Features
Mayhem starts in Mirihana! Where will it go? How will it end?
by Rajan Philips
Thursday/Friday (March 31/April 1)
6:00 PM
– Protesters gather at the Jubilee Post in their “tens of thousands”.
7:30 PM
– March towards Pengiriwatte Road leading to the President’s private residence.
8:39 PM
– “Several hundreds” protest at Pengiriwatte Road, chanting “Gota, Go Home.”
9:48 PM
– Tense situation as protesters try to the break police barricades.
10:27 PM
– Tear gas and water cannons fired as protesters break through barricades.
11:51 PM
– Sri Lankan Army bus and jeep set on fire. Vehicles overturned.
12:30 AM
– Kandy-Colombo Road blocked by protesters at the Bulugaha junction.
12:32 AM
– Injured people admitted to hospitals in Colombo and Kalubowila.
12:43 AM
– Police curfew imposed in Colombo and Nugegoda Police Divisions.
05:59 AM
– Police curfew lifted.
Online media registered the above timeline as Thursday night and Friday morning as protests unfolded near the private residence of President Rajapaksa in Mirihana. Sri Lankans at home and abroad, from Colombo to California, saw live reporting of the events. Over 30 people, including journalists, have been admitted to hospitals with injuries. Over 40 people have been arrested. The Presidential Media Division (PMD) has called Thursday’s events “unrest” and “riot” and blamed them on an unnamed “extremist group.”
While social media has been telling everyone about a major protest planned for Sunday, April 3, there has been little or no public intimation about the Mirihana protests, except for reported warning by state intelligence sources. On Friday morning, The Daily Mirror reported continuing “public outrage against President Gotabaya Rajapaksa, Prime Minister Mahinda Rajapaksa and Sports Minister Namal Rajapaksa” on social media. And public demonstrations are reportedly expected to continue on Saturday with a ‘white cloth’ campaign outside the Nelum Pokuna theater. Candlelight protests have been going on in several parts of the country as it plunged into darkness with extensive power cuts.
There is no clear information about the organization of the protest planned for Sunday. A Whatsapp message sent out by a social media group has been asking people to come out to protest on Sunday morning. Political parties have denied involvement and a number of them have called on their members not to participate in the protest on Sunday.
The Samagi Jana Balawegaya (SJB) is being accused of having it both ways – encouraging the protest but disclaiming involvement. “People are suffering in darkness, they don’t have gas, food. We have tolerated the government enough. It’s time to act therefore join us and take to the streets on April 3,” Leader of Opposition Sajith Premadasa reportedly posted on his Facebook page. The post triggered “harsh criticisms” against Mr. Premadasa and calls to political parties “to stay out of it.”
The UNP, whose leader Ranil Wickremesinghe attended the All Party Conference convened by President Rajapaksa, has indicated that it will not participate in the protest on Sunday. In a twitter statement, the UNP said “the United National Party will not be joining any protest organized by anonymous groups. We are committed to conducting our Sathyagraha Campaign around the country. The next Sathyagraha will be held at Matara on April 6, 2022 .”
The JVP has also “cautioned against protest campaigns that cannot be traced back to a recognizable and accountable organiser or group.” While acknowledging “the people’s right to organize their own protests against Sri Lanka’s worsening economic crisis,” the JVP has warned of “dangers lurking in a protest movement that has no accountability.”
Last week on this page, I referred to a statement by David Beasley, the executive director of the UN Word Food Programme (WFP), that the food situation in many countries today is worse than the 2011 crisis of rising food prices that triggered the Arab Spring uprisings in Egypt and across North Africa. I went on to comment that in Sri Lanka “no one can predict how the public mood will change and what it will precipitate if the current shortages and high prices continue to worsen and the government fails to provide relief to the people.”
Mirihana is now evidence as to what the public mood is. Howsoever it came to pass, the Mirihana protest summed up the mood of the people and their boiling anger at the government’s utter ineptitude and its heartless insensitivity. For the first time, public anger directly targeted the highest in the land. Once public anger is breached, it is hard to predict what course it will take. The perception of inaction by opposition parties is also opening up space for seemingly spontaneous protests to fill in.
Before Thursday night it seemed that India was ready to do some heavy lifting to protect the Rajapaksa presidency. Now, all of India’s lines of credit in cash and kind may not be enough to either prevent Humpty Dumpty from his great fall, or patching him up after the fall. But India has no permanent interest in Gotabaya Rajapaksa or any other Sri Lankan political leader, for that matter. If Gota is gone, as he is being asked to go, India will look for the next best bet among aspiring contenders. But is there any way that Gota can stay?
Protests and Options
One way would be to emulate what President Lyndon Johnson did when he stunningly announced at the end of a televised address on 31 March 1968: “I shall not seek, and I will not accept, the nomination of my party for another term as your president.” After becoming President in 1963, following Kennedy’s assassination, and his landslide victory in the 64 election, Johnson was hugely successful on the domestic front with truly historic achievements in civil rights, social welfare and social justice. But he was undone by the Vietnam war which started dividing America and destroying his presidency. Lyndon Johnson opted to take himself out of office and out of politics for the sake of the country.
Short of resignation, the best that the Sri Lankan President can do is to announce that he will not seek a second term but will use the remainder of his single term to work with all the political leaders and parties in parliament to make sure that Sri Lanka avoids mass starvation and that its derailed economy is put back on track. He should also commit to dissolving parliament at the earliest constitutional opportunity in March 2023. Beyond the current term, the President and the family should forget about any more extended terms in office. They should consider themselves lucky to get through with what they have now.
For the country, getting rid of Gotabaya Rajapaksa over the weekend is not going to solve the country’s foreign exchange crisis and its chronic shortages. Deposing the regime is not going to bring shiploads of food and fuel next week. As the constitution provides, if the President were to resign, the Prime Minister, Mahinda Rajapaksa, will become the acting President until Parliament elects, by majority vote, an interim President from one of its MPs to serve out the remaining term of the resigning President. Let us not mention impeachment.
In a situation where Gotabaya Rajapaksa finds no alternative but to resign, Mahinda Rajapaksa cannot conceivably continue as acting President. He too will have to reign, and Parliament will have to find a way to elect some other MP as President, who will then appoint another MP as Prime Minister and still others as cabinet ministers. In the same breath, Parliament can pass a resolution calling for its dissolution, which the new acting/interim President will have to duly comply with.
All of this can happen and can be even fun if the country were in normal times. But it will not be fun for parliament to become theatre when people are running out of food and the country has already run out of fuel and electricity. On the other hand, allowing the incumbent President to continue, but on a tight leash from parliament, will avoid disrupting the pressing tasks of keeping essential supplies flowing to avoid mass starvation and endless dark nights. For this scenario, it cannot be business as usual for President Rajapaksa and for the rest of the Rajapaksa family.
The President will have to find a way to engage all the parties in parliament and forming a new cabinet focused on immediate relief measures and negotiations with the IMF. On Friday, Harsha de Silva posted an article entitled, “The Government cannot go on this way,” in which he draws attention to the collapse of public and investor confidence in the government and calls for “the complete overhaul of the monetary board of the Central Bank of Sri Lanka (CBSL),” whose decisions are the main cause for the current crisis. The President has no option but to do this if he is to stay in office, and along with overhauling the monetary board, the President should also surround himself with a new team of advisors who will recommend Sri Lanka’s negotiating team for the IMF. It cannot include GL Pieris, Ali Sabri, Nivard Cabraal and S.R. Attygalle.
If the SJB or the JVP have other alternatives they should let the country know what they are. The SJB and the JVP have been flogging the dissolution horse for a while, but they do not have the votes in parliament to ride the poor animal home. Udaya Gamanpilla is now threatening that he and Weerawansa would be able to muster enough votes from both sides of the aisle to force an immediate election. Why would anyone from the opposition join these two discredited weathervanes who want a new election to get a new Finance Minister?
If parliament can muster a majority resolution to dissolve itself, so be it. But it would be ill-advised to do so in the current circumstances. It will leave the Executive President in total control until a new parliament returns. Worse, it will be a disruptive diversion from the more pressing tasks now – to scour for foreign exchange, streamline supplies, and restore electricity. Even if an election were to be held this year, it would still be a ‘hung parliament’ under the proportional representation system. How would it make it easier to get things done than it is now?
One would like to see the lifting of the curfew within five hours on Friday morning as a positive sign that no one in the government or the family is thinking Rathupaswala (August 1, 2013). There are legitimate fears that the government may use the current protests to clamp down militarily. But any clampdown will only worsen the situation of food shortages and foreign exchange crisis. The sanction-happy West will impose itself with vigour and will make the IMF inaccessible. All the currently assured cash and kind lines of credit from India will cease. China alone cannot feed all Sri Lankans, and it will likely not even try. There are better options.
Features
Oil prices rise like rockets, fall like feathers (if you’re lucky)
Crude oil is the lifeblood of the global industrial economy, yet the journey from a subterranean reservoir to a litre of petrol at the forecourt involves a cascade of physical transformations, commercial transactions, and fiscal interventions that profoundly shape who bears the cost, and how much. A sudden shift in the world market price of crude, whether triggered by OPEC+ supply discipline, geopolitical disruption, or a demand shock, does not translate uniformly into consumer prices across the globe. The consequences are systematically different, depending on a country’s tax policy, exchange rate, efficiencies in refining processes, distribution processes and dependence on energy imports.
The Refining Process: From Crude to Finished Products
Crude oil is a naturally occurring mixture of hydrocarbons and its chemical composition varies by field: Heavy sour crudes from Venezuela, or Saudi Arabia, require additional processing, raising refining costs by USD 2–5 per barrel. One standard barrel contains approximately 159 litres.
Crude oil is preheated to approximately 370–400°C and the operating principle exploits differences in boiling points. The resulting fractions, collected from top to bottom, include: light petroleum gases (LPG) boiling below 40°C; naphtha and gasoline fractions in the 40–205°C range; kerosene and jet fuel between 175°C and 275°C; diesel and gas oil from 250°C to 350°C; and atmospheric residue above 350°C which is then processed in a vacuum distillation unit to recover further distillates, including lubricating oil base stocks.
Primary distillation alone is insufficient to meet market demand. Gasoline demand far exceeds the natural yield of the distillation cut. A modern complex refinery achieves the following approximate product yields from a light sweet crude: petrol/gasoline ~45%; diesel/gasoil ~25%; kerosene/jet fuel ~10%; LPG ~5%; heavy fuel oil ~10%; and other by-products ~5%. These ratios shift with crude quality and refinery configuration, and response differently to crude price changes.
The Crude Truth: How Oil Prices Punish the Poor Twice
An accounting perspective reveals a waterfall of costs, each layer added by a distinct economic actor and subject to a distinct set of market forces and regulatory interventions. A companion of the approximate cost structure for a litre of petrol at the retail level, assuming a crude oil price of USD 70 per barrel (approximately USD 0.44 per litre of crude equivalent), between advanced and emerging economies, can be explained in four layers:
Layer 1 — Crude Oil Cost (~51% of Retail Price)
The foundation of every fuel product is the crude oil acquisition cost. At USD 70/barrel, the raw material cost embedded in one litre of refined petrol is approximately USD 0.44. This figure includes wellhead lifting costs, field operating expenses, royalties, and sovereign resource taxes paid to the producing country, as well as freight and insurance for ocean tanker shipment.
For emerging economies, without domestic refining capacity, or with currencies that are not freely convertible, this layer is doubly exposed: a crude price increase is compounded by any simultaneous depreciation of the local currency.
Layer 2 — Refining Margin (~20% of Retail Price)
The gross refining margin, measured by the industry’s standard 3-2-1 crack spread;
Crack Spread (gross refining margin) = (2×Gasoline Price) + (1×Diesel Price) − (3×Crude Price)
Critically, this gross figure must not be confused with profit. A refinery typically uses 6–8% of its own crude input as process fuel, and significant variable operating costs. This gross refining margin, the difference between the value of products produced and the cost of crude, varies considerably with market conditions.
In advanced economies with large, integrated refinery systems, these margins are moderated by competition and long-term supply contracts. In emerging economies, dependent on a single import refinery or on product imports rather than crude, refining costs are effectively set by the international product market, leaving little domestic control over this cost layer.
Layer 3 — Distribution and Marketing (~11% of Retail Price)
Refined products must travel from the refinery gate to the consumer through a distribution network involving primary pipelines or product tankers, regional storage terminals, secondary truck distribution, and retail fuel stations. In advanced economies, this infrastructure is mature, privately operated, and highly efficient, contributing a relatively stable USD 0.05–0.10 per litre to the retail price. In many emerging economies, the distribution infrastructure is fragmented, underdeveloped, or state-controlled, introducing additional costs, quality inconsistencies, and opportunities for rent-seeking. In Sri Lanka, for instance, the state-owned Ceylon Petroleum Corporation has historically cross-subsidised distribution costs, masking the true economic cost until subsidy withdrawal forced rapid price adjustments in 2022.
Rent-Seeking is extracting value without creating value; essentially corruption and inefficiency
Licensing corruption:Limited fuel station licenses create artificial scarcity; Licenses sold/traded at premiums; Political connections needed to obtain licenses
Quality adulteration: Consumers pay for “petrol” but get lower-quality mix
Quota manipulation:Subsidised kerosene (meant for poor households) diverted to diesel mixing; Creates black markets during shortages
Phantom costs:
Layer 4 — Taxation (18–60% of Retail Price)
Taxation is the most variable, politically sensitive, and analytically important layer in the cost structure. In advanced economies a high tax bases serve a dual purpose: generating substantial fiscal revenue and acting as an automatic price stabiliser. When crude rises, the absolute tax component remains constant, so the percentage of the price attributable to crude increases less than proportionately at the retail level.
In contrast, emerging economies historically imposed low fuel taxes or active subsidies, particularly for diesel, LPG, and kerosene used by low-income households. Sri Lanka’s fuel tax component, prior to the 2022 crisis, was, they claim, effectively negative in real terms due to administered pricing below cost.
The Impact of a Crude Price Increase: Advanced vs. Emerging Economies
For example, if crude oil rises from USD 70 to USD 85 per barrel, an increase of approximately 21.4%. The mechanisms by which this shock is transmitted to consumers, and the capacity of economies to absorb or redistribute it, diverge dramatically along the advanced/emerging economy divide (Table 1).

Absorb shocks through tax relief
Advanced economies possess well-established fiscal frameworks that enable them to absorb temporary commodity shocks through tax relief, targeted transfers, or direct subsidies without compromising fiscal sustainability. Research by the Center for Global Development (2026) estimates the median fiscal cost of shielding consumers from the crude price increase of USD 15 scenario at approximately manageable cost of 0.4% of GDP for advanced economies.
Emerging economies face median fiscal costs of approximately 0.9% of GDP — effectively double. For Sri Lanka, entering the 2022 energy crisis with near-zero foreign reserves, even a temporary subsidy was fiscally impossible, forcing an immediate and politically destabilising pass-through of the full price increase to consumers. The lesson is stark: the ability to smooth out a commodity price shock across time is itself a function of prior fiscal strength, making the poor more vulnerable precisely because their governments are already under strain.
Inflation Pass-Through and Monetary Policy Credibility
The second transmission mechanism operates through the consumer price index and central bank behaviour. In advanced economies, fuel typically represents 3–5% of the CPI basket, and central banks enjoy high credibility in anchoring inflation expectations.
In emerging economies, fuel and food together often constitute 40–60% of CPI baskets, and central banks have historically struggled to maintain credible inflation targets. A 21% crude price increase translates into a far larger initial CPI shock. Worse, the loss of inflation credibility means that workers and businesses adjust wages and prices preemptively, generating persistent second-round inflation (> Double). To defend its inflation target, the emerging economy central bank must raise interest rates aggressively, simultaneously raising the cost of borrowing for businesses and governments, a painful policy dilemma in an economy already under stress.
Structural Current Account Vulnerability
The third and perhaps most structurally significant difference lies in the current account and foreign exchange dynamics. The advanced economies hold large reserve currencies and deep financial markets that allow them to finance import cost increases without immediate exchange rate pressure.
Sri Lanka, by contrast, allocated approximately 23% of its total import bill to petroleum products. A USD 15/barrel price increase instantly widens the current account deficit of these economies, depleting foreign exchange reserves. As reserves fall, currency markets anticipate further depreciation, precipitating speculative selling of the domestic currency. The resulting exchange rate depreciation, potentially 5–15% in a shock scenario, multiplies the cost of crude imports in local currency terms. A 21% USD price increase thus becomes a 28–39% local currency price increase at the refinery gate, before any refining, distribution, or tax component is added. This vicious cycle; crude price rise → reserve depletion → currency depreciation → amplified import cost → further reserve depletion, is a hallmark of emerging economy energy crises, and Sri Lanka’s 2022 experience illustrated it in extreme form.
Double bind when crude rises and subsidised
Countries that have historically subsidised fuel face a double bind when crude rises: the subsidy bill expands sharply (as the gap between subsidised price and market cost widens), while fiscal space contracts. The International Monetary Fund has consistently recommended subsidy reform, allowing fuel prices to reflect market cost while protecting the poor through direct cash transfers, as the fiscally sustainable path. Sri Lanka’s forced price liberalisation in 2022 (under IMF programme conditions) illustrate both the political difficulty and the macroeconomic necessity of this adjustment.
The Asymmetry of Oil Price Responses: Advanced vs. Emerging Economies
Advanced economies enjoy bidirectional flexibility in responding to oil price volatility; prices rise and fall with crude markets, leaving fiscal positions largely neutral. Emerging economies, by contrast, face a structural trap: when crude rises, subsidy bills explode, draining public finances; when crude falls, governments retain windfall savings to offset accumulated deficits rather than passing relief to consumers. Sri Lanka’s cycle from collapse to liberalisation to renewed subsidies illustrates this vividly. Underlying this is a political economy ratchet, price hikes are unavoidable, but reductions are politically captured, making permanent reform structurally elusive.
(The writer, a senior Chartered
Accountant and professional banker,
is a professor at SLIIT, Malabe. Views expressed in this article are personal.)
Features
Eshan Malinga keeps getting them in the second half
Life keeps throwing hurdles in his way, but Eshan Malinga keeps vaulting over them. Take his February from hell. For several months, Malinga had been building up to his first ever World Cup, a dream for pretty much anyone who ever picks up a cricket ball. But a week before that World Cup, Malinga dislocated his non bowling shoulder while bowling, which the team’s medical staff have since described as a freak injury they had never seen before.
“I was devastated,” Malinga says. “On top of it being my first World Cup, it was also at home and I didn’t know when I would get that chance again. There were a few days there where I did absolutely nothing.”
And yet in mid-May, here he is grinning from atop a pile of 16 IPL wickets, having developed a serious reputation as a reverse-swing operator. Sunrisers Hyderabad’s explosive batters may have seized the spotlight in this frenetic IPL, but on the bowling front, no SRH bowler has neared Malinga’s wicket haul, which is fifth best in the season overall. In a year in which they have not had Pat Cummins for seven of their 11 matches, it is Malinga who has held down the fort, particularly in the second half of the innings.
But trading difficulty for success is just what Malinga does. What he has long been doing. Go back eight years and Malinga had never played a hard-ball cricket match. On top of which his home district of Ratnapura – at the base of Sri Lanka’s central hills – was better known for its gems and waterfalls than cricket, never having produced a men’s international. Malinga, additionally, was not even actively trying to be a cricketer. He had moved from his first school in a village called Opanayake to Ratnapura’s Sivali Central College due to strong academic results, and found, almost by accident, that his new school had a hard-ball cricket team.
But what Malinga knew at that point was that he could bowl fast. That much had been obvious growing up in Opanayaka, where despite his mother’s occasional misgivings, Malinga was highly sought after by the organisers of the village softball team (Sri Lanka has a thriving village-level softball cricket ecosystem). And as had been the case with the better-known Malinga, this one was also aware he possessed a killer yorker – a prized asset in every form of cricket, with any kind of ball.
If he’d been on track to be a softball legend, Malinga found his horizons began to expand at a spectacular rate the moment he got a hard ball in his hands. First, his yorker and his pace began to reap big wickets in the Division Three schools competition for Sivali Central, whose coach had immediately hoisted him into the team upon seeing Malinga bowl at practice one day. Then in mid-2019, about a year into playing hard-ball cricket, came the day he still reflects on as the one that changed his cricketing life. Having missed a fast-bowling competition in Ratnapura because he had been playing for his school that day, Malinga travelled to the hill town of Badulla to bowl in the competition there, and clocked 127kph on the gun, which was enough to win him first place.
This was when he first became a blip, however faint and distant, on Sri Lanka Cricket’s radar. Visions of a cricketing life began to appear as wisps of opportunity began to materialise. The next few years, Covid-riddled though they were, became a crash course into the sport for Malinga. There were coaching camps in Colombo in which the best of the rural talent was trained up and funnelled into a programme at the next level up. There were trials for first-class teams, and eventually a fledgling domestic career.
“I don’t know how many times I came to Colombo from Ratnapura during those times,” he laughs now. “It was a lot! I would leave home at about 3am, and the bus journey to Colombo took about three-and-a-half hours. Then I’d train or play the match, and the bus back home always took longer because of traffic. So every day, I was on the road for more than seven hours.”
The Malinga who made these exhausting daily commutes was, as far as the Sri Lankan cricket system was concerned, a bowler of decent rather than blinding promise. His pace had propelled him to the top of the regional pool, but at the first-class level he was still adapting his yorker and slower ball (another weapon he had developed in his softball days). If he needed another gear, Malinga found it – again almost by accident – sometime in 2022.
“I was playing an Under-23 three-day tournament, and I remember that being the first time I really started reverse-swinging the ball,” he says. “Coaches had anyway told me that with my action and my pace, it should be possible. But it started almost automatically. It’s not something I had to learn.
“But it wasn’t that easy, because it was a long process to learn how to control it. To get reverse swing, you have to release the ball at a different point than a straight ball, because you want it to still hit the stumps when it is swinging. So I scuffed up a lot of balls and trained hard to get that line right.”
And so, the Malinga that emerged at the end of 2022 had sharp enough pace, an excellent yorker, a developing slower ball, mountains of homespun tenacity, and had also discovered that he can naturally reverse-swing the ball earlier in an innings than most. You could have seen where this is going, right? All the ingredients of an ace white-ball bowler were there. And Malinga was already a master of turning wisps of opportunities into tangible advances. Over the next three years, he’d land a spot in the national fast-bowling academy, use that as a trampoline to impress in an Emerging Teams three-dayer against Bangladesh, and from there bounce into a stint at the MRF Pace Academy in 2024, before on the franchise side of things parlaying a trial at Rajasthan Royals at Kumar Sangakkara’s invitation into a decent run at the SA20 for Paarl Royals.
Having leapt up to the fringes of the Sri Lanka team over the past 18 months, Malinga has at this IPL now seized another unusual chance. The square at SRH’s home stadium is among the barest and most abrasive in the league, and Malinga’s reverse swing has prospered upon it. Of his 16 wickets this season, 11 have come at home. In the second half of the innings, when the ball is most likely to reverse, Malinga’s economy rate is 8.37 at a venue where runs have been scored at 9.38 in that period this season.
Malinga had put in a robust 2025 season for SRH as well, so there is a body of work emerging there. Perhaps this is why this year, SRH’s bowling plans have tended to follow the contours of Malinga’s own game.
“After six overs the ball gets damaged here, so we needed to make use of that. When I bowled at practice, the ball reversed, so I think a plan emerged where we were going to use the scuffed up ball and take advantage of that.
“In the first powerplay the ball comes on to the bat nicely here. After that we try to get the advantage of having an older ball. We’ve got bowlers who bowl 140kph-plus, and we have Pat Cummins, who also reverses the ball. So we make sure to look after the ball in a way that will give us reverse.”
At 25, eight years into a serious cricket career, Malinga sees himself as a work in progress. He wants to work on his powerplay bowling. His variations, he thinks, still need some work. He’d like to play Tests, where his reverse swing could really stretch its legs. And, oh, he is still waiting to play that first World Cup.
Even here, his keen nose for opportunity leads him. He points out through the course of our conversation that where the three previous World Cups had been played with a new ball at either end being used right through the innings, the next World Cup, in 2027, will feature rules that seem at least partially designed to enhance reverse swing, an older ball more suited to the craft now available towards the end of the innings.
He isn’t even a sure-fire pick in Sri Lanka’s ODI XI just yet, so this is just a flicker of an opportunity for now. But having made the journey from the village of Opanayaka to the most raucous cricketing showpiece on the planet, Malinga knows just what to do with those.
[Cricinfo]
Features
High Stakes in Pursuing corruption cases
The death of the most important suspect in the Sri Lankan Airlines Airbus deal has drawn intense public speculation. Kapila Chandrasena the former CEO of the heavily loss-making national airline was found dead under circumstances that the police are still investigating.
He had recently been arrested by the Commission to Investigate Allegations of Bribery or Corruption in connection with the controversial Airbus aircraft purchase agreement signed in 2013. Police investigations are continuing into the cause of death and whether or not he committed suicide. The unresolved death brings to light the high stakes involved in accountability efforts of this nature.
The uncertainty surrounding Chandrasena’s death has revived public memories of other mysterious deaths linked to corruption investigations and public scandals. Among them is the death of Rajeewa Jayaweera, a former SriLankan Airlines executive and outspoken critic of the Airbus transaction. He was following in the tradition of his father, the late foreign service officer and public servant Stanley Jayaweera who mentored the younger generation in good governance practices and formed the group “Avadhi Lanka” along with icons such as Prof Siri Hettige. Rajeewa had written a series of articles exposing irregularities in the deal before he was found dead near Independence Square in Colombo in 2020. The CCTV cameras in that high security area were turned off. Questions raised at that time whether or not he had committed suicide were not satisfactorily resolved.
The controversy about the cause of Chandrasena’s death is diverting attention away from the massive damage done to the country by the SriLankan Airlines deal itself. The value of the aircraft agreement was close to the size of the International Monetary Fund bailout package that Sri Lanka desperately needed by 2023 in order to stabilise the economy after bankruptcy. Sri Lanka’s IMF Extended Fund Facility amounted to about USD 3 billion spread over four years. The comparison shows the scale of the losses and liabilities that irresponsible and corrupt decisions have imposed on the country and which must never happen again.
Wider Pattern
The corruption linked to the Airbus transaction came fully into the open only because of investigations conducted outside Sri Lanka. In 2020 Airbus agreed to pay record penalties of more than EUR 3.6 billion to authorities in Britain, France and the United States to settle global corruption investigations. Sri Lanka was identified as one of the countries where bribes had allegedly been paid in order to secure contracts. The Airbus deal involved the purchase of six A330 aircraft and four A350 aircraft valued at approximately USD 2.3 billion. Investigations showed that Airbus paid bribes amounting to nearly USD 16 million in order to secure the contract. According to court submissions, at least part of this money amounting to USD 2 million was transferred through a shell company registered in Brunei and routed through Singapore bank accounts linked to the late airline CEO and his wife.
The commissions involved in this deal may seem comparatively small compared to the overall value of the contracts but devastating in their consequences. But they also show that a few million dollars paid secretly to decision makers could lead to the country assuming liabilities worth hundreds of millions or even billions of dollars over decades. This is why corruption is not simply a moral issue. It is a direct economic assault on the living standards of ordinary people. Money lost through corruption is money unavailable for schools, hospitals, rural development and job creation. In the end the burden falls on ordinary citizens who are left to repay debts incurred in their name without receiving commensurate benefits in return.
The SriLankan Airlines transaction gives an indication of the wider pattern of corruption and misuse of national resources that has taken place over many years. This was not an isolated incident. There were numerous large scale infrastructure and procurement projects that imposed heavy debts on the country while enriching politically connected individuals and their associates. Other projects such as the Colombo Port City, Hambantota Harbour and highway construction reveal a similar pattern.
Less publicised but equally damaging scandals have involved fertiliser medicine and energy contracts. Investigations into medicine procurement in recent years uncovered allegations that substandard pharmaceuticals had been imported at inflated prices causing both financial losses and risks to public health.
Moral Renewal
The present government appears determined to investigate major corruption cases in a manner that no previous government has attempted. Those who ransacked and bankrupted the treasury need to be dealt with according to the law. There is considerable public support for efforts to recover stolen assets and ensure accountability.
In his May Day speech President Anura Kumara Dissanayake stated that around 14 corruption cases were nearing completion in the courts this very month and called upon the public to applaud when verdicts are delivered. Political opponents of the government claim that such comments could place pressure on the judiciary and blur the separation between political leadership and the courts. But the deeper public frustration that underlies the president’s remarks also needs to be understood.
The challenge facing Sri Lanka is twofold. The country must ensure that justice is done through due process and independent institutions. If anti corruption campaigns become politicised they can lose legitimacy. But if corruption and abuse of power continue without consequences the country will remain trapped in a cycle of economic decline and moral decay. Sri Lanka also needs to confront past abuses linked to the war period. There are allegations of kidnapping, extortion, disappearances and criminal activity in which members of the security forces have been implicated. Vulnerable sections of the population suffered greatly during those years. If political leaders turned a blind eye or actively connived in such crimes they too need to be held accountable under the law. Selective justice will not heal the country. Accountability must apply across the board regardless of political position, ethnicity or institutional power.
Sri Lanka has paid a very heavy price for corruption and impunity. The economic collapse of 2022 did not occur overnight. It was the result of years of bad governance, reckless decision making, abuse of power and the misuse of public wealth. If the country is to move forward the focus cannot be diverted by sensational speculation alone. Suspicious deaths and political intrigue may dominate headlines for a few days. But the larger issue is the system that enabled corruption to flourish without accountability for so long. The real national task is to end that system. Sri Lanka cannot build a prosperous future on a foundation of corruption and impunity. Unless those who looted public wealth are held accountable and the systems that enabled them are dismantled, the country risks repeating the same cycle again.
Jehan Perera
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