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Formulating a National Action Plan for Reparations: An Interview with the Head and Director General of the Office for Reparations

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Interview

Writers-Hiruni Jayaratne and Waruni Kumarasingha- Strategic Communications Unit (Lakshman Kadirgamar Institute)

Sri Lanka is very much in the spotlight at 51st session of the UN Human Rights Council in September 2022. Last year, the Council adopted resolution 46/1 calling on the Government of Sri Lanka to show tangible progress in accountability and reconciliation. The government’s stated policy is that there are domestic mechanisms to address the concerns raised by the international community and they should be given time to show results. However, critics charge that the domestic mechanisms are one-sided and favours the Government without addressing the core issues of reconciliation.

It is therefore important to analyse these views and gain proper understanding of this mechanism. In terms of the domestic mechanisms referred to by the Government , there are six such mechanisms: The Office for National Unity and Reconciliation (ONUR), the Steering Committee on Sustainable Development Goals (SGD16); The Presidential Commission to inquire into the findings of the previous Commissions, The Office on Missing Persons, The Office of Reparations and The Human Rights Commission.

We spoke to Dhara Wijayatilake, Attorney-at-Law, Chairperson and Nazeema Ahmed, Director General at the Office for Reparation to find out how this mechanism operates and its objectives.

The following are excerpts of the interview:

What is the mandate of your institution and the background to its creation?

The Office for Reparations is an independent body established in terms of the Office for Reparations Act, No. 34 of 2018 to manage Sri Lanka’s reparations regime and grant reparations to victims of conflict, which was passed in Parliament and came into operation on 22nd October 2018. The principle objective of the Reparations Act is to provide for a framework for the grant by Government of remedies or relief to its citizens or the intention to assist persons who have suffered loss or damage as a result of a conflict referred to, to build and restore their lives.

How do you define “Reparations”? Do you have a criteria to measure “progress” in Reparations?

“Reparations” is another term for “relief”, “remedies” or “redress” and the affected persons are referred to as “aggrieved persons”. As expressly set out in the preamble to the Act, the intention is to contribute to the promotion of reconciliation for the wellbeing and security of all Sri Lankans, including future generations. This is to be achieved through assisting all citizens of Sri Lanka who have suffered under specific circumstances listed under Section 27 of the Reparations Act to “rebuild and restore their lives, and thereby to advance the wellbeing and security of all Sri Lankans, including future generations. The huge task that the Office for Reparations faces is to help formulate a national action plan to identify the outcome oriented difficulties and to make this goal a reality.

What activities has the OR done so far such as progress, action plan, strategies etc to achieve this vision?

Office for Reparation is delivering a greater service to the society by focusing on key areas consisting of:

i. Livelihood Support

Generating livelihood support was identified as an immediate need by the OR. Throughout the period, OR has organised and completed numerous programmes to facilitate livelihood assistance to the community. For instance,

Access to water supply for irrigational/ agricultural activities to assist farmer communities;

Integrating the aggrieved persons to the numerous poverty alleviation programs carried out by the government;

Generation of livelihood avenues, and self-employment opportunities in the affected areas.

To improve the living standards of the aggrieved community, last year OR developed a knowledge and technology transfer programme enabling new startups and entrepreneurship. The first Knowledge and Technology transfer programme was conducted for female heads of households in Thellipalai Divisional Secretariat in the Jaffna district in December. One hundred and two (102) women participated in the programme which provided both lectures and practical demonstrations on new startups such as virgin coconut oil extraction, preparation of liquid soap, etc.

ii. Compensation and Financial Support

During the period, the OR processed 5,964 claims and paid Rs.399.8 million as compensation for death, injury and loss or damage to property as a result of the conflict in the North and East and seven other incidents of civil commotions that occurred between 2006 and 2019. In addition to the compensation payments, the OR also continued to implement a loan scheme that was commenced by Rehabilitation of Persons, Properties and Industries Authority (REPPIA). The financial support is provided for aggrieved persons and socially reintegrated ex-combatants for self-employment and housing.

iii. Restitution of Land Rights

OR is working on the expeditious release of land, where possible, to the rightful owners, and where release is not possible, expeditious payment of compensation or provision of alternate land to the rightful owners with the collaboration of respective government authorities.

iv. Provision of Housing

The housing loan scheme was approved by the government in 2010 to assist war affected widows and other affected persons to construct houses for their resettlement. An amount of Rs. 24,000,000.00 was paid for 96 cases in 2019 and amount of Rs.750,000.00 was paid for 03 beneficiaries in 2020 under the review by OR.

v. Development of Community Infrastructure

To develop the community infrastructure based on various damages, have been monitored and facilitated by OR during the last years. For instance, payment of compensation for the affected persons and families in Kandy incident, compensation for the affected victims of easter Sunday bomb attack who lost properties and lives in 2019, Payment of compensation for the damaged places of worship.

vi. Administrative Relief

Since many programmes have already been implemented at district level, the OR considered it necessary to engage with the district administration to identify the gaps. For this purpose, the OR met with the District Secretaries from all 25 districts in November 2021 to create awareness on the role and mandate of the OR, and to discuss the support expected of them. The OR distributed a questionnaire to collate relevant information from the District and Divisional Secretariats to identify the needs of the aggrieved community.

vii. Psychosocial Support

The OR has identified the impact of conflict on victims as a serious concern which needed to be addressed. Under this, a pilot Psychosocial Support Programme was designed and the training of 26 Case Managers was completed during last year. The pilot programme commenced during the year with the conduct of the field level engagement with 136 aggrieved persons in five Divisional Secretariat areas that were selected for the Pilot programme in Kilinochchi (Karachchi DS Division), Batticaloa (Arayampathy -Manmunai Pattu DS Division), Ampara (Navithanveli DS Division), Kurunegala (Kurunegala DS Division) and Matara (Matara Four Gravets DS Division).

viii. Measures to advance unity, reconciliation and non-recurrence of violence

Several initiatives have been identified and are being taken in collaboration with relevant stakeholders including government and civil society organizations. An initial discussion to introduce a pictorial book to promote peace and unity among primary grade students was held with the Ministry of Education. The Members of the OR initiated a joint consultation grouping titled the “Unity Cluster” which meets regularly to discuss common programmes and areas for support and thereby avoiding duplication and promoting meaningful use of resources with the joint collaboration of the Office for Missing Persons (OMP) and the Office for National Unity and Reconciliation (ONUR).

Meanwhile the OR has taken other key initiatives to facilitate the society by,

Awareness creation among stakeholders

The OR made presentations to different stakeholder groups with the objective of creating awareness of the Cabinet approved Policies and Guidelines and the role of the OR in providing reparations last year. For instance, Development Partners on 8 October 2021, Butterfly Peace Garden CSO on 27 October, Meeting with the Hon. Governor and the District Secretaries of the Northern Province on 29 October 2021, Civil Society Collectives on 9 November 2021, Muslim Women Development Trust (displaced community of Puttalam district) on 25 November, Disability Action Committee of Batticaloa district on 21 December 2021.

Engagement with Civil Society Organisations

The OR organised a dialogue with CSOs on 15 October, 2021 which was attended by over 40 participants representing 30 organizations. As a follow-up to this discussion, the Secretariat had bilateral discussions with several CSOs to discuss the implementation of programs for the benefit of the aggrieved communities.

Transparency and dissemination of information

To provide appropriate and accurate information, the OR website has been revamped and all information uploaded in all three languages, subject to maintaining confidentiality with regard to details regarding aggrieved persons. In addition, a comprehensive Information Management System is being developed to enable evidence-based decision making in relation to the grant of reparations to aggrieved persons.

Sensitisation of OR staff

To empower OR’s staff on the victim centric approach that needs to be adopted in dealing with victims of conflict, various sessions have been organised during the years. For instance; the session on gender and reparations conducted by Center for Equality and Justice (CEJ), awareness session on domestic violence conducted by Women in Need (WIN), the session to mark the World Mental Health Day 2021 to understand the mentalities of the victims and the role of the OR staff in granting relief conducted by the Psychosocial support Consultant, the session on stress and coping conducted by the trained Case Managers of the OR based on their real experience, awareness session on the reparations policies and guidelines conducted by the Director General with a main focus of adopting a common and outcome-oriented approach in service delivery.

04. What do you see as the main problem or problems to reparations in this country and what are some of the ways that the Office for Reparations is addressing these problems?

After the conflict ended, restoring, rebuilding or assists persons who have suffered is the major challenge for Office for Reparations to identify the root causes and solutions to the problems. Office for Reparations has identified the areas to be addressed with immediate effect by giving psychosocial support,Knowledge Transfer programmes and technological workshops to those who interested in pursuing self- employment opportunities. Therefore, lack of internal human resources is the main issue and challenge that Office for Reparation is currently facing with.

Lack of literacy on Reparations among civilians is another challenge that the Office for Reparations is dealing with, to enhance the knowledge about Reparations to the public these above mentioned workshops by OR has given positive impact especially for the “Aggrieved Person” during the civil war.

05. Gaining international credibility for the domestic mechanisms is one of the greatest challenges faced by the government. How do you address this in regard to the Office for Reparations?

Any institution gains credibility from the service it provides to the people who receive its services, and the commitment it demonstrates to achieve its macro-goals. The Office for Reparations has been able to actively
carry out its statutory mandate over the past few years, serving aggrieved persons and restoring lives, despite several challenges, including COVID-19. The feedback we have received from our beneficiaries has been very positive. Special mention should be made to the pilot psychosocial support programme we launched last year, which received a very positive feedback from the victims and their families.

The Office for Reparations is actively engaged in consultation with the civil society organisations, organizing public awareness programmes and funding or restoring projects around the island. So far, the feedback from the international organizations, embassies and civil society is very positive, encouraging the Office to do more.



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Opinion

Defeat of Terrorism and Triumph of Hypocrisy – another view

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Gotabaya, Mahinda, Basil, Chamal and Namal

This is regarding the editorial of The Island on 19 May 2026, titled “Defeat of Terrorism- Triumph of hypocrisy”.

I fully agree with the Editor when he says that Terrorism needs to be eliminated in all its forms and manifestations. Terrorism is generally defined as “massacring innocents to achieve a political aim”. Whether the cause for terrorism is justifiable or not, terrorism per se, cannot be justified and thus, should be eliminated.

However, I have different views with the rest of the editorial.

The editor says what Rajapaksas did to the country was like saving a damsel in distress and abusing her thereafter. Elaborating the same, he says that Rajapaksas have thought leadership to defeat terrorism was a special license to do as they pleased and sought to politicise and monopolise war victory to accelerate their dynasty building projects. He continues to say that the post war Mahinda Rajapaksa (MR) admininstration became a government of Rajapaksas by the Rajapaksas and for Rajapaksas. In short, the implication was that MR, after defeating LTTE, has done nothing except furthering his and his family’s political interests.

MR, even during the critical period in the war against LTTE, handled the economy professionally. There was an upward trend in SL economy from 2005–2009 showing GDP growth from 24.4 billion dollars in 2005 to 42.5 billion dollars in 2009, doubling the 2005 GDP. During 2010–2015 showed Sri Lanka’s strongest economic performance with the economy growing from US $ 56.7 billion to US $ 80.6 billion.

The annual growth rate was over 7.4%, per capita income more than tripled (from US $ 1200 to over US $ 3,600) elevating SL to lower-middle income status. National poverty level declined significantly, dropping from over 15% in 2006 to below 7% by 2012. Unemployment declined to 4 %. Transport and energy sectors received a significant boost. Massive power generation projects such as Norochcholai coal power plant and Upper Kothmale Hydro power plant were completed.

The expansion of Colombo port, development of Hambantota port, Mattala International Airport and building of expressways (Southern and Colombo-Katunayake) greatly improved the country’s transportation capacity and brought SL clear to a goal of being a dynamic Maritime and Aviation Hub.

The above statistics of the Central Bank does not prove the fact that Rajapaksas only looked after their interests after the war. Hence the proverbial “Damsel” that the editor was referring to, was not abused as he claimed, but had been looked after very well.

Excesses may have happened and it happens everywhere in every field. But the fact remains that MR defeated the most ruthless terrorist organisation in the world and developed the country with roads, rails, ports, airports, expressways, bridges, power plants, stadiums etc. which deserves appreciation.

The editor then says MR suffered a humiliating electoral defeat in 2015, again came to power in 2019, but mismanaged the economy, indulged in corruption and bankrupted the country. That too is far from the truth.

The foreign exchange crisis that culminated in 2002 was not due to mismanagement /corruption of Gotabaya Rajapaksa (GR) government but mainly due to excessive foreign borrowings during 2015-2019. By 2019 Nov, the economy was already in a precarious state, with the IMF itself warning that SL was highly vulnerable to external shocks.

The editorial never mentions Covid 19, the worst global pandemic the GR government had to face. During this period the government revenue fell by approx. Rs 534 billion. (revenue lost from import restriction of motor vehicles, Covid lockdown and closure of liquor shops were Rs 136 billion, 323 billion and 75 billion respectively.) At the end of the MR regime in 2014, the outstanding ISBs were US $ 5.3 billion and the reserves were US $ 8.2 billion. By the time GR came to power, the outstanding ISBs were US $ 15.2 billion and the reserves were US $ 7.6 billion. In 2020-2021, the GR government did not issue any ISBs but settled them in time.

The decision to maintain debt servicing was not just about protecting the country’s image in financial markets but to ensure critical health and humanitarian support including vaccines, medicines, and essential supplies continued to flow into the country during the worst global health crisis in the country.

It’s a pity that the public who remained silent when foreign debt was piling up, launched an Aragalaya to expel the leader who settled the debts without obtaining fresh loans. Was it hypocrisy or treason?

The claim that the tax reduction implemented in Dec 2019 caused a significant loss of revenue was also not correct. When economic activity is deliberately halted by a global pandemic, with borders shut, businesses closed, citizens confined to their residences, production at the lowest, no tax rate high or low, can generate revenue from transactions that are simply not occurring.

The economic downfall was not due to mismanagement or corruption but due to the promulgation of bankruptcy (debt standstill) by Central Bank (CB) on the advice of former CB governor Dr. Indrajth Coomaraswamy and consultant Prof. Shantha Devaraja. That decision undermined the on-going efforts to stabilise the economy. I consider allowing such an announcement was a mistake done by GR. It halted IMF staff level already agreed loan, Indian Credit Line of US $ 3 billion and suspended WB and ADB loans. Also, China had to halt the loans already requested as China Secure (the government insurance company) could not insure loans to a bankrupt country.

The reserves were carefully used by GR to buy vaccines giving priority to human lives, and due to lack of foreign exchange, procurement of gas and fuel was critically effected. In the final stages there was an organised campaign by saboteurs to steal and hoard fuel. The JVP members publicly appealed to Sri Lankans abroad not to send any dollars to the country. A hate campaign was carried out against the Rajapaksas.

A protest called Aragalaya was held at Galle face. The entire episode was a grand conspiracy to oust GR, who was sworn in as the President at Ruwanwelisaya, the great symbol of Sinhalese Buddhist culture. Black Vesak lanterns, ridiculing Buddhist sacred symbols, insulting the Mahanayakas, anti-unitary slogans and glorifying federalism and free biriyani for the entire crowd by “unknown” sponsors were ample evidence of its hidden agenda.

Aragalaya, which forcibly took over the Presidential Secretariat, was obviously illegal. The other mistake done by GR was to allow protesters to operate without chasing them away using force if necessary. Finally, GR, the Commander in Chief of the three forces, left the country without hurting anyone.

The editor says that Rajapaksas squandered an opportunity that presented itself after the war to bring about national reconciliation and defeat LTTE ideology politically. He says reconciliation has become a victim of hypocrisy.

MR, after the war, launched a large number of development projects in the North constructing roads, bridges, grounds, schools, hospitals, etc. All the roads were carpeted. During the period 2010-2012 the growth rate in Jaffna was 22% compared to 7% in the rest of the country. That was the first step he took towards reconciliation.

Reconciliation needs an equal contribution from both sides. Unfortunately, the goodwill shown and the enormous economic support provided by MR were never reciprocated by the Tamil politicians. MR held PC elections (without abolishing 13A even with two-thirds majority in parliament) and allowed them to elect their own leaders. That was the second step towards reconciliation.

Mr. C. V. Vigneswaran studied at Royal college and Colombo Law College, became a Magistrate, High Court judge, a judge in the Court of Appeal and in the Supreme Court. Having lived among Sinhalese for more than 65 years, after being elected as the Chief Minister in the Northern Province, he declared that the Sinhalese had no right to live in Jaffna. Every year he returned most of the funds allocated for Northern development back to the Treasury without utilising it fully, to indicate that there was no support from the government. That was how Tamil politicians contributed towards reconciliation.

After 2009, hundreds of Tamil students in the North have become doctors, engineers, lawyers, top government officials, etc., due to unhindered education. The civilians who suffered under LTTE facing abductions, paying ransom, etc., now live in peace without any fear. Most of the Tamils have migrated to areas outside the North and the East. More than 52% of the Tamils are now living among Sinhalese without any problem. Main businesses in Colombo are dominated by the Tamils. What else is required Mr. Editor for the so-called reconciliation? Granting a separate state on a platter?

With all the above, the Tamils in the North annually commemorate the very person who made their lives miserable for 30 years. How would the Sinhalese feel when they see the terrorists who killed pregnant women, monks, infants, devotees being garlanded and felicitated in the North every year?

Yes, the editor was correct. Reconciliation has become a victim of hypocrisy.

Retired Rear admiral (Dr) Sarath Weerasekera VSV RWP USP

Former Public Security Minister

 

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Opinion

IMF’s failure to tackle corruption in Sri Lanka

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Anti-corruption and governance reforms are central pillars of Sri Lanka’s $2.9 billion bailout agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). This was the first time in Asia that an IMF programme was explicitly linked to a comprehensive anti-corruption diagnostic and specific legislative measures.

At the press conference announcing the deal, Senior Mission Chief Peter Breuer said that the IMF had emphasised that anti-corruption and governance reforms are central pillars of the programme. He added that the IMF would subject Sri Lanka to a comprehensive governance diagnostic exercise, making it the first Asian economy to undergo such an exercise, which will assess corruption and governance vulnerabilities in Sri Lanka and provide prioritised and sequenced recommendations. “Sri Lanka will be the first country in Asia to undergo a governance diagnostic exercise by the IMF. We look forward to further engagement and collaboration with stakeholders and civil society organisations on this critical reform area,” the IMF official said.

An extract from the Technical Assistance Report on Governance Diagnostic Assessment, Sri Lanka  (September 30, 2023) is as follows; “The report highlights immediate and short-term measures to address key corruption issues, as well as structural reforms that require more time and resources but are essential to strengthen governance and initiate lasting change. The recommendations are designed as a coherent approach to improving governance through a focus on: clarity of authority and responsibility for core functions; financial and operational independence of essential accountability and law enforcement institutions; transparency in government practices and performance, especially relating to the planning, spending, and accounting for the use of public funds and assets; inclusive, accessible, and rule-based means to enforce private agreements and challenge official behaviour; and efficient mechanisms for making information public and holding organisations and individuals to account for their performance and behaviour”.

Further, the agreement required Sri Lanka to implement several specific, actionable measures to curb corruption vulnerabilities:

New Anti-Corruption Legislation: The government passed the landmark Anti-Corruption Act in 2023, which expanded the powers of the Commission to Investigate Allegations of Bribery or Corruption (CIABOC), required electoral candidates and officials to declare their assets, and introduced protections for whistleblowers.

Fiscal and Procurement Reforms: The IMF programme included commitments to improve public financial management, increase tax transparency, and advance public procurement laws to eliminate political interference and cronyism in government contracts.

The IMF Executive Board is supposed to continuously track these anti-corruption and governance benchmarks during its periodic programme reviews to ensure compliance. The IMF officials’ last visit to Sri Lanka was from March 26th to April 9th when they reviewed the progress of the programme, decided that it was going well and approved the release of the final tranche. Their statement did not carry any reference to the activities of the government regarding control of corruption.

The Letter of Intent submitted by the government at the conclusion of the review becomes relevant under these circumstances. It was officially released on May 29, 2026. One of the critical undertakings by the government, according to the Letter of Intent, relates to cost-recovery pricing, the government has reaffirmed its commitment to maintaining cost-recovery pricing for fuel and electricity.

Going by available communications, apparently the IMF has not inquired into what caused the increase of cost of production of electricity. Cost of electricity production has gone up due to increased use of diesel, as low quality coal is not producing the required amounts. The coal that has been recently imported has been found to be of low quality and the government has said the losses due to this misadventure will not be shifted to the people. The irregularities in the coal procurement process that has happened recently is no secret, the Auditor General’s report has pointed out the flaws in the said procedure. Ironically, the IMF programme highlights the need to have fool proof procurement and tender procedures, and emphasises “holding organisations and individuals to account for their performance and behaviour” as the above quoted Technical Assistance Report mentions, yet it is silent on this matter showing its lack of responsibility. And it wants cost-recovery pricing for electricity! This may be taken as proof that the IMF is not very much concerned about the plight of the poor.

Further, these policies and recommendations of the IMF may substantiate the accusations made by left oriented organisations that the IMF insists on austerity measures, often at the expense of welfare expenditure, in order to serve neoliberalism. The clauses on corruption control in its agreement with the government appear to be mere lip service and window dressing. If no follow-up action is taken on these requirements, such clauses have no meaning and serve no useful purpose. If it is a responsible organisation, the IMF should have called for an impartial inquiry into the coal procurement procedure, for it is mandated to ensure transparency and integrity in these procedures. Moreover, if it is concerned about the welfare of the public it should not have asked for cost-recovery pricing of electricity when the reason for the increased cost could be corruption. Instead of going into the matter of corruption the IMF asks the government to recover the losses from the people. Cannot it think of a fairer means of recovering these losses instead of burdening the already impoverished people?

Thus, the question arises whether the IMF is a tool of imperialism. Many critics, particularly in the Global South, argue that the IMF functions as an instrument of financial imperialism or neo-colonialism. Structural Adjustment Programmes of the IMF ties its emergency loans to strict conditions like austerity, privatisation, and deregulation. Critics argue these demands dismantle local welfare systems, strip developing nations of their sovereignty, and open their markets to exploitation by multinational corporations. Further, the wealthy nations, particularly the United States and European powers, hold the majority of voting shares and effectively control the institution, dictating economic policy to weaker states. Critics claim that IMF-mandated currency devaluations artificially lower the cost of raw materials and natural resources in developing countries, benefiting wealthy creditor nations which amount to resource extraction.

Another matter of concern is that the interest rate for IMF loans to Sri Lanka, contrary to common belief that it is concessionary, is 5% which is pretty high and may be unbearable to a poor country like Sri Lanka. The country was in a woeful state in 2022 and was forced to declare bankruptcy, and seek IMF assistance. If we seriously examine the cause of this economic disaster, we will see that it was due to the economic policies the country had been following since independence. We import more than we export and take loans to meet the shortfall. This practice has gone on and on and is continued at present. No government, including the present one, despite its left leaning claims, had attempted to correct this colossal mistake. Our debt burden is frightening, less said about it the better.

The obvious solution to this problem would have been to achieve self-sufficiency in our essential needs, like food, and reduce reliance on imports. Most of our needs in food and other essentials could be locally produced. The IMF may not recommend such a course of action. It would want us to remain a poor country, struggling in the vicious cycle of import-export-debt quagmire.

by N. A. de S. Amaratunga

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Opinion

When the decisive vote changes hands: Sri Lanka’s next electoral shift may already be underway

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In the summer of 1789, as the French Revolution gathered momentum, delegates of the National Assembly assembled in Versailles to debate the future of France. The seating arrangement inside the chamber was not planned to shape political vocabulary for centuries to come. Yet it did. Those who favoured sweeping political change, greater equality, and the dismantling of inherited privilege gravitated to the left side of the hall. Those who defended the monarchy, established institutions, and traditional social hierarchies took their seats on the right. What began as a matter of convenience soon became a political metaphor. More than two centuries later, we still speak of the “left” and the “right” to describe competing visions of society.

Since then, the terms have evolved and acquired different meanings across countries and historical periods. Yet, the broad distinction remains remarkably durable. Ideologies associated with the left generally place greater emphasis on social, political, and economic equality, often advocating a more active role for the state in addressing disparities and expanding collective welfare. Ideologies associated with the right tend to place greater value on tradition, market mechanisms, authority, and various forms of social hierarchy, arguing that stability and prosperity emerge from preserving established institutions and incentives. Most political movements, of course, occupy positions somewhere between these poles, combining elements of both traditions in different proportions.

Few elections have altered the course of Sri Lankan politics as dramatically as the general election of 1977. Sweeping to power with an unprecedented five-sixths majority in Parliament, the United National Party ushered in a new political and economic era under the leadership of J. R. Jayewardene. He would later become the country’s first Executive President under a constitutional framework that vested extensive powers in the office. The changes that followed reflected a decisive move towards market-oriented reforms and a political outlook that leaned more to the right than anything Sri Lanka had previously experienced.

Yet even a political machine as formidable as the UNP’s could not hold power indefinitely. After nearly seventeen years of dominance, its grip on the electorate weakened. In 1994, the pendulum swung once again, bringing Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga. The victory was widely interpreted as a return to a more socially conscious and centre-left political vision.

What followed was not merely a change of government but the emergence of a recurring pattern in Sri Lankan political landscape. Since 1994, governments of varying compositions and personalities have risen to power with crucial support from parties and constituencies positioned on the left of the political spectrum. Whether through formal coalitions, strategic alliances, or ideological influence, the left has often provided the decisive electoral weight needed to secure victory. In many cases, without that support, the arithmetic of power would have looked very different.

Yet it is equally important to recognise what Sri Lanka has not become. Despite the enduring influence of left-wing thought, the country has never embraced an uncompromising far-left political project. Instead, successive governments have largely occupied a centre-left space, balancing market economics with welfare commitments, nationalism with social reform, and political pragmatism with egalitarian aspirations. The result has been a political landscape where power changes hands, parties rise and fall, and personalities dominate headlines, but the centre of gravity remains remarkably leftist. Sri Lanka’s electorate has repeatedly rewarded those who speak the language of social justice, even while stopping short of endorsing political extremes.

One possible explanation for this enduring centre-left tendency lies not in political parties themselves, but in the cultural formation of the electorate. For much of the period between the 1960s and the liberalisation of the economy in 1977–78, Russian literature occupied a prominent place in Sri Lanka’s reading culture. Affordable translations of the works of writers such as Tolstoy, Dostoevsky, Gorky, Chekhov and Pushkin circulated widely among students, teachers and ordinary readers. Alongside their literary value, these works exposed generations of Sri Lankans to questions of social justice, class inequality, collective responsibility and the moral obligations of society toward the vulnerable.

By the early 1990s, the generation that had grown up reading this literature had come of age politically. As they entered the electorate in larger numbers, they helped shape the contours of public opinion. Their voting preferences did not necessarily favour revolutionary socialism or radical left-wing politics. Rather, they appeared to support governments that combined commitments to welfare, social protection and egalitarian ideals with the practical realities of governing a developing nation. In this sense, the centre-left orientation that has characterised much of Sri Lanka’s political landscape since 1994 may owe as much to the country’s literary and intellectual culture as to the strategies of political parties themselves.

Yet there is an apparent paradox at the heart of this story. While successive governments often drew legitimacy from centre-left political ideals, their economic policies frequently moved in a different direction. Confronted by fiscal constraints, global economic pressures and shifting geopolitical realities, they operated within an international economic order largely shaped by market-oriented principles. Institutions such as the International Monetary Fund exerted considerable influence over economic policymaking, encouraging reforms associated more closely with liberalisation, fiscal discipline and market efficiency than with traditional left-wing economics.

It was thus a balancing act that defined Sri Lankan governance for decades after 1994: governments elected on promises of social justice and collective welfare, yet compelled to pursue economic strategies shaped by the imperatives of a global market economy. Politically, the country remained centre-left. Economically, it often travelled along a more market-oriented path.

Sri Lanka may have settled its political direction for the next few years, but the next truly decisive moment may arrive closer to 2030. By then, the composition of the electorate will have changed once again. A growing share of voters will belong to Generation Z and Generation Alpha, generations whose intellectual and cultural worlds differ markedly from those that came before them.

If the electorate that emerged in the 1990s was shaped, in part, by the values encountered in Russian literature and a reading culture that emphasised questions of social responsibility, collective welfare and inequality, the generations now entering political maturity have been formed by a different landscape altogether. Their influences are increasingly digital, global and instantaneous, are shaped more by algorithms and by social media feeds, content creators and transnational cultural currents. Many have grown up in a world where entrepreneurship, individual success, innovation and market-driven solutions occupy a far more visible place in public discourse.

This generational shift is unfolding alongside broader transformations in global politics. Across much of the world, including major powers such as the United Kingdom and the United States, contemporary political movements that emphasise markets, national interests, economic competitiveness, and stronger state authority have gained momentum. Whether these trends will find a lasting echo in Sri Lanka remains a question that deserves careful attention, not merely as an electoral matter, but as one intertwined with some of the defining challenges of our time.

Today, concerns of national sovereignty, security, strategic influence and even soft power are increasingly mediated through economic strength and market performance. Nations are judged not only by their political ideals but also by their ability to compete, innovate and secure their place within an interconnected global economy. Sri Lanka, still navigating the aftermath of economic crisis and charting its future development path, finds itself at the centre of these debates.

Against this backdrop, if the decisive vote is gradually passing from a generation shaped by the books that once filled the nation’s shelves to one shaped by the screens that now fill its hands, the question therefore does not simply become who will win the next election. It is whether the intellectual and cultural influences that shaped Sri Lanka’s centre-left political consensus can retain their hold on a new electorate formed by different experiences, different technologies, and different aspirations.

If every era is ultimately defined by the stories it tells itself, what story is the next generation of Sri Lankan voters already beginning to write? Will it move the centre of gravity towards a more market-oriented, centre-right vision? The answer may well determine not only the outcome of future elections, but the ideological direction of Sri Lanka itself.

By Viran Maddumage PhD (Reading), Macquarie University,
and Sanduni Rathnayake, AAL

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