Features
Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement-1987 as JR Jayewardene saw it
“A few days later, at a public lunch, when I was congratulated on my escape by a speaker in these words, “Blessed are the Peace-makers for they shall soon be in Heaven,” I replied, “Rajiv missed Heaven by a few inches, and I missed it by a few seconds!”
(Excerpted from Men and Memories by JR Jayewardene)
The Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement of 1987 was signed by Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and myself as President on July 29, 1987. It was a Peace Treaty and brought Peace, till one group of the LTTE broke it in October 1987. India then had to oppose them till March 1990, when the Sri Lanka Government took over and this led to a bloody war with the LTTE which still continues (when this was written).
The Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement was signed on Wednesday, July 29, 1987, by the Prime Minister of India, Rajiv Gandhi, and myself as President of Sri Lanka. On the next day, when Rajiv was inspecting a Naval Guard of Honour, prior to his departure, a Naval Rating attempted to assassinate him by raising the butt-end of his rifle and bringing it down on Rajiv’s head. Seeing the movement in time, Rajiv bent his head and escaped death by a few inches.
A few weeks later, on August 18, two bombs were thrown at me and Prime Minister Premadasa, while we were sitting at the Chairman’s table at a meeting of the Government Parliamentary Group held in a Committee Room of the Parliamentary Complex. Both bombs missed. One hit our table and bounced off, and the other went over our heads. An official standing behind us was hit by a pellet and fell dead; a Minister sitting where the two bombs burst a few yards away from us, was killed. Several Ministers and Members of Parliament were injured and hospitalized.
A few days later, at a public lunch, when I was congratulated on my escape by a speaker in these words, “Blessed are the Peace-makers for they shall soon be in Heaven,” I replied, “Rajiv missed Heaven by a few inches, and I missed it by a few seconds!”
Though I spoke in a lighter vein of these incidents, it was evident that there was much feeling against Rajiv’s arrival in Sri Lanka. I can understand the opposition to Rajiv at that time for his government had violated our sovereignty by sending food by air and ship to the Jaffna Peninsula against the express refusal of the Government of Sri Lanka to entertain them.
Many of those who caused riots throughout the Island were not interested in the Agreement but opposed Rajiv’s visit. They were against the Indian help to the northern terrorists with arms, money and training. The Agreement itself was forgotten. It, however, brought peace to Sri Lanka. As President Ranasinghe Premadasa said in the Manifesto with which he won the Presidential Election of November 1988:
The Indo-Sri Lanka Accord was signed to obtain India’s assistance to restore peace, law and order in the North and East. In the process, we succeeded in strengthening our good relations with India. Its basis is the geopolitics of the region. It put our relations with her on a new and firm footing. Its sincerity is unquestionable. We will build upon its positive achievements through dialogue and reciprocity.
The peace lasted till October 1987, when one of the groups that accepted it, namely, the LTTE, broke it and have continued its lone fight against the Government of Sri Lanka to this day and earlier against the Government of India till the last soldier of the IPKF left in March 1990. Before the Agreement was signed, Sri Lanka fought the LTTE and several other groups aided and abetted by the Government of Tamil Nadu, with the knowledge and acquiescence of the Central Government of India. After the Agreement, the LTTE was left alone and by a strange quirk of fate, the Government of India fought them for a year and a half losing over 1,500 men, 5,000 injured and spending billions of rupees in Sri Lankan currency.
Within a few days after the signing, peace reigned in the North and the East, and I was praised by all. Prime Minister Premadasa said on October 19, 1987, that my “skill of diplomacy had turned the protectors of terrorism to being hunters of terrorism”–referring to India. From America it was said that “India had been turned from a part of the problem to being a part of the solution.”
In these pages I write of the events that preceded the signing of the Agreement, of the Agreement and its aftermath. I kept in mind throughout the words of Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, “If your enemy extends a hand, however dishonestly, you grab it. If there is good faith, you have responded. If not, then at least you have one of his hands immobilised!”
There had been negotiations beteween the Sri Lankan and Indian Governments for a few years prior to the signing of the Agreement of July 1987. An Agreement had been reached between the two governments in New Delhi in 1983 and embodied in a document known as “Annexure C” and tabled before the All Party Conference in Sri Lanka. Sri Lanka had opposed meeting the separatist and terrorist groups as some of the leaders of these groups wanted by the Police for a wide range of criminal charges. However, they lived in India, protected by the Indian Government.
Prabhakaran, the LTTE leader, had been suspected of responsibility for the killing in 1975 of the then Mayor of Jaffna, Mr Duraiappa, a fellow Tamil and Government Party (SLFP) Member of Parliament.
In June 1985, direct talks took place in New Delhi between me and Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, on how to deal with Sri Lanka’s Tamil problem. While the Sri Lankan Government agreed to talk to the Tamil groups, there also began a struggle among these groups for leadership and to be recognized as the chief spokesmen.
They were the PLOT, TELO, LTTE, EPRLF and the non-violent group, the TULF. All the terrorist groups were provided with arms, arms training, money and other help, as is now admitted by the Government of Tamil Nadu, with the knowledge and authority of the Central Government of India.
The first round of talks was held in Thimpu, Bhutan in June 1985. The Sri Lanka delegation consisted of a group of senior lawyers led by my brother, H.W. Jayewardene, Q.C. The talks broke down, but a second round of talks were held in August.
For the first time, a system of Provincial Councils was discussed in response to the claim of the representatives of Tamil groups that their right to self-determination be recognized, and along with the right to a Tamil homeland, i.e., the Northern and Eastern Provinces. In regard to the latter, the TULF also joined the terrorist groups. Though the talks did not yield results, the two governments carried on their negotiations with their representatives led by H.W. Jayewardene on one side and the Indian officials led by Romesh Bhandari, who had succeeded G. Parthasarthy, as India’s Foreign Secretary.
From these talks emerged certain decisions, namely that the unit of devolution was to be a Province and not a District and that the powers to be devolved to be wider than had been discussed earlier. A document was initiated, led by Romesh Bhandari on the Indian side and E.F. Dias Abeysinghe, Secretary of the Sri Lanka delegation, for Sri Lanka to go beyond the Delhi Accord of August 1985. Relations between Sri Lanka and India began to improve now with Rajiv Gandhi as Prime Minister.
All the while, the Tamil terrorist groups continued to have their training and other facilities from bases in Tamil Nadu. The Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu that time was M.G. Ramachandran, who played a prominent role in these events. After 1985, his health broke down, he could hardly speak but he still continued to govern Tamil Nadu expressing his wishes through lip-reading, and movements of his eyes and hands.
In the meantime, the internecine fighting between the Tamil groups led to a bloody victory for the LTTE over its main rivals in April 1986, especially TELO. The terrorist groups now began to attack more than before the civilian population adjoining the Northern and Eastern Provinces, specially unarmed Sinhalese civilians. In May 1985, in a surprise raid in Anuradhapura, 150 civilians were killed near the Sacred Bo-Tree. Gradually the terrorist groups become a formidable guerrilla force and the Sri Lanka Government spent a large proportion of its annual budget, which rose from Rs 550 million (US$ 18 m) in 1980 to Rs 3,500 million (US $115 m) in 1987, for the expansion and equipping of its armed forces.
The Government of Central India continued to campaign throughout the world against the Government of Sri Lanka. The Indian embassies abroad became centers of support for the terrorists and separatist groups. This led to the reluctance on the part of some of the Western powers to supply arms and other aid to Sri Lanka. They were anxious not to offend India.
In April 1986, the Indian Government sent to Sri Lanka a new delegation led by a Minister of State, P. Chidambaram (40), a young Tamil and Natwar Singh, the Minister of State for External Affairs. An official communique in May 1986, announced that the Sri Lanka Government agreed to make further concessions beyond the Delhi Agreement dealing with Law and Order, Land Settlement etc. Sri Lanka meanwhile, embarked on a new political initiative, the Political Parties’ Conference with eight political parties, that met me on 25 June 25, 1986.
These talks continued in July 1986. A TULF delegation also arrived in Sri Lanka from India and had formal talks with me in July and August 1986. The following Ministers also participated regularly – the Minister of Foreign Affairs, A.C.S. Hameed; the Minister of Finance, Ronnie de Mel; the Minister of National Security, Lalith Athulathmudali; the Minister of Lands, Land Development and Mahaweli Development, Gamini Dissanayake and several others off and on.
The discussions between the Government of Sri Lanka and the TULF and the discussions and debates within the Political Parties Conference, continued for over three months. The SLFP boycotted these discussions. All the other parties, including the traditional Left parties which were not represented in Parliament, also participated in these discussions. The Conference drafted Constitutional Amendments, a Draft Provincial Councils Bill, schedules setting out the Reserved, Concurrent and Provincial lists as well as detailed memoranda dealing with Law and Order, Land and Land Settlement and Education.
The subjects of Finance and Administration were discussed in detail but no final agreements were reached. An official statement issued by the Sri Lanka Government on 26 November 26, 1986 stated that apart from subjects not finalized, these proposals constituted a package which would have been a reasonable basis of settlement fair to all sections of the people of Sri Lanka.
The agreed to proposals formed the basis of discussions between me and Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi when we met in Bangalore at the SAARC Summit on November 17 and 18, 1986. At the end of the Conference, it was announced that apart from the subjects of Finance and Administration, which were not clarified by the TULF, the matters which required further modification and agreement, were fully set out in a working paper on the Bangalore discussions dated November 19, 1986. The LTTE alone refused to accept these proposals.
For the first time, the Indian Government imposed restrictions on Sri Lanka Tamil terrorists operating from Indian territory. These were nullified by the Tamil Nadu Government’s noncooperation in these moves. Attempts were made by the Central Government to prevent the LTTE leader Prabhakaran from leaving India for Jaffna, unsuccessfully. A time-table was worked out between the two governments for signing an Accord based on these proposals to take place preferably in January 1987.
Features
Addressing human rights needs multi-pronged approach
by Jehan Perera
The ongoing 63rd session of the United Nations Human Rights Council, which runs from September 7 to October 7, 2026, in Geneva is important to Sri Lanka. Its outcome will send a signal to other international actors, including the European Union, as to whether Sri Lanka’s reform policy is on track. The written update on Sri Lanka, prepared by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights under High Commissioner Volker Türk and presented by Deputy High Commissioner Nada Al-Nashif, has taken a more holistic approach to the government’s performance over the past year. It acknowledged the progress Sri Lanka has made under the NPP government in relation to accountability for financial fraud and other economic crimes. At the same time, the High Commissioner’s update made clear that progress in relation to economic crime cannot be equated with progress in relation to accountability for grave human rights violations committed during the armed conflict and in other periods of political violence.
The government may have felt sufficiently confident that its response to the High Commissioner’s update could be handled by its representative in Geneva and did not require the attendance of Foreign Minister Vijitha Herath. Sri Lanka’s representative Sumith Dassanayake called for a fundamental review of country-specific mandates within the UN Human Rights Council. Sri Lanka has been facing repeated scrutiny in the form of successive UNHRC resolutions from 2012 onwards. Ambassador Dassanayake argued that such mandates should not continue indefinitely and must be regularly assessed against measurable objectives and tangible outcomes. This may reflect confidence that its record of reform is beginning to receive recognition internationally. The reports and statements at the Human Rights Council acknowledged progress in the government’s efforts to address corruption and economic crime.
The government’s anti-corruption drive has included investigations into allegations involving individuals who held the highest political offices in the country. The arrest of former President Ranil Wickremesinghe in connection with alleged misuse of public funds, and the investigation into the controversial SriLankan Airlines Airbus transaction involving former President Mahinda Rajapaksa’s son, are examples of the reach of these investigations. The arrest of SLPP National Organiser and Member of Parliament Namal Rajapaksa in connection with allegations relating to the Airbus purchase scandal has also demonstrated that the government is willing to pursue cases involving politically powerful figures.
Wide Range
The ongoing investigations appear to encompass a wide range of parliamentarians and government members, both past and present. They suggest that accountability for corruption is not being confined to lower-level officials or to individuals who lack political influence. This is precisely the kind of accountability that the public has long demanded and that previous governments have too often failed to deliver. The government is also reaching into the upper levels of the military hierarchies of the past. The case in which 11 young men, most of them Tamil, disappeared after being abducted in Colombo between 2008 and 2009 involved allegations that some families were asked to pay ransoms. The investigation into this case has reached senior military figures. The willingness to pursue such cases is important because it challenges the assumption that those who exercised power during the war are beyond the reach of the law. Such cases would provide a practical test of whether the government’s commitment to accountability for economic crimes is part of a broader commitment to the rule of law.
Success in prosecuting corruption cannot substitute for justice for those who were unlawfully killed, disappeared, tortured or otherwise victimised. The UN report noted that there had been no recognition or accountability for crimes under international law, gross human rights violations and serious violations of international humanitarian law committed by all parties during the war. The government has yet to establish a credible and effective process to address the many cases of enforced disappearance, extrajudicial killing, torture and other serious violations. The government needs to take the international commitments it has inherited on human rights issues seriously. It needs to adopt a multi-pronged approach and go beyond focusing primarily on financial and corruption-related accountability.
Need Action
As a member of the international community, Sri Lanka has a responsibility to abide by the commitments it has made. It cannot selectively uphold international obligations postponing those that are politically difficult. Also, as a small country, Sri Lanka has a self-interest in ensuring the survival of international law, which is all that it has to protect it from the depredations of the bigger international actors. The erosion of international law by powerful states makes it all the more important that smaller states uphold the principles on which the international system is based. Sri Lanka cannot credibly appeal to international law when it is threatened from outside while disregarding its own obligations within. Sri Lanka also needs to win the confidence of its own population that it is committed to justice and equality for all. Public opinion polls and community-level research have disclosed that ethnic and religious minorities are appreciative of the sense of greater security they enjoy under the present government from ethnic or religious extremists.
But a sense of security is not the same as the fulfilment of rights. As far as the Tamil people are concerned, the government has yet to deliver on several of its specific promises. These include the long-standing problems of missing persons, the release of political prisoners who have been members of Tamil militant organisations, and the return of land taken over for military purposes during the war. The issue of Buddhist statues and archaeological sites found on their properties which are then taken from their control continue to trouble them especially as they see no signs of resolution of those disputes. The issue of pastureland in the east of the country in Mylathamadu is particularly concerning to them as they see orders by successive presidents, both President Ranil Wickremesinghe and President Anura Kumara Dissanayake, being disregarded on the ground. The Mylathamadu pastureland dispute is where traditional Tamil dairy farmers have engaged in multi-year protests against the ongoing encroachment of their ancestral grazing lands by Sinhalese crop cultivators relocated under government development schemes.
The government’s failure to hold Provincial Council elections is particularly troubling. The provincial council system is the only one that can provide the Tamil people and other ethnic minorities the opportunity to wield political power and exercise a measure of self-determination in the areas in which they are the numerical majority. The continued postponement of Provincial Council elections therefore has consequences that go beyond an ordinary electoral delay. It deprives communities of an important constitutional avenue for democratic participation and power-sharing. The ethnic and religious minorities appreciate what the government is doing in the larger national interest, but they must not be made to feel that their special concerns are being ignored. The government cannot resolve Sri Lanka’s entire legacy of rights violations overnight. But it does need to demonstrate that it is willing to move forward on multiple fronts, not only on a few.
Features
The emptying university: why are academics leaving?
by Hasini Lecamwasam
Brain drain in Sri Lanka is at an all-time high. The latest Human Flight and Brain Drain Index for 2024 shows that we are 16th of 175 countries on this count, and first in South Asia. That this is a crisis goes without saying. Brain drain affects all sectors, and is a huge strain on the resources of a developing country. Particularly in Sri Lanka, where considerable public investment is made in the moulding of professionals through the system of free education, this amounts to transferring the resources of poorer countries to richer ones with top migration destinations. It is, therefore, important to consider the push and pull factors behind skilled outmigration, specifically from the public university system of Sri Lanka, a key focus of the Kuppi column.
From frustration to exit
Several bitter realities in our crumbling public university system act as push factors in the migration decisions of academics. Many essays on this column have, over several years, attempted to highlight numerous aspects of this erosion. Perhaps, primary among them is the lack of adequate funding, which has debilitating ramifications for the system: very little investment is made in the up-keep of infrastructure (and even less in its expansion), resulting in serious constraints in accommodating growing batches of students and the wellbeing of the staff (particularly in regional universities); research funding is negligible, severely curtailing academics’ ability to effectively discharge their primary duty of teaching which should ideally be informed by their research (and the research of others, access to which is also, unfortunately, mediated by funding); a funding crunch also means a slash in (or greater constraints on) recruitments, increasing the workloads of academics, currently in service, and eating into the quality of their teaching and research.
What recruitments are done frustrate those with any faith in merit. As many of our interventions in this column have shown, recruitment processes are characterised by archaic selection criteria that place very little weight on a candidate’s postgraduate growth and the advantages of interdisciplinary training. Added to this is the general preference for ‘culturally compliant’ candidates who would not rock the boat too much. The combined effect is that those with the capacity and spirit to try out innovations in education are discouraged from joining or staying on in the public university system. Some, or many, of them may instead seek appointments abroad.
A thread that binds all of these problems together is pervasive hierarchy which, again, many interventions on this column have sought to highlight. It is the interest in preserving hierarchy that leads to the preference for alumni in recruitment processes. Hierarchy within universities can be particularly frustrating for younger faculty and women, who typically have to bear the brunt of the workload of their senior, often male, colleagues. In a context of funding, and, therefore, recruitment, restrictions, this translates into a disproportionate burden being placed on junior (usually female) faculty, seriously hindering their prospects of growing into successful academics due to the time constraints within which they have to operate. Junior academics, therefore, are more likely to look to educational institutions abroad for what they hope would be a different work culture that respects them more.
Ideological ruses
On top of these structural frustrations are also the workings of neoliberal ideology. For one, the nature of relations between the global metropole and peripheral countries like Sri Lanka largely dictates what is desirable and what is not. The apparent lifestyles of Western countries – from food to clothing, housing, appliances, and so on – have continued to lure people from the periphery with the promise of a ‘better’ life, alongside better career advancement opportunities. This, of course, masks much of the struggle that goes on behind the scenes to survive in Western societies. For instance, in most cases highly attractive public infrastructure such as roads, public transport, clean air, quality control of food, and so on belie the astronomical privatised costs of healthcare and education. Health insurance is usually mandatory and steep in most high-income settings, while even subsidised education (for which eligibility criteria are strict) creates a serious dent in household earnings. Of course, the happy images of glossy trams and gleeful international travellers don’t convey this.
A second ideological ruse is the myth of greater opportunities and recognition abroad. While there is no denying that local skilled sectors – be it higher education, health, civil service, or private white-collar positions – are replete with issues that inhibit merit-based professional advancement, the notion that things are fundamentally different in Western countries stems from an uninformed optimism. As is now increasingly known and discussed, Western labour markets are notoriously racialised, and equivalent skills are rarely treated as such. Instead, it is usually demanded that skilled migrants clear certain formal examinations in their host countries. In fields like medicine, this is followed by an interview that may also be racially prejudiced. Once these initial steps are cleared, remuneration reverts to square one irrespective of experience accumulated abroad, not to mention the many subtle aggressions, rejections, and trials one has to go through in the negotiation of everyday life. In the many cases where professional qualifications are used as leverage for a move abroad, sights are set on a better future for one’s children, which again is informed by the misplaced faith in greater opportunities and a lack of awareness of the factors outlined above. Needless to say, in the global swing to the Right, things have become even more challenging. In such a context, considering the few rare cases where skilled migrants live extremely comfortable lives as the norm becomes a dangerous misconception.
The two ideological pull factors mentioned above are complemented by a push factor, which has to do with a highly classed understanding of what a white-collar professional is due in their society. Many of these aspirations are clearly articulated in academic trade union action demanding separate quotas for school entry, increased fuel allowances, winning back the presently stalled vehicle permit scheme, salary hikes, and so on. While working people have every right to agitate for better material conditions, insofar as it remains unconnected to a broader movement for improving the conditions of the lot of the working class, it remains self-serving and very much within the class logic of capitalist society. Since these demands are articulated as a means of maintaining distinction, it is clear that they are not envisaged as part of a class movement. The frustration of not having these needs for distinction satisfied may push some to seek greener pastures abroad, at least financially, (perhaps as a means of social mobility based on it), only to be disappointed on most occasions.
What is to be done?
Addressing the systemic push factors listed above requires, first and foremost, greater allocations for free public higher education. This would immediately translate into more recruitments and less work per academic, and better research and teaching in the long haul. An increase in funding would also ideally lead to greater infrastructural investments, especially including improving the living conditions of those who work in regional universities amid untold hardships. Next, fairer, more creative, and, therefore, more effective recruitment policies are badly needed to attract talented individuals to university positions. Rather than carving out a ‘special category’ for academics to achieve this purpose, which is informed by a classed logic, this needs to be done through fundamental reforms in recruitment processes. Third, a persistent attack on the entrenched hierarchy within universities through internal reform is much called for. Reforming recruitment practices will go a long way towards addressing this. Measures should also be taken to introduce more stringent policies against SGBV (not to mention ragging, even though it is not directly connected to brain drain). Such measures would create a safer, fairer, and more attractive workplace, which would give more reasons for people to stay.
On top of greater allocations, we also need a transformation of our aspirations themselves if this situation is to change. That necessitates a kind of education capable of questioning the ‘paradise’ conception of Western societies, and lays bare their colonial material and ideological dimensions, in both their historical and contemporary manifestations. These colonial understandings of the ‘good life’, moreover, have devastating ecological implications for the planet, not to mention social justice. An education with the ability to transform this mindset would hopefully prove to be more than a mere path to social mobility, rather being a tool of social emancipation that renders mobility moot.
(Hasini Lecamwasam is with the Department of Political Science, University of Peradeniya)
Kuppi is a politics and pedagogy happening on the margins of the lecture hall that parodies, subverts, and simultaneously reaffirms social hierarchies.
Features
Friends favourite Suzi Croner returns for Oktoberfest 2026
Charming audiences in Switzerland as Suzi Flückiger, Sri Lanka’s own Suzi Croner is coming home… for a very special occasion.
The bubbly former frontline vocalist of 90s band Friends will take the stage at a popular venue in Colombo for Oktoberfest 2026.
Known in Europe for her country and classic hits, Suzi has remained a much-loved name back home. This will be a rare chance for local fans to see her live and celebrate the voice behind so many Friends memories.
Oktoberfest 2026 in Colombo promises an evening of live music, traditional Bavarian food and beer, colourful dirndls and lederhosen, folk dancing, and plenty of community cheer.

Suzi Croner (Flückiger)
Against this lively backdrop, Suzi will take the stage for a special solo set, featuring her own pre-recorded music. She performed at the event last year too, as a solo artiste, but a German band providing the music.
This year, however she says, it’s a different scene.
“The novel attraction will be the dancers from Germany — all girls, clad in German outfits,” Suzi said. She added that the event will also highlight the activities generally connected with Oktoberfest, which should generate a lot of fun and excitement for those who join her in Colombo next month.
Suzi has become a much-in-demand artiste in Europe, and has even performed Down Under, in Melbourne.
In Switzerland, where she has been based for the past 42 years, she continues to charm audiences with country and classic hits, performing at private events and community nights across Europe.
“My weekends are generally loaded with my work as a singer,” she said. “And I also play tennis three times a week, because I need to keep fit to entertain my audience in an active way.”
Her repertoire is made up mainly of Swiss, German and English songs.
And true to form, Suzi loves springing surprises.
“So watch out when you join me at Oktoberfest 2026, in Colombo!” she said.
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