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JVP: From “Hammer and Sickle” to Social Democracy – Or not?

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Rohana Wijeweera

The National People’s Power (NPP), led by the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP), came to power promising democratic renewal and long-awaited economic, educational, healthcare, and social transformation. It pledged to build a modern Sri Lanka rooted in democratic values while steering the country toward its vision of Democratic Socialism. For many supporters, the NPP’s rise to the pinnacle of political power represents a historic opportunity to reset the nation’s direction.

Yet recent developments have stirred unease. Statements by several senior ministers and certain policy signals have prompted critics to question whether the government’s path remains firmly democratic. Some warn that in the pursuit of rapid development and social justice, central pillars of the NPP’s election campaign, there may be a growing temptation to consolidate power in ways that edge toward policies of old “Hammer & Sickle.”

Is the NPP committed to pluralistic democratic socialism, or is Sri Lanka witnessing the early signs of a more centralised political model? To answer this question, it is necessary to revisit the JVP’s ideological history, examine the pressures that shape governing parties once in power, and weigh the potential consequences, both promising and perilous, of any shift in direction.

History of the JVP

The JVP emerged in the mid-1960s with a revolutionary agenda, mobilising youth through its Five Lecture Programme, which criticised capitalist policies, questioned the country’s “real independence,” opposed Indian influence, and called for armed struggle. This ideology culminated in the 1971-armed uprising against the elected government, leading to widespread violence, a harsh state crackdown, mass arrests, and the banning of the party.

Although suppressed, the JVP later re-entered democratic politics after its leaders were imprisoned and eventually pardoned. In the 1980s, after electoral defeat, the JVP shifted from strict Marxist-Leninist ideology toward a national, framework known as “Jathika Chinthanaya”, while maintaining strong opposition to Indian involvement.

However, it launched a second violent insurgency in 1988–1989, resulting in significant loss of life and severe repression, including the killing of its leader, Rohana Wijeweera. These events marked a decisive turning point, after which the party gradually moved away from armed struggle and embraced parliamentary politics.

By 1994, the JVP abandoned armed insurrection and embraced parliamentary democracy. While retaining its Marxist-Leninist identity, it adopted a more pragmatic socialist approach, seeking influence through elections rather than violence.

Embracing Parliamentary Democracy

The party served as Ministers and Deputy Ministers under President Chandrika Kumaratunga (2004–2005) and later supported Mahinda Rajapaksa in the 2005 presidential and subsequent parliamentary elections. Between 2005 and 2010, the JVP aligned with the Rajapaksa government in opposing federalism and supporting a unitary state.

Historically, the JVP opposed federalism. Under Anura Kumara Dissanayake (AKD), however, there appears to be a strategic shift toward decentralisation and inclusivity, without formally endorsing federalism. Since 2019, the NPP/JVP has criticised successive governments for failing to implement the 13th Amendment fully. This transformation is real and should be acknowledged.

Reports indicate the NPP/JVP is drafting a new constitution, but there is limited public clarity on its position regarding abolishing the Executive Presidency and devolving powers to Provincial Councils. Sri Lanka can chart a path toward a united, prosperous future where all citizens feel valued and represented. Therefore, I hope that NPP will consider the Provincial Councils in their current form might best serve as a relic of the past, making way for more cohesive and efficient systems of governance.

It is also a fact that many parties have historically criticised the Executive Presidency while in opposition, only to retain it in power. Whether the NPP/JVP will pursue genuine reform remains a subject of debate.

Democratic Concerns State Power

A recent statement by a senior Cabinet Minister that the party holds government power but has not yet “captured” broader state power raises fundamental questions. In a parliamentary democracy, winning government is the highest legitimate authority a party can obtain. Government power is temporary which is granted by voters, limited by the Constitution, and revocable at elections.

State power is permanent and it lies with state institutions i. e. the judiciary, administrative service, armed forces, law enforcement, and independent commissions. These bodies must remain politically neutral and serve the Constitution, to prevent any ruling party from dominating the permanent machinery of governance.

To frame democratic victory as incomplete without “capturing” state power, suggests a conception of power that goes beyond electoral legitimacy. It echoes a revolutionary mindset highlighting the real transformation requires ideological alignment of the state itself.

Past few decades, Sri Lanka has suffered from politicised institutions. Replacing one form of control with another is not reform, it is substitution.

Judiciary and Due Process

Public frustration over past corruption is understandable. However, allegations must be addressed through due legal process. In a democracy, individuals are innocent until proven guilty in a court of law. When parliamentarians publicly pass judgments on opposition figures before judicial proceedings conclude, it risks undermining the rule of law and raising concerns about political overreach.

Concerns are further heightened when there are perceptions that the rule of law is not applied equally, particularly if members of the governing party are treated differently in similar circumstances in the recent past. Unequal enforcement of legal standards can erode public trust in institutions. If such patterns persist, they may raise broader questions about the strength and impartiality of democratic governance.

Village-Level Courts

Democratic Concerns
State Power

In another recent statement, by a senior Minister reiterated one of his earlier proposals to establish judicial courts at the village level to adjudicate certain legal cases, depending on the nature and severity of the alleged offences. While improving local access to justice may enhance efficiency, such courts require strong institutional safeguards.

As this proposal raises serious concerns, it bears characteristics often associated with totalitarian systems, where village-level courts may be controlled by ruling party “cadres” who preside over legal matters and pass judgments against individuals. Without strong safeguards to ensure independence, transparency, and adherence to the rule of law, such courts could be misused to suppress dissent and curtail legitimate political opposition.

Any reform of the judicial system must uphold constitutional protections and preserve the separation of powers. Failing to do so could raise broader concerns about democratic accountability and institutional independence.

Civil / Administrative Service

Before 1978, Sri Lanka’s civil service was widely respected for its professionalism and independence. Over time, however, political appointments increasingly influenced senior administrative positions.

There are growing concerns that some recent appointments to high-level administrative service posts by the NPP may also be politically motivated. Many voters expected systemic reform and a decisive shift toward merit-based governance under the NPP/JVP. It is disappointing to observe indications that similar patterns of politicisation may be continuing.

The real test of reform lies not in rhetoric but in institutional safeguards. Transparent selection criteria, independent oversight mechanisms, and clear accountability structures are essential to ensuring that the administrative service remains professional and non-partisan.

History shows that democracy does not usually collapse overnight. It erodes gradually when ruling parties seek to align permanent institutions with their own ideological or political objectives.

Strengthening institutional independence is not optional, it is imperative. Sri Lanka’s democratic future depends not only on who holds power, but on how responsibly that power is exercised.

Media Freedom

“I disapprove of what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it”
(Evelyn Beatrice Hall, describing Voltaire’s belief in freedom of speech.)

Recent reports suggest the NPP/JVP government is dissatisfied with parts of the media, accusing some outlets of political bias and even proposing bans for allegedly spreading false information. Such actions would be undemocratic and would weaken constructive criticism.

Governments already possess legal remedies for defamation. If laws are inadequate, they may be reviewed. However, this must not undermine the media’s fundamental right to fair, independent, and legitimate criticism of those in power.

Every government dislikes criticism. But mature democracies tolerate it. Any attempt to restrict the media risks eroding democratic freedoms and should be adamantly opposed by all who value an independent media.

Religion and Public Conduct

In the past, opposition parties accused the JVP of being hostile to religion, particularly toward Buddhist monks aligned with political opponents. Confirming this accusation, recently a few NPP/JVP ministers, MPs, and party supporters have publicly criticised Buddhist monks who speak and organise meetings against the government.

At the same time, social media contains intolerable language about the conduct of certain Buddhist monks. While misconduct by members of the clergy is concerning, it does not justify hostile or disrespectful reactions from politicians or the public.

Responding with anger and division contradicts the very Dhamma many claim to defend. Using monks as political tools, or attacking them publicly, only deepens social divisions. If there are genuine concerns about the monastic order, they should be addressed respectfully through proper religious channels rather than through public humiliation.

Economic Democracy

Following Sri Lanka’s 2022 fiscal crisis, the NPP/JVP revised its economic policy and aligned itself with a framework closer to Social Democracy. This shift suggests that the JVP has accepted capitalism as the economic system necessary to revive the collapsed economy. At the same time, it has emphasised redistribution, welfare measures, and regulatory reforms aimed at reducing inequality.

The NPP/JVP’s economic policy now focuses on reforming capitalism rather than replacing it. The party initially sought to renegotiate the IMF agreement to ease the burden on the public. However, it was unable to secure significant changes. A key long-term objective remains reducing dependency on imports. The NPP aims to promote local industries and agriculture, while supporting small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) to reduce unemployment and expand export capacity.

Although the party pledged to strengthen state-owned enterprises through improved management rather than outright privatisation, recent developments indicate a shift toward public-private partnerships and selective privatisation.

Overall, economic progress is gradually aligning with these reformed Capitalist policies. This approach marks a significant departure from the original “Hammer and Sickle” ideology associated with classical Marxist theory as articulated by thinkers such as Karl Marx, Vladimir Lenin, and Friedrich Engels.

If judged solely on economic direction, the shift from revolutionary rhetoric to reformist governance appears substantial.

Bribery and Corruption

The nation is deeply grateful to the NPP government for taking bold steps to minimise bribery and corruption, which have long been a cancer eating away at our society. For decades, this practice has existed from top politicians to the lowest levels of the state sector, and even within society at large. Full credit must be given to the NPP government for prioritising the fight against this unethical and deeply rooted problem. It is hoped that the law will be applied equally to everyone, irrespective of status or party affiliation.

However, the public remains sceptical about the delay in pressing charges against the alleged culprits. During the election campaign, the JVP claimed that it possessed substantial evidence, over one hundred files, sufficient to prosecute members of previous governments accused of misusing public funds. Are they now discovering that the evidence is not as concrete as initially suggested?

Conclusion

Having analysed the current situation of the NPP/JVP, it is evident that there are conflicting statements from some senior figures in the JVP. Some favour the continuation of the traditional “Hammer and Sickle” policies. Others within the NPP emphasise and implement aspects of Social Democratic policies. Considering these differences, the nation is entitled to seek clarity regarding the government’s present direction.

It remains to be seen whether the JVP is merely marking time before reintroducing its former ideological policies, or whether it has genuinely chosen the path of Social Democracy.

By Gamini Jayaweera



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Features

‘Lord Edgware Dies’

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It has been some time since I read an Agatha Christie, the plot of which I cannot remember. So, I was delighted to find on the shelves of a friend Lord Edgware Dies, which I had a vague memory of, but no certainty about who had done it.

When I read it, I found that my memory of who was probably the killer was correct, but I could not be certain and the red herrings Christie threw in were so diverting that until almost the very end I wondered if I had been wrong.

The plot is very simple. Jane Wilkinson, who is married to Lord Edgware, tells him that she is desperate for a divorce since she is in love with a very proper Anglo-Catholic peer, Lord Melton, but Edgware refuses to divorce her. She asks Poirot to talk to him, which he does, and is surprised to find that Edgware has told Jane he is prepared to give her a divorce. This was, after he had categorically refused, through a letter, which Jane said she had not received.

That night Edgware is murdered, after Jane had been to see him, or so the butler said, and also Edgware’s secretary. But Jane had been that evening at a grand dinner many miles away, where a dozen fellow guests could swear to her presence.

There was a solution however to the mystery of two Jane Wilkinsons, namely a skilful impersonator called Carlotta Adams who, in the opening chapter had impersonated Jane Wilkinson, who had also been at the performance. But when Poirot goes to see her, he finds that she had been found dead on the morning after Edgware had been killed, of an overdose. And in her bag was a gold case, with a strange inscription, that contained the drug, along with a pair of pince-nez.

Her maid said she had written a letter to her sister in America and posted it the previous night. Poirot asks Inspector Japp to get the letter, and a transcript is received from America, and in it the name of Edgware’s nephew Ronald Marsh is mentioned; he had taken Carlotta to dinner after her performance, with which the book opens, and had then set her a challenge. Japp arrests Marsh, but Poirot is not happy and asks for the original of the letter, which the sister sends him. That shows that a page is missing, and the tear is obvious, though that raises the question as to why it had not simply been cut.

Matters are further complicated by the fact that Marsh had gone in a taxi to the Edgware house, along with Edgware’s daughter Geraldine, in the interval of an opera which had previously seemed to provide them with cast iron alibis. Geraldine had gone in to fetch her pearls so that Marsh could raise money he needed, and thus had an opportunity to kill Edgware, as did Marsh, for the driver said he had got out of the taxi while waiting and gone into the house.

Agatha Christie

Marsh explained why he had gone to the house on the night of the murder as having followed Bryan Martin, an American actor, who had been in love with Jane, whom he saw go into the house with a key. But there was no one visible when he entered, and Geraldine almost immediately came down and they left together. And Martin too has become an object of suspicion to Poirot, for he had been to see him before the murders were discovered with a story of being followed by a man with a gold tooth – a story Poirot immediately realized was false when he was asked how old the man was, and was told he was young, for young people did not have gold teeth.

A heap of French money Edgware had got for a trip to Paris was missing, but since Marsh had no need for it after his cousin’s offer of help, Poirot deduces that it must have been taken by the butler, who has disappeared. Christie has stressed that he is astonishingly handsome, unusual in a butler, and Poirot notes a resemblance to Martin, so he thinks the mysterious man going into the house must have been him.

Incidentally, later Poirot assumes that Edgware’s change of mind was because he was involved in some scandal, and I believe Christie intends us to see the cause of this in his handsome butler, though this is not specified.

Meanwhile, Poirot has asked Japp to find out the provenance of the case found in Carlotta’s handbag, and it turns out to have been made in Paris, specially commissioned, and collected by a woman with pince-nez.

But then another murder occurs—that of another guest at the grand dinner, which provided Jane with her alibi. The victim is an actor who had been bemused when Jane, at a lunch, thought the Judgment of Paris referred to the city. He told Hastings he wanted to see Poirot, but was killed before he could get to the appointment. Poirot had rushed there when told about his request, but it was too late.

Meanwhile, Poirot has tried out the pince-nez on Edgware’s secretary, but she could not see through these. It was only a chance remark heard outside the theatre that led him to try them out on Wilkinson’s maid Ellis, a spare pair that had been appropriated for the night of the murders.

Poirot then lays things out, having summoned Martin and told him that he probably suppressed Edgware’s letter, as he had been dropped by then and he did not want Jane to marry another. But after teasing Martin, Poirot says that Jane was in fact the murderer, and she got Carlotta to impersonate her at the dinner while she went to the house and killed her husband. After meeting Carlotta later and checking with her through a call that she had not been rumbled, Jane had gone ahead with the murder – she put veronal into her drink and the case with veronal into the handbag. She forgot to take out the pince-nez she had used earlier to imitate an American. Carlotta had registered as the American in a hotel and Jane had gone to see her, and there they exchanged identities. After seen the letter, she made use of it by tearing off the page that referred to her, and the S of She, so that the person who had challenged Carlotta to impersonate her seemed to be a man.

There is a coda in which Jane, condemned to death, writes to Hastings, still full of pride at her ingenuity hoping she will be remembered.

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Features

Desilt reservoirs, learn from our ancient irrigation systems

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Polgolla

by Prof. O. A. Ileperuma

Silting of reservoirs is a major problem today affecting our hydropower production and irrigation systems. The main Mahaweli reservoirs are silted to a considerable extent reducing the water holding capacity of them. Due to poor soil management practices, floodwaters deposit large amounts of silt in these reservoirs. When the Polgolla reservoir was fully drained about two years back, one could see mountains of silt in the lower reaches of the reservoir. A rough estimate is that 50% of the total capacity of these reservoirs has been lost to siltation. This is a serious issue which affects not only power and agriculture but also flood control.

Our ancient irrigation systems ensured that desilting of reservoirs took place under royal decree where all users of the reservoirs were ordered to carry out desilting of reservoirs during the dry season. The clay thus collected was used in making bricks for the construction of great stupas which dot the landscape of our ancient kingdoms. This ensured that the reservoirs had their full capacity filled with water for the next cultivating season. Our ancient kings were clever enough not to construct reservoirs by blocking main rivers such as the Mahaweli. A classic example is the Minipe left canal where they tapped only the surface water of Mahaweli. Even the bigger tanks such as Nuwara Wewa and Parakrama Samudraya were fed with minor rivulets. There were also other ingenious features in the cascade irrigation systems built by the ancient kings, such as mud sluice canals and forest reservations between the reservoirs in the cascade system. These reservations helped trap silt and remove excess nutrients, which could otherwise contribute to increasing salinity as water flowed from one reservoir to another.

Victoria

Moragahakanda

A classic engineering marvel is the former Yoda Ela, which carries water from Kalawewa to Nuwara Wewa and Tissa Wewa. It is 87 km long although the straight distance between these points is only about 40 km. The gradient of this canal is about 10 cm per km or 6 inches per mile. Yodha Ela functions as a moving reservoir and feeds about 4,600 hectares of paddy lands. It is a winding canal with about 120 smaller reservoirs on its way. It was constructed during the reign of King Dhatusena around 459 AD and later expanded by King Parakramabahu by connecting more reservoirs to the network. Unfortunately, during the Mahaweli project our modern-day engineers constructed a concrete canal replacing the winding path of this Yoda Ela also called Jaya Ganga. This effectively removed the ability of the old Yoda Ela to remove silt and nutrients. The bank of this Ela has wet zone trees such as jak and areca nut growing well. They take up the nutrients from the flowing stream making the water suitable for irrigation later.

Ancient Mesopotamian civilisations depended on dams constructed along the two main rivers, Euphrates and Tigris. After continuous irrigation of their fields over several thousand years, salinity of the irrigated lands increased making them unsuitable for agriculture. People died due to famine and this clearly illustrates the danger of blocking main rivers for agriculture. There is scientific evidence that the salinity of paddy soils in the Mahaweli C area is increasing.

We saw the devastation caused by Cyclone Ditwah. The sluice gates of the Kotmale Reservoir were opened, and Kandy and Peradeniya were flooded. If the reservoir had had greater storage capacity, couldn’t the opening of the gates have been delayed? This may not be an argument that modern-day engineers would readily accept, and I am not an irrigation expert. These ideas may well be naïve. But most of us tend to think of reservoirs mainly in terms of hydropower generation and irrigation, while their role in flood control receives much less attention. The question therefore deserves serious consideration. Could restoring lost reservoir capacity through desilting help improve our ability to manage extreme rainfall and reduce flood risks?

Desilting our reservoirs should be considered a national priority.

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Features

Losing out to Ethiopia

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From Trailblazer to Tailender

Export diversification – Missing the wood for the trees – Part III

by Gomi Senadhira

In Sri Lanka, the word “Ethiopia” is often used as disparaging slang to describe individuals or areas experiencing extreme poverty, starvation, or severe economic hardship. This linguistic habit originated in the 1980s with the Western media coverage of the devastating Ethiopian famine of 1983-85. That media coverage shocked the world but also left an outdated and offensive global stereotype that the country is permanently starving. Much has changed since then. By now, with an annual growth rate of around 9%, it is the fastest-growing economy in sub-Saharan Africa. Ethiopia has also emerged as a highly competitive exporter and is challenging not only its competitors in the region but also countries like Sri Lanka. This article is on how Sri Lanka has lost ground to Ethiopia (and a few other countries) in the GCC markets for agricultural and floricultural products.

Sri Lanka – A Pioneer in the Agriculture and Floricultural Market in the GCC

As discussed in Part II of this article, by the mid-1980s Sri Lanka had established a strong foothold in the GCC’s fruit, vegetable, and floricultural market. Geographical proximity and well-established shipping and air links gave Sri Lanka a strong comparative advantage over Southeast Asian and African nations. Thailand, Vietnam, and Kenya were not even in the market. At that time, Ethiopia was experiencing (as BBC news reports described) “a biblical famine”.

The market was not very large, but it was lucrative and growing. Trade Minister Lalith Athulathmudali as well as the Chairman of the Export Development Board, Victor Santiapillai, who visited Kuwait (and the GCC countries), recognised the market potential for these products and encouraged us to continue with our work. The minister was particularly keen to further develop links between the market for these products, exporters, and his Export Production Villages (EPVs). So, it was becoming a successful case not only for export diversification but also for transferring gains from exports directly to rural households.

From Trailblazer to Tailender

As a result, even by the beginning of this century Sri Lanka had a larger market share than most of its competitors from Asia or Africa. But since then, our competitiveness has weakened significantly. The tables below provide a comparative snapshot of Sri Lanka’s performance vis-à-vis Thailand, Vietnam, Kenya and Ethiopia in the GCC market for vegetables, fruits and floricultural products. As illustrated therein, in 2001 Sri Lanka was ahead of Thailand, Kenya and Ethiopia in this small but rapidly growing market. Since then, we have fallen behind Thailand, Kenya and many other countries in that lucrative market. If this trend continues, Sri Lanka will fall behind Ethiopia within the next few years. (See Table 1)

In the GCC market for vegetables (covered in HS chapter 07), Sri Lanka was ahead of most other competitors in 2001. As illustrated in Table 1 , Sri Lanka had failed to develop this market, while Thailand, Kenya, and even Ethiopia had very efficiently increased their market shares. The GCC is a market to which Sri Lanka can supply some vegetables, like cabbages, by sea. It appears Sri Lanka had also failed to exploit this mode of supply.

We can see a similar trend in the market for fruits. Vietnam, Kenya, and Thailand have emerged as major players, while exports from Sri Lanka have staggered on slowly. In this segment, Vietnam has emerged as a leading player during the last twenty years and the GCC imports from Viet Nam have shot up from US$44 thousand in 2001 to US$346 million by 2024. In part one of these articles, I discussed the remarkable increase of jackfruit exports from Vietnam “…just $3 million in 2015 to an impressive $236.8 million in 2023” while most of our jackfruit production rots under the trees. This explains how countries develop their markets, geographically and product-wise. (See Table 2)

Sri Lanka’s performance has been weakest in the market for floricultural products (HS Chapter 06), which groups live trees, cut flowers, and ornamental foliage. When we first entered the market in the 1980s, the market was dominated by the Netherlands, and Kenya and Ethiopia were not even in the market. At that time, we identified the Gulf states as a market where Sri Lanka could have a dominant presence due to geographical proximity. Even in 2001, Sri Lanka was ahead of Kenya, Ethiopia, and Thailand. But by now, Kenya has emerged as the dominant supplier. Ethiopia is also expanding its market share and is the third-largest exporter. (See Table 3)

Missing the Wood for the Trees

In the mid-1980s, Sri Lanka first established its foothold in the GCC market. Since then, Thailand, Vietnam, Kenya, and even Ethiopia have moved well ahead of us and have become leading players. Why did we lag behind in our export diversification efforts in general and, more particularly, in the GCC market?

The reasons are very clear. After the initial attempts in the 1980s and early 1990s, Sri Lanka has not been proactively involved in identifying, developing, and promoting new products and markets, or protecting and further developing new markets already established. The focus has simply been on traditional exports: tea, coconut, cinnamon, and garments, while other products were almost ignored. In essence, we have been and continue to focus intensely on a narrow group of products and markets, and we have lost sight of the bigger picture.

(The writer can be reached at senadhiragomi@gmail.com)

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