Opinion

Sri Lanka’s development dilemmas

Published

4 years ago

2022/06/11

by Uditha Devapriya

On May 18, the grace period for a USD 78 million coupon payment expired in Sri Lanka. For the first time in its post-independence history, the island nation defaulted on its foreign debt. The Governor of the Central Bank, Dr Nandalal Weerasinghe, then announced that it would take six months for it to start repaying its creditors. An agreement with the IMF is in the pipeline now, but such an agreement will take another month or two.From a global perspective, of course, there is nothing unique about Sri Lanka’s crisis. For the country’s 22 million plus population, however, its scale has been unprecedented. While horror stories of Sri Lanka turning into another Lebanon or Zimbabwe have been recycled relentlessly in the press, since 2020, in recent months such comparisons have been made more frequently. Inflation, which began peaking last year, hit 30 percent in April and 40 percent in May. While nowhere near Lebanon or Zimbabwe, estimates by certain observers and analysts put Sri Lanka at the top of global inflation indices.All this has given rise to certain perceptions about the country’s problems. Western and Indian media, in particular, ascribe the crisis to the convulsions of domestic politics. Very few commentators have noted that these problems have been decades in the making, that the government’s ineptitude is more a symptom than a cause, and that external factors have had a say in such issues. The President’s bungling has contributed to these problems, to be sure, but that only shows how complex they are in the first place.

Neoliberal prescriptions

Just how complex, though? To answer that, it is necessary to address the structural causes that neoliberal economists and commentators note as having led to the crisis. These groups underline four factors: the government’s indulgence of unorthodox economic theories, its drive towards organic agriculture, its refusal to go to the IMF, and its insistence on diverting foreign reserves to defending the currency and repaying bondholders.It must be noted that all these problems are linked to the structural weaknesses of the economy. While there is a consensus on those weaknesses, though, economists and political analysts are divided over what, or who, is to blame for them.

Sri Lanka’s economy has been paraded, even by some radical commentators, as “export-dependent.” Yet it has been running trade deficits for the last 50 years. Its exports include primary commodities like tea, textiles, and tourism. It also earns remittances from migrant workers, many of whom effectively subsidise West Asian economies.These sectors took a hit from the COVID-19 pandemic. While tourism was on its way up in February, most arrivals were from countries like Russia and Ukraine. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine thus, effectively, dealt a blow to hopes of a long-term revival.

Neoliberal economists, especially those linked to Colombo’s well-funded and well-oiled think-tanks, attribute the country’s problems to excessive money printing and government spending. They see the country’s public sector as bloated, politicised.To an extent, the latter view is correct. Sri Lanka’s bureaucracy has long been a preferred destination for unemployed graduates and the politically connected. While Gotabaya Rajapaksa came to power implying he would end such a culture, he reversed course two years later and hired 65,000 graduates to the state sector. Ironically enough, it is their peers who are occupying the frontlines of anti-government protests today.

The heterodox view: Industrialisation and local production

Heterodox economists see things differently. According to them, Sri Lanka’s problems have had to do with its failure to industrialise and shift to manufacture.One of Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s first decisions, after coming to power in 2019, was to appoint Dr W. D. Lakshman, a proponent of industrialisation, as the Governor of the Central Bank. Economic analyst Shiran Illanperuma describes Dr Lakshman’s appointment as having been “poorly received by comprador capitalists and economists.” Lakshman earned the wrath of this crowd heavily after he began enacting policies aimed, ostensibly, at stimulating growth, including a series of tax cuts which have now been reversed.

Another of the country’s biggest advocates of industrialisation is Dr Howard Nicholas. A Senior Lecturer in Economics at the International Institute of Social Studies at the Erasmus University of Rotterdam, the Netherlands, Dr Nicholas helped set up the Institute of Policy Studies (IPS), a think-tank that advocated industrialisation, in the late 1980s.In its first few years, the IPS promoted alternative development strategies. Its advocacy of these strategies was received positively by then president, Ranasinghe Premadasa; based on its recommendations, he spearheaded an ambitious Garment Factory Programme which provided jobs to the rural sector while stimulating growth. This was around the same time Vietnam embarked on export-led industrialisation via its apparel sector.

According to Dr Nicholas, Sri Lanka’s prospects were bright in the 1990s. It even had the potential to surpass Vietnam. Yet with the assassination of Premadasa and the election in 1994 of a regime that modelled itself on Clintonian Third Way Centrist lines, industrialisation was abandoned in favour of outright privatisation and deregulation.The new strategy filled the government coffers – for a while. But with the escalation of the civil war and, paradoxically, the elevation of the country to middle-income status in the 2000s, Sri Lanka found it hard to access traditional aid programmes. It was at that juncture that it started moving into international bond markets.

While Western media and think-tanks propagate Chinese debt trap narratives, it has been Sri Lanka’s reliance on bond markets, which constitute a greater proportion of its external debt than does China, that finally brought its economy to its knees.To be sure, over the years several groups have highlighted these concerns. Yet, they differ as to the strategies and tactics needed to chart a way out of the crisis.

Neoliberal commentators argue that the private sector should take the lead. But Sri Lanka’s private sector is dominated by rentiers. Moreover, the country’s exports are limited to commodities and tourism, along with sectors such as IT. These themselves are dependent heavily on imported raw materials and intermediate capital goods.According to Harvard University’s Atlas of Economic Complexity, Sri Lanka’s largest exports are in “moderate and low complexity products”, like textiles. This contrasts with Vietnam, where textiles are more highly complex. Sri Lanka is also seeing “a static pattern of export growth.” In other words, while in 1990 it could boast of much potential in garments, by the early 2000s the sector’s prospects had considerably reduced.

To resolve the economic crisis, heterodox economists and analysts thus contend that the government must oversee a radical, socialist strategy, centring on import-substitution and local production: a dreary, dismal prospect for Colombo’s neoliberal coterie.

Leaderless protests and lack of alternatives

Sadly, the protests themselves seem little concerned by these imperatives. As has been pointed out by Rathindra Kuruwita in The Diplomat, they remain leaderless and rudderless. This has exposed them considerably to the risk of manipulation.Thus, while the protesters have called for Rajapaksa’s resignation and coupled it with demands for the resignation of all parliamentarians, they have also claimed that the latter demand, which delegitimises the country’s legislature and empowers the Executive, was incorporated into the protests by government supporters. Moreover, many of them fault the government for not going to the IMF earlier, failing to realise that the IMF’s track record in the Global South, during the COVID-19 pandemic, has been questionable.

More seriously, none of the protesters seem aware of what led to the crisis in the first place. To quote Dr Asoka Bandarage of the California Institute of Integral Studies, they “have not been able to put forward an alternative leadership or a viable road map for the future” and seem “unaware of the global dynamics” of the crisis.

Gotagogama, the site of the protests at Galle Face Green, has played host to several radical activists and artists, many of them linked to Marxist, anarchist, and other anti-government parties and alliances. Yet even these groups have failed to call attention to the wider issues. Those that have, like workers’ collectives and leftist commentators, have been marginalised by neoliberal discourses and populist demands for resignations.

The failures of governance and the road ahead

On the other hand, unfortunate as it has been for advocates of alternative development, the government has failed to appreciate the importance of their recommendations. A combination of corruption, ineptitude, and an eagerness to capitulate has thus put alternative development, and industrialisation, on the backburner.Milco is a case in point. Sri Lanka’s state-owned milk manufacturer, Milco recorded profits after a while last year. Yet a year or so after this milestone in the island’s public sector, the government replaced its chairman rather inexplicably. Such actions, multiplied many times over, have only distanced capable individuals from the State.

At one level, all this fits in with South Asia’s legacy of dynastic politics. From India to Bangladesh, the subcontinent is hardly a stranger to family rule. The Rajapaksas are no exception there: despite the recent spurt in anti-government protests, members of the family continue to hold important positions in the country.However, at another level, the Rajapaksa family has gone well beyond the regional model. As the country’s leading political analyst Dr Dayan Jayatilleka has observed, “this is not the Asian phenomenon of familial succession in politics, which is serial and sequential. The contemporary Sri Lankan phenomenon and process is both sequential and simultaneous, vertical and horizontal.” In other words, while family rule in the rest of Asia has served to sustain the political system, in Sri Lanka it has led to its very dismantlement. This includes the Rajapaksas’ deployment of the military, and allegations of militarisation in the north and east of the country: regions which bore the brunt of a 30-year civil war.

Nevertheless, despite all this, it goes without saying that what protesters consider as the government’s failures have been symptoms, rather than causes, of the structural faults underpinning the economy. The government must share the blame for this: in particular, its tendency to surround itself with yes-men and henchmen.Yet beyond this narrative, there is a far more compelling problem: a failure to resolve pressing issues like the island’s dependence on imports and sovereign debt. That in itself is linked to the sprawling global debt crisis, which has extended to other countries. While not all protesters are oblivious to these priorities, many of them are yet to address them fully. So long as debates over the crisis remain dominated by narratives of corruption and political personalities, such problems will go unnoticed and unresolved.

(The writer is an international relations analyst, researcher, and columnist based in Sri Lanka who can be reached at udakdev1@gmail.com. A shorter version of this article appeared in Global South Development Magazine.)

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Opinion

War with Iran and unravelling of the global order – II

Published

1 week ago

2026/04/9

Sahan Weerasooriya

A US airstrike on Iran

Broader Strategic Consequences

One of the most significant strategic consequences of the war is the accelerated erosion of U.S. political and moral hegemony. This is not a sudden phenomenon precipitated solely by the present conflict; rather, the war has served to illuminate an already evolving global reality—that the era of uncontested U.S. dominance is in decline. The resurgence of Donald Trump and the reassertion of his “America First” doctrine reflect deep-seated domestic economic and political challenges within the United States. These internal pressures have, in turn, shaped a more unilateral and inward-looking foreign policy posture, further constraining Washington’s capacity to exercise global leadership.

Moreover, the conduct of the war has significantly undermined the political and moral authority of the United States. Perceived violations of international humanitarian law, coupled with the selective application of international norms, have weakened the credibility of U.S. advocacy for a “rules-based international order.” Such inconsistencies have reinforced perceptions of double standards, particularly among states in the Global South. Skepticism toward Western normative leadership is expected to deepen, contributing to the gradual fragmentation of the international system. In this broader context, the ongoing crisis can be seen as symptomatic of a more fundamental transformation: the progressive waning of a global order historically anchored in U.S. hegemony and the emergence of a more contested and pluralistic international landscape.

The regional implications of the crisis are likely to be profound, particularly given the centrality of the Persian Gulf to the global political economy. As a critical hub of energy production and maritime trade, instability in this region carries systemic consequences that extend far beyond its immediate geography. Whatever may be the outcome, whether through the decisive weakening of Iran or the inability of external powers to dismantle its leadership and strategic capabilities, the post-conflict regional order will differ markedly from its pre-war configuration. In this evolving context, traditional power hierarchies, alliance structures, and deterrence dynamics are likely to undergo significant recalibration.

A key lesson underscored by the war is the deep interconnectivity of the contemporary global economic order. In an era of highly integrated production networks and supply chains, disruptions in a single strategic node can generate cascading effects across the global system. As such, regional conflicts increasingly assume global significance. The structural realities of globalisation make it difficult to contain economic and strategic shocks within regional boundaries, as impacts rapidly transmit through trade, energy, and financial networks. In this context, peace and stability are no longer purely regional concerns but global public goods, essential to the functioning and resilience of the international system

The conflict highlights the emergence of a new paradigm of warfare shaped by the integration of artificial intelligence, cyber capabilities, and unmanned systems. The extensive use of unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs)—a trend previously demonstrated in the Russia–Ukraine War—has been further validated in this theatre. However, unlike the Ukraine conflict, where Western powers have provided sustained military, technological, and financial backing, the present confrontation reflects a more direct asymmetry between a dominant global hegemon and a Global South state. Iran’s deployment of drone swarms and AI-enabled targeting systems illustrates that key elements of Fourth Industrial Revolution (4IR) warfare are no longer confined to technologically advanced Western states. These capabilities are increasingly accessible to Global South actors, lowering barriers to entry and significantly enhancing their capacity to wage effective asymmetric warfare. In this evolving context, technological diffusion is reshaping the strategic landscape, challenging traditional military hierarchies and altering the balance between conventional superiority and innovative, cost-effective combat strategies.

The war further exposed and deepened the weakening of global governance institutions, particularly the United Nations. Many of these institutions were established in 1945, reflecting the balance of power and geopolitical realities of the immediate post-Second World War era. However, the profound transformations in the international system since then have rendered aspects of this institutional architecture increasingly outdated and less effective.

The war has underscored the urgent need for comprehensive international governance reforms to ensure that international institutions remain credible, representative, and capable of addressing contemporary security challenges. The perceived ineffectiveness of UN human rights mechanisms in responding to violations of international humanitarian law—particularly in contexts such as the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and more recently in Iran—has amplified calls for institutional renewal or the development of alternative frameworks for maintaining international peace and security. Moreover, the selective enforcement of international law and the persistent paralysis in conflict resolution mechanisms risk accelerating the fragmentation of global norms. If sustained, this trajectory would signal not merely the weakening but the possible demise of the so-called liberal international order, accelerating the erosion of both the legitimacy and the effective authority of existing multilateral institutions, and deepening the crisis of global governance.

Historically, major wars have often served as harbingers of new eras in international politics, marking painful yet decisive transitions from one order to another. Periods of systemic decline are typically accompanied by instability, uncertainty, and profound disruption; yet, it is through such crises that the contours of an emerging order begin to take shape. The present conflict appears to reflect such a moment of transition, where the strains within the existing global system are becoming increasingly visible.

Notably, key European powers are exhibiting a gradual shift away from exclusive reliance on the U.S. security umbrella, seeking instead a more autonomous and assertive role in global affairs. At the same time, the war is likely to create strategic space for China to expand its influence. As the United States becomes more deeply entangled militarily and politically, China may consolidate its position as a stabilising economic actor and an alternative strategic partner. This could be reflected in intensified energy diplomacy, expanded infrastructure investments, and a more proactive role in regional conflict management, advancing Beijing’s long-term objective of reshaping global governance structures.

However, this transition does not imply a simple replacement of Pax Americana with Pax Sinica. Rather, the emerging global order is likely to be more diffuse, pluralistic, and multilateral in character. In this sense, the ongoing transformation aligns with broader narratives of an “Asian Century,” in which power is redistributed across multiple centers rather than concentrated in a single hegemon. The war, therefore, may ultimately be understood not merely as a geopolitical crisis, but as a defining inflection point in the reconfiguration of the global order.

Conclusion: A New Era on the Horizon

History shows that major wars often signal the birth of new eras—painful, disruptive, yet transformative. The present conflict is no exception. It has exposed the vulnerabilities of the existing world order, challenged U.S. dominance, and revealed the limits of established global governance.

European powers are beginning to chart a more independent course, reducing reliance on the U.S. security umbrella, while China is poised to expand its influence as an economic stabiliser and strategic partner. Through energy diplomacy, infrastructure investments, and active engagement in regional conflicts, Beijing is quietly shaping the contours of a more multipolar world. Yet this is not the rise of Pax Sinica replacing Pax Americana. The emerging order is likely to be multilateral, fluid, and competitive—a world in which multiple powers, old and new, share the stage. The war, in all its turbulence, may therefore mark the dawn of a genuinely new global era, one where uncertainty coexists with opportunity, and where the next chapter of international politics is being written before our eyes.

by Gamini Keerawella
(First part of this article appeared yesterday (08 April)

Opinion

University admission crisis: Academics must lead the way

Published

1 week ago

2026/04/8

Sahan Weerasooriya

130,000 students are left out each year—academics hold the key

Each year, Sri Lanka’s G.C.E. Advanced Level examination produces a wave of hope—this year, nearly 175,000 students qualified for university entrance. Yet only 45,000 will be admitted to state universities. That leaves more than 130,000 young people stranded—qualified, ambitious, but excluded. This is not just a statistic; it is a national crisis. And while policymakers debate infrastructure and funding, the country’s academics must step forward as catalysts of change.

Beyond the Numbers: A National Responsibility

Education is the backbone of Sri Lanka’s development. Denying access to tens of thousands of qualified students risks wasting talent, fueling inequality, and undermining national progress. The gap is not simply about seats in lecture halls—it is about the future of a generation. Academics, as custodians of knowledge, cannot remain passive observers. They must reimagine the delivery of higher education to ensure opportunity is not a privilege for the few.

Expanding Pathways, Not Just Campuses

The traditional model of four-year degrees in brick-and-mortar universities cannot absorb the demand. Academics can design short-term diplomas and certificate programmes that provide immediate access to learning. These programmes, focused on employable skills, would allow thousands to continue their education while easing pressure on degree programmes. Equally important is the digital transformation of education. Online and blended learning modules can extend access to rural students, breaking the monopoly of physical campuses. With academic leadership, Sri Lanka can build a reliable system of credit transfers, enabling students to begin their studies at affiliated institutions and later transfer to state universities.

Partnerships That Protect Quality

Private universities and vocational institutes already absorb many students who miss out on state admissions. But concerns about quality and recognition persist. Academics can bridge this divide by providing quality assurance and standardised curricula, supervising joint degree programmes, and expanding the Open University system. These partnerships would ensure that students outside the state system receive affordable, credible, and internationally recognised education.

Research and Advocacy: Shaping Policy

Academics are not only teachers—they are researchers and thought leaders. By conducting labour market studies, they can align higher education expansion with employability. Evidence-based recommendations to the University Grants Commission (UGC) can guide strategic intake increases, regional university expansion, and government investment in digital infrastructure. In this way, academics can ensure reforms are not reactive, but visionary.

Industry Engagement: Learning Beyond the Classroom

Sri Lanka’s universities must become entrepreneurship hubs and innovation labs. Academics can design programmes that connect students directly with industries, offering internship-based learning and applied research opportunities. This approach reduces reliance on classroom capacity while equipping students with practical skills. It also reframes education as a partnership between universities and the economy, rather than a closed system.

Making the Most of What We Have

Even within existing constraints, academics can expand capacity. Training junior lecturers and adjunct faculty, sharing facilities across universities, and building international collaborations for joint programmes and scholarships are practical steps. These measures maximise resources while opening new avenues for students.

A Call to Action

Sri Lanka’s university admission crisis is not just about numbers—it is about fairness, opportunity, and national development. Academics must lead the way in transforming exclusion into empowerment. By expanding pathways, strengthening partnerships, advocating for policy reform, engaging with industry, and optimizing resources, they can ensure that qualified students are not left behind.

“Education for all, not just the fortunate few.”

Dr. Arosh Bandula (Ph.D. Nottingham), Senior Lecturer, Department of Agricultural Economics & Agribusiness, Faculty of Agriculture, University of Ruhuna

by Dr. Arosh Bandula

Opinion

Post-Easter Sri Lanka: Between memory, narrative, and National security

Published

1 week ago

2026/04/7

Sahan Weerasooriya

As Sri Lanka approaches the seventh commemoration of the Easter Sunday attacks, the national mood is once again marked by grief, reflection, and an enduring sense of incompleteness. Nearly seven years later, the tragedy continues to cast a long shadow not only over the victims and their families, but over the institutions and narratives that have since emerged.

Commemoration, however, must go beyond ritual. It must be anchored in clarity, accountability, and restraint. What is increasingly evident in the post-Easter landscape is not merely a search for truth, but a contest over how that truth is framed, interpreted, and presented to the public.

In recent times, public discourse has been shaped by book launches, panel discussions, and media interventions that claim to offer new insights into the attacks. While such contributions are not inherently problematic, the manner in which certain narratives are advanced raises legitimate concerns. The selective disclosure of information particularly when it touches on intelligence operations demands careful scrutiny.

Sri Lanka’s legal and institutional framework is clear on the sensitivity of such matters. The Official Secrets Act (No. 32 of 1955) places strict obligations on the handling of information related to national security. Similarly, the Police Ordinance and internal administrative regulations governing intelligence units emphasize confidentiality, chain of command, and the responsible use of information. These are not mere formalities; they exist to safeguard both operational integrity and national interest.

When individual particularly those with prior access to intelligence structures enter the public domain with claims that are not subject to verification, it raises critical questions. Are these disclosures contributing to justice and accountability, or are they inadvertently compromising institutional credibility and future operational capacity?

The challenge lies in distinguishing between constructive transparency and selective exposure.

The Presidential Commission of Inquiry into the Easter Sunday Attacks provided one of the most comprehensive official examinations of the attacks. Its findings highlighted a complex web of failures: lapses in intelligence sharing, breakdowns in inter-agency coordination, and serious deficiencies in political oversight. Importantly, it underscored that the attacks were not the result of a single point of failure, but a systemic collapse across multiple levels of governance.

Yet, despite the existence of such detailed institutional findings, public discourse often gravitates toward simplified narratives. There is a tendency to identify singular “masterminds” or to attribute responsibility in ways that align with prevailing political or ideological positions. While such narratives may be compelling, they risk obscuring the deeper structural issues that enabled the attacks to occur.

Equally significant is the broader socio-political context in which these narratives are unfolding. Sri Lanka today remains a society marked by fragile intercommunal relations. The aftermath of the Easter attacks saw heightened suspicion, polarisation, and, in some instances, collective blame directed at entire communities. Although there have been efforts toward reconciliation, these fault lines have not entirely disappeared.

In this environment, the language and tone of public discourse carry immense weight. The framing of terrorism whether as a localized phenomenon or as part of a broader ideological construct must be handled with precision and responsibility. Overgeneralization or the uncritical use of labels can have far-reaching consequences, including the marginalization of communities and the erosion of social cohesion.

At the same time, it is essential to acknowledge that the global discourse on terrorism is itself contested. Competing narratives, geopolitical interests, and selective historiography often shape how events are interpreted. For Sri Lanka, the challenge is to avoid becoming a passive recipient of external frameworks that may not fully reflect its own realities.

A professional and unbiased approach requires a commitment to evidence-based analysis. This includes:

· Engaging with primary sources, including official reports and judicial findings
·

· Cross-referencing claims with verifiable data
·

· Recognizing the limits of publicly available information, particularly in intelligence matters

It also requires intellectual discipline the willingness to question assumptions, to resist convenient conclusions, and to remain open to complexity.

The role of former officials and subject-matter experts in this discourse is particularly important. Their experience can provide valuable insights, but it also carries a responsibility. Public interventions must be guided by professional ethics, respect for institutional boundaries, and an awareness of the potential impact on national security.

There is a fine balance to be maintained. On one hand, democratic societies require transparency and accountability. On the other, the premature or uncontextualized release of sensitive information can undermine the very systems that are meant to protect the public.

As Sri Lanka reflects on the events of April 2019, it must resist the temptation to reduce a national tragedy into competing narratives or political instruments. The pursuit of truth must be methodical, inclusive, and grounded in law.

Easter is not only a moment of remembrance. It is a test of institutional maturity and societal resilience.

The real question is not whether new narratives will emerge they inevitably will. The question is whether Sri Lanka has the capacity to engage with them critically, responsibly, and in a manner that strengthens, rather than weakens, the foundations of its national security and social harmony.

In the end, justice is not served by noise or conjecture. It is served by patience, rigor, and an unwavering commitment to truth.

Mahil Dole is a former senior law enforcement officer and national security analyst, with over four decades of experience in policing and intelligence, including serving as Head of Counter-Intelligence at the State Intelligence Service of Sri Lanka and a graduate of the Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies in Hawai, USA.

by Mahil Dole
Former Senior Law Enforcement Officer National Security Analyst; Former Head of Counter-Intelligence, State Intelligence Service)