Midweek Review
Killing of Premakeerthi amidst govt., JVP onslaught on media
‘Premakeerthi Ghathanaye Sulamula briefly discussed the JVP’s association with PLOTE (People’s Liberation Organisation of Tamil Eelam), one of the Indian sponsored terrorist groups. The PLOTE that received international attention in late 1988 when it, at the behest of a Maldivian businessman Abdulla Luthfee, mounted a sea borne attack on Male. Their bid to assassinate the then President Maumoon Abdul Gayoom went awry. The JVP has received the backing of the PLOTE to set up a radio station of its own. It was called ‘Ranahanda.’ Tamil groups (not the LTTE) also provided support to the JVP to produce landmines. However, the JVP never succeeded in mastering landmine warfare completely, though they carried out several dozens of attacks. Had they mastered landmine warfare, the second JVP terror campaign could have taken an entirely different turn. Whatever the allegations against the military, police and para military units, they defeated the JVP twice and crushed separatist Tamil terrorism for once and for all.
Dharman Wickremaratne’s latest book ‘Premakeerthi Ghathanaye Sulamula’ meticulously examines the killing of radio announcer, producer and lyricist Premakeerthi de Alwis in late July 1989, at the height of the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP)-led terror campaign.
Having examined various claims, accusations and assertions by interested parties, including Premakeerthi’s first wife, Daya, the author on the basis of the proceedings at the Colombo High Court, during the UNP rule, declared that the much admired SLBC staffer was killed by the JVP.
A gang of JVPers gunned down Premakeerthi after having taken him out of his home, situated on the Homagama-Katuwana road.
Premakeerthi had been 10 years younger to SLBC announcer and lyricist Daya at the time of their marriage. Mother of one child, Daya had been the widow of journalist Somapala Ranatunga at the time she met Premakeerthi.
Daya, who legally separated from Premakeerthi in 1975, following a five-year tumultuous marriage, sent shockwaves through political parties when she declared her former husband was assassinated at the behest of Hudson Samarasinghe. The shocking but unsubstantiated declaration was made at an event at the SLBC, chaired by President Rajapaksa, to mark the 25th death anniversary of Premakeerthi. This happened on 31 July, 2014, just six months before the change of government.
Hudson Samarasinghe moved court against Daya but she again cleared the JVP of one of the most dastardly killings at that time when she appeared alongside National People’s Power candidate Anura Kumara Dissanayake at a propaganda event at the Colombo Public Library about six years later. She cleared the JVP of Premakeerthi’s killing. AKD, who simultaneously led both the JVP and NPP, had been unsuccessful at the 2019 Nov. presidential election. The event at the Colombo public library was held in late Oct. 2019. Daya’s declaration didn’t make any impact.
Hudson Samarasinghe withdrew his defamation case seeking compensation to the tune of Rs 500 mn in the wake of Daya’s death in late July this year.

Hudson Samarasinghe / Dharman Wickremaratne
Dharman, the former Divaina staffer, who served as the Editor of Silumina for a period of four years, during the administrations of Gotabaya Rajapaksa and Ranil Wickremesinghe (2020-2024,) has so far authored four books on the ’80s terror and he intends to release five more books on that period.
Wickremaratne’s far reaching work on the JVP should be examined cautiously, keeping in mind that the author himself had been accused of being supportive of the JVP, and Upali Newspapers was compelled to discontinue his services as a Divaina staffer. The writer joined The Island in 1987, four years after Wickremaretne joined Divaina.
Both the UNP and the JVP furiously directed attacks on the media with the state media at the receiving end of unbridled violence as the latter sought to overwhelm the government. Wickremaretne skillfully dealt with the violence against the media at a time the South bled. In the Northern and Eastern provinces, the armed forces had been confined to barracks in terms of the Indo-Lanka Accord of July 1987, while the New Delhi’s Army, deployed here as the Indian Peace Keeping Force, battled the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) till they were asked to leave by President Premadasa while supplying truckloads of weapons and money to the Tigers to fight the IPKF.
‘Premakeerthi Ghathanaye Sulamula’ is a must read for those interested in the JVP rise to power after having launched two abortive bids in 1971 and 1987-1989 to capture power. Wickremaretne’s account of Saman Priyankara, who had been sentenced to life in prison in March 1994 during the tail end of the UNP reign, joining the JVP, is exciting. The teenager had been among a gang of activists assigned to kill Premakeerthi for refusing to heed a JVP directive to quit the SLBC. The Prisons Department released him after serving 18 years out of the life term.
The author, who had been digging into the past, met Saman Priyankara, as well as many other former members of the organisation. Wickremaratne’s work is particularly important against the backdrop of the JVP-led NPP enjoying political power. Having secured the presidency at the 2019 Sept presidential poll, the AKD-led NPP won an overwhelming 159 seats – nine more than an extraordinary 2/3 majority.
Inspired by anti-India feelings
The author explained the circumstances Saman Priyankara had been sentenced to life imprisonment though he was not among those who shot Premakeerthi. Those who allegedly shot Premakeerthi hadn’t been identified/apprehended during counter-insurgency operations. Saman Priyankara had been a member of the JVP hit squad though he didn’t cause any physical harm to Premakeerthi.
During court proceedings, it transpired that a gang of JVPers, numbering about six, confronted them (Saman Priyankara and a person identified as Pathmasiri), in July 1989, on the road, close to Magammana Purana Viharaya, and demanded that they join the JVP as the Indian Army was destroying Sri Lanka.
The JVP blatantly exploited the deployment of the Indian Army, in the Northern and Eastern Provinces, in terms of the Indo-Lanka accord that had been forced on Sri Lanka, to muster public support. That is the undeniable truth. The author also very briefly discussed the operations undertaken by the JVP in the eastern Trincomalee district embroiled in post-accord violence that at one point threatened to undermine the whole ‘peace’ process.
While the author placed the number of Indian military deaths at 29 during this period (1987 July to 1990 March), the JVP claimed its Eastern front group killed 63 Indians. India never acknowledged deaths caused by JVPers cadres. The JVP’s claims, as well as Wickremaratne’s assertions with regard to Indian Army deaths, need further verification.
As Wickremaratne pointed, out it would be pertinent to mention that the JVP launched its terror campaign several months before India forced Sri Lanka to accept the deployment of its Army here. The first victim of JVP terror had been 39-year-old H. Jayawickrema, killed on 05 Dec., 1986. The JVP found fault with Jayawickrema, principal of Gonadeniya Vidyalaya, Middeniya, for suspending a group of students over pasting of JVP notices.
The Middeniya killing was followed with the assassination of Daya Pathirana on 15 Dec., 1986. At the time of his death, Pathirana led the Independent Students Union of University of Colombo during the period 1985–1986. However, the deployment of the Indian Army gave a massive boost to the JVP and the supposed Marxist group shook the entire political establishment by mounting grenade attacks on the UNP parliamentary group in Parliament on 18 August, 1987. Both President JRJ and Premier Ranasinghe Premadasa had been present at the time of the attack. That attack compelled both the government and the JVP to go all out against each other.
But what really made me interested is the fact that the JVP involved Saman Priyankara, an Army deserter’s younger brother, in somewhat of a high profile killing within days, if not weeks, after he joined the organisation. Obviously the JVP disregarded the possibility of a novice ending up in police/security forces custody. Perhaps, in the absence of sufficient experienced armed cadre, the organisation absorbed the young novices into units assigned to eliminate opponents. Like the Tigers, the cunning JVP hierarchy attracted youth to their movement in their impressionable young and gullible years.
Saman Priyankara had been just 17 years at the time he pledged his allegiance to the organisation. Wickremaretne disclosed some interesting information pertaining to the use of children by the LTTE. According to him, 171 children, under 15 years of age, had been apprehended and rehabilitated after the annihilation of the JVP. But as a percentage of 11,658 rehabilitated, those under 15 is just 1%. However, of the 15 to 25 age category, which included Saman Priyankara, 5,508 underwent rehabilitation (46%) of the total rehabilitated.
The JVP’s use of children cannot be compared with that of the LTTE during the war in the Northern and Eastern Provinces. The LTTE threw children into high intensity battles, involving armour and artillery, and, in a despicable manner that caused massive loss of life. But that does not absolve the JVP of culpability in using children in terrorist activity as cannon fodder.
The author revealed how a 13-year-old boy received training off Kantale in mid-1989. The boy is alleged to have killed a female UNP supporter. As the JVP collapsed in early 1990, within months after the arrest and execution of its leader, Rohana Wijeweera, the boy, known as ‘bonikka’ (doll) must have carried out the killing at the age of 13 or 14.
One of the gruesome examples given by the author to highlight the use of children is the killing of an SLTB driver, identified as Dingiri Banda, who defied a JVP directive not to work. Two 15-year-old boys, in Grade 09, according to the author, murdered the driver attached to the Kuliyapitiya bus depot, at Giriulla. The killing of an employee of the Udugama Janatha Estate Development Board was also blamed on a child activist who delivered the severed head of the victim on a plate to his home. The possibility of exaggeration cannot be ruled out. Therefore, the JVP, now ensconced in power, should consider inquiring into such allegations.
The involvement of children in two other incidents was also mentioned by Wickremaretne whose exposure surely embarrassed not only the JVP but the NPP as well. A driver, attached to the Kataragama depot, identified as Weerasekera, had been killed just before he stepped onto the traditional Poruwa with his would-be-bride for their marriage ceremony at Pallemalala, Hambantota.
Inquirer into sudden deaths of the Hali-Ela Dehiwini Palatha korale, Weeraratne had been shot dead at his home. The author confidently asserted that though children lacked political ideology they were a new element ready to act swiftly. But on the other hand, when apprehended they quickly succumbed to police and armed forces pressure and ended up being informants.
During that reign of terror, altogether 137 SLTB employees had been murdered by the JVP for refusing to leave employment.
JVP’s swift collapse
By June/July 1989, the government had been desperately trying to cope up with the situation. Amidst JVP attacks, and counter violence unleashed by the police, the armed forces and paramilitary groups, the UNP won the parliamentary elections conducted in February 1989. The JVP ordered a civil disobedience campaign. The JVP issued specific orders against those who disregarded its campaign meant to destabilise the state-run media. The then State Defence Minister Ranjan Wijeratne on 07 July, 1989, vowed to retaliate. The author pointed out the JVP’s response to Wijeratne’s warning by killing four persons attached to state media, namely Thevis Guruge (23 July, 1989), Premakeerthi de Alwis (31 July, 1989), chief news editor of Rupavahini, Kulasiri Amaratunga (13 August, 1989) and Rupavahini announcer Sagarika Gomes (13 Sept., 1989). The situation was so bad, President Ranasinghe Premadasa had no option but to bring state media under the then Air Commodore Ananda Samarakoon.
In fact, Premakeerthi had been among a group of SLBC staffers who received letters on a Friday morning, in the first week of July, threatening them with death. All of the threatened persons had been attached to the News Section of the SLBC. The threatened were Hemasiri Kularatne, Wasantha Lankathilaka, Palitha Perera and Premakeerthi de Alwis. However, Premakeerthi had been quite confident that the JVP, or the so-called Deshapremi Janatha Viyaparaya (DJV), wouldn’t cause him any harm. Obviously he was totally wrong.
In a way, the country had been in the grip of JVP terror with the government making desperate bids to counter such violence. Amidst many employees refusing to serve as announcers, due to direct death threats on them, the government brought in the Army and Air Force personnel to fill the vacuum.
Wickremaratne appreciated the role played by military personnel as announcers. The author recalled how Airwoman Anoma Satharasingha, on the night of 13 Nov., 1989, announced the arrest and death of JVP leader Wijeweera. The author named those who had served the government at the risk to their lives amidst the killing of their colleagues. However, Wickremaretne failed to explain as to why Premakeerthi, in spite of receiving direct and specific death threats, hadn’t been granted military security. There is no explanation as to why Premakeerthi had been deprived of security. Did he decline to accept military security?
While trying to cripple the state-run media, the JVP tried hard to set up its own radio. It was called Ranahanda. The government quickly identified the JVP strategy and took measures to neutralize that threat.
Wickremaretne’s narrative of the Army putting pressure on Director Programmes, Rupavahini, Piyadasa Rathnasinha, to announce Wijeweera’s killing, around 2 am, made good reading. The author based his description on an interview Irida Lankadeepa writer Priyantha Kodipilli had with Piyadasa Rathnasinha, carried in the 12 January, 2024, edition. Piyadasa Rathnasinha’s claim that he declined to adhere with the instructions issued by the Army and got in touch with President Premadasa, around 2 am in the morning, and received order from the head-of-state not to telecast the video but wait till he viewed the tape and decided what to do, underscored the crisis at the time. President Premadasa had visited Rupavahini on the same day, viewed the video and decided to edit Wijeweera’s speech, recorded by the Army, to just two minutes.
After having won the presidential election, conducted in Dec. 1988, President Ranasinghe Premadasa made a desperate bid to reach a consensus with the JVP. Regardless of serious concerns, expressed by the police, the armed forces and members of the government, President Premadasa ordered the release of a large number of detained JVP suspects from various places. The President’s gamble failed. The JVP intensified violence. The government resorted to an all-out campaign. The country bled. Within a couple of months after Premadasa’s election as President, the government gradually overwhelmed the JVP. The latter couldn’t keep up with the pace of the government counter terror campaign. Within four months after Premakeerthi’s assassination, the JVP was in tatters. Its top leadership was executed, barring Somawanasa Amerasinghe, who managed to escape to India with the help of New Delhi, and thousands of activists and supporters killed.
Those who demand legal action against Ranil Wickremesinghe for his association with the Batalanda conveniently forget how the JVP strategy compelled the then government to resort to counter terror tactics. But the JVP may not have contemplated the scale of the government’s counter attack. The UNP, regardless of consequences, also took measures to suppress the Opposition, including the media. The assassination of much loved journalist Richard de Zoysa was obviously part of that counter-insurgency strategy. It certainly was a case of absolute power corrupting absolutely with R. Premadasa and Ranjan Wijeratne, who wanted to consolidate their power at any cost. Similarly, the JVPers are no angels or they were even worse having sent so many innocent people to premature and gruesome deaths for their macabre wishes to succeed with no permanent principles whatsoever. A good example of this is that after the crushing of their second violent uprising they joined every government that came to power, thereafter, as a coalition partner and every time it helped to topple each of those administrations in its cunning march to power.
By Shamindra Ferdinando
Midweek Review
A retired General’s narrative
Regime change:

Egodawele
Gemunu Watch veteran retired Maj. Gen. K.B. Egodawele painted a bleak picture of the overall failure on the part of the Defence Ministry, National Security Council and the armed forces to deal with the Pangiriwatte, Mirihana, violent protest on 31, March, 2022. Had those responsible for overall security taken tangible measures, after the Pangiriwatte letdown, the rapid deterioration of the situation, leading to the 9 July, 2022, assault on the President’s House, could have been averted, he opined. The author explained how in the absence of even a basic plan to prevent large scale public movement/gathering, the conspirators succeeded in bringing several hundred thousand people to Colombo, that included even a train load of activists from Kandy. Egodawele quite rightly asserted that the hoodwinked ordinary innocent people had been the real strength behind the regime change operation. Egodawele raised a spate of pertinent questions regarding the security aspects, with the focus on the 09 July, 2022, assault, taking into consideration various influencing factors, including Field Marshal Sarath Fonseka’s appeal to the armed forces not to point guns at the public as they didn’t want a repetition of 9 May, 2022, at Galle Face.
Whatever the impact of politicians and religious leaders urging the armed forces not to intervene, the war-winning Army Chief’s appeal may have influenced the military and even some members of the National Security Council.
By Shamindra Ferdinando
Maj. Gen. (retd.) K.B. Egodawele believes the ban on import of chemical fertilisers and agrochemicals, in April/May 2021, that led to staggering drop in crop yields, and countrywide protests, had been a key contributing factors that helped galvanise the Western-engineered Aragalaya plot against President Gotabaya Rajapaksa, similar to parallel regime changes carried out by Washington in Pakistan, Bangladesh and Nepal.
Egodawele, who had served the President as an Additional Secretary (Administration), attached to the Presidential Secretariat, dealt with regime change in ‘Aragalaya: Adarayen Prachandathwayata (From Love to Violence). In fact, according to the ex-Gemunu Watch veteran, who retired in 2004, the crisis caused by the fertiliser ban had been the first major issue that undermined President Rajapaksa.
Turmoil over the fertiliser ban paved the way for a series of other large scale protests. Although not directly connected with the fertiliser issue, teachers’ protests, demanding higher salaries, campaign against Sir John Kotelawala National Defence University (KNDU) Bill, Muslims and Catholics’ protests, targeting the President, followed by countrywide demonstrations over the collapse of essential services and supplies, created an explosive situation. The unexplained explosions of gas cylinders, too, caused anger and confusion among the public struggling to cope up with the developing situation.
Egodawele asserted that the Tamil Diaspora played a significant role in the regime-change project, with external powers utilising political parties here to carry out the conspiracy. The author is confident that the regime change project got underway soon after the Gajaba Regiment veteran assumed Office, as the seventh executive President.
In addition to Egodawele, who launched his work in 2023, former Central Bank Governor Ajith Nivard Cabraal (2022), former parliamentarian Wimal Weerawansa (2023), renowned author Sena Thoradeniya (2023), one-time Finance Secretary Mahinda Siriwardana (2025), President Ranil Wickremesinghe’s media head Prof. Sunanda Maddumabandara (2025), political analyst Asanga Abeygunasekera (2026) and President Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s Media head/DG, Information Department Mohan Samaranayake (2026) dealt with the first successful use of calculated violence to achieve a regime change.
As a person who had a ring side view of the rapid developments, Egodawele quite rightly asserted that the crisis got out of hand due to the delay on the part of the government to reach consensus with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to secure a lifeline. Who caused the delay in Sri Lanka initiating action to obtain IMF assistance for the 18th time? Those who had read Siriwardena’s book know that direct accusations were directed at the then Central Bank Governor W.D. Lakshman and others for their failure to seek IMF assistance, thereby jeopardizing the government. Samaranayake went a step further when he questioned whether such actions had been deliberate and meant to cause the downfall of the President, elected by a huge majority.
Referring to the Covid-19 crisis that dealt a knockout blow to the already weak national economy, Egodawele declared that it wouldn’t be fair by President Gotabaya Rajapaksa to blame him for the economic fallout as previous leaders, too, contributed to the collapse. Alleging that the external and internal conspirators exploited the Covid-19 crisis to achieve their political objective, the author named the main Opposition Samagi Jana Balwegaya (SJB), the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna and JVP breakaway faction Frontline socialist party (FSP/Peratugami pakshaya) as well as other political parties and groups being among the schemers.
The Catholic Church was also accused of direct involvement in the operation against President Gotabaya Rajapaksa. However, the author’s assertion, in the foreword, that extremists took control over the protest campaign that was launched at Kohuwala by those ordinary people affected by the crisis seemed wrong.
Having perused all books which dealt with the regime change operation and discussed the issues at hand with those in government at that time, both civilian and military, The Island is of the view that the whole operation, from the very beginning, was planned and executed by political parties/groups, both in and outside Parliament. Perhaps as Samaranayake pointed out in his study of the regime change project, Switzerland, with the backing of the US, launched the operation in late November, 2029, by staging the abduction drama, with the help of Somalatha or Siriyalatha Perera (later changed to Garnier Banister Francis), a local employee at the Embassy (https://island.lk/focus-on-swiss-role-in-garnier-abduction-as-furgler-succeeds-mock/)
Egodawele’s assertion that President Gotabaya’s decision to accommodate UNP leader Ranil Wickremesinghe in his Cabinet, as Prime Minister, as a correct and prudent move, is questionable. The President had no other option but to reach consensus with Wickremesinghe after the SJB leader Sajith Premadasa declared pre-conditions for him to accept that offer. But, Wickremesinghe’s acceptance of premiership cannot be examined without taking into consideration his role in the US-India backed project. President Gotabaya Rajapaksa, too, declared that Wickremesinghe was the best person to handle the situation but, whatever the assertions, the fact remains he was part of it. The protest couldn’t have exploded at Pangiriwattte, Mirihana, outside the President’s private residence without the direct UNP involvement.
Internal strife
From the very outset, the President failed to receive the anticipated support from his team. In fact, the Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna (SLPP) hadn’t been enthusiastic in fielding the wartime Defence Secretary as their candidate but the circumstances compelled them to do so. In the absence of direct control of the SLPP that commanded a 2/3 majority in Parliament, though it secured only 145 seats at the 2020 general election, the President never really received the backing of the ruling party.
Egodawele discussed this issue to some extent as one of the major reasons for the failure on the part of the President to face daunting challenges, particularly on the economic front. The President had been furious and so disappointed over the way the Central Bank and the Treasury responded to, what he called, the global crisis, and he directly accused them of not briefing him properly. Egodawele, who had been, most probably, present at a meeting the President called on 16 June, 2020, quoted him as having declared that the Central Bank failed to submit a single proposal to strengthen the economy.
The author emphasised the increase of funds required for debt servicing from USD 2 bn in 2014 to USD 6 bn by 2019 end as a key contributing factor for the crisis that overwhelmed President Rajapaksa. Those who had been very fast to blame President Gotabaya for bankruptcy are conveniently silent on the culpability of the UNP-SLFP Yahapalanaya.
The Wickremesinghe-Sirisena duo took an estimated USD 12.05 bn in foreign currency loans through International Sovereign Bonds (ISBs). In addition to ISBs, they borrowed over Rs. 5.7 trillion in domestic (rupee-denominated) loans via treasury bills and bonds. In spite of that, Wickremesinghe emerged as the country’s saviour and he, unashamedly, exploited the situation to his advantage at the 2024 presidential election. The UNP propagated the lie that Wickremesinghe saved the country from ruins without making reference to the massive borrowings, during the Yahapalana administration, that caused irreparable damage to the country and, as to this day, we do not know what they did with such huge borrowings. At least the Rajapaksas built a brand new international airport and a harbour, along with countless other development projects, from expressways to resuscitating badly neglected road network, and even built the country’s very first coal fired power plant at Norochcholai.
Egodawele should have paid sufficient attention to President Gotabaya’s hasty declaration of sweeping tax cuts to kick start the sagging economy with private investments. Instead of defending the President’s decision, the author should have dealt with the issue with an open mind. The ill-fated tax cuts should be examined taking into consideration the drastic reduction of the Special Commodity Levy (SCL) on imported sugar, from Rs. 50 to 25 cents per kilogram, in October, 2020. Although the author made no reference to the sugar scam, the writer believes it caused massive harm to the Rajapaksa government image and it can be compared with the release of 323 plus two ‘ice’ containers from the Colombo port by the incumbent government, in January, 2025.
Such shortsighted, corrupt and fraudulent actions erode public confidence in those governing the country. That is the undeniable truth our political parties cannot comprehend. The SLPP tried its best to cover up the sugar scam and, within weeks, ended up with a massively tarnished image. It may have been a case of paying back those who funded their previous election. The cocky SLPP never ever bothered to examine its actions. Instead, the SLPP attacked, including its own if they offered a dissenting opinion. Samaranayake, in his must-read memoirs, explained the parliamentary group, at the behest of Basil Rajapaksa, harmed both the party and the administration. (https://island.lk/overall-slpp-failures-stressed-in-new-aragalaya-narrative/)
GR overwhelmed
Amidst the rapid build-up of the unrelenting campaign against him, President Gotabaya requested visiting Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, on 09 January, 2022, to help Sri Lanka in debt restructuring. Obviously, China, by then, had decided not to intervene and was an obvious spectator as the US-India sinister project developed beyond control.
The JVP/NPP that entered into seven MoUs with India, including one on defence, in April, 2025, and months later, allowed Indian takeover of the Colombo Dockyard Limited after having launched protests, in January, 2022, against President Gotabaya for reaching an agreement with India, regarding the Trincomalee oil tank farm. India neutralised our fake revolutionaries in JVP/NPP with a cue from Washington, their true master, and brought it within its orbit, and today New Delhi’s influence is growing. The recent declaration by Indian High Commissioner Santosh Jha regarding the urgent and vital need to establish an overland bridge between Rameswaram and Talaimannar underscored the gravity of the developing situation.
Egodawele discussed the acceleration of the SLPP’s internal collapse with the formation of a political group, consisting of 11 constituents/groups of the ruling coalition. The establishment of the grouping, on 02 March, 2022, forced the President to sack ministers Wimal Weerawansa and Udaya Gammanpila. According to the author, the President had been reluctant and refrained from taking a decision at a Cabinet meeting held in the morning but gave in after meeting the parliamentary group.
The President made a last ditch attempt to secure IMF help but by then the situation had deteriorated to such an extent a recovery seemed impossible. Pangiriwatte erupted in violence within days after the IMF agreed, in late March, 2022, to initiate action in response to his request. By then, the SLPP parliamentary group had been fragmented and lost direction as various interested parties sought to distance themselves from the beleaguered President.
The author has allocated an entire chapter to the Muslims’ contribution to the regime change operation. The transformation of their anger, initially over Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s support, in his capacity as the Defence Secretary, during Mahinda Rajapaksa’s presidential tenure, to ‘Bodu Bala Sena’ (BBS), to hatred, that demanded the community, as a whole, sought the President’s ouster, depicted a worrisome picture. That brought the Muslims, who had been chased out of the Northern Province in October, 1990, by the LTTE, and subjected a series of brutal massacres, together with the Tamil Diaspora, to support President Gotabaya’s violent and humiliating ouster, despite his pivotal role in eradicating the separatist terrorists, cannot be disputed, under any circumstances.
Unfortunately, President Rajapaksa, instead of addressing the developing issues, appeared to have aggravated the situation by setting “One Country, One Law” commission, under Ven. Galagodaatte Gnanasara, leader of the ultra-nationalist BBS. Obviously these fake ultra nationalist Sinhalese were like the bought over Jihadists in West Asia, who, in fact, were Western moles. But, perhaps, the author should have examined the much-touted claim that a group of Muslims carried out suicide attacks in April, 2019, to facilitate Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s victory at the presidential election as their (Muslim community) were contradictory. Had the Muslim community been so hostile towards Gotabaya Rajapaksa, why on earth would they sacrifice their own lives to help him win the presidency and then join the Tamil Diaspora and the Catholic Church in the Galle Face regime change project.
Egodawele confidently confirmed that a hasty ban on import of chemical fertilisers, and agrochemicals, was taken due to the government’s inability to pay for fertiliser imports. The author asserted that the government found it difficult to allocate as much as USD 400 mn for fertiliser imports on one occasion.
The GMOA’s role, particularly the influencing actions of its President Dr. Anuruddha Padeniya, and the Chinese carbonic fertiliser fiasco that developed into a major diplomatic issue, resulting in catastrophic Chinese response, undermined the President, who further suffered as a result of teachers’ protests demanding higher salaries, KNDU Bill as well as domestic gas cylinder explosions.
Egodawele’s narrative explained the serious shortcomings on the part of the government in responding to the rapidly developing situations. The seventh chapter that discussed the 31 March, 2022, incidents, near the President’s private residents, proved that those who had been directly responsible for security of the Head of State were clueless regarding the sinister plan hatched by the interested parties to transform the protest campaign to a violent assault. Security chiefs, as well as the intelligence staff, were obviously caught napping. The author dealt with the then Prime Minister Wickremesinghe’s visit to the Pangiriwatte residence to meet President Rajapaksa, the warning issued by the UNPer regarding the gathering of people outside the President’s residence, and secretly planned protest in addition to the one at Jubilee Post junction that seemed peaceful. The author speculated that the protest at Jubilee Post junction may have been carried out to deceive those in charge of security regarding the conspirators real and deadly intentions. The author alleged that the SJB had been involved in the conspiracy. A private television station was also accused of inviting people to join the Pengiriwatte confrontation
Declaring that the Army had been slow in responding to the situation, Egodawele commended the police for not falling to the protesters’ bid to force them to open fire. Egodawele also questioned the rationale in JVP/NPP leader Anura Kumara Dissanayake’s claim that on 01 April, 2022, there were suspicions regarding a group affiliated to the government causing property damage at Pangiriwatte. The despicable role played by a section of the lawyers, in the aftermath of the Pangiriwatte mayhem, was mentioned by Egodawele who opined that had the President taken punitive measures against all those responsible for the Pangiriwatte security failure, perhaps the subsequent events could have been avoided, or successfully dealt with.
The President’s decision to vacate the Pangiriwatte home and move to the President’s House, on the recommendation of the National Security Council, was taken on 01 April, 2022.
Necessity for a proper investigation
Egodawele carefully examined the circumstances leading to the President’s fall. He seems to believe whatever caused the unprecedented crisis the flight of the President could have been averted if the armed forces acted in unison. He dealt with various situations and possibilities while pointing the finger at the JVP/NPP as the dominant party that exploited the situation and secured the support of some retired armed forces officers and men. It would be pertinent to mention that Egodawele launched his book during Wickremesinghe’s presidency in 2023 as the JVP/NPP was making rapid progress.
The need for comprehensive investigation into regime change operations is required. The military needs to identify the shortcomings (intentional/unintentional) on their part to take remedial measures. The author referred to the Rathupaswala shooting, in 2013, and the Rambukkana incident where the Kegalle police opened fire to prevent a violent group from setting a fully loaded fuel bowser on fire, in April, 2022, as two factors that may have impacted on the police and the military. The Rajapaksas response to Rathupaswala and Rambukkana incidents may have discouraged the armed forces and police to an extent they refrained from taking action. Egodawele also found fault with the intelligence services for their failure to recognise the developing insecurity among the police and armed forces and the growing belief that the growing regime change operation was certain to succeed.
Those who are genuinely interested in the regime change project should peruse Egodawele’s easy to comprehend presentation that lucidly dealt with a crisis created by what can be described as collective blunders by successive governments, though the declaration of bankruptcy was blamed on President Gotabaya Rajapaksa.
Midweek Review
Palm leaf manuscripts of Sri Lanka – IV
Tripitaka was first recorded on palm leaves. Religious histories such as Mahavamsa and Tupavamsa were also written on palm leaves. The printed texts we read today, of ancient classics, were composed after examining and comparing several palm leaf manuscripts. We forget this when we read. We assume that they were always on paper!
It is important to remember that literacy was developed through the use of ola manuscripts. The hodiya (alphabet) was written on palm leaf. The Sinhala hodiya included additional characters to accommodate Sanskrit and Pali phonemes. There were 52 letters. The library of the National Museum, Colombo has a palm leaf hodiya.
The tradition of writing on palm leaves continued throughout the colonial period. Robert Knox, who spent nearly two decades in captivity in the Kandyan Kingdom (Udarata), while the Dutch controlled Sri Lanka’s coastal areas (17th Century), said the ‘books’ available in Sinhala homes were on religion, medicine, magic, etc. This interest continued in the years that followed. In 1930, when the Historical Manuscripts Commission surveyed palm-leaf manuscripts held in private homes in Udarata, it found manuscripts on medicine, astrology, and charms.
The tradition of writing on palm leaves was held in high esteem and was not readily abandoned, observed analysts. Ananda Coomaraswamy, who was in Sri Lanka from 1903 to 1907 during British rule, said that Kandyan craftsmen invariably prepared their jewellery drawings on ola leaves. He had encountered only a handful drawn on paper.
Sirancee Gunawardena’s book titled “Palm leaf manuscripts of Sri Lanka “(1977) is the first and probably only book which gives a comprehensive account of the palm leaf manuscripts of Sri Lanka. The book is a landmark publication. There is no other book like it on the subject. The author deserves much praise and appreciation for her painstaking work.
This book has been written primarily to encourage Sri Lankans to regard palm-leaf manuscripts as a valuable part of Sri Lanka’s heritage. Palm leaf manuscripts are historical documents and should be preserved as such, says Sirancee. They contain rich primary data, making them a valuable source for primary research as well. Some olas, at least, had beautiful handwriting and a high standard of grammar. They also contained palindromes that could be read in all four directions, she says.
The book is the product of 12 years of painstaking research. Sirancee speaks of “the joy and feeling of exultation” she experienced “peering into dusty nooks and cobweb encrusted wooden boxes and forgotten corners of libraries”. She has spoken to a number of specialists, including persons who knew how to prepare ola leaves and those who could read the manuscripts. She has personally copied scores of manuscripts and the drawings in them.
Sirancee has examined manuscripts dating from the 13th century to 19th century. She has examined the 13-century copy of Chullavagga in the Museum library. This manuscript has 144 folios, size is 23″ x 2 ½”. The writing is beautiful. It has wooden covers with a design. This may be the oldest book illustration in Sri Lanka, says Sirancee.
She was able, over a long period, to personally examine most of the ola manuscripts in the National Museum. She also examined the collections in temple libraries. The Potgul Vihara, Hanguranketa, had one of the largest and best-arranged libraries of palm-leaf manuscripts.
There was a photograph of Sirancee examining the ola manuscripts at Sri Rahula Vihara, Bentota, and another of Sirancee writing down the text as Gamariya read out from a copy of the Mahavamsa. This was probably the well-known astrologer Daniel Gamariya.
There was a great range in size and content in palm-leaf manuscripts. The average manuscript seen by Sirancee had 60–65 folios. Most manuscripts were pure text, but Vessantara Jataka and yantra manuscripts were profusely illustrated. In one manuscript, there was a drawing of the peacock vehicle of the Kataragama God. The drawing extended over three pages stitched together.
Some Vessantara Jataka olas are illustrated, event by event. These illustrations closely resemble temple fresco paintings. The Vessantara jataka manuscript at Dharmadasa Vihara, Boralesgamuwa is profusely illustrated and in colour. The Illustrations are small, in cameo form but have minute decorative details. In her book, Sirancee had reproduced the full text, including illustrations, of two Vessantara jataka texts (p 93-126,275-278). An illustrated Vidura Pandita Jataka from the Hugh Nevill collection is also reproduced in full (p 269-273).
Sirancee wants to give the reader some idea of the wide range of subjects found in palm-leaf manuscripts. She provides the following list. She notes that palm-leaf manuscripts are a source of material on ancient medicine, veterinary science, astrology, yantra and mantra practices, land endowments by kings, medieval taxation, agriculture, trade in ancient times, land grants, land transfers, royal amnesties, acupuncture, ophthalmology, music, metaphysics, and cosmology, as well as the construction of tanks, temple building, and ancient systems of taxation.
Let us take a closer look at some of the subjects mentioned above. First, it is clear that the Mahavamsa was not the only historical text found in curated palm-leaf collections. The Dipavamsa and the Rajavaliya were also included. Copies of the Rajavaliya are found in abundance in both public and private collections. These include holdings in the Colombo Museum Library, the University of Peradeniya, the British Library, and the private collections of L. S. D. Peiris and S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike.
The Rajavaliya was also found in the following temples: Subadrarama Vihara, Balapitiya; Kande Vihara, Atabage; Pallewela Sellawali Raja Maha Vihara, Halloluwa; Pravachanodaya Pirivena Temple, Molligoda, Wadduwa; and Yogilalena Temple, Sandalankara. The copy at the Sri Vardhanarama Library, Mohotimulla, is one of the oldest.
Historical Manuscripts Commission of 1930 found that family collections had various olas that gave information on the Sinhala kings, especially Udarata kings, with the exact dates and hour of their death. The Thalgodapitiya family collection had a Sri Wickrama Alankaraya by Vaidyaratne Basnayake nilame, 1882. Kurunegala Vistaraya was found in many private family collections.
The Historical Manuscripts Commission did not consider these manuscripts to be of academic importance. However, it noted that Yapahuwa temple had an ola with the dates of coronation and death of kings and other important events in the life of “all kings of Kandy”.
Buddhist temples collected ola manuscripts on Buddhism, with particular emphasis on the Dhamma. Olas containing religious texts of great significance were wrapped in silk and kept in the inner sanctum of the temple, Sirancee observes.
The histories of important stupas and temples were also written on ola manuscripts. The Tupavamsa gives the history of the Mahathupa, the Lowa Maha Paya, and the Mirisaveti Stupa. The Andreas Nell collection contains an ola manuscript describing how the four boundaries of the Ridi Vihara were determined. The Henry Parker collection includes an ola manuscript which states that, in relation to the Ridi Vihara, silver was discovered in a nearby cave by a traveller during his journey.
The temple collections included these historical texts. Nagolle Vihara had a copy of the Mahabodhivamsa. Copies of the Hathavanagalla Vihara Vamsa were distributed to neighbouring temples and can still be found today at the Attanagalla Raja Maha Vihara and the Beligammana Raja Maha Vihara.
Palm leaf manuscripts also gave the specifications for the Buddha statue. There were manuscripts on the art of making images of the Buddha, as well as hamsa, lata, kinnara and makara images. The Sariputra ola in Colombo Museum gives dimensions of images in general and Buddha in particular. It gives specifications for the standing, sitting and reclining Buddha. It is written in Sinhala, but text is in Sanskrit. It is in good handwriting.
The Historical Manuscripts Commission (1930) reported the discovery of a Pirit Pota in a family collection. The manuscript was written using black vegetable dye. According to the Commission’s report, the letters remain as black today as they were when written a century ago. The coloured floral illuminations were also executed using the same vegetable dye.
Jataka stories were held in palm leaves. Sirancee has personally examined many magnificent, large Jataka olas held in libraries. Colombo Museum had two large manuscripts containing many jataka stories. One was titled Sinhala Jataka Pota. Each had over one thousand leaves. The leaf strips were 27″ to 33″ by 2 ½. “
The Pansiya Panas Jataka manuscript owned by K.V.J. de Silva is one of the largest manuscripts Sirancee had seen and possibly the largest in Sri Lanka. It was a copy of a manuscript written in the time of king Parakrama bahu IV (1302-1326). It was written in Sinhala and had 984 folios. The folios at the end of the manuscript contained an index to the stories.
There is a manuscript of Vidura Pandita Jataka in the Hugh Nevill collection in the British Library. It is an original manuscript written in the time of king Senerat (1604-1635). It was written by Matale Rate Atapattu Amanthi of Owille in Matara (sic). The text is accompanied by very beautiful illustrations. The LSD Pieris collection has a small jataka manuscript, 10.5 cm in size, containing several illustrated jatakas. One illustration shows Siddhartha Gautama putting his bowl into the river.The most popular jataka story in Sri Lanka, is undoubtedly the Vessantara Jataka. It features prominently in our temple frescos and olas. The T. P. P. Goonetilleke collection held at Peradeniya had 30 Vessantara Jataka manuscripts. Some Vessantara manuscripts are held in private collections as heirlooms.
Legal matters were recorded on palm leaf manuscripts. Abhaya dana was written in olas. The ola had the royal sign “Sri “symbolising the king but inscribed by a Mohottala on the order of the Sannas Rala. Sirancee had come across a manuscript which stated that when a person died intestate the king inherited the lands. The LSD Pieris collection had a manuscript on a money transaction. The ola recorded that the money owed was handed over in the presence of witnesses who were named.
Land grants were recorded on olas. They were recorded on gold, silver and copper plates as well. Sirancee came across many Land grants in the collections she looked at. VP Ratnayake had a manuscript which said “By this it is declared that Godakkumbura Setunge Mudiyanse was given Pallekumbura in Udukaha pattu Kotugampola Korale on Jan 1630 by Monerawila Rajapakse, Bathwadana Nilame, who is the owner of Matale Dissawa and Sat Korale Dissawa.
P.E.E. Fernando found in the record room of the district court of Kandy, a deed of conveyance drawn up at the request of a person named Patra-Abo Sastru-raja, where he transferred to a vihara he had constructed, a house and garden called Dharmapata geratta (sic) in which he was residing, together with other lands, the boundaries of which were set out in great detail. Some movable objects such as a pitcher, palanquin and three slaves including a female slave were also offered. The document was attested by four persons and a fifth person stated that he had written the document.
Temples carefully looked after olas relating to the ownership of their temple lands. Ridi vihara has a very old manuscript titled Sangaraja Vahanseta Mahanuwara Lekan Pota with names and information on the temples given to the chief monk. When paddy lands were offered to temples, the transfer was recorded in an ola. There is an ola which stated that Pahalavela Kumbura was offered to Atkande Vihara by Teliyaskatuwe Lekam and Maddumaya.
Temples also held on to olas which gave the decisions on disputes over temple land. The high priest of Aluvihare, Matale had an ola on litigation relating to Aluvihare lands. The text is given in full by Sirancee on p 298. Uthurupaw Vihara had an ola issued by Adikara Dissawe. It contained the judgment in a land dispute which had taken place in the 15th century.
In ancient times, administration was done through olas. The Esala Perahera in Kandy has a chieftain mounted on an elephant carrying an ola which gives permission for the perahera to take place. Appointments were announced via olas. The Matale Maha Dissawe Kadaimpota, announced that ‘Niharapola Alahakoon Mohottala was appointed lekam of Tun Korale and also received the Ran Panhinda and flag.’ Administrative responsibilities were given in olas. Historical Manuscripts Commission found at the Atkande vihara, a 16th century ola giving information on the dissaves in charge of Kurunegala district.
Kadaimpot and Lekam Miti were held on ola. The Historical Manuscripts Commission found several of these in private collections. The Maya Rata Kadimpota held in a private collection, gave information on the 28 districts or towns in Maya Rata. At Padiyapelella, the Commission found a Kadaimpota dating to 14th Century, dealing with Ruhuna, Maya, Pihiti with names of subdivisions, the ratas, also Kelaniya, Panadura, Dambadeniya and so on. The Lekam Miti Pota of 1.1.1830 listed land holdings in the eastern part of Nuwarakalaviya. (To be continued)
References
Sirancee Gunawardana Palm leaf manuscripts of Sri Lanka 1977
L.S.D. Pieris Yantra drawing on palm leaf sri Lanka. 2018
1st report of the Historical Manuscripts Commission 1933, SP 9 of 1933
3rd report of Historical Manuscripts Commission 1951, SP 19 of 1951
Ismeth Raheem
https://www.sundaytimes.
lk/260426/plus/turning-back-the-pages-of-sri-lankas-paper-trail-639604.html
by KAMALIKA PIERIS
Midweek Review
A Quiet Counter-Revolution Unfolds
A peaceful counter-revolution is taking shape,
Against current ‘Digital Age’ intoxications,
At that ever-green seat of higher learning,
Wolfson College of the University of Cambridge,
Where one hour every Thursday is set apart,
For reading, writing and creative activity,
In the more time-tested analogues ways,
For those who opt for it, in an august space,
Thus paving the way for the Creator to prevail,
Over Creatures who are tending to run berserk,
More so why humans could cry out in one voice:
‘Long Live, WCSA Digital Detox Thursdays!’
By Lynn Ockersz
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