Midweek Review

B’caloa Tigers’ 2004 shock revolt in retrospect

Published

1 year ago

2025/04/23

Pilleyan, a key element in that drama now arrested for political expediency?

The LTTE killed two Karuna loyalists on July 15, 2004 in the Batticaloa Prison. The dead included Satchi Master. The killer was an LTTEer serving a short sentence for jewellery theft and assault. The killings in the Batticaloa Prison caused anxiety among senior government officials. On Aug. 24, 2004, an LTTEer shot dead another Karuna loyalist, P. Jayakumar, in the Akkaraipattu Magistrate’s Court. A jail guard and a court clerk sustained minor injuries. The police arrested Jayakumar, along with another LTTE dissident, Saravanamuthu Shanthakumar, at a road block, at Akkaraipattu, on May 19th, 2004. They were in possession of a pistol, one hand grenade and 15 rounds of ammunition. Shanthakumar was killed on July 15, 2004 at the Batticaloa Prison along with Satchi Master.

Against the backdrop of one-time LTTEer Sivanesathurai Chandrakanthan, alias Pilleyan’s arrest on April 08, 2025 and subsequent detention under Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) over Eastern University Vice Chancellor Prof. S. Raveendranath’s disappearance on Dec. 15, 2006, whose life was actually under threat from the TIGERS several years after Karuna and Pilleyan broke away from it, various interested parties started commenting on the role played/atrocities perpetrated by Pilleyan and Vinayagamoorthy Muralitharan, aka Karuna Amman, during the conflict, and after.

Both Karuna and Pilleyan entered mainstream politics before the successful conclusion of the war in May 2009. Pilleyan is the current leader of TMVP (Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Pulikal).

In a way it is a pity that the police are now trying to pin Pilleyan for the disappearance of Prof Raveendranath, obviously to please the current political masters.

Comments included their role in LTTE terrorism and what they did after switching their allegiance to the government in March 2004. Let me stress that they daringly rebelled against the LTTE during Ranil Wickremesinghe’s tenure as the Prime Minister. The UNP has repeatedly claimed the credit for the unprecedented schism in what was considered a monolithic terror organisation and some asserted that the LTTE engineered Wickremesinghe’s defeat at the 2005 presidential election to avenge the catastrophic split.

Pilleyan’s arrest caused a political storm with his counsel Udaya Gammanpila alleging that an attempt was being made to compel his client to confess complicity in the 2019 Easter Sunday suicide attacks. Pivithuru Hela Urumaya (PHU) leader and former Minister Gammanpila is no stranger to controversy, but he has remained unscathed when it comes to his integrity.

In spite of vindictive attacks on him, Attorney-at-Law Gammanpila declared that nothing could be as ridiculous as accusing Pilleyan, who had been detained at the Batticaloa Prison for a period of five years (Oct. 11, 2015 to Nov. 24, 2020) of arranging National Thowheed Jaamaath (NTJ) to bomb churches and hotels on April 21, 2019. Having granted bail to Pilleyan and four others held in connection with the Christmas Day, 2005, assassination of TNA MP Joseph Pararajasingham on two personal sureties of Rs. 100,000/- each, the Batticaloa High Court acquitted and released them on January 13, 2021.

It would be pertinent to examine the devastating split caused by Karuna in March 2003 and its impact on the Eelam War IV (2006 August to May 2009).

Karuna’s move

Having received information that ‘Colonel’ Karuna decamped, the Kilinochchi-based leadership acted swiftly and decisively to neutralise the impending threat. The LTTE planned to take hold of both Karuna Amman, responsible for Ampara-Batticaloa sector, and his colleague, Sivasubramanium Varadanthan, aka ‘Colonel’ Paduman, in charge of the neighbouring Trincomalee District, to Kilinochchi. The Kilinochchi-based leadership, or Vanni leadership, wanted to ensure that those deployed under the command of Karuna and Paduman remaind loyal to the organisation. Both Karuna and Paduman had held the rank of ‘Colonel’ at that time, though Karuna was in the limelight due to his involvement in negotiations with the UNF government.

The Kilinochchi command cleverly used the Defence Ministry and SCOPP (Secretariat for Coordinating Peace Process) officials to arrange for an SLAF chopper to fly Karuna Amman, along with Paduman, to Kilinochchi. SCOPP records prove that on the authorisation of the Defence Ministry, it directed the SLAF to pick Paduman from Trincomalee and then touch down at a pre-arranged location in the Batticaloa District, on March 2, 2004, to take on board Karuna.

Fearing that he would have to face a firing squad in Kilinochchi, Karuna declined to join Paduman. Instead, he set in motion a strategy, which finally debilitated the LTTE’s conventional fighting capability. The writer disclosed the LTTE’s counter-move in a Sunday Island report headlined ‘Prabhakaran plotted Karuna capture’ in its March 28, 2004, edition.

Both Karuna and Paduman, at that time, confirmed the LTTE using SCOPP/ SLAF to arrange their transfer from the East to Kilinochchi.

The UNP and the Norwegians never bothered to raise the issue with the LTTE at that time. The Defence Ministry continued to provide chopper rides to the LTTE and did everything possible to appease the outfit, even at the expense of national security.

Norwegian peace facilitator and the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM), too, had been aware of the LTTE request for an SLAF chopper ride for top Tigers in the East. Had Karuna got into that chopper and ended up in a secret LTTE detention camp or executed, Eelam War IV would have taken a different course.

The Vanni leadership used Paduman, on several occasions, to counter reports of a debilitating split in the LTTE. The LTTE never allowed Paduman to leave the Vanni throughout Eelam War IV. Paduman surrendered on May 15, 2009, four days before troops killed LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran, on the banks of the Nanthikadal lagoon.

Karuna caused the split just over a year after the LTTE quit the negotiating table. President CBK, PM Wickremesinghe, and the co-chairs of the peace process, agreed that the LTTE should be allowed to deal with the situation. They allowed the situation to develop into a bloody confrontation. They failed to realise that Karuna’s revolt caused irreparable damage to the organisation by dividing the LTTE’s fighting cadre on regional lines. The crisis denied the LTTE recruitment in the Batticaloa and Ampara sectors, while its operations in the Trincomalee District, too, experienced difficulties due to the detention of ‘Colonel’ Paduman, the senior man in charge of the area. ‘Colonel’ Paduman, too, was perceived as a threat due to his close association with Karuna.

Karuna acted swiftly to ensure his protection and that of the eastern cadres. The well-proven battlefield strategist felt that his security, as well as the safety of the Batticaloa fighting cadre, depended on an understanding with the Sri Lankan military. Karuna pushed for a separate agreement on the lines of the Norwegian arranged CFA between the GoSL and the LTTE in February 2002.

The Island dealt with Karuna’s move in an exclusive headlined ‘Rebel Karuna wants separate deal with government’ in the March 5, 2004 issue, which was based on information provided by Varathan, an aide to Karuna. The then Army Chief, Lieutenant General Lionel Balagalle and DIG Nimal Lewke confirmed what Varathan had to say on behalf of Karuna.

Karuna offered to negotiate a separate ceasefire in the Ampara-Batticaloa sector, though both the Norwegians and the government promptly rejected the move, while reiterating their commitment to the CFA. But, an influential section, within the establishment, supported Karuna’s move. Varathan alleged that a wave of killings in the Eastern Province, in the wake of the CFA, and a demand for 1,000 more cadres from the Batticaloa-Ampara sector for deployment in the Northern Province, too, had contributed to Karuna’s decision to break ranks.

Wobbling goverment

An unprecedented crisis caused by Karuna sent shock waves through the LTTE and its supporters. Among the affected parties were the TNA and the Tamil Diaspora. The LTTE struggled to contain the developing crisis. In spite of specific government orders issued to the Army not to intervene, at certain levels the military cooperated with Karuna.

Karuna wanted the Army to prevent a group of senior cadres, who had been under his overall command, from crossing the entry/exit point at Omanthai, north of Vavuniya, back to the Vanni. The LTTE dissident also urged the Army to facilitate an operation to help his men, deployed in the Northern Province, to return through Army lines on the night of March 3, 2004. The government prohibited the Army from supporting Karuna’s efforts, hence a group of senior cadres, including ‘Colonel” T. Ramesh and their families, crossed the entry/exit point. Immediately after their arrival in Kilinochchi, ‘Colonel’ Ramesh was declared as Karuna’s successor.

Undaunted by the government’s refusal to back his revolt against, what Karuna called, the treacherous Kilinochchi leadership, he ordered public protests in Batticaloa. The first of a series of protests was held at Kiran, Karuna’s home town, where a crowd of over 2,000 people gathered in support of Karuna. Some of them set fire to effigies of Prabhakaran and Ramesh, while Karuna reiterated his demand for a separate CFA with the government. Much to the glee of the LTTE and the Norwegians, the government rejected Karuna’s call for cooperation out of hand. But, the military continued to extend support to Karuna.

In spite of the LTTE’ pull-out from negotiations in April 2003, the government reiterated its commitment to a non-existent peace process thereby bending backwards to please the LTTE and the so-called peace facilitator with its own ultimate agenda coinciding with those of the LTTE.

The LTTE ordered the Tamil media not to provide space for the rebellious group. No one dared challenge the LTTE, though Karuna, too, exerted pressure on the media. Undergraduates from the Northern Province, studying at the Eastern University at Vantharamoolai ,returned to their villages amidst rising tension.

Regardless of the government directive that the military kept its distance from the rebel faction, an influential section of those in the military, who were earlier deployed in clandestine operations behind enemy lines, threw their weight behind the former LTTE field commander.

Batticaloa’s hostility towards the LTTE increased after an LTTE operative shot dead eight Karuna loyalists, including Kuheneshan, widely believed to be a high ranker among the renegade group, at Crystal Terrace housing scheme, Kottawa, on July 25, 2004. They were slain in their sleep

Batticaloa Tamils defied an LTTE directive prohibiting public participation at the funerals of the three Karuna loyalists killed at Kottawa. Several hundred people paid their last respects to Pakyam Amarasevan, alias Tehvan, of Main Street, Kommathurai, Chennkalady, Ponnathurai Thurainadan alias Ruban of the same address, and Kandiah Annandakumar of Kattankudy. The LTTE distributed leaflets warning the public of dire consequences if they attended, what they called, traitors’ funeral. The LTTE made an attempt to prevent public participation, having failed to dissuade families of the victims from bringing the bodies to Batticaloa. Families, living in military held areas, accepted the bodies, whereas those living in the LTTE-controlled region had no option but to accept the directive.

It would be important to examine the circumstances under which the LTTE hunted down those given refuge at the Crystal Terrace housing scheme. They had moved in on July 13, 2004, and were in the process of trying to obtain passports to leave the country. The police quoted a neighbour as having said he heard gunshots around 3.30 a.m. As people used to light crackers to scare monkeys away, he had not taken much notice, he said.

In fact, the first indication of the LTTE operation, the biggest directed against the Karuna faction in Colombo, since the March 2004 split, came to light after the military intercepted a conversation between two LTTE personnel. Although they discussed a successful hit in Colombo, there was no clue as regards the location. The conversation revealed that those involved in the operation had reached Karuna’s successor, ‘Colonel’ Thambirajah Ramesh based in the Batticaloa district. The Colombo police took about four hours to locate the scene of the massacre.

Impact on CFA

The crisis created by Karuna quickly engulfed the entire CFA process. Those trying to save the CFA soon realised that they were fighting a losing battle. They understood Karuna’s action had caused irreparable damage and nothing could resurrect the Norwegian initiative.

The SLMM (Norway led Sri Lanka monitoring mission) suspended the monitoring process in areas under Karuna’s control. Overnight, the Northern and Eastern Provinces were divided into three sectors, under the control of the GoSL, the LTTE and the breakaway LTTE faction. The Norwegians and the SLMM rejected Karuna’s overtures to have a separate CFA negotiated between the breakaway faction and the GoSL. Karuna also emphasised that the LTTE should recognise that the Batticaloa-Ampara sector was outside its purview. UNICEF and the UNHCR, too, pulled out of Karuna’s territory.

Today only a few remember the dicey situation the country experienced at thatime.

The SLMM also turned down an SLA request to arrange for a meeting between the Army and Karuna. In spite of the Army chief, Lt. Gen. Balagalle, who held the post of the Chief of Defence Staff, personally pushing for a meeting, which he felt could help ease tensions, the SLMM refused to comply. The LTTE insisted that there shouldn’t be any interaction whatsoever between the SLMM and the breakaway faction. Erik Solheim ruled out a Norwegian intervention, thereby effectively ending any sort of mediation effort.

In a desperate bid to settle the crisis, the UK stepped in. The UK sent its top diplomat in Colombo, Steven Evans, along with its Defence Attaché, Lt. Col. Mark Weldon, to find a way out.

Efforts to isolate Karuna failed. Premier Wickremesinghe compelled Ali Zarheer Moulana to resign his parliamentary seat after the disclosure of his role in facilitating Karuna to leave the Batticaloa district. Before that, the battlefield tactician quickly won over the confidence of the Tamil-speaking people in the region. He took advantage of the situation by offering to discuss long standing grievances of the public. Then General Officer Commanding (GoC) the Army’s 23 Division, headquartered at Welikanda, Brigadier Vajira Wijegunawardene, recalled how Karuna moved swiftly to consolidate his power in areas under his control. Karuna offered to discuss the forcible takeover of land by the LTTE in the east. Soon, the UNP and the TNA realised that the crisis was having a debilitating impact on their campaign for the April 2, 2004 parliamentary polls. In fact, Premier Wickremesinghe had to avoid Batticaloa during campaigning in the East as the Defence Ministry couldn’t guarantee his security.

Vanni move on East

Under the noses of the Norwegians, the LTTE moved cadres to beef up its strength in the Batticaloa District to take on Karuna. The SLMM and the government facilitated the transfer of LTTE cadres from the North to the East in the run-up to the parliamentary polls. The CFA permitted transfers, though there had been restrictions as regards the number of personnel. The LTTE overcame the problem by sending groups in small batches across Army controlled entry and exit points at Omanthai and Uliyankulam. Although the Army had managed to detect some of those entering the East illegally, it couldn’t thwart the LTTE plans. Then the LTTE humiliated the government by launching a series of sea landings on the night of April 9, 2004 to wipe out the breakaway group. The LTTE operation had got underway a few hours after the service commanders arrived at Trincomalee. In spite of the Defence portfolio being under her control, President Kumaratunga did nothing, while the Prime Minister and the Norwegians looked the other way. A confident LTTE leadership told the government that it intended to use sea routes to mount an operation targeting Karuna. The government was told to keep the Navy out of the LTTE’s way. The government gave in to LTTE demands. Following urgent consultations in Colombo between the military and the President, the top brass summoned a meeting at the Batticaloa Brigade Headquarters, where senior officers, in charge of the region, were told to keep out of the fight.

After Karuna’s decision to give up the fight on April 9, 2004, when the LTTE confronted his cadres on the banks of the Verugal River, many believed that Prabhakaran’s erstwhile friend wouldn’t survive.

Karuna’s decision has been influenced by the realisation that the sea borne assault was led by Batticaloa cadres, the majority of those who had fought under him. Had Karuna engaged them on the banks of the Verugal River, there would have been many casualties. Instead of fighting, Karuna ordered his men to leave the battlefield and return to their villages, while he fled Batticaloa with the help of UNP National List MP Ali Zaheer Moulana. Until Moulana acknowledged his role in Karuna’s escape, the UNP, a section of the medi, and even the Norwegians, blamed the Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI) for helping Karuna escape. Once the UNP had established Moulana’s involvement, PM Wickremesinghe demanded his resignation. He swiftly complied. Moulana sought protection abroad. After years in the US, he returned to the country to pledge his allegiance to President Rajapaksa.

Karuna loyalists killed five LTTE cadres, including ‘Lt. Colonel’ Neelan, the deputy head of the Batticaloa District Intelligence outfit before fleeing the area. A furious Kilinochchi leadership vowed to hit back wherever Karuna and his top men took refuge.

A spate of killings undermined SLMM efforts to restore normalcy in the Batticaloa-Ampara sector, where unidentified gunmen killed 10 LTTE personnel, in three separate incidents on April 24, May 2 and May 6, 2004. The LTTE accused the DMI of carrying out the killings, a charge vehemently denied by the DMI. The LTTE hit back. An LTTE operative shot dead Lance Corporal Wasantha Liyanage. He was shot through the head inside a private bus approaching Batticaloa town on May 9, 2004. The bus was coming from Chenkaladi.

The LTTE struck again on May 19, 2004, outside the Batticaloa hospital. Reserve police constable, Dassanayake (32658) of police intelligence shot through his head in broad daylight. The gunman walked out of the nearby post office and shot the policeman before walking away.

In spite of a change of government in April, 2004, the UPFA’s response to the LTTE, too, remained the same.

But the military responded to the LTTE threat by stepping up clandestine action, particularly in the East. A growing relationship, mutually beneficial to the military and the breakaway LTTE faction, gradually undermined the LTTE in the Eastern Province. By the time Eelam War IV erupted in Aug 2006, the LTTE had suffered a debilitating setback in the East.

By Shamindra Ferdinando

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Midweek Review

Unexpected focus on ‘pieces of tin’ worn by military men

Published

14 hours ago

2026/07/8

Sahan Weerasooriya

Maj. Lalith Jayasinghe with Kaushalya on his wedding day. Jayasinghe, receipient of Sri Lanka's highest military honour, has been credited with unprecedented raids behind the enemy lines. He died in late November, 2008, in the Vanni east.

Second Lieutenant S.U. Aladeniya, the first recipient of the Parama Weera Vibhushanaya, died fighting the LTTE in the second week of July, 1990. The young commanding officer of the isolated Kokavil Army detachment refused an opportunity to leave his wounded colleagues. Instead, he chose to set an extraordinary example. The fate of the Kokavil detachment, as well as the unprecedented military debacle that forced the Army to vacate the Kandy–Jaffna A9 road, north of Vavuniya, in 1990, happened due to the late President Ranasinghe Premadasa’s folly. Premadasa trusted the LTTE to such an extent, he ordered several hundred police officers, in the East, to surrender to appease the LTTE. The rest is history.

By Shamindra Ferdinando

Additional Solicitor General Dileepa Peiris recently questioned in court as to why retired Air Force officer Shantha Jayathilake appeared in court wearing armed forces medals.

The highly decorated war hero Flight Lieutenant Jayathilake represented himself under Section 260 of the Criminal Procedure Code in the trial of Maj. Gen. Suresh Sallay, the alleged mastermind of the 2019 Easter Sunday carnage.

During his submission, Dileepa Pieris looked at the medals worn by the retired officer and said: “He comes wearing pieces of tin.”

When Jayathilake objected to the ASG’s remark, Magistrate Pasan Amarasena warned the ex-officer not to interrupt proceedings. Then Peiris said that he couldn’t see Jayathilake’s medals properly. Jayathilake is the recipient of Weewa Wickrema Vibhushanaya (WWV), the second highest gallantry medal awarded to Sri Lankan military. The PWV is the highest gallantry decoration that can be received by a living military man. Jayathilake who joined the Air Force in 1989 at the height of the JVP-led insurgency, retired in 1999, and was also the recipient of the Rana Sura Padakkama (RSP).

Senior President’s Counsel Maithree Gunaratne, who represented Sallay in court, said: “The problem is not with your eyes, but with the red-tinted glasses you are wearing. You wore blue-tinted glasses for a while, and now you wear red-tinted glasses, so the gallantry medals, earned with blood, sweat, and tears for the country, look like pieces of tin to you”

Gunaratne requested that Pieris’s comments on the ex-officer be formally recorded in court records. This happened in the Fort Magistrate’s court on 2 July, 2026. The court proceedings caused controversy with various interested parties expressing differing views on Jayathilake wearing medals to a courtroom.

Some found fault with him for wearing medals while others strongly backed him. The issue at hand received social media attention. Obviously some sought political advantage at the expense of the government and the Attorney General’s Department. Others lambasted the former State Intelligence Service (SIS) Chief Sallay (2029-2024) for causing unnecessary developments. However, the gallantry medals worn by military, both officers and men, cannot be ridiculed by anyone, regardless of his/her position in the society. Gallantry medals remind the country of immense and untold sacrifices made by the military, during the war, and any attempt to dilute them should be strongly opposed.

Those who silently backed or publicly take action against war-winning Army Chief General (retd.) Sarath Fonseka, in 2010, after his defeat at the 2010 January presidential election, shouldn’t see the incident at the Fort Magistrate court as an opportunity.

Although Sri Lanka has been deeply divided over investigations into the conduct of armed forces during the war and after, no issue caused controversy like the arrest of Sallay, a post-war head of the Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI) over the 2019 Easter Sunday carnage. Sallay served as the Director of State Intelligence Service (SIS) from 2019 to 2024 before President Anura Kumara Dissanayake replaced him. Perhaps President Gotabaya Rajapaksa shouldn’t have brought Sallay as Director, SIS, contrary to the practice of SIS always being headed by a senior police officer or he was quite right in bringing in a serving military officer with a proven intelligence track record, knowing the shameful behaviour of responsible top police officers in the run up to the Easter Sunday suicide attacks, despite there having been adequate advance intelligence warnings to prevent them.

The intervention made by the retired Air Force officer triggered an unexpected reaction from the Attorney General’s top representative and the subsequent continuing controversy influenced The Island to discuss the awarding of gallantry medals, namely Parama Weera Vibhushanaya (PWV), the highest, followed by Weera Wickrema Vibhushanaya (WWV), Rana Wickrema Padakkama (RWP) and Rana Sura Padakkama (RSP). The fourth medal, Weeradhara Vibhushanaya, is awarded for bravery, regardless of the risks to one’s own life, but for voluntary interventions outside the battlefield.

Bravery of an exceptional kind

During the war, Sri Lanka awarded 32 PVWs posthumously. The Army, Navy and Air Force shared 29, 2 and 1, respectively. The PVW is awarded to all ranks of armed forces, both regular and volunteer, for individual acts of bravery in the face of enemy, disregarding the risks to one’s own life. Of the 32 recipients of the PVW, the extraordinary case of Maj. J.A.L. Jayasinghe (Lalith Jayasinghe), posthumously promoted to the rank of Lieutenant Colonel, captured unprecedented public attention.

On many occasions, PWVs were awarded posthumously for sacrifices made in defensive action, while the armed forces were responding to enemy action. However, Lalith had initiated action deep within the enemy-held territory and his efforts reflected the overall military strategy.

The 29 recipients consisted of 27 Army: Second Lieutenant S.U Aladeniya, Lance Corporal (LC) Y.G.G. Kularatne (Hasalaka Gamini), Second Lt. K.W.T. Nishshanka, Staff Sgt. H.P.B. Gunasekera, LC W.I.M. Seneviratne, Lt. Col. A.F Lafir, Capt. G.S. Jayanath, Maj. J.A.L. Jayasinghe, Maj. K.A. Gamage, Capt. U.G.A.S. Samaranayake, H.G.M.K.I. Megawarna, Sgt H.G.S. Bandara, Corporal P.N. Suranga, Corporal P.M.N. Pushpakumara, Corporal D.N\M.S. Chandrasiri Bandara, LC K. Chandana, Private R.M.D.M. Ratnayake, LC A.M.M.P. Abeysinghe, recruit A.M.B.H.G. Abeyratne Banda, private T.G.R. Dayananda, Lt. P.N. Punsiri, Second Lt W.D. Jayathilake, Sgt. K.G.N.L.R. Perera, Corporal K.P.D.T. Gunasekera, LC H.A. Nilantha Kumara, LC S.V.A.M. Pushpamal. Navy: Lt. J.L.D.S. Wijetunga, Petty Officer K.G. Shantha and Air Force: Squadron Leader T.D.S. Silvapulle.

Although Jayasinghe paid the supreme sacrifice, while serving the Special Forces, he had been a proud member of the Gemunu Watch (GW). GW veteran Maj. Gen. K.B. Egodawele in his Hewayekuge Mathaka Satahan (Memories of a soldier), first launched in 2012, declared that Jayasinghe had been among four GW personnel, namely Captain U.G.A.S. Samaranayake, Captain H.P.M.K. Meghawardena and Corporal D.M.A.M. Pushpakumara to receive the PWV, posthumously.

All of them received the highest gallantry award for actions on the Vanni east region during Eelam War IV (2006 August to 2009 May).

Jayasinghe’s wife Kaushalya accepted the PVW on 19 May, 2012, at the annual Victory Day parade. Maj. Gen. Kamal Gunaratne read the awardee’s official citation. Kaushalya had been five months pregnant at the time Jayasinghe mounted a raid deep inside the LTTE-held territory in the Vanni east region. Gunaratne, the wartime General Officer Commanding (GoC) of the 53 Division declared that Jayasinghe had been in command of an LRRP (Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol)/Deep Penetration Unit tasked to eliminate LTTE leaders. That unit had moved about 40 kms into the enemy held territory in Oddusuddan and was positioned alongside the Mankulam-Oddusuddan road to kill LTTE leaders, on 26 November, 2008.

Suddenly, Jayasinghe had fallen sick but joined other members of the LLRP to fight the enemy after fierce fighting erupted between the two sides. In spite of having an opportunity to retreat, Jayasinghe, hero of many previous battles, suffered grievous injuries during the battle and succumbed to his injuries.

Jayasinghe had been an extraordinary soldier and was the recipient of the second highest gallantry medal, WWV, on three or four occasions. In one such occasion, Jayasinghe had received two WWVs at one ceremony and recalled retired Maj. Gen. Dhammi Hewage, who received the RSP at the same event. Hewage spoke admirably about what he called high risk and extraordinary LRRP operations undertaken by Jayasinghe over a period of time. Let me give you an opportunity to know more about Hewage whose no holds barred examination of the Army during the war received public attention ( https://island.lk/a-special-forces-officers-narrative/)

Those who risked their lives to earn battlefield recognition played a significant role in transforming the armed forces, particularly the Army. Gallantry medals had been earned by armed forces officers and men in various circumstances but the deadly LRRP strikes, deep within the LTTE held territory, made quite a difference in the overall direction of the war. Those who operated in enemy territory in a way functioned as suicide cadres/units as the probability of them being intercepted by the LTTE was very high. But, regardless of severe risks, they ventured out of government-held areas to infiltrate deep inside enemy held territory to carry out operations. The LRRP team, led by Jayasinghe, is a case in point.

Clandestine operations received public attention in the run-up to the 2001 December parliamentary election when UNP leader Ranil Wickremesinghe all of a sudden alleged that the Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI) was planning to assassinate him. Within weeks after the UNP victory at the parliamentary election, the UNP unleashed the police on the DMI. The police raided the DMI safe house at Millennium City, Athurugiriya. In spite of Army Chief, the late Lt. Gen. Lionel Balagalle, personally assuring the UNP that there was absolutely no basis for such claims, Wickremesinghe was not prepared to change his political strategy. He gave Minister John Amaratunga in charge of police the go ahead for planned action.

The January 2, 2002, raid led to the arrest of Captain Mohamed Nilam, Staff Sgt. P. Ananda Udulagama, Staff Sergeant I. Edirisinghe Jayamanne, Corporal H.M. Nissanka Herath, Lance Corporal H. Mohamed Hilmy and an LTTE operative identified as Niyaz/Subashkaran. Others involved in that particular operation had been living in the East and were called into join operations, depending on the requirement. On the instructions of Lt. Gen. Balagalle, those tasked with carrying out attacks on selected targets received the opportunity to train under Special Forces instructors from Maduru Oya. They underwent training at the Panaluwa Test Firing Range, where firing special weapons was a key element in the training schedule.

In a bid to ensure secrecy, those operatives mostly operated on their own, and had their own arsenal, which included a range of weapons, including claymore mines. In fact, those involved in such operations functioned on a need-to-know basis. Even senior DMI officials, as well as the Army top brass, except a few, hadn’t been aware of what was going on. Even the then powerful Deputy Defence Minister, the late Anuruddha Ratwatte, hadn’t been told of the Millennium City safe-house, though he knew of the ongoing hits behind enemy lines.

Shortly after the exposure of the DMI operation, Balagalle met Premier Wickremesinghe to explain the secret operations undertaken against the LTTE. The Army chief had been accompanied by officials, including Hendarawithana, while one-time Attorney General Tilak Marapana, National List MP holding the Defence portfolio, and Minister Milinda Moragoda, too, were present.

“Except for Minister Moragoda, the others obviously didn’t realise what we were doing. They acted as if we were conspiring to do away with the political leadership so as to undermine the Norwegian initiative,” a source familiar with the dynamics of the project said. “We quickly realised we were up against a government, which simply wanted to negotiate a deal with the LTTE at any cost. The LTTE and the Norwegians exploited the situation to the hilt.”

Success in the East

Hitting the enemy in the area under its control had been Balagalle’s idea. The DMI hadn’t been successful in its first and the second attempts to take two specific targets. The targeted area had been Batticaloa south and the first and the second operations were mounted on 18 July 2001 and 12 September 2001. But both actions went awry and the targeted men identified as Jim Kelly (commander of Jeyanthan regiment) and Jeevan escaped death.

But, they succeeded on 17 September 2001. Operatives carried out a successful attack on ‘Major’ Mano Master, who was at that time in charge of the communications network in the Ampara-Batticaloa area.

But immediately after the UNP’s victory, the government terminated all such operations. The treacherous government betrayed those who risked their lives for the country. Ex-LTTEers and others who worked for the Army were exposed and the LTTE hunted them down. Scores of men were killed. Some were tortured and killed.

Apart from Mano Master, the secret raids claimed the lives of Batticaloa District Intelligence Head Lt. Col Nizam and Capt. Thevathasan.

Among those killed in the north were LTTE Air Wing Head Col. Shankar (Vaithilingam Sornalingam) and Sea Tiger Deputy Commander Lt. Col Kangai Amaran.

S.P. Thamilselvan, his Deputy Major S. Thangan, Vavuniya Special Commander Col. Jeyam and Deputy Military Chief Col. Balraj were believed to have been targeted in the North but escaped. In the East, among those who escaped targeted killings, were Col. Karuna, Karikalan, Jim Kelly and Intelligence Chief Lt. Col. Ramanan.

In spite of the LTTEers, particularly its leaders on a heightened state of alert, the Army ambushed Karikalan’s vehicle on 18 October, 2001. The destruction of the vehicle fuelled speculation of Karikalan’s demise, with a section of the media reporting him killed in a special operation. Shortly before the attack on Karikalan’s vehicle, the Army intercepted a radio conversation between Karikalan and his wife, a medical doctor by profession, serving in the Northern Province. “She simply begged him to leave Batticaloa and take refuge in the North to avoid the Army’s deep penetration operations,” a source familiar with LRRP operations told the writer many years ago.

The Army struck again on 26 November, 2001. ‘Major’ Swarnaseelan and ‘Captain’ Devadas were eliminated in the Pulipanjikkal area. It was the last operation before the December 5 General Election.

The UNP terminated the operation. But, the Army revived the strategy after the eruption of hostilities in 2005.

It would be pertinent to mention that hit and run attacks, deep within the LTTE held territory, troubled them to such an extent, they took up the issue with Norway. Fearing a relentless campaign, the LTTE got Norway to include LRRP operations in their negotiations, leading to a one-sided Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) signed in February 2002 by the Wickremesinghe regime. That CFA revealed the existence of a secret Army project to target the LTTE in their own area. The CFA called for termination of LRRP operations.

Three PVWs

Lieutenant J.L.D.S. Wijetunga was the first Navy recipient of the Parama Weera Vibhushanaya (PWV), Sri Lanka’s highest gallantry award given posthumously. Wijetunga, Commanding Officer of the Israeli built Dvora Fast Attack Craft (FAC), maneuvered his vessel to intercept an explosives-laden Sea Tiger suicide boat approaching a troop transport ship off Point Pedro on 30 March, 1996. Wijetunga, in spite of knowing his action was suicidal, went ahead with the risky maneuver that saved the lives of a large contingent of off duty servicemen on their way to Trincomalee from Kankesanthurai (KKS).

The Navy earned its second PWV on 1 November, 2008, off Point Pedro, during the Eelam war IV. A Petty Officer of elite Special Boat Squadron K.G. Shantha rammed an explosives-laden Sea Tiger suicide craft with his Arrow boat (Z-142 ). Shantha and his three SBS colleagues were blasted to smithereens, though their action saved an Inshore Patrol Craft (IPC) carrying a dozen SBS personnel.

Wing Commander T.D.S. Silvapulle received the nation’s highest gallantry award PWV for attacking Sea Tiger boats firing at Army defences south-east of Elephant Pass on 19 December, 1999. Silvapulle, flying a Mi 24 helicopter gunship in adverse weather conditions, regardless of the threat posed by surface-to-air missiles, engaged the enemy craft. Silvapulle compelled the enemy to flee but was hit during the confrontation. His individual act of gallantry was recognized in 2012, four years after the eradication of the LTTE. The then President Mahinda Rajapaksa conferred the PWV at a ceremony held on 19 May, 2012. Maj. Lalith Jayasinghe received his PWV at the same ceremony.

The betrayal of the armed forces in October, 2015, at the Geneva-based Human Rights Council, by the treacherous Sirisena-Wickremesinghe regime, underscored the mentality of those who wielded political power. The calling of gallantry medals ‘pieces of tin’ reminded the country of the pathetic and disgraceful state of affairs.

Midweek Review

Poor, little upper-middle income country

Published

14 hours ago

2026/07/8

Sahan Weerasooriya

“Sri Lanka has been ranked among the least happy countries in the latest World Happiness Report 2026…standing alongside Ethiopia”- The Sunday Island March 2026

Sri Lanka was officially declared an Upper-Middle Income country by the World Bank in July 2026, regaining the classification it had in 2019.

On the 30th of June, the IMF delegation meeting the President at the Presidential Secretariat praised the government: “…IMF praised the government’s economic programme and noted that Sri Lanka has made greater progress than many other countries implementing IMF-supported programmes. The delegation commended the government for maintaining macroeconomic stability despite a series of external shocks and for remaining firmly committed to its reform agenda…” (Presidential Media Division, 30 June 2026)

Meanwhile, a UN-backed World Happiness Report 2026 compiled by the Wellbeing Research Centre at the University of Oxford, ranked Sri Lanka 134th out of 147 nations. A daily newspaper which ran the story on the 19th of March 2026, added that the report showed that “Sri Lanka has slipped one place from its 133rd ranking in 2025, now standing alongside Ethiopia. The country also trails behind its South Asian neighbours, with India ranked 116th, Pakistan and Bangladesh positioned significantly higher.”

Good News, Bad News

The Upper-Middle Income classification was declared by the World Bank during the Yahapalana government in July 2019. 6 months later, the Yahapalana government was swept out at elections.

Only 2 years later, in April 2022, the country was declared bankrupt, and by July that year the newly elected President was toppled by a people’s uprising for the first time in the country’s history.

To fill the vacuum, an unlikely combination of an unelected MP from the Opposition who was made President by the Parliament and an unpopular government that had barely survived the uprising, governed the country together. It was massively defeated by the people only 2 years later in 2024, despite ‘stabilising’ the economy.

An Upper-Middle Income status may give the impression of a prosperous people, but prosperous people are not an unhappy people. The World Bank report 2026 (World Bank, Sri Lanka Development Update) notes the anomaly: “the recovery is unfinished and has not translated into widespread improvements in welfare.”

The report adds:

* Real output remains below 2018 levels.

* Although poverty is projected to decline in 2025, it remains double the 2019 levels.

* Vulnerability remains high with an additional 10 percent of the population living just above the poverty line.

* Malnutrition continues to be elevated.

* The labour market recovery is slow with real wages and labor force participation well below 2019 levels.

The World Bank’s Poverty and Equity Brief (October 2025) sheds further light:

* Poverty is projected at 22.3-22.4 percent in 2025 and around 20 percent until 2027 without stronger inclusive growth.

* Real earnings remain below pre-crisis levels.

So, are Top of the Class in the IMF index and almost Bottom of the Class in the Happiness Index related?

As a friend who is a highly-placed economist explained to me, if people are poorer, undernourished, indebted, and insecure after stabilisation, then reserves, inflation, and primary balances alone cannot be relied on to judge the next IMF programme. Sri Lanka needs a national programme whose success metric is household recovery, jobs, nutrition, and productive capacity.

From the praise heaped on the President and this government’s strong leadership by the IMF for their performance thus far, sticking closely to the IMF conditionalities, we can only infer that things for the unhappy citizens will hardly get better as they negotiate the 18th IMF programme.

The AKD administration doesn’t haggle on behalf of the people. They see the rewards of that approach in fiscal consolidation and macroeconomic stability. This however, is not the only kind of stability they have to bear in mind, given recent history.

By the People, But Not for the People?

The new or renewed (from July 2019) ‘Upper-Middle Income’ classification has served to remind people where the government has failed, been weak, as much as where it has been strong and succeeded. The economy in the abstract is better off, but the majority of the people who gave the government a two thirds majority, are much worse off in material reality.

To return to my top economist friend, she explained that Sri Lanka should not reject fiscal discipline, but it must own the design of fiscal adjustment. The country needs a fairer tax mix, better tax administration, public investment discipline, and protection of health, education, nutrition, and climate-resilient infrastructure. Otherwise, fiscal discipline becomes socially brittle and growth-reducing.

The direction she recommended is hardly where the government is heading. The World Bank warns that the on-going reliance on regressive indirect taxes could worsen the poverty outlook, while the primary expenditure ceiling of 13 percent of GDP can constrain public investment and service delivery.

A leading financial daily (6 July) reported that at the CA Sri Lanka’s 5th Annual Economic and Tax Symposium, both the Government’s tax policies and the Inland Revenue Department (IRD) “came under sustained criticism from leading private sector tax professionals”. Gajma & Co. Senior Partner N.R. Gajendran argued that “…higher revenues had come largely from imposing a heavier burden on existing taxpayers rather than widening the tax base.”

He said that “When taxes become excessive and unbearable, and it is not coming from the widening of the base, it is coming from the same taxpayer, it erodes expenditure capabilities, it erodes saving capabilities, and it erodes investment capabilities,” warning that “sustained over-taxation ultimately weakens consumption, investment, and long-term economic growth.”

Sri Lanka has already lost a large number of skilled professionals who migrated in droves in the last two years. Factum reports (April 2026) that the annual departures for foreign employment have hovered above the 310,000 mark. This includes Healthcare Professionals (Doctors, nurses), Academics and Researchers (including 80-90% of State University graduates), Technologists and Engineers.

Will the Lawyers be next? The Island editorial of 6 July 2026 strongly supports the stand that the BASL has taken, (endorsed by the Colombo Law Society, Colombo High Court Lawyers Association, LAWASIA and the Commonwealth Lawyers Association) opposing the government’s effort to move a constitutional amendment to extend the retirement age of judges of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal, denouncing political interference in the judiciary and urging the government to avoid a Zimbabwean crisis.

None of this makes for a happy citizen, stability notwithstanding.

By the People, for the Creditors

So, what of all those promises made with such passion to do better than all previous governments since Independence in 1948?

The World Food Programme has this to report:

* Households unable to meet essential food needs increased from 14 percent in 2024 to 20 percent in 2026.

* If price trends continue, another 1.3 million people could be unable to afford essential food needs, including nearly 300,000 urban poor.

* Child nutrition remains worrying: stunting 10.1 percent, wasting 8.6 percent, and underweight 16.1 percent. (WFP, Food Security Under Pressure)

Economists warn that a programme that ‘stabilises’ the economy while households sell assets, cut food, reduce education and health spending, and slide into coping strategies, i.e., de-stabilises the household economy and lives, will not be socially, politically or developmentally sustainable.

Those who care for the people recommend that Sri Lanka’s own programme must place adaptive social protection, nutrition, and livelihoods at the very centre.

The promised re-negotiation of the 17th IMF package to make the necessary economic recovery less taxing (pun intended) for the people, less painful, and more sustainable overall, never happened. The government acted as if it was elected by the People for the Creditors.

We have been warned that Sri Lanka’s shift toward commercial borrowing and ISBs changed the debt-risk profile, with ISBs carrying high interest rates and short maturities. The government’s promised negotiations didn’t resemble anything like what was expected by the people, and went the way of the ISB holders who celebrated the victory in Canary Wharf toasting our President in absentia.

IMF Country Report No 26/111 indicates that even after restructuring, debt sustainability risks remain high. Public debt is projected at around 100.1 percent of GDP in 2026, with central government gross financing needs at 19.8 percent of GDP.

Economists remind us that Sri Lanka’s recent graduation to the Upper Middle-Income classification means that we will have to pay more in debt repayments as per the macro-linked bond of the debt restructuring settlement with the creditors.

IMF 18, going on 19?

Who’d have thought it? In the last 77 years, the most pro-people, pro-poor administration has certainly not been the AKD government. There were much better ones, even during the 30 year war, when policies were more enlightened and served the people; were undertaken with confidence and determination, and some still continue to provide the foreign exchange to pay for subsequent errors of judgment. And with the courage of their convictions and confidence in their capacity to deliver, those leaders didn’t feel the need to postpone any elections.

Stabilisation was an immediate necessity. But my economist friend spoke for us all when she told me “Sri Lanka cannot stabilise its way to prosperity. It should not risk turning emergency discipline into a permanent development model”.

With the current state of play, is that what we are looking at? There is little evidence that this administration has the capacity to design an independent programme, not subject to the whims and fancies of IFIs, but as my friend put it, “our own programme: fiscally responsible, socially protective, production-oriented, climate-resilient, and politically owned. The IMF can support that programme, but it cannot be the programme.”

An unhappy people is surely as much of an indicator of the real health of the economy, as the Gross National Income per capita calculated in US dollars by the World Bank. A Sunday newspaper quoted a young economist, Rehana Thowfeek, co-founder/director at Arutha Research, who says: “There is no point in celebrating becoming an upper-middle-income country while 1 in 4 of our people is in poverty, two out of every 5 Sri Lankans cannot afford a healthy diet and 1 out of 3 of our children under 5 years is malnourished.”

This is not a situation that should be allowed to prevail by an allegedly pro-people government, or indeed any government that has been granted the privilege to govern, through the people’s vote. The planning, the policy choices are all in the hands of the government. Will they choose a better path?

People are not unhappy because they are too mean to acknowledge what a wonderful job this government is doing, and give praise to this administration like the IMF at the Presidential Secretariat. It is because they are in pain, they are suffering, they are hungry, they cannot pay the bills, and they are looking at a future where none of these things are going away, but is set to get much worse, as the government slouches towards its next IMF programme and the next debt repayment.