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Police, Politics & The Rule of Law:The Great Betrayals

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By Dr. Kingsley Wickremasuriya

Preface

Sri Lanka Police Service is the premier law enforcement agency on the Island and one of its oldest government establishments counting over one and half centuries of existence. During this long history, 36 Inspectors-General of Police – 11 of them from the Colonial Administration, and the rest thereafter – were in charge.

Their periods of office were characterized by riots, coups, insurrections, terrorism, political violence, trade union action, mass protests, and worst of all, the politicization of the institution. The vicissitudes the police had to face were many.

The thrust of this essay is to show how once a force that worked according to the rule of law during the colonial administration turned partial and eventually became an apparatus serving political interests rather than those of the common man. Party politics crept into the picture with the progressive introduction of constitutional reforms. To substantiate his thesis, the writer will draw selectively from material available on various websites and other archival material including Police Commission Reports.

The Portuguese – Dutch Period

The Maritime Provinces of Ceylon were under the Portuguese after their invasion in the 15th Century. The Dutch, who arrived in Sri Lanka in 1602, were able to bring the Maritime Provinces and the Jaffna Peninsula under their rule by 1658. Although they controlled certain areas of the maritime provinces, they did not carry out any serious changes to the existing system of civil administration of the country. The concept of policing in Sri Lanka however, started with the Dutch who saddled the military with the responsibility of policing the City of Colombo.

In 1659, the Colombo Municipal Council (under the Dutch) adopted a resolution to appoint paid guards to protect the city by night. Accordingly, a few soldiers were appointed to patrol the city at night.

They initially opened three police stations, one at the northern entrance to the Fort, a second at the causeway connecting the Fort and Pettah, and a third at Kayman’s Gate in the Pettah. In addition to these, ‘Maduwa’ or the office of Dissawa of Colombo who was a Dutch official at Hulftsdorp, also served as a police station for these suburbs. Thus, it was the Dutch who established the earliest police stations and thus became the forerunners of the police in the country.

The British Period

The Dutch surrendered to the British on February 16, 1796. After the occupation of Colombo by the British, law and order were, for some time, maintained by the military. In 1797 the office of fiscal, which had been abolished was re-created. Governor Fredrick North, having found that the fiscal was over-burdened with the additional duty of supervising the police, obtained the concurrence of the Chief Justice and entrusted the Magistrates and Police Judges with the task of supervising the police.

In 1805 police functions came to be clearly defined. Apart from matters connected with the safety, comfort, and convenience of the people, these also came to be connected with preventing and detecting crime and maintaining law and order. The rank of police constable (PC) was created and it came to be associated with all types of police work. By Act No. 14 of 1806, Colombo was divided into 15 divisions, and PCs were appointed to supervise the divisions.

First Superintendent of Police

Mr. Thomas Oswin, Secretary to the Chief Justice, was appointed the first Superintendent of Police of Colombo. Mr. Lokubanda Dunuwila, who was the Dissawa of Uva, was appointed as the Superintendent of Police for Kandy. He goes into history as the very first Lankan to be a Superintendent of Police.

In 1847 the ranks of Assistant Superintendent of Police and Sub Inspector of Police were created. Inspector De La Harpe was promoted as the first Assistant Superintendent of Police.

The National Police

Robert Campbell, KCMG, was the first Inspector General of Police of British Ceylon. The Governor, who was looking for a dynamic person to reorganize the police on the island, turned to India to obtain the services of a capable officer. The Governor of Bombay recommended Mr. G. W. R. Campbell, who was in charge of the “Ratnagiri Rangers” of the Bombay Police, to shoulder this onerous responsibility.

After serving as chief of police in the Indian province of Ratnagiri, Campbell was appointed by Governor Frederick North on September 3, 1866, as Chief Superintendent of Police in Ceylon, in charge of the police force and assumed duties on September 3, 1866. This date is thus reckoned as the beginning of the Sri Lanka Police Service.

Campbell is credited with shaping the force into an efficient organization and giving it a distinct identity. He brought the whole island under his purview and the police became a national rather than a local force. In 1867, by an amendment to the Police Ordinance No. 16 of 1865, the designation of the Head of the Police Force was changed from Chief Superintendent to Inspector-General of Police. In 1887 he was awarded the CMG. On his retirement, he received a knighthood for his service.

Apart from Campbell, 35 others were in charge of the Police Force in Sri Lanka. They performed to different degrees of standards contributing to the development or the decline of the police service in Sri Lanka. Cyril Longdon, the sixth Inspector-General was instrumental in establishing a Police Training School for recruits and a Criminal Investigation Department.

Ivor Edward David was the seventh British colonial Inspector-General of Police in Ceylon (1910-1913). During his tenure, David was noted for establishing the POLICE SPORTS GROUNDS in Bambalapitiya in 1912. Dowbiggin succeeded him as Inspector-General of Police.

Sir Herbert Layard Dowbiggin, CMG, was the eighth British colonial Inspector General of Police of Ceylon from 1913 to 1937, the longest tenure of office of an Inspector General of Police. He was called the ‘Father of the Colonial Police’. Dowbiggin joined the Ceylon Police Force in 1901 and became Inspector General in 1913.

During his tenure, the strength of the force was enhanced considerably with the posts of two deputy inspectors general were created. He oversaw an expansion of the force: the number of police stations increased so that by 1916 there were 138 all over the island. He also modernized the force, introducing new techniques of investigation such as fingerprinting and photography; improving the telecommunications network for the police as well as increasing the mobility of the force. The analysis of crime reports became more systematic. He purchased the land on Havelock Road, Colombo, on which the Field Force Headquarters and the ‘Police Park’ playing fields are located. He was knighted in 1931.

Osmund de Silva

First Sri Lankan Inspector General

Beginning with Sir Richard Aluwihare, KCMG, CBE, JP, CCS, 25 others served as IGPs thereafter. Sir Richard was a Sri Lankan civil servant and the first Ceylonese IGP who later served as Ceylon’s High Commissioner to India. The Police Department, which was under the Home Ministry, was brought under the purview of the Defense Ministry during his tenure.

Sir Richard faced the unenviable responsibility of transforming the police from its colonial outlook to a national police with the gaining of independence in 1948. To this end, he introduced a large number of innovative measures embracing the welfare of the men, investigation, prevention, and detection of crime, the women police, crime prevention societies, rural volunteers, police kennels, public relations, new methods of training and improvement of conditions of service.

He transformed what was a Police Force into a Police Service. Its role was narrowly defined and restricted to the maintenance of law and order and the prevention and detection of crime. In 1948 he established the Police Training School in Kalutara.

He retired from the civil service as IGP and was succeeded by his son-in-law Osmund de Silva. Santiago Wilson Osmund de Silva, OBE was the 13th and the first Ceylonese career police officer to become Inspector-General of Police (1955–1959). In 1955 he succeeded his father-in-law, Sir Richard Aluwihare to be appointed IGP. He became the first IGP appointed from within the police force and the first Buddhist. He introduced community policing to the country, a vision not shared by his successors.

The Great Betrayals

It was during his tenure that Prime Minster Bandaranaike is reported to have exhorted IGP Osmund de Silva that the police should have that ’extra bit of loyalty’ to the government. The response to this by the IGP was an exhortation to his officers that what they should uphold is the Rule of Law. He said this knowing that he would be falling out of favour with the premier and that it would affect his tenure. This assertion by the IGP came when there was no Bill of Rights in the Parliament or no Republican Constitution with Fundamental Rights to fall back on.

Thereafter, when the Prime Minister, S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike requested that the police intervene against trade union action occurring at Colombo Port. De Silva declined to do the PM’s bidding on the basis that he believed the request was unlawful. On April 24, 1959, de Silva was compulsorily retired from the police force with  M. Walter F. Abeykoon, a senior public servant, appointed in his place.

This was the first betrayal by the head of government ignoring an entrenched police norm held sacrosanct through almost a century by the colonial administrators. It eventually led to a near mutiny by the police top brass and later even to more serious consequences of a coup the government managed to avoid by a stroke of luck.

Morawakkorakoralege Walter Fonseka Abeykoon served IGP between 1959 and 1963. He was appointed to this position May 1, 1959 by his personal friend and bridge partner, Prime Minister S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike. The appointment was highly controversial as the PM appointed Abeykoon from outside the service by-passing several senior career police officers, on the basis that Abeykoon was a Sinhala Buddhist.

Senior police officers protested and DIG C. C. Dissanayake tendered his resignation, which was later withdrawn. The senior police officers, who were predominantly Christian, fearing a calamity, met to consider their options. They considered whether the entire police executive resigned on masse, although they decided against this as they thought it had the potential to cause the entire police service to collapse. Alternatively, they surveyed the Executive Corps for the senior- most officer among them who was a Buddhist and could find only young SP Stanley Senanayake.

They resolved to make representations to the Prime Minister that they were prepared to work under Stanley who was junior to all of them rather than having to work under an outsider with no experience who knew nothing of Police or the Police Ordinance. Bandaranaike however ignored their representations and appointed Abeykoon. In 1962, when a coup d’état was attempted by senior officers of the military and police, Abeykoon was caught off guard. Early warning from one of the conspirators, however, allowed the government to respond in time. Ironically, Stanley Senanayake was the whistle blower and the information was conveyed to IGP Abeykoon by P. de S. Kularatne, Senanayake’s father-in-law.

Thereafter, Benjamin Lakdasa ‘Lucky’ Victor de Silva Kodituwakku was appointed as the Inspector General of Police on September 1, 1998 by President Chandrika Kumaratunga following the retirement of Wickremasinghe Rajaguru on August 31, 1998 . This was a controversial appointment, his being selected over five other DIGs with greater seniority. Allegedly this appointment was influenced by the ruling party.

Kodituwakku, while in charge of the Kelaniya Police Division as SP, received transfer orders to go into charge of the Jaffna Police Division. He tried his best to get the transfer canceled but the department stood firm on its policy decision that every police officer needed to serve Jaffna for one year during the LTTE threat.

He opted to leave the service in 1984 resigning his post when he failed to circumvent the transfer. Following his resignation, he worked as a security consultant in a private company and was out of the Police Service for over one-and-a-half decades.

However, following the election of the People’s Alliance government at the 1994 parliamentary elections the new government enabled public servants who had faced alleged “political victimization” to appeal for reinstatement and back wages. Making use of this opportunity Kodituwakku re-joined the service and on October 1, 1997, was promoted to DIGl and Senior DIG rank on August 2, 1998 (a double promotion, from the rank of SSP ignoring the fact that he refused to go on transfer to Jaffna and resigned defying a mandatory policy decision taken by the Department that applied to every servicing police officer.

Kodituwakku was the Inspector-General at the time the Waymaba Provincial Council Elections took place. He was blamed for the violence and the election malpractices that took place during the elections. The 17th Amendment to the Constitution was the result of a political initiative launched by Members of Parliament in the Opposition led by the United National Party in 2001 as a response to the Wayamba Election Episode.

This was the second betrayal by a Head of State- President Chandrika Kumaratunga- when she decided to appoint Lucky Kodituwakku the 26th IGP ignoring so many other seniors over him just because of the special position he enjoyed as the Personal Security officer (PSO) of a VVIP that gave him an advantage over his seniors to canvass for the post. Wayamba- election- bungling and the 17th Amendment to the Constitution was the result.

These precedents led to yet other betrayals last of which was when Deshabndu Tennakoon came to be appointed by the current President Ranil Wickremasinghe as the 36th IGP even though the Supreme Court held that Deshabandu was guilty of human rights violations.

Tennakoon Mudiyanselage Wanshalankara Deshabandu Tennakoon (born 3 July 1971), known as Deshabandu Tennakoon is the current Inspector General of the Sri Lankan Police.

On 14 December 2023, a three-judge bench of the Supreme Court of Sri Lanka ruled that Tennakoon and two of his subordinates were guilty of torturing Weheragedara Ranjith Sumangala of Kindelpitiya for alleged theft and thereby violating his fundamental rights when the men were in uniform attached to the Nugegoda Police Division in 2010.

The Fundamental Rights Application (SC/FR 107/2011) was filled by Sumangala in the Supreme Court in March 2011, against the then Superintendent of Police, M.W.D. Tennakoone, Inspector of Police Bhathiya Jayasinghe, then OIC (Emergency Unit) Mirihana, Police Officer Bandara, former Sergeant Major Ajith Wanasundera of Padukka, and several others in the police department. The three bench panel consisting of Justices S. Thurairaja, Kumudini Wickremasinghe, and Priyantha Fernando, directed the National Police Commission and other relevant authorities to take disciplinary action against Tennakoon and two of his subordinates.

On 29 November 2023, President Ranil Wickremesinghe however, appointed Tennakoon as acting Inspector General of Police. He was appointed as the permanent Inspector General of Police on 26 February 2024.

The same day that he was appointed to the post of Inspector General of Police, Leader of the Opposition Sajith Premadasa claimed that the Constitutional Council, which oversees high-level appointments, saw only four votes cast in favor of Tennakoon. In comparison, two votes were cast against and there were two abstentions. Speaker Mahinda Yapa Abeywardena, counting the abstentions as votes against exercised his casting vote to break the tie in Tennekoon’s favour. This matter is currently being canvassed in the Supreme Court.

(To be continued)
kingsley.wickremasuriya@gmail.com



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Features

Power crept into the Sangha and is now tearing it apart

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A file photo of Buddhist monks engaged in a protest

For more than a century, Sri Lankan society has lived with a quiet contradiction at the heart of its religious life. On the one hand, the Buddhist monk is revered as the embodiment of moral discipline, selfrestraint, and renunciation. On the other, the modern monk has become a public figure, political actor, administrator, media personality, and in some cases power broker whose influence extends far beyond the temple. This contradiction has been tolerated, even celebrated, for decades. But recent events, most notably a widely publicised case involving a senior monk accused of grave moral misconduct, have forced the country to confront a painful truth: the institutional conditions that make such scandals possible are not new. They are the predictable outcome of a long historical process that H. L. Seneviratne described with remarkable clarity in The Work of Kings. The moral deterioration visible today is not an aberration. It is the culmination of a centurylong transformation in the identity, function, and authority of the Sangha.

To understand how we arrived at this moment, it is necessary to revisit the argument Seneviratne made nearly three decades ago. His thesis was simple but profound: the modern Sri Lankan monkhood has taken on the ‘work of kings.’ By this he meant that monks, instead of confining themselves to the renunciant life prescribed by the Vinaya, have assumed the secular responsibilities once associated with precolonial kingship, such as protecting the religion, organising society, guiding the nation, and enforcing moral order. This shift, he argued, was not a natural evolution of Buddhist tradition but a modern invention shaped by colonialism, nationalism, and the anxieties of a society struggling to redefine itself in the face of foreign domination. The monk became a symbol of national identity, a guardian of cultural authenticity, and a leader in the struggle for political autonomy. In the process, the boundaries that once separated the monastic from the worldly began to dissolve.

Transformation

The consequences of this transformation were not immediately visible. For decades, the activist monk was celebrated as a patriot, a reformer, and a moral guide. His involvement in education, social welfare, and nationalist mobilisation was seen as a necessary response to colonial pressures and missionary competition. But beneath the surface, the foundations of monastic discipline were slowly eroding. The Vinaya, which had served for centuries as a rigorous framework for regulating monastic life, was increasingly overshadowed by the demands of public engagement. The communal structures that once ensured accountability, senior supervision, collective confession, and the daily rhythms of monastic routine, were weakened by the pressures of modernity. Monks who travelled constantly, managed institutions, or lived independently in urban temples found themselves outside the traditional systems of oversight that had long protected the integrity of the Sangha.

Scandal

It is within this historical context that the recent scandal must be understood. The case shocked the nation not only because of the severity of the allegations but because it shattered the public’s assumption that the monkhood remains a bastion of moral purity. Yet the shock itself reveals a collective denial. For years, Sri Lankan society has been aware, sometimes quietly, sometimes openly—of the growing gap between the ideal of the monk and the realities of modern monastic life. Stories of misconduct, financial irregularities, political manipulation, and abuse of authority have circulated with increasing frequency. But each incident has been treated as an isolated failure, a personal weakness, or an unfortunate exception. What has been missing is recognition that these incidents are symptoms of a deeper structural problem.

Seneviratne’s analysis helps illuminate this problem. When monks take on the work of kings, they inevitably enter domains of power that expose them to temptations the Vinaya was designed to avoid. Handling money, managing institutions, cultivating political patrons, and exercising authority over laypeople create opportunities for ego, ambition, and moral compromise. The monk who becomes a public figure is no longer shielded by the anonymity and humility of the renunciant life. Instead, he becomes a celebrity, a leader, and in some cases an object of uncritical devotion. This elevation brings with it a dangerous form of immunity. Laypeople who revere a monk for his public achievements may hesitate to question his behaviour. Politicians who rely on monastic support may protect him from scrutiny. The media, which often treats monks as moral authorities, may be reluctant to investigate allegations that challenge the sanctity of the robe.

The recent scandal illustrates how these dynamics can converge. The monk at the centre of the case was not an obscure figure. He was a respected preacher, charismatic leader, and head of a prominent institution. His public image was built on years of service, teaching, and community engagement. Yet it was precisely this public stature that allowed him to operate without meaningful oversight. The institutional structures around him, administrators, lay supporters, and junior monks, were either unwilling or unable to challenge his authority. The very qualities that made him a respected figure in the eyes of the public also made him untouchable within his own institution. When allegations finally emerged, they revealed not only personal wrongdoing but a systemic failure of accountability.

Failure that is not unique

This failure is not unique to one temple or one monk. It reflects a broader pattern within the modern Sangha. As monastic institutions have grown in size, wealth, and influence, their internal governance has struggled to keep pace. Many temples operate as semiautonomous entities controlled by a single monk or a small group of monks. Financial transparency is limited, administrative oversight is weak, and the mechanisms for addressing misconduct are often informal or ineffective. The traditional structures of monastic discipline, such as the Sangharama procedures for adjudicating offences, are rarely used in modern contexts, partly because they require collective participation and partly because they are illsuited to the complexities of contemporary institutional life. In practice, this means that monks who wield significant authority can act with little fear of internal sanction.

The politicisation of the Sangha has further complicated matters. Since the midtwentieth century, monks have played an increasingly prominent role in electoral politics, nationalist movements, and public policy debates. This involvement has given them access to political networks that can be mobilised to protect their interests. It has also created a culture in which monks are valued not for their adherence to the Vinaya but for their ability to influence public opinion, mobilise voters, or lend moral legitimacy to political causes. In such an environment, the monk who is politically useful may be shielded from criticism, while the monk who adheres strictly to the renunciant ideal may find himself marginalised or ignored.

The result is a profound distortion of monastic identity. The monk who once sought liberation from worldly attachments is now encouraged to cultivate influence, authority, and public recognition. The monk who once lived under the strict supervision of senior elders now operates in a world where independence is celebrated and oversight is minimal. The monk who once relied on laypeople for basic sustenance now controls vast resources, manages institutions, and commands the loyalty of thousands of followers. This inversion of traditional roles has created a fertile ground for moral deterioration.

Yet it would be a mistake to interpret this deterioration as evidence that the Sangha as a whole is corrupt. Many monks continue to live lives of remarkable discipline, humility, and spiritual dedication. In remote forest monasteries, small village temples, and meditation centres across the country, monks quietly uphold the ancient ideals of the renunciant life. They are not the ones who appear on television, lead political rallies, or manage large institutions. Their work is invisible, their influence subtle, and their commitment unwavering. The crisis facing the Sangha today is not a crisis of individual morality but a crisis of institutional identity. It is the product of a centurylong transformation that has blurred the boundaries between the monastic and the secular, the spiritual and the political, the renunciant and the worldly.

If Sri Lanka is to address this crisis, it must begin by acknowledging the structural nature of the problem. The temptation to treat each scandal as an isolated incident must be resisted. Instead, the country must confront the uncomfortable reality that the modern configuration of monastic life is fundamentally at odds with the principles of the Vinaya. The Sangha cannot simultaneously function as a political force, a social service provider, a media institution, and a spiritual community without compromising its integrity. The more monks are drawn into the world, the more vulnerable they become to the moral dangers that the Buddha warned against.

Reform, therefore, must focus not only on punishing individual offenders but on rethinking the institutional structures that enable misconduct. This includes strengthening internal governance, enhancing financial transparency, restoring the authority of senior elders, and reestablishing the communal practices that once ensured accountability. It also requires a broader cultural shift in how laypeople relate to monks. Blind devotion must give way to informed respect. Reverence must be balanced with responsibility. The robe must be honoured, but it must not be used as a shield against scrutiny.

Seneviratne’s work offers a valuable starting point for this rethinking. His analysis reminds us that the crisis facing the Sangha is not the result of moral decline alone but of historical forces that reshaped the identity of the monkhood. By tracing the evolution of the activist monk, he shows how the Sangha became entangled in the political and social structures of the modern nationstate. This entanglement has brought both benefits and dangers. It has allowed monks to play important roles in education, social welfare, and national development. But it has also exposed them to the corrupting influences of power, wealth, and public acclaim.

The challenge now is to disentangle the Sangha from these influences without undermining its ability to serve society. This will not be easy. The activist monk has become deeply embedded in the cultural and political fabric of the country. Many laypeople expect monks to be leaders, reformers, and guardians of national identity. Politicians rely on monastic support to legitimise their agendas. Media institutions depend on monks for content, commentary, and moral authority. Reversing this trend will require a collective effort from monks, laypeople, and political leaders alike.

Ultimately, the future of the Sangha depends on its ability to reclaim the renunciant ideal that lies at the heart of Buddhist monasticism. This does not mean withdrawing from society entirely, but it does mean reestablishing the boundaries that protect the monk from the dangers of worldly involvement. It means recognising that the true strength of the Sangha lies not in its political influence or institutional power but in its moral authority, its spiritual discipline, and its commitment to the path of liberation. The recent scandal, painful as it is, may serve as a catalyst for this reevaluation. It has exposed the vulnerabilities of the modern monastic system and forced the country to confront the consequences of a centurylong transformation.

To understand how the Vihara Devalegam Act relates to the perceived moral deformation of the clergy, it is necessary to examine how property management, state law, and monastic discipline intersect in the modern era. Historically stemming from the Buddhist Temporalities Ordinance No. 19 of 1931, this act serves as the primary legal framework governing the ‘temporalities’—meaning the secular wealth, extensive landholdings, and material donations belonging to Buddhist temples and shrines. While ancient kings granted these vast tracts of land to support the monkhood’s spiritual pursuits, the modern codification of this law has inadvertently fostered a system where property rights frequently supersede spiritual accountability.

The core of the crisis lies in the commercialisation of the monastic order that this legal framework enables. By treating temple lands as economic assets and vesting absolute administrative power in individual chief monks or lay trustees, the act has contributed to the rise of what critics term a monastic middle class. Access to vast, unregulated financial resources, rent from lands, and corporate donations has fundamentally shifted the focus of certain segments of the clergy away from the traditional path of worldly renunciation and spiritual guidance. Instead, it has driven a preoccupation with business investments, the accumulation of private capital, and luxury lifestyles, which deeply alienates a public looking to the Sangha for moral leadership.

The institutional flaws embedded in the Vihara Devalegam Act find a stark, real-world manifestation in the recent criminal case involving Venerable Pallegama Hemarathana Thero. As the chief priest of Anuradhapura and the custodian of the Atamasthana—the eight highly venerated Buddhist shrines, including the sacred Jaya Sri Maha Bodhi—Hemarathana Thero occupied one of the most powerful and wealthy positions within the Sri Lankan Sangha. His arrest on charges of sexual abuse of a minor girl perfectly illustrates how the structural defects of the Act facilitate not only moral decay but also the systemic obstruction of justice.

The core of this intersection lies in the vast, unaccountable wealth generated by the temporalities of the Anuradhapura shrines. Under the Vihara Devalegam Act, the chief custodian exercises immense, virtually unchecked control over temple revenues, state-backed land management, and millions of rupees in daily donations from millions of global pilgrims. It is precisely this immense financial liquidity that enabled the alleged deployment of vast sums of money to the victim’s family.

Furthermore, the situation underscores the profound policy failures cited regarding the helplessness of the monastic hierarchy and state enforcement. When child protection authorities initially attempted to act, the National Child Protection Authority noted severe delays and institutional resistance, stating they practically had to force the police to execute the arrest. The monk’s immediate retreat to a private hospital in Colombo upon the advancement of the criminal probe, followed by his release on bail, mirrors the exact loop described where wealthy monastics deploy high-priced legal defence teams funded directly or indirectly by their institutional positions. Because the Vihara Devalegam Act does not provide a mechanism for the immediate, unconditional forfeiture of temporal administrative rights upon a criminal indictment, the accused retains his structural power throughout the legal process. The Pallegama Thero scandal stands as definitive proof that without a fundamental overhaul of how temple wealth is legally governed and disciplined, the material benefits guaranteed by ancient temporalities will continue to shield the worst elements of moral deformation from the rule of law.

If Sri Lanka can learn from this moment and if it can recognise the structural roots of the crisis and commit to meaningful reform, then the Sangha may yet emerge stronger, more disciplined, and more faithful to its ancient ideals. But if the country continues to treat each scandal as an isolated failure and if it continues to ignore the deeper institutional problems that Seneviratne identified, then the moral deterioration we see today will only deepen. The work of kings, when performed by monks, carries a heavy price. It is time to decide whether that price is worth paying.

by Professor Amarasiri de Silva

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Kondachchi wind farm and battery storage project to boost energy security, says Power Ministry Secretary

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The Power and Energy Ministry’s drive towards energy security and renewable energy expansion received a major boost yesterday with the signing of a tripartite cooperation agreement for the development of the 150 MW Kondachchi Wind Power Project and an integrated Battery Energy Storage System (BESS) in Mannar.

The agreement was signed at the Ministry of Power auditorium under the patronage of Power Minister Anura Karunatilaka and Deputy Power Minister Arkam Ilyas.

Speaking at the event, Ministry Secretary G. M. R. D. Aponsu described the project as a transformative investment that would strengthen the country’s electricity network while supporting Sri Lanka’s transition towards cleaner energy sources.

“The Kondachchi Wind Power Project represents a significant milestone in Sri Lanka’s renewable energy journey. By combining large-scale wind generation with advanced battery energy storage technology, we are creating a more resilient and reliable power system capable of meeting future energy demands while reducing dependence on imported fossil fuels,” Aponsu said.

The project will be developed at Silavathurai in the Kondachchi area of Mannar on lands owned by the Sri Lanka Cashew Corporation. It is expected to utilise some 31 modern wind turbines with a total installed capacity of at least 150 MW.

Aponsu said the inclusion of an integrated battery storage facility would help address the variability associated with wind power generation and ensure stable electricity supply to the national grid.

“The battery energy storage component is a key feature of this project. It will enable the efficient integration of renewable energy into the grid and enhance overall system stability, which is essential as Sri Lanka increases the share of renewables in its energy mix,” he said.

According to the Ministry, the wind farm is expected to generate nearly 525 gigawatt-hours of electricity annually, significantly reducing the country’s expenditure on imported fuel and strengthening national energy security.

The project is also expected to contribute to Sri Lanka’s climate commitments by reducing carbon dioxide emissions by an estimated 372,750 tonnes annually.

“This investment delivers both economic and environmental benefits. It will reduce greenhouse gas emissions, support sustainable development objectives and help Sri Lanka move closer to achieving its renewable energy and climate targets,” Aponsu noted.

The project will be implemented under a Public-Private Partnership (PPP) arrangement using the Build, Own and Operate (BOO) model. The Asian Development Bank is providing technical and financial advisory support through its Transaction Advisory Services programme.

The signing ceremony was attended by Pradeep Perera, Chairman of the National System Operator (Pvt) Ltd., and Takeyo Koike, Head of Market Development and Public-Private Partnership Division of the ADB, among other distinguished guests.

The Ministry said comprehensive Environmental Impact Assessments and avifaunal studies have been undertaken to ensure minimal impacts on bird populations, nearby communities and agricultural lands. A dedicated 220-kilovolt transmission system will also be constructed to connect the project to the national grid.

“The Kondachchi Wind Farm is a strategic national project that will help secure Sri Lanka’s energy future while accelerating the country’s transition towards sustainable and affordable electricity generation,” Aponsu said.

Energy sector experts view the project as one of the most important renewable energy initiatives currently being pursued in Sri Lanka, combining utility-scale wind generation with modern energy storage technology to enhance grid reliability and long-term energy sustainability.

By Ifham Nizam

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Saudi Arabia sets new benchmark in Hajj management as 1.7 million pilgrims complete sacred journey

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Ambassador Al-Kahtani

Interview with Khalid Hamoud Al-Kahtani, Ambassador of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to Sri Lanka

Saudi Arabia has once again demonstrated its unparalleled capacity to manage one of the world’s largest annual religious gatherings, with this year’s Hajj pilgrimage concluding successfully despite extreme temperatures and the immense logistical challenge of accommodating more than 1.7 million pilgrims from around the world.

In an exclusive interview with The Island, Khalid Hamoud Al-Kahtani, Ambassador of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to Sri Lanka, described the 2026 Hajj season as a resounding success, crediting the achievement to the visionary leadership of the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques, His Royal Highness the Crown Prince and Prime Minister, and the coordinated efforts of multiple government agencies working around the clock to serve pilgrims.

The Ambassador noted that nearly 3,500 Sri Lankan pilgrims participated in this year’s Hajj under the quota allocated to Sri Lanka, benefiting from enhanced healthcare services, sophisticated crowd-management systems, expanded shaded areas and cutting-edge digital solutions introduced by the Kingdom.

With Saudi Arabia continuing to invest heavily in infrastructure, technology and pilgrim services under Vision 2030, Ambassador Al-Kahtani said the Kingdom remains committed to ensuring that pilgrims from around the world perform their religious duties in safety, comfort and tranquility.

The Saudi envoy also highlighted the growing partnership between Saudi Arabia and Sri Lanka, emphasising expanding cooperation not only in Hajj affairs but also in trade, investment, education, culture and institutional exchanges.

Following are excerpts of the interview:


Q: How do you assess this year’s Hajj season?

Ambassador Al-Kahtani: This year’s Hajj season was a resounding success, thanks to the Almighty Allah and the integrated efforts of the government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, led by the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques and His Royal Highness the Crown Prince and Prime Minister. This success was reflected in the efficiency of crowd management, the quality of services provided to the Hajj pilgrims and the effective coordination among the various relevant authorities, which enabled pilgrims to perform their rituals in an atmosphere of security, tranquility and ease.

Q: How many Sri Lankan pilgrims performed Hajj this year?

Ambassador Al-Kahtani: The number of Hajj pilgrims from the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka reached approximately 3,500, within the quota allocated to Sri Lanka for this season.

Q: Are there any discussions regarding increasing Sri Lanka’s quota in the future?

Ambassador Al-Kahtani:Hajj quotas are determined according to approved regulatory mechanisms that take into account a range of considerations. The relevant authorities in the Kingdom continue to study various aspects related to developing Hajj services and accommodating the allocated numbers for all countries, in coordination with the concerned parties.

Q: What were the most prominent special arrangements implemented this year?

Ambassador Al-Kahtani: The operational plans for this season focused on enhancing the safety and comfort of the Hajj pilgrims, especially given the climatic conditions and high temperatures. Measures included expanding shaded areas, increasing water distribution points and enhancing health and ambulance services, in addition to developing the transportation system and traffic management within the holy sites.

Q: What are the most prominent digital systems and smart services that were provided?

Ambassador Al-Kahtani:The Kingdom continues to implement its digital transformation objectives for the Hajj and Umrah system. The scope of electronic services offered through the Nusuk platform and application has been expanded, along with the development of digital systems for issuing permits, managing crowds, guidance and health services. This contributes to increasing the efficiency of services and improving the pilgrim’s experience at all stages of their journey.

Q: How were the challenges of overcrowding and heat addressed?

Ambassador Al-Kahtani: The relevant authorities adopted an integrated crowd-management system based on modern technologies and real-time data analysis. This was coupled with intensified health-awareness campaigns, expanded organised movement routes and increased deployment of field, medical and emergency teams. These measures support the safety of the Hajj pilgrims and reduce the risks associated with crowd density and climatic conditions.

Q: Were there special services for the elderly and sick?

Ambassador Al-Kahtani: Yes. The Kingdom paid special attention to the elderly and people with special health needs by providing specialized medical services, assistive transportation and facilities equipped to meet their needs, in addition to field teams working to provide humanitarian support and necessary healthcare throughout the Hajj period.

Q: How successful was the Kingdom in combating irregular Hajj permits?

Ambassador Al-Kahtani: The relevant authorities in the Kingdom continued to rigorously implement the regulations and instructions governing Hajj, utilising modern technologies and advanced monitoring procedures to reduce violations related to irregular Hajj. These efforts contributed to enhancing the safety of pilgrims, improving crowd-management efficiency and maintaining the smooth flow of movement within the holy sites.

Q: How would you describe Saudi-Sri Lankan cooperation in organising Hajj?

Ambassador Al-Kahtani: Cooperation between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Republic of Sri Lanka is characterised by continuous and constructive coordination in all matters related to Hajj. The relevant authorities in both countries work jointly to ensure the provision of the best services for Sri Lankan pilgrims and enable them to perform their rituals with ease and peace of mind.

Q: How many Hajj pilgrims were there globally, and what were the main challenges?

Ambassador Al-Kahtani: According to official statistics, the number of Hajj pilgrims this year reached 1,707,301 from various countries around the world. The main challenges included managing large crowds, ensuring public safety and providing health, transportation and accommodation services within a specific geographical and temporal scope. These challenges were addressed through advanced and integrated operational plans, which contributed to the smooth and successful completion of the Hajj season.

Q: Are there any future expansion projects?

Ambassador Al-Kahtani: The Kingdom continues to implement strategic development projects within the framework of Vision 2030, including developing the infrastructure in Makkah and the Holy Sites, and enhancing transportation networks and smart services. This contributes to raising the quality of services provided to pilgrims and Umrah performers and improving their long-term experience.

Q: How are Saudi-Sri Lankan relations  strengthened outside the context of Hajj?

Ambassador Al-Kahtani: Relations between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Republic of Sri Lanka are witnessing continuous development in many areas, including political, economic, trade, cultural and educational cooperation, in addition to developing exchanges between institutions and the private sector. This reflects the two countries’ keenness to strengthen the bilateral partnership and achieve common interests.

Q: What message would you like to convey to Sri Lankan Muslims?

Ambassador Al-Kahtani: We extend our sincere congratulations to the Hajj pilgrims who have completed their Hajj rituals, and we ask Almighty Allah to accept their pilgrimage. We also assure Muslims in Sri Lanka that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia places serving the Two Holy Mosques and the guests of Almighty Allah at the forefront of its priorities and continues to develop the Hajj and Umrah system to achieve the highest standards of quality and safety.

By Ifham Nizam

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