Midweek Review

City University and utilisation of existing higher education institutions

Published

5 years ago

2021/10/13

Sahan Weerasooriya

President Gotabaya Rajapaksa launching the city university project

By Sunil Dahanayake and Samanthi Senaratne

The launch ceremony of the City University took place at the President’s Office and it was followed by a discussion, on TV Derana, among high-ranking officials of the University Grants Commission (UGC). Thereafter, we googled the words ‘City University of Sri Lanka’ and noted the following utopian phrases provided on the City University website.

“COME. DREAM. DO.

There is a beginning to every story, and it is now more vital than ever, to ensure that you have the right start. City University is your platform to launch your dreams into the world.”

This is a catchy phrase used to lure prospective students to these new City Universities planned by the government. Is this a reality or a fantasy? Are Sri Lankan General Certificate of Education (GCE) Advanced Level (A/L) qualified students deceived by such a university project? In this review, we critically analyse these questions and explain the current situation of university and technical education in Sri Lanka. We also provide an alternative proposal for the City University, on how to utilise the existing higher education institutions to improve university education in Sri Lanka.

The dialogue on school and higher education in Sri Lanka was initiated by the President’s policy statement, ‘Soubagye Dakma’ or ‘Vistas of Prosperity’ in November 2019. The presidential policy statement and his verbal presentations emphasised three major areas in higher education reforms to (a) decrease the time gap between the release of GCE A/L results and the university enrolment date; (b) increase the number of students for university enrolments and (c) produce employable graduates. The President has appointed one Cabinet minister for education with four state ministers and among them; two state ministers are responsible for higher education reforms. They are State Minister of Education Reforms, Open Universities and Distance Learning Promotion, and State Minister of Skills Development, Vocational Education, Research and Innovations. This article focuses on the City University concept initiated by the State Minister for Skills Development, Vocational Education, Research, and Innovation (SMSDVERI). The relevant state ministry plans to operate the City University under the Gazette Extraordinary No.2209/14, dated January 4, 2021, as indicated on its website.

Many students who pass the GCE A/L examination fail to gain admission to state universities in Sri Lanka. As per the statistical handbook published by the UGC, the number of students admitted to state universities in 2019/2020 was 41,641 (23 percent) compared to students qualified for admission, which was 181,206. This means that 77 percent of students could not gain admission to state universities in 2019/2020. These students, who are unable to get university admissions, explore various other avenues such as overseas universities, private non-state higher education institutes, professional examinations, the Open University of Sri Lanka (OUSL), and technical colleges to continue their education. The President has emphasised the need to fulfil the aspirations of these GCE A/L qualified students by increasing the enrolment numbers of the state university system of Sri Lanka, with degree programmes that produce employable graduates. The City University project was initiated as a solution to address these concerns.

What is this City University? On the website of City University, it is described as “the first and only tertiary education institution in the country, that will establish a highly industry-centric focus on all the programmes offered.” As mentioned on the website, the focus of the degree programmes offered by the City University is the employability of graduates. Also, the students who are enrolled in its degree programmes will be given practical experience in different disciplines. Thus, the objectives of these City University campuses are human resource development, stakeholder collaboration, development of regional areas and facilitating technology transfer. The City University’s website provides the following information.

“The State Ministry of Skills Development, Vocational Education, Research and Innovation has been vested with the task of establishing City Universities. It has been planned to open a City University in every district. After a feasibility study, five locations were selected to start with. The first CU will be opened in Wagolla, Rambukkana, in the Kegalle District.”

The City University campuses plan to offer bachelor’s degree programmes in Applied Information Technology, Sustainable Tourism and Hospitality Management, Post-Harvest Management and Value Addition.

We appreciate the praiseworthy objective of this City University concept. It can increase the student enrolment numbers in the state university system. Since this project is backed by the government, there is also a possibility of securing some funds from the treasury or donor agencies such as the World Bank and Asian Development Bank. However, there are many weaknesses, which could doom the City University project in the long run, when considering the issues faced by the existing state universities and technical colleges in the country. Hence, we argue that the SMSDVERI ought to evaluate the needs of prospective students and should optimally utilise the available higher education institutions and resources for this purpose.

We are not pessimistic about the intentions of the Ministry of Education and the UGC, but we review this project pragmatically under the concept of ‘Marketing Myopia’ by Theodore Levitt. Levitt (Harvard Business Review, 1960) argues “that most of the dead and dying industries have shown the self-deceiving cycle of bountiful expansion and undetected decay.” Similarly, the designers of the City University concept seem to operate with the perception that thousands of students will enrol in this university without information on academic accreditation, programme details and standard of the academic staff. The City University website does not provide sufficient details on faculty structure, programmes and course descriptions, and the academic staff involved in these programmes. The lack of such information raises the question whether this City University and its degree programmes are properly planned. It seems that the designers of this project have adopted a production-oriented approach rather than a market-oriented approach. Thus, they should not work with the assumption that the GCE A/L qualified students are a vulnerable group who would enrol in any programme offered under a label of a university. They should realise that there are many local and international higher educational institutes operating in Sri Lanka other than state universities. As such, prospective students compare information available on this City University with that of other higher educational institutions in making their enrolment decisions. Further, the best universities in the world are not merely teaching-focused; rather they are vibrant institutions, which focus on all three functions of a university, teaching, research and community service. However, it is questionable whether this proposed City University has been designed to meet all these purposes.

There are 14 state universities, including the OUSL, operating under the UGC, apart from specific purpose universities such as Bhikku Universities and Visual and Performing Arts University. Further, the Sri Lanka Institute of Advanced Technological Education (SLIATE) and its 20 technical colleges also enrol GCE A/L qualified students in their diploma programmes. These existing universities and technical colleges are under-resourced and exhibit many hallmarks of underdevelopment. These include the lack of state-of-the-art lecture halls, the absence of well-developed informational technology (IT) platforms, largely manual administration and finance systems, inadequate funds for research and staff development, and inadequate student accommodation and other facilities. State universities in Sri Lanka except for the two oldest universities, Colombo and Peradeniya, are not among the top universities in the world as per world university rankings due to the above-mentioned limitations in the university system. Most Sri Lankan state universities are mainly teaching-focused instead of both teaching and research-focused, as research funds are inadequate. Under such a resource strained environment, the UGC and SMSDVERI plan to establish 25 City Universities throughout Sri Lanka in addition to the existing 14 main universities making a total of 49 state universities in the country.

We question the rationale behind the government’s plan to spend capital and operational outlay for these City Universities without effectively utilising the resources of existing universities and other higher educational institutions. Therefore, we provide an alternative to utilise the available infrastructure facilities of SLIATE and its technical colleges, OUSL, and Colleges of Education (Teacher Training Colleges) to increase the student enrolment numbers to state universities. We argue that the breeding of new universities does not resolve higher education problems in Sri Lanka unless the existing universities and technical college education system in the country is streamlined.

Missing link between university and technical education

One of the major flaws in our university and technical education system is that these two organisational structures are not connected for the students to enrol in the relevant degree programmes of universities after completing the diploma programmes from technical colleges. Therefore, we suggest combining university and technical college education systems under this City University concept and developing one centralised university with regional university colleges, after absorbing the technical colleges. This combined approach of higher education is similar to the system that exists in developed countries like Australia. For example, Australia has three major levels of education; schools, Technical and Further Education (TAFE) Institutes and Universities. Students who are unable to get direct admission to the universities can enrol in a TAFE College and complete a diploma programme after completing the year 12 examination. Subsequently, these students can enter a university and complete a degree programme. The TAFE Colleges in Australia also provide education options for adult learners and school dropouts to improve their careers. Therefore, the UGC and SMSDVERI can develop a similar scheme to link universities and technical colleges to increase the number of students admitted to state universities.

Technical colleges are administered by SLIATE and come under the purview of SMSDVERI. These technical colleges offer diploma level and certificate level programmes under various subjects such as business studies, accounting and engineering. Diploma qualifications of technical college students are not currently considered sufficiently in enrolling students in undergraduate and postgraduate degree programmes in the state universities despite the provisions for such, in the Sri Lanka Qualification Framework (SLQF). Examples are the Higher National Diploma in Accountancy (HNDA) and Higher National Diploma in Commerce (HNDC) conducted by the technical colleges under the SLIATE. These two diplomas are considered inferior to the degrees in Accounting and Commerce conducted by the state universities. Hence, the students of technical colleges are at a disadvantage when finding jobs and pursuing university education in Sri Lanka. This missing link between university and technical college education does not support the young and adult learners, who have missed direct entry to the university system through GCE A/L results. Therefore, we suggest combining and streamlining the higher education programmes of state universities and technical colleges under the concept of City University.

Utilising organisational structure of SLIATE and Technical Colleges

The SMSDVERI can reorganise and streamline the SLIATE and its 20 technical colleges into one centralised university with affiliated university colleges, instead of constructing 25 new universities under the City University Concept. The current 20 technical colleges can operate as affiliated university colleges, under the umbrella of the proposed centralised university. The proposed centralised university can be established in the Maradana or Dehiwala Technical College utilising the available resources and facilities. This proposal may require amendments to the SLIATE and University Acts, evaluation of the diploma programmes conducted by the technical colleges and upgrading some of them as degree programmes under various faculties. Finally, this process of reorganisation should be followed by launching a marketing campaign to attract students, parents, and other stakeholders. We believe that reorganising and streamlining the SLIATE and its technical colleges will result in an increase in university student enrolment, as expected by the City University concept.

It is also necessary to evaluate skilled occupation areas identified by developed countries during reorganisation of higher education systems. We examined the Australian skilled migration occupation categories as provided in the web link of the Australian Department of Home Affairs. Accordingly, skilled employment areas with the highest demand are Medicine, Engineering, Architecture, Accounting, Auditing and Finance, Information Technology, Allied Health Sciences and Nursing and Hospitality and Tourism Management. The demand is also high for technically proficient personnel such as Motor Mechanics, Bricklayers, Welders and Electricians. Hence, we are of the view that the UGC and higher education authorities should assess the local and global employment needs when developing university education programmes instead of haphazard development of City University campuses in every district.

The proposed centralised university and its affiliated university colleges can establish schools or faculties for the subject streams based on employer demands as highlighted above. Accordingly, Engineering, Accounting and Business Administration, Information Technology, Hospitality and Tourism Management, Allied Health Sciences and Nursing can be considered as priority subject areas. Further, a Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences should be established to cater to students’ languages and social sciences knowledge and skills improvement. Diplomas that are currently offered by SLIATE through its technical colleges should be revised under the above subject categories. The duration of the basic diploma or associate degrees should be limited to a two-year period or four semesters. Diploma holders or associate degree holders, who want to continue their studies, should enroll in university level degree programmes offered by these affiliated university colleges of the centralised university.

In this proposed centralised university and affiliated university college system, students should be allowed to complete double major diploma or degree programmes such as Engineering and Business Administration, Business Administration and English Language and Tourism and Hospitality Management and Accounting. Hence, students who want to launch their own enterprises are facilitated as they are equipped with the necessary subject knowledge and technical skills in entrepreneurship. For example, a student who wants to open a hotel can opt for a joint diploma or degree in Tourism and Hospitality Management, and Business Administration. These proposed diplomas or associate degree programmes should be incorporated with internships, in addition to the theoretical knowledge. Thereby, these students can find local and foreign jobs as soon as they complete the diploma or degree programmes. We noted that the proposed City University has given due consideration to the provision of practical training, which is commendable.

Combining with OUSL and Colleges of Education

The proposed centralised university and affiliated university college system can also be combined with the existing academic programmes of OUSL, and Colleges of Education. The OUSL with its main campus in Nawala, nine regional centres and 19 study centres operate distance mode degree programmes under six academic faculties. Consequently, this City University can introduce inter-university enrolments with OUSL. The OUSL requires classrooms that are compatible with state-of-the-art teaching technologies in the Nawala campus, which can support both in-house and distance mode education programmes to increase student enrolment numbers. The academic coordination for each subject unit can be done by a senior lecturer at the main campus with the support of a few assistant lecturers in regional centres. Therefore, opportunities and resources are available to execute this proposed university system with the support of the OUSL.

There are also several Colleges of Education in Sri Lanka such as Nilwala National College of Education, Ruwanpura National College of Education, and Sri Pada College of Education. A few of these Colleges of Education can be upgraded to universities and combined with this proposed centralised university and its affiliated university colleges. These upgraded Colleges of Education can commence degree programmes in other subject streams in addition to the diploma programmes in education. The diploma in education programmes can be upgraded into a BA degree in education. We also noted a news item in the Daily Mirror, dated September 2, 2021, which reported that Jeevan Thondaman, State Minister for Estate Housing and Community Infrastructure, was in discussion with the Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu on getting assistance to establish a university for upcountry Tamil students. As such, what we have suggested in this article on upgrading the Colleges of Education meets the demands of the social and political system. Thus, Sri Pada College of Education can be upgraded to a university to offer degree programmes in education and other subject streams. We noted that the ministerial sub-committee appointed to propose solutions for the salary anomalies of school teachers has also proposed the upgrade of these Colleges of Education into universities.

In summary, the proposed city university can be operated using the SLIATE and its technical colleges as a new centralised university with affiliated university colleges. Further, it can be linked with the OUSL and upgraded Colleges of Education as universities. In our opinion, this is a more pragmatic solution than establishing new city universities in every district, which is unrealistic when considering the fragile economic state of the country.

We have discussed the proposed City University concept and alternative solutions for the development of higher education institutions in Sri Lanka. In this analysis, we raise the question why the government is not utilising the available resources of the SLIATE and its technical college campuses, OUSL and Colleges of Education to increase the student enrolment numbers at universities and re-vitalising these organisations. We noted that the Ministry of Education focuses on constructing new universities without considering the effective utilisation of these existing resources. Hence, we argue that the City University concept is a utopian fantasy rather than a pragmatic project when considering the current economic and socio-political environment of Sri Lanka.

Universities and higher education institutions fulfil three main functions; teaching, research, and community services. However, universities and technical colleges in Sri Lanka do not have adequate resources to carry out these tasks effectively. For example, lecture halls and information technology systems are outdated and cannot compete with universities in the developed world. The administration and financial management systems are outdated and are largely manually operated. The academics are not provided with adequate research funds. State universities in Sri Lanka mostly focus on teaching and not on research as reflected in the world university rankings. State universities in Sri Lanka have received poor ratings in the world university ranking indexes such as Quacquarelli Symonds (QS) and Times Higher Education rankings due to the lack of quality research publications. The University of Colombo and the University of Peradeniya have been ranked between 1,000 and 1,200 best universities in the world by QS ranking whereas Times Higher Education ranked University of Peradeniya between 401 nad 500 and University of Colombo between 801 and 1,000. The other 12 state universities have not been included in these rankings. The City University, with the above indicated deficiencies, can lower the bar of accreditation of degrees awarded by state universities in Sri Lanka in the international arena. This would negatively impact skilled employment and higher education opportunities for Sri Lankan university graduates in developed countries.

What Sri Lanka needs is the streamlining and reorganising of existing universities, technical colleges, and colleges of education under the UGC for mutual recognition of degree and diploma programmes offered by these institutions. Hence, we have provided an alternative solution to increase the student enrolment of the existing universities, technical colleges, and colleges of education under this City University project using the available resources. The SLIATE maintains about 20 technical college campuses scattered around Sri Lanka and offers 14 diploma programmes. Therefore, it is apparent that the SLIATE and its technical colleges have the required organisational structure, staff, and academic programmes. Hence, what is required is the reorganisation or streamlining of SLIATE and its technical colleges into one centralised university with affiliated university colleges under the concept ‘City University’. A new centralised university campus can be set up either at Maradana or Dehiwala technical college.

The OUSL and its regional centres can also be used to offer degree programmes under the proposed system, which will enable an inter-university enrolment system. The OUSL can offer degree programmes for students of these affiliated university colleges. Further, a few Colleges of Education scattered around Sri Lanka can be upgraded into universities and the current diploma in education programmes can be restructured as a BA degree in Education, under its faculty of education. Further, these Colleges of Education, which are upgraded into universities, can commence degree programmes in other subject streams such as Management, Information Technology, Hospitality and Tourism Management, Engineering and Health Sciences.

We emphasise that the existing capacity of universities should be effectively utilised while focusing on obtaining international accreditation for state universities through expansion of research activities. Further, the Sri Lankan university system should be made flexible by abandoning the archaic systems of student enrolments, embracing inter-university and inter-faculty enrolments, and introducing double major degree programmes. These changes would enhance the quality of university education. We reiterate the fact that the Ministry of Education, two State Ministries for Higher Education, UGC, SLIATE, OUSL, other state universities, National Institute of Education (NIE) and Colleges of Education need to act together to optimally use the existing organisations and their resources to achieve long-term objectives of higher education in Sri Lanka.

Promoters of the City University concept have crafted an image of a utopian university, which reminds us of Thomas More’s concept of ‘utopia’ (1516) , John Henry Newman’s ‘Idea of a University’ (1873) and Robert Maynard Hutchins’ ‘The University of Utopia’ (1953). Hutchins, who served as the President of the University of Chicago, argued that the function of a university is to develop learned responsible citizens, instead of producing mere technicians. Hence, the proposed City University falls short of those philosophical concepts and will add another expenditure line item to the national budget.

Sunil Dahanayake, PhD, FCA is a Chartered Accountant and Samanthi Senaratne, PhD is Senior Professor in Accounting, Department of Accounting, University of Sri Jayewardenepura. She can be reached via email at samanthisenaratne@sjp.ac.lk)

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Midweek Review

Opp. caught up in CIABOC offensive

Published

5 days ago

2026/06/24

Sahan Weerasooriya

Mahinda Rajapaksa leaving CIABOC on 12 June, 2026

The Commission to Investigate Allegations of Bribery or Corruption (CIABOC) on 12 June questioned former President Mahinda Rajapaksa regarding the USD 2 Mn bribe allegation directed at the late SriLankan CEO Kapila Chandrasena, whose body was found on 8 May in a close relative’s home in Kollupitiya. Chandrasena’s alleged suicide sent shock waves through political circles and interested parties questioned the circumstances leading to him being granted bail on 6 May on cash bail of Rs. 500,000 with three sureties of Rs. 10 million each. The Colombo Magistrate court also imposed a travel ban. The issue at hand is as to how Mohamed Riswan and Mohamed Irshan stood as sureties for Chandrasekera. Of all the investigations undertaken by the CIABOC, the USD 2 Mn bribe case is the most politically charged probe.

Of the Rajapaksas, former State Minister Shasheendra Rajapaksa is so far the last to be indicted. CIABOC on 19 June filed indictments before the Colombo High Court against him and two others Sepalika Saman Kumari and Keerthi Bandara Kotagama. According to the charges, the accused are alleged to have committed the offence of corruption and aided and abetted the commission of the offence by using official influence to pressure certain government officials, attached to the Office for Reparations, to obtain compensation amounting to Rs. 8.85 million for a property built on a state land by Shasheendra and destroyed by marauding Aragalaya mobs.

By Shamindra Ferdinando

The ruling National People’s Power (NPP) government last week emphasised, in no uncertain terms, that it wouldn’t tolerate the growing Opposition challenge.

Amidst the growing controversy over the continuing detention of retired Maj. Gen. Suresh Sallay. in terms of the draconian Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA), under humiliating conditions, in connection with the ongoing investigations into the 2019 Easter Sunday carnage, police arrested Sugeeshwara Bandara, leader of the New People’s Front (NPF). The Central Crime Investigation Bureau (CCIB) apprehended him on 18 June and the Fort Magistrate’s Court remended him till 1 July..

The CCIB also apprehended Binoy Hettiarachchi who was accompanying Bandara. Hettiarachchi served as a media coordinator at the former President Ranil Wickremesinghe’s Flower Road Office. Police intercepted their vehicle at Kollupitiya where the arrests were made like in an action-packed movie. Hettiarachchi was freed four hours later.

But, it would be better to identify Bandara as the former private secretary to President Gotabaya Rajapaksa as well as the Director General of Special Projects at the Presidential Secretariat in the wake of Ranil Wickremesinghe taking over the presidency.

Accused of receiving two salaries simultaneously, under the President’s Expenditure Head, Bandara who managed the media for Gotabaya Rajapaksa, in the run-up to the 2019 presidential election, is under investigation for abuse of government vehicles and employing government workers for political work.

Having launched his political career as the Colombo District organiser of the alliance New People’s Front, a breakaway faction of the UPFA, in February, 2024, Bandara contested the November, 2024, parliamentary polls on the New Democratic Front (NDF) ticket. But, of late, Bandara, as the leader of NPF, became one of the most active opposition activists, aligned with the political grouping, dubbed People’s United Opposition, operating from Ranil Wickremesinghe’s Flower Road Office.

Bandara drew the wrath of the government when he launched a noisy protest outside Finance Secretary Dr. Harshana Suriyapperuma’s residence at Akuregoda, Pelawatta, on 26 April, where he and his protesting supporters were given a shower of excreta. The group, led by Bandara, demanded the Finance Secretary’s resignation over the theft of USD 2.5 mn from the Treasury. No less a person than President Anura Kumara Dissanayake reacted angrily to Bandara’s actions.

Acknowledging the right for legitimate protests, the President warned against protests directed at residences of officials. On 18 April, Bandara led a protest outside Agriculture Minister K.D. Lal Kantha’s recently built luxury residence at Weliwita, Kaduwela, where he questioned how the JVPer managed to build such a home as he was on record as having repeatedly said that he lived a difficult life.

The police apprehended Bandara as he was returning from a meeting between senior representatives of the People’s United Opposition and the IMF Colombo at the Tiki Bar, Shangri-La. In spite of negligible parliamentary presence, with those elected on the NDF ticket at the last parliamentary election not really speaking in one voice, the Flower Road project has become a headache for the government.

In fact, the Flower Road operation has been causing continuous harassment to the NPP, while the Samagi Jana Balawegaya (SJB) struggled to play its anticipated role as the main Opposition. Instead of conducting a cohesive campaign against the cocky NPP government, members of the SJB seem to be pulling in different directions at the expense of the common opposition front.

Regardless of the Wickremesinghe-led grouping vowing to press ahead with its campaign, the arrest of Bandara is obviously meant to have a detrimental impact on the activities of the Opposition.

It would be pertinent to mention that Bandara had been among those who stayed with President Gotabaya Rajapaksa at the President’s House, in Colombo, as a massive protest erupted on 9 July, 2022. Bandara was among the last to flee the President’s House as the military withdrew, amidst mounting pressure on their positions.

The police arrested Bandara as former President Gotabaya Rajapaksa moved the Court of Appeal in terms of Article 140 of the Constitution to prevent him being arrested under the PTA. The wartime Defence Secretary sought the court intervention in the wake of police probing the 2019 Easter Sunday carnage and obtaining a travel ban against him.

The court heard Romesh de Silva PC’s submissions on behalf of the ex-President on 18 June. The court deferred the hearing to 24 June. The crux of the matter is that the ex-President fears that the CID is about to arrest him on the basis of a statement made by fugitive Azad Moulana, in Paris, linking Sallay directly with the Easter Sunday carnage.

NPP intensifies pressure

The NPP seems confident of its current course of action meant to pin down the Opposition. In spite of unbridled corruption being the major issue on the post-war election platform, no political party succeeded in going flat-out against the political opposition.

However, the NPP allowed the judicial process to continue. The first major sentencing was announced on 2 April, 2025, just six months after the parliamentary polls, handsomely won by the NPP. The Commission to Investigate Allegations of Bribery or Corruption (CIABOC) moved the Colombo High Court successfully against the former Chief Minister of the North Central Province S.M. Ranjith Samarakoon.

Colombo High Court No. 01 Judge Adithya Patabendige sentenced him in terms of Section 70 of the Bribery Act. The HC declared the former CM perpetrated malpractices by ordering fuel to his personal secretary’s vehicle. The personal secretary happened to be Shanthi Chandrasena, wife of his brother S.M. Chandrasena, a former Cabinet Minister and one of the most powerful Ministers to represent the North Central province.

The ex- Chief Minister and the second accused, his personal secretary, were convicted guilty of two charges. Both were sentenced to 16 years rigorous imprisonment and were also ordered to pay a fine of Rs. 200,000/- with an additional two-year prison term in case of default.

Deputy Director General Asitha Anthoney appeared on behalf of the Commission to Investigate Allegations of Bribery or Corruption.

There had never been any really coordinated CIABOC campaign against corruption. No political party, or a particular family, felt threatened by CIABOC. Both those in and outside Parliament acted with impunity. They feared no one. There was no need to be because the powerful and the influential operated above the law.

Just a couple of weeks after sentencing of S.M. Ranjith Samarakoon and Shanthini Chandrasena, the CIABOC arrested the latter’s husband, one-time Deputy Economic Development Minister and Special Projects Minister, S.M. Chandrasena. The CIABOC took him into custody on 4 July, 2025.

The CIABOC accused the former Minister of causing loss to the government by distributing seed corn, imported at a cost of Rs 25 mn, in 2024, among the farmer community in the Anuradhapura district, at a subsidised price. The distribution had taken place ahead of the 2015 presidential election contested by Mahinda Rajapaksa and estranged former SLFP General Secretary Maithripala Sirisena. The CIABOC alleged that Chandrasena exerted undue influence on the Director (Planning) and other officers of the District Secretariat and distributed seeds through his political allies to gain an advantage in the 2015 presidential election and incurred a loss to the government.

Chandrasena was granted bail on 1 August, 2025. He was indicted on 12 June before the Colombo High Court.

Before further discussing the ongoing anti-corruption campaign, let me introduce the top leadership of CIABOC. The Commission consists of Justice W.M.N.P. Iddawela (Chairman), K.B. Rajapakse and Chethiya Goonesekera P.C, with High Court judge R.S.A. Dissanayake as its Director General.

The sentencing of the S. M. Ranjith Samarakoon didn’t really bother his side. The arrest of his brother S.M. Chandrasena, too, didn’t really upset those facing charges. But, sentencing of former Minister Mahindananda Aluthgamage and former Sathosa Chairman and former Trade Minister Nalin Fernando on 29 May, 2025, sent shock waves through the Opposition.

The Colombo High Court Trial-at-Bar sentenced Aluthgamage and Fernando for committing the offence of corruption by purchasing 14,000 carrom boards and 11,000 checkers boards through Sathosa, allegedly to distribute to schools and sports clubs selected by the Sports Ministry, and distributing them to party offices of the government, during the 2015 presidential election campaign thereby, causing a loss of over 53 million rupees to the government, stunned the Opposition.

Aluthgamage was sentenced to 20 years of rigorous imprisonment, Fernando received a sentence of 25 years of rigorous imprisonment. Additionally, a fine of Rs. 100,000 (hundred thousand) was imposed for each count.

The CIABOC’s Assistant Director General Mrs. Anuththara Jayasinghe and Assistant Director General Mrs. Thushari Dayaratne conducted the prosecution.

During the Yahapalana government Aluthgamage spearheaded a high profile anti-corruption campaign, dubbed ‘Yahapalana Top 10 kamba horu’. The then Joint Opposition (JO) group, led in Parliament by Dinesh Gunawardena, published a 750-page book, targeting the Yahapalana ministers. Mahindananda, who spearheaded that campaign, is now serving a long sentence.

The JO group consists of UPFA lawmakers who declined to throw their weight behind the then President Sirisena aligned with the UNP.

Let me mention the names of those against whom the accusations were made by the JO.

Yahapalana corruption

The JO dealt with 10 major cases. (1) The Treasury bond scams perpetrated in 2015 and 2016. Accusations were directed at Ranil Wickremesinghe, Ravi Karunanayake and Governor Central Bank Arjuna Mahendran. The losses were estimated at Rs 26 bn. (2) causing losses amounting to Rs 10 bn through the fraudulent import of vehicles. Ravi Karunanayake was named the chief culprit (3) Misappropriation of Mahapola funds to the tune of Rs. 1 bn. Allegations were directed at Malik Samarawickrema (4) Stealing from an insurance scheme implemented for the benefit of those going for employment in West Asia. The JO accused Thalatha Atukarale of misappropriating funds amounting Rs 1.5 bn (5) Receiving Rs 1.5 bn through the leasing of Hambantota port to China on a 99-year lease. Ranil Wickremesinghe, Malik Samarawickrema and R. Paskaralingam were named the offenders (6) Kabir Hashim was accused of causing a loss of Rs 54 bn by cancelling aircraft ordered from Airbus Industries for the national carrier (7) fraudulent activities pertaining to the release of paddy stocks held by the government. The JO estimated the losses caused to the government at Rs 10 bn. (8) Scam in vehicle parts. Ravil Karunanayake was accused of causing losses amounting to Rs. 6.5 bn, (9 A) Dr. Rajitha Senaratne was accused of leasing of the Modera fisheries harbor and procurement of eight vessels to catch fish, fraudulently, and thereby causing losses up to Rs 1 bn, (9B) The JO also found fault with Dr. Senaratne for perpetrating Rs 1.5 bn fraud in the procurement of medicine and lastly (10) Ranil Wickremesinghe, Malik Samarawickrema, R. Paskaralingam and Charitha Ratwatte were blamed for a massive fraud in the procurement of coal for the Norochcholai coal-fired power plant. That particular fraud was estimated at Rs 5 bn.

Although the JO transformed itself to Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna (SLPP) later, to successfully contested the 2019 presidential election, none of the above-mentioned cases were investigated. As far as we know, none of those cases had been dealt with during the SLPP rule, from November, 2019, to July, 2022. Faced with an externally backed regime change operation, the SLPP invited Wickremesinghe, who had been named by them in three major corruption cases, to accept the premiership in May, 2022, and presidency in July same year.

So far, there is no indication whether the mentioned JO allegations had received the attention of the CIABOC or the Attorney General of the government. As far as we know of all the politicians and officials, Wickremesinghe is the only one facing imminent threat due to the ongoing case pertaining to him visiting the UK in September, 2023, to join his wife Prof. Maithree at the University of Wolverhampton at her graduation ceremony.

Wickremesinghe has been accused of squandering nearly 17 mn rupees at a time the country was in deep economic turmoil. The Fort Magistrate’s court is scheduled to take up the case on 8 July.

SLPP parliamentary group leader Namal Rajapaksa is also facing a major legal challenge. The former Minister has been indicted on charges of criminal misappropriation of Rs. 70 mn in connection with the controversial Krrish project. The indictments have been forwarded to the Colombo High Court by the Attorney General, alleging that Namal Rajapaksa misappropriated funds by receiving Rs. 70 million from the Indian real estate company for the development of rugby in Sri Lanka.

Yoshitha Rajapaksa, too, has been dealt with by the CIABOC. The Rajapaksas have been accused of lowering qualifications required to join the executive branch of the Navy and then sending him to the Royal Naval Academy in the United Kingdom at taxpayers’ expense. Produced before the Colombo Additional Magistrate, Yoshitha was released on three personal bail bonds of Rs. 5 million each.

Producing Yoshitha before court on 17 June, Deputy Director General of the Bribery Commission, Ruvini Wickramasinghe declared: “”Your Honour, the complaint regarding this incident was received on June 25, 2016. Accordingly, the Commission initiated investigations. The complaint states that the suspect had participated in naval training programmes held in England and Ukraine by misusing government funds, while depriving qualified applicants of such opportunities. At that time, this individual, who is a civilian in the dock today, was also a civilian in 2006 when he was deemed eligible for the Royal Navy Young Officer training at the Royal Naval Academy in the United Kingdom. The opportunities to receive this training are extremely limited. Your Honour, selection to this prestigious course is usually based on being the most outstanding cadet officer during a two-year training period or based on performance during training. However, this suspect, although a civilian in 2006, was proposed and included in the list and was sent for the course in haste.”

The Deputy Director General also stated that Yoshitha Rajapaksa had undergone medical examinations required for overseas training even before being officially recruited into the Navy.

The court was also told that though Sri Lanka previously received scholarships from the UK the Rajapaksa government funded Yoshitha to the tune of Rs 6.2 mn.

Opp. attacks CIABOC

The Opposition has repeatedly attacked the CIABOC with its Director General Ranga Dissanayake being the primary target. Accusing Dissanayake of being a JVPer, the Opposition has repeatedly questioned the conduct of the High Court judge demanding that the CIABOC inquired into the top official’s conduct, especially with regard to the alleged suicide of former Sri Lankan CEO Kapila Chandrasena who had been under investigation pertaining to the receiving of USD 2 mn bribe to facilitate procurement aircraft from Airbus Industrie during Mahinda Rajapaksa’s second term.

Former Foreign Minister Prof. G. L. Peiris, a regular speaker at Flower Road media briefings, alleged that the CIABOC was a political tool in the NPP’s hands.

A section of the Opposition to question the circumstances one-time JVP heavyweight Nandana Gunatilleke died in January this year at the Ragama Teaching Hospital after accusing Dissanayake of pursuing an agenda beneficial to the JVP, a charge denied by the High Court judge. When the writer raised the allegations with Dissanayake, he emphatically denied any wrongdoing on his part https://island.lk/ciaboc-dg-denies-jvp-link/.

The CIABOC has simply ignored accusations directed at its DG who proved through his actions that he really meant high profile public pronouncements against corruption.

Former Deputy Minister and ex-MP Sarana Gunawardena was sentenced to a total of 16 years rigorous imprisonment by the Colombo High Court on June 8, 2026.

During the Yahapalana administration many cases, filed by the CIABOC as well as the Attorney General, were either dismissed or dropped due to lapses on their part. The accused in such cases were ex-MP Sajin Vass Gunawardena, ex-EP Chief Minister Sivanesathurei Chandrakanthan alias Pilleyan, ex-Ministers Johnston Fernando, Rohitha Abeygunawardena, Basil Rajapaksha, Mahindananda Aluthgamage and Janaka Bandara Tennakoon and former AG and CJ Mohan Peiris.

Regardless of Opposition protests, the public appreciate tangible action against corruption. However, the NPP has not been free from serious allegations against it since the last general elections. The release of suspicious 323 containers, plus two containers filled with ice, in January, 2025, followed by the massive coal scam perpetrated in September 2025, loss of over USD 2.5 mn from the Treasury and controversial Aswesuma payments, as well as wealth, accumulated by NPP Ministers as revealed by declarations made to CIABOC, shocked the electorate.

The NPP has failed to counter allegations. The circumstances under which Energy Minister Kumara Jayakody resigned, along with Energy Secretary Udayanga Hemapala, on 17 April, just a week after the NPP defeated the no-confidence motion moved by the Opposition against the Energy Minister. dealt a devastating blow to the NPP’s much touted integrity. The NPP couldn’t explain as to why a person under investigation by the CIABOC for an alleged fraud perpetrated during the Yahapalana government was accommodated in President Dissanayake’s first Cabinet. Indicted before the Colombo High Court, Jayakody’s case commenced last week.

Asset declarations of some NPP Ministers have shocked the country. The SJB has called for CIABOC to investigate them without delay and prove that CIABOC was not only going after the Opposition. Ministers Lal Kantha and Wasantha Samarasinghe are two of the top JVPers who have attracted attention as the Opposition hits back at the government.

SJB MP Mujibur Rahuman said that the JVP/NPP owed an explanation as to how their members amassed so much wealth since 2024 as they repeatedly claimed their inability to meet even their basic needs. But, their asset declarations exposed their blatant lies.

Midweek Review

Geopolitics of the Indian Ocean

Published

5 days ago

2026/06/24

Sahan Weerasooriya

Listening to the Winds, Reading the Waves:

Prof. Gamini Keerawella’s latest publication, Winds and Waves: Geopolitical Currents in the Indian Ocean since 1945 will be launched on 5 August at the Auditorium of the Bandaranaike Centre for International Studies (BCIS). The keynote address will be delivered by Prof. T. V. Paul, James, McGill Professor of Political Science at McGill University, Canada and the former President of the International Studies Association (ISA).

Prof. Keerawella, Professor Emeritus of History at the University of Peradeniya, has dedicated hisbook to the memory of Dr. Newton Gunasinghe, the eminent sociologist and Marxist theoretician who encouraged him to venture beyond disciplinary frontiers. In many respects, this work represents a successful realization of that intellectual endeavour. In her testimonial to back cover of the book, Dr. Radhika Coomaraswamy observes that “Gamini Keerawella offers a nuanced and layered account of the Indian Ocean region’s strategic evolution from the era of decolonization to the contemporary phase of intensifying great-power rivalry. Its distinctive analytical perspective makes it an important contribution to the study of international relations, maritime geopolitics, and regional strategic dynamics.” This assessment accurately captures the significance of the work, and I fully endorse her judgement.

This volume constitutes the final publication of a trilogy that explores the evolving dynamics of international relations from a distinctly Sri Lankan perspective. The first study examined the trajectory of Sri Lanka’s defence and foreign policy, while the second revisited the origins, evolution, and principal constituent elements of international relations as an academic discipline from a Global South perspective. The present work broadens the analytical canvas by tracing the shifting geopolitical contours of the Indian Ocean since 1945 and examining the evolving interplay between great-power competition and regional agency.

Indian Ocean not merely maritime transit space

At the heart of Prof. Keerawella’s analysis is the argument that the Indian Ocean is not merely a maritime space of transit but a living archive whose language is inscribed in tides, trade, and collective memory. To uncover the deeper structures that have shaped the region, he draws on Michel Foucault’s concept of the archaeology of knowledge, probing beneath the visible layers of historical experience to reveal successive strata of thought, exchange, and power. This approach enables him to trace the multiple origins of the Indian Ocean’s geopolitical significance through the sedimented traces of how the ocean has been known, governed, and imagined across time. Complementing this perspective is Fernand Braudel’s concept of the longue durée, which provides the framework for understanding the long-term evolution of Indian Ocean geopolitics. As Keerawella notes, for Braudel, history unfolds not as a single linear sequence but as a layered field of continuity and change, revealing the deeper architecture of the past—the slow yet powerful currents that shape political and economic developments beneath the surface of events (Keerawella 2026: xxiii).Prof. Keerawella further notes that later historians such as K. N. Chaudhuri and M. N. Pearson drew on Braudel’s insights and adapted them to understand the Indian Ocean as a polycentric world.

Prof. Keerawella argues that the terms employed in the title of this work—Winds, Waves, and Currents—evoke the ocean’s dual language of surface movement and underlying structure. In his reading, winds and waves signify motion: the visible and often turbulent forces that carry ships, peoples, commodities, and ideas across shifting maritime frontiers. Currents, by contrast, refer to the deeper and less visible forces that shape historical trajectories and connect coasts and continents through enduring patterns of interaction. As he observes, while winds and waves represent the restless dynamics of the ocean’s surface, currents embody the slower yet more consequential energies that operate beneath it, binding disparate regions into a larger maritime system (2026: xx).

Metaphors and Conceptual Foundation

Building on this conceptual foundation, the author employs winds, waves, and currents not merely as metaphors but also as analytical categories. Winds represent changing strategic directions and geopolitical realignments; waves denote recurring cycles of commerce, conflict, and interaction; and currents symbolize the deep structural forces that connect societies across space and time. Viewed from a distinctly Sri Lankan perspective, the volume demonstrates how a strategically located small state at the centre of the Indian Ocean perceives and navigates this maritime space through its own strategic lens. The book opens by situating Sri Lanka within the intersecting forces of history, geography, and power that have shaped the Indian Ocean world. It advances the notion of a dual strategic consciousness that has informed Sri Lanka’s external engagements: a persistent sense of vulnerability, rooted in colonial experience and geographical exposure, coexisting with a cosmopolitan outlook forged through centuries of maritime exchange. Prof. Keerawella contends that this dual consciousness constitutes the underlying framework through which Sri Lanka has historically interpreted and responded to developments in its external environment.

Winds and Waves is a comprehensive study comprising eleven chapters and an extensive introduction that establishes the analytical foundations of the work by treating the ocean simultaneously as text and method. The opening chapter situates Sri Lanka within the wider Indian Ocean system, tracing the island’s navigation through shifting configurations of power while emphasising the agency of small states. The Indian Ocean is presented not merely as a strategic arena but also as a moral and political space, linking Sri Lanka’s historical experience to the broader aspirations and consciousness of the Global South.

Revisiting British withdrawal

The book revisits Britain’s withdrawal from the Indian Ocean, arguing that it was not simply a consequence of post-war decline but the culmination of deeper structural transformations in the international system. Decolonisation, Afro-Asian nationalism, and the emergence of bipolarity fundamentally altered the regional order and created the conditions for Britain’s retreat. In turn, this withdrawal opened the way for superpower competition, particularly between the United States and the Soviet Union, transforming the Indian Ocean into major theatre of Cold War geopolitics.

A substantial portion of the volume is devoted to examining the policies and strategic trajectories of the major powers. The author traces American engagement from Cold War containment through post-Cold War maritime predominance to contemporary Indo-Pacific formulations, demonstrating that U.S. strategy has evolved through the interaction of structural imperatives and changing strategic discourses. Particular attention is paid to the 2026 U.S.–Iran War, which is interpreted as a transformative event that exposed the limits of military hegemony and accelerated patterns of strategic hedging and multi-alignment among regional actors. The book also explores the Soviet Union’s entry into the Indian Ocean in 1968 and the subsequent re-emergence of Russia under Vladimir Putin through selective naval deployments, arms transfers, and strategic partnerships, illustrating what the author characterises as the recurrent rhythms of great-power engagement in the region.

The rise of China receives extensive treatment as one of the most significant structural developments of the twenty-first century. Through the Belt and Road Initiative, port development projects, and naval modernisation, China has translated growing economic power into expanding strategic influence. The author contrasts Beijing’s assertive posture in the South China Sea with its relatively restrained approach in the Indian Ocean, where economic diplomacy and cooperative security initiatives have assumed greater prominence. Equally significant is the discussion of India’s transformation from a regional power into an emerging global strategic actor. The evolution of Indian maritime strategy—from Nehruvian custodianship to contemporary blue-water ambitions—demonstrates how a rising power navigates structural constraints while expanding its strategic reach. Initiatives such as SAGAR, naval modernization, and deepening partnerships with the United States, Japan, and Australia have positioned India as a central actor in the evolving Indo-Pacific order.

Roles of Japan and EU examined

The volume also examines the roles of Japan and the European Union in shaping the contemporary maritime order. Japan’s transition from post-war restraint to proactive strategic engagement, embodied in the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) vision, illustrates how middle powers adapt to changing geopolitical realities through coalition-building and maritime capacity enhancement. The European Union’s engagement is portrayed through less visible but nevertheless significant mechanisms, including trade, development cooperation, maritime governance, and norm diffusion, contributing to what the author terms a form of “quiet-making multipolarity” that encourages restraint, stability, and pragmatic cooperation.

Moving beyond conventional geopolitics, the book broadens the analytical framework to address a range of non-traditional security challenges confronting South Asia in general and Sri Lanka in particular. Climate change, piracy, illegal fishing, maritime terrorism, public health vulnerabilities, and digital insecurity are examined as transnational challenges that transcend the capabilities of individual states. The author argues that these issues reveal the limits of unilateral action and underscore the growing importance of cooperation, collective action, institutional innovation, and middle-power leadership in maritime governance.

Prof. Keerawella further situates the Indian Ocean within the wider context of the emerging Asian Century. Asia’s resurgence—driven principally by China and India and reinforced by the dynamism of Southeast Asia—is presented as a major reconfiguration of global power. In this transformation, the Indian Ocean functions as a vital maritime artery connecting energy resources, manufacturing centres, and consumer markets. At the same time, the author cautions against deterministic interpretations, emphasising that the realisation of the Asian Century remains contingent upon how the region responds to persistent inequalities, environmental challenges, governance deficits, and intensifying strategic competition.

Assessing how SL has navigated shifts

The book concludes by returning to Sri Lanka and assessing how the country has navigated contemporary shifts in the regional and global balance of power under the National People’s Power (NPP) government that emerged in the aftermath of the Aragalaya of 2022. The author demonstrates how economic crisis, demands for accountability, and aspirations for a new political culture have reshaped the domestic context within which foreign policy is conducted. Under President Anura Kumara Dissanayake, Sri Lanka is portrayed as pursuing a carefully calibrated strategy that combines engagement with international financial institutions, enhanced cooperation with India in defence and energy sectors, continued economic engagement with China, and functional security relations with the United States. The government’s response to the 2026 U.S.–Iran War—rejecting military access requests from all parties while extending humanitarian assistance—serves as an illustration of the author’s broader argument that strategic flexibility, principled neutrality, and diplomatic agility remain essential for small states navigating an increasingly complex Indian Ocean order.

Taken together, the book advances several interconnected propositions. First, the Indian Ocean is entering an increasingly multipolar era in which power is exercised through complex networks of cooperation, competition, and interdependence rather than rigid alliance structures. Second, small states are neither passive spectators nor mere proxies of great powers; they possess strategic agency and navigate competing pressures through hedging, diversification, and calibrated diplomacy. Third, Sri Lanka’s strategic behaviour—characterised by navigating asymmetry through flexibility and ambiguity—reflects a historically rooted dual consciousness that combines vulnerability with cosmopolitan engagement. Fourth, non-traditional security challenges and environmental governance are no longer peripheral concerns but central components of the evolving regional order.

Need for adaptive navigation

Prof. Keerawella argues that contemporary statecraft in the Indian Ocean requires adaptive navigation rather than rigid alignment. In a fluid and contested maritime environment, survival and influence depend less on resisting structural change than on understanding and responding to it with prudence, flexibility, and strategic clarity. The book therefore offers important insights into how small states can transform structural vulnerability into strategic agency and convert exposure into opportunities for engagement within a changing regional order.

Combining historical depth with contemporary analysis, it provides a nuanced understanding of the interaction between great-power competition, regional transformation, and the strategic choices of smaller states. The book will be of considerable value to students and scholars of international relations, political science, strategic studies, and maritime affairs, while also offering useful perspectives to policymakers, diplomats, and practitioners. Equally important, it opens several promising avenues for future research on the Indian Ocean and the emerging Indo-Pacific order.

Hermeneutic approachs

Methodologically, the study draws upon hermeneutic approaches to examine the geopolitical and maritime environments that shape relationships among states, societies, and historical processes. The result is a work that is both analytically rigorous and intellectually engaging. This review has sought less to evaluate the book in a conventional sense than to introduce its central themes and encourage a wider readership to engage with its arguments. Having highlighted the many merits of the volume, it is worth noting one technical shortcoming: the absence of an index. Given the book’s wide thematic scope and rich empirical content, the inclusion of an index would have significantly enhanced its value as a reference tool for researchers and students alike.

In sum, Prof. Keerawella listens attentively to the winds, reads the waves with analytical precision, and traces the deeper currents that shape the Indian Ocean world. The outcome is Winds and Waves: Geopolitical Currents in the Indian Ocean since 1945, a timely and thought-provoking contribution published by the Bandaranaike Centre for International Studies.

Reviewed by
Dr. Ramesh Ramasamy
Department of Political Science, University
of Peradeniya