Midweek Review

Foreign Exchange Crisis

Published

5 years ago

2022/02/9

By Dr. C. S. Weeraratna

csweera@sltnet.lk Sri Lanka is facing a deepening financial crisis. According to media reports there is a short supply of essential items such as fuel, medicine and gas for domestic use attributed to the foreign exchange (FE) crisis. Dhammika Perera (DP) has proposed a seven-pronged strategy to overcome Sri Lanka’s foreign exchange crisis (The Island 30 January).

One of the strategies suggested by DP is that the government build a university town consisting of five universities within 30 minutes from the Bandaranaike International Airport at Katunayake, to accommodate 150,000 students (30,000 at each university). This is an excellent idea but it will cost the government at least Rs10 billion at the rate of Rs 2 billion per university. Once the universities are built, it will be necessary to get qualified academic staff and suitable accommodation. Further it will take a couple of years to build the five universities. Some need to have laboratories and equipping these adequately is expensive, time consuming and requires a substantial amount of FE. It is a long-term project. Currently, there are 17 universities located in different parts of the country. Perhaps, it may be more realistic if five selected universities already functioning are developed to meet the required standards. Instead of having all the five selected universities in Katunayaka it would be desirable if there is at least one in the north and another one in the east so that those in these regions are also benefited.

Another strategy proposed by DP is to build two hospitals like Singapore’s Mount Elizabeth with internationally recognised facilities. As in the case of establishing new universities, building two such hospitals will take a long time, perhaps two to three years and will require a great deal of foreign exchange. Developing some existing hospitals to meet the stipulated standards may be a realistic alternative.

The total extent under coconut cultivation in Sri Lanka is around 400,000 ha and about 325,000 ha are small holdings. The annual production of coconut has been fluctuating around 3,000 million nuts, (approximately 6000 nuts per hectare). As suggested by DP, developing the coconut industry by planting 1.5 million nuts annually is very timely. At the same time the state of the existing coconut plantations should be looked into. If the production of the existing coconut lands is increased by 1000 nuts per hectare per year through better management and applying organic and inorganic fertilisers, the total production can be increased substantially within a year which will increase the export income from coconut.

One of the main strategies to solve the current FE crisis would be to increase export earnings and reduce expenditure on imports. Most of the activities involved are short term while the others are medium or long term.

Increase export earnings

The dire need to increase our export earnings to meet the severe financial crisis we are facing today has been emphasised by many. Increasing exports is of paramount importance to improve the present FE situation. A major source of FE is the plantation sector. Around 800,000 ha are cultivated with plantation crops tea, rubber and coconut and this sector, in the last few years, earned nearly Rs. 360 billion annually. However, as indicated in table 1, these major export crops do not show a substantial increase in production during the last five years and the contribution from this sector has remained at nearly 20 percent of the export income. Consequently, strategies need to be implemented to increase production and thereby, FE earnings from this sector. There are many state sector organisations to implement such strategies.

As shown in Table 1 tea production has been fluctuating around 300 million kg per year during the last five years, in spite of several institutions assigned to the tea sector. The average tea yields are considerably lower than the potential yields. It has been reported that some of the cultivars developed by the Tea Research Institute of Sri Lanka had been yielding around 8,000 kg per hectare in South India under commercial conditions but the average tea yield in Sri Lanka is much lower. In the smallholder tea sector the average yield is around 1800 kg per hectare and in the estate sector it is about 1200 kg per hectare. In 2020 tea earned Rs. 230 billion in FE. Better management practices in the short term would increase the quantity and quality of the tea produced making it possible to increase FE earnings substantially from the current Rs. 230 billion.

Rubber is another important export crop. In 2017 it earned nearly Rs. 6 billion in foreign exchange but has decreased during the following three years. Based on Central Bank annual reports, the total Rubber production in 2010 was 152.9 million kg and by 2019 it had plummeted to 74.8 million kg. The corresponding average yields are 1561 kg per hectare and 665 kg per hectare respectively. These figures indicate that the Sri Lankan rubber sector is ailing in spite of several institutions assigned to promote rubber production in the country. With the current higher rubber prices it would be possible to earn more FE by increasing rubber production through better management practices which would produce results in the short term. In the last few years the rubber sector was affected by many factors, one of which is ineffective management.

Coconut production too has declined during the last five years as shown in Table 1. This appalling situation in the plantation sector can be attributed to many factors. If the productivity of this sector is raised, by implementing better management practices it would be possible to increase foreign exchange earnings. Most of these practices would produce results in the short term.

A large number of crops, other than tea, rubber and coconut, cultivated in Sri Lanka have high potential as export crops. There are 24 agro ecological zones, each characterised by a specific climate and soil. This makes possible the cultivation of different types of crops such as spice crops, tuberous crops, horticultural (fruit crops) and floricultural crops and medicinal herbs.

Sri Lanka is famous for spices. The most sought after spice crops are cinnamon, pepper, cloves, cardamoms, nutmeg, mace and vanilla which grow in abundance mainly in the wet and intermediate zone. In 2020 the county earned nearly Rs.60 billion by exporting spice crops.

Cinnamon is the most important spice commodity in the spice sector. In 2019, it earned around Rs. 32 billion in FE. The production of cinnamon has been fluctuating around 20,000 tonnes per year during the last few years. Sri Lanka received its first ever Geographical Indication (GI) certification when the European Union (EU) Commission on 2 February, 2022 granted GI status to Ceylon Cinnamon. This would increase the demand for Sri Lanka cinnamon.

Pepper is the second most important commodity among spices. It is grown in the wet and intermediate zones mostly as a mixed crop. The Sri Lankan Pepper has a higher piperine content which gives it a superior quality and pungency. Annual production of pepper too has remained stagnant at around 20,000 kg.

Other spices such as cloves, cardamom, nutmeg and mace have the potential to earn a substantial amount of FE. With the increase of international demand for natural products, and the government’s focus on enhancing and diversifying its value added range, spices and essential oils extracted from these crops will continue to earn more FE.

Dehydrated food is another agricultural product which has the potential to earn much needed FE. During some months there is a glut of fruits and exporting dehydrated or canned fruits would bring in an appreciable amount of FE.

In any programme or plan to increase foreign exchange earnings from the agriculture sector, agro-industries have to be given much emphasis. A large number of crops cultivated in Sri Lanka have considerable potential in various agro-industries. However only rubber, coconut and a few fruit crops are used in industries. Crops such as cassava, horticultural and floricultural crops, medicinal herbs, cane, bamboo, sunflower, castor and ayurvedic herbs have a considerable industrial or export potential but are not cultivated to any appreciable extent. Development of agro-industries will also increase export income and will have a tremendous impact on the economy of the country and also provide employment opportunities to rural people. The private sector can get involved in such projects for which appropriate technical assistance needs to be provided by the relevant public organisations.

Decrease expenditure on imports

While implementing strategies to increase our FE income by promoting exports, action also needs to be taken to decrease our expenditure on imports. During the period between 2017 and 2020 annual expenditure on importing food has been around Rs. 320 billion. The current expenditure on food imports is likely to be even higher due to the depreciation of the SL rupee, and shortage of rice and other food crops, the result of banning import of agrochemicals.

One of the problems the country is facing is the fuel crisis, which is likely to have extremely undesirable repercussions. A large sum of money is spent on importing petroleum to Sri Lanka. In 2020 we have imported fuel worth Rs 540 billion. If we are going to consume petroleum products at the current rate, at least an additional Rs. 50 billion will have to be spent in 2022. Consequently, it is essential to reduce petrol and diesel consumption. In many other countries such as China, Thailand and Singapore, action has already been taken to reduce fuel or power consumption and cut down wastage. If we reduce our power consumption by 10 percent, it will result in a saving of Rs 60 billion in foreign exchange.

Studies conducted in many countries have found that ethanol is a viable alternative for petrol. Many countries are either producing or using ethanol in large quantities or are providing incentives to expand ethanol production and use. Prompted by the increase in oil prices in the 1970s, Brazil introduced a program to produce ethanol for use in automobiles to reduce oil imports. Brazilian ethanol is made mainly from sugar cane. Among other countries using ethanol as a bio fuel are Australia, France, India, Sweden, USA and South Africa. Use of ethanol tends to reduce environmental pollution caused by compounds such as tetraethyl lead, used in petrol. Ethanol can be made from high starch containing crops such as manioc and maize, or high sugar containing crops such as sugarcane. These crops are cultivated in Sri Lanka. Around 10 million litres of alcohol are produced annually at Pelwatta and Sevanagala sugar factories. These can be mixed with petrol to be used at least in three wheelers so that those who use them need not pay higher fares. A few years ago former Science and Technology Minister Dr. Thissa Witharana appointed a committee to look into the possibility of using substitutes for fuel. The committee recommended the use of ethyl alcohol and Jatropha oil as bio-fuels. No follow-up action was taken by the subsequent governments to promote these alternatives as biofuels. Oil from Jatropha (Weta Erandu), a crop that can be grown widely in the Dry Zone of Sri lanka, can be used as a biofuel.

Dendro power can be generated using fast growing nitrogen fixing trees such as gliricidia and Leucaena. These crops can be used not only to generate electricity but are also a good source of animal feed and fertilisers. It may be more beneficial to grow these crops in eroded tea lands where the yields are relatively low. Soil erosion in such tea lands can also be reduced by growing these crops. The Bio Energy Association of Sri Lanka has been instrumental in promoting cultivation of gliricidia.

Sri Lanka, a country begging for dollar loans to import medicine and fuel, which are critical, need to have flexible export and import policies. As indicated above, there are 24 agro ecological zones, each characterised by a specific climate and soil. This makes possible the cultivation of different types of crops. Most of the food imported can be locally produced, thereby reducing expenditure on food imports. A closer look at the imports indicate that around Rs. 50 billion (nearly 16 percent of food imports) in FE is spent on importing sugar, most of which can be locally produced. The total annual requirement of sugar in the country is around 620,000 tonnes, but only about 50,000 tonnes are produced locally. Sugarcane has a considerable potential to reduce food import expenditure. Sugar production in the country has not increased by any appreciable amount during the present decade. The Kantale sugar factory remains closed while a plan to cultivate sugarcane in Bibile remains shelved. Jaggery made from kitul, and sugarcane are good substitutes for sugar manufactured from sugarcane.

A substantial amount of foreign exchange is spent on importing milk. In 2020 Rs. 60 billion in FE was spent on importing milk and dairy products. We have around 1 million mostly indigenous cattle. Their productivity is low (one to three litres per day) mainly due to the poor nature of the breeds and inadequate low quality feed supply. The dairy industry has the potential to contribute considerably to solve Sri Lanka’s FE crisis. Milk production can be increased by increasing availability of cattle feed and thereby an appreciable amount of foreign exchange spent on milk imports can be reduced. Milk production also plays an important role in alleviating malnutrition and offers many employment opportunities. If milk production can be increased, an appreciable amount of foreign exchange spent on milk imports can be reduced, while also improving the nutritional status of the people.

Expenditure on subsidiary food crops such as chillies, green gram, ground nut and potato is few billions of rupees. The extent under these crops and their average per hectare yields have not increased by any appreciable amount during the last decade. A few years ago, a former Minister of Agricultural Development, Chamal Rajapaksa appointed an Advisory Panel to make proposals to develop the agricultural sector so that there is a quantitative and qualitative increase in crop production at a lower cost with no damage to the environment. The recommendations of the panel were mainly on the development and use of better varieties of seeds and planting material; effective control of weeds, insect pests and diseases; better water management, and water conservation; proper use of inorganic and organic fertilisers; control of soil degradation and appropriate land use; promotion of agro-industries and carrying out relevant agricultural research and use of their findings. During the last few years numerous programmes such as AMA, ‘Waga Sangramaya’ and ‘Govi Sevana’ were implemented. All these activities and programmes, appear to have not made any appreciable positive impact on the agricultural sector of the country, indicated by increasing expenditure on food.

In addition to sugar, milk and rice, we spend a colossal sum on importing food items which can be locally produced. Among these are lentils (Rs. 20 billion), onions (Rs 16 billion), maize (Rs. 10 billion), fruits and vegetables and spices, mainly chillies. Even herbs such as katuwelbatu and Thippili, which can be produced locally and used in ayurvedic drugs, are imported at a cost of nearly six million US dollars every year. Most of these crops can be cultivated in the dry zone, where only about two million acres are in productive use out of the 4.5 million ha. Non-availability of adequate rainfall during the Yala season is one of the limiting factors of crop production in the dry zone. However, better water management practices and rainwater harvesting would resolve this limitation.

Although hundreds of research projects related to plantation and food crops are carried out by the faculties of agriculture and Department of Agriculture there appears to be very little liaison or interaction between the relevant institutions, to utilise the research findings in our efforts to increase productivity in the agriculture sector, which will result in saving an appreciable amount of FE.

All News Advertisement

Midweek Review

A ‘partnership’ like no other!

Published

19 hours ago

2026/09/16

Sahan Weerasooriya

Indian Defence Minister Rajnath Singh at the Indian Army memorial

Against the backdrop of the economic crisis that erupted in 2021/2022 Sri Lanka’s dependence on Indian economic and military support is growing. INS Udayagiri, Indian Navy’s indigenously built multi-role stealth frigate, that arrived at Colombo Port hours before Indian Defence Minister Rajnath Singh arrived here, brought essential machinery/equipment spares for Sri Lanka Navy and Sri Lanka Air Force. INS Udayagiri departed on 11 September, less than 24 hours after Singh concluded his three-day visit. The list of Indian support is long. In June this year, India swiftly transferred military stores worth USD 5.5 million to Sri Lanka Army on gratis basis from its operational stocks. India stepped in when Sri Lanka appealed for assistance to deploy over 1,000-member military contingent in Haiti under the UN command to help maintain order in that violence ridden country.

By Shamindra Ferdinando

Parliament on 9 Sept. passed the Chief of Defence Staff (Repeal) Bill, over one and half years after the last Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) General Shavendra Silva retired.

The wartime General Officer Commanding (GoC) of the celebrated 58 Division (former Task Force 1) bid farewell to the Sri Lanka Army (SLA) on 1 January, 2025, following some record breaking achievements, leading his troops from the front in the final phase of the war to eradicate the Tiger terrorists.

Following the debate on the second reading of the Bill, on 9 Sept., the Bill was passed without a division. It clearly indicated that the Samagi Jana Balawegaya (SJB)-led Opposition wasn’t at least interested in making an obvious issue out of it. The Bill has been introduced to repeal the Chief of Defence Staff Act, No. 35 of 2009, enacted in 2009, to carry out functions, including the coordination of activities among the Armed Forces and the Ministry of Defence.

Pointing out that the relevant Bill had been enacted after the conclusion of the war, the National People’s Power (NPP) government declared in Parliament that the abolition of the Office of the CDS wouldn’t harm national security. The NPP emphasised that the Mahinda Rajapaksa administration created that post to accommodate war-winning Army Commander Lt. Gen. Sarath Fonseka after he firmly turned down the offer to accept a non-military post as Secretary to the Sports Ministry.

Amidst rapidly deepening turmoil within the government, Fonseka received the appointment as the first CDS on 15 July, 2009, in terms of the newly enacted Act. It would be pertinent to mention that the government had no option but to placate Fonseka by establishing the Office of CDS through a parliamentary Act to ensure the change of command take place, as planned.

The writer was among those assigned to cover Fonseka receiving the appointment as CDS and Maj. Gen. Jagath Jayasuriya taking over the command of the war-winning Army from Fonseka. This was against a background of Fonseka wanting Chief of Staff Maj. Gen. G.A. Chandrasiri succeeded him. Instead, the Rajapaksas brought in Maj. Gen. Jagath Jayasuriya as Fonseka’s successor. Chandrasiri was made to retire and those who had been senior to Jayasuriya sidelined as the government tightened its grip on the Army. Therefore, the creation of the Office of the CDS to accommodate Fonseka should be considered in the appropriate context.

But, Fonseka quit the CDS post in November 2009 after reaching a consensus with the UNP-JVP combine to contest the presidential election. Air Chief Marshal Roshan Goonetileke succeeded Fonseka as CDS, on 16 November, 2009, while continuing his duties as the Commander of the Air Force.

The NPP, at the inception of its administration, quite clearly wanted to abolish the post of CDS. Silva, who received the appointment as Acting CDS, on 1 January, 2020, while serving as the Commander of the Army, relinquished the substantive post on 1 June, 2022. That happened in the wake of the 9 May countrywide systematic violence unleashed by those spearheading the high profile project to oust President Gotabaya Rajapaksa after the increasingly humiliated SLPP by the siege laid by Aragalaya activists on important government institution with a foreign dictated agenda, ordered a goon attack on those Galle Face protesters.

Retired Maj. Gen. K.B. Egodawele, former Minister Wimal Weerawansa, foreign affairs commentator Asanga Abeyagoonasekera and Prof. Sunanda Maddumabandara, who authored books on the 2022 regime change project, all pointed to external hands in the mayhem. Abeyagoonasekera went to the extent of alleging direct Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) role in the operation, while Prof. Maddumabandara named then Indian High Commissioner Gopal Baglay as the one who asked Speaker Mahinda Yapa Abeywardena to take over the presidency, along with the backing of the likes of Omalpe Sobitha thera. That brought an end to the repeated attacks on US Ambassador Julie Chung over an alleged meeting with Abeywadena on the eve of President Rajapaksa being forced to flee the country.

India never challenged Prof. Maddumabandara’s declaration, widely believed to be based on revelation made by Abeywardena.

A significant visit

Indian Defence Minister Rajnath Singh’s historic three-day official visit to Colombo coincided with the House passing the Chief of Defence Staff (Repeal) Bill. What a coincidence it was!

A rapidly deepening partnership spanning defence, economic aid, and regional connectivity under India’s Neighbourhood First policy dominates bilateral relations.

Singh, a senior member of the ruling Bharatiya Janatha Party (BJP), laid a wreath at the Indian Army memorial, in Pelawatte, Sri Jayewardenepura, on 9 September, on the second day of his visit, as the Parliament announced the repealing of the Bill. The memorial is a stark reminder of a despicable Indian destabilisation project directed at smaller, economically weak Sri Lanka in the 80s.

Singh, who is on his second term as Defence Minister, would go down in history as the first Indian Defence Minister to pay respect at the memorial built in memory of Indian Army officers and men killed in Sri Lanka. Having established a large scale terrorist project in Sri Lanka, the Congress government destabilised Sri Lanka to facilitate signing of the so-called Indo-Lanka Peace Accord after the arm twisting by its infamous ‘parippu’ drop over Jaffna, humiliating and bringing to its knees the then ‘all-powerful’ JRJ government when its powerful friends in the West turned their backs on their perennial vasal here, dubbed the ‘20th Century Fox’. The deployment of the Indian Army followed, beginning 29 July, 1987, on a mission to ostensibly disarm terrorist groups, including the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).

The then Indian Defence Minister K.C. Pant visited Colombo on May 30-June 1, 1988, in the run-up to the presidential election at the time the Indian Army was engaged in operations against the LTTE. India never sent another defence minister here even after Sri Lanka built a memorial near Battaramulla, in August 2008. It had been put up on a recommendation by the late Gen. Lionel Balagalle, Commander of the Army and CDS following an official visit to New Delhi in Dec., 2003.

Indian High Commissioner Ashok Kantha was the first top Indian government representative to pay floral tribute at the memorial on 15 August, 2010, over a year after Sri Lanka brought the once Indian sponsored war to a successful conclusion.

There is another Indian Army memorial in Palaly, Jaffna, built by the Indian Army in memory of 33 officers and men killed in a disastrous heli-borne assault on the LTTE, based in the Jaffna University. That assault took place on 12 Oct., 1987, at the onset of Indian operations. However, among the Indian dead inscribed on the memorial was Lieutenant Colonel Arun Kumar Chhabra who served the 10 Para (SF), elite battalion of the Parachute Regiment involved in the Jaffna University assault. Chhabra died on 14 Oct., 1989, during a gun battle with the LTTE.

The point is whatever various interested parties say today about the Indian intervention here, the truth is Premier Indira Gandhi destabilised this country in line with her strategy meant to address separatist sentiments in Tamil Nadu. India cannot absolve itself of the responsibility for the massive death and destruction caused not only in Sri Lanka but also the assassination of former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi who advanced his slain mother’s strategy by deploying the Indian Army here.

Indian trained terrorists, the People’s Liberation Organisation of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE), almost succeeded in overthrowing Maldivian President Maumoon Abdul Gayoom in Nov., 1988. Two boat loads of PLOTE terrorists passed under the nose of the Indian Navy, at that time responsible for controlling all movements within Sri Lanka territorial waters, to reach the Maldives. The Indian intervention in the Maldives to save the Gayoom’s administration was hailed as a spectacular Indian military operation. No one found fault with India for sponsoring PLOTE. In fact, the PLOTE, widely believed to have been disarmed by the Indian Army in line with the Indo-Lanka peace accord signed under duress, retained weapons to mount the operation. That proved the much publicised project to disarm terrorist groups, including the LTTE and PLOTE, was more a farce than anything else.

The top BJPer’s, who recently concluded his visit to Colombo, emphasised the nearly four decades long absence of an Indian Defence Minister paying respects at the Jayewardenepura monument. Interested parties have sought to depict the monument as a testament to India sacrificing life to protect Sri Lanka. But, the truth is the monument reminds the world of a politically motivated terror project that ruined Sri Lanka, caused deaths of at least 1,200 Indian military personnel, and paved the way for a coup attempt in the Maldives. Names of 1169 Indians, including 55 officers, are inscribed therein. The catastrophic Indian project also led to the invention of suicide attacks (human bombs), a tactic now practiced in different parts of the world. India experienced the horrors of suicide bombing when a Sri Lanka woman blew up Rajiv Gandhi at Sriperumbudur, Tamil Nadu, on 21 May, 1991, over a year after India pulled out its Army from Sri Lanka.

Two Battaramulla memorials

Sri Lanka and Indian media reported Defence Minister Singh’s visit to the Indian Army memorial at Battaramulla. Unfortunately, print, electronic and social media failed to mention that the National War Memorial, with names of nearly 29,000 officers and men, who paid the supreme sacrifice, inscribed, is situated a walking distance from the Indian Army memorial. Perhaps the Indian Defence Minister should have laid a wreath at the National War Memorial, a gesture that may have somewhat atoned for an utterly irresponsible and reckless political decision.

The two memorials situated just 1.1 kms apart underscore the horrors of conflict engineered and sustained by regional power that almost destroyed Sri Lanka. Sri Lanka was trapped in separatist terrorism and a simultaneous insurgency in the South that ripped the country apart.

Sri Lanka transformed its ceremonial armed forces to a worthy fighting formation over the years. The Office of the CDS had been in place throughout the war though it was not constituted by a specific law (Chief of Defence Staff Act, No. 35 of 2009).

As the armed forces expanded, the country needed a headquarters for better coordination among the armed forces and police. The Joint Operations Command (JOC) was established in 1985. In 1999, during the tenure of President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga, the JOC was replaced by Joint Operations Bureau (JOB), a civilian led set up that failed miserably to meet the challenging task. In the same year, Kumaratunga, in her capacity as the Defence Minister, did away with the JOB and established Joint Operations Headquarters.

Kumaratunga created the Office of CDS in 2000 ahead of major northern battles. That functioned till the end of the war in May, 2009, and no one ever thought of enacting a specific Bill to constitute the Office of CDS. The NPP told Parliament, on 9 September, that a staggering Rs 8.7 bn had been spent on the Office of CDS, since 2009.

Multi-role stealth frigate INS Udayagiri at the Colombo port. The ship
visit coincided with Singh’s 3-day tour

The Indian political establishment largely ignored the humiliating loss of lives suffered during the mission in Sri Lanka. They conveniently forgot the disastrous intervention though the High Commissioner here visited the Battaramulla memorial in 2010. However, Modi, having captured power at the 2014 general election, initiated his own strategy. He first visited the Battaramulla memorial, in March, 2015, less than a year after becoming the Premier. He again visited the memorial in April, 2025, when he visited Colombo to sign seven Memorandum of Understanding (MoUs), including one on defence.

Having backed Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s ouster in 2022, Modi (Rajnath Singh served as the Defence Minister during the US-Indian operation in Colombo) endorsed the candidature of Anura Kumara Dissanayake, in February, 2024, by extending an official invitation to the leader of the NPP, as well as the JVP. Dissanayake was given the opportunity to meet External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar and National Security Advisor Ajit Doval. The message from New Delhi was loud and clear. Although Al Jazeera described the Indian move as an unlikely invitation, those who have carefully analyzed New Delhi’s actions here may realise the importance of the unexpected rescue of Somawansa Amarasinghe, in the early 90s, as the UNP government was about to capture him. Had Amarasinghe ended up in the custody of the military, the same fate that befell other party seniors, including Rohana Wijeweera, too, would have been his.

The UNP showed no mercy at all to the JVPers. Amarasinghe escaped with Indian help in February, 1990, three months after the Army executed Wijeweera. Although some speculated about a possible Indian role in saving Amarasinghe, no one could prove it. Then, unexpectedly, Amarasinghe himself, at a rally held in Kalutara, in late 2001, disclosed how India saved his life. The revelation was made at the first rally he addressed after returning home, following a 12-year exile.

Dissanayake received a second invitation from New Delhi after his historic unlikely victory achieved, thanks to outside machinations, mainly by the West ,in the run up to the Sept. 2024 presidential election. Modi announced their consensus on entering into MoU on defence at the conclusion of Dissanayake’s Dec. 2024 visit, though the joint statement didn’t say so. India swiftly moved to finalise the Defence MoU along with six other MoUs in the first week of April 2025 when Modi visited Colombo.

By then even the JVP/NPP had forgotten that the JVP waged insurgency against the UNP over the signing of the Indo-Lanka Accord. The emergence of the NPP as the undisputed political power in Colombo has facilitated the Indian strategy here. It also facilitated US strategy, as well as joint US-Indian scheme, the future of it now very much in doubt, especially with erratic actions of President Trump.

Immediately after Modi concluded his April 2025 visit, the Colombo West International Terminal (CWIT), Sri Lanka’s first fully automated container terminal with an $800 million investment, officially commenced operations. The project that offered a significant boost to the maritime economy marked a major milestone in India–Sri Lanka infrastructure collaboration.

By then, India has secured the controlling interests of the Colombo Dockyard Limited (CDL), a move facilitated by Japan. Although the announcement regarding Japan’s Onomichi Dockyard parting with its 51% of shares to India’s state-owned Mazagon Dock Shipbuilders Limited, supplier of warships to India et al. It was India’s first-ever acquisition of a foreign shipyard.

India never had such a hold on Sri Lanka during the war of post-conflict period. In fact, the current Indo-Lanka partnership or whatever you choose to call it seemed to be fait accompli.

The way forward

‘Yankie Dicky’s’ (JRJ was known as Yankie Dicky because of his ardent pro-American stands) nephew Ranil Wickremesinghe, in his capacity as President and Defence Minister, declared a moratorium on foreign scientific research vessels during 2024. Wickremesinghe, struggling to cope up with economic difficulties amidst being at the mercy of US and India, announced the moratorium on such ship visits. It was meant to deprive Sri Lanka of the opportunity to receive Chinese vessels. Wickremesinghe’s announcement came in the wake of US backed Indian protests over Chinese vessels Yuan Wang 5 and Shi Yan 6 vessels visiting Sri Lanka. But, Wickremesinghe’s moratorium still remains in force as the incumbent government shied away from making its position known to the public. China, having acquired the strategically situated Hambantota Port and Colombo International Container Terminals (CICT), South Asia’s premier deep water terminal, Beijing consolidated its position here. Perhaps many people do not remember that the Colombo Terminal project was awarded to a consortium involving China, in Sept, 2010, then a joint venture established under a 35-year Build–Operate and Transfer (BOT) project in 2011 and the facility inaugurated in August 2013 though construction continued till April 2014.

The Hambantota Port was acquired in 2017 during the Yahapalana government, in the wake of the Colombo Port City controversy. In spite of issues, China has established control over Colombo Port City, CICTT, as well as the Hambantota Port.

Sri Lanka may overtly take a stand that may see us as bei pro-India but at the end of the day whoever wielded political power as well as those in the Opposition wouldn’t be able to disregard Chinese interests. President Gotabaya Rajapaksa realised his folly when he declared intention to renegotiate the Hambantota Port deal. China simply dismissed the President’s proposal. The President was compelled to issue a clarification at his own expense.

The recent statement attributed by the Defence Ministry to Defence Secretary AVM (retd) Sampah Thyuyakontha regarding Sri Lanka’s readiness to seek NATO assistance drew a sharp response from General Secretary of the Communist Party of Sri Lanka Dr. G. Weerasinghe. Thuyakontha made the statement during a recent visit to Canada where he represented the government at the 28th Annual Indo-Pacific Chiefs of Defence (CHOD) Conference, held in Victoria, Canada, from 31 August to 2 September 2026.

There hadn’t been a previous instance of Sri Lanka seeking NATO assistance. The CP Chief questioned Sri Lanka’s unexpected declaration while examining post-2024 presidential polls developments. It would be pertinent to mention that it was Mahinda Rajapaksa who first entered into ACSA (Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement) in March, 2007. The CP, without hesitation, criticised President Rajapaksa’s action. President Sirisena extended that agreement in 2017 though he pretended he didn’t approve it. Since the change of government in 2024, the NPP has enhanced defence relations with the US and the next year’s extension of ACSA is a foregone conclusion. Sri Lanka is set to go ahead with US-India strategies though China remains a factor that cannot be ignored, under any circumstances.

Midweek Review

Feeling political sadness as signs of hope and resistance

Published

19 hours ago

2026/09/16

Sahan Weerasooriya

by Sasanka Perera
(The writer is on X as @sasmester)

A few weeks ago, a friend in India wrote to me about Ghazala Jamil’s book, What to Do with Political Sadness and Other Essays on Death, Destruction and Hauntology (2026). It had just been published by New Delhi’s Simon & Schuster India and Yoda Press. And thanks to the kindness of yet another friend, I managed to get a copy of the book. I think we are all surrounded by different forms of ‘political sadness’ both in our own country and beyond. And some of us might actually ask ourselves the same question Jamil has posed in the title of her book: What to do with political sadness? In this situation, since the book spoke to me directly, I ended up writing notes on it and reflecting on what she had to say as I read.

Globally, we live in an era governed by systemic attrition, state-sanctioned violence, and the steady dismantling of democratic institutions. In this situation, despair is frequently framed as a personal pathology or a personal tragedy that is difficult for one to reconcile with. This is particularly the case if one lives in conditions of political instability burdened with a conscience — knowing full well what is right and what is wrong but not having the power to make a difference. Contemporary neoliberal politics routinely urge the disenfranchised to practice ‘resilience’ or ‘mindfulness’ without offering serious means to deal with unbearable situations. That process helps strong-man and dictatorial politics to not only survive but also justify their destructive politics.

Ghazala Jamil thoughtfully and reflectively deals with what happens when one must deal with politics of violence up front in her collection of essays. Jamil argues that the political sadness felt by marginalized people experiencing juridical, economic, and physical destruction is neither an aberration nor a personal failure. It is, instead, a rational and ethically sound response to state power built on dispossession and intimidation. For Jamil, political sadness is a method of both perseverance in difficult conditions and a means of generating hope as well as a way of imagining a future despite being surrounded by orchestrated death, destruction and dispossession.

Rather than attempting to ‘cure’ this sadness or dismiss it as weakness, Jamil interrogates its anatomy in an attempt to locate something far more durable than passive optimism or taken-for-granted fatalism so familiar in South Asia. That is a radical, unyielding form of idealism rooted in memory and a refusal to be silenced. Idealism in this sense is increasingly becoming a scarce resource in the circumstances where most of us live and work. While reading Jamil’s essays and writing these thoughts, I was also contemplating on the unfolding politics in Sri Lanka. A recent tweet by me in response to a news item pertaining to the UN Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers, Margaret Satterthwaite requesting information from the Sri Lankan government’s proposed judicial reforms in Sri Lanka drew much criticism.

While I was concerned overall on the reforms meant to increase the retirement age of judges across the judicial hierarchy on matters of principle and potential impact on democratic governance in the country, my immediate concern was the UN’s established bias in responding to these kinds of issues. That is, the blatant lack of equality where people at the receiving end usually happen to be nations without a veto or the ability to control one in the UN. Many people, both known and unknown, were upset with the tweet claiming I did not know how the UN system worked or had not done my homework. My sense was, I was considered naïve or even stupid as I harboured a sense of idealism, which sadly they had lost. Jamil, on the other hand, might agree with me.

Across nineteen essays, spanning political philosophy, urban sociology, and cultural critique, the collection is based on a close reading of three primary and closely related theoretical positions buttressed by immediate life experiences in both India and beyond.

The first position deals with what might be called, mechanics of state violence. Here, Jamil explores the politics of physical and institutional mechanisms, that range from spatial segregation and legal disenfranchisement — such as the weaponisation of citizenship laws — to the degradation of public resources such as education and transport. In this situation, she considers death and destruction as essential byproducts of governance that may not however be always intended. But ultimately, such mechanisms define the nature and reach of state authority.

The second overall position she deals with has to do with bodily dissent and martyrdom. It is in this discussion that Jamil analyzes extreme forms of political protest, such as hunger strikes and suicide drawing from experiences ranging from India to Ireland. When the state strips vulnerable communities of institutional recourse to justice and fair play, the body becomes the final site of sovereignty and agency. But bodily self-sacrifice forces a public ethical showdown, demonstrating that even the dispossessed retain the agency to expose the moral bankruptcy of majoritarian power. Even so, such extreme protests do not always work, nevertheless keeping alive political sadness, and with it, reservoirs of hope.

The final position Jamil explores is focused on the idea of hauntology and futures. Drawing on Jacques Derrida’s concept of hauntology, Jamil examines the spectral presence of unfulfilled post-colonial promises. In the Indian context, the constitutional ideals of secularism, egalitarianism, and social justice have been systematically compromised or dismantled, even though their ‘ghosts’ refuse to disappear. They haunt the present, reminding us of what was promised, what was destroyed, and what remains to be reclaimed and achieved. Therefore, this also becomes a repository for hope from where futures may be imagined.

As far as my reading is concerned, the core strength of Jamil’s work lies in how she retrieves hope from the debris of political grief. Her kind of idealism rejects toxic positivity, insisting that genuine hope can only emerge after we fully confront actual histories and experiences of destruction. This, I think, is essential, and speaks to me personally and directly in a situation where such idealism has been compromised by an unfortunate combination of naivety and political foolishness.

For Jamil, hauntology acts as an engine of political memory. Ideally, the ghosts of past struggles should prevent us from normalising present atrocities. Idealism, therefore, is not an abstract dream of a utopian future. Instead, it is the stubborn refusal to allow state violence to dictate the limits of human imagination. To feel political sadness is to remember that things were supposed to be different, and that they still could be.

Though Jamil writes from her location in India augmented by theoretical arguments that are in global circulation, what she has to say speaks to the world in the present time. This makes her critique both locally grounded and regionally and globally applicable.

In so far as India is concerned, Jamil’s critique speaks to a situation marked by the relentless rise of ethno-nationalism, religious intolerance, bulldozer politics of dispossession, and the systematic marginalisation of minority identities and their sense of being. Hope in this context is found in grassroots resistance, such as the constitutional consciousness kept alive by student movements, civil rights activists, and community-led dissenters who insist on asserting full citizenship despite systemic hostility. I would locate the recent Cockroach Janta Party agitations in this context.

As far as my own location, Sri Lanka is concerned, Jamil’s exploration of hauntology provides immediate resonance and painful familiarity. Sri Lankan society is haunted by unresolved ghosts of wartime as well as post-war absence of state accountability, forced disappearances, alienation of minorities, and the catastrophic economic collapse that dismantled public security. This is without even venturing into the violence and dispossession orchestrated by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam and Janata Vimukti Peramuna when these entities wielded power in their agitations against the state. The mass uprising of 2022 or the ‘aragalaya’ placed in context both the transformative power of collective hope and the tragic reality of state appropriation. Reading Jamil from Colombo underscores how South Asian states export and replicate tools of division, militarization, and erasure.

Beyond the subcontinent, Jamil’s writing indicates the necessity that localised grief must be connected to globally intertwined histories. From hyper-capitalist labor exploitation to climate displacement, the Global South faces a collective and ongoing crisis of hegemony. Reclaiming hope requires cross-border solidarity, recognising that struggles against authoritarianism or majoritarianism in South Asia and elsewhere constitutes part of a worldwide fight for human dignity.

For me, Ghazala Jamil’s What to Do with Political Sadness is an essential and thoughtful manual for ethical survival and the generation of hope in difficult times. It does not offer easy comfort or simple solutions. Instead, it offers something far more valuable: a framework for ethical survival and persevering with idealism and hope. Let me conclude with my 2022 poem, ‘Island Story’ (Let Us be Silent: Poems, Sarasavi, Nugegoda, 2025).

“To live in the blessed isle
close your ears
guard your tongue
freeze your heart

Then,
hell of despair

would seem
like
heaven of hope”

I attempted to deal with my unhappiness not merely by writing a poem, but by trying not to see what was obvious, as a means of dealing with pain and overshadowing the conscience. Jamil, will have none of this as she has convincingly argued throughout her book. By transforming political grief into an active analytical tool and method for hope, Jamil reminds us that our sadness is proof of our lingering moral clarity. In many ways, her effort is a conversation among theory, life experience and hope. For most of us, living under the shadow of disrupted pasts and lost futures, this book serves as a powerful reminder that as long as we remember what has been destroyed, the blueprint for a just world remains alive.

(A shorter version of this essay was published in The Wire [new Delhi] on 22 August 2026)