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Barometer confirms window for political settlement

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Once again, Sri Lanka is at a crossroads. After decades of missed opportunities and delayed reforms, the conditions are there for a lasting political resolution of the ethnic conflict. The NPP government has the chance to resolve the country’s longest and most divisive conflict through Sri Lankan institutions, on its own terms. The government holds a two-thirds majority in parliament that allows it to amend the constitution and introduce the reforms that past governments promised but failed to deliver. It came to power on the back of a popular demand for system change, and the public expectation that followed that election was not for minor adjustments but for a deep restructuring of the state. The opposition is neither strong nor dominated by the racist and extremist voices that in the past sabotaged every attempt at reconciliation.

The danger is that, as Shakespeare pointed out, time does not wait.  Internationally, the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) has provided it space to resolve issues domestically. The latest resolution on Sri Lanka gives the country two more years to fulfil its commitments to accountability, truth-seeking, and reparations. The resolution explicitly acknowledges that national mechanisms can address these issues, de-emphasising the need for an international process. It is a kind of diplomatic reprieve that the world is willing to let Sri Lanka find its own way but also the right way.  On  the other hand, if nothing tangible happens within the next two years, the international mood could shift sharply. The next UNHRC resolution may be stronger and demand direct intervention or international mechanisms once again to deal with internal matters.

The recently released Sri Lanka Barometer 2025, a project sponsored by the European Union and the German government (www.srilankabarometer.lk), adds weight to the need for urgency. Conducted countrywide, it offers an empirically grounded picture of reconciliation in this time of political transition. Its findings show both danger and possibility.  According to the survey findings, political trust is lowest in the Northern and Eastern provinces compared with the other seven provinces.  It showed that political trust has risen nationally from 5.9 (2023) to 6.9 (2025), the highest since 2020. However, trust declined in both the Northern and Eastern provinces, falling to 6.5 and 6.2 respectively in 2025 down from 6.9 and 6.5 in 2023.  Respondents in the north and east reported persistent feelings of marginalisation and unfulfilled justice. Many expressed the view that promises made by successive governments have not been translated into action, and that the lack of provincial council elections has left them without a political voice.

 Positive Findings

 On the positive side, the survey identifies a broad national openness to reconciliation amid change.  The research finds that a majority of Sri Lankans across ethnic and religious lines believe reconciliation is possible if it is linked to visible improvements in governance, justice, and livelihoods. Equally significant is the expanding civic space for reconciliation under the present government.  Local civil society organisations, community leaders, and youth groups are participating more actively in dialogue and advocacy than in previous years. The survey also showed that people are increasingly willing to join reconciliation-related activities when these are led by credible local actors rather than by partisan or external ones. Despite the decline in trust levels in the North and East, people in these two provinces reported the highest level of confidence in their own ability to engage politically, suggesting strong civic motivation and agency at community level.   The national average was 6.7 (up from 6.1 in 2023) but in the Northern and Eastern provinces the score was 7.2.  The report states “The highest levels of internal political efficacy in 2025 are recorded in the Northern and Eastern Provinces (with mean scores of 7.2), which may be linked to the higher-than-average active citizenship observed in these regions.” This demonstrates that a bottom-up approach can succeed if matched by political leadership from above.

 The message from the Barometer is there is still space for reconciliation, but it is narrowing. The Barometer shows a national rise in trust and optimism, but a clear divergence in the North and East, where trust and responsiveness are eroding, although civic confidence and participation remain strong there. This suggests that the public in war-affected areas continues to believe in change but not yet in the state’s will or capacity to deliver it. The longer justice and devolution are delayed, the harder it becomes to sustain public trust. When grievances are left unaddressed, they are easily exploited by extremist actors on all sides. The voice of frustration and demand for justice comes not only from the north and east but also from ethnic and religious minority communities across the country. From Kattankudy to Katuwapitiya, from Valvettithurai to Digana where communities continue to seek truth and accountability. The continued delay in addressing these grievances deepens distrust in institutions and erodes faith in the rule of law.

 The government, with its parliamentary majority and its popular mandate, is uniquely placed to reverse this trend. It needs to demonstrate commitment by restoring the democratic process at the provincial level, holding provincial council elections, and ensuring that transitional-justice commitments to missing persons are implemented in a way that people can see and feel.  The time to deliver on commitments is now, not later.  It would be pertinent to note that majorities and mandates can be fleeting as they were with the Gotabaya Rajapaksa government. The government’s current strength will not last indefinitely. Political goodwill erodes quickly when people do not see results. If this moment is allowed to pass, it may not return any time soon.

 Lost Opportunities

 The history of modern Sri Lanka is one of lost opportunities to address the ethnic conflict that has dogged the country since its Independence. In 1977, President J. R. Jayewardene came to office with a five-sixths parliamentary majority and a manifesto that recognised Tamil grievances. He pledged a roundtable conference to address them but delayed too long.  In 2015 the Sirisena-Wickremesinghe government started strong, formed a constitutional assembly out of parliament, but then ran out of steam.   The question, today, is not whether the present government has the power to act but whether it has the vision, commitment and courage to use it.

At the heart of Sri Lanka’s unresolved conflict lies the question of power-sharing. The 13th Amendment to the constitution, which introduced the provincial council system, remains the most viable basis for a political solution. It offers limited autonomy within a unitary framework, balancing the desire for self-administration in the North and East with the need to maintain the unity of the state.  In a recent article, Dr Dayan Jayatilleka has argued that the provincial council system is not simply an Indian construct but an indigenous model that goes back to the Bandaranaike-Chelvanayakam Pact of 1957 which sought to establish “Regional Councils” (with power to levy taxes).  He has also summarised the reason why Sri Lanka needs devolution of power.  He writes “We need provincial-level devolution because the reality of the island’s demographic composition and disposition is such that we must either have a level playing-field constitutionally, guaranteeing equality with no built-in privilege for any community (e.g., France, Singapore), or we must share power between the centre and the provinces which contain non-majority constituent communities in compact near-contiguity.” (https://www.ft.lk/columns/Electoral-reactivation-of-provincial-councils-is-an-urgent-systemic-imperative/4-783312)

 Sri Lanka stands today at a rare intersection of political will, social expectation, and international opportunity. The people voted for system change. The government has both the power and the legitimacy to deliver. The UNHRC has extended a window for domestic action. Civil society is ready, as the Sri Lanka Barometer confirms, to participate in rebuilding trust. What remains is the political decision to move from intent to implementation. Holding Provincial Council elections, empowering local institutions, acknowledging the suffering of all communities, and demonstrating that justice is for all are steps that can make national  reconciliation a reality. The time to act is now, not next year, and certainly not after another round of debates or delays that can drag on for years.

by Jehan Perera



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Rebuilding the country requires consultation

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A positive feature of the government that is emerging is its responsiveness to public opinion. The manner in which it has been responding to the furore over the Grade 6 English Reader, in which a weblink to a gay dating site was inserted, has been constructive. Government leaders have taken pains to explain the mishap and reassure everyone concerned that it was not meant to be there and would be removed. They have been meeting religious prelates, educationists and community leaders. In a context where public trust in institutions has been badly eroded over many years, such responsiveness matters. It signals that the government sees itself as accountable to society, including to parents, teachers, and those concerned about the values transmitted through the school system.

This incident also appears to have strengthened unity within the government. The attempt by some opposition politicians and gender misogynists to pin responsibility for this lapse on Prime Minister Dr Harini Amarasuriya, who is also the Minister of Education, has prompted other senior members of the government to come to her defence. This is contrary to speculation that the powerful JVP component of the government is unhappy with the prime minister. More importantly, it demonstrates an understanding within the government that individual ministers should not be scapegoated for systemic shortcomings. Effective governance depends on collective responsibility and solidarity within the leadership, especially during moments of public controversy.

The continuing important role of the prime minister in the government is evident in her meetings with international dignitaries and also in addressing the general public. Last week she chaired the inaugural meeting of the Presidential Task Force to Rebuild Sri Lanka in the aftermath of Cyclone Ditwah. The composition of the task force once again reflects the responsiveness of the government to public opinion. Unlike previous mechanisms set up by governments, which were either all male or without ethnic minority representation, this one includes both, and also includes civil society representation. Decision-making bodies in which there is diversity are more likely to command public legitimacy.

Task Force

The Presidential Task Force to Rebuild Sri Lanka overlooks eight committees to manage different aspects of the recovery, each headed by a sector minister. These committees will focus on Needs Assessment, Restoration of Public Infrastructure, Housing, Local Economies and Livelihoods, Social Infrastructure, Finance and Funding, Data and Information Systems, and Public Communication. This structure appears comprehensive and well designed. However, experience from post-disaster reconstruction in countries such as Indonesia and Sri Lanka after the 2004 tsunami suggests that institutional design alone does not guarantee success. What matters equally is how far these committees engage with those on the ground and remain open to feedback that may complicate, slow down, or even challenge initial plans.

An option that the task force might wish to consider is to develop a linkage with civil society groups with expertise in the areas that the task force is expected to work. The CSO Collective for Emergency Relief has set up several committees that could be linked to the committees supervised by the task force. Such linkages would not weaken the government’s authority but strengthen it by grounding policy in lived realities. Recent findings emphasise the idea of “co-production”, where state and society jointly shape solutions in which sustainable outcomes often emerge when communities are treated not as passive beneficiaries but as partners in problem-solving.

Cyclone Ditwah destroyed more than physical infrastructure. It also destroyed communities. Some were swallowed by landslides and floods, while many others will need to be moved from their homes as they live in areas vulnerable to future disasters. The trauma of displacement is not merely material but social and psychological. Moving communities to new locations requires careful planning. It is not simply a matter of providing people with houses. They need to be relocated to locations and in a manner that permits communities to live together and to have livelihoods. This will require consultation with those who are displaced. Post-disaster evaluations have acknowledged that relocation schemes imposed without community consent often fail, leading to abandonment of new settlements or the emergence of new forms of marginalisation. Even today, abandoned tsunami housing is to be seen in various places that were affected by the 2004 tsunami.

Malaiyaha Tamils

The large-scale reconstruction that needs to take place in parts of the country most severely affected by Cyclone Ditwah also brings an opportunity to deal with the special problems of the Malaiyaha Tamil population. These are people of recent Indian origin who were unjustly treated at the time of Independence and denied rights of citizenship such as land ownership and the vote. This has been a festering problem and a blot on the conscience of the country. The need to resettle people living in those parts of the hill country which are vulnerable to landslides is an opportunity to do justice by the Malaiyaha Tamil community. Technocratic solutions such as high-rise apartments or English-style townhouses that have or are being contemplated may be cost-effective, but may also be culturally inappropriate and socially disruptive. The task is not simply to build houses but to rebuild communities.

The resettlement of people who have lost their homes and communities requires consultation with them. In the same manner, the education reform programme, of which the textbook controversy is only a small part, too needs to be discussed with concerned stakeholders including school teachers and university faculty. Opening up for discussion does not mean giving up one’s own position or values. Rather, it means recognising that better solutions emerge when different perspectives are heard and negotiated. Consultation takes time and can be frustrating, particularly in contexts of crisis where pressure for quick results is intense. However, solutions developed with stakeholder participation are more resilient and less costly in the long run.

Rebuilding after Cyclone Ditwah, addressing historical injustices faced by the Malaiyaha Tamil community, advancing education reform, changing the electoral system to hold provincial elections without further delay and other challenges facing the government, including national reconciliation, all require dialogue across differences and patience with disagreement. Opening up for discussion is not to give up on one’s own position or values, but to listen, to learn, and to arrive at solutions that have wider acceptance. Consultation needs to be treated as an investment in sustainability and legitimacy and not as an obstacle to rapid decisionmaking. Addressing the problems together, especially engagement with affected parties and those who work with them, offers the best chance of rebuilding not only physical infrastructure but also trust between the government and people in the year ahead.

 

by Jehan Perera

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PSTA: Terrorism without terror continues

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When the government appointed a committee, led by Rienzie Arsekularatne, Senior President’s Counsel, to draft a new law to replace the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA), as promised by the ruling NPP, the writer, in an article published in this journal in July 2025, expressed optimism that, given Arsekularatne’s experience in criminal justice, he would be able to address issues from the perspectives of the State, criminal justice, human rights, suspects, accused, activists, and victims. The draft Protection of the State from Terrorism Act (PSTA), produced by the Committee, has been sharply criticised by individuals and organisations who expected a better outcome that aligns with modern criminal justice and human rights principles.

This article is limited to a discussion of the definition of terrorism. As the writer explained previously, the dangers of an overly broad definition go beyond conviction and increased punishment. Special laws on terrorism allow deviations from standard laws in areas such as preventive detention, arrest, administrative detention, restrictions on judicial decisions regarding bail, lengthy pre-trial detention, the use of confessions, superadded punishments, such as confiscation of property and cancellation of professional licences, banning organisations, and restrictions on publications, among others. The misuse of such laws is not uncommon. Drastic legislation, such as the PTA and emergency regulations, although intended to be used to curb intense violence and deal with emergencies, has been exploited to suppress political opposition.

 

International Standards

The writer’s basic premise is that, for an act to come within the definition of terrorism, it must either involve “terror” or a “state of intense or overwhelming fear” or be committed to achieve an objective of an individual or organisation that uses “terror” or a “state of intense or overwhelming fear” to realise its aims. The UN General Assembly has accepted that the threshold for a possible general offence of terrorism is the provocation of “a state of terror” (Resolution 60/43). The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe has taken a similar view, using the phrase “to create a climate of terror.”

In his 2023 report on the implementation of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, the Secretary-General warned that vague and overly broad definitions of terrorism in domestic law, often lacking adequate safeguards, violate the principle of legality under international human rights law. He noted that such laws lead to heavy-handed, ineffective, and counterproductive counter-terrorism practices and are frequently misused to target civil society actors and human rights defenders by labelling them as terrorists to obstruct their work.

The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) has stressed in its Handbook on Criminal Justice Responses to Terrorism that definitions of terrorist acts must use precise and unambiguous language, narrowly define punishable conduct and clearly distinguish it from non-punishable behaviour or offences subject to other penalties. The handbook was developed over several months by a team of international experts, including the writer, and was finalised at a workshop in Vienna.

 

Anti-Terrorism Bill, 2023

A five-member Bench of the Supreme Court that examined the Anti-Terrorism Bill, 2023, agreed with the petitioners that the definition of terrorism in the Bill was too broad and infringed Article 12(1) of the Constitution, and recommended that an exemption (“carve out”) similar to that used in New Zealand under which “the fact that a person engages in any protest, advocacy, or dissent, or engages in any strike, lockout, or other industrial action, is not, by itself, a sufficient basis for inferring that the person” committed the wrongful acts that would otherwise constitute terrorism.

While recognising the Court’s finding that the definition was too broad, the writer argued, in his previous article, that the political, administrative, and law enforcement cultures of the country concerned are crucial factors to consider. Countries such as New Zealand are well ahead of developing nations, where the risk of misuse is higher, and, therefore, definitions should be narrower, with broader and more precise exemptions. How such a “carve out” would play out in practice is uncertain.

In the Supreme Court, it was submitted that for an act to constitute an offence, under a special law on terrorism, there must be terror unleashed in the commission of the act, or it must be carried out in pursuance of the object of an organisation that uses terror to achieve its objectives. In general, only acts that aim at creating “terror” or a “state of intense or overwhelming fear” should come under the definition of terrorism. There can be terrorism-related acts without violence, for example, when a member of an extremist organisation remotely sabotages an electronic, automated or computerised system in pursuance of the organisation’s goal. But when the same act is committed by, say, a whizz-kid without such a connection, that would be illegal and should be punished, but not under a special law on terrorism. In its determination of the Bill, the Court did not address this submission.

 

PSTA Proposal

Proposed section 3(1) of the PSTA reads:

Any person who, intentionally or knowingly, commits any act which causes a consequence specified in subsection (2), for the purpose of-

(a) provoking a state of terror;

(b) intimidating the public or any section of the public;

(c) compelling the Government of Sri Lanka, or any other Government, or an international organisation, to do or to abstain from doing any act; or

(d) propagating war, or violating territorial integrity or infringing the sovereignty of Sri Lanka or any other sovereign country, commits the offence of terrorism.

The consequences listed in sub-section (2) include: death; hurt; hostage-taking; abduction or kidnapping; serious damage to any place of public use, any public property, any public or private transportation system or any infrastructure facility or environment; robbery, extortion or theft of public or private property; serious risk to the health and safety of the public or a section of the public; serious obstruction or damage to, or interference with, any electronic or automated or computerised system or network or cyber environment of domains assigned to, or websites registered with such domains assigned to Sri Lanka; destruction of, or serious damage to, religious or cultural property; serious obstruction or damage to, or interference with any electronic, analogue, digital or other wire-linked or wireless transmission system, including signal transmission and any other frequency-based transmission system; without lawful authority, importing, exporting, manufacturing, collecting, obtaining, supplying, trafficking, possessing or using firearms, offensive weapons, ammunition, explosives, articles or things used in the manufacture of explosives or combustible or corrosive substances and biological, chemical, electric, electronic or nuclear weapons, other nuclear explosive devices, nuclear material, radioactive substances, or radiation-emitting devices.

Under section 3(5), “any person who commits an act which constitutes an offence under the nine international treaties on terrorism, ratified by Sri Lanka, also commits the offence of terrorism.” No one would contest that.

The New Zealand “carve-out” is found in sub-section (4): “The fact that a person engages in any protest, advocacy or dissent or engages in any strike, lockout or other industrial action, is not by itself a sufficient basis for inferring that such person (a) commits or attempts, abets, conspires, or prepares to commit the act with the intention or knowledge specified in subsection (1); or (b) is intending to cause or knowingly causes an outcome specified in subsection (2).”

While the Arsekularatne Committee has proposed, including the New Zealand “carve out”, it has ignored a crucial qualification in section 5(2) of that country’s Terrorism Suppression Act, that for an act to be considered a terrorist act, it must be carried out for one or more purposes that are or include advancing “an ideological, political, or religious cause”, with the intention of either intimidating a population or coercing or forcing a government or an international organisation to do or abstain from doing any act.

When the Committee was appointed, the Human Rights Commission of Sri Lanka opined that any new offence with respect to “terrorism” should contain a specific and narrow definition of terrorism, such as the following: “Any person who by the use of force or violence unlawfully targets the civilian population or a segment of the civilian population with the intent to spread fear among such population or segment thereof in furtherance of a political, ideological, or religious cause commits the offence of terrorism”.

The writer submits that, rather than bringing in the requirement of “a political, ideological, or religious cause”, it would be prudent to qualify proposed section 3(1) by the requirement that only acts that aim at creating “terror” or a “state of intense or overwhelming fear” or are carried out to achieve a goal of an individual or organisation that employs “terror” or a “state of intense or overwhelming fear” to attain its objectives should come under the definition of terrorism. Such a threshold is recognised internationally; no “carve out” is then needed, and the concerns of the Human Rights Commission would also be addressed.

 

by Dr. Jayampathy Wickramaratne
President’s Counsel

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ROCK meets REGGAE 2026

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JAYASRI: From Vienna, Austria

We generally have in our midst the famous JAYASRI twins, Rohitha and Rohan, who are based in Austria but make it a point to entertain their fans in Sri Lanka on a regular basis.

Well, rock and reggae fans get ready for a major happening on 28th February (Oops, a special day where I’m concerned!) as the much-awaited ROCK meets REGGAE event booms into action at the Nelum Pokuna outdoor theatre.

It was seven years ago, in 2019, that the last ROCK meets REGGAE concert was held in Colombo, and then the Covid scene cropped up.

Chitral Somapala with BLACK MAJESTY

This year’s event will feature our rock star Chitral Somapala with the Australian Rock+Metal band BLACK MAJESTY, and the reggae twins Rohitha and Rohan Jayalath with the original JAYASRI – the full band, with seven members from Vienna, Austria.

According to Rohitha, the JAYASRI outfit is enthusiastically looking forward to entertaining music lovers here with their brand of music.

Their playlist for 28th February will consist of the songs they do at festivals in Europe, as well as originals, and also English and Sinhala hits, and selected covers.

Says Rohitha: “We have put up a great team, here in Sri Lanka, to give this event an international setting and maintain high standards, and this will be a great experience for our Sri Lankan music lovers … not only for Rock and Reggae fans. Yes, there will be some opening acts, and many surprises, as well.”

Rohitha, Chitral and Rohan: Big scene at ROCK meets REGGAE

Rohitha and Rohan also conveyed their love and festive blessings to everyone in Sri Lanka, stating “This Christmas was different as our country faced a catastrophic situation and, indeed, it’s a great time to help and share the real love of Jesus Christ by helping the poor, the needy and the homeless people. Let’s RISE UP as a great nation in 2026.”

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