Midweek Review
B’caloa Tigers’ 2004 shock revolt in retrospect
Pilleyan, a key element in that drama now arrested for political expediency?
The LTTE killed two Karuna loyalists on July 15, 2004 in the Batticaloa Prison. The dead included Satchi Master. The killer was an LTTEer serving a short sentence for jewellery theft and assault. The killings in the Batticaloa Prison caused anxiety among senior government officials. On Aug. 24, 2004, an LTTEer shot dead another Karuna loyalist, P. Jayakumar, in the Akkaraipattu Magistrate’s Court. A jail guard and a court clerk sustained minor injuries. The police arrested Jayakumar, along with another LTTE dissident, Saravanamuthu Shanthakumar, at a road block, at Akkaraipattu, on May 19th, 2004. They were in possession of a pistol, one hand grenade and 15 rounds of ammunition. Shanthakumar was killed on July 15, 2004 at the Batticaloa Prison along with Satchi Master.
Against the backdrop of one-time LTTEer Sivanesathurai Chandrakanthan, alias Pilleyan’s arrest on April 08, 2025 and subsequent detention under Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) over Eastern University Vice Chancellor Prof. S. Raveendranath’s disappearance on Dec. 15, 2006, whose life was actually under threat from the TIGERS several years after Karuna and Pilleyan broke away from it, various interested parties started commenting on the role played/atrocities perpetrated by Pilleyan and Vinayagamoorthy Muralitharan, aka Karuna Amman, during the conflict, and after.
Both Karuna and Pilleyan entered mainstream politics before the successful conclusion of the war in May 2009. Pilleyan is the current leader of TMVP (Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Pulikal).
In a way it is a pity that the police are now trying to pin Pilleyan for the disappearance of Prof Raveendranath, obviously to please the current political masters.
Comments included their role in LTTE terrorism and what they did after switching their allegiance to the government in March 2004. Let me stress that they daringly rebelled against the LTTE during Ranil Wickremesinghe’s tenure as the Prime Minister. The UNP has repeatedly claimed the credit for the unprecedented schism in what was considered a monolithic terror organisation and some asserted that the LTTE engineered Wickremesinghe’s defeat at the 2005 presidential election to avenge the catastrophic split.
Pilleyan’s arrest caused a political storm with his counsel Udaya Gammanpila alleging that an attempt was being made to compel his client to confess complicity in the 2019 Easter Sunday suicide attacks. Pivithuru Hela Urumaya (PHU) leader and former Minister Gammanpila is no stranger to controversy, but he has remained unscathed when it comes to his integrity.
In spite of vindictive attacks on him, Attorney-at-Law Gammanpila declared that nothing could be as ridiculous as accusing Pilleyan, who had been detained at the Batticaloa Prison for a period of five years (Oct. 11, 2015 to Nov. 24, 2020) of arranging National Thowheed Jaamaath (NTJ) to bomb churches and hotels on April 21, 2019. Having granted bail to Pilleyan and four others held in connection with the Christmas Day, 2005, assassination of TNA MP Joseph Pararajasingham on two personal sureties of Rs. 100,000/- each, the Batticaloa High Court acquitted and released them on January 13, 2021.
It would be pertinent to examine the devastating split caused by Karuna in March 2003 and its impact on the Eelam War IV (2006 August to May 2009).
Karuna’s move
Having received information that ‘Colonel’ Karuna decamped, the Kilinochchi-based leadership acted swiftly and decisively to neutralise the impending threat. The LTTE planned to take hold of both Karuna Amman, responsible for Ampara-Batticaloa sector, and his colleague, Sivasubramanium Varadanthan, aka ‘Colonel’ Paduman, in charge of the neighbouring Trincomalee District, to Kilinochchi. The Kilinochchi-based leadership, or Vanni leadership, wanted to ensure that those deployed under the command of Karuna and Paduman remaind loyal to the organisation. Both Karuna and Paduman had held the rank of ‘Colonel’ at that time, though Karuna was in the limelight due to his involvement in negotiations with the UNF government.
The Kilinochchi command cleverly used the Defence Ministry and SCOPP (Secretariat for Coordinating Peace Process) officials to arrange for an SLAF chopper to fly Karuna Amman, along with Paduman, to Kilinochchi. SCOPP records prove that on the authorisation of the Defence Ministry, it directed the SLAF to pick Paduman from Trincomalee and then touch down at a pre-arranged location in the Batticaloa District, on March 2, 2004, to take on board Karuna.
Fearing that he would have to face a firing squad in Kilinochchi, Karuna declined to join Paduman. Instead, he set in motion a strategy, which finally debilitated the LTTE’s conventional fighting capability. The writer disclosed the LTTE’s counter-move in a Sunday Island report headlined ‘Prabhakaran plotted Karuna capture’ in its March 28, 2004, edition.
Both Karuna and Paduman, at that time, confirmed the LTTE using SCOPP/ SLAF to arrange their transfer from the East to Kilinochchi.
The UNP and the Norwegians never bothered to raise the issue with the LTTE at that time. The Defence Ministry continued to provide chopper rides to the LTTE and did everything possible to appease the outfit, even at the expense of national security.
Norwegian peace facilitator and the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM), too, had been aware of the LTTE request for an SLAF chopper ride for top Tigers in the East. Had Karuna got into that chopper and ended up in a secret LTTE detention camp or executed, Eelam War IV would have taken a different course.
The Vanni leadership used Paduman, on several occasions, to counter reports of a debilitating split in the LTTE. The LTTE never allowed Paduman to leave the Vanni throughout Eelam War IV. Paduman surrendered on May 15, 2009, four days before troops killed LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran, on the banks of the Nanthikadal lagoon.
Karuna caused the split just over a year after the LTTE quit the negotiating table. President CBK, PM Wickremesinghe, and the co-chairs of the peace process, agreed that the LTTE should be allowed to deal with the situation. They allowed the situation to develop into a bloody confrontation. They failed to realise that Karuna’s revolt caused irreparable damage to the organisation by dividing the LTTE’s fighting cadre on regional lines. The crisis denied the LTTE recruitment in the Batticaloa and Ampara sectors, while its operations in the Trincomalee District, too, experienced difficulties due to the detention of ‘Colonel’ Paduman, the senior man in charge of the area. ‘Colonel’ Paduman, too, was perceived as a threat due to his close association with Karuna.
Karuna acted swiftly to ensure his protection and that of the eastern cadres. The well-proven battlefield strategist felt that his security, as well as the safety of the Batticaloa fighting cadre, depended on an understanding with the Sri Lankan military. Karuna pushed for a separate agreement on the lines of the Norwegian arranged CFA between the GoSL and the LTTE in February 2002.
The Island dealt with Karuna’s move in an exclusive headlined ‘Rebel Karuna wants separate deal with government’ in the March 5, 2004 issue, which was based on information provided by Varathan, an aide to Karuna. The then Army Chief, Lieutenant General Lionel Balagalle and DIG Nimal Lewke confirmed what Varathan had to say on behalf of Karuna.
Karuna offered to negotiate a separate ceasefire in the Ampara-Batticaloa sector, though both the Norwegians and the government promptly rejected the move, while reiterating their commitment to the CFA. But, an influential section, within the establishment, supported Karuna’s move. Varathan alleged that a wave of killings in the Eastern Province, in the wake of the CFA, and a demand for 1,000 more cadres from the Batticaloa-Ampara sector for deployment in the Northern Province, too, had contributed to Karuna’s decision to break ranks.
Wobbling goverment
An unprecedented crisis caused by Karuna sent shock waves through the LTTE and its supporters. Among the affected parties were the TNA and the Tamil Diaspora. The LTTE struggled to contain the developing crisis. In spite of specific government orders issued to the Army not to intervene, at certain levels the military cooperated with Karuna.
Karuna wanted the Army to prevent a group of senior cadres, who had been under his overall command, from crossing the entry/exit point at Omanthai, north of Vavuniya, back to the Vanni. The LTTE dissident also urged the Army to facilitate an operation to help his men, deployed in the Northern Province, to return through Army lines on the night of March 3, 2004. The government prohibited the Army from supporting Karuna’s efforts, hence a group of senior cadres, including ‘Colonel” T. Ramesh and their families, crossed the entry/exit point. Immediately after their arrival in Kilinochchi, ‘Colonel’ Ramesh was declared as Karuna’s successor.
Undaunted by the government’s refusal to back his revolt against, what Karuna called, the treacherous Kilinochchi leadership, he ordered public protests in Batticaloa. The first of a series of protests was held at Kiran, Karuna’s home town, where a crowd of over 2,000 people gathered in support of Karuna. Some of them set fire to effigies of Prabhakaran and Ramesh, while Karuna reiterated his demand for a separate CFA with the government. Much to the glee of the LTTE and the Norwegians, the government rejected Karuna’s call for cooperation out of hand. But, the military continued to extend support to Karuna.
In spite of the LTTE’ pull-out from negotiations in April 2003, the government reiterated its commitment to a non-existent peace process thereby bending backwards to please the LTTE and the so-called peace facilitator with its own ultimate agenda coinciding with those of the LTTE.
The LTTE ordered the Tamil media not to provide space for the rebellious group. No one dared challenge the LTTE, though Karuna, too, exerted pressure on the media. Undergraduates from the Northern Province, studying at the Eastern University at Vantharamoolai ,returned to their villages amidst rising tension.
Regardless of the government directive that the military kept its distance from the rebel faction, an influential section of those in the military, who were earlier deployed in clandestine operations behind enemy lines, threw their weight behind the former LTTE field commander.
Batticaloa’s hostility towards the LTTE increased after an LTTE operative shot dead eight Karuna loyalists, including Kuheneshan, widely believed to be a high ranker among the renegade group, at Crystal Terrace housing scheme, Kottawa, on July 25, 2004. They were slain in their sleep
Batticaloa Tamils defied an LTTE directive prohibiting public participation at the funerals of the three Karuna loyalists killed at Kottawa. Several hundred people paid their last respects to Pakyam Amarasevan, alias Tehvan, of Main Street, Kommathurai, Chennkalady, Ponnathurai Thurainadan alias Ruban of the same address, and Kandiah Annandakumar of Kattankudy. The LTTE distributed leaflets warning the public of dire consequences if they attended, what they called, traitors’ funeral. The LTTE made an attempt to prevent public participation, having failed to dissuade families of the victims from bringing the bodies to Batticaloa. Families, living in military held areas, accepted the bodies, whereas those living in the LTTE-controlled region had no option but to accept the directive.
It would be important to examine the circumstances under which the LTTE hunted down those given refuge at the Crystal Terrace housing scheme. They had moved in on July 13, 2004, and were in the process of trying to obtain passports to leave the country. The police quoted a neighbour as having said he heard gunshots around 3.30 a.m. As people used to light crackers to scare monkeys away, he had not taken much notice, he said.
In fact, the first indication of the LTTE operation, the biggest directed against the Karuna faction in Colombo, since the March 2004 split, came to light after the military intercepted a conversation between two LTTE personnel. Although they discussed a successful hit in Colombo, there was no clue as regards the location. The conversation revealed that those involved in the operation had reached Karuna’s successor, ‘Colonel’ Thambirajah Ramesh based in the Batticaloa district. The Colombo police took about four hours to locate the scene of the massacre.
Impact on CFA
The crisis created by Karuna quickly engulfed the entire CFA process. Those trying to save the CFA soon realised that they were fighting a losing battle. They understood Karuna’s action had caused irreparable damage and nothing could resurrect the Norwegian initiative.
The SLMM (Norway led Sri Lanka monitoring mission) suspended the monitoring process in areas under Karuna’s control. Overnight, the Northern and Eastern Provinces were divided into three sectors, under the control of the GoSL, the LTTE and the breakaway LTTE faction. The Norwegians and the SLMM rejected Karuna’s overtures to have a separate CFA negotiated between the breakaway faction and the GoSL. Karuna also emphasised that the LTTE should recognise that the Batticaloa-Ampara sector was outside its purview. UNICEF and the UNHCR, too, pulled out of Karuna’s territory.
Today only a few remember the dicey situation the country experienced at thatime.
The SLMM also turned down an SLA request to arrange for a meeting between the Army and Karuna. In spite of the Army chief, Lt. Gen. Balagalle, who held the post of the Chief of Defence Staff, personally pushing for a meeting, which he felt could help ease tensions, the SLMM refused to comply. The LTTE insisted that there shouldn’t be any interaction whatsoever between the SLMM and the breakaway faction. Erik Solheim ruled out a Norwegian intervention, thereby effectively ending any sort of mediation effort.
In a desperate bid to settle the crisis, the UK stepped in. The UK sent its top diplomat in Colombo, Steven Evans, along with its Defence Attaché, Lt. Col. Mark Weldon, to find a way out.
Efforts to isolate Karuna failed. Premier Wickremesinghe compelled Ali Zarheer Moulana to resign his parliamentary seat after the disclosure of his role in facilitating Karuna to leave the Batticaloa district. Before that, the battlefield tactician quickly won over the confidence of the Tamil-speaking people in the region. He took advantage of the situation by offering to discuss long standing grievances of the public. Then General Officer Commanding (GoC) the Army’s 23 Division, headquartered at Welikanda, Brigadier Vajira Wijegunawardene, recalled how Karuna moved swiftly to consolidate his power in areas under his control. Karuna offered to discuss the forcible takeover of land by the LTTE in the east. Soon, the UNP and the TNA realised that the crisis was having a debilitating impact on their campaign for the April 2, 2004 parliamentary polls. In fact, Premier Wickremesinghe had to avoid Batticaloa during campaigning in the East as the Defence Ministry couldn’t guarantee his security.
Vanni move on East
Under the noses of the Norwegians, the LTTE moved cadres to beef up its strength in the Batticaloa District to take on Karuna. The SLMM and the government facilitated the transfer of LTTE cadres from the North to the East in the run-up to the parliamentary polls. The CFA permitted transfers, though there had been restrictions as regards the number of personnel. The LTTE overcame the problem by sending groups in small batches across Army controlled entry and exit points at Omanthai and Uliyankulam. Although the Army had managed to detect some of those entering the East illegally, it couldn’t thwart the LTTE plans. Then the LTTE humiliated the government by launching a series of sea landings on the night of April 9, 2004 to wipe out the breakaway group. The LTTE operation had got underway a few hours after the service commanders arrived at Trincomalee. In spite of the Defence portfolio being under her control, President Kumaratunga did nothing, while the Prime Minister and the Norwegians looked the other way. A confident LTTE leadership told the government that it intended to use sea routes to mount an operation targeting Karuna. The government was told to keep the Navy out of the LTTE’s way. The government gave in to LTTE demands. Following urgent consultations in Colombo between the military and the President, the top brass summoned a meeting at the Batticaloa Brigade Headquarters, where senior officers, in charge of the region, were told to keep out of the fight.
After Karuna’s decision to give up the fight on April 9, 2004, when the LTTE confronted his cadres on the banks of the Verugal River, many believed that Prabhakaran’s erstwhile friend wouldn’t survive.
Karuna’s decision has been influenced by the realisation that the sea borne assault was led by Batticaloa cadres, the majority of those who had fought under him. Had Karuna engaged them on the banks of the Verugal River, there would have been many casualties. Instead of fighting, Karuna ordered his men to leave the battlefield and return to their villages, while he fled Batticaloa with the help of UNP National List MP Ali Zaheer Moulana. Until Moulana acknowledged his role in Karuna’s escape, the UNP, a section of the medi, and even the Norwegians, blamed the Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI) for helping Karuna escape. Once the UNP had established Moulana’s involvement, PM Wickremesinghe demanded his resignation. He swiftly complied. Moulana sought protection abroad. After years in the US, he returned to the country to pledge his allegiance to President Rajapaksa.
Karuna loyalists killed five LTTE cadres, including ‘Lt. Colonel’ Neelan, the deputy head of the Batticaloa District Intelligence outfit before fleeing the area. A furious Kilinochchi leadership vowed to hit back wherever Karuna and his top men took refuge.
A spate of killings undermined SLMM efforts to restore normalcy in the Batticaloa-Ampara sector, where unidentified gunmen killed 10 LTTE personnel, in three separate incidents on April 24, May 2 and May 6, 2004. The LTTE accused the DMI of carrying out the killings, a charge vehemently denied by the DMI. The LTTE hit back. An LTTE operative shot dead Lance Corporal Wasantha Liyanage. He was shot through the head inside a private bus approaching Batticaloa town on May 9, 2004. The bus was coming from Chenkaladi.
The LTTE struck again on May 19, 2004, outside the Batticaloa hospital. Reserve police constable, Dassanayake (32658) of police intelligence shot through his head in broad daylight. The gunman walked out of the nearby post office and shot the policeman before walking away.
In spite of a change of government in April, 2004, the UPFA’s response to the LTTE, too, remained the same.
But the military responded to the LTTE threat by stepping up clandestine action, particularly in the East. A growing relationship, mutually beneficial to the military and the breakaway LTTE faction, gradually undermined the LTTE in the Eastern Province. By the time Eelam War IV erupted in Aug 2006, the LTTE had suffered a debilitating setback in the East.
By Shamindra Ferdinando
Midweek Review
A retired General’s narrative
Regime change:

Egodawele
Gemunu Watch veteran retired Maj. Gen. K.B. Egodawele painted a bleak picture of the overall failure on the part of the Defence Ministry, National Security Council and the armed forces to deal with the Pangiriwatte, Mirihana, violent protest on 31, March, 2022. Had those responsible for overall security taken tangible measures, after the Pangiriwatte letdown, the rapid deterioration of the situation, leading to the 9 July, 2022, assault on the President’s House, could have been averted, he opined. The author explained how in the absence of even a basic plan to prevent large scale public movement/gathering, the conspirators succeeded in bringing several hundred thousand people to Colombo, that included even a train load of activists from Kandy. Egodawele quite rightly asserted that the hoodwinked ordinary innocent people had been the real strength behind the regime change operation. Egodawele raised a spate of pertinent questions regarding the security aspects, with the focus on the 09 July, 2022, assault, taking into consideration various influencing factors, including Field Marshal Sarath Fonseka’s appeal to the armed forces not to point guns at the public as they didn’t want a repetition of 9 May, 2022, at Galle Face.
Whatever the impact of politicians and religious leaders urging the armed forces not to intervene, the war-winning Army Chief’s appeal may have influenced the military and even some members of the National Security Council.
By Shamindra Ferdinando
Maj. Gen. (retd.) K.B. Egodawele believes the ban on import of chemical fertilisers and agrochemicals, in April/May 2021, that led to staggering drop in crop yields, and countrywide protests, had been a key contributing factors that helped galvanise the Western-engineered Aragalaya plot against President Gotabaya Rajapaksa, similar to parallel regime changes carried out by Washington in Pakistan, Bangladesh and Nepal.
Egodawele, who had served the President as an Additional Secretary (Administration), attached to the Presidential Secretariat, dealt with regime change in ‘Aragalaya: Adarayen Prachandathwayata (From Love to Violence). In fact, according to the ex-Gemunu Watch veteran, who retired in 2004, the crisis caused by the fertiliser ban had been the first major issue that undermined President Rajapaksa.
Turmoil over the fertiliser ban paved the way for a series of other large scale protests. Although not directly connected with the fertiliser issue, teachers’ protests, demanding higher salaries, campaign against Sir John Kotelawala National Defence University (KNDU) Bill, Muslims and Catholics’ protests, targeting the President, followed by countrywide demonstrations over the collapse of essential services and supplies, created an explosive situation. The unexplained explosions of gas cylinders, too, caused anger and confusion among the public struggling to cope up with the developing situation.
Egodawele asserted that the Tamil Diaspora played a significant role in the regime-change project, with external powers utilising political parties here to carry out the conspiracy. The author is confident that the regime change project got underway soon after the Gajaba Regiment veteran assumed Office, as the seventh executive President.
In addition to Egodawele, who launched his work in 2023, former Central Bank Governor Ajith Nivard Cabraal (2022), former parliamentarian Wimal Weerawansa (2023), renowned author Sena Thoradeniya (2023), one-time Finance Secretary Mahinda Siriwardana (2025), President Ranil Wickremesinghe’s media head Prof. Sunanda Maddumabandara (2025), political analyst Asanga Abeygunasekera (2026) and President Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s Media head/DG, Information Department Mohan Samaranayake (2026) dealt with the first successful use of calculated violence to achieve a regime change.
As a person who had a ring side view of the rapid developments, Egodawele quite rightly asserted that the crisis got out of hand due to the delay on the part of the government to reach consensus with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to secure a lifeline. Who caused the delay in Sri Lanka initiating action to obtain IMF assistance for the 18th time? Those who had read Siriwardena’s book know that direct accusations were directed at the then Central Bank Governor W.D. Lakshman and others for their failure to seek IMF assistance, thereby jeopardizing the government. Samaranayake went a step further when he questioned whether such actions had been deliberate and meant to cause the downfall of the President, elected by a huge majority.
Referring to the Covid-19 crisis that dealt a knockout blow to the already weak national economy, Egodawele declared that it wouldn’t be fair by President Gotabaya Rajapaksa to blame him for the economic fallout as previous leaders, too, contributed to the collapse. Alleging that the external and internal conspirators exploited the Covid-19 crisis to achieve their political objective, the author named the main Opposition Samagi Jana Balwegaya (SJB), the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna and JVP breakaway faction Frontline socialist party (FSP/Peratugami pakshaya) as well as other political parties and groups being among the schemers.
The Catholic Church was also accused of direct involvement in the operation against President Gotabaya Rajapaksa. However, the author’s assertion, in the foreword, that extremists took control over the protest campaign that was launched at Kohuwala by those ordinary people affected by the crisis seemed wrong.
Having perused all books which dealt with the regime change operation and discussed the issues at hand with those in government at that time, both civilian and military, The Island is of the view that the whole operation, from the very beginning, was planned and executed by political parties/groups, both in and outside Parliament. Perhaps as Samaranayake pointed out in his study of the regime change project, Switzerland, with the backing of the US, launched the operation in late November, 2029, by staging the abduction drama, with the help of Somalatha or Siriyalatha Perera (later changed to Garnier Banister Francis), a local employee at the Embassy (https://island.lk/focus-on-swiss-role-in-garnier-abduction-as-furgler-succeeds-mock/)
Egodawele’s assertion that President Gotabaya’s decision to accommodate UNP leader Ranil Wickremesinghe in his Cabinet, as Prime Minister, as a correct and prudent move, is questionable. The President had no other option but to reach consensus with Wickremesinghe after the SJB leader Sajith Premadasa declared pre-conditions for him to accept that offer. But, Wickremesinghe’s acceptance of premiership cannot be examined without taking into consideration his role in the US-India backed project. President Gotabaya Rajapaksa, too, declared that Wickremesinghe was the best person to handle the situation but, whatever the assertions, the fact remains he was part of it. The protest couldn’t have exploded at Pangiriwattte, Mirihana, outside the President’s private residence without the direct UNP involvement.
Internal strife
From the very outset, the President failed to receive the anticipated support from his team. In fact, the Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna (SLPP) hadn’t been enthusiastic in fielding the wartime Defence Secretary as their candidate but the circumstances compelled them to do so. In the absence of direct control of the SLPP that commanded a 2/3 majority in Parliament, though it secured only 145 seats at the 2020 general election, the President never really received the backing of the ruling party.
Egodawele discussed this issue to some extent as one of the major reasons for the failure on the part of the President to face daunting challenges, particularly on the economic front. The President had been furious and so disappointed over the way the Central Bank and the Treasury responded to, what he called, the global crisis, and he directly accused them of not briefing him properly. Egodawele, who had been, most probably, present at a meeting the President called on 16 June, 2020, quoted him as having declared that the Central Bank failed to submit a single proposal to strengthen the economy.
The author emphasised the increase of funds required for debt servicing from USD 2 bn in 2014 to USD 6 bn by 2019 end as a key contributing factor for the crisis that overwhelmed President Rajapaksa. Those who had been very fast to blame President Gotabaya for bankruptcy are conveniently silent on the culpability of the UNP-SLFP Yahapalanaya.
The Wickremesinghe-Sirisena duo took an estimated USD 12.05 bn in foreign currency loans through International Sovereign Bonds (ISBs). In addition to ISBs, they borrowed over Rs. 5.7 trillion in domestic (rupee-denominated) loans via treasury bills and bonds. In spite of that, Wickremesinghe emerged as the country’s saviour and he, unashamedly, exploited the situation to his advantage at the 2024 presidential election. The UNP propagated the lie that Wickremesinghe saved the country from ruins without making reference to the massive borrowings, during the Yahapalana administration, that caused irreparable damage to the country and, as to this day, we do not know what they did with such huge borrowings. At least the Rajapaksas built a brand new international airport and a harbour, along with countless other development projects, from expressways to resuscitating badly neglected road network, and even built the country’s very first coal fired power plant at Norochcholai.
Egodawele should have paid sufficient attention to President Gotabaya’s hasty declaration of sweeping tax cuts to kick start the sagging economy with private investments. Instead of defending the President’s decision, the author should have dealt with the issue with an open mind. The ill-fated tax cuts should be examined taking into consideration the drastic reduction of the Special Commodity Levy (SCL) on imported sugar, from Rs. 50 to 25 cents per kilogram, in October, 2020. Although the author made no reference to the sugar scam, the writer believes it caused massive harm to the Rajapaksa government image and it can be compared with the release of 323 plus two ‘ice’ containers from the Colombo port by the incumbent government, in January, 2025.
Such shortsighted, corrupt and fraudulent actions erode public confidence in those governing the country. That is the undeniable truth our political parties cannot comprehend. The SLPP tried its best to cover up the sugar scam and, within weeks, ended up with a massively tarnished image. It may have been a case of paying back those who funded their previous election. The cocky SLPP never ever bothered to examine its actions. Instead, the SLPP attacked, including its own if they offered a dissenting opinion. Samaranayake, in his must-read memoirs, explained the parliamentary group, at the behest of Basil Rajapaksa, harmed both the party and the administration. (https://island.lk/overall-slpp-failures-stressed-in-new-aragalaya-narrative/)
GR overwhelmed
Amidst the rapid build-up of the unrelenting campaign against him, President Gotabaya requested visiting Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, on 09 January, 2022, to help Sri Lanka in debt restructuring. Obviously, China, by then, had decided not to intervene and was an obvious spectator as the US-India sinister project developed beyond control.
The JVP/NPP that entered into seven MoUs with India, including one on defence, in April, 2025, and months later, allowed Indian takeover of the Colombo Dockyard Limited after having launched protests, in January, 2022, against President Gotabaya for reaching an agreement with India, regarding the Trincomalee oil tank farm. India neutralised our fake revolutionaries in JVP/NPP with a cue from Washington, their true master, and brought it within its orbit, and today New Delhi’s influence is growing. The recent declaration by Indian High Commissioner Santosh Jha regarding the urgent and vital need to establish an overland bridge between Rameswaram and Talaimannar underscored the gravity of the developing situation.
Egodawele discussed the acceleration of the SLPP’s internal collapse with the formation of a political group, consisting of 11 constituents/groups of the ruling coalition. The establishment of the grouping, on 02 March, 2022, forced the President to sack ministers Wimal Weerawansa and Udaya Gammanpila. According to the author, the President had been reluctant and refrained from taking a decision at a Cabinet meeting held in the morning but gave in after meeting the parliamentary group.
The President made a last ditch attempt to secure IMF help but by then the situation had deteriorated to such an extent a recovery seemed impossible. Pangiriwatte erupted in violence within days after the IMF agreed, in late March, 2022, to initiate action in response to his request. By then, the SLPP parliamentary group had been fragmented and lost direction as various interested parties sought to distance themselves from the beleaguered President.
The author has allocated an entire chapter to the Muslims’ contribution to the regime change operation. The transformation of their anger, initially over Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s support, in his capacity as the Defence Secretary, during Mahinda Rajapaksa’s presidential tenure, to ‘Bodu Bala Sena’ (BBS), to hatred, that demanded the community, as a whole, sought the President’s ouster, depicted a worrisome picture. That brought the Muslims, who had been chased out of the Northern Province in October, 1990, by the LTTE, and subjected a series of brutal massacres, together with the Tamil Diaspora, to support President Gotabaya’s violent and humiliating ouster, despite his pivotal role in eradicating the separatist terrorists, cannot be disputed, under any circumstances.
Unfortunately, President Rajapaksa, instead of addressing the developing issues, appeared to have aggravated the situation by setting “One Country, One Law” commission, under Ven. Galagodaatte Gnanasara, leader of the ultra-nationalist BBS. Obviously these fake ultra nationalist Sinhalese were like the bought over Jihadists in West Asia, who, in fact, were Western moles. But, perhaps, the author should have examined the much-touted claim that a group of Muslims carried out suicide attacks in April, 2019, to facilitate Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s victory at the presidential election as their (Muslim community) were contradictory. Had the Muslim community been so hostile towards Gotabaya Rajapaksa, why on earth would they sacrifice their own lives to help him win the presidency and then join the Tamil Diaspora and the Catholic Church in the Galle Face regime change project.
Egodawele confidently confirmed that a hasty ban on import of chemical fertilisers, and agrochemicals, was taken due to the government’s inability to pay for fertiliser imports. The author asserted that the government found it difficult to allocate as much as USD 400 mn for fertiliser imports on one occasion.
The GMOA’s role, particularly the influencing actions of its President Dr. Anuruddha Padeniya, and the Chinese carbonic fertiliser fiasco that developed into a major diplomatic issue, resulting in catastrophic Chinese response, undermined the President, who further suffered as a result of teachers’ protests demanding higher salaries, KNDU Bill as well as domestic gas cylinder explosions.
Egodawele’s narrative explained the serious shortcomings on the part of the government in responding to the rapidly developing situations. The seventh chapter that discussed the 31 March, 2022, incidents, near the President’s private residents, proved that those who had been directly responsible for security of the Head of State were clueless regarding the sinister plan hatched by the interested parties to transform the protest campaign to a violent assault. Security chiefs, as well as the intelligence staff, were obviously caught napping. The author dealt with the then Prime Minister Wickremesinghe’s visit to the Pangiriwatte residence to meet President Rajapaksa, the warning issued by the UNPer regarding the gathering of people outside the President’s residence, and secretly planned protest in addition to the one at Jubilee Post junction that seemed peaceful. The author speculated that the protest at Jubilee Post junction may have been carried out to deceive those in charge of security regarding the conspirators real and deadly intentions. The author alleged that the SJB had been involved in the conspiracy. A private television station was also accused of inviting people to join the Pengiriwatte confrontation
Declaring that the Army had been slow in responding to the situation, Egodawele commended the police for not falling to the protesters’ bid to force them to open fire. Egodawele also questioned the rationale in JVP/NPP leader Anura Kumara Dissanayake’s claim that on 01 April, 2022, there were suspicions regarding a group affiliated to the government causing property damage at Pangiriwatte. The despicable role played by a section of the lawyers, in the aftermath of the Pangiriwatte mayhem, was mentioned by Egodawele who opined that had the President taken punitive measures against all those responsible for the Pangiriwatte security failure, perhaps the subsequent events could have been avoided, or successfully dealt with.
The President’s decision to vacate the Pangiriwatte home and move to the President’s House, on the recommendation of the National Security Council, was taken on 01 April, 2022.
Necessity for a proper investigation
Egodawele carefully examined the circumstances leading to the President’s fall. He seems to believe whatever caused the unprecedented crisis the flight of the President could have been averted if the armed forces acted in unison. He dealt with various situations and possibilities while pointing the finger at the JVP/NPP as the dominant party that exploited the situation and secured the support of some retired armed forces officers and men. It would be pertinent to mention that Egodawele launched his book during Wickremesinghe’s presidency in 2023 as the JVP/NPP was making rapid progress.
The need for comprehensive investigation into regime change operations is required. The military needs to identify the shortcomings (intentional/unintentional) on their part to take remedial measures. The author referred to the Rathupaswala shooting, in 2013, and the Rambukkana incident where the Kegalle police opened fire to prevent a violent group from setting a fully loaded fuel bowser on fire, in April, 2022, as two factors that may have impacted on the police and the military. The Rajapaksas response to Rathupaswala and Rambukkana incidents may have discouraged the armed forces and police to an extent they refrained from taking action. Egodawele also found fault with the intelligence services for their failure to recognise the developing insecurity among the police and armed forces and the growing belief that the growing regime change operation was certain to succeed.
Those who are genuinely interested in the regime change project should peruse Egodawele’s easy to comprehend presentation that lucidly dealt with a crisis created by what can be described as collective blunders by successive governments, though the declaration of bankruptcy was blamed on President Gotabaya Rajapaksa.
Midweek Review
Palm leaf manuscripts of Sri Lanka – IV
Tripitaka was first recorded on palm leaves. Religious histories such as Mahavamsa and Tupavamsa were also written on palm leaves. The printed texts we read today, of ancient classics, were composed after examining and comparing several palm leaf manuscripts. We forget this when we read. We assume that they were always on paper!
It is important to remember that literacy was developed through the use of ola manuscripts. The hodiya (alphabet) was written on palm leaf. The Sinhala hodiya included additional characters to accommodate Sanskrit and Pali phonemes. There were 52 letters. The library of the National Museum, Colombo has a palm leaf hodiya.
The tradition of writing on palm leaves continued throughout the colonial period. Robert Knox, who spent nearly two decades in captivity in the Kandyan Kingdom (Udarata), while the Dutch controlled Sri Lanka’s coastal areas (17th Century), said the ‘books’ available in Sinhala homes were on religion, medicine, magic, etc. This interest continued in the years that followed. In 1930, when the Historical Manuscripts Commission surveyed palm-leaf manuscripts held in private homes in Udarata, it found manuscripts on medicine, astrology, and charms.
The tradition of writing on palm leaves was held in high esteem and was not readily abandoned, observed analysts. Ananda Coomaraswamy, who was in Sri Lanka from 1903 to 1907 during British rule, said that Kandyan craftsmen invariably prepared their jewellery drawings on ola leaves. He had encountered only a handful drawn on paper.
Sirancee Gunawardena’s book titled “Palm leaf manuscripts of Sri Lanka “(1977) is the first and probably only book which gives a comprehensive account of the palm leaf manuscripts of Sri Lanka. The book is a landmark publication. There is no other book like it on the subject. The author deserves much praise and appreciation for her painstaking work.
This book has been written primarily to encourage Sri Lankans to regard palm-leaf manuscripts as a valuable part of Sri Lanka’s heritage. Palm leaf manuscripts are historical documents and should be preserved as such, says Sirancee. They contain rich primary data, making them a valuable source for primary research as well. Some olas, at least, had beautiful handwriting and a high standard of grammar. They also contained palindromes that could be read in all four directions, she says.
The book is the product of 12 years of painstaking research. Sirancee speaks of “the joy and feeling of exultation” she experienced “peering into dusty nooks and cobweb encrusted wooden boxes and forgotten corners of libraries”. She has spoken to a number of specialists, including persons who knew how to prepare ola leaves and those who could read the manuscripts. She has personally copied scores of manuscripts and the drawings in them.
Sirancee has examined manuscripts dating from the 13th century to 19th century. She has examined the 13-century copy of Chullavagga in the Museum library. This manuscript has 144 folios, size is 23″ x 2 ½”. The writing is beautiful. It has wooden covers with a design. This may be the oldest book illustration in Sri Lanka, says Sirancee.
She was able, over a long period, to personally examine most of the ola manuscripts in the National Museum. She also examined the collections in temple libraries. The Potgul Vihara, Hanguranketa, had one of the largest and best-arranged libraries of palm-leaf manuscripts.
There was a photograph of Sirancee examining the ola manuscripts at Sri Rahula Vihara, Bentota, and another of Sirancee writing down the text as Gamariya read out from a copy of the Mahavamsa. This was probably the well-known astrologer Daniel Gamariya.
There was a great range in size and content in palm-leaf manuscripts. The average manuscript seen by Sirancee had 60–65 folios. Most manuscripts were pure text, but Vessantara Jataka and yantra manuscripts were profusely illustrated. In one manuscript, there was a drawing of the peacock vehicle of the Kataragama God. The drawing extended over three pages stitched together.
Some Vessantara Jataka olas are illustrated, event by event. These illustrations closely resemble temple fresco paintings. The Vessantara jataka manuscript at Dharmadasa Vihara, Boralesgamuwa is profusely illustrated and in colour. The Illustrations are small, in cameo form but have minute decorative details. In her book, Sirancee had reproduced the full text, including illustrations, of two Vessantara jataka texts (p 93-126,275-278). An illustrated Vidura Pandita Jataka from the Hugh Nevill collection is also reproduced in full (p 269-273).
Sirancee wants to give the reader some idea of the wide range of subjects found in palm-leaf manuscripts. She provides the following list. She notes that palm-leaf manuscripts are a source of material on ancient medicine, veterinary science, astrology, yantra and mantra practices, land endowments by kings, medieval taxation, agriculture, trade in ancient times, land grants, land transfers, royal amnesties, acupuncture, ophthalmology, music, metaphysics, and cosmology, as well as the construction of tanks, temple building, and ancient systems of taxation.
Let us take a closer look at some of the subjects mentioned above. First, it is clear that the Mahavamsa was not the only historical text found in curated palm-leaf collections. The Dipavamsa and the Rajavaliya were also included. Copies of the Rajavaliya are found in abundance in both public and private collections. These include holdings in the Colombo Museum Library, the University of Peradeniya, the British Library, and the private collections of L. S. D. Peiris and S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike.
The Rajavaliya was also found in the following temples: Subadrarama Vihara, Balapitiya; Kande Vihara, Atabage; Pallewela Sellawali Raja Maha Vihara, Halloluwa; Pravachanodaya Pirivena Temple, Molligoda, Wadduwa; and Yogilalena Temple, Sandalankara. The copy at the Sri Vardhanarama Library, Mohotimulla, is one of the oldest.
Historical Manuscripts Commission of 1930 found that family collections had various olas that gave information on the Sinhala kings, especially Udarata kings, with the exact dates and hour of their death. The Thalgodapitiya family collection had a Sri Wickrama Alankaraya by Vaidyaratne Basnayake nilame, 1882. Kurunegala Vistaraya was found in many private family collections.
The Historical Manuscripts Commission did not consider these manuscripts to be of academic importance. However, it noted that Yapahuwa temple had an ola with the dates of coronation and death of kings and other important events in the life of “all kings of Kandy”.
Buddhist temples collected ola manuscripts on Buddhism, with particular emphasis on the Dhamma. Olas containing religious texts of great significance were wrapped in silk and kept in the inner sanctum of the temple, Sirancee observes.
The histories of important stupas and temples were also written on ola manuscripts. The Tupavamsa gives the history of the Mahathupa, the Lowa Maha Paya, and the Mirisaveti Stupa. The Andreas Nell collection contains an ola manuscript describing how the four boundaries of the Ridi Vihara were determined. The Henry Parker collection includes an ola manuscript which states that, in relation to the Ridi Vihara, silver was discovered in a nearby cave by a traveller during his journey.
The temple collections included these historical texts. Nagolle Vihara had a copy of the Mahabodhivamsa. Copies of the Hathavanagalla Vihara Vamsa were distributed to neighbouring temples and can still be found today at the Attanagalla Raja Maha Vihara and the Beligammana Raja Maha Vihara.
Palm leaf manuscripts also gave the specifications for the Buddha statue. There were manuscripts on the art of making images of the Buddha, as well as hamsa, lata, kinnara and makara images. The Sariputra ola in Colombo Museum gives dimensions of images in general and Buddha in particular. It gives specifications for the standing, sitting and reclining Buddha. It is written in Sinhala, but text is in Sanskrit. It is in good handwriting.
The Historical Manuscripts Commission (1930) reported the discovery of a Pirit Pota in a family collection. The manuscript was written using black vegetable dye. According to the Commission’s report, the letters remain as black today as they were when written a century ago. The coloured floral illuminations were also executed using the same vegetable dye.
Jataka stories were held in palm leaves. Sirancee has personally examined many magnificent, large Jataka olas held in libraries. Colombo Museum had two large manuscripts containing many jataka stories. One was titled Sinhala Jataka Pota. Each had over one thousand leaves. The leaf strips were 27″ to 33″ by 2 ½. “
The Pansiya Panas Jataka manuscript owned by K.V.J. de Silva is one of the largest manuscripts Sirancee had seen and possibly the largest in Sri Lanka. It was a copy of a manuscript written in the time of king Parakrama bahu IV (1302-1326). It was written in Sinhala and had 984 folios. The folios at the end of the manuscript contained an index to the stories.
There is a manuscript of Vidura Pandita Jataka in the Hugh Nevill collection in the British Library. It is an original manuscript written in the time of king Senerat (1604-1635). It was written by Matale Rate Atapattu Amanthi of Owille in Matara (sic). The text is accompanied by very beautiful illustrations. The LSD Pieris collection has a small jataka manuscript, 10.5 cm in size, containing several illustrated jatakas. One illustration shows Siddhartha Gautama putting his bowl into the river.The most popular jataka story in Sri Lanka, is undoubtedly the Vessantara Jataka. It features prominently in our temple frescos and olas. The T. P. P. Goonetilleke collection held at Peradeniya had 30 Vessantara Jataka manuscripts. Some Vessantara manuscripts are held in private collections as heirlooms.
Legal matters were recorded on palm leaf manuscripts. Abhaya dana was written in olas. The ola had the royal sign “Sri “symbolising the king but inscribed by a Mohottala on the order of the Sannas Rala. Sirancee had come across a manuscript which stated that when a person died intestate the king inherited the lands. The LSD Pieris collection had a manuscript on a money transaction. The ola recorded that the money owed was handed over in the presence of witnesses who were named.
Land grants were recorded on olas. They were recorded on gold, silver and copper plates as well. Sirancee came across many Land grants in the collections she looked at. VP Ratnayake had a manuscript which said “By this it is declared that Godakkumbura Setunge Mudiyanse was given Pallekumbura in Udukaha pattu Kotugampola Korale on Jan 1630 by Monerawila Rajapakse, Bathwadana Nilame, who is the owner of Matale Dissawa and Sat Korale Dissawa.
P.E.E. Fernando found in the record room of the district court of Kandy, a deed of conveyance drawn up at the request of a person named Patra-Abo Sastru-raja, where he transferred to a vihara he had constructed, a house and garden called Dharmapata geratta (sic) in which he was residing, together with other lands, the boundaries of which were set out in great detail. Some movable objects such as a pitcher, palanquin and three slaves including a female slave were also offered. The document was attested by four persons and a fifth person stated that he had written the document.
Temples carefully looked after olas relating to the ownership of their temple lands. Ridi vihara has a very old manuscript titled Sangaraja Vahanseta Mahanuwara Lekan Pota with names and information on the temples given to the chief monk. When paddy lands were offered to temples, the transfer was recorded in an ola. There is an ola which stated that Pahalavela Kumbura was offered to Atkande Vihara by Teliyaskatuwe Lekam and Maddumaya.
Temples also held on to olas which gave the decisions on disputes over temple land. The high priest of Aluvihare, Matale had an ola on litigation relating to Aluvihare lands. The text is given in full by Sirancee on p 298. Uthurupaw Vihara had an ola issued by Adikara Dissawe. It contained the judgment in a land dispute which had taken place in the 15th century.
In ancient times, administration was done through olas. The Esala Perahera in Kandy has a chieftain mounted on an elephant carrying an ola which gives permission for the perahera to take place. Appointments were announced via olas. The Matale Maha Dissawe Kadaimpota, announced that ‘Niharapola Alahakoon Mohottala was appointed lekam of Tun Korale and also received the Ran Panhinda and flag.’ Administrative responsibilities were given in olas. Historical Manuscripts Commission found at the Atkande vihara, a 16th century ola giving information on the dissaves in charge of Kurunegala district.
Kadaimpot and Lekam Miti were held on ola. The Historical Manuscripts Commission found several of these in private collections. The Maya Rata Kadimpota held in a private collection, gave information on the 28 districts or towns in Maya Rata. At Padiyapelella, the Commission found a Kadaimpota dating to 14th Century, dealing with Ruhuna, Maya, Pihiti with names of subdivisions, the ratas, also Kelaniya, Panadura, Dambadeniya and so on. The Lekam Miti Pota of 1.1.1830 listed land holdings in the eastern part of Nuwarakalaviya. (To be continued)
References
Sirancee Gunawardana Palm leaf manuscripts of Sri Lanka 1977
L.S.D. Pieris Yantra drawing on palm leaf sri Lanka. 2018
1st report of the Historical Manuscripts Commission 1933, SP 9 of 1933
3rd report of Historical Manuscripts Commission 1951, SP 19 of 1951
Ismeth Raheem
https://www.sundaytimes.
lk/260426/plus/turning-back-the-pages-of-sri-lankas-paper-trail-639604.html
by KAMALIKA PIERIS
Midweek Review
A Quiet Counter-Revolution Unfolds
A peaceful counter-revolution is taking shape,
Against current ‘Digital Age’ intoxications,
At that ever-green seat of higher learning,
Wolfson College of the University of Cambridge,
Where one hour every Thursday is set apart,
For reading, writing and creative activity,
In the more time-tested analogues ways,
For those who opt for it, in an august space,
Thus paving the way for the Creator to prevail,
Over Creatures who are tending to run berserk,
More so why humans could cry out in one voice:
‘Long Live, WCSA Digital Detox Thursdays!’
By Lynn Ockersz
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