Midweek Review

IAF aerobatics display over Port City of Colombo

Published

5 years ago

2021/03/10

Sahan Weerasooriya

A grave being dug in Batticaloa for the burial of a Muslim Covid-19 victim

By Shamindra Ferdinando

Two F 7 GS multi-role jet fighters brought the SLAF’s flypast at the Galle Face Green on Wednesday (3) to an end. The flypast conducted to mark the 70th anniversary of the SLAF was definitely the largest ever such show held either during the conflict or in the post-war period. Sri Lanka brought the war to a successful conclusion on the morning of May 19, 2009, on the banks of the Nanthikadal lagoon.

The conclusion of the flypast, featuring Bell 212, Bell 412 helicopters, Mi-17 helicopters, Cessna 150 aircraft, B200 Beech King aircraft, MA-60 aircraft, followed by a pair of F 7 GS jets, paved the way for a superlative IAF aerobatics display

The Tejas (fighter aircraft), the Sarang (advanced light helicopter) and Surya Kiran (Hawks) teams displayed their flying prowess to a large gathering at the Galle Face, in spite of the continuing Covid-19 pandemic. Wednesday’s show was brought to an end with one F 7 fighter jet aircraft making a daring low pass. The Indian deployment included Dornier Maritime Patrol Aircraft of its Navy and totalled 23 aircraft of their Air Force and the Navy. All Indian aircraft operated from Katunayake.

The Indian High Commission stressed on the deployment of indigenously built aircraft for the Colombo ‘mission.’

Among the spectators were President Gotabaya Rajapaksa, first lady Ioma, and 18th Commander of the SLAF Air Marshal Sudarshana Pathirana and he is the sixth Commander of the SLAF since the conclusion of the war. Since the end of the war in May 2009 others who commanded the SLAF have been H.D. Abeywickrama (Feb 27, 2011-Feb 27, 2014, K.A. Gunatilleke (Feb 27, 2014-June 15, 2015), Gagan Bulathsinghala (June 15, 2015-Sept 12, 2016), Kapila Jayampathy (Sept 13, 2016-May 29, 2019 and Sumangala Dias (May 30, 2019-Nov 2-2020). All of them received the rank of Air Chief Marshal following their retirement. The then Air Marshal Roshan Goonetileke (June 11, 2006-Feb 27, 2011) had been at the helm during the Eelam War IV and was present at the fly past and acrobatics display in his capacity as the Governor of the Western Province. Goonetileke holds the rank of Marshal of the Air Force.

The F7s on display were among the four Chinese jets acquired in the wake of the first LTTE attack on the SLAF base, Katunayake, in March 2007. The raid stunned the first Rajapaksa administration, at that time fighting the LTTE in the Eastern Province. The LTTE remained strong in both the northern and eastern theatres. The Army, deployed in the Jaffna peninsula, remained trapped, unable to break through the Muhamalai frontline, extending from Kilali to Nargarkovil, in the Vadamarachchi east coast.

The SLAF badly felt the need for an aircraft with dedicated capabilities of a jet interceptor. The top SLAF leadership was in a quandary with the country being offered the opportunity to buy F7s or much more advanced MiG 29s from Ukraine. It would be pertinent to mention that Sri Lanka grappled with the two offers and finally decided to go for the Chinese jets.

The three day-day fly past and acrobatic display came to an end on Friday (5) with President Gotabaya Rajapaksa awarding Presidential Colours to No 05 jet squadron and No 06 transport helicopter squadron. With this, altogether 13 SLAF units have received Presidential Colours. The ceremony was held at SLAF Katunayake. The March 5 visit to Katunayake was President Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s first since the last presidential election. He previously visited Katunayake in his capacity as the Defence Secretary on June 11, 2009 to participate in an event to mark the conclusion of air operations against the LTTE. The writer had an opportunity to cover the Defence Secretary’s visit to Katunayake where he declared that it was the man at the controls of whatever the armaments at the SLAF’s disposal who made a difference in the battlefield. To mark the conclusion of air operations, nine aircraft from No 10, No 12 and No 05 flew in formation over the airbase (Gota: what matters is the man at the controls of armaments – The Island, June 12, 2009)

Sri Lanka should be eternally grateful for the crucial support provided by Pakistan to bring the scourge of terrorism to an end. Pakistan provided crucial support, especially providing jet flying training to SLAF pilots at a time even China was somewhat reluctant to do so.

Acquisition of F7 GS

H.D. Abeywickrama told the writer how a three-member team selected the F 7 GS over MiG 29s. The then Group Captain Sudarshana Pathirana had been a member of that team and subsequently flew the freshly acquired Chinese jets. The SLAF deployed F 7 GS in January 2008. The three member expert team asserted that the SLAF should acquire Chinese jets immediately and explore the possibility of acquiring MiG 29s for a long term solution. The F 7 GS were the jets acquired by the SLAF last.

At the height of the war, the SLAF had three fighter squadrons, namely No 10 (Israeli Kfirs), No 12 (Ukrainian MiG 27s) and No 05 (Chinese F 7s). All squadrons were based at the SLAF base, Katunayake, adjoining the Bandaranaike International Airport (BIA) under constant LTTE threat. In July 2001, the LTTE infiltrated the BIA. The commando-style raid caused massive losses.

During Eelam War IV, the SLAF deployed nearly two dozen jets. Incumbent SLAF Chief had the rare opportunity to command No 12 and No 05 squadrons on an acting capacity while being Commanding Officer of the No 10 squadron. Pathirana flew both Kfirs and F 7s and was one of the most experienced pilots in jet operations.

Wouldn’t it have been better if Kfirs and MiG 27s, too, were in the fly past as the SLAF celebrated its 70th anniversary? Today both squadrons are not operational. The No 09 squadron comprising Mi 24s helicopter gunships now flies Mi-17s as Mi 24s are no longer operational. Sri Lanka acquired Mi 24 s in 1995, Kfirs in 1996, MiG 27s in 2000. The SLAF’s decision to acquire Mi 24s in the wake of the enemy employing shoulder-fired heat seeking missiles in late April 1995 was influenced by the IPKF having Mi 24s during its deployment here. It wouldn’t be economically viable to maintain peace-time three jet squadrons as well as an attack helicopter squadron. However, the SLAF should be also mindful of the danger in losing much valued experience acquired in jet and Mi 24 operations. Political leadership, too, should be attentive to the armed forces’ needs. Now that the MiG 27s have been retired, and Mi 24 unlikely to fly again, the SLAF is considering the feasibility of overhauling the Kfirs.

As the SLAF celebrated its 70th anniversary with the IAF’s participation being the highlight, the country should seriously examine post-war realities against the backdrop of the growing rivalry between China and the US. Last week’s fly past and aerobatics display took place over an area encompassing the flagship China-funded ‘Port City Colombo.’ Situated next to the Galle Face Green, the project, developed by CHEC Port City Colombo (Pvt) Ltd., with an initial investment of USD 1.4 bn, covers 269 ha of land reclaimed from the sea. The reclamation was completed in January 2019 before the second humiliating polls trouncing of the yahapalana government 10 months later.

The SLAF suffered in the wake of the January 2015 change of government. The UNP-SLFP government found fault with the acquisition of Ukrainian MiG 27 by the first Rajapaksa administration. The Yahapalana administration flayed the Rajapaksa administration over what it called a corrupt MiG deal. Retired SLAF Commander, the then Air Marshal Goonetilike, was among those summoned by the FCID (Financial Crimes Investigation Division) probing acquisition of MiGs.

SLAF re-acquires jet capability

In the immediate aftermath of the 1971 insurgency, the SLAF took delivery of MiG 15s and MiG 17s from the then Soviet Union. The Soviet aircraft were phased out in 1981. The SLAF felt the urgent need for jet capability in the wake of the LTTE resuming war in June 1990 following a 14-month long ‘honeymoon’ with the then President Ranasinghe Premadasa. China was the only country willing to supply jets to the SLAF as India continued to oppose weapons sales to Colombo. By then, India had terminated its so called peace keeping mission (July 1987-March 1990) as a result of President Premadasa entering into direct negotiations with the LTTE. Chinese built F 7s were deployed in 1991 after acquiring FT 5 and FT 7 (twin-seater supersonic jet trainer) in the previous year. The Kfirs were added to the SLAF arsenal in 1996 and the MiGs in 2000.

Both Kfirs and MiG 27s were acquired during Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumararatunga’s presidency. But, the SLAF gradually developed the jet capability that finally involved a range of other air assets, including UAVs (Unmanned Aerial Vehicles) and Beechcraft in mounting coordinated attacks. The targeted killing of Thamilselvam, the international face of the LTTE terrorism as its head of the political wing on Nov 2, 2007, just 12 days after the devastating LTTE raid on Anuradhapura airbase, is something the entire armed forces can be quite rightly proud of. The writer still remembers, Air Marshal Goonetileke sharing the successful attack carried out by a pair of aircraft, a Kfir and MiG 27 on Thamilselvam’s hideout south of Kilinochchi with this writer.

At the time the SLAF celebrated its 50th anniversary in 2001, the country boasted of 12 Kfirs – a formidable weapons platform. Altogether SLAF acquired as many as 15 Kfirs. But, the SLAF experienced delays in obtaining engine spares as each and every delivery required US State Department approval as the engine happened to be of US origin. It would be pertinent to mention the SLAF examined the possibility of acquiring MiG 29 or MiG 27 before deciding on the latter. The deployment of MiG 27s in 2000 gave the SLAF capability to carry a heavy payload in low flying attacks. The acquisition of Kfirs and MiG 27 should be examined against the backdrop of the LTTE securing shoulder fired missiles. F 7 BS found it difficult to cope up with the situation hence the decision to acquire Kfirs. Four years later, the SLAF added MiGs to its arsenal. The SLAF acquired seven MiG 27s in 2000. However, in spite of having immense airpower, it was never used as part of the overall military strategy meant to annihilate the LTTE. That situation changed in 2006.

By the time Mahinda Rajapaksa won the presidency in Nov 2005, of the seven MiGs, four had been destroyed. One was caused by Ukrainian Captain L Valeric on August 18, 2001 when he flew a jet on the Ukrainian Aviation Day. The low flying aircraft hit a telephone wire and smashed into a house by the Negombo lagoon, situated about a km away from the writer’s home. The remaining three MiG 27s and the MiG trainer were grounded. Faced with an unprecedented LTTE threat, the SLAF pushed for immediate overhauling of the grounded aircraft, in addition to four extra aircraft. Initially an attempt was made to procure MiGs 27s from India as the IAF at that time was believed to have approximately 200 MiGs. India turned down the request. Sri Lanka sought Ukrainian help and was able to secure the required aircraft. The transaction was made on a government to government basis though the yahapalana administration found fault with the transaction. The whole thing was called a corrupt transaction. During Eelam War IV (August 2006-May 2009), No 12 squadron comprising MiG 27s, carried out hundreds of sorties /missions.

Those who furiously attacked the MiG 27 transaction during the Rajapaksa administration and the most obnoxious way they addressed the issue may have convinced the reader perhaps MiGs weren’t acquired after all in spite of payments made. For the disgraceful yahapalana strategists, the No 12 squadron didn’t exist.

Air Chief Marshal Mujahid Anwar Khan, Chief of the Air Staff of the Pakistan Air Force receiving a memento from Tejas fighter pilot Wing Commander Karthikeya Singh at the Galle Face Green. Air Marshal Sudarshana Pathirana looks on

‘Rolling Thunder’

Let me discuss the largest airstrike carried out by the SLAF during the entire conflict. The operation, code-named ‘Rolling Thunder’, carried out on June 10, 2008, involved 10 aircraft, four MiG 27 and F 7GS and a pair of Kfirs. There hadn’t been any other instance of the SLAF deploying almost half of all available jets for the assault on the Muhamalai frontline. The Army couldn’t breach the Muhamalai LTTE defence though many costly attempts were made over the years. In fact, the Jaffna-based Divisions couldn’t breach the Muhamalai line until the then Brigadier Shavendra Silva’s celebrated Task Force 1/58 Division moved against the LTTE from the direction of Paranthan in early January 2009.

Throughout the war, the Katunayake-based jet squadrons played a pivotal role in carrying out specific operations in support of the advancing Army and independent operations meant to dismantle the LTTE’s conventional fighting capability. The SLAF (fighter squadrons) developed the capacity to launch night time operations. The No 12 squadron engaged in low level bombing operations.

The SLAF experienced severe difficulties caused by no fault of theirs. The SLAF’s attempts to establish an anti-aircraft defence was delayed due to New Delhi’s strong objections to installation of Chinese 3D radar. India felt threatened by the installation of Chinese radar here whereas Sri Lanka remained exposed to the LTTE air threat. Finally, the SLAF acquired both Indian (2 D Indra MK ii) and Chinese radar (JY 11), the latter being 3 D, in the wake of the first LTTE air attack carried out on March 27, 2007. The LTTE used Zlin 143 light aircraft for night time attacks.

Big powers jostle for power

Today, India is a key member of the US-led Quad opposed to China rapidly expanding its influence globally. Its other members are Australia and Japan. Sri Lanka has been compelled to walk a diplomatic tightrope having handed over the strategic Hambantota port to China in 2017 on a 99-year-lease under controversial circumstances. Interestingly, the UNP-led yahapalana government, having come to power vowing to do away with China-funded projects, ended up handing over the Hambantota port to China much to the dismay of its overseas benefactors.

Sri Lanka’s decision to seek Indian and Japanese investment for the proposed West Container Terminal (WCT) instead of going ahead with the the 2019 Memorandum of Cooperation (MoC) on the much sought after East Container Terminal (ECT) should be examined, taking into account both China and the US seeking to consolidate their position in Colombo. In addition to the Hambantota port, secured on a 99-year lease in 2017, China operates a terminal at the Colombo harbour. Colombo International Container Terminals Ltd., (CICT) is a joint venture involving China Merchants Port Holdings Company Limited (85 per cent) and Sri Lanka Ports Authority (SLPA/15 per cent) under a 35 year Build Operate and Transfer deal. Many an eyebrow was raised when India set the record straight regarding Sri Lanka’s recent statement on the proposed agreement with India’s Adani Group on the ECT. India declared that Sri Lanka had sought consensus with Adani on the WCT instead of going through the Indian High Commission.

Recent US declaration that Sri Lanka wouldn’t be considered for Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) Compact shouldn’t be considered under any circumstances as a case of the US losing interest. The US, as well as its allies, India, Japan and Australia, as part of their individual/joint overall strategy meant to counter China, are engaged with Sri Lanka. At that time India threw its weight behind terrorism here, it had been firmly in the then Soviet Camp. India’s dependence on Soviet Union for its defence needs was so much, New Delhi had no option but to keep quiet when Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in late 1979. But today, the Indian foreign policy has turned a full circle. India is now firmly in the US camp with their relationship encompassing an entire gamut of factors, including nuclear cooperation. The US simply cannot do without India in Asia. That is the reality and the undeniable truth.

But India should keep in mind the Churchilian adage that there are no permanent friends and permanent enemies, but only permanent interests. I

The recent Indian High Commission response to Energy Minister and Attorney-at-Law Udaya Gammanpila’s declaration in respect of the Trincomalee oil tank farm underscored New Delhi’s determination to hold onto the foothold in the strategic Trincomalee region. One cannot find fault with the Indian High Commission for immediately setting the record straight. The Indian response to Minister Gammanpila can be compared with a furious Chinese Embassy reaction to the then Finance Minister Ravi Karunanayake over the latter’s criticism of Chinese loans. A spate of Chinese Embassy statements issued here in response to US criticism of China at the time of US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s visit last December emphasized the state of play. IAF’s dazzling performance over the Colombo skies is certainly a significant factor as important as New Delhi’s stand on the latest accountability resolution at the UNHRC on Sri Lanka.

Let me end this piece by recalling what retired Army Commander Gen. Gerry de Silva told the writer several years ago. Responding to a query, Silva said that for him the IAF violating Sri Lanka’s airspace in 1987 was the most humiliating moment. The IAF violation compelled Sri Lanka to call off Operation Liberation, the first ever Brigade-size ground operation to bring back the Jaffna peninsula under its control. Had Sri Lanka enjoyed the freedom to deal with terrorism, Operation Liberation probably would have changed the course of history.

The fly past and aerobatic display coincided with an air observer training exercise conducted by the Indian Navy. Sri Lanka Navy partnered with the Indian Navy and the SLAF took part in an air observer training exercise on a Dornier aircraft of the Indian Navy conducted in the southern coast from 02nd to 05th March 2021. Taking the wings from the Air Force base, Katunayake, a total of four training sorties were carried out covering the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in the southern coast during the training deployment.

Finally, let me pay tribute to those who made SLAF overseas deployment along with six Mi 17s possible under UN command in the Central African Republic and South Sudan successful. Perhaps deployment under UN command is the pinnacle of the SLAF’s development over the past 70 years. The political and SLAF leaderships should keep in mind those seeking to humiliate Sri Lanka at the UNHRC want the UN to terminate overseas Sri Lankan military deployment.

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Midweek Review

Opp. caught up in CIABOC offensive

Published

23 hours ago

2026/06/24

Sahan Weerasooriya

Mahinda Rajapaksa leaving CIABOC on 12 June, 2026

The Commission to Investigate Allegations of Bribery or Corruption (CIABOC) on 12 June questioned former President Mahinda Rajapaksa regarding the USD 2 Mn bribe allegation directed at the late SriLankan CEO Kapila Chandrasena, whose body was found on 8 May in a close relative’s home in Kollupitiya. Chandrasena’s alleged suicide sent shock waves through political circles and interested parties questioned the circumstances leading to him being granted bail on 6 May on cash bail of Rs. 500,000 with three sureties of Rs. 10 million each. The Colombo Magistrate court also imposed a travel ban. The issue at hand is as to how Mohamed Riswan and Mohamed Irshan stood as sureties for Chandrasekera. Of all the investigations undertaken by the CIABOC, the USD 2 Mn bribe case is the most politically charged probe.

Of the Rajapaksas, former State Minister Shasheendra Rajapaksa is so far the last to be indicted. CIABOC on 19 June filed indictments before the Colombo High Court against him and two others Sepalika Saman Kumari and Keerthi Bandara Kotagama. According to the charges, the accused are alleged to have committed the offence of corruption and aided and abetted the commission of the offence by using official influence to pressure certain government officials, attached to the Office for Reparations, to obtain compensation amounting to Rs. 8.85 million for a property built on a state land by Shasheendra and destroyed by marauding Aragalaya mobs.

By Shamindra Ferdinando

The ruling National People’s Power (NPP) government last week emphasised, in no uncertain terms, that it wouldn’t tolerate the growing Opposition challenge.

Amidst the growing controversy over the continuing detention of retired Maj. Gen. Suresh Sallay. in terms of the draconian Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA), under humiliating conditions, in connection with the ongoing investigations into the 2019 Easter Sunday carnage, police arrested Sugeeshwara Bandara, leader of the New People’s Front (NPF). The Central Crime Investigation Bureau (CCIB) apprehended him on 18 June and the Fort Magistrate’s Court remended him till 1 July..

The CCIB also apprehended Binoy Hettiarachchi who was accompanying Bandara. Hettiarachchi served as a media coordinator at the former President Ranil Wickremesinghe’s Flower Road Office. Police intercepted their vehicle at Kollupitiya where the arrests were made like in an action-packed movie. Hettiarachchi was freed four hours later.

But, it would be better to identify Bandara as the former private secretary to President Gotabaya Rajapaksa as well as the Director General of Special Projects at the Presidential Secretariat in the wake of Ranil Wickremesinghe taking over the presidency.

Accused of receiving two salaries simultaneously, under the President’s Expenditure Head, Bandara who managed the media for Gotabaya Rajapaksa, in the run-up to the 2019 presidential election, is under investigation for abuse of government vehicles and employing government workers for political work.

Having launched his political career as the Colombo District organiser of the alliance New People’s Front, a breakaway faction of the UPFA, in February, 2024, Bandara contested the November, 2024, parliamentary polls on the New Democratic Front (NDF) ticket. But, of late, Bandara, as the leader of NPF, became one of the most active opposition activists, aligned with the political grouping, dubbed People’s United Opposition, operating from Ranil Wickremesinghe’s Flower Road Office.

Bandara drew the wrath of the government when he launched a noisy protest outside Finance Secretary Dr. Harshana Suriyapperuma’s residence at Akuregoda, Pelawatta, on 26 April, where he and his protesting supporters were given a shower of excreta. The group, led by Bandara, demanded the Finance Secretary’s resignation over the theft of USD 2.5 mn from the Treasury. No less a person than President Anura Kumara Dissanayake reacted angrily to Bandara’s actions.

Acknowledging the right for legitimate protests, the President warned against protests directed at residences of officials. On 18 April, Bandara led a protest outside Agriculture Minister K.D. Lal Kantha’s recently built luxury residence at Weliwita, Kaduwela, where he questioned how the JVPer managed to build such a home as he was on record as having repeatedly said that he lived a difficult life.

The police apprehended Bandara as he was returning from a meeting between senior representatives of the People’s United Opposition and the IMF Colombo at the Tiki Bar, Shangri-La. In spite of negligible parliamentary presence, with those elected on the NDF ticket at the last parliamentary election not really speaking in one voice, the Flower Road project has become a headache for the government.

In fact, the Flower Road operation has been causing continuous harassment to the NPP, while the Samagi Jana Balawegaya (SJB) struggled to play its anticipated role as the main Opposition. Instead of conducting a cohesive campaign against the cocky NPP government, members of the SJB seem to be pulling in different directions at the expense of the common opposition front.

Regardless of the Wickremesinghe-led grouping vowing to press ahead with its campaign, the arrest of Bandara is obviously meant to have a detrimental impact on the activities of the Opposition.

It would be pertinent to mention that Bandara had been among those who stayed with President Gotabaya Rajapaksa at the President’s House, in Colombo, as a massive protest erupted on 9 July, 2022. Bandara was among the last to flee the President’s House as the military withdrew, amidst mounting pressure on their positions.

The police arrested Bandara as former President Gotabaya Rajapaksa moved the Court of Appeal in terms of Article 140 of the Constitution to prevent him being arrested under the PTA. The wartime Defence Secretary sought the court intervention in the wake of police probing the 2019 Easter Sunday carnage and obtaining a travel ban against him.

The court heard Romesh de Silva PC’s submissions on behalf of the ex-President on 18 June. The court deferred the hearing to 24 June. The crux of the matter is that the ex-President fears that the CID is about to arrest him on the basis of a statement made by fugitive Azad Moulana, in Paris, linking Sallay directly with the Easter Sunday carnage.

NPP intensifies pressure

The NPP seems confident of its current course of action meant to pin down the Opposition. In spite of unbridled corruption being the major issue on the post-war election platform, no political party succeeded in going flat-out against the political opposition.

However, the NPP allowed the judicial process to continue. The first major sentencing was announced on 2 April, 2025, just six months after the parliamentary polls, handsomely won by the NPP. The Commission to Investigate Allegations of Bribery or Corruption (CIABOC) moved the Colombo High Court successfully against the former Chief Minister of the North Central Province S.M. Ranjith Samarakoon.

Colombo High Court No. 01 Judge Adithya Patabendige sentenced him in terms of Section 70 of the Bribery Act. The HC declared the former CM perpetrated malpractices by ordering fuel to his personal secretary’s vehicle. The personal secretary happened to be Shanthi Chandrasena, wife of his brother S.M. Chandrasena, a former Cabinet Minister and one of the most powerful Ministers to represent the North Central province.

The ex- Chief Minister and the second accused, his personal secretary, were convicted guilty of two charges. Both were sentenced to 16 years rigorous imprisonment and were also ordered to pay a fine of Rs. 200,000/- with an additional two-year prison term in case of default.

Deputy Director General Asitha Anthoney appeared on behalf of the Commission to Investigate Allegations of Bribery or Corruption.

There had never been any really coordinated CIABOC campaign against corruption. No political party, or a particular family, felt threatened by CIABOC. Both those in and outside Parliament acted with impunity. They feared no one. There was no need to be because the powerful and the influential operated above the law.

Just a couple of weeks after sentencing of S.M. Ranjith Samarakoon and Shanthini Chandrasena, the CIABOC arrested the latter’s husband, one-time Deputy Economic Development Minister and Special Projects Minister, S.M. Chandrasena. The CIABOC took him into custody on 4 July, 2025.

The CIABOC accused the former Minister of causing loss to the government by distributing seed corn, imported at a cost of Rs 25 mn, in 2024, among the farmer community in the Anuradhapura district, at a subsidised price. The distribution had taken place ahead of the 2015 presidential election contested by Mahinda Rajapaksa and estranged former SLFP General Secretary Maithripala Sirisena. The CIABOC alleged that Chandrasena exerted undue influence on the Director (Planning) and other officers of the District Secretariat and distributed seeds through his political allies to gain an advantage in the 2015 presidential election and incurred a loss to the government.

Chandrasena was granted bail on 1 August, 2025. He was indicted on 12 June before the Colombo High Court.

Before further discussing the ongoing anti-corruption campaign, let me introduce the top leadership of CIABOC. The Commission consists of Justice W.M.N.P. Iddawela (Chairman), K.B. Rajapakse and Chethiya Goonesekera P.C, with High Court judge R.S.A. Dissanayake as its Director General.

The sentencing of the S. M. Ranjith Samarakoon didn’t really bother his side. The arrest of his brother S.M. Chandrasena, too, didn’t really upset those facing charges. But, sentencing of former Minister Mahindananda Aluthgamage and former Sathosa Chairman and former Trade Minister Nalin Fernando on 29 May, 2025, sent shock waves through the Opposition.

The Colombo High Court Trial-at-Bar sentenced Aluthgamage and Fernando for committing the offence of corruption by purchasing 14,000 carrom boards and 11,000 checkers boards through Sathosa, allegedly to distribute to schools and sports clubs selected by the Sports Ministry, and distributing them to party offices of the government, during the 2015 presidential election campaign thereby, causing a loss of over 53 million rupees to the government, stunned the Opposition.

Aluthgamage was sentenced to 20 years of rigorous imprisonment, Fernando received a sentence of 25 years of rigorous imprisonment. Additionally, a fine of Rs. 100,000 (hundred thousand) was imposed for each count.

The CIABOC’s Assistant Director General Mrs. Anuththara Jayasinghe and Assistant Director General Mrs. Thushari Dayaratne conducted the prosecution.

During the Yahapalana government Aluthgamage spearheaded a high profile anti-corruption campaign, dubbed ‘Yahapalana Top 10 kamba horu’. The then Joint Opposition (JO) group, led in Parliament by Dinesh Gunawardena, published a 750-page book, targeting the Yahapalana ministers. Mahindananda, who spearheaded that campaign, is now serving a long sentence.

The JO group consists of UPFA lawmakers who declined to throw their weight behind the then President Sirisena aligned with the UNP.

Let me mention the names of those against whom the accusations were made by the JO.

Yahapalana corruption

The JO dealt with 10 major cases. (1) The Treasury bond scams perpetrated in 2015 and 2016. Accusations were directed at Ranil Wickremesinghe, Ravi Karunanayake and Governor Central Bank Arjuna Mahendran. The losses were estimated at Rs 26 bn. (2) causing losses amounting to Rs 10 bn through the fraudulent import of vehicles. Ravi Karunanayake was named the chief culprit (3) Misappropriation of Mahapola funds to the tune of Rs. 1 bn. Allegations were directed at Malik Samarawickrema (4) Stealing from an insurance scheme implemented for the benefit of those going for employment in West Asia. The JO accused Thalatha Atukarale of misappropriating funds amounting Rs 1.5 bn (5) Receiving Rs 1.5 bn through the leasing of Hambantota port to China on a 99-year lease. Ranil Wickremesinghe, Malik Samarawickrema and R. Paskaralingam were named the offenders (6) Kabir Hashim was accused of causing a loss of Rs 54 bn by cancelling aircraft ordered from Airbus Industries for the national carrier (7) fraudulent activities pertaining to the release of paddy stocks held by the government. The JO estimated the losses caused to the government at Rs 10 bn. (8) Scam in vehicle parts. Ravil Karunanayake was accused of causing losses amounting to Rs. 6.5 bn, (9 A) Dr. Rajitha Senaratne was accused of leasing of the Modera fisheries harbor and procurement of eight vessels to catch fish, fraudulently, and thereby causing losses up to Rs 1 bn, (9B) The JO also found fault with Dr. Senaratne for perpetrating Rs 1.5 bn fraud in the procurement of medicine and lastly (10) Ranil Wickremesinghe, Malik Samarawickrema, R. Paskaralingam and Charitha Ratwatte were blamed for a massive fraud in the procurement of coal for the Norochcholai coal-fired power plant. That particular fraud was estimated at Rs 5 bn.

Although the JO transformed itself to Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna (SLPP) later, to successfully contested the 2019 presidential election, none of the above-mentioned cases were investigated. As far as we know, none of those cases had been dealt with during the SLPP rule, from November, 2019, to July, 2022. Faced with an externally backed regime change operation, the SLPP invited Wickremesinghe, who had been named by them in three major corruption cases, to accept the premiership in May, 2022, and presidency in July same year.

So far, there is no indication whether the mentioned JO allegations had received the attention of the CIABOC or the Attorney General of the government. As far as we know of all the politicians and officials, Wickremesinghe is the only one facing imminent threat due to the ongoing case pertaining to him visiting the UK in September, 2023, to join his wife Prof. Maithree at the University of Wolverhampton at her graduation ceremony.

Wickremesinghe has been accused of squandering nearly 17 mn rupees at a time the country was in deep economic turmoil. The Fort Magistrate’s court is scheduled to take up the case on 8 July.

SLPP parliamentary group leader Namal Rajapaksa is also facing a major legal challenge. The former Minister has been indicted on charges of criminal misappropriation of Rs. 70 mn in connection with the controversial Krrish project. The indictments have been forwarded to the Colombo High Court by the Attorney General, alleging that Namal Rajapaksa misappropriated funds by receiving Rs. 70 million from the Indian real estate company for the development of rugby in Sri Lanka.

Yoshitha Rajapaksa, too, has been dealt with by the CIABOC. The Rajapaksas have been accused of lowering qualifications required to join the executive branch of the Navy and then sending him to the Royal Naval Academy in the United Kingdom at taxpayers’ expense. Produced before the Colombo Additional Magistrate, Yoshitha was released on three personal bail bonds of Rs. 5 million each.

Producing Yoshitha before court on 17 June, Deputy Director General of the Bribery Commission, Ruvini Wickramasinghe declared: “”Your Honour, the complaint regarding this incident was received on June 25, 2016. Accordingly, the Commission initiated investigations. The complaint states that the suspect had participated in naval training programmes held in England and Ukraine by misusing government funds, while depriving qualified applicants of such opportunities. At that time, this individual, who is a civilian in the dock today, was also a civilian in 2006 when he was deemed eligible for the Royal Navy Young Officer training at the Royal Naval Academy in the United Kingdom. The opportunities to receive this training are extremely limited. Your Honour, selection to this prestigious course is usually based on being the most outstanding cadet officer during a two-year training period or based on performance during training. However, this suspect, although a civilian in 2006, was proposed and included in the list and was sent for the course in haste.”

The Deputy Director General also stated that Yoshitha Rajapaksa had undergone medical examinations required for overseas training even before being officially recruited into the Navy.

The court was also told that though Sri Lanka previously received scholarships from the UK the Rajapaksa government funded Yoshitha to the tune of Rs 6.2 mn.

Opp. attacks CIABOC

The Opposition has repeatedly attacked the CIABOC with its Director General Ranga Dissanayake being the primary target. Accusing Dissanayake of being a JVPer, the Opposition has repeatedly questioned the conduct of the High Court judge demanding that the CIABOC inquired into the top official’s conduct, especially with regard to the alleged suicide of former Sri Lankan CEO Kapila Chandrasena who had been under investigation pertaining to the receiving of USD 2 mn bribe to facilitate procurement aircraft from Airbus Industrie during Mahinda Rajapaksa’s second term.

Former Foreign Minister Prof. G. L. Peiris, a regular speaker at Flower Road media briefings, alleged that the CIABOC was a political tool in the NPP’s hands.

A section of the Opposition to question the circumstances one-time JVP heavyweight Nandana Gunatilleke died in January this year at the Ragama Teaching Hospital after accusing Dissanayake of pursuing an agenda beneficial to the JVP, a charge denied by the High Court judge. When the writer raised the allegations with Dissanayake, he emphatically denied any wrongdoing on his part https://island.lk/ciaboc-dg-denies-jvp-link/.

The CIABOC has simply ignored accusations directed at its DG who proved through his actions that he really meant high profile public pronouncements against corruption.

Former Deputy Minister and ex-MP Sarana Gunawardena was sentenced to a total of 16 years rigorous imprisonment by the Colombo High Court on June 8, 2026.

During the Yahapalana administration many cases, filed by the CIABOC as well as the Attorney General, were either dismissed or dropped due to lapses on their part. The accused in such cases were ex-MP Sajin Vass Gunawardena, ex-EP Chief Minister Sivanesathurei Chandrakanthan alias Pilleyan, ex-Ministers Johnston Fernando, Rohitha Abeygunawardena, Basil Rajapaksha, Mahindananda Aluthgamage and Janaka Bandara Tennakoon and former AG and CJ Mohan Peiris.

Regardless of Opposition protests, the public appreciate tangible action against corruption. However, the NPP has not been free from serious allegations against it since the last general elections. The release of suspicious 323 containers, plus two containers filled with ice, in January, 2025, followed by the massive coal scam perpetrated in September 2025, loss of over USD 2.5 mn from the Treasury and controversial Aswesuma payments, as well as wealth, accumulated by NPP Ministers as revealed by declarations made to CIABOC, shocked the electorate.

The NPP has failed to counter allegations. The circumstances under which Energy Minister Kumara Jayakody resigned, along with Energy Secretary Udayanga Hemapala, on 17 April, just a week after the NPP defeated the no-confidence motion moved by the Opposition against the Energy Minister. dealt a devastating blow to the NPP’s much touted integrity. The NPP couldn’t explain as to why a person under investigation by the CIABOC for an alleged fraud perpetrated during the Yahapalana government was accommodated in President Dissanayake’s first Cabinet. Indicted before the Colombo High Court, Jayakody’s case commenced last week.

Asset declarations of some NPP Ministers have shocked the country. The SJB has called for CIABOC to investigate them without delay and prove that CIABOC was not only going after the Opposition. Ministers Lal Kantha and Wasantha Samarasinghe are two of the top JVPers who have attracted attention as the Opposition hits back at the government.

SJB MP Mujibur Rahuman said that the JVP/NPP owed an explanation as to how their members amassed so much wealth since 2024 as they repeatedly claimed their inability to meet even their basic needs. But, their asset declarations exposed their blatant lies.

Midweek Review

Geopolitics of the Indian Ocean

Published

23 hours ago

2026/06/24

Sahan Weerasooriya

Listening to the Winds, Reading the Waves:

Prof. Gamini Keerawella’s latest publication, Winds and Waves: Geopolitical Currents in the Indian Ocean since 1945 will be launched on 5 August at the Auditorium of the Bandaranaike Centre for International Studies (BCIS). The keynote address will be delivered by Prof. T. V. Paul, James, McGill Professor of Political Science at McGill University, Canada and the former President of the International Studies Association (ISA).

Prof. Keerawella, Professor Emeritus of History at the University of Peradeniya, has dedicated hisbook to the memory of Dr. Newton Gunasinghe, the eminent sociologist and Marxist theoretician who encouraged him to venture beyond disciplinary frontiers. In many respects, this work represents a successful realization of that intellectual endeavour. In her testimonial to back cover of the book, Dr. Radhika Coomaraswamy observes that “Gamini Keerawella offers a nuanced and layered account of the Indian Ocean region’s strategic evolution from the era of decolonization to the contemporary phase of intensifying great-power rivalry. Its distinctive analytical perspective makes it an important contribution to the study of international relations, maritime geopolitics, and regional strategic dynamics.” This assessment accurately captures the significance of the work, and I fully endorse her judgement.

This volume constitutes the final publication of a trilogy that explores the evolving dynamics of international relations from a distinctly Sri Lankan perspective. The first study examined the trajectory of Sri Lanka’s defence and foreign policy, while the second revisited the origins, evolution, and principal constituent elements of international relations as an academic discipline from a Global South perspective. The present work broadens the analytical canvas by tracing the shifting geopolitical contours of the Indian Ocean since 1945 and examining the evolving interplay between great-power competition and regional agency.

Indian Ocean not merely maritime transit space

At the heart of Prof. Keerawella’s analysis is the argument that the Indian Ocean is not merely a maritime space of transit but a living archive whose language is inscribed in tides, trade, and collective memory. To uncover the deeper structures that have shaped the region, he draws on Michel Foucault’s concept of the archaeology of knowledge, probing beneath the visible layers of historical experience to reveal successive strata of thought, exchange, and power. This approach enables him to trace the multiple origins of the Indian Ocean’s geopolitical significance through the sedimented traces of how the ocean has been known, governed, and imagined across time. Complementing this perspective is Fernand Braudel’s concept of the longue durée, which provides the framework for understanding the long-term evolution of Indian Ocean geopolitics. As Keerawella notes, for Braudel, history unfolds not as a single linear sequence but as a layered field of continuity and change, revealing the deeper architecture of the past—the slow yet powerful currents that shape political and economic developments beneath the surface of events (Keerawella 2026: xxiii).Prof. Keerawella further notes that later historians such as K. N. Chaudhuri and M. N. Pearson drew on Braudel’s insights and adapted them to understand the Indian Ocean as a polycentric world.

Prof. Keerawella argues that the terms employed in the title of this work—Winds, Waves, and Currents—evoke the ocean’s dual language of surface movement and underlying structure. In his reading, winds and waves signify motion: the visible and often turbulent forces that carry ships, peoples, commodities, and ideas across shifting maritime frontiers. Currents, by contrast, refer to the deeper and less visible forces that shape historical trajectories and connect coasts and continents through enduring patterns of interaction. As he observes, while winds and waves represent the restless dynamics of the ocean’s surface, currents embody the slower yet more consequential energies that operate beneath it, binding disparate regions into a larger maritime system (2026: xx).

Metaphors and Conceptual Foundation

Building on this conceptual foundation, the author employs winds, waves, and currents not merely as metaphors but also as analytical categories. Winds represent changing strategic directions and geopolitical realignments; waves denote recurring cycles of commerce, conflict, and interaction; and currents symbolize the deep structural forces that connect societies across space and time. Viewed from a distinctly Sri Lankan perspective, the volume demonstrates how a strategically located small state at the centre of the Indian Ocean perceives and navigates this maritime space through its own strategic lens. The book opens by situating Sri Lanka within the intersecting forces of history, geography, and power that have shaped the Indian Ocean world. It advances the notion of a dual strategic consciousness that has informed Sri Lanka’s external engagements: a persistent sense of vulnerability, rooted in colonial experience and geographical exposure, coexisting with a cosmopolitan outlook forged through centuries of maritime exchange. Prof. Keerawella contends that this dual consciousness constitutes the underlying framework through which Sri Lanka has historically interpreted and responded to developments in its external environment.

Winds and Waves is a comprehensive study comprising eleven chapters and an extensive introduction that establishes the analytical foundations of the work by treating the ocean simultaneously as text and method. The opening chapter situates Sri Lanka within the wider Indian Ocean system, tracing the island’s navigation through shifting configurations of power while emphasising the agency of small states. The Indian Ocean is presented not merely as a strategic arena but also as a moral and political space, linking Sri Lanka’s historical experience to the broader aspirations and consciousness of the Global South.

Revisiting British withdrawal

The book revisits Britain’s withdrawal from the Indian Ocean, arguing that it was not simply a consequence of post-war decline but the culmination of deeper structural transformations in the international system. Decolonisation, Afro-Asian nationalism, and the emergence of bipolarity fundamentally altered the regional order and created the conditions for Britain’s retreat. In turn, this withdrawal opened the way for superpower competition, particularly between the United States and the Soviet Union, transforming the Indian Ocean into major theatre of Cold War geopolitics.

A substantial portion of the volume is devoted to examining the policies and strategic trajectories of the major powers. The author traces American engagement from Cold War containment through post-Cold War maritime predominance to contemporary Indo-Pacific formulations, demonstrating that U.S. strategy has evolved through the interaction of structural imperatives and changing strategic discourses. Particular attention is paid to the 2026 U.S.–Iran War, which is interpreted as a transformative event that exposed the limits of military hegemony and accelerated patterns of strategic hedging and multi-alignment among regional actors. The book also explores the Soviet Union’s entry into the Indian Ocean in 1968 and the subsequent re-emergence of Russia under Vladimir Putin through selective naval deployments, arms transfers, and strategic partnerships, illustrating what the author characterises as the recurrent rhythms of great-power engagement in the region.

The rise of China receives extensive treatment as one of the most significant structural developments of the twenty-first century. Through the Belt and Road Initiative, port development projects, and naval modernisation, China has translated growing economic power into expanding strategic influence. The author contrasts Beijing’s assertive posture in the South China Sea with its relatively restrained approach in the Indian Ocean, where economic diplomacy and cooperative security initiatives have assumed greater prominence. Equally significant is the discussion of India’s transformation from a regional power into an emerging global strategic actor. The evolution of Indian maritime strategy—from Nehruvian custodianship to contemporary blue-water ambitions—demonstrates how a rising power navigates structural constraints while expanding its strategic reach. Initiatives such as SAGAR, naval modernization, and deepening partnerships with the United States, Japan, and Australia have positioned India as a central actor in the evolving Indo-Pacific order.

Roles of Japan and EU examined

The volume also examines the roles of Japan and the European Union in shaping the contemporary maritime order. Japan’s transition from post-war restraint to proactive strategic engagement, embodied in the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) vision, illustrates how middle powers adapt to changing geopolitical realities through coalition-building and maritime capacity enhancement. The European Union’s engagement is portrayed through less visible but nevertheless significant mechanisms, including trade, development cooperation, maritime governance, and norm diffusion, contributing to what the author terms a form of “quiet-making multipolarity” that encourages restraint, stability, and pragmatic cooperation.

Moving beyond conventional geopolitics, the book broadens the analytical framework to address a range of non-traditional security challenges confronting South Asia in general and Sri Lanka in particular. Climate change, piracy, illegal fishing, maritime terrorism, public health vulnerabilities, and digital insecurity are examined as transnational challenges that transcend the capabilities of individual states. The author argues that these issues reveal the limits of unilateral action and underscore the growing importance of cooperation, collective action, institutional innovation, and middle-power leadership in maritime governance.

Prof. Keerawella further situates the Indian Ocean within the wider context of the emerging Asian Century. Asia’s resurgence—driven principally by China and India and reinforced by the dynamism of Southeast Asia—is presented as a major reconfiguration of global power. In this transformation, the Indian Ocean functions as a vital maritime artery connecting energy resources, manufacturing centres, and consumer markets. At the same time, the author cautions against deterministic interpretations, emphasising that the realisation of the Asian Century remains contingent upon how the region responds to persistent inequalities, environmental challenges, governance deficits, and intensifying strategic competition.

Assessing how SL has navigated shifts

The book concludes by returning to Sri Lanka and assessing how the country has navigated contemporary shifts in the regional and global balance of power under the National People’s Power (NPP) government that emerged in the aftermath of the Aragalaya of 2022. The author demonstrates how economic crisis, demands for accountability, and aspirations for a new political culture have reshaped the domestic context within which foreign policy is conducted. Under President Anura Kumara Dissanayake, Sri Lanka is portrayed as pursuing a carefully calibrated strategy that combines engagement with international financial institutions, enhanced cooperation with India in defence and energy sectors, continued economic engagement with China, and functional security relations with the United States. The government’s response to the 2026 U.S.–Iran War—rejecting military access requests from all parties while extending humanitarian assistance—serves as an illustration of the author’s broader argument that strategic flexibility, principled neutrality, and diplomatic agility remain essential for small states navigating an increasingly complex Indian Ocean order.

Taken together, the book advances several interconnected propositions. First, the Indian Ocean is entering an increasingly multipolar era in which power is exercised through complex networks of cooperation, competition, and interdependence rather than rigid alliance structures. Second, small states are neither passive spectators nor mere proxies of great powers; they possess strategic agency and navigate competing pressures through hedging, diversification, and calibrated diplomacy. Third, Sri Lanka’s strategic behaviour—characterised by navigating asymmetry through flexibility and ambiguity—reflects a historically rooted dual consciousness that combines vulnerability with cosmopolitan engagement. Fourth, non-traditional security challenges and environmental governance are no longer peripheral concerns but central components of the evolving regional order.

Need for adaptive navigation

Prof. Keerawella argues that contemporary statecraft in the Indian Ocean requires adaptive navigation rather than rigid alignment. In a fluid and contested maritime environment, survival and influence depend less on resisting structural change than on understanding and responding to it with prudence, flexibility, and strategic clarity. The book therefore offers important insights into how small states can transform structural vulnerability into strategic agency and convert exposure into opportunities for engagement within a changing regional order.

Combining historical depth with contemporary analysis, it provides a nuanced understanding of the interaction between great-power competition, regional transformation, and the strategic choices of smaller states. The book will be of considerable value to students and scholars of international relations, political science, strategic studies, and maritime affairs, while also offering useful perspectives to policymakers, diplomats, and practitioners. Equally important, it opens several promising avenues for future research on the Indian Ocean and the emerging Indo-Pacific order.

Hermeneutic approachs

Methodologically, the study draws upon hermeneutic approaches to examine the geopolitical and maritime environments that shape relationships among states, societies, and historical processes. The result is a work that is both analytically rigorous and intellectually engaging. This review has sought less to evaluate the book in a conventional sense than to introduce its central themes and encourage a wider readership to engage with its arguments. Having highlighted the many merits of the volume, it is worth noting one technical shortcoming: the absence of an index. Given the book’s wide thematic scope and rich empirical content, the inclusion of an index would have significantly enhanced its value as a reference tool for researchers and students alike.

In sum, Prof. Keerawella listens attentively to the winds, reads the waves with analytical precision, and traces the deeper currents that shape the Indian Ocean world. The outcome is Winds and Waves: Geopolitical Currents in the Indian Ocean since 1945, a timely and thought-provoking contribution published by the Bandaranaike Centre for International Studies.

Reviewed by
Dr. Ramesh Ramasamy
Department of Political Science, University
of Peradeniya