Features

The Central Bank

Published

1 year ago

2025/08/24

Thilina Walpola

CHAPTER 13

(Excerpted from N.U. JAYAWARDENA The first five decades)

(Continued from last week)

Department of Economic Research

One of the two departments that had been expressly provided for in the Monetary Law Act was the Department of Economic Research (the other was the Department of Banking Supervision).( The Exter Report stated that the functions of the Exchange Control Department which were presently functioning under the Treasury, were “better left to the determination of the Monetary Board,” however added that, “in other countries (which have an exchange control department), central banks ordinarily do the bulk of the work of operating the exchange control” (see Exter Report, p. 21). According to the Exter Report, the department had been “given special recognition in the… law in order to emphasise its importance:”

While there may be a tendency in highly developed countries to attach too much importance to economic research, the opposite is more likely to be true in underdeveloped countries… It may not be too much to say that the solid achievements of the Central Bank in years to come will depend as much upon the successful development of this department as upon anything else. (Exter Report, p.18)

Intellectuals such as the lawyer and historian, Colvin R. de Silva, echoed these sentiments and commended the Research Department as an “excellent” feature of the bill:

The express provisions for the creation of a Department of Economic Research is something to be welcomed without reserve. In our country, we have always suffered from the absence of authoritative statistics, from the absence of proper, relevant, day-to-day information for the economic studies relevant to current developments. (Hansard, 24 Nov. 1949, p.832)

In later years, the Department of Economic Research – which was close to NU’s heart – played a central role in fulfilling the mandate of the Bank. The department was, he wrote: empowered to train… personnel… within and without the Bank, to equip itself with a team of highly competent talent in economics, statistics, sociology and other behavioural sciences, so that it would develop into a forceful engine of original thought, of reflection and knowledge, of communication and advice on the economic and social aspects of community life. (N.U. Jayawardena, message on the 25th anniversary of the Central Bank)

The Economic Research Department became the most prestigious department of the Bank, where many of the best and the brightest officers began their careers. Under Section 26 of the Monetary Law Act, the Director of this department was statutorily empowered to require any person to furnish information he deemed necessary for “the proper discharge of the functions and responsibilities of the Central Bank.” The first director of this important post was B.B. Das Gupta. Several new graduates in Economics from the University were recruited; and NU, during his period at the Central Bank, took a great interest in the Department of Economic Research, encouraging its young staff members to acquire further qualifications (Eramudugolla, 2004, p.18-19).

Scholarships for Higher Education

At the time, few Sri Lankans did research or postgraduate studies at local or foreign universities. The Central Bank was the only government institution other than the University to offer scholarships for postgraduate education abroad in Economics. In fact, provision for this was set out in Section 27 of the Monetary Law Act:

The Central Bank shall promote and sponsor training of technical personnel in the subjects of money, banking, statistics, finance, and other economic subjects… (and) is hereby authorized to defray the costs of study abroad of employees of the bank who are of proved merit. (emphasis added)

Family photo

According to former Central Bank Governor A.S. Jayawardena (personal communication, 2006), this was one of the main incentives for some to join the Bank. Several staff economists (including some future Governors of the Bank) benefited from this scheme. They included A.S. Jayawardena, H.N.S. Karunatillake, G. Usvattearatchi, W. Rasaputra, M.R.P. Salgado, S.B.D. de Silva, W.M. Tilekeratne, J.B. Kelegama, P.B. Karandawela and P. Wignaraja.

The Research Library

Access to the latest books on economic theory and socio-economic subjects, as well as to statistics, reports and journals, was vital for the effective functioning of the Department of Economic Research. A research library therefore was set up under this department. NU, the perennial student of economics and lover of books, by all accounts took an active interest in helping build up its collection. An economist working at the Central Bank at the time recalls that NU was always questioning the staff about the latest publications in economics. For instance, when NU heard about Ragnar Nurkse’s book, Problems of Capital Formation in Underdeveloped Countries, he ordered five copies for the Central Bank Library; and when a staff member was about to leave for studies in Australia, NU asked him to send Douglas Copeland’s book on the Australian economy, Inflation and other Essays for the Library (S.B.D. de Silva, 2007, personal communication).

By its 25th anniversary, the Central Bank Library had managed to amass in its collection approximately 24,000 books, including a “unique collection of unpublished reports from government institutions and rare books on Sri Lanka” (A.S. Jayawardena, personal communication, 2006), as well as “a considerable number of periodicals and reports in economics and related subjects,” and a large number of books gifted by the World Bank in 1964 (Central Bank of Ceylon, c.1975, p.37). Tragically, the LTTE suicide bomb attack on the Central Bank in January 1996, which resulted in the deaths of 41 Bank employees – including several members of the library staff – also destroyed much of the library’s valuable collection, which up until that time had been “a major repository of works on the social sciences” (R.K. de Silva, 1998, p.239).

Rewarding Merit

Some of the administrative and personnel policies instituted in the early years of the Central Bank continued to benefit many of its officers down the years. One of the policies of the Bank, which was unheard of in the public service at the time, was a merit-based increment and promotion system – rather than the traditional system based solely on seniority. The system worked in favour of Economics graduates who had acquired postgraduate degrees (Eramudugolla, pp.97-98). A graduate in Grade 1 usually took eight years to attain Grade 2, but could reach it in five years with a postgraduate degree. This system, while being an incentive to further studies, led to some criticisms from those who relied on seniority (ibid, p.98).

However, NU valued hard work and achievement, and believed these should be recognized and adequately rewarded. He would apply this principle to his employees throughout his later career in the private sector as well. He did not have time for those who relied on position rather than contribution – and he had experience of such persons throughout his time in the public service.

The Bank’s salary increment system also worked in such a way that an employee could receive more than one time the annual salary increment based on merit. A well-thought-out confidential evaluation system was created based on the one used by the Bank of New Zealand. (Correspondence and material from this period show that NU solicited advice from the Governor of the Bank of New Zealand regarding this area and received the evaluation forms and other materials used there for this purpose.) It is said that the economist Dr. Gamani Corea held the record for the largest number of increments in one year. This system helped the Bank to retain outstanding people by pushing their wages to near market wages (A.S. Jayawardena, personal communication, 2006).

During his period as Deputy Governor, NU drew up a succinct but thorough handbook outlining the operations, functions and philosophy of the Bank. This document was referred to by many in the bank as “The Bible.” A.S. Jayawardena relates how he found the original copy of this manuscript in the Governor’s Office. The document, in NU’s neat handwriting, lucidly laid out the philosophy and scope of the Central Bank. ( In a paper written by NU in 1999 (Central Banking

as Catalyst of Economic Growth), he seems to make mention of this document when he states that the important function of the Central Bank as a “catalyst of

growth” had been laid out in: a document in long-hand covering some 16 pages, in which as Deputy Governor of the Central Bank I had expressed my views, after discussion with the incumbent Governor, John Exter, on what was then an emerging novel theme of ‘Central Banking’ as instrument of economic development. In the paper, NU had lamented that, although 48 years had passed, this function had yet to be instituted in the Central Bank.) A.S. recounts how it was at this moment that he realized the breadth of NU’s vision and his deep understanding of central banking (ibid).

Socializing with the Exters

Exter stepped down as Governor in July 1953, barely three years into his term, to return to the US. He left to take up a position in the World Bank, but one year later he returned to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, where he was promoted to the position of Vice-President (Money Changer, 2000). During their stay in Sri Lanka, Exter and his wife Marion maintained an active social life and made many friends. Their American informality was said to be refreshing and surprising. NU’s daughter Neiliya recalls the Exters as being “fun-loving,” and, although Exter was only two years younger than NU, she says that the Exters “seemed much younger than my parents.” Neiliya also recalls taking trips to Gal Oya with the Exters, her parents and other friends. After their stay in Sri Lanka, the Exters did occasionally return to Sri Lanka over the years and remained friends with NU and his family.

NU Succeeds Exter

When it became clear that Exter would be returning to the US, there were many who lobbied to be his successor. According to Stanley Wickramaratne (2002), there was “much behind the scene activity” by many contenders, and “many aspirants eyed this coveted position, while others in the public service canvassed against Mr. Jayawardena.”There was a “heavily charged atmosphere of speculation and suspense.” However, NU was, without question, the most suitable successor, and Exter recommended that he be appointed to succeed him.

Thus in July 1953, at the age of 45, NU became the first Sri Lankan Governor of the Central Bank. According to Wickramaratne:

NU at an international conference

[Among] the numerous messages of congratulations Mr. Jayawardena received it was amusingly ironical to find…letters of expression of faith and good wishes from those very high personalities who openly canvassed against Mr. Jayawardena’s nomination.

This was the crowning achievement of years of determination, hard work, and sacrifice by NU. His salary as Governor was Rs. 36,000 per annum, with an official house and car, and driver as well as an entertainment allowance. NU recalled that, when the first currency notes signed by him were issued, he sent a 50-rupee note, which bore his signature, to his father – the astonishing sequel many decades later to his childhood fantasy that one day he might achieve this ambition. Sadly, by this time NU’s parents were ailing, and both would die later that year. When his father Diyonis was hospitalized in Colombo in 1953, NU and his wife Gertrude once visited him formally dressed, on their way from a banquet they had attended. According to NU’s niece Chandrani, on seeing his son, NU’s father was delighted and exclaimed, “You look like a prince!” (personal communication, 2007). Diyonis’ funeral was attended by the Governor of the Bank of England, C.F. Cobbold, who was in Colombo at the time for a conference.

Work and Discipline

As Governor, NU proved to be a strict disciplinarian and a hard taskmaster. He imposed on the staff all the office discipline and experience that he had absorbed in his years in government departments, when he interacted with eminent British and local civil servants. But he also followed a harsh regime himself, working very long hours. Edmund Eramudugolla, a former Deputy Governor of the Central Bank who had worked under NU as a junior official, said NU was not only “hard working,” but also did not conform to usual working hours. “Work appeared to be the driving force in his life.” He further recounts his personal experience with NU:

Many were the occasions he sent for me after I had left office for the day to my home in Lunava… to discuss sections of the MLA (Monetary Law Act)… It didn’t seem to matter to NUJ that it was very late in the day… In NUJ’s enthusiasm for work, he appeared to have no notion of time or space! (Eramudugolla, 2004, p.19)

Annual Report of the Central Bank of Ceylon

Stanley Wickramaratne also describes NU as: a workaholic to the very extreme; he extracted from his assistants and subordinates maximum work output irrespective of whether it was day or night, a weekend or a public holiday. In short, for him the clock stood still.

There are many amusing anecdotes about NU’s capacity for working round the clock, including one recounted by the writer Nalin Fernando from NU’s later days. It was 6 p.m. on Budget day and he had asked NU for a comment on the Budget. Nalin had been told to meet him at his office at one o’clock. When Nalin explained that his deadline was noon, NU replied “not 1 p.m., but one in the morning.” As Fernando wrote: “I paused… rather bewildered, then gathered my wits and told him it would be quite convenient and a pleasure for me to see him at that bewitching hour” (Ceylon Daily News, 30 March 2002). On the occasion of his 80th birthday, NU was recorded as saying: “I love to work – it gives me joy and happiness” (Mid-week Mirror, 25 Feb. 1998).

More Travels and Negotiations Abroad

During the year 1952, as Deputy Governor, NU had been involved with many international meetings abroad. He spent part of January and February in the UK to assist in the preparatory meeting for the annual Commonwealth Finance Ministers Meeting and attended the meeting, which was held over two months that summer. NU travelled again to the UK in early November for the preparatory meeting for the next Commonwealth Finance Ministers’ Conference, and stayed on for the event that took place later that month. During his stay in London, he also assisted Oliver Goonetilleke, who was then Minister of Agriculture and Food, to negotiate the release of sterling balances for food supplies.

As Governor, NU continued to have a busy travel schedule, negotiating a World Bank loan, attending the second and third annual International Monetary Fund (IMF) meetings in Washington DC in 1953 and 1954, negotiating a sterling loan in the UK, and attending the 1954 Commonwealth Finance Ministers’ Conference in Australia. He attended the latter meeting with Oliver Goonetilleke, who had succeeded J.R. Jayewardene as Finance Minister.

NU’s colleagues, Douglas Gunasekera, K. Williams, Tissa Chandrasoma, Edmund Cooray and Herbert Tennekoon, often formed part of the negotiating team on these trips, and as a result spent a lot of time together, both at work and socially. NU’s daughter Neiliya recalls being told how many members of this group shared the common experience on these trips abroad of being disturbed in the middle of the night by a knock on their door, only to discover

NU outside their hotel room, eager to discuss an idea or solution to a work problem that had just struck him

The Impending Fall

While NU’s contribution and legacy to the Central Bank were long lasting, NU’s term as Governor would soon be cut short. He had earlier experienced some disappointments, but this would be his first hard fall in life. NU was by nature a person in a hurry – his agile mind constantly ticking away, with many ideas brewing at once. He had a strong physical constitution and possessed a quick intellect. He required little sleep and had an energy level that made it hard for others to keep up with him – physically or mentally, and when he had an idea, he would pursue it relentlessly. On the other hand, he could be impetuous and impatient. Nor was he politically astute. This particular combination of traits and circumstances would lead him not only to great heights, but also at times into trouble. At the peak of his career, the dark clouds of a gathering storm were looming. (N.U. Jayawardena, 1950, p. 11)

By Kumari Jayawardena and Jennifer Moragoda ✍️

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Features

Preventing grievances from becoming communal

Published

14 hours ago

2026/10/6

Sahan Weerasooriya

Police removing the Thileepan statue

by Jehan Perera

The death sentence on Sivarasa Anojan, a Sri Lankan citizen convicted of blasphemy in Saudi Arabia has taken a central place in national consciousness for the past several weeks. It has been in the headline news since it was first reported last month. There have been many initiatives taken locally to get a more lenient sentencing by the Saudi authorities. There is also an undercurrent that is critical of both the culture and religion from which this sentencing emanates. This also sustains the widespread publicity being given nationally to the issue. By way of contrast, the controversy caused by the forcible removal of the Thileepan statue in Jaffna has not significantly impacted upon the national consciousness. There was only passing mention of the incident in the national media which has been overtaken by other events.

However, in the north and east of the country, and in the diaspora, the removal of the Thileepan statue has become a major issue. It has led to protest marches led by university students and widespread condemnation by civil society and political groups. The issues underlying the Thileepan statue have deep undercurrents in the Tamil consciousness particularly in the north and east which time is unlikely to dispel. The real test of harmony in a multi-ethnic, multi-religious society like Sri Lanka is not whether communities coexist peacefully when nothing controversial is at stake. Rather, the test is how they respond when an event touches their identities and grievances. The death sentence imposed on Anojan in Saudi Arabia and the removal of the Thileepan statue in Jaffna carry the risk of becoming grievances to entire communities.

In the case of Anojan, a young Tamil migrant worker, he was first sentenced to five years imprisonment and a fine of three million Saudi riyals over a Facebook comment. Both he and the Saudi prosecution appealed, with the appeal court raising the sentence to death. This has led to public sympathy for him in Sri Lanka.

Appeals for clemency have come from the President, government and opposition leaders, clergy of all faiths and Muslim political leaders. At the same time there is a need to reject attempts to turn the case into a source of anti-Muslim sentiment or collective blame. Peacebuilding therefore has to be within Sri Lanka as well as diplomatic. Religious leaders and civil society in the country should be ready to quell rumour, even as Muslim, Buddhist, Hindu and Christian leaders stand together publicly.

Thileepan Statue

The Thileepan controversy has had a different trajectory. Many Tamils admire Thileepan, the LTTE name of Rasaiah Parthipan, who died on 26 September 1987 after a twelve-day fast. His demands were addressed to India but included matters pertaining to the Sri Lankan government including the release of detainees held under the Prevention of Terrorism Act. The statue put up during this year’s commemoration was removed by police in the early hours of 27 September, a day after the commemoration ended. The government’s legal concern, as articulated by its spokesperson, was the LTTE remains a proscribed organisation and before removing the statue, police had presented facts to the court. But law and memory answer different questions and the depth of Tamil anguish cannot be disregarded.

For many Tamils, remembrance of Thileepan is connected to their sense of loss and historical memory. The memorial has been destroyed and rebuilt more than once, and each destruction has added to the meaning it carries. Many who mourn Thileepan are grieving a young man who died without violence and by his own fast. They also grieve an era of loss of the struggle for Tamil rights and self-determination for which Thileepan has become a symbol. The Office for Reparations Act, No. 34 of 2018, provides for collective reparations and gives the Office for Reparations a role in policies on memorialisation. This does not automatically permit any particular statue, nor does it override laws on public places or proscribed organisations. But it shows that memorialisation is recognised within Sri Lanka’s framework for reparations and reconciliation. There is also a wider question of equality.

The JVP that now leads the NPP government was itself once proscribed when it took up arms against the state in which tens of thousands died, later entered democratic politics, and now for many years has publicly commemorated its own fallen. The opportunity to remember those who died should not belong to one community alone.

A commitment to peacebuilding requires that the same trust that has been given to former militants of one community needs to be given to members of other communities if equal citizenship and equal rights are to have meaning. Further, the Office for Reparations Act provides for reparations through livelihood. It is today a fact that those former LTTE members who went through the government’s rehabilitation process find it difficult to get jobs in the private sector.

Private sector employers are reluctant to come under surveillance for employing former LTTE members. There needs to be equal access to employment and removal of unjustified barriers to reintegration, with targeted public programmes where necessary. Until this situation is realized on the ground, the government needs to consider employing those who went through the government’s rehabilitation process and still unable to find suitable employment.

Continuing Peace

The challenge that post-war Sri Lanka faces, a full 17 years after the end of war, is to strengthen the foundations of trust between communities rather than deepen existing suspicions. Anojan is an individual Sri Lankan citizen facing a severe sentence in another country. His case should not become a reason to blame Sri Lankan Muslims. Thileepan is remembered differently by different communities, but the dispute over his memorial should not become a reason to revive the communal divisions of the past. The cases are also mirror images in an important respect. In the Anojan case, the state is an advocate pleading before another government. In the Thileepan case, the state is the actor whose decision is being judged. The first calls for quiet diplomacy and restraint in public language. The second calls for fairness and explanation, and the burden on the state is heavier.

The common roots of the two cases lie in mistrust that does not belong to one community alone. It has been produced by experiences of discrimination, violence, insecurity and loss that have been interpreted differently by different communities. Grievances turn communal when an individual is seen as a representative of a community, when institutions seem to treat communities unequally, and when people feel their pain goes unacknowledged. Each of these can be addressed. The system change that the Sri Lankan people voted for in 2024 would need to include a government that rejects collective blame, acknowledges grief and explains its decisions openly. It also requires state institutions to act transparently and consistently, so that no citizen feels that the law protects some communities more than others.

This peacebuilding imperative requires enlightened leadership as much as legal authority. It requires leaders who will speak to their own communities against prejudice, even when this is politically inconvenient. It requires religious leaders who will demonstrate solidarity across religious boundaries. And it requires civil society to recognise that peacebuilding is not simply preventing violence after tensions have risen, but is addressing the mistrust and grievances that allow tensions to rise in the first place. Sri Lanka has learned, at great cost, that communal divisions can become much larger than the events that initially give rise to them. The Anojan and Thileepan cases give Sri Lanka an opportunity to demonstrate that it has learned from its past. The test of Sri Lanka’s continuing peace is whether we can address difficult grievances without turning them into communal ones.

Features

Sri Lanka Cricket Bill: Governance reform is not yet a cricket strategy – Part II

Published

14 hours ago

2026/10/6

Sahan Weerasooriya

By Sarath S. Kodithuwakku

President, Institute of Management of Sri Lanka; Senior Professor, University of Peradeniya

(Continued from yesterday)

Representation, Independence and Decision-Making

The membership-based electoral structure should provide representation without becoming a substitute for executive management. The seven Elected Directors would bring the perspectives of the SLC membership into the Board, while the seven Independent Directors would provide additional professional expertise and independence. The model’s effectiveness will, therefore, depend on whether the Board can integrate these perspectives into coherent strategic decisions while maintaining a clear boundary between governance and day-to-day management.

The equal division between Elected and Independent Directors also raises a governance-design question. An even-numbered Board can create a tie. The Bill addresses this directly: in the event of equality, the Chairperson has a casting vote; in the Chairperson’s absence, the Deputy Chairperson has a casting vote; and if both are absent, an Independent Director, elected to preside, has the casting vote. The issue is, therefore, not whether a tie can be resolved, but how this mechanism affects the balance between representation, independence and accountability.

The leadership structure reinforces this balance: the Chairperson is elected from among the Independent Directors and the Deputy Chairperson from among the Elected Directors. The casting-vote arrangement makes the Chairperson’s role and perceived independence particularly important, especially when a major strategic decision divides the two components of the Board.

The Bill’s committee provisions could support a disciplined model of delegation, but implementation will depend heavily on the terms of reference adopted by the new Board. The framework could be strengthened by requiring a published cricket-development strategy, a clear division of powers among the Board, executives and selection committees, transparent principles for major development allocations, and periodic reporting on outcomes across men’s, women’s, schools and domestic cricket. These measures would strengthen accountability without legislating the details of team selection or tournament scheduling.

From Measurement to Strategic Accountability

If the Board is to hold management accountable for strategy rather than simply for short-term results, it needs a performance framework that captures both outcomes and the capabilities that produce them.

SLC should consider requiring an explicit multi-year cricket-development strategy, supported by measurable objectives and an annual strategy review. Such a strategy should identify the development pathway from schools and grassroots cricket through domestic competitions to high performance; define major capability priorities such as coaching, sports science, data and analytics; set resource-allocation principles; and establish indicators against which progress can be assessed.

The purpose would not be to turn cricket into a bureaucratic exercise. Strategic accountability simply creates a disciplined basis for asking whether the organisation is doing what it said it would do, whether its assumptions remain valid, and whether resources are producing the intended results.

From Measurement to Organisational Learning

SLC should, therefore, consider adopting a formal Balanced Scorecard. Rather than measuring success solely through international match results or annual financial audits, the framework could track four interdependent perspectives:

Financial Sustainability:

commercial growth, financial discipline and compliance.

Internal Processes:

domestic tournament quality, development pathways and selector-process integrity.

Stakeholder Value:

grassroots development, school cricket and women’s cricket expansion.

Strategic Capability:

coaching quality, sports science, talent development, data and analytics capability, and the organisation’s ability to convert investment into sustainable performance.

The purpose of such a framework would not be to reduce cricket development to a collection of numbers. Rather, it would create a disciplined process for asking four fundamental management questions:

What did we expect to achieve?

What actually happened?

Why was there a difference?

What should we change as a result?

Evaluating these dimensions periodically would help SLC move beyond performance reporting towards genuine organisational learning.

ICC as a Stakeholder in Governance Reform

The ICC is another important stakeholder whose interests should be recognised in the reform process. SLC’s governance arrangements do not operate solely within Sri Lankan law; they also have to be compatible with the governance obligations associated with ICC membership. The ICC’s Articles of Association require each Member to provide for free and democratic elections (or nominees from outside its members) and to manage its affairs autonomously, without government or other public-body interference in the governance, regulation or administration of cricket.

International experience demonstrates that ICC engagement in member governance restructuring is not unusual. In the United States, after the ICC expelled the old national association for chronic governance failures, the ICC directly oversaw a multi-year project to design a new governance model. The ICC Board formally approved the constitution for a replacement body (USA Cricket) before it was adopted. The resulting structure combined elected constituent directors with independent directors, showing that an ICC-backed framework can accommodate both forms of representation.

In Nepal, the ICC established a Nepal Advisory Group comprising stakeholders from across the game to recommend constitutional amendments, with adoption of the revised constitution and subsequent elections forming part of the conditions for reinstatement of ICC membership.[8] The ICC subsequently facilitated an independent panel that included ICC nominees together with representatives of Nepal’s National Sports Council and the existing cricket administration to map the election process, guidelines and timelines.[9] More recently, in 2026, an ICC delegation visited Bangladesh to engage with stakeholders on governance and electoral matters.[10] The ICC has also reported that its Deputy Chair and another ICC Board representative visited Sri Lanka and met relevant stakeholders to assess ongoing developments, while the ICC Board reiterated the need for elections to be held as soon as possible.

These precedents make the ICC a legitimate stakeholder in considering the governance implications of the proposed Bill. This does not mean that the ICC should determine Sri Lanka’s domestic legislation, nor that every feature of the Bill requires prior ICC approval. It does, however, suggest that early and formal engagement with the ICC would be prudent, particularly where the proposed arrangements concern Board independence, elections, government involvement and the transition to the new governance structure.

This is particularly relevant because the Bill creates two institutional arrangements that deserve careful scrutiny from an autonomy perspective. The Transformation Committee is responsible for managing the transition until the First Board is constituted, while the Nomination Committee, although structurally independent of the SLC Board, includes representatives connected with the Sports Ministry and the National Sports Council. Neither arrangement, by itself, establishes government interference. However, taken together, they make it important that the independence of the incoming Board is demonstrable through transparent procedures rather than assumed from the structure alone.

Given the professional calibre and international exposure of the members of the Transformation Committee, it would be reasonable to expect that the importance of ICC engagement would have been recognised. Although any such consultation has not been evident in the public domain, it is therefore reasonable to expect that the ICC has either already been consulted or will be consulted before the Bill is enacted. Such engagement would allow potential incompatibilities to be identified before the new structure is enacted and implemented, rather than after the fact.

The Transition Is Itself a Governance Challenge

The transition provisions introduce a significant organisational-change challenge. Replacing the existing club- and association-based governance structure with a new hybrid Board and governance architecture is not simply a legal exercise; it is an organisational change programme. The Sri Lanka Cricket Transformation Committee is required to manage the transition until the First Board is constituted and, during that period, to establish rules covering matters including tournament structure, domestic governance, selection committee appointments, committee terms of reference, the Nomination Committee process and the election of the Elected Directors.

Structural reform on paper can encounter resistance from established interests, institutional habits and existing routines. The implementation phase will therefore require a clear change-management framework, including stakeholder engagement, transparent onboarding for Independent Directors, clarification of decision rights, alignment of legacy committees, and careful transfer of information and responsibilities.

Without attention to these organisational factors, cultural friction could undermine the intended administrative improvements. The success of the reform will therefore depend not only on the text of the legislation but also on the quality of the rules, appointments, delegation arrangements and organisational behaviours that follow it.

From Governance Reform to a Cricket Strategy

The Bill deserves credit for addressing how SLC is constituted and for creating places for specialist advice. It should not be dismissed simply because it does not prescribe a batting order or a domestic fixture list. Those are not appropriate tasks for legislation.

Its limitation is more precise: the proposed governance arrangements do not, by themselves, assure the strategic capability of the Board or the quality, independence and accountability of the decisions made beneath it. They establish the architecture. The future Board and management must supply the strategy, capabilities, discipline and learning mechanisms that make the architecture work.

A stronger reform would connect four elements: a Board selected for collective strategic capability; professional cricket management with clear delegated authority; transparent but non-mechanical selection and investment processes; and systematic evaluation of development outcomes. Within the first of these, information technology and computer science should be recognised as distinct from the broader capability to understand and govern data science, analytics and emerging AI-enabled decision support.

Ultimately, the governing question is not only who gets a seat at the SLC Board table. It is whether that Board can build, fund, execute and learn from a credible strategy for Sri Lankan cricket.

References

1. Department of Government Printing, Sri Lanka. Sri Lanka Cricket Bill, Gazette Supplement, Part II of September 25, 2026, issued on 28 September 2026.

2. International Cricket Council. Media release, 15 July 2026, reporting the ICC Board discussion of Sri Lanka Cricket and the need for elections to be held as soon as possible.

3. Sport New Zealand – Ihi Aotearoa. Nine Steps to Effective Governance, particularly Step 1: Define and Agree the Board’s Role; Step 4: Provide Strategic Leadership; Step 5: Employ and Support a Chief Executive; and Step 8: Get the Right People on Board.

4. Cricket South Africa. Governance and management frameworks, including the delegation-of-authority framework, Board committees, Cricket Committee, Cricket Pipeline Committee and CEO accountability.

5. International Cricket Council. ICC Articles of Association, provisions requiring free and democratic elections and autonomous administration without government or other public-body interference. ICC. https://images.icc-cricket.com/image/upload/prd/f7vm88yw1933dc38cgtg.pdf

6. International Cricket Council. “ICC outlines proposed USACA constitution.” ICC, 2017. https://www.icc-cricket.com/news/icc-outlines-proposed-usaca-constitution

7. International Cricket Council. “Approved constitution marks historic landmark for cricket in USA.” ICC, 2017. https://www.icc-cricket.com/media-releases/approved-constitution-marks-historic-landmark-for-cricket-in-usa

8. International Cricket Council. “ICC welcomes Nepal Special General Meeting to adopt revised constitution.” ICC, 2018. https://www.icc-cricket.com/media-releases/icc-welcomes-nepal-special-general-meeting-to-adopt-revised-constitution

9. International Cricket Council. “Independent Panel meet to progress Nepal elections under revised constitution.” ICC, 2018. https://www.icc-cricket.com/media-releases/independent-panel-meet-to-progress-nepal-elections-under-revised-constitution

10. International Cricket Council. “ICC delegation visits Bangladesh to engage with stakeholders on governance and electoral matters.” ICC, 2026. https://www.icc-cricket.com/media-releases/icc-delegation-visits-bangladesh-to-engage-with-stakeholders-on-governance-and-electoral-matters

11. International Cricket Council. “ICC Board approves governance, membership and member support decisions.” ICC, 2026; see also “ICC Board Meeting,” 2026, reporting ICC representatives’ meetings with stakeholders in Sri Lanka. https://www.icc-cricket.com/media-releases/icc-board-approves-governance-membership-and-member-support-decisions

(Concluded)

Features

Why do they keep crossing? Africa, Europe and long history behind migration

Published

14 hours ago

2026/10/6

Sahan Weerasooriya

A file photo: In the early hours of 30 July 2026, thousands of people attempted to enter Ceuta, the Spanish territory on the northern coast of Africa.

by Viran Maddumage

Assistant Lecturer & PhD (Reading) Macquarie University Australia

Sanduni Rathnayake

Lecturer (Probationary) General Sir John Kotelawala Defence University

The Mediterranean is not merely a border between two continents. It is also a reminder of a relationship between Africa and Europe that was built over centuries; and whose consequences have not disappeared.

There are some borders that people cross with passports. Others are crossed by people who have run out of alternatives.

In the early hours of 30 July, 2026, thousands of people attempted to enter Ceuta, the Spanish territory on the northern coast of Africa. Spanish authorities reported that between 50,000 and 60,000 people entered the enclave irregularly during the crisis. The episode followed a Spanish Supreme Court ruling concerning the immediate rejection at the border of people who arrived by sea. Spanish authorities subsequently moved to restore the situation, while Morocco and Spain intensified their cooperation to prevent further crossings.

Ceuta is a strange place to contemplate migration. It is geographically in Africa but politically part of Spain; and therefore, part of the European Union. Its border is not simply a line separating two states. It is a physical manifestation of a much older relationship between two continents.

And perhaps the most important question is not simply: Why are people trying to enter Europe?

It is: Why does Europe remain sufficiently attractive that people are willing to risk their lives trying to reach it?

From extraction to aspiration

The contemporary migration story cannot be reduced to colonialism. Africans migrate for many reasons: employment, education, family reunification, conflict, insecurity, political conditions, environmental pressures and personal aspirations. Much African migration also takes place within Africa itself.

Yet history matters.

European colonialism profoundly reshaped African economies. In many territories, economic structures were organised around the extraction and export of primary commodities. Roads and railways were frequently constructed to connect areas of agricultural, or mineral production, to ports and external markets rather than to create integrated domestic economies. World Bank historical analyses have documented the extent to which colonial economies were dependent on a limited number of primary commodities and external markets.

This was not merely an economic arrangement. It affected what economies produced, where infrastructure was built, how labour was organised and where the value generated by production was realised.

The Congo Free State ,under King Leopold II, offers one of history’s starkest examples. The territory was subjected to a system of forced labour and violent extraction, particularly around rubber and ivory. Forced labour was legally authorised and coercive systems were used to secure production.

But Leopold’s Congo should not be presented as a metaphor for every African country or every European colonial experience. Colonial rule differed substantially across the continent. The broader point is narrower; and perhaps more consequential: colonial economies frequently connected African land, labour and resources to European markets on terms that privileged extraction and external trade.

Modern scholarship continues to examine the long-term effects of these structures. Research on colonial cash-crop economies, for example, has found that colonial production and infrastructure created lasting patterns of economic organisation, while the benefits of these systems were often geographically concentrated and domestic production linkages remained weak.

The question, then, is not whether colonialism single-handedly caused contemporary African migration.

It is whether a history in which Europe was deeply involved in shaping African economies also helped produce the unequal relationship from which today’s migration patterns emerged.

The language of migration

There is another legacy that is easy to overlook because it has become so ordinary: language.

French is spoken across substantial parts of West and Central Africa. Portuguese remains an official language in several African states. English is widely used in countries whose histories are connected to the British Empire.

These are not simply linguistic accidents.

Colonial rule created institutional, educational and administrative connections that survived independence. Those connections later became migration networks.

France, Belgium, Portugal and other European countries are, therefore, not random destinations for African migrants. Their migration relationships with particular African states have been shaped by history, including colonial connections and post-war labour recruitment. The OECD notes that the composition of immigrant populations in several European countries continues to reflect colonial legacies; France, Belgium, Portugal and the Netherlands, for example, have substantial African-born populations.

This creates something more powerful than a shared language. It creates familiarity.

A young person in an African country may have a cousin in Paris, an uncle in Brussels, a former schoolmate in Lisbon or a friend in Milan. Europe ceases to be an abstract geographical destination. It becomes a place where somebody they know already lives.

Diaspora networks can, therefore, function as social infrastructure for migration. They provide information, contacts, accommodation, employment leads and emotional reassurance. The journey may be dangerous, but the destination is no longer entirely unknown.

Why Europe?

There is an uncomfortable paradox at the heart of this story.

For centuries, European powers travelled to Africa in search of land, labour, markets and resources.

Today, Africans travel towards Europe in search of employment, security, education and opportunity.

The direction of movement has changed.

The unequal relationship has not necessarily disappeared. That does not mean Europe is uniformly prosperous while Africa is uniformly poor. Africa is a continent of 54 states with enormous differences in wealth, governance, opportunity and living standards. Nor is Europe free from unemployment, inequality or social exclusion.

But migration decisions are comparative. People do not need to believe that Europe is perfect. They need to believe that their prospects there are better than their prospects at home. That distinction matters.

A person crossing the Mediterranean may not be chasing luxury. They may be chasing a job, a university place, safety, family, dignity or simply the possibility of building a future that appears increasingly difficult to build at home.

Research on West African migration similarly identifies economic opportunity, employment, governance, development conditions and existing migration networks among the factors shaping movement.

The Mediterranean as a graveyard

The tragedy is that the Mediterranean has become not merely a migration route, but a graveyard.

The International Organisation for Migration recorded 5,305 deaths or disappearances on migration routes to Europe in 2016. More than 5,000 deaths and disappearances were recorded in the Mediterranean that year alone.

The danger has never meant that people stop moving.

Instead, when legal routes narrow, journeys can become more dangerous.

That is the central paradox of irregular migration: the more difficult it becomes to cross safely, the greater the incentives for smugglers and increasingly dangerous routes can become for people who are determined to leave.

Ceuta illustrates this geography particularly vividly. Spain and Morocco have spent years reinforcing physical barriers and security arrangements around the enclave. Yet the geographical proximity remains. Africa is only a few kilometres from Europe at its closest points.

A fence can prevent a person from crossing.

It cannot, by itself, erase the reasons that person wanted to cross.

Map courtesy BBC

Europe responds with law

Europe is not without a legal response. Indeed, the European Union has spent years developing increasingly sophisticated mechanisms for managing migration and asylum. As of June 2026, the EU Pact on Migration and Asylum entered into application across EU Member States. It establishes common procedures for screening and registering irregular arrivals, asylum processing, responsibility-sharing and returns, alongside safeguards for fundamental rights.

The European Commission has simultaneously emphasised both stronger external borders and expanded pathways for legal migration, including the EU Talent Pool for workers from outside the Union.

The legal architecture, therefore, reflects competing imperatives.

States have a legitimate interest in controlling their borders.

People have rights when they cross borders.

States have obligations concerning asylum and fundamental rights.

And migrants have reasons; sometimes compelling reasons, for moving.

The challenge is that border control addresses the movement of people. It does not necessarily address the conditions that produce the desire to move.

That distinction should be at the centre of the migration debate.

The African dream of Europe

There is a phrase often encountered in discussions about African migration: that Europe represents a promised land, while Africa is left behind.

Such descriptions can be unfair to a continent that contains enormous economic, cultural and political diversity. But the aspiration itself should not be dismissed.

When a young person believes that their best chance of employment, education or security lies thousands of kilometres away, that tells us something about both the destination and the place they are leaving.

Migration, therefore, becomes a form of social commentary.

People vote with their feet; not because migration is always the right choice, but because their decisions reveal how they perceive the opportunities available to them.

This is also why migration matters for the sustainability of states.

If a country’s young people increasingly organise their lives around the possibility of leaving, the problem is larger than the loss of individual workers. Countries can lose skills, professionals, entrepreneurs, researchers and future leaders. Families may become transnational. Communities may depend increasingly upon remittances. And the political question becomes unavoidable:

What kind of country are we building if so many of our citizens imagine their future somewhere else?

Sri Lanka should understand this question.

The circumstances are obviously different from those of African states facing Mediterranean migration routes. Sri Lankan migration is shaped by its own economic, political and historical circumstances, and its principal destinations and migration channels differ considerably.

Yet the underlying question is familiar.

When leaving becomes the most attractive strategy for an ambitious young person, migration is no longer merely an individual phenomenon. It becomes a measure of confidence in the future of the country itself.

Beyond the border

Perhaps, then, Europe should not ask only how to stop people from crossing.

And African governments should not ask only how to persuade people to stay.

Both questions are too narrow.

The deeper question is why a world divided by such profound economic inequalities continues to expect people to remain content on one side of the divide while opportunity is concentrated on the other.

The answer cannot be an open border without regulation. Nor can it be a fortress surrounded by increasingly dangerous seas.

A more durable approach would require investment in economic opportunity, domestic industries, education, accountable institutions and safe and lawful avenues for migration. It would require European countries to recognise that migration management is not simply a security question. It is also an economic, historical and human-rights question.

And African states must confront an equally difficult reality: historical exploitation can explain part of today’s inequality, but it cannot become an excuse for indefinitely postponing the task of building states in which people want to remain.

The Mediterranean will continue to separate Africa from Europe geographically.

But history has already connected them.

The resources extracted from Africa helped build European economies. Colonial languages created enduring institutional links. Diaspora communities now connect African families to European cities. Labour moves in both directions. Capital moves in both directions. Ideas move in both directions.

What crosses the Mediterranean, therefore, is not merely a migrant.

It is history.

The person swimming towards Ceuta is carrying more than a small bag, if they have one at all. They may be carrying the expectations of a family, the memory of an economy shaped by generations of external relationships, the example of relatives who successfully migrated, and the belief that somewhere on the other side of the water there is a future worth risking everything to reach.

Perhaps, that is the question Europe should hear beneath the sound of the waves:

What would have to change so that crossing the sea was a choice rather than a necessity?

(The views expressed are those of the writers and do not necessarily represent those of the institutions with which the writers associated)