among other things, strengthening community sources of insurance (fisheries cooperatives, coop savings), promoting self-insurance strategies (savings, alternative livelihoods, women employment), and addressing social injustices caused by the process of Blue Economic Growth.

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Features

Power crept into the Sangha and is now tearing it apart

Published

8 hours ago

2026/06/5

Thilina Walpola

A file photo of Buddhist monks engaged in a protest

For more than a century, Sri Lankan society has lived with a quiet contradiction at the heart of its religious life. On the one hand, the Buddhist monk is revered as the embodiment of moral discipline, selfrestraint, and renunciation. On the other, the modern monk has become a public figure, political actor, administrator, media personality, and in some cases power broker whose influence extends far beyond the temple. This contradiction has been tolerated, even celebrated, for decades. But recent events, most notably a widely publicised case involving a senior monk accused of grave moral misconduct, have forced the country to confront a painful truth: the institutional conditions that make such scandals possible are not new. They are the predictable outcome of a long historical process that H. L. Seneviratne described with remarkable clarity in The Work of Kings. The moral deterioration visible today is not an aberration. It is the culmination of a centurylong transformation in the identity, function, and authority of the Sangha.

To understand how we arrived at this moment, it is necessary to revisit the argument Seneviratne made nearly three decades ago. His thesis was simple but profound: the modern Sri Lankan monkhood has taken on the ‘work of kings.’ By this he meant that monks, instead of confining themselves to the renunciant life prescribed by the Vinaya, have assumed the secular responsibilities once associated with precolonial kingship, such as protecting the religion, organising society, guiding the nation, and enforcing moral order. This shift, he argued, was not a natural evolution of Buddhist tradition but a modern invention shaped by colonialism, nationalism, and the anxieties of a society struggling to redefine itself in the face of foreign domination. The monk became a symbol of national identity, a guardian of cultural authenticity, and a leader in the struggle for political autonomy. In the process, the boundaries that once separated the monastic from the worldly began to dissolve.

Transformation

The consequences of this transformation were not immediately visible. For decades, the activist monk was celebrated as a patriot, a reformer, and a moral guide. His involvement in education, social welfare, and nationalist mobilisation was seen as a necessary response to colonial pressures and missionary competition. But beneath the surface, the foundations of monastic discipline were slowly eroding. The Vinaya, which had served for centuries as a rigorous framework for regulating monastic life, was increasingly overshadowed by the demands of public engagement. The communal structures that once ensured accountability, senior supervision, collective confession, and the daily rhythms of monastic routine, were weakened by the pressures of modernity. Monks who travelled constantly, managed institutions, or lived independently in urban temples found themselves outside the traditional systems of oversight that had long protected the integrity of the Sangha.

Scandal

It is within this historical context that the recent scandal must be understood. The case shocked the nation not only because of the severity of the allegations but because it shattered the public’s assumption that the monkhood remains a bastion of moral purity. Yet the shock itself reveals a collective denial. For years, Sri Lankan society has been aware, sometimes quietly, sometimes openly—of the growing gap between the ideal of the monk and the realities of modern monastic life. Stories of misconduct, financial irregularities, political manipulation, and abuse of authority have circulated with increasing frequency. But each incident has been treated as an isolated failure, a personal weakness, or an unfortunate exception. What has been missing is recognition that these incidents are symptoms of a deeper structural problem.

Seneviratne’s analysis helps illuminate this problem. When monks take on the work of kings, they inevitably enter domains of power that expose them to temptations the Vinaya was designed to avoid. Handling money, managing institutions, cultivating political patrons, and exercising authority over laypeople create opportunities for ego, ambition, and moral compromise. The monk who becomes a public figure is no longer shielded by the anonymity and humility of the renunciant life. Instead, he becomes a celebrity, a leader, and in some cases an object of uncritical devotion. This elevation brings with it a dangerous form of immunity. Laypeople who revere a monk for his public achievements may hesitate to question his behaviour. Politicians who rely on monastic support may protect him from scrutiny. The media, which often treats monks as moral authorities, may be reluctant to investigate allegations that challenge the sanctity of the robe.

The recent scandal illustrates how these dynamics can converge. The monk at the centre of the case was not an obscure figure. He was a respected preacher, charismatic leader, and head of a prominent institution. His public image was built on years of service, teaching, and community engagement. Yet it was precisely this public stature that allowed him to operate without meaningful oversight. The institutional structures around him, administrators, lay supporters, and junior monks, were either unwilling or unable to challenge his authority. The very qualities that made him a respected figure in the eyes of the public also made him untouchable within his own institution. When allegations finally emerged, they revealed not only personal wrongdoing but a systemic failure of accountability.

Failure that is not unique

This failure is not unique to one temple or one monk. It reflects a broader pattern within the modern Sangha. As monastic institutions have grown in size, wealth, and influence, their internal governance has struggled to keep pace. Many temples operate as semiautonomous entities controlled by a single monk or a small group of monks. Financial transparency is limited, administrative oversight is weak, and the mechanisms for addressing misconduct are often informal or ineffective. The traditional structures of monastic discipline, such as the Sangharama procedures for adjudicating offences, are rarely used in modern contexts, partly because they require collective participation and partly because they are illsuited to the complexities of contemporary institutional life. In practice, this means that monks who wield significant authority can act with little fear of internal sanction.

The politicisation of the Sangha has further complicated matters. Since the midtwentieth century, monks have played an increasingly prominent role in electoral politics, nationalist movements, and public policy debates. This involvement has given them access to political networks that can be mobilised to protect their interests. It has also created a culture in which monks are valued not for their adherence to the Vinaya but for their ability to influence public opinion, mobilise voters, or lend moral legitimacy to political causes. In such an environment, the monk who is politically useful may be shielded from criticism, while the monk who adheres strictly to the renunciant ideal may find himself marginalised or ignored.

The result is a profound distortion of monastic identity. The monk who once sought liberation from worldly attachments is now encouraged to cultivate influence, authority, and public recognition. The monk who once lived under the strict supervision of senior elders now operates in a world where independence is celebrated and oversight is minimal. The monk who once relied on laypeople for basic sustenance now controls vast resources, manages institutions, and commands the loyalty of thousands of followers. This inversion of traditional roles has created a fertile ground for moral deterioration.

Yet it would be a mistake to interpret this deterioration as evidence that the Sangha as a whole is corrupt. Many monks continue to live lives of remarkable discipline, humility, and spiritual dedication. In remote forest monasteries, small village temples, and meditation centres across the country, monks quietly uphold the ancient ideals of the renunciant life. They are not the ones who appear on television, lead political rallies, or manage large institutions. Their work is invisible, their influence subtle, and their commitment unwavering. The crisis facing the Sangha today is not a crisis of individual morality but a crisis of institutional identity. It is the product of a centurylong transformation that has blurred the boundaries between the monastic and the secular, the spiritual and the political, the renunciant and the worldly.

If Sri Lanka is to address this crisis, it must begin by acknowledging the structural nature of the problem. The temptation to treat each scandal as an isolated incident must be resisted. Instead, the country must confront the uncomfortable reality that the modern configuration of monastic life is fundamentally at odds with the principles of the Vinaya. The Sangha cannot simultaneously function as a political force, a social service provider, a media institution, and a spiritual community without compromising its integrity. The more monks are drawn into the world, the more vulnerable they become to the moral dangers that the Buddha warned against.

Reform, therefore, must focus not only on punishing individual offenders but on rethinking the institutional structures that enable misconduct. This includes strengthening internal governance, enhancing financial transparency, restoring the authority of senior elders, and reestablishing the communal practices that once ensured accountability. It also requires a broader cultural shift in how laypeople relate to monks. Blind devotion must give way to informed respect. Reverence must be balanced with responsibility. The robe must be honoured, but it must not be used as a shield against scrutiny.

Seneviratne’s work offers a valuable starting point for this rethinking. His analysis reminds us that the crisis facing the Sangha is not the result of moral decline alone but of historical forces that reshaped the identity of the monkhood. By tracing the evolution of the activist monk, he shows how the Sangha became entangled in the political and social structures of the modern nationstate. This entanglement has brought both benefits and dangers. It has allowed monks to play important roles in education, social welfare, and national development. But it has also exposed them to the corrupting influences of power, wealth, and public acclaim.

The challenge now is to disentangle the Sangha from these influences without undermining its ability to serve society. This will not be easy. The activist monk has become deeply embedded in the cultural and political fabric of the country. Many laypeople expect monks to be leaders, reformers, and guardians of national identity. Politicians rely on monastic support to legitimise their agendas. Media institutions depend on monks for content, commentary, and moral authority. Reversing this trend will require a collective effort from monks, laypeople, and political leaders alike.

Ultimately, the future of the Sangha depends on its ability to reclaim the renunciant ideal that lies at the heart of Buddhist monasticism. This does not mean withdrawing from society entirely, but it does mean reestablishing the boundaries that protect the monk from the dangers of worldly involvement. It means recognising that the true strength of the Sangha lies not in its political influence or institutional power but in its moral authority, its spiritual discipline, and its commitment to the path of liberation. The recent scandal, painful as it is, may serve as a catalyst for this reevaluation. It has exposed the vulnerabilities of the modern monastic system and forced the country to confront the consequences of a centurylong transformation.

To understand how the Vihara Devalegam Act relates to the perceived moral deformation of the clergy, it is necessary to examine how property management, state law, and monastic discipline intersect in the modern era. Historically stemming from the Buddhist Temporalities Ordinance No. 19 of 1931, this act serves as the primary legal framework governing the ‘temporalities’—meaning the secular wealth, extensive landholdings, and material donations belonging to Buddhist temples and shrines. While ancient kings granted these vast tracts of land to support the monkhood’s spiritual pursuits, the modern codification of this law has inadvertently fostered a system where property rights frequently supersede spiritual accountability.

The core of the crisis lies in the commercialisation of the monastic order that this legal framework enables. By treating temple lands as economic assets and vesting absolute administrative power in individual chief monks or lay trustees, the act has contributed to the rise of what critics term a monastic middle class. Access to vast, unregulated financial resources, rent from lands, and corporate donations has fundamentally shifted the focus of certain segments of the clergy away from the traditional path of worldly renunciation and spiritual guidance. Instead, it has driven a preoccupation with business investments, the accumulation of private capital, and luxury lifestyles, which deeply alienates a public looking to the Sangha for moral leadership.

The institutional flaws embedded in the Vihara Devalegam Act find a stark, real-world manifestation in the recent criminal case involving Venerable Pallegama Hemarathana Thero. As the chief priest of Anuradhapura and the custodian of the Atamasthana—the eight highly venerated Buddhist shrines, including the sacred Jaya Sri Maha Bodhi—Hemarathana Thero occupied one of the most powerful and wealthy positions within the Sri Lankan Sangha. His arrest on charges of sexual abuse of a minor girl perfectly illustrates how the structural defects of the Act facilitate not only moral decay but also the systemic obstruction of justice.

The core of this intersection lies in the vast, unaccountable wealth generated by the temporalities of the Anuradhapura shrines. Under the Vihara Devalegam Act, the chief custodian exercises immense, virtually unchecked control over temple revenues, state-backed land management, and millions of rupees in daily donations from millions of global pilgrims. It is precisely this immense financial liquidity that enabled the alleged deployment of vast sums of money to the victim’s family.

Furthermore, the situation underscores the profound policy failures cited regarding the helplessness of the monastic hierarchy and state enforcement. When child protection authorities initially attempted to act, the National Child Protection Authority noted severe delays and institutional resistance, stating they practically had to force the police to execute the arrest. The monk’s immediate retreat to a private hospital in Colombo upon the advancement of the criminal probe, followed by his release on bail, mirrors the exact loop described where wealthy monastics deploy high-priced legal defence teams funded directly or indirectly by their institutional positions. Because the Vihara Devalegam Act does not provide a mechanism for the immediate, unconditional forfeiture of temporal administrative rights upon a criminal indictment, the accused retains his structural power throughout the legal process. The Pallegama Thero scandal stands as definitive proof that without a fundamental overhaul of how temple wealth is legally governed and disciplined, the material benefits guaranteed by ancient temporalities will continue to shield the worst elements of moral deformation from the rule of law.

If Sri Lanka can learn from this moment and if it can recognise the structural roots of the crisis and commit to meaningful reform, then the Sangha may yet emerge stronger, more disciplined, and more faithful to its ancient ideals. But if the country continues to treat each scandal as an isolated failure and if it continues to ignore the deeper institutional problems that Seneviratne identified, then the moral deterioration we see today will only deepen. The work of kings, when performed by monks, carries a heavy price. It is time to decide whether that price is worth paying.

by Professor Amarasiri de Silva

Features

Kondachchi wind farm and battery storage project to boost energy security, says Power Ministry Secretary

Published

9 hours ago

2026/06/5

Thilina Walpola

The Power and Energy Ministry’s drive towards energy security and renewable energy expansion received a major boost yesterday with the signing of a tripartite cooperation agreement for the development of the 150 MW Kondachchi Wind Power Project and an integrated Battery Energy Storage System (BESS) in Mannar.

The agreement was signed at the Ministry of Power auditorium under the patronage of Power Minister Anura Karunatilaka and Deputy Power Minister Arkam Ilyas.

Speaking at the event, Ministry Secretary G. M. R. D. Aponsu described the project as a transformative investment that would strengthen the country’s electricity network while supporting Sri Lanka’s transition towards cleaner energy sources.

“The Kondachchi Wind Power Project represents a significant milestone in Sri Lanka’s renewable energy journey. By combining large-scale wind generation with advanced battery energy storage technology, we are creating a more resilient and reliable power system capable of meeting future energy demands while reducing dependence on imported fossil fuels,” Aponsu said.

The project will be developed at Silavathurai in the Kondachchi area of Mannar on lands owned by the Sri Lanka Cashew Corporation. It is expected to utilise some 31 modern wind turbines with a total installed capacity of at least 150 MW.

Aponsu said the inclusion of an integrated battery storage facility would help address the variability associated with wind power generation and ensure stable electricity supply to the national grid.

“The battery energy storage component is a key feature of this project. It will enable the efficient integration of renewable energy into the grid and enhance overall system stability, which is essential as Sri Lanka increases the share of renewables in its energy mix,” he said.

According to the Ministry, the wind farm is expected to generate nearly 525 gigawatt-hours of electricity annually, significantly reducing the country’s expenditure on imported fuel and strengthening national energy security.

The project is also expected to contribute to Sri Lanka’s climate commitments by reducing carbon dioxide emissions by an estimated 372,750 tonnes annually.

“This investment delivers both economic and environmental benefits. It will reduce greenhouse gas emissions, support sustainable development objectives and help Sri Lanka move closer to achieving its renewable energy and climate targets,” Aponsu noted.

The project will be implemented under a Public-Private Partnership (PPP) arrangement using the Build, Own and Operate (BOO) model. The Asian Development Bank is providing technical and financial advisory support through its Transaction Advisory Services programme.

The signing ceremony was attended by Pradeep Perera, Chairman of the National System Operator (Pvt) Ltd., and Takeyo Koike, Head of Market Development and Public-Private Partnership Division of the ADB, among other distinguished guests.

The Ministry said comprehensive Environmental Impact Assessments and avifaunal studies have been undertaken to ensure minimal impacts on bird populations, nearby communities and agricultural lands. A dedicated 220-kilovolt transmission system will also be constructed to connect the project to the national grid.

“The Kondachchi Wind Farm is a strategic national project that will help secure Sri Lanka’s energy future while accelerating the country’s transition towards sustainable and affordable electricity generation,” Aponsu said.

Energy sector experts view the project as one of the most important renewable energy initiatives currently being pursued in Sri Lanka, combining utility-scale wind generation with modern energy storage technology to enhance grid reliability and long-term energy sustainability.

By Ifham Nizam

Features

Saudi Arabia sets new benchmark in Hajj management as 1.7 million pilgrims complete sacred journey

Published

9 hours ago

2026/06/5

Thilina Walpola

Ambassador Al-Kahtani

Interview with Khalid Hamoud Al-Kahtani, Ambassador of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to Sri Lanka

Saudi Arabia has once again demonstrated its unparalleled capacity to manage one of the world’s largest annual religious gatherings, with this year’s Hajj pilgrimage concluding successfully despite extreme temperatures and the immense logistical challenge of accommodating more than 1.7 million pilgrims from around the world.

In an exclusive interview with The Island, Khalid Hamoud Al-Kahtani, Ambassador of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to Sri Lanka, described the 2026 Hajj season as a resounding success, crediting the achievement to the visionary leadership of the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques, His Royal Highness the Crown Prince and Prime Minister, and the coordinated efforts of multiple government agencies working around the clock to serve pilgrims.

The Ambassador noted that nearly 3,500 Sri Lankan pilgrims participated in this year’s Hajj under the quota allocated to Sri Lanka, benefiting from enhanced healthcare services, sophisticated crowd-management systems, expanded shaded areas and cutting-edge digital solutions introduced by the Kingdom.

With Saudi Arabia continuing to invest heavily in infrastructure, technology and pilgrim services under Vision 2030, Ambassador Al-Kahtani said the Kingdom remains committed to ensuring that pilgrims from around the world perform their religious duties in safety, comfort and tranquility.

The Saudi envoy also highlighted the growing partnership between Saudi Arabia and Sri Lanka, emphasising expanding cooperation not only in Hajj affairs but also in trade, investment, education, culture and institutional exchanges.

Following are excerpts of the interview:

Q: How do you assess this year’s Hajj season?

Ambassador Al-Kahtani: This year’s Hajj season was a resounding success, thanks to the Almighty Allah and the integrated efforts of the government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, led by the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques and His Royal Highness the Crown Prince and Prime Minister. This success was reflected in the efficiency of crowd management, the quality of services provided to the Hajj pilgrims and the effective coordination among the various relevant authorities, which enabled pilgrims to perform their rituals in an atmosphere of security, tranquility and ease.

Q: How many Sri Lankan pilgrims performed Hajj this year?

Ambassador Al-Kahtani: The number of Hajj pilgrims from the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka reached approximately 3,500, within the quota allocated to Sri Lanka for this season.

Q: Are there any discussions regarding increasing Sri Lanka’s quota in the future?

Ambassador Al-Kahtani:Hajj quotas are determined according to approved regulatory mechanisms that take into account a range of considerations. The relevant authorities in the Kingdom continue to study various aspects related to developing Hajj services and accommodating the allocated numbers for all countries, in coordination with the concerned parties.

Q: What were the most prominent special arrangements implemented this year?

Ambassador Al-Kahtani: The operational plans for this season focused on enhancing the safety and comfort of the Hajj pilgrims, especially given the climatic conditions and high temperatures. Measures included expanding shaded areas, increasing water distribution points and enhancing health and ambulance services, in addition to developing the transportation system and traffic management within the holy sites.

Q: What are the most prominent digital systems and smart services that were provided?

Ambassador Al-Kahtani:The Kingdom continues to implement its digital transformation objectives for the Hajj and Umrah system. The scope of electronic services offered through the Nusuk platform and application has been expanded, along with the development of digital systems for issuing permits, managing crowds, guidance and health services. This contributes to increasing the efficiency of services and improving the pilgrim’s experience at all stages of their journey.

Q: How were the challenges of overcrowding and heat addressed?

Ambassador Al-Kahtani: The relevant authorities adopted an integrated crowd-management system based on modern technologies and real-time data analysis. This was coupled with intensified health-awareness campaigns, expanded organised movement routes and increased deployment of field, medical and emergency teams. These measures support the safety of the Hajj pilgrims and reduce the risks associated with crowd density and climatic conditions.

Q: Were there special services for the elderly and sick?

Ambassador Al-Kahtani: Yes. The Kingdom paid special attention to the elderly and people with special health needs by providing specialized medical services, assistive transportation and facilities equipped to meet their needs, in addition to field teams working to provide humanitarian support and necessary healthcare throughout the Hajj period.

Q: How successful was the Kingdom in combating irregular Hajj permits?

Ambassador Al-Kahtani: The relevant authorities in the Kingdom continued to rigorously implement the regulations and instructions governing Hajj, utilising modern technologies and advanced monitoring procedures to reduce violations related to irregular Hajj. These efforts contributed to enhancing the safety of pilgrims, improving crowd-management efficiency and maintaining the smooth flow of movement within the holy sites.

Q: How would you describe Saudi-Sri Lankan cooperation in organising Hajj?

Ambassador Al-Kahtani: Cooperation between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Republic of Sri Lanka is characterised by continuous and constructive coordination in all matters related to Hajj. The relevant authorities in both countries work jointly to ensure the provision of the best services for Sri Lankan pilgrims and enable them to perform their rituals with ease and peace of mind.

Q: How many Hajj pilgrims were there globally, and what were the main challenges?

Ambassador Al-Kahtani: According to official statistics, the number of Hajj pilgrims this year reached 1,707,301 from various countries around the world. The main challenges included managing large crowds, ensuring public safety and providing health, transportation and accommodation services within a specific geographical and temporal scope. These challenges were addressed through advanced and integrated operational plans, which contributed to the smooth and successful completion of the Hajj season.

Q: Are there any future expansion projects?

Ambassador Al-Kahtani: The Kingdom continues to implement strategic development projects within the framework of Vision 2030, including developing the infrastructure in Makkah and the Holy Sites, and enhancing transportation networks and smart services. This contributes to raising the quality of services provided to pilgrims and Umrah performers and improving their long-term experience.

Q: How are Saudi-Sri Lankan relations strengthened outside the context of Hajj?

Ambassador Al-Kahtani: Relations between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Republic of Sri Lanka are witnessing continuous development in many areas, including political, economic, trade, cultural and educational cooperation, in addition to developing exchanges between institutions and the private sector. This reflects the two countries’ keenness to strengthen the bilateral partnership and achieve common interests.

Q: What message would you like to convey to Sri Lankan Muslims?

Ambassador Al-Kahtani: We extend our sincere congratulations to the Hajj pilgrims who have completed their Hajj rituals, and we ask Almighty Allah to accept their pilgrimage. We also assure Muslims in Sri Lanka that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia places serving the Two Holy Mosques and the guests of Almighty Allah at the forefront of its priorities and continues to develop the Hajj and Umrah system to achieve the highest standards of quality and safety.

By Ifham Nizam