Features
Revisiting presidential system of government
By Neville Ladduwahetty
The government’s announcement that a new Constitution will be unveiled within the next few months is in keeping with one of the ten key policy commitments in the President’s election manifesto. This announcement has encouraged several prominent constitutional experts to express opinions relating to constitutional reforms, perhaps in the hope of influencing the ongoing constitution making process. However, at the fundamental level, all these opinions for governance boil down to a choice essentially between parliamentary or presidential systems with their favoured variations.
At this fundamental level the choice for “We the People” is whether it is in their best interests to grant their sovereign rights to a single body of elected representatives as in Parliamentary systems, or divide them between two separately elected branches of government as in Presidential systems, notwithstanding the fact that the system in Sri Lanka is not strictly Presidential as in the USA, but one that is Semi-Presidential because of the incorporation of Members of Parliament from the Legislature in the Executive branch.
PARLIAMENTARY v. PRESIDENTIAL
In a Parliamentary system, all power in respect of Legislative and Executive powers are exercised by the elected political party or coalition with the majority to form a functioning government. Under such an arrangement, the opportunity to exercise checks and balances by the Legislature over Executive action becomes blurred despite the fact that the Executive with its Cabinet of Ministers is answerable and responsible to Parliament. Furthermore, while the responsibility for formulating Policy relating to a particular subject is supposed to be that of the Minister and administering that Policy is supposed to be the responsibility of the Administrator, the distinctions between them become seamless because administrative decisions involve policy. This blurring of responsibilities gives the Minister the opportunity to involve himself in the Administration causing administrative action to be influenced by politics.
Addressing this issue that is inherent with Cabinet systems, Sir. Ivor Jennings in his book titled “THE CONSTITUTION OF CEYLON” (1949) states: “The Cabinet system implies a division between policy and administration. Administration is the function of paid officials; policy is the function of responsible Ministers. The line between them is often fine, because many administrative decisions involve policy. It is the duty of the official to put before the Minister every decision about which there may be any doubt in terms of policy; but it is equally the duty of the Minister to abstain from interfering where no question of policy is raised” (p. 87).
Such idyllic arrangements do not exist in real life. This is particularly so, as presently in Sri Lanka when Secretaries to Ministries responsible for Administration are appointed by the President with no reference to the Minister. Therefore, whatever the system, since the performance of Ministries and ultimately the Government depends on the symbiotic relationship between the Minister and the Secretary, it is imperative that the Secretary should be appointed by the appointing authority in consultation with the Minister so that they could work as a team to further the agenda of the Government. Problems associated with this relationship have been the primary cause for poor Executive performance
On the other hand, in a presidential system, Legislative and Executive power of the people are exercised by two separately elected bodies. Thus, for all intents and purposes, there is separation of power between these two branches of government. While this is so in countries such as the USA, where the two branches function and operate separately, it is not so in the Sri Lankan context of the presidential arrangement because the Prime Minister and the Cabinet of Ministers that form an integral component of the President’s Executive are from Parliament.
Such arrangements are referred to as Semi-Presidential. Under such systems too, the blurring of Policy and Administration that exist under Parliamentary arrangements with Cabinet systems continue. Therefore, there is an urgent need to revisit existing arrangements to ensure that arrangements are instituted for the development of Policy and its Administration in a manner that enables the President and the Executive to fulfill their commitments to the People.
REVISITING CURRENT ARRANGEMENTS
As long as the Cabinet system exists as part of the Executive, the difference between the Parliamentary systems that had existed in Sri Lanka e.g., 1972 Constitution, and what exists currently under a Semi-Presidential system, is marginal. For instance, under the 1972 Parliamentary system a nominated President appointed the members of the Cabinet of Ministers presumably on the advice of the Prime Minister. Similarly, the elected President under the current Semi-Presidential system appoints the Cabinet of Ministers on the advice of the Prime Minister. As before, the Cabinet of Ministers is “charged with the direction and control of the Government of the Republic. However, since the People expect the President they elect to exercise their executive power including the defence of Sri Lanka, it is the President as the Head of the Cabinet of Ministers who should be selecting his chosen Ministers of the Cabinet. Furthermore, since it is the President who made certain commitments to the People in his Manifesto, the direction and control of the Government should reflect what he undertook to deliver to the People. The Cabinet of Ministers thus become the President’s team to fulfill his commitments to the People. This perspective should be reflected in the revisited arrangements
The direction and control of the government thus becomes the collective responsibility of the President and his chosen Cabinet. The responsibility of each Minister should then be to develop the Policies relating to the subjects assigned to him as part of the collective responsibility of the Executive. In the development of Policies relating to the assigned subjects, the Minister should be free to engage with anyone who in his opinion could contribute to the process. A draft Policy Paper that would be the outcome of such an exercise should be submitted to the Cabinet for review, comment and approval.
This should be followed by the Secretary to the Ministry as the Chair to determine how to administer the Cabinet approved draft of the Policy. The total package of Policies and Administrative measures should then be submitted to the Cabinet for review and comment so that any amendments could be incorporated into the final policy statement, which them becomes a collective decision of the Cabinet. The lack of attention given to the process of administering Policies is often the cause for failed Policies.
For instance, the Policy of the current Government was to use organic fertilizer and to ban imported chemical fertilizer and pesticides. Under the revisited arrangements, the Minister of Agriculture together with a team selected by the Minister would develop the Policies needed to implement the Policy of using organic fertilizer. The policies so determined would then be submitted by the Minister to the Cabinet for review, comment and approval. Having secured preliminary approval of the Policies, a working group headed by the Secretary to the Ministry of Agriculture should develop the Administrative measures needed to implement the Policies. If at this stage, serious challenges are imposed due to non-availability of material and/or resources to administer the Policy, the administrative process should be revised, or the Policy should be revised to suit capacities. Since such a decision would have far reaching political consequences the decision whether to phase out or forge ahead should be taken collectively by the Cabinet.
If the collective decision is to implement the Policy in stages, the Secretary should develop the administrative arrangements to ensure that the Policy is successfully implemented. On the other hand, if the collective decision of the Cabinet is not to phase out implementing the Policy, it is the responsibility of the Secretary to develop strategies needed to implement the Policy. The total package of Policy and the administrative arrangements needed to implement the Policy should then be submitted to the Cabinet for approval.
The approach suggested above is in keeping with the concept of the Cabinet being collectively responsible for the direction and control of the Government. The revisited approach may appear too complicated. However, the reason why good Policies have failed to meet expectations is because of poor planning and lack of due attention to effective administration. The fact remains that if what is proposed is too cumbersome some alternative has to be developed to ensure that collective decisions are reached, as long as the Cabinet systems remain as part and parcel of the Executive.
RESPONSIBILITIES of PARLIAMENT
The primary responsibility of Parliament is to exercise the Legislative power of the People. Equally important is for Parliament to oversee executive action. In this regard, Articles 42 and 43 (1) of the 20th Amendment to the Constitution state: 42. The President shall be responsible to Parliament for the due exercise, performance and discharge of his powers, duties and functions under the Constitution and any written law, including the law for the time being relating topublic security.43. (1) There shall be a Cabinet of Ministers charged with the direction and control of the Government of the Republic, which shall be collectively responsible and answerable to Parliament.
Apart from the question of how a President directly elected by the People could be responsible to another organ of Government – the Parliament, also directly elected by the same People, the fact is that the President and the Cabinet of Ministers are collectively responsible to Parliament means that Parliament is Constitutionally entitled to review Executive action. Although the Constitution does not spell out how Parliament is to fulfill this specific responsibility, the Standing Orders of Parliament contain provisions under Sectoral Oversight Committees and Ministerial Consultative Committees that could be modified to serve as a mechanism to oversee Executive action of the President, and the collective and individual actions of the Cabinet and its Ministers. Since the focus of these Committees is to address issues relating to Legislature, they should be revised, expanded and strengthened to oversee Executive action and incorporated in a revisited Constitution.
INDEPENDENT COMMISSIONS
Appointments to Independent Commissions were made by the President on the recommendations of the Constitutional Council under the 19th Amendment and now by the Parliamentary Council under the 20th Amendment. The Constitutional Council consisted of ten members of which seven were from Parliament. The present Parliamentary Council consists of five members and all of them are from Parliament.
The question that arises is how realistic is it to expect Councils made up of either a majority or its entirety from Parliament, to be objective enough in the appointment of Independent Commissions. If the intention is to create an independent and productive Public Service, the arrangements that exist today are a far cry from what were intended, because what Sri Lanka has inexorably and unwittingly ended up is to politicize the Public Service and weaken its motivation for effective administration. The temptation to politicize was in the misguided hope of the political establishment that administering policies with hand-picked officers who would personally be loyal to them would enable them to achieve their objectives. The consequence of this trend was to demoralize the rest to a point of believing that without political patronage there is no future for them in the Public Service. In such a background, complaining about them would not get the political establishment its desired outcomes. Instead, they should realize that it is in their own interest to have an effective Public Service without which their policies would not be implemented. Therefore, it is imperative that the prevailing trend is reversed.
To do so the arrangements instituted to set-up Independent Commissions should be scrapped, and the existing Presidential Council should focus on setting up an effective Public Service Commission vested with executive powers of appointment, promotion, transfer, disciplinary control, dismissal of public officers including addressing of grievances of the public. The fact that the 20th Amendment has deleted The Audit Service Commission and The National Procurement Commissions that had existed in the 19th Amendment, attest to the fact that the functions of these Commissions could be transferred to the Public Service Commission. A further development is that the Police Commission only handles public grievances. The rest of the functions of the Police Department have already been transferred to the Public Service Commission. In keeping with this trend, other Commissions too should be scrapped except for the Human Rights and Judicial Commissions. An effective Public Service Commission means that even the role of the Ombudsman becomes superfluous, because it should be possible for the Commission with expanded executive power to address grievances of the Public more effectively, since grievances of the public are invariably due to dereliction of duties of public servants.
CONCLUSION
The need for a new Constitution is based on the premise that the Constitution in its present form is a fetter to the progress and development of Sri Lanka. How valid is this perception? The material presented above, if viewed objectively, demonstrates that the real impediment to progress and development is the form and manner in which the Constitution operates.
The Constitution in its present form is not a true Presidential system that is based on the separation of power as in the United States. Instead, it is a Semi-Presidential system because of the inclusion of members of Parliament in the Executive Branch as members of the Cabinet. What is proposed herein is to retain the existing structure for practical reasons, but amend the form and manner in which it functions so that predetermined Executive Policies could be effectively administered.
This approach is predicated on the premise that the reason for poor performance is because of the mismatch between Policy and Administration. A match between the two could be initiated by formulating fresh procedures and revisiting existing constitutional provision through amendments, instead of a new Constitution.
Another concern of major importance is the lack of Constitutional provisions to address Executive performance despite the fact that constitutionally the President and the Cabinet are collectively responsible to Parliament. What is recommended is to use existing provisions under Standing Orders relating to Sectoral Oversight Committees and Ministerial Consultative Committees, and adapt them to address Executive action as a constitutional imperative.
Finally, the concept of Independent Commissions whose origins could be traced to the Youth Commission, have not served their intended purpose, primarily because appointments to these Commissions by a Presidential Commission consisting of Members of Parliament have a political bias. What is proposed instead, is to scrap them and transfer all functions that were handled by Individual Departments to a seriously empowered Public Service Commission with sufficient executive powers to address grievances of the Public as well. This means that even the role of Ombudsman becomes superfluous.
The political establishment as a whole is dissatisfied with the public servants and the services they offer. The primary reason for this belief is that without political patronage their future advancement is bleak. If this perception is to change for the sake of an efficient and committed public service, the political establishment has to give up the practice of using hand-picked favourites for key positions at the expense of more senior and experienced members of the service. The independence of a Public Service Commission becomes their shield. The irony is that the success of a Minister’s performance depends on the commitment of the public servant, and if the Minister is to garner the full commitment of the public servant, he cannot afford to treat some as being more equal than others.
Features
The Great AI Schism: When the Titans of Tech tell us to slow down
by Prof. C. A. Saliya
Something extraordinary happened in September 2026. The very people who have spent the last decade pouring tens of billions of dollars into building artificial intelligence, the visionaries, the investors, the CEOs, suddenly started telling the world to hit the brakes. It’s a bit like the captain of a speeding train leaning out of the window and shouting, “Actually, maybe we should slow down a bit!” The public, understandably, is confused. We’ve been told AI will cure cancer, solve climate change, and give us all free time. Now we’re being told it might kill us all. Welcome to the great AI schism.
To understand what’s happening, you have to listen to the people in the room. These are not wild-eyed doomsayers on the internet. They are the titans of the industry. And they are starting to argue with each other.
Dario Amodei: The Insider Who Wants to Hit Pause
Dario Amodei, the CEO of Anthropic (Claude AI), is the man who kicked the hornet’s nest. In a 3,800-word essay, posted on his website in mid-September 2026, he didn’t just suggest caution, he demanded a slowdown. “We must slow the pace at which we improve the capabilities of AI models,” he wrote. His reasoning is simple and terrifying: the technology is moving faster than our ability to control it. He warned that AI could be misused for cyberattacks, bioterrorism, and serious economic disruption.
What makes Amodei’s warning so chilling is that it comes from a man whose company, Anthropic, builds one of the most powerful AI models in the world, Claude. He’s not a critic on the sidelines. He’s in the driver’s seat, and he’s telling us the car might not have brakes. In an interview with CNN’s Anderson Cooper, he said he agreed with a departing Anthropic researcher who claimed AI could “kill us all” by the end of the decade. That researcher, 27-year-old Jacob Coxon, resigned in protest, saying the people building AI “earnestly believe that it could kill us all”. When the people building the technology start resigning because they’re afraid of it, you should pay attention.
Bill Gates: The Elder Statesman with a Warning
Bill Gates has been around long enough to know a paradigm shift when he sees one. The Microsoft co-founder, who spent decades warning the world about pandemics and climate change, has now turned his attention to AI. And he’s not mincing words. In September 2026, Gates warned that AI is “powerful enough to drive events that, you know, cause a billion deaths”.
Gates is not worried about Terminator-style robots. He’s worried about people. “There’s never been a weapon as powerful as the combination of people with ill intent using the latest AI tools,” he said. His solution is simple: regulation. “No one thinks self-regulation is enough,” he told NBC’s Meet the Press. He even offered to be the man to convince President Trump to regulate AI. Gates is a pragmatist. He knows the technology is coming. He just wants to make sure it doesn’t get us first.
Sam Altman: The Showman with a Conscience (Maybe)
Sam Altman, the CEO of OpenAI (Chat GPT), has always been the industry’s greatest showman. He’s the man who told us AGI (Artificial General Intelligence) is “just around the corner” and that AI will soon be a “genie that can grant any wish”. But even Altman is now singing a different tune. In September 2026, he ruled out an OpenAI IPO in 2026, citing safety concerns. He called even a 10% risk of AI causing human extinction “unacceptable”.
“I agree with Dario that we need to pace the frontier,” Altman posted on X. This is a remarkable shift. Altman has spent years being criticised for moving too fast, for prioritising profit over safety. Now, facing mounting evidence that AI models can cause real harm, from cyberattacks to mental health crises, he’s suddenly the voice of caution. Is it genuine? Or is it a PR move? The cynics will tell you it’s the latter. But the fact remains: when Sam Altman says we need to slow down, the world listens.
Elon Musk: The Provocateur Who Saw It Coming
Elon Musk has been warning about AI for over a decade. He’s the man who called AI “more dangerous than nuclear weapons” long before it was fashionable. So it’s no surprise that he joined the chorus of slowdown calls in September 2026. But Musk being Musk, he couldn’t resist a bit of dark humour. When asked if we’re all going to die within 10 years, he replied, “I don’t want to disappoint you, but we’re all going to die someday anyway”.
But behind the joke is a serious point. Musk believes AI models could escape their constraints, take control of military systems, and even launch nuclear weapons. His solution is mutual oversight: leading AI companies should test each other’s systems for safety before release, and he even suggested a deal with China to make it happen. Musk is a provocateur, but he’s also a visionary. And his vision is one where AI is a weapon that we might not be able to control.

Satya Nadella: The Quiet Strategist
While the others are shouting about doom, Satya Nadella is quietly building an empire. The Microsoft CEO doesn’t talk about extinction risks. He talks about “agentic AI”, AI that can act autonomously, which he calls “a new paradigm”. Microsoft’s Azure cloud platform, which powers these AI agents, grew 43% in the last quarter, surpassing $100 billion in annual revenue.
Nadella’s view is simple: don’t compete to build the most powerful model; compete to control the “orchestration layer”, the systems that connect different AI models. He wants to build the infrastructure that everyone else relies on. It’s a smart play, and it’s making Microsoft a fortune. But Nadella’s silence on safety is deafening. While Amodei and Altman wrestle with their consciences, Nadella is counting the money. It’s not that he doesn’t care; it’s that his business model depends on AI being adopted, not regulated.
Jacob Coxon: The Whistleblower Who Lit the Fuse
You may not have heard of Jacob Coxon. He’s not a billionaire. He’s not a CEO. He’s a 27-year-old researcher who worked at both OpenAI and Anthropic. And in September 2026, he resigned from Anthropic with a warning that shook the industry. “Neither company is acting responsibly,” he wrote on X. “They are launching themselves directly toward a superintelligence capable of self-improvement, and gambling with our lives”.
Coxon’s warning was remarkable because it came from inside the machine. He said the people building AI “earnestly believe that it could kill us all by the end of the decade”. He called for a temporary freeze on advanced AI training. His resignation triggered a wave of concern, and even Dario Amodei admitted he agreed with Coxon more than he disagreed. Coxon is the canary in the coal mine. And the canary is not looking well.
Donald Trump: The Wildcard
And then there’s Donald Trump. The US President has consistently downplayed AI fears, calling them a “hoax” and a “sick conspiracy”. But even Trump is starting to change his tune, sort of. In September 2026, he announced plans to create an “AI Force” and appoint an AI “Czar”. He said the government would look for “bad” uses of AI through the existing criminal and civil justice systems.
But Trump’s priority is clear: winning the AI race against China. “We will not in any way hinder or stifle the growth of this incredible industry,” he said. He wants AI to account for 25% of US GDP. Trump is not a technologist. He’s a businessman and a nationalist. He sees AI as a tool for economic dominance, not an existential threat. Whether he’s right or wrong, his stance puts him at odds with almost every expert in the field.
The Bottom Line: A House Divided
So where does this leave us? We have the CEOs of the world’s leading AI companies, Amodei, Altman, and Musk, all calling for a slowdown. We have Bill Gates, the elder statesman of tech, warning of a billion deaths. We have a whistleblower who says the industry is gambling with our lives. And then we have Satya Nadella, quietly building the infrastructure that powers it all, and Donald Trump, who wants to speed up.
The irony is hard to miss. The people who built the AI train are now telling us to slow down. The people who profit from the AI economy are the ones building the tracks. And the public is caught in the middle, trying to figure out who to believe.
Maybe the most honest thing anyone said came from Jacob Coxon, the 27-year-old researcher who quit. “The people building AI earnestly believe that it could kill us all by the end of the decade,” he wrote. “This is not a marketing stunt”.
If the people building the technology believe it could kill us, perhaps we should listen. Before it’s too late.
(Prof. C. A. Saliya, is a charted accountant, academic, researcher and former banker. He is the author of SAMAJA GAVESHAKAYA and Springer Publication DOING SOCIAL RESEARCH. He can be contacted at saliya.ca@gmail.com. The views expressed in this article are his own and do not necessarily represent those of the organisations with which he is affiliated.)
Features
Preventing grievances from becoming communal
by Jehan Perera
The death sentence on Sivarasa Anojan, a Sri Lankan citizen convicted of blasphemy in Saudi Arabia has taken a central place in national consciousness for the past several weeks. It has been in the headline news since it was first reported last month. There have been many initiatives taken locally to get a more lenient sentencing by the Saudi authorities. There is also an undercurrent that is critical of both the culture and religion from which this sentencing emanates. This also sustains the widespread publicity being given nationally to the issue. By way of contrast, the controversy caused by the forcible removal of the Thileepan statue in Jaffna has not significantly impacted upon the national consciousness. There was only passing mention of the incident in the national media which has been overtaken by other events.
However, in the north and east of the country, and in the diaspora, the removal of the Thileepan statue has become a major issue. It has led to protest marches led by university students and widespread condemnation by civil society and political groups. The issues underlying the Thileepan statue have deep undercurrents in the Tamil consciousness particularly in the north and east which time is unlikely to dispel. The real test of harmony in a multi-ethnic, multi-religious society like Sri Lanka is not whether communities coexist peacefully when nothing controversial is at stake. Rather, the test is how they respond when an event touches their identities and grievances. The death sentence imposed on Anojan in Saudi Arabia and the removal of the Thileepan statue in Jaffna carry the risk of becoming grievances to entire communities.
In the case of Anojan, a young Tamil migrant worker, he was first sentenced to five years imprisonment and a fine of three million Saudi riyals over a Facebook comment. Both he and the Saudi prosecution appealed, with the appeal court raising the sentence to death. This has led to public sympathy for him in Sri Lanka.
Appeals for clemency have come from the President, government and opposition leaders, clergy of all faiths and Muslim political leaders. At the same time there is a need to reject attempts to turn the case into a source of anti-Muslim sentiment or collective blame. Peacebuilding therefore has to be within Sri Lanka as well as diplomatic. Religious leaders and civil society in the country should be ready to quell rumour, even as Muslim, Buddhist, Hindu and Christian leaders stand together publicly.
Thileepan Statue
The Thileepan controversy has had a different trajectory. Many Tamils admire Thileepan, the LTTE name of Rasaiah Parthipan, who died on 26 September 1987 after a twelve-day fast. His demands were addressed to India but included matters pertaining to the Sri Lankan government including the release of detainees held under the Prevention of Terrorism Act. The statue put up during this year’s commemoration was removed by police in the early hours of 27 September, a day after the commemoration ended. The government’s legal concern, as articulated by its spokesperson, was the LTTE remains a proscribed organisation and before removing the statue, police had presented facts to the court. But law and memory answer different questions and the depth of Tamil anguish cannot be disregarded.
For many Tamils, remembrance of Thileepan is connected to their sense of loss and historical memory. The memorial has been destroyed and rebuilt more than once, and each destruction has added to the meaning it carries. Many who mourn Thileepan are grieving a young man who died without violence and by his own fast. They also grieve an era of loss of the struggle for Tamil rights and self-determination for which Thileepan has become a symbol. The Office for Reparations Act, No. 34 of 2018, provides for collective reparations and gives the Office for Reparations a role in policies on memorialisation. This does not automatically permit any particular statue, nor does it override laws on public places or proscribed organisations. But it shows that memorialisation is recognised within Sri Lanka’s framework for reparations and reconciliation. There is also a wider question of equality.
The JVP that now leads the NPP government was itself once proscribed when it took up arms against the state in which tens of thousands died, later entered democratic politics, and now for many years has publicly commemorated its own fallen. The opportunity to remember those who died should not belong to one community alone.
A commitment to peacebuilding requires that the same trust that has been given to former militants of one community needs to be given to members of other communities if equal citizenship and equal rights are to have meaning. Further, the Office for Reparations Act provides for reparations through livelihood. It is today a fact that those former LTTE members who went through the government’s rehabilitation process find it difficult to get jobs in the private sector.
Private sector employers are reluctant to come under surveillance for employing former LTTE members. There needs to be equal access to employment and removal of unjustified barriers to reintegration, with targeted public programmes where necessary. Until this situation is realized on the ground, the government needs to consider employing those who went through the government’s rehabilitation process and still unable to find suitable employment.
Continuing Peace
The challenge that post-war Sri Lanka faces, a full 17 years after the end of war, is to strengthen the foundations of trust between communities rather than deepen existing suspicions. Anojan is an individual Sri Lankan citizen facing a severe sentence in another country. His case should not become a reason to blame Sri Lankan Muslims. Thileepan is remembered differently by different communities, but the dispute over his memorial should not become a reason to revive the communal divisions of the past. The cases are also mirror images in an important respect. In the Anojan case, the state is an advocate pleading before another government. In the Thileepan case, the state is the actor whose decision is being judged. The first calls for quiet diplomacy and restraint in public language. The second calls for fairness and explanation, and the burden on the state is heavier.
The common roots of the two cases lie in mistrust that does not belong to one community alone. It has been produced by experiences of discrimination, violence, insecurity and loss that have been interpreted differently by different communities. Grievances turn communal when an individual is seen as a representative of a community, when institutions seem to treat communities unequally, and when people feel their pain goes unacknowledged. Each of these can be addressed. The system change that the Sri Lankan people voted for in 2024 would need to include a government that rejects collective blame, acknowledges grief and explains its decisions openly. It also requires state institutions to act transparently and consistently, so that no citizen feels that the law protects some communities more than others.
This peacebuilding imperative requires enlightened leadership as much as legal authority. It requires leaders who will speak to their own communities against prejudice, even when this is politically inconvenient. It requires religious leaders who will demonstrate solidarity across religious boundaries. And it requires civil society to recognise that peacebuilding is not simply preventing violence after tensions have risen, but is addressing the mistrust and grievances that allow tensions to rise in the first place. Sri Lanka has learned, at great cost, that communal divisions can become much larger than the events that initially give rise to them. The Anojan and Thileepan cases give Sri Lanka an opportunity to demonstrate that it has learned from its past. The test of Sri Lanka’s continuing peace is whether we can address difficult grievances without turning them into communal ones.
Features
Sri Lanka Cricket Bill: Governance reform is not yet a cricket strategy – Part II
By Sarath S. Kodithuwakku
President, Institute of Management of Sri Lanka; Senior Professor, University of Peradeniya
(Continued from yesterday)
Representation, Independence and Decision-Making
The membership-based electoral structure should provide representation without becoming a substitute for executive management. The seven Elected Directors would bring the perspectives of the SLC membership into the Board, while the seven Independent Directors would provide additional professional expertise and independence. The model’s effectiveness will, therefore, depend on whether the Board can integrate these perspectives into coherent strategic decisions while maintaining a clear boundary between governance and day-to-day management.
The equal division between Elected and Independent Directors also raises a governance-design question. An even-numbered Board can create a tie. The Bill addresses this directly: in the event of equality, the Chairperson has a casting vote; in the Chairperson’s absence, the Deputy Chairperson has a casting vote; and if both are absent, an Independent Director, elected to preside, has the casting vote. The issue is, therefore, not whether a tie can be resolved, but how this mechanism affects the balance between representation, independence and accountability.
The leadership structure reinforces this balance: the Chairperson is elected from among the Independent Directors and the Deputy Chairperson from among the Elected Directors. The casting-vote arrangement makes the Chairperson’s role and perceived independence particularly important, especially when a major strategic decision divides the two components of the Board.
The Bill’s committee provisions could support a disciplined model of delegation, but implementation will depend heavily on the terms of reference adopted by the new Board. The framework could be strengthened by requiring a published cricket-development strategy, a clear division of powers among the Board, executives and selection committees, transparent principles for major development allocations, and periodic reporting on outcomes across men’s, women’s, schools and domestic cricket. These measures would strengthen accountability without legislating the details of team selection or tournament scheduling.
From Measurement to Strategic Accountability
If the Board is to hold management accountable for strategy rather than simply for short-term results, it needs a performance framework that captures both outcomes and the capabilities that produce them.
SLC should consider requiring an explicit multi-year cricket-development strategy, supported by measurable objectives and an annual strategy review. Such a strategy should identify the development pathway from schools and grassroots cricket through domestic competitions to high performance; define major capability priorities such as coaching, sports science, data and analytics; set resource-allocation principles; and establish indicators against which progress can be assessed.
The purpose would not be to turn cricket into a bureaucratic exercise. Strategic accountability simply creates a disciplined basis for asking whether the organisation is doing what it said it would do, whether its assumptions remain valid, and whether resources are producing the intended results.
From Measurement to Organisational Learning
SLC should, therefore, consider adopting a formal Balanced Scorecard. Rather than measuring success solely through international match results or annual financial audits, the framework could track four interdependent perspectives:
Financial Sustainability:
commercial growth, financial discipline and compliance.
Internal Processes:
domestic tournament quality, development pathways and selector-process integrity.
Stakeholder Value:
grassroots development, school cricket and women’s cricket expansion.
Strategic Capability:
coaching quality, sports science, talent development, data and analytics capability, and the organisation’s ability to convert investment into sustainable performance.
The purpose of such a framework would not be to reduce cricket development to a collection of numbers. Rather, it would create a disciplined process for asking four fundamental management questions:
What did we expect to achieve?
What actually happened?
Why was there a difference?
What should we change as a result?
Evaluating these dimensions periodically would help SLC move beyond performance reporting towards genuine organisational learning.
ICC as a Stakeholder in Governance Reform
The ICC is another important stakeholder whose interests should be recognised in the reform process. SLC’s governance arrangements do not operate solely within Sri Lankan law; they also have to be compatible with the governance obligations associated with ICC membership. The ICC’s Articles of Association require each Member to provide for free and democratic elections (or nominees from outside its members) and to manage its affairs autonomously, without government or other public-body interference in the governance, regulation or administration of cricket.
International experience demonstrates that ICC engagement in member governance restructuring is not unusual. In the United States, after the ICC expelled the old national association for chronic governance failures, the ICC directly oversaw a multi-year project to design a new governance model. The ICC Board formally approved the constitution for a replacement body (USA Cricket) before it was adopted. The resulting structure combined elected constituent directors with independent directors, showing that an ICC-backed framework can accommodate both forms of representation.
In Nepal, the ICC established a Nepal Advisory Group comprising stakeholders from across the game to recommend constitutional amendments, with adoption of the revised constitution and subsequent elections forming part of the conditions for reinstatement of ICC membership.[8] The ICC subsequently facilitated an independent panel that included ICC nominees together with representatives of Nepal’s National Sports Council and the existing cricket administration to map the election process, guidelines and timelines.[9] More recently, in 2026, an ICC delegation visited Bangladesh to engage with stakeholders on governance and electoral matters.[10] The ICC has also reported that its Deputy Chair and another ICC Board representative visited Sri Lanka and met relevant stakeholders to assess ongoing developments, while the ICC Board reiterated the need for elections to be held as soon as possible.
These precedents make the ICC a legitimate stakeholder in considering the governance implications of the proposed Bill. This does not mean that the ICC should determine Sri Lanka’s domestic legislation, nor that every feature of the Bill requires prior ICC approval. It does, however, suggest that early and formal engagement with the ICC would be prudent, particularly where the proposed arrangements concern Board independence, elections, government involvement and the transition to the new governance structure.
This is particularly relevant because the Bill creates two institutional arrangements that deserve careful scrutiny from an autonomy perspective. The Transformation Committee is responsible for managing the transition until the First Board is constituted, while the Nomination Committee, although structurally independent of the SLC Board, includes representatives connected with the Sports Ministry and the National Sports Council. Neither arrangement, by itself, establishes government interference. However, taken together, they make it important that the independence of the incoming Board is demonstrable through transparent procedures rather than assumed from the structure alone.
Given the professional calibre and international exposure of the members of the Transformation Committee, it would be reasonable to expect that the importance of ICC engagement would have been recognised. Although any such consultation has not been evident in the public domain, it is therefore reasonable to expect that the ICC has either already been consulted or will be consulted before the Bill is enacted. Such engagement would allow potential incompatibilities to be identified before the new structure is enacted and implemented, rather than after the fact.
The Transition Is Itself a Governance Challenge
The transition provisions introduce a significant organisational-change challenge. Replacing the existing club- and association-based governance structure with a new hybrid Board and governance architecture is not simply a legal exercise; it is an organisational change programme. The Sri Lanka Cricket Transformation Committee is required to manage the transition until the First Board is constituted and, during that period, to establish rules covering matters including tournament structure, domestic governance, selection committee appointments, committee terms of reference, the Nomination Committee process and the election of the Elected Directors.
Structural reform on paper can encounter resistance from established interests, institutional habits and existing routines. The implementation phase will therefore require a clear change-management framework, including stakeholder engagement, transparent onboarding for Independent Directors, clarification of decision rights, alignment of legacy committees, and careful transfer of information and responsibilities.
Without attention to these organisational factors, cultural friction could undermine the intended administrative improvements. The success of the reform will therefore depend not only on the text of the legislation but also on the quality of the rules, appointments, delegation arrangements and organisational behaviours that follow it.
From Governance Reform to a Cricket Strategy
The Bill deserves credit for addressing how SLC is constituted and for creating places for specialist advice. It should not be dismissed simply because it does not prescribe a batting order or a domestic fixture list. Those are not appropriate tasks for legislation.
Its limitation is more precise: the proposed governance arrangements do not, by themselves, assure the strategic capability of the Board or the quality, independence and accountability of the decisions made beneath it. They establish the architecture. The future Board and management must supply the strategy, capabilities, discipline and learning mechanisms that make the architecture work.
A stronger reform would connect four elements: a Board selected for collective strategic capability; professional cricket management with clear delegated authority; transparent but non-mechanical selection and investment processes; and systematic evaluation of development outcomes. Within the first of these, information technology and computer science should be recognised as distinct from the broader capability to understand and govern data science, analytics and emerging AI-enabled decision support.
Ultimately, the governing question is not only who gets a seat at the SLC Board table. It is whether that Board can build, fund, execute and learn from a credible strategy for Sri Lankan cricket.
References
1. Department of Government Printing, Sri Lanka. Sri Lanka Cricket Bill, Gazette Supplement, Part II of September 25, 2026, issued on 28 September 2026.
2. International Cricket Council. Media release, 15 July 2026, reporting the ICC Board discussion of Sri Lanka Cricket and the need for elections to be held as soon as possible.
3. Sport New Zealand – Ihi Aotearoa. Nine Steps to Effective Governance, particularly Step 1: Define and Agree the Board’s Role; Step 4: Provide Strategic Leadership; Step 5: Employ and Support a Chief Executive; and Step 8: Get the Right People on Board.
4. Cricket South Africa. Governance and management frameworks, including the delegation-of-authority framework, Board committees, Cricket Committee, Cricket Pipeline Committee and CEO accountability.
5. International Cricket Council. ICC Articles of Association, provisions requiring free and democratic elections and autonomous administration without government or other public-body interference. ICC. https://images.icc-cricket.com/image/upload/prd/f7vm88yw1933dc38cgtg.pdf
6. International Cricket Council. “ICC outlines proposed USACA constitution.” ICC, 2017. https://www.icc-cricket.com/news/icc-outlines-proposed-usaca-constitution
7. International Cricket Council. “Approved constitution marks historic landmark for cricket in USA.” ICC, 2017. https://www.icc-cricket.com/media-releases/approved-constitution-marks-historic-landmark-for-cricket-in-usa
8. International Cricket Council. “ICC welcomes Nepal Special General Meeting to adopt revised constitution.” ICC, 2018. https://www.icc-cricket.com/media-releases/icc-welcomes-nepal-special-general-meeting-to-adopt-revised-constitution
9. International Cricket Council. “Independent Panel meet to progress Nepal elections under revised constitution.” ICC, 2018. https://www.icc-cricket.com/media-releases/independent-panel-meet-to-progress-nepal-elections-under-revised-constitution
10. International Cricket Council. “ICC delegation visits Bangladesh to engage with stakeholders on governance and electoral matters.” ICC, 2026. https://www.icc-cricket.com/media-releases/icc-delegation-visits-bangladesh-to-engage-with-stakeholders-on-governance-and-electoral-matters
11. International Cricket Council. “ICC Board approves governance, membership and member support decisions.” ICC, 2026; see also “ICC Board Meeting,” 2026, reporting ICC representatives’ meetings with stakeholders in Sri Lanka. https://www.icc-cricket.com/media-releases/icc-board-approves-governance-membership-and-member-support-decisions
(Concluded)
-
News7 days agoUS-assisted ‘Ice’ detection: NPC to examine IGP’s move to transfer drug-busting team
-
Editorial6 days agoColombo Port drug bust: The plot thickens
-
Editorial7 days agoDrug busting, transfers and trust deficit
-
Features4 days agoThe first woman in the foreign service or Ceylon Overseas Service it was then called
-
News7 days agoSri Lankan facing death penalty in Saudi Arabia: Mano G appeals to Crown Prince
-
Editorial5 days agoFuelling discontent and protest
-
News3 days agoGeneva takes up Sallay’s case and govt. ignores opportunity to answer accusations
-
Latest News4 days agoTharindu Rathnayake, bowlers secure Asian Games Bronze for Sri Lanka
