Midweek Review

Visit to Moscow amid US travel ban

Published

5 years ago

2021/11/10

General Shavendra Silva and wife Sujeewa Nelson at the Mikhailovskaya Military Artillery School(pic courtesy Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation)

By Shamindra Ferdinando

General Shavendra Silva’s recently concluded visit (Oct 23 to Oct 30) to Russia should be examined against the backdrop of an unprecedented travel ban by the United States on the Sri Lanka Army Commander over hearsay war crimes accusations, including extrajudicial killings, during the last phase of the Vanni offensive.

Sri Lanka brought the war to a successful conclusion on the morning of May 19, 2009, on the banks of the Nanthikadal lagoon, despite a chorus of ‘expert’ opinion generated by the West over the years claiming that the country’s armed forces were incapable of defeating the LTTE and they had literally elevated the Tigers to a mythical and invincible status.

Combined Sri Lankan armed forces, however, conducted a relentless campaign, over a period of two years and 10 months, until Velupillai Prabhakaran was trapped in the one-time LTTE stronghold Mullaitivu. Prabhakaran was killed the day after the then General Sarath Fonseka’s Army declared the end of the war, on May 18, 2009. The Vijayabahu Infantry Regiment (VIR) was credited with the killing of Prabhakaran and recovery of his body more or less intact.

The US, one of the worst violators of human rights in many conflict zones, in the world, imposed a politically-motivated travel ban on General Silva, the first General Officer Commanding (GOC) of the much-celebrated 58 Division (formerly Task Force I).

Having launched offensive operations in early Sept 2007, from the Western front, the area popularly known as the Mannar rice bowl, the TF 1 troops fought their way northwards, captured Pooneryn (late Nov 2008) and then turned eastwards, crossed the Kandy-Jaffna A9 road, at Paranthan, and in quick succession stormed enemy defences at Elephant Pass and also brought Kilinochchi South under their control by early January 2009. With the fall of Kilinochchi, the Army stepped up offensive action leading to the final confrontation with Prabhakaran on May 19, 2009 in the environs of the Nanthikadal lagoon.

It must be noted here that Fonseka’s Army changed overall tactics in the northern and eastern theatres. The enemy simply had no answer to several fighting formations advancing on its bases and troops causing havoc, deep inside enemy held territory.

It would be pertinent to mention that the Army-raised TF 1 comprising two infantry Brigades on August 31, 2007, at Irattaperiyakulam camp under the leadership of the then Brigadier Chagie Gallage who carried out the first successful mission which resulted in the liberation of Silavathurai.

Earlier in April of that year, men Gallage led, captured the Thoppigala base of the Tigers, which some thought was impregnable. After its capture, ironically, then Opposition Leader Ranil Wickremesinghe tried to denigrate the victory as just the capture of a rock outcrop. We can recall that when Brig. Gallage went to announce the capture of the Tiger Jungle base at Toppigala he drove his own jeep like an ordinary soldier with a staff officer next to him also dressed like an ordinary soldier, but the media that had converged at his base close to the Black Bridge Batticaloa were not aware of the important if not symbolic achievement till it was announced over the TV and radio that night.In fact, Gallage spearheaded the Eastern campaign except the action at Mavilaru, conducted by the then Brigadier Prasanna Silva.

While TF 1 was steadily advancing from the Mannar Rice Bowl, Brig. Gallage suffered a heart attack in the Vanni west, Gallage had to undergo emergency surgery in Colombo. Fonseka brought in Shavendra Silva to command TF 1. The Army never revealed at that time military strategist Gallage suffered a heart attack on Oct 22, 2007, the day the LTTE mounted a commando-style raid on the Anuradhapura air base. Because of the calamity at the air base, Gallage had to be taken by chopper to Sigiriya air base and then flown to Ratmalana air base in a fixed aircraft. The rest is history.

Army Chief blacklisted

The US blacklisted Gen. Silva close on the heels of Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Ground Forces, General Oleg Salyukov’s five-day visit to Colombo in early Feb 2020 on the invitation of his Sri Lankan counterpart the then Lieutenant General Shavendra Silva. General Salyukov extended an invitation to General Silva to visit Russia though the eruption of Covid-19 epidemic prevented him from leaving the country as he was appointed as the head of the Task Force appointed to prevent the spread of the pandemic.

General Silva’s wife, Sujeewa Nelson accompanied him on his second foreign visit since the imposition of the US travel ban. Their first overseas visit was in March 2021 to Islamabad on the invitation of the country’s all-weather friend Pakistan. General Silva and Sujeewa Nelson were invitees at Pakistan’s national military parade. A section of the foreign media condemned and disputed Pakistan’s invitation to General Silva on the basis of him being among those accused of war crimes.

Having solidly defended Sri Lanka at the Geneva-based United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC), both Pakistan and Russia have absolutely no qualms in inviting General Silva. Both countries voted against anti-Sri Lanka resolutions spearheaded by the West moved in Geneva.

The timing of the US ban underscored the Superpower’s intention to meddle in local politics. The announcement was made between the last presidential election held in mid-November 2019 and the parliamentary polls in August 2020. It would be pertinent to mention that the parliamentary polls, scheduled for April 25, 2020, had to be put off to August due to the Covid-19 eruption. The UNP suffered a very heavy defeat with the over 70 year-old party that had 106 MPs in Parliament (2015-2019) being reduced to a solitary National List slot.

Most probably the US never expected the then Maj. Gen. Silva to receive an opportunity to command the Sri Lanka Army. Had that happened, the US wouldn’t have had to blacklist the highly decorated soldier. Obviously, the UNP-led government and the then President Maithripala Sirisena didn’t agree on how to deal with Silva.

The failed constitutional coup in late Oct 2018 ruined the political relationship between President Sirisena and Premier Ranil Wickremesinghe. Therefore, no one would have been surprised by the yahapalana leaders’ disagreement on the Army Commander’s appointment.

President Sirisena appointed the distinguished ground combat commander as the 23rd Commander of the Army on August 18, 2019. Maj. Gen. Silva was also elevated to the rank of Lieutenant General effective the same date. Had efforts to deprive Silva of the top position succeeded, the US wouldn’t have had to play politics with the Sri Lankan military by imposing a controversial travel ban on him. Or had the Presidency been in the hands of the UNP it would have appointed one of its uniformed ‘yes’ men as the new Army Commander and definitely not one who helped to defeat the most ruthless terror outfit in the world.

Whatever the reasons, the stand taken by President Sirisena, the Commanding-in-Chief of the armed forces as well as the Defence Minister should be appreciated.

Following wartime Defence Secretary Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s triumph at the Nov 2019 presidential election, Silva was promoted to the rank of a 4-star General on Dec 28, 2020. With the retirement of Admiral Ravi Wijegunaratne on Dec 31, 2019, Gen. Silva was named the Chief of Defence Staff. Six weeks later the US categorised General Silva as a war criminal.

Denigration of an Army Chief

Why did the US categorise General Silva a war criminal well over a decade after the conclusion of the war? Let me remind the reader that Silva, in 2010, received the appointment as Deputy Permanent Representative of Sri Lanka to the United Nations, in New York. Silva is the one and only serving military officer in Sri Lanka’s history to be promoted to an ‘Ambassadorial’ rank in the country’s Foreign Service. Most importantly, why on earth the US found it necessary to declare Silva a war criminal having backed the war-winning General Sarath Fonseka’s candidature at the 2010 January presidential election.

In fact, the US played a significant role in building up a UNP-led coalition that included the Tamil National Alliance (TNA) in support of Fonseka. War crimes accusations against the Army seemed ridiculous against the backdrop of all predominantly Tamil speaking electoral districts in the North and the East voting overwhelmingly for Fonseka. But, incumbent President Mahinda Rajapaksa polled 1.8 mn votes more than Fonseka. The silly Opposition blamed Fonseka’s defeat on what the late JVP leader Somawansa Amarasinghe called a computer jilmart.

When the then government arrested Fonseka under controversial circumstances and was sentenced, the US intervened on the retired General’s behalf despite then US Ambassador Patricia Butenis having named Fonseka a war criminal along with the Rajapaksa brothers, Mahinda, Basil and Gotabaya. Butenis assertion is in the public domain thanks to secret Wiki Leaks. Butenis’ cable sent just weeks before the January 2010 presidential election underscored duplicitous US strategy.

Ten years after the 2010 presidential election, US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo tweeted: “I am designating Shavendra Silva making him ineligible for entry into the US due to his involvement in extrajudicial killings during Sri Lanka’s Civil War. The US will not waver in its pursuit of accountability for those who commit war crimes and violate human rights.”

Designation of the Army Chief took place soon after Pompeo declared the US looked forward to deepening ties with Sri Lanka. How did the US expect to improve ties by blacklisting a hugely popular Army Chief?

In a previous statement, Pompeo said that allegations of gross human rights violations against Shavendra Silva had been documented by the United Nations and other organisations. US sanctions barred both Silva and his immediate family members from entering the US.

“The Government of Sri Lanka takes strong objection to the imposition of travel restrictions on Lieutenant General Silva and his immediate family members by the Government of the United States, based on independently unverified information,” the Foreign Ministry said in a statement.

Lanka responds to US

Sri Lanka’s Ambassador in Washington Rodney Perera declared that the US decision hadn’t been based on independently verified information, but on the much-disputed OISL Report of 2015 and accusations propagated by various other organisations.

Ambassador Perera urged the US to verify the authenticity of its sources of information. Ambassador Perera said so addressing the American Foreign Service Association Club in Washington D.C. The gathering included several former U.S. Ambassadors and senior officials who served in Colombo.

Commenting on the inclusion of the family members of the Army Commander on the blacklist, Ambassador Perera declared: “Even though we are now in the 21st Century, even members of his family who have not been accused of any wrongdoing, have been subjected to a collective punishment reminiscent of the practice in medieval Europe.”

The career diplomat assured Sri Lanka would remain strongly engaged on this issue with the United States to have it review its decision. The assurance was given about a week after the US blacklisted the much decorated soldier. What have we done since then to disapprove unsubstantiated war crimes allegations against General Silva? In fact, the despicable project against the Commander of the Army is nothing but an affront to the country. Parliament never really took up the Western powers’ campaign against the war-winning military here. During Karu Jauasuriya’s tenure as the Speaker, the UNP politician never bothered to take it up with Western diplomats. One shouldn’t be surprised over that, as his party betrayed the military by co-sponsoring an accountability resolution on Oct.01, 2015. However, the failure on the part of incumbent Speaker Mahinda Yapa Abeywardena to speak on behalf of the military when foreign diplomats called on him, cannot be justified.

Before General Silva undertook the visit to Russia, Chief of Indian Army Staff General Manoj Mukund Naravane was here. In spite of India being a US ally, New Delhi went ahead with its Army Chief’s visit to Colombo. Naravane had been here with the Indian Peace Keeping Force during its deployment in terms of the Indo-Lanka Accord and had been based in Trincomalee. Now, the issue is how is it that those countries demanding action against the Sri Lankan military for eradicating terrorism on its soil are silent on India’s accountability issues here. Unfortunately, Sri Lanka lacked the political will to present its case properly before the international community.

Failure on the part of successive Sri Lankan governments to address accountability issues since the end of the conflict has underscored utter irresponsibility on the country’s part. Against that pathetic background, the Russian invitation extended to Gen. Silva is of paramount importance.

Considered to be one of the highest honours, presented in recent times, the formal and elegant Guard of Honour parade with four squads of the Russian Land Forces, together with a Russian Army band distinctively featured the significance and the recognition the Russian Land Forces attach to the visiting Sri Lankan Army Chief.

General Silva after formal honours was ushered to pay floral tribute to the monument at Alexandrovsky Garden of Moscow Kremlin where the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier stands.

During General Shavendra Silva’s stay in the Russian Federation, he visited the Moscow Higher Combined Arms Command School and met its Commandant, Major General Roman Binyukov, Division Commander of the 4th Guards Tank Division in Naro-Fominsk and the Commandant at Mikhailovskaya before he visited the Military Artillery Academy, Military Medical Academy and several other places of military and tourist attractions.

Saliyapura bombshell

The writer earlier mentioned the change of command of the TF 1 in Oct 2007 following Gallage’s predicament, but what is of far more importance is what he said at Saliyapura Gajaba Regimental headquarters in the first week of Sept 2018 as his farewell speech when he retired from the service after an illustrious military career, much of it having spent leading combat troops. Gajaba veteran General Gallage didn’t mince his words when he questioned how having served the Army for well over 30 years he was compelled to retire being categorised as a war criminal. Why did Gallage have to say that? Gallage had sought a visa in Sept 2016 to visit his brother living in Australia. He wanted to visit Australia from Dec. 2016 to January 2017. Gallage’s brother, an Australian citizen of Sri Lankan origin, had visited Colombo especially to make representations to the Australian HC.

Following that meeting the Australian department of Immigration and Border Protection issued a report titled ‘Potential Controversial Visitor’ citing war crimes and crimes against humanity as reasons for denying Gallage a visa.

In the absence of specific accusations against Gallage, Australia found fault with him for giving leadership to the 59 Division after the conclusion of the war. In other words, those who commanded fighting formations during the war (Divisions 58, 59, 57, 53, 55 et al) on the Vanni front and after can be humiliated. Gallage’s is a case in point.

Interestingly, the Army celebrated its 72 anniversary at the Saliyapura base last Oct with the participation of President Gotabaya Rajapaksa formerly of the Gajaba Regiment. In his speech at Saliyapura, Rajapaksa, who retired having achieved Lieutenant Colonel’s rank (1971-1992), acknowledged shortcomings on the part of his government. The government should examine the aptness of its response to war crimes accusations. President Rajapaksa made reference on Nov 6 to Sri Lanka having to face Geneva accusations though in a different context.

Designation of the Army Chief should be examined taking into consideration overall war crimes accusations directed at Sri Lanka. How can the government forget the US declined to issue a visa to Field Marshal Sarath Fonseka and the circumstances?

Haven’t those in authority observed how Canada and Italy rejected retired Air Force Commander Air Marshal Sumangala Dias as Sri Lanka’s top diplomatic envoy?

British Conservative politician Lord Naseby in an interview with this writer in late Sept 2019 questioned Sri Lanka’s response to the accountability issue (Naseby disappointed in Lanka’s collective failure to use ‘Gash reports’ for its defence-Sept 25, 2019, The Island.’

Why didn’t Sri Lanka continue to refrain from effectively using British cables that had been obtained by Lord Naseby after near a three-year legal battle and wartime US Defence Advisor Lt. Colonel Lawrence Smith’s taking a view 100 percent contrary to the US and its allies as regards the accountability issue, at the 2011 Colombo Defence seminar? Nothing can be as important as the US official’s statement exclusively reported by The Island as it was made just two months after the much debated highly controversial Darusman report’s release. The split in the war-winning team with Fonseka’s entry into politics in late 2009, too, also contributed to Sri Lanka’s overall failure. Instead of countering lies, the first Rajapaksa administration squandered millions of USD in foolish image building projects.

Sri Lanka’s relations with the world should be examined in the context of Quad strategies and new trilateral security partnership AUKUS under which Australia would get a fleet of nuclear-powered submarines for the first time and Sri Lanka’s strong partnership with China. The ongoing controversy over Sri Lanka moving the Colombo Commercial Court against top Chinese fertiliser company, its local agent and the People’s Bank to stop payment for carbonic fertiliser consignment shouldn’t be allowed to ruin relations between the two countries. Like Pakistan, the emerging world power China is an all-weather friend, whose continuing support to Colombo is essential. Therefore, the issue at hand should be dealt carefully taking into consideration all factors. But, under no circumstances, should corruption be allowed to undermine Lanka-China relations.

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Midweek Review

Opp. caught up in CIABOC offensive

Published

3 days ago

2026/06/24

Sahan Weerasooriya

Mahinda Rajapaksa leaving CIABOC on 12 June, 2026

The Commission to Investigate Allegations of Bribery or Corruption (CIABOC) on 12 June questioned former President Mahinda Rajapaksa regarding the USD 2 Mn bribe allegation directed at the late SriLankan CEO Kapila Chandrasena, whose body was found on 8 May in a close relative’s home in Kollupitiya. Chandrasena’s alleged suicide sent shock waves through political circles and interested parties questioned the circumstances leading to him being granted bail on 6 May on cash bail of Rs. 500,000 with three sureties of Rs. 10 million each. The Colombo Magistrate court also imposed a travel ban. The issue at hand is as to how Mohamed Riswan and Mohamed Irshan stood as sureties for Chandrasekera. Of all the investigations undertaken by the CIABOC, the USD 2 Mn bribe case is the most politically charged probe.

Of the Rajapaksas, former State Minister Shasheendra Rajapaksa is so far the last to be indicted. CIABOC on 19 June filed indictments before the Colombo High Court against him and two others Sepalika Saman Kumari and Keerthi Bandara Kotagama. According to the charges, the accused are alleged to have committed the offence of corruption and aided and abetted the commission of the offence by using official influence to pressure certain government officials, attached to the Office for Reparations, to obtain compensation amounting to Rs. 8.85 million for a property built on a state land by Shasheendra and destroyed by marauding Aragalaya mobs.

By Shamindra Ferdinando

The ruling National People’s Power (NPP) government last week emphasised, in no uncertain terms, that it wouldn’t tolerate the growing Opposition challenge.

Amidst the growing controversy over the continuing detention of retired Maj. Gen. Suresh Sallay. in terms of the draconian Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA), under humiliating conditions, in connection with the ongoing investigations into the 2019 Easter Sunday carnage, police arrested Sugeeshwara Bandara, leader of the New People’s Front (NPF). The Central Crime Investigation Bureau (CCIB) apprehended him on 18 June and the Fort Magistrate’s Court remended him till 1 July..

The CCIB also apprehended Binoy Hettiarachchi who was accompanying Bandara. Hettiarachchi served as a media coordinator at the former President Ranil Wickremesinghe’s Flower Road Office. Police intercepted their vehicle at Kollupitiya where the arrests were made like in an action-packed movie. Hettiarachchi was freed four hours later.

But, it would be better to identify Bandara as the former private secretary to President Gotabaya Rajapaksa as well as the Director General of Special Projects at the Presidential Secretariat in the wake of Ranil Wickremesinghe taking over the presidency.

Accused of receiving two salaries simultaneously, under the President’s Expenditure Head, Bandara who managed the media for Gotabaya Rajapaksa, in the run-up to the 2019 presidential election, is under investigation for abuse of government vehicles and employing government workers for political work.

Having launched his political career as the Colombo District organiser of the alliance New People’s Front, a breakaway faction of the UPFA, in February, 2024, Bandara contested the November, 2024, parliamentary polls on the New Democratic Front (NDF) ticket. But, of late, Bandara, as the leader of NPF, became one of the most active opposition activists, aligned with the political grouping, dubbed People’s United Opposition, operating from Ranil Wickremesinghe’s Flower Road Office.

Bandara drew the wrath of the government when he launched a noisy protest outside Finance Secretary Dr. Harshana Suriyapperuma’s residence at Akuregoda, Pelawatta, on 26 April, where he and his protesting supporters were given a shower of excreta. The group, led by Bandara, demanded the Finance Secretary’s resignation over the theft of USD 2.5 mn from the Treasury. No less a person than President Anura Kumara Dissanayake reacted angrily to Bandara’s actions.

Acknowledging the right for legitimate protests, the President warned against protests directed at residences of officials. On 18 April, Bandara led a protest outside Agriculture Minister K.D. Lal Kantha’s recently built luxury residence at Weliwita, Kaduwela, where he questioned how the JVPer managed to build such a home as he was on record as having repeatedly said that he lived a difficult life.

The police apprehended Bandara as he was returning from a meeting between senior representatives of the People’s United Opposition and the IMF Colombo at the Tiki Bar, Shangri-La. In spite of negligible parliamentary presence, with those elected on the NDF ticket at the last parliamentary election not really speaking in one voice, the Flower Road project has become a headache for the government.

In fact, the Flower Road operation has been causing continuous harassment to the NPP, while the Samagi Jana Balawegaya (SJB) struggled to play its anticipated role as the main Opposition. Instead of conducting a cohesive campaign against the cocky NPP government, members of the SJB seem to be pulling in different directions at the expense of the common opposition front.

Regardless of the Wickremesinghe-led grouping vowing to press ahead with its campaign, the arrest of Bandara is obviously meant to have a detrimental impact on the activities of the Opposition.

It would be pertinent to mention that Bandara had been among those who stayed with President Gotabaya Rajapaksa at the President’s House, in Colombo, as a massive protest erupted on 9 July, 2022. Bandara was among the last to flee the President’s House as the military withdrew, amidst mounting pressure on their positions.

The police arrested Bandara as former President Gotabaya Rajapaksa moved the Court of Appeal in terms of Article 140 of the Constitution to prevent him being arrested under the PTA. The wartime Defence Secretary sought the court intervention in the wake of police probing the 2019 Easter Sunday carnage and obtaining a travel ban against him.

The court heard Romesh de Silva PC’s submissions on behalf of the ex-President on 18 June. The court deferred the hearing to 24 June. The crux of the matter is that the ex-President fears that the CID is about to arrest him on the basis of a statement made by fugitive Azad Moulana, in Paris, linking Sallay directly with the Easter Sunday carnage.

NPP intensifies pressure

The NPP seems confident of its current course of action meant to pin down the Opposition. In spite of unbridled corruption being the major issue on the post-war election platform, no political party succeeded in going flat-out against the political opposition.

However, the NPP allowed the judicial process to continue. The first major sentencing was announced on 2 April, 2025, just six months after the parliamentary polls, handsomely won by the NPP. The Commission to Investigate Allegations of Bribery or Corruption (CIABOC) moved the Colombo High Court successfully against the former Chief Minister of the North Central Province S.M. Ranjith Samarakoon.

Colombo High Court No. 01 Judge Adithya Patabendige sentenced him in terms of Section 70 of the Bribery Act. The HC declared the former CM perpetrated malpractices by ordering fuel to his personal secretary’s vehicle. The personal secretary happened to be Shanthi Chandrasena, wife of his brother S.M. Chandrasena, a former Cabinet Minister and one of the most powerful Ministers to represent the North Central province.

The ex- Chief Minister and the second accused, his personal secretary, were convicted guilty of two charges. Both were sentenced to 16 years rigorous imprisonment and were also ordered to pay a fine of Rs. 200,000/- with an additional two-year prison term in case of default.

Deputy Director General Asitha Anthoney appeared on behalf of the Commission to Investigate Allegations of Bribery or Corruption.

There had never been any really coordinated CIABOC campaign against corruption. No political party, or a particular family, felt threatened by CIABOC. Both those in and outside Parliament acted with impunity. They feared no one. There was no need to be because the powerful and the influential operated above the law.

Just a couple of weeks after sentencing of S.M. Ranjith Samarakoon and Shanthini Chandrasena, the CIABOC arrested the latter’s husband, one-time Deputy Economic Development Minister and Special Projects Minister, S.M. Chandrasena. The CIABOC took him into custody on 4 July, 2025.

The CIABOC accused the former Minister of causing loss to the government by distributing seed corn, imported at a cost of Rs 25 mn, in 2024, among the farmer community in the Anuradhapura district, at a subsidised price. The distribution had taken place ahead of the 2015 presidential election contested by Mahinda Rajapaksa and estranged former SLFP General Secretary Maithripala Sirisena. The CIABOC alleged that Chandrasena exerted undue influence on the Director (Planning) and other officers of the District Secretariat and distributed seeds through his political allies to gain an advantage in the 2015 presidential election and incurred a loss to the government.

Chandrasena was granted bail on 1 August, 2025. He was indicted on 12 June before the Colombo High Court.

Before further discussing the ongoing anti-corruption campaign, let me introduce the top leadership of CIABOC. The Commission consists of Justice W.M.N.P. Iddawela (Chairman), K.B. Rajapakse and Chethiya Goonesekera P.C, with High Court judge R.S.A. Dissanayake as its Director General.

The sentencing of the S. M. Ranjith Samarakoon didn’t really bother his side. The arrest of his brother S.M. Chandrasena, too, didn’t really upset those facing charges. But, sentencing of former Minister Mahindananda Aluthgamage and former Sathosa Chairman and former Trade Minister Nalin Fernando on 29 May, 2025, sent shock waves through the Opposition.

The Colombo High Court Trial-at-Bar sentenced Aluthgamage and Fernando for committing the offence of corruption by purchasing 14,000 carrom boards and 11,000 checkers boards through Sathosa, allegedly to distribute to schools and sports clubs selected by the Sports Ministry, and distributing them to party offices of the government, during the 2015 presidential election campaign thereby, causing a loss of over 53 million rupees to the government, stunned the Opposition.

Aluthgamage was sentenced to 20 years of rigorous imprisonment, Fernando received a sentence of 25 years of rigorous imprisonment. Additionally, a fine of Rs. 100,000 (hundred thousand) was imposed for each count.

The CIABOC’s Assistant Director General Mrs. Anuththara Jayasinghe and Assistant Director General Mrs. Thushari Dayaratne conducted the prosecution.

During the Yahapalana government Aluthgamage spearheaded a high profile anti-corruption campaign, dubbed ‘Yahapalana Top 10 kamba horu’. The then Joint Opposition (JO) group, led in Parliament by Dinesh Gunawardena, published a 750-page book, targeting the Yahapalana ministers. Mahindananda, who spearheaded that campaign, is now serving a long sentence.

The JO group consists of UPFA lawmakers who declined to throw their weight behind the then President Sirisena aligned with the UNP.

Let me mention the names of those against whom the accusations were made by the JO.

Yahapalana corruption

The JO dealt with 10 major cases. (1) The Treasury bond scams perpetrated in 2015 and 2016. Accusations were directed at Ranil Wickremesinghe, Ravi Karunanayake and Governor Central Bank Arjuna Mahendran. The losses were estimated at Rs 26 bn. (2) causing losses amounting to Rs 10 bn through the fraudulent import of vehicles. Ravi Karunanayake was named the chief culprit (3) Misappropriation of Mahapola funds to the tune of Rs. 1 bn. Allegations were directed at Malik Samarawickrema (4) Stealing from an insurance scheme implemented for the benefit of those going for employment in West Asia. The JO accused Thalatha Atukarale of misappropriating funds amounting Rs 1.5 bn (5) Receiving Rs 1.5 bn through the leasing of Hambantota port to China on a 99-year lease. Ranil Wickremesinghe, Malik Samarawickrema and R. Paskaralingam were named the offenders (6) Kabir Hashim was accused of causing a loss of Rs 54 bn by cancelling aircraft ordered from Airbus Industries for the national carrier (7) fraudulent activities pertaining to the release of paddy stocks held by the government. The JO estimated the losses caused to the government at Rs 10 bn. (8) Scam in vehicle parts. Ravil Karunanayake was accused of causing losses amounting to Rs. 6.5 bn, (9 A) Dr. Rajitha Senaratne was accused of leasing of the Modera fisheries harbor and procurement of eight vessels to catch fish, fraudulently, and thereby causing losses up to Rs 1 bn, (9B) The JO also found fault with Dr. Senaratne for perpetrating Rs 1.5 bn fraud in the procurement of medicine and lastly (10) Ranil Wickremesinghe, Malik Samarawickrema, R. Paskaralingam and Charitha Ratwatte were blamed for a massive fraud in the procurement of coal for the Norochcholai coal-fired power plant. That particular fraud was estimated at Rs 5 bn.

Although the JO transformed itself to Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna (SLPP) later, to successfully contested the 2019 presidential election, none of the above-mentioned cases were investigated. As far as we know, none of those cases had been dealt with during the SLPP rule, from November, 2019, to July, 2022. Faced with an externally backed regime change operation, the SLPP invited Wickremesinghe, who had been named by them in three major corruption cases, to accept the premiership in May, 2022, and presidency in July same year.

So far, there is no indication whether the mentioned JO allegations had received the attention of the CIABOC or the Attorney General of the government. As far as we know of all the politicians and officials, Wickremesinghe is the only one facing imminent threat due to the ongoing case pertaining to him visiting the UK in September, 2023, to join his wife Prof. Maithree at the University of Wolverhampton at her graduation ceremony.

Wickremesinghe has been accused of squandering nearly 17 mn rupees at a time the country was in deep economic turmoil. The Fort Magistrate’s court is scheduled to take up the case on 8 July.

SLPP parliamentary group leader Namal Rajapaksa is also facing a major legal challenge. The former Minister has been indicted on charges of criminal misappropriation of Rs. 70 mn in connection with the controversial Krrish project. The indictments have been forwarded to the Colombo High Court by the Attorney General, alleging that Namal Rajapaksa misappropriated funds by receiving Rs. 70 million from the Indian real estate company for the development of rugby in Sri Lanka.

Yoshitha Rajapaksa, too, has been dealt with by the CIABOC. The Rajapaksas have been accused of lowering qualifications required to join the executive branch of the Navy and then sending him to the Royal Naval Academy in the United Kingdom at taxpayers’ expense. Produced before the Colombo Additional Magistrate, Yoshitha was released on three personal bail bonds of Rs. 5 million each.

Producing Yoshitha before court on 17 June, Deputy Director General of the Bribery Commission, Ruvini Wickramasinghe declared: “”Your Honour, the complaint regarding this incident was received on June 25, 2016. Accordingly, the Commission initiated investigations. The complaint states that the suspect had participated in naval training programmes held in England and Ukraine by misusing government funds, while depriving qualified applicants of such opportunities. At that time, this individual, who is a civilian in the dock today, was also a civilian in 2006 when he was deemed eligible for the Royal Navy Young Officer training at the Royal Naval Academy in the United Kingdom. The opportunities to receive this training are extremely limited. Your Honour, selection to this prestigious course is usually based on being the most outstanding cadet officer during a two-year training period or based on performance during training. However, this suspect, although a civilian in 2006, was proposed and included in the list and was sent for the course in haste.”

The Deputy Director General also stated that Yoshitha Rajapaksa had undergone medical examinations required for overseas training even before being officially recruited into the Navy.

The court was also told that though Sri Lanka previously received scholarships from the UK the Rajapaksa government funded Yoshitha to the tune of Rs 6.2 mn.

Opp. attacks CIABOC

The Opposition has repeatedly attacked the CIABOC with its Director General Ranga Dissanayake being the primary target. Accusing Dissanayake of being a JVPer, the Opposition has repeatedly questioned the conduct of the High Court judge demanding that the CIABOC inquired into the top official’s conduct, especially with regard to the alleged suicide of former Sri Lankan CEO Kapila Chandrasena who had been under investigation pertaining to the receiving of USD 2 mn bribe to facilitate procurement aircraft from Airbus Industrie during Mahinda Rajapaksa’s second term.

Former Foreign Minister Prof. G. L. Peiris, a regular speaker at Flower Road media briefings, alleged that the CIABOC was a political tool in the NPP’s hands.

A section of the Opposition to question the circumstances one-time JVP heavyweight Nandana Gunatilleke died in January this year at the Ragama Teaching Hospital after accusing Dissanayake of pursuing an agenda beneficial to the JVP, a charge denied by the High Court judge. When the writer raised the allegations with Dissanayake, he emphatically denied any wrongdoing on his part https://island.lk/ciaboc-dg-denies-jvp-link/.

The CIABOC has simply ignored accusations directed at its DG who proved through his actions that he really meant high profile public pronouncements against corruption.

Former Deputy Minister and ex-MP Sarana Gunawardena was sentenced to a total of 16 years rigorous imprisonment by the Colombo High Court on June 8, 2026.

During the Yahapalana administration many cases, filed by the CIABOC as well as the Attorney General, were either dismissed or dropped due to lapses on their part. The accused in such cases were ex-MP Sajin Vass Gunawardena, ex-EP Chief Minister Sivanesathurei Chandrakanthan alias Pilleyan, ex-Ministers Johnston Fernando, Rohitha Abeygunawardena, Basil Rajapaksha, Mahindananda Aluthgamage and Janaka Bandara Tennakoon and former AG and CJ Mohan Peiris.

Regardless of Opposition protests, the public appreciate tangible action against corruption. However, the NPP has not been free from serious allegations against it since the last general elections. The release of suspicious 323 containers, plus two containers filled with ice, in January, 2025, followed by the massive coal scam perpetrated in September 2025, loss of over USD 2.5 mn from the Treasury and controversial Aswesuma payments, as well as wealth, accumulated by NPP Ministers as revealed by declarations made to CIABOC, shocked the electorate.

The NPP has failed to counter allegations. The circumstances under which Energy Minister Kumara Jayakody resigned, along with Energy Secretary Udayanga Hemapala, on 17 April, just a week after the NPP defeated the no-confidence motion moved by the Opposition against the Energy Minister. dealt a devastating blow to the NPP’s much touted integrity. The NPP couldn’t explain as to why a person under investigation by the CIABOC for an alleged fraud perpetrated during the Yahapalana government was accommodated in President Dissanayake’s first Cabinet. Indicted before the Colombo High Court, Jayakody’s case commenced last week.

Asset declarations of some NPP Ministers have shocked the country. The SJB has called for CIABOC to investigate them without delay and prove that CIABOC was not only going after the Opposition. Ministers Lal Kantha and Wasantha Samarasinghe are two of the top JVPers who have attracted attention as the Opposition hits back at the government.

SJB MP Mujibur Rahuman said that the JVP/NPP owed an explanation as to how their members amassed so much wealth since 2024 as they repeatedly claimed their inability to meet even their basic needs. But, their asset declarations exposed their blatant lies.

Midweek Review

Geopolitics of the Indian Ocean

Published

3 days ago

2026/06/24

Sahan Weerasooriya

Listening to the Winds, Reading the Waves:

Prof. Gamini Keerawella’s latest publication, Winds and Waves: Geopolitical Currents in the Indian Ocean since 1945 will be launched on 5 August at the Auditorium of the Bandaranaike Centre for International Studies (BCIS). The keynote address will be delivered by Prof. T. V. Paul, James, McGill Professor of Political Science at McGill University, Canada and the former President of the International Studies Association (ISA).

Prof. Keerawella, Professor Emeritus of History at the University of Peradeniya, has dedicated hisbook to the memory of Dr. Newton Gunasinghe, the eminent sociologist and Marxist theoretician who encouraged him to venture beyond disciplinary frontiers. In many respects, this work represents a successful realization of that intellectual endeavour. In her testimonial to back cover of the book, Dr. Radhika Coomaraswamy observes that “Gamini Keerawella offers a nuanced and layered account of the Indian Ocean region’s strategic evolution from the era of decolonization to the contemporary phase of intensifying great-power rivalry. Its distinctive analytical perspective makes it an important contribution to the study of international relations, maritime geopolitics, and regional strategic dynamics.” This assessment accurately captures the significance of the work, and I fully endorse her judgement.

This volume constitutes the final publication of a trilogy that explores the evolving dynamics of international relations from a distinctly Sri Lankan perspective. The first study examined the trajectory of Sri Lanka’s defence and foreign policy, while the second revisited the origins, evolution, and principal constituent elements of international relations as an academic discipline from a Global South perspective. The present work broadens the analytical canvas by tracing the shifting geopolitical contours of the Indian Ocean since 1945 and examining the evolving interplay between great-power competition and regional agency.

Indian Ocean not merely maritime transit space

At the heart of Prof. Keerawella’s analysis is the argument that the Indian Ocean is not merely a maritime space of transit but a living archive whose language is inscribed in tides, trade, and collective memory. To uncover the deeper structures that have shaped the region, he draws on Michel Foucault’s concept of the archaeology of knowledge, probing beneath the visible layers of historical experience to reveal successive strata of thought, exchange, and power. This approach enables him to trace the multiple origins of the Indian Ocean’s geopolitical significance through the sedimented traces of how the ocean has been known, governed, and imagined across time. Complementing this perspective is Fernand Braudel’s concept of the longue durée, which provides the framework for understanding the long-term evolution of Indian Ocean geopolitics. As Keerawella notes, for Braudel, history unfolds not as a single linear sequence but as a layered field of continuity and change, revealing the deeper architecture of the past—the slow yet powerful currents that shape political and economic developments beneath the surface of events (Keerawella 2026: xxiii).Prof. Keerawella further notes that later historians such as K. N. Chaudhuri and M. N. Pearson drew on Braudel’s insights and adapted them to understand the Indian Ocean as a polycentric world.

Prof. Keerawella argues that the terms employed in the title of this work—Winds, Waves, and Currents—evoke the ocean’s dual language of surface movement and underlying structure. In his reading, winds and waves signify motion: the visible and often turbulent forces that carry ships, peoples, commodities, and ideas across shifting maritime frontiers. Currents, by contrast, refer to the deeper and less visible forces that shape historical trajectories and connect coasts and continents through enduring patterns of interaction. As he observes, while winds and waves represent the restless dynamics of the ocean’s surface, currents embody the slower yet more consequential energies that operate beneath it, binding disparate regions into a larger maritime system (2026: xx).

Metaphors and Conceptual Foundation

Building on this conceptual foundation, the author employs winds, waves, and currents not merely as metaphors but also as analytical categories. Winds represent changing strategic directions and geopolitical realignments; waves denote recurring cycles of commerce, conflict, and interaction; and currents symbolize the deep structural forces that connect societies across space and time. Viewed from a distinctly Sri Lankan perspective, the volume demonstrates how a strategically located small state at the centre of the Indian Ocean perceives and navigates this maritime space through its own strategic lens. The book opens by situating Sri Lanka within the intersecting forces of history, geography, and power that have shaped the Indian Ocean world. It advances the notion of a dual strategic consciousness that has informed Sri Lanka’s external engagements: a persistent sense of vulnerability, rooted in colonial experience and geographical exposure, coexisting with a cosmopolitan outlook forged through centuries of maritime exchange. Prof. Keerawella contends that this dual consciousness constitutes the underlying framework through which Sri Lanka has historically interpreted and responded to developments in its external environment.

Winds and Waves is a comprehensive study comprising eleven chapters and an extensive introduction that establishes the analytical foundations of the work by treating the ocean simultaneously as text and method. The opening chapter situates Sri Lanka within the wider Indian Ocean system, tracing the island’s navigation through shifting configurations of power while emphasising the agency of small states. The Indian Ocean is presented not merely as a strategic arena but also as a moral and political space, linking Sri Lanka’s historical experience to the broader aspirations and consciousness of the Global South.

Revisiting British withdrawal

The book revisits Britain’s withdrawal from the Indian Ocean, arguing that it was not simply a consequence of post-war decline but the culmination of deeper structural transformations in the international system. Decolonisation, Afro-Asian nationalism, and the emergence of bipolarity fundamentally altered the regional order and created the conditions for Britain’s retreat. In turn, this withdrawal opened the way for superpower competition, particularly between the United States and the Soviet Union, transforming the Indian Ocean into major theatre of Cold War geopolitics.

A substantial portion of the volume is devoted to examining the policies and strategic trajectories of the major powers. The author traces American engagement from Cold War containment through post-Cold War maritime predominance to contemporary Indo-Pacific formulations, demonstrating that U.S. strategy has evolved through the interaction of structural imperatives and changing strategic discourses. Particular attention is paid to the 2026 U.S.–Iran War, which is interpreted as a transformative event that exposed the limits of military hegemony and accelerated patterns of strategic hedging and multi-alignment among regional actors. The book also explores the Soviet Union’s entry into the Indian Ocean in 1968 and the subsequent re-emergence of Russia under Vladimir Putin through selective naval deployments, arms transfers, and strategic partnerships, illustrating what the author characterises as the recurrent rhythms of great-power engagement in the region.

The rise of China receives extensive treatment as one of the most significant structural developments of the twenty-first century. Through the Belt and Road Initiative, port development projects, and naval modernisation, China has translated growing economic power into expanding strategic influence. The author contrasts Beijing’s assertive posture in the South China Sea with its relatively restrained approach in the Indian Ocean, where economic diplomacy and cooperative security initiatives have assumed greater prominence. Equally significant is the discussion of India’s transformation from a regional power into an emerging global strategic actor. The evolution of Indian maritime strategy—from Nehruvian custodianship to contemporary blue-water ambitions—demonstrates how a rising power navigates structural constraints while expanding its strategic reach. Initiatives such as SAGAR, naval modernization, and deepening partnerships with the United States, Japan, and Australia have positioned India as a central actor in the evolving Indo-Pacific order.

Roles of Japan and EU examined

The volume also examines the roles of Japan and the European Union in shaping the contemporary maritime order. Japan’s transition from post-war restraint to proactive strategic engagement, embodied in the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) vision, illustrates how middle powers adapt to changing geopolitical realities through coalition-building and maritime capacity enhancement. The European Union’s engagement is portrayed through less visible but nevertheless significant mechanisms, including trade, development cooperation, maritime governance, and norm diffusion, contributing to what the author terms a form of “quiet-making multipolarity” that encourages restraint, stability, and pragmatic cooperation.

Moving beyond conventional geopolitics, the book broadens the analytical framework to address a range of non-traditional security challenges confronting South Asia in general and Sri Lanka in particular. Climate change, piracy, illegal fishing, maritime terrorism, public health vulnerabilities, and digital insecurity are examined as transnational challenges that transcend the capabilities of individual states. The author argues that these issues reveal the limits of unilateral action and underscore the growing importance of cooperation, collective action, institutional innovation, and middle-power leadership in maritime governance.

Prof. Keerawella further situates the Indian Ocean within the wider context of the emerging Asian Century. Asia’s resurgence—driven principally by China and India and reinforced by the dynamism of Southeast Asia—is presented as a major reconfiguration of global power. In this transformation, the Indian Ocean functions as a vital maritime artery connecting energy resources, manufacturing centres, and consumer markets. At the same time, the author cautions against deterministic interpretations, emphasising that the realisation of the Asian Century remains contingent upon how the region responds to persistent inequalities, environmental challenges, governance deficits, and intensifying strategic competition.

Assessing how SL has navigated shifts

The book concludes by returning to Sri Lanka and assessing how the country has navigated contemporary shifts in the regional and global balance of power under the National People’s Power (NPP) government that emerged in the aftermath of the Aragalaya of 2022. The author demonstrates how economic crisis, demands for accountability, and aspirations for a new political culture have reshaped the domestic context within which foreign policy is conducted. Under President Anura Kumara Dissanayake, Sri Lanka is portrayed as pursuing a carefully calibrated strategy that combines engagement with international financial institutions, enhanced cooperation with India in defence and energy sectors, continued economic engagement with China, and functional security relations with the United States. The government’s response to the 2026 U.S.–Iran War—rejecting military access requests from all parties while extending humanitarian assistance—serves as an illustration of the author’s broader argument that strategic flexibility, principled neutrality, and diplomatic agility remain essential for small states navigating an increasingly complex Indian Ocean order.

Taken together, the book advances several interconnected propositions. First, the Indian Ocean is entering an increasingly multipolar era in which power is exercised through complex networks of cooperation, competition, and interdependence rather than rigid alliance structures. Second, small states are neither passive spectators nor mere proxies of great powers; they possess strategic agency and navigate competing pressures through hedging, diversification, and calibrated diplomacy. Third, Sri Lanka’s strategic behaviour—characterised by navigating asymmetry through flexibility and ambiguity—reflects a historically rooted dual consciousness that combines vulnerability with cosmopolitan engagement. Fourth, non-traditional security challenges and environmental governance are no longer peripheral concerns but central components of the evolving regional order.

Need for adaptive navigation

Prof. Keerawella argues that contemporary statecraft in the Indian Ocean requires adaptive navigation rather than rigid alignment. In a fluid and contested maritime environment, survival and influence depend less on resisting structural change than on understanding and responding to it with prudence, flexibility, and strategic clarity. The book therefore offers important insights into how small states can transform structural vulnerability into strategic agency and convert exposure into opportunities for engagement within a changing regional order.

Combining historical depth with contemporary analysis, it provides a nuanced understanding of the interaction between great-power competition, regional transformation, and the strategic choices of smaller states. The book will be of considerable value to students and scholars of international relations, political science, strategic studies, and maritime affairs, while also offering useful perspectives to policymakers, diplomats, and practitioners. Equally important, it opens several promising avenues for future research on the Indian Ocean and the emerging Indo-Pacific order.

Hermeneutic approachs

Methodologically, the study draws upon hermeneutic approaches to examine the geopolitical and maritime environments that shape relationships among states, societies, and historical processes. The result is a work that is both analytically rigorous and intellectually engaging. This review has sought less to evaluate the book in a conventional sense than to introduce its central themes and encourage a wider readership to engage with its arguments. Having highlighted the many merits of the volume, it is worth noting one technical shortcoming: the absence of an index. Given the book’s wide thematic scope and rich empirical content, the inclusion of an index would have significantly enhanced its value as a reference tool for researchers and students alike.

In sum, Prof. Keerawella listens attentively to the winds, reads the waves with analytical precision, and traces the deeper currents that shape the Indian Ocean world. The outcome is Winds and Waves: Geopolitical Currents in the Indian Ocean since 1945, a timely and thought-provoking contribution published by the Bandaranaike Centre for International Studies.

Reviewed by
Dr. Ramesh Ramasamy
Department of Political Science, University
of Peradeniya