Features

Who needs the PTA?

Published

11 months ago

2025/07/20

Thilina Walpola

A protest against the PTA. (Picture credit Ada Derana)

“Not only our actions, but also our inactions, become our destiny.”
Heinrich Zimmer (The King and the Corpse)

Mohamad Suhail was arrested twice in one day, first under normal law, then under the Prevention of Terrorism Act. The first ‘crime’ of this 21-year-old student was walking down the road outside the Chabad House in Dehiwala. The Chabad House (a religio-political-social institution belonging to the Chabad-Lubavitch Movement, a Jewish-fundamentalist sect – think of Bodu Bala Sena with way more brains and cash), reportedly an illegal construction, continues to thrive under the benign gaze of law enforcement officers. Yet the same law enforcement officers arrested Mr. Suhail, a Lankan citizen, for being near a structure built to serve Israeli tourists.

Since Mr. Suhail’s real ‘crime’ would have earned them a magisterial reprimand, Dehiwala police accused him of not having an identity card. The magistrate refused to remand him and released him, pointing out that being in a public space without an identity card was no crime. Case closed. Or so it seemed.

Mr. Suhail went home to Mawanella with his father that evening. In the night, a team from the Dehiwala police went to his home and arrested him again under the PTA, effectively preventing the magistrate from giving him bail. His ‘crime’ this time was having anti-Israel posts on his social media.

That was 24 October 2024. He spent the next eight months and three weeks in remand prison. He would have vegetated behind bars for many more months, or even years, had not his incarceration made it to the news in June 2025, resulting in an outcry.

This week, the police informed the court that Mr. Suhail can be released on bail since he had committed no wrongdoing under the PTA. Incomprehensibly, despite this total lack of evidence, the case against him is to continue. Even harder to comprehend is the reason for his arrest. After all, being critical of Israel (or of any other country including Sri Lanka) is not a crime even under normal law let alone the PTA.

Mr Suhail’s case could have been regarded as an isolated incident had it not been for the arrest in March 2025 of 22-year-old Mohamad Rusdi. He too was detained under the PTA for the ‘crime’ of being anti-Israel. In his case too, the police failed to find any ‘evidence’ – other than his opposition to the Gaza genocide. He too was released on bail, because the state wants to maintain the case against him.

The two cases, taken together, prove how easily, how dangerously the PTA can be abused, how it can be used to persecute innocents on the most ludicrous of pretexts. If this practice of arresting Lankans for being anti-Israel is given a pass, what will the authorities do next? Arrest Lankans for laughing at Donald Trump, ridiculing Narendra Modi or mocking Xi Jinping? How about the ‘terrorist’ crime of disrespecting the Pakistani flag, Maldivian national flower or Nepal’s national anthem?

After all, had we been told one year ago that a Lankan can be detained under the PTA for being critical of Israel, wouldn’t we have dismissed it as an April Fool’s joke?

The conclusion is terrifyingly obvious: any act, however ordinary or innocuous, can be deemed terrorism under the PTA and anyone, however innocent, a terrorist.

Initially, the victims would be non-Sinhalese since in Sri Lanka terror mostly meant and means Tamil or Muslim. But eventually, it will be the turn of any Sinhalese the government of the day has a problem with. It is not hard to envisage NPP/JVP leaders being detained under the PTA by a future Namal Rajapaksa dispensation, maybe for the crime of threatening the president’s second cousin! After all, the NPP/JVP in government has set a new record in abusing the PTA, making it easier for its successor to sink to even more abysmal depths.

The PTA has been in existence for 46 years. In that time, it failed to prevent the phenomenal growth of the LTTE, the Eelam War, the Second JVP insurgency, and the Easter Sunday massacre. Despite these monumental failures, it thrives and will continue to thrive because every government feels the need for it, feels safer, more potent for it, sees it as a protector of last resort, not of the country or the people but of its own power.

Regarding the PTA as a talisman against political opposition, public discontent, and electoral failure is a mistake every government makes and no government learns from.

PTA: an anatomy of failure

Not every promise is made equal. Some can be ignored without major consequences. Breaking others herald disaster.

Like the promise the UNP made in its 1977 election manifesto to politically resolve the Tamil ethnic problem.

Armed separatism came into being under the UF government of Sirima Bandaranaike (the LTTE was formed in 1976). But there was still a chance to prevent large scale bloodshed by finding political solutions to the political problems of the Tamil people. This was what the UNP promised do in its election manifesto: “The United National Party accepts the position that there are numerous problems confronting the Tamil-speaking people. The lack of a solution to their problems has made the Tamil-speaking people support even a movement for the creation of a separate state. In the interests of national integration and unity so essential for the economic development of the whole country, the party feels that such problems should be resolved without the loss of time. The party, when it comes to power, will take all possible steps to remedy their grievances in such fields as,

· Education; (2) Colonisation; (3) Use of Tamil language; (4) Employment in the public and semi-public corporations.

We will summon an All-Party Conference as stated earlier and implement its decisions” (emphasis mine).

But once in power with a five-sixth majority, the UNP forgot its promise. Instead of prioritising national integration, J. R. Jayewardene focused on creating an executive presidency thereby concentrating almost all power in his own hands. In the meantime, the virulent outpourings of the likes of Cyril Mathew began to given the government a racist image the UNP didn’t have in opposition.

Less than a month after the election, all hell broke loose.

On 15 August, three policemen on patrol in Jaffna stopped three cyclists. One of the cyclists pulled out a revolver and shot at a policeman. Over the next couple of days, the police went berserk attacking civilians, destroying property and burning the iconic Jaffna market.

On 17 August at 11. 00 am, a radio message was sent from the Jaffna police station to the IGP in Colombo: “Today, four CTB buses have been set on fire. Naga Vihara is under attack. A crowd has gathered at the railway station Jaffna with intention to assault incoming passengers. The situation is deemed serious.” Every word in that message was a lie, but was received as nothing but the truth by many Sinhalese. Soon, anti-Tamil violence exploded in Colombo, regional towns, and in the Plantations. In some parts of the North, Tamils retaliated by attacking Sinhala traders. Violence raged over two weeks. Hundreds of people were killed and tens of thousands displaced, most of them Tamil.

The riots were a warning of the fragility of the situation and the urgent need for a measured political response by the government. Had the Jayewardene administration returned to its election promise, and worked at resolving key Tamil grievances, the war could have been avoided and hundreds of thousands of lives, Tamil, Sinhala, and Muslim, saved. Unfortunately, the government did the opposite; forgetting the political grievances which led to the Eelam demand, it resorted to generalised repression in the North while and trying to surpass the SLFP on the racism scale in the South.

The Prevention of Terrorism Act was born of this mindset. Formulated in 1978 and becoming law in 1979, the PTA made it possible for the authorities to arrest and detain any Tamil on terrorism charges without a shred of evidence.

When the PTA came into being in 1979, the LTTE was capable only of isolated acts of violence. Just four years later, by 1983, despite a severe internal schism, it was able to wipe out an entire army patrol.

A vignette from the deadly Four-Four Bravo operation indicates what the Lankan state and government lost by focusing on repression instead of on winning over ordinary Tamils. The operation was carried out by the crème de la crème of the LTTE, including Vellupillai Prabhakaran. As the group made their way to the selected spot in the Tinnaveli junction, their footfalls attracted the attention of some residents. “The more inquisitive ones peeped out of their windows or balconies. The LTTE had anticipated this. To pass for Sri Lankan troops, Chellakili and Victor barked out orders in Sinhalese. The perennial fear of men in uniform did the trick. The curious onlookers quickly retreated out of sight” (Inside an Elusive Mind – MR Narayan Swami). Had the government adopted an approach of isolating the militants by reaching out to ordinary Tamils, some alarm might have been given and the attack averted, saving countless lives, starting with the 13 soldiers who were to die that night.

Not taking that path would lead to Black July and quarter of a century of war.

Who lied to the President, and why?

Like the UNP in 1977, the NPP/JVP came into office promising to achieve national reconciliation. And, like the UNP, it is failing. The needless and unjust detention of Mohamad Rusdi and Mohamad Suhail under the PTA signals that the current government is headed to an abyss – this time totally of its own making.

In April 2025, President Dissanayake publicly defended the arrest of Mr Rusdi insisting there was ample evidence to justify his detention under the PTA. Later, the police were forced to admit the opposite – there was not an iota of evidence against Mr. Rusdi.

Did the President lie knowingly or was he duped? If he was duped (which seems the more likely possibility since he is yet to show any signs of racism) it would have been by someone he trusts. We do not know who lied to him, but he does. Knowing the identity of the liar, it should be possible for him to figure out the reason for the lie. Was it money (Israel is notorious for bribery) or innate anti-Muslim sentiments? Or, are these arrests false flag operations aimed at whipping up another round of anti-Muslim hysteria?

In August 1977, a generalised pogrom could have been avoided if some police official in Jaffna had not sent that false radio message to the IGP. Who authored it remains a mystery. The why is obvious. That radio message was a false flag operation aimed at setting the country on fire. It was done with malicious intent, and it was done by a supposed guardian of law.

Warned by history, President Dissanayake has a chance to uncover the official/officials responsible for the equation of anti-Israel with terrorism and the consequent abuse of the PTA and bring him/them to justice.

The PTA was born as an anti-Tamil law. Its concept of terror invoked the image of every Tamil, from the politician advocating a separate state to the old woman sweeping the street who knew nothing of a separate state. So, when the LTTE carried out the Four-Four Bravo operation, Sinhala mobs wreaked bloody vengeance on every Tamil they could get hold of.

In 2012, the Rajapaksas, in search of a threat to keep Sinhala-Buddhists cleaved to them, created the Muslim enemy. That image led to the anti-Muslims riots of Aluthgama and Digana, and from thence to the Easter Sunday massacre. The one thing it didn’t do was to make Nilantha Jayawardena, the then head of the SIS, the first top official to receive concrete information about the coming attack do anything to prevent it. By April 21^st, he was in possession of the names of several potential attackers: Mohamed Zaharan, Mohamed Milhan, and Mohamedu Rilwan. If he had moved to arrest even one of these men, the attack might have been prevented. And he could have done so easily, under the normal law or the PTA. Yet he didn’t. As the Supreme Court pointed out, “All this shows that there was so much information that was available before Nilantha Jayawardena…but it cannot be said that Nilantha Jayawardena acted with alacrity and promptitude.”

Had Mr. Jayawardena been a Muslim he would have been accused of helping the terrorists, perhaps even arrested under the PTA. But he is Sinhala and Buddhist, and therefore remains as free as a bird. No wonder the PTA failed miserably in doing what it was created to do – prevent terrorism. But it will survive the NPP/JVP government to be used in an even more surreal and deadly manner under a President Namal Rajapaksa.

The PTA is like the executive presidency, another Ring of Power its current wearer never wants to take off. Today, it is Anura Kumara Dissanayake’s Precious. Someday it will be used against him. By the time he realises that, it will be too late, for him, and for ordinary Lankans who can become its victims for any reason or none.

by Tisaranee Gunasekara ✍️

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Features

Power crept into the Sangha and is now tearing it apart

Published

1 day ago

2026/06/5

Thilina Walpola

A file photo of Buddhist monks engaged in a protest

For more than a century, Sri Lankan society has lived with a quiet contradiction at the heart of its religious life. On the one hand, the Buddhist monk is revered as the embodiment of moral discipline, selfrestraint, and renunciation. On the other, the modern monk has become a public figure, political actor, administrator, media personality, and in some cases power broker whose influence extends far beyond the temple. This contradiction has been tolerated, even celebrated, for decades. But recent events, most notably a widely publicised case involving a senior monk accused of grave moral misconduct, have forced the country to confront a painful truth: the institutional conditions that make such scandals possible are not new. They are the predictable outcome of a long historical process that H. L. Seneviratne described with remarkable clarity in The Work of Kings. The moral deterioration visible today is not an aberration. It is the culmination of a centurylong transformation in the identity, function, and authority of the Sangha.

To understand how we arrived at this moment, it is necessary to revisit the argument Seneviratne made nearly three decades ago. His thesis was simple but profound: the modern Sri Lankan monkhood has taken on the ‘work of kings.’ By this he meant that monks, instead of confining themselves to the renunciant life prescribed by the Vinaya, have assumed the secular responsibilities once associated with precolonial kingship, such as protecting the religion, organising society, guiding the nation, and enforcing moral order. This shift, he argued, was not a natural evolution of Buddhist tradition but a modern invention shaped by colonialism, nationalism, and the anxieties of a society struggling to redefine itself in the face of foreign domination. The monk became a symbol of national identity, a guardian of cultural authenticity, and a leader in the struggle for political autonomy. In the process, the boundaries that once separated the monastic from the worldly began to dissolve.

Transformation

The consequences of this transformation were not immediately visible. For decades, the activist monk was celebrated as a patriot, a reformer, and a moral guide. His involvement in education, social welfare, and nationalist mobilisation was seen as a necessary response to colonial pressures and missionary competition. But beneath the surface, the foundations of monastic discipline were slowly eroding. The Vinaya, which had served for centuries as a rigorous framework for regulating monastic life, was increasingly overshadowed by the demands of public engagement. The communal structures that once ensured accountability, senior supervision, collective confession, and the daily rhythms of monastic routine, were weakened by the pressures of modernity. Monks who travelled constantly, managed institutions, or lived independently in urban temples found themselves outside the traditional systems of oversight that had long protected the integrity of the Sangha.

Scandal

It is within this historical context that the recent scandal must be understood. The case shocked the nation not only because of the severity of the allegations but because it shattered the public’s assumption that the monkhood remains a bastion of moral purity. Yet the shock itself reveals a collective denial. For years, Sri Lankan society has been aware, sometimes quietly, sometimes openly—of the growing gap between the ideal of the monk and the realities of modern monastic life. Stories of misconduct, financial irregularities, political manipulation, and abuse of authority have circulated with increasing frequency. But each incident has been treated as an isolated failure, a personal weakness, or an unfortunate exception. What has been missing is recognition that these incidents are symptoms of a deeper structural problem.

Seneviratne’s analysis helps illuminate this problem. When monks take on the work of kings, they inevitably enter domains of power that expose them to temptations the Vinaya was designed to avoid. Handling money, managing institutions, cultivating political patrons, and exercising authority over laypeople create opportunities for ego, ambition, and moral compromise. The monk who becomes a public figure is no longer shielded by the anonymity and humility of the renunciant life. Instead, he becomes a celebrity, a leader, and in some cases an object of uncritical devotion. This elevation brings with it a dangerous form of immunity. Laypeople who revere a monk for his public achievements may hesitate to question his behaviour. Politicians who rely on monastic support may protect him from scrutiny. The media, which often treats monks as moral authorities, may be reluctant to investigate allegations that challenge the sanctity of the robe.

The recent scandal illustrates how these dynamics can converge. The monk at the centre of the case was not an obscure figure. He was a respected preacher, charismatic leader, and head of a prominent institution. His public image was built on years of service, teaching, and community engagement. Yet it was precisely this public stature that allowed him to operate without meaningful oversight. The institutional structures around him, administrators, lay supporters, and junior monks, were either unwilling or unable to challenge his authority. The very qualities that made him a respected figure in the eyes of the public also made him untouchable within his own institution. When allegations finally emerged, they revealed not only personal wrongdoing but a systemic failure of accountability.

Failure that is not unique

This failure is not unique to one temple or one monk. It reflects a broader pattern within the modern Sangha. As monastic institutions have grown in size, wealth, and influence, their internal governance has struggled to keep pace. Many temples operate as semiautonomous entities controlled by a single monk or a small group of monks. Financial transparency is limited, administrative oversight is weak, and the mechanisms for addressing misconduct are often informal or ineffective. The traditional structures of monastic discipline, such as the Sangharama procedures for adjudicating offences, are rarely used in modern contexts, partly because they require collective participation and partly because they are illsuited to the complexities of contemporary institutional life. In practice, this means that monks who wield significant authority can act with little fear of internal sanction.

The politicisation of the Sangha has further complicated matters. Since the midtwentieth century, monks have played an increasingly prominent role in electoral politics, nationalist movements, and public policy debates. This involvement has given them access to political networks that can be mobilised to protect their interests. It has also created a culture in which monks are valued not for their adherence to the Vinaya but for their ability to influence public opinion, mobilise voters, or lend moral legitimacy to political causes. In such an environment, the monk who is politically useful may be shielded from criticism, while the monk who adheres strictly to the renunciant ideal may find himself marginalised or ignored.

The result is a profound distortion of monastic identity. The monk who once sought liberation from worldly attachments is now encouraged to cultivate influence, authority, and public recognition. The monk who once lived under the strict supervision of senior elders now operates in a world where independence is celebrated and oversight is minimal. The monk who once relied on laypeople for basic sustenance now controls vast resources, manages institutions, and commands the loyalty of thousands of followers. This inversion of traditional roles has created a fertile ground for moral deterioration.

Yet it would be a mistake to interpret this deterioration as evidence that the Sangha as a whole is corrupt. Many monks continue to live lives of remarkable discipline, humility, and spiritual dedication. In remote forest monasteries, small village temples, and meditation centres across the country, monks quietly uphold the ancient ideals of the renunciant life. They are not the ones who appear on television, lead political rallies, or manage large institutions. Their work is invisible, their influence subtle, and their commitment unwavering. The crisis facing the Sangha today is not a crisis of individual morality but a crisis of institutional identity. It is the product of a centurylong transformation that has blurred the boundaries between the monastic and the secular, the spiritual and the political, the renunciant and the worldly.

If Sri Lanka is to address this crisis, it must begin by acknowledging the structural nature of the problem. The temptation to treat each scandal as an isolated incident must be resisted. Instead, the country must confront the uncomfortable reality that the modern configuration of monastic life is fundamentally at odds with the principles of the Vinaya. The Sangha cannot simultaneously function as a political force, a social service provider, a media institution, and a spiritual community without compromising its integrity. The more monks are drawn into the world, the more vulnerable they become to the moral dangers that the Buddha warned against.

Reform, therefore, must focus not only on punishing individual offenders but on rethinking the institutional structures that enable misconduct. This includes strengthening internal governance, enhancing financial transparency, restoring the authority of senior elders, and reestablishing the communal practices that once ensured accountability. It also requires a broader cultural shift in how laypeople relate to monks. Blind devotion must give way to informed respect. Reverence must be balanced with responsibility. The robe must be honoured, but it must not be used as a shield against scrutiny.

Seneviratne’s work offers a valuable starting point for this rethinking. His analysis reminds us that the crisis facing the Sangha is not the result of moral decline alone but of historical forces that reshaped the identity of the monkhood. By tracing the evolution of the activist monk, he shows how the Sangha became entangled in the political and social structures of the modern nationstate. This entanglement has brought both benefits and dangers. It has allowed monks to play important roles in education, social welfare, and national development. But it has also exposed them to the corrupting influences of power, wealth, and public acclaim.

The challenge now is to disentangle the Sangha from these influences without undermining its ability to serve society. This will not be easy. The activist monk has become deeply embedded in the cultural and political fabric of the country. Many laypeople expect monks to be leaders, reformers, and guardians of national identity. Politicians rely on monastic support to legitimise their agendas. Media institutions depend on monks for content, commentary, and moral authority. Reversing this trend will require a collective effort from monks, laypeople, and political leaders alike.

Ultimately, the future of the Sangha depends on its ability to reclaim the renunciant ideal that lies at the heart of Buddhist monasticism. This does not mean withdrawing from society entirely, but it does mean reestablishing the boundaries that protect the monk from the dangers of worldly involvement. It means recognising that the true strength of the Sangha lies not in its political influence or institutional power but in its moral authority, its spiritual discipline, and its commitment to the path of liberation. The recent scandal, painful as it is, may serve as a catalyst for this reevaluation. It has exposed the vulnerabilities of the modern monastic system and forced the country to confront the consequences of a centurylong transformation.

To understand how the Vihara Devalegam Act relates to the perceived moral deformation of the clergy, it is necessary to examine how property management, state law, and monastic discipline intersect in the modern era. Historically stemming from the Buddhist Temporalities Ordinance No. 19 of 1931, this act serves as the primary legal framework governing the ‘temporalities’—meaning the secular wealth, extensive landholdings, and material donations belonging to Buddhist temples and shrines. While ancient kings granted these vast tracts of land to support the monkhood’s spiritual pursuits, the modern codification of this law has inadvertently fostered a system where property rights frequently supersede spiritual accountability.

The core of the crisis lies in the commercialisation of the monastic order that this legal framework enables. By treating temple lands as economic assets and vesting absolute administrative power in individual chief monks or lay trustees, the act has contributed to the rise of what critics term a monastic middle class. Access to vast, unregulated financial resources, rent from lands, and corporate donations has fundamentally shifted the focus of certain segments of the clergy away from the traditional path of worldly renunciation and spiritual guidance. Instead, it has driven a preoccupation with business investments, the accumulation of private capital, and luxury lifestyles, which deeply alienates a public looking to the Sangha for moral leadership.

The institutional flaws embedded in the Vihara Devalegam Act find a stark, real-world manifestation in the recent criminal case involving Venerable Pallegama Hemarathana Thero. As the chief priest of Anuradhapura and the custodian of the Atamasthana—the eight highly venerated Buddhist shrines, including the sacred Jaya Sri Maha Bodhi—Hemarathana Thero occupied one of the most powerful and wealthy positions within the Sri Lankan Sangha. His arrest on charges of sexual abuse of a minor girl perfectly illustrates how the structural defects of the Act facilitate not only moral decay but also the systemic obstruction of justice.

The core of this intersection lies in the vast, unaccountable wealth generated by the temporalities of the Anuradhapura shrines. Under the Vihara Devalegam Act, the chief custodian exercises immense, virtually unchecked control over temple revenues, state-backed land management, and millions of rupees in daily donations from millions of global pilgrims. It is precisely this immense financial liquidity that enabled the alleged deployment of vast sums of money to the victim’s family.

Furthermore, the situation underscores the profound policy failures cited regarding the helplessness of the monastic hierarchy and state enforcement. When child protection authorities initially attempted to act, the National Child Protection Authority noted severe delays and institutional resistance, stating they practically had to force the police to execute the arrest. The monk’s immediate retreat to a private hospital in Colombo upon the advancement of the criminal probe, followed by his release on bail, mirrors the exact loop described where wealthy monastics deploy high-priced legal defence teams funded directly or indirectly by their institutional positions. Because the Vihara Devalegam Act does not provide a mechanism for the immediate, unconditional forfeiture of temporal administrative rights upon a criminal indictment, the accused retains his structural power throughout the legal process. The Pallegama Thero scandal stands as definitive proof that without a fundamental overhaul of how temple wealth is legally governed and disciplined, the material benefits guaranteed by ancient temporalities will continue to shield the worst elements of moral deformation from the rule of law.

If Sri Lanka can learn from this moment and if it can recognise the structural roots of the crisis and commit to meaningful reform, then the Sangha may yet emerge stronger, more disciplined, and more faithful to its ancient ideals. But if the country continues to treat each scandal as an isolated failure and if it continues to ignore the deeper institutional problems that Seneviratne identified, then the moral deterioration we see today will only deepen. The work of kings, when performed by monks, carries a heavy price. It is time to decide whether that price is worth paying.

by Professor Amarasiri de Silva

Features

Kondachchi wind farm and battery storage project to boost energy security, says Power Ministry Secretary

Published

1 day ago

2026/06/5

Thilina Walpola

The Power and Energy Ministry’s drive towards energy security and renewable energy expansion received a major boost yesterday with the signing of a tripartite cooperation agreement for the development of the 150 MW Kondachchi Wind Power Project and an integrated Battery Energy Storage System (BESS) in Mannar.

The agreement was signed at the Ministry of Power auditorium under the patronage of Power Minister Anura Karunatilaka and Deputy Power Minister Arkam Ilyas.

Speaking at the event, Ministry Secretary G. M. R. D. Aponsu described the project as a transformative investment that would strengthen the country’s electricity network while supporting Sri Lanka’s transition towards cleaner energy sources.

“The Kondachchi Wind Power Project represents a significant milestone in Sri Lanka’s renewable energy journey. By combining large-scale wind generation with advanced battery energy storage technology, we are creating a more resilient and reliable power system capable of meeting future energy demands while reducing dependence on imported fossil fuels,” Aponsu said.

The project will be developed at Silavathurai in the Kondachchi area of Mannar on lands owned by the Sri Lanka Cashew Corporation. It is expected to utilise some 31 modern wind turbines with a total installed capacity of at least 150 MW.

Aponsu said the inclusion of an integrated battery storage facility would help address the variability associated with wind power generation and ensure stable electricity supply to the national grid.

“The battery energy storage component is a key feature of this project. It will enable the efficient integration of renewable energy into the grid and enhance overall system stability, which is essential as Sri Lanka increases the share of renewables in its energy mix,” he said.

According to the Ministry, the wind farm is expected to generate nearly 525 gigawatt-hours of electricity annually, significantly reducing the country’s expenditure on imported fuel and strengthening national energy security.

The project is also expected to contribute to Sri Lanka’s climate commitments by reducing carbon dioxide emissions by an estimated 372,750 tonnes annually.

“This investment delivers both economic and environmental benefits. It will reduce greenhouse gas emissions, support sustainable development objectives and help Sri Lanka move closer to achieving its renewable energy and climate targets,” Aponsu noted.

The project will be implemented under a Public-Private Partnership (PPP) arrangement using the Build, Own and Operate (BOO) model. The Asian Development Bank is providing technical and financial advisory support through its Transaction Advisory Services programme.

The signing ceremony was attended by Pradeep Perera, Chairman of the National System Operator (Pvt) Ltd., and Takeyo Koike, Head of Market Development and Public-Private Partnership Division of the ADB, among other distinguished guests.

The Ministry said comprehensive Environmental Impact Assessments and avifaunal studies have been undertaken to ensure minimal impacts on bird populations, nearby communities and agricultural lands. A dedicated 220-kilovolt transmission system will also be constructed to connect the project to the national grid.

“The Kondachchi Wind Farm is a strategic national project that will help secure Sri Lanka’s energy future while accelerating the country’s transition towards sustainable and affordable electricity generation,” Aponsu said.

Energy sector experts view the project as one of the most important renewable energy initiatives currently being pursued in Sri Lanka, combining utility-scale wind generation with modern energy storage technology to enhance grid reliability and long-term energy sustainability.

By Ifham Nizam

Features

Saudi Arabia sets new benchmark in Hajj management as 1.7 million pilgrims complete sacred journey

Published

1 day ago

2026/06/5

Thilina Walpola

Ambassador Al-Kahtani

Interview with Khalid Hamoud Al-Kahtani, Ambassador of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to Sri Lanka

Saudi Arabia has once again demonstrated its unparalleled capacity to manage one of the world’s largest annual religious gatherings, with this year’s Hajj pilgrimage concluding successfully despite extreme temperatures and the immense logistical challenge of accommodating more than 1.7 million pilgrims from around the world.

In an exclusive interview with The Island, Khalid Hamoud Al-Kahtani, Ambassador of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to Sri Lanka, described the 2026 Hajj season as a resounding success, crediting the achievement to the visionary leadership of the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques, His Royal Highness the Crown Prince and Prime Minister, and the coordinated efforts of multiple government agencies working around the clock to serve pilgrims.

The Ambassador noted that nearly 3,500 Sri Lankan pilgrims participated in this year’s Hajj under the quota allocated to Sri Lanka, benefiting from enhanced healthcare services, sophisticated crowd-management systems, expanded shaded areas and cutting-edge digital solutions introduced by the Kingdom.

With Saudi Arabia continuing to invest heavily in infrastructure, technology and pilgrim services under Vision 2030, Ambassador Al-Kahtani said the Kingdom remains committed to ensuring that pilgrims from around the world perform their religious duties in safety, comfort and tranquility.

The Saudi envoy also highlighted the growing partnership between Saudi Arabia and Sri Lanka, emphasising expanding cooperation not only in Hajj affairs but also in trade, investment, education, culture and institutional exchanges.

Following are excerpts of the interview:

Q: How do you assess this year’s Hajj season?

Ambassador Al-Kahtani: This year’s Hajj season was a resounding success, thanks to the Almighty Allah and the integrated efforts of the government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, led by the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques and His Royal Highness the Crown Prince and Prime Minister. This success was reflected in the efficiency of crowd management, the quality of services provided to the Hajj pilgrims and the effective coordination among the various relevant authorities, which enabled pilgrims to perform their rituals in an atmosphere of security, tranquility and ease.

Q: How many Sri Lankan pilgrims performed Hajj this year?

Ambassador Al-Kahtani: The number of Hajj pilgrims from the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka reached approximately 3,500, within the quota allocated to Sri Lanka for this season.

Q: Are there any discussions regarding increasing Sri Lanka’s quota in the future?

Ambassador Al-Kahtani:Hajj quotas are determined according to approved regulatory mechanisms that take into account a range of considerations. The relevant authorities in the Kingdom continue to study various aspects related to developing Hajj services and accommodating the allocated numbers for all countries, in coordination with the concerned parties.

Q: What were the most prominent special arrangements implemented this year?

Ambassador Al-Kahtani: The operational plans for this season focused on enhancing the safety and comfort of the Hajj pilgrims, especially given the climatic conditions and high temperatures. Measures included expanding shaded areas, increasing water distribution points and enhancing health and ambulance services, in addition to developing the transportation system and traffic management within the holy sites.

Q: What are the most prominent digital systems and smart services that were provided?

Ambassador Al-Kahtani:The Kingdom continues to implement its digital transformation objectives for the Hajj and Umrah system. The scope of electronic services offered through the Nusuk platform and application has been expanded, along with the development of digital systems for issuing permits, managing crowds, guidance and health services. This contributes to increasing the efficiency of services and improving the pilgrim’s experience at all stages of their journey.

Q: How were the challenges of overcrowding and heat addressed?

Ambassador Al-Kahtani: The relevant authorities adopted an integrated crowd-management system based on modern technologies and real-time data analysis. This was coupled with intensified health-awareness campaigns, expanded organised movement routes and increased deployment of field, medical and emergency teams. These measures support the safety of the Hajj pilgrims and reduce the risks associated with crowd density and climatic conditions.

Q: Were there special services for the elderly and sick?

Ambassador Al-Kahtani: Yes. The Kingdom paid special attention to the elderly and people with special health needs by providing specialized medical services, assistive transportation and facilities equipped to meet their needs, in addition to field teams working to provide humanitarian support and necessary healthcare throughout the Hajj period.

Q: How successful was the Kingdom in combating irregular Hajj permits?

Ambassador Al-Kahtani: The relevant authorities in the Kingdom continued to rigorously implement the regulations and instructions governing Hajj, utilising modern technologies and advanced monitoring procedures to reduce violations related to irregular Hajj. These efforts contributed to enhancing the safety of pilgrims, improving crowd-management efficiency and maintaining the smooth flow of movement within the holy sites.

Q: How would you describe Saudi-Sri Lankan cooperation in organising Hajj?

Ambassador Al-Kahtani: Cooperation between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Republic of Sri Lanka is characterised by continuous and constructive coordination in all matters related to Hajj. The relevant authorities in both countries work jointly to ensure the provision of the best services for Sri Lankan pilgrims and enable them to perform their rituals with ease and peace of mind.

Q: How many Hajj pilgrims were there globally, and what were the main challenges?

Ambassador Al-Kahtani: According to official statistics, the number of Hajj pilgrims this year reached 1,707,301 from various countries around the world. The main challenges included managing large crowds, ensuring public safety and providing health, transportation and accommodation services within a specific geographical and temporal scope. These challenges were addressed through advanced and integrated operational plans, which contributed to the smooth and successful completion of the Hajj season.

Q: Are there any future expansion projects?

Ambassador Al-Kahtani: The Kingdom continues to implement strategic development projects within the framework of Vision 2030, including developing the infrastructure in Makkah and the Holy Sites, and enhancing transportation networks and smart services. This contributes to raising the quality of services provided to pilgrims and Umrah performers and improving their long-term experience.

Q: How are Saudi-Sri Lankan relations strengthened outside the context of Hajj?

Ambassador Al-Kahtani: Relations between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Republic of Sri Lanka are witnessing continuous development in many areas, including political, economic, trade, cultural and educational cooperation, in addition to developing exchanges between institutions and the private sector. This reflects the two countries’ keenness to strengthen the bilateral partnership and achieve common interests.

Q: What message would you like to convey to Sri Lankan Muslims?

Ambassador Al-Kahtani: We extend our sincere congratulations to the Hajj pilgrims who have completed their Hajj rituals, and we ask Almighty Allah to accept their pilgrimage. We also assure Muslims in Sri Lanka that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia places serving the Two Holy Mosques and the guests of Almighty Allah at the forefront of its priorities and continues to develop the Hajj and Umrah system to achieve the highest standards of quality and safety.

By Ifham Nizam