Features
Flashbacks of reinforcing 13A
By Austin Fernando
Prime Minister Mahinda Rajapaksa has recently said that the Provincial Council (PC) elections will be held when the ground situation is conducive. Minister Sarath Weerasekara insists on scrapping the PCs. Ambassador Nalin de Silva has opined that in the absence of elected PCs, the 13th Amendment to the Constitution (13A) stands abolished.
There are three competing standpoints: (a) Legally, the PM believes the 13A is intact; (b) Conceptually, Minister Weerasekara believes 13A is live, but must be “killed”; and (c) Cavalierly, Ambassador de Silva thinks it is already dead! Thankfully, sanity prevailed when Sagara Kariyawasam MP, following the PM’s statement said: “The 13A remains part of the Constitution, and elections will have to be conducted” and “PCs cannot be indefinitely run by Governors and officials.”
13A and devolutionary dynamism
Against this background, I read an article by my respected and adored guru, Professor Gerald Peiris. He urged abolishing the PCs and replacement by constitutional devices, to ensure: (a) genuine power-sharing, and (b) statutorily protect Sri Lanka’s sovereignty/ territorial integrity. He revisits the Dutch and British times, articulating a rich historical analysis of how the provinces evolved. There is other analysis as regards the provinces like that by Professor Madduma Bandara.
Although no government implemented the 13A in full, leading politicians and political parties, undecided or against or silent on 13A, attempted to reinforce devolution by creating Regional Councils (RCs) between 1997 and 2000.
President Mahinda Rajapaksa internationally validated 13A by incorporating it in the UNHRC Resolution in 2009, which the Yahapalana government repeated in the Co-sponsored UNHRC Resolution in 2015. Therefore, I hope PM Mahinda Rajapaksa and yahapalana leaders may not conscientiously demand the repealing of 13A.
These developments are not discussed by Prof. Peiris, while I consider them as important, because they are attached to international diplomacy, the All-Party Conference recommendations, and other influences and consequences.
Anyway, conceptually devolution has come to stay. It has also inputted political dynamism. The Tamil political parties, India, internationals and Diaspora groups, and our political leaders across the divide (excepting President Gotabaya Rajapaksa, who was apolitically inclined then) have virtually contributed to the creation of this status. However, due to the continuity requirement, President Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s stand is appreciated.
One formidable influencing factor is India. She has shown interest in our devolution under successive governments. This has been clear from the policies of Prime Ministers Rajiv Gandhi, Manmohan Singh, and now Narendra Modi, who has made his position clear to President Gotabaya Rajapaksa and PM Mahinda Rajapaksa. (See: “Crisscrossing 13A Abolition”- November 13th, 2020 – The Island)
These interventions are probably forgotten by our leaders who were instrumental in enhancing devolution. We hardly hear from them about such interventions nowadays. The younger generation of first timers in Parliament who support the 13A erasure proposition are either unaware of this past or being conformist.
That the aforesaid leaders did help enhance devolution does not mean that there were no hostile moves to undermine it. A case in point is the late President R. Premadasa’s Transfer of Power Act, through which the District Administration was disturbed, and the Divisions were institutionally brought under direct central control, at the expense of the powers of the PCs. Similarly, the lowest village level functionaries, i. e. Grama Niladharis were brought under the Ministry of Home Affairs by President DB Wijetunga.
Reinforcing devolution
One notable attempt to enhance devolution was the ‘Proposals for Constitutional Reforms’ of 1997, mooted by President Chandrika Kumaratunga. The then ministers Mahinda Rajapaksa, Chamal Rajapaksa, Nimal Siripala de Silva, GL Peiris and Susil Premjayanth were supportive of it. But they would not talk about it today!
The second attempt at the reinforcement of devolution was the Bill to repeal and replace the Sri Lankan Constitution in August 2000. The above-mentioned personages were in power and supported the changes proposed. Now, they are silent on that.
I wonder whether the former Chief Ministers who are MPs now, such as Susil Premjayanth, Chamara Sampath, Shan Wijaylal de Silva, CV Wigneswaram, and Nazeer Ahamad and former Provincial Governor Seetha Arambepola are supportive of reinforcing devolution.
Chandrika Kumaratunga, when she was the Chief Minister of the Western Province, having passed a PC resolution, ably supported by Susil Premjayanth, Felix Perera et al, vehemently demanded the devolution of police powers; but she did not care to grant the PCs police powers after becoming the President. Since there is no LTTE conflict now, I wonder whether Minister Susil Premjayanth will call for devolving police powers to the provinces now.
Before the Romesh de Silva Committee to formulate a new Constitution was appointed, there were proposals made to amend the Constitution. The 13A is material to devolution and PCs. Even 17A, 18A, and 19A which mostly dealt with governance did not attempt changes to 13A.
The constitutional reform proposals which took devolution seriously were the ones presented in 1997 and 2000, and the Steering Committee proposals (post-2015). The latter did not lead to a formal consensus. One important difference with the current exercise is that the yahapalana project had a Steering Committee of the Constitutional Assembly, whereas the current exercise is a government affair without any parliamentary participation. The worst way to formulate Constitutions! This could be due to the two-thirds majority of the incumbent government in the Parliament.
Out of the six Sub Committees appointed by the Yahapalana Steering Committee- some headed by currently pro-government politicians such as Ministers Premjayanth (Public Service Reforms), Bandula Gunawardena (Finance), and from the Opposition Sagala Ratnayaka (Public Security), MP D Siddharthan (Center – Periphery Relations), four were related to devolution. The other two were on Judiciary and Fundamental Rights. I believe the current committee deliberating on a new Constitution could gain from these Sub-Committee Reports, without reinventing the wheel if it so wishes.
Years 1997 and 2000 devolution proposals
The 1997 and 2000 constitutional reform proposals are available in print. Very recently, Professor Gerry Peiris has discussed the evolutions of Provinces, probably because he was concentrating on the historical progression. Since this evolution is dynamic, I may discuss some selected aspects (due to space constraints) of reinforcing devolution. It is because the 1997 and 2000 proposals are revolutionary as regards devolution. Although the 1997 document was an internal one, the 2000 document had Opposition inputs provided by eminent persons like KN Choksy.
I refer to the Table below which shows a comparison of a few selected aspects for reinforcement.
What concerns me is the stoic silence of seniors in the government, having agreed to support different devolutionary approaches, as evident from the Table. I do not wish to discuss the nitty-gritty of land powers for instance although there are questionable issues i. e. the attempt by the 1997 proposals to abolish the National Land Commission; it was corrected in the 2000 proposals. I will limit my presentation to the issues in the Table.
PC Boundaries
Let us look at PC boundaries. Some critics are against the existing boundaries of North and East Provinces, for reasons such as sovereignty and national security. But in 1997 the then government proposed to amalgamate two districts of Eastern Province with the Northern Province subject to approval by the people at a referendum in two districts. In 2000, they agreed to the creation of the North-East Province after a referendum, as proposed by Indians by way of an option, having staged street protests against it.
They were willing to establish a Muslim-dominated South-Eastern RC, pushing aside the Sinhala majority in Ampara Polling Division to the Uva RC, disturbing the demographic status of both RCs. They knew that the remaining Sinhalese and Tamil community, nearly 40% of the population in the Ampara District, would become a split minority in the new RC. The same fate would have befallen the North Trincomalee Sinhalese population, who were not offered the benefit of joining the North Central RC as in the proposed Ampara-Uva amalgamation. Having been the Governor of East, I am aware of such sensitivities. So much for the politicians who consider themselves the savior of the Sinhalese in the North and Eastern Provinces. In a way, one may expect the indigenous Eastern Muslim politicians to clamour for the South Eastern RC in return for the votes cast for the 20th Amendment.
Governors
The appointment of Governors is a presidential prerogative under 13A. But the 1997 proposals sought to dilute it by subjecting it to the advice of the Chief Minister. The Chief Minister’s involvement was one issue used by these politicians against devolving police powers to a Provincial Police Commission. The appointing prerogative was further restricted in the 2000 proposals by making it conditional to the concurrence of the Chief Minister, consultation with PM and approval of the Constitutional Council. That proposal, if implemented, would certainly have an averse to the powers of the incumbent President.
Of course, these changes in 1997 and 2000 will be attractive to minority party politicians. If the 2000 proposals were adopted, the names of those to be appointed Governors would have to be submitted to the Parliamentary Council, for its observations and endorsing the President’s choice. The removal of Governors in the 2000 proposals was the same as under 13A and 1997 proposals, but the setting up of another committee of inquiry was incorporated into the 2000 proposals [Art 129(d)(iv)] to check on the capacity of the Governor to perform his duties.
Provincial Executive Powers
Executive powers are given in one Article in the 13A and enlarged in 1997 and 2000 proposals. Extra responsibility for contracts is mentioned in Art 130(2)(a) and personal immunity from contract liability is given in Art 130(2)(b). The 1997 and 2000 proposals sought to introduce the Executive Committee system, which empowers discussion of subjects and functions assigned to an RC Ministry. More emphasis is given to the selection of the members than functioning in the proposed Article.
Committees are more powerful in the Indian States. The Committee system is preferred due to the time constraint for the members study the Bills, allowing an informed debate. Apart from scrutinizing legislation, Indian committees also examine budgetary allocations for various departments and other policies. These “mini-legislatures” provide a forum for lawmakers to develop expertise, engage with citizens, seek stakeholder inputs, provide a platform for building consensus on various issues, and strengthen policy management.
Of course, for a government that wishes to prevent committees from overviewing legislation in Parliament, such improvements at the PC level may be anathema. However, this discussion aims to highlight fact that positive and constructive propositions have been attempted.
Statute-making
There was no constitutional provision under 13A to support statute making. Therefore, the PCs had to depend on the generosity of expertise in the Attorney General’s Department. The two PCs in the North and the East, where devolution was to make an indomitable mark, we find slow progress in statute-making. The PCs in general did not have the expertise for statute-making. The clarification of any legal arrangement was always delayed.
A solution was found in the 1997 and 2000 proposals through the appointment of a Regional Attorney General (1997) and an Advocate General of the Region (2000). The provision in 13A for statute-making is reinforced with these two propositions.
Clamour for elections
I will not argue whether the PC elections should be held or not, or whether PCs should exist or not. I only attempt to show that the devolution concept has been expanded from 13A, and those who once agreed to reinforce devolution should not forget their past actions.
Of course, one may argue that the 13A was intended to resolve the armed conflict, which ceased in 2009, and therefore a new mechanism should be constructed to suit the present situation. However, their opponents may argue that the causes of the conflict have yet to be obviated and thus among other things, strengthening 13A is a prerequisite for national integration and reconciliation. Importantly, political commitments by leaders of the incumbent government should not be forgotten. Of course, this may create an issue for President Gotabaya Rajapaksa, who has not included national reconciliation and integration in the 20A.
The PC administrations have also been wavering as regards the powers they already have. I am reminded how all Peoples’ Alliance Chief Ministers challenged Land Minister Rajitha Senaratna’s attempt to pass land legislation and won. These PCs were silent when President Mahinda Rajapaksa once insisted that the centre held the land powers. It is noted that former PC Members supportive of the government have organized themselves demanding PC elections. They represent the government’s grassroots support like the Local Authority Members, who were responsible for the SLPP’s victory at the local government polls in 2018, which made the party’s electoral wins in 2019 and 2020 possible.
Some believe that the PC elections need not be held because its fate can be determined when the new Constitution is drafted. The very same commentators were silent when the 19A was replaced by 20A, without waiting for the new constitution!
Conclusion
This article has attempted to emphasise that we should not only consider the 13A as the basis for future decision-making as regards devolution.
Secondly, it aims to highlight the less-discussed issues that cropped up from 1987 (13A) to 2020 (20A). These are in the public domain and should be seriously considered by politicians as well as those who advise the government.
Thirdly, some of the incumbent government leaders have been exponents of devolution and were instrumental in the drafting of the aforesaid documents. Therefore, they need to remember the good they had done towards developing institutions and try to do something better. This is an exercise not only in politicking but also in bringing about reconciliation, which is necessary for the wellbeing of the country.
Fourthly, since there are measures that have received approval from the incumbent government leaders previously, the Opposition should look at them positively and contribute to further improvement instead of putting for political arguments.
Finally, the government should make a genuine effort to usher in reconciliation and reintegration, which will help it in Geneva come March 2021.
Features
The 22nd Amendment, constitutional recovery and illiberal slippage
by Dinesha Samararatne
Professor, Dept. of Public & International Law, Faculty of Law of the University of Colombo
and was an independent member of Sri Lanka’s Constitutional Council (Jan. 2023 to Jan. 2026).
Sri Lanka’s political transition in 2024 was widely regarded as restoration of democracy, a reversal of authoritarian rule and an opportunity for constitutional recovery. The 22nd Amendment is the first constitutional amendment since this turning point. It 1) extends the age of retirement of the judges of the superior courts by two years, 2) expands the number of judges in the Court of Appeal by 4, and 3) introduces a cap of 6 years on the term of a Chief Justice. The expansion of the Court of Appeal is meant to facilitate the Court sitting outside of Colombo.
This Amendment is a stress-test on Sri Lanka’s democratic restoration as well as constitutional recovery. This Bill was published in the Gazette along with a proposed amendment to the Judicature Act of 1978, which sought to extend the age of retirement for the lower judiciary and to increase the number of judges of the High Court by 10. The enactment of the Amendment coincides with the completion of two years of this Government. Here, I offer a brief assessment of some of the key policy and constitutional issues involved.
Democratic Transition and Constitutional Recovery
There were many signs of a new lease of political life in Sri Lanka following the presidential election in 2024. Many politicians (of a certain kind) who sensed the change chose to not even contest the parliamentary elections. An Inspector General of Police (whose appointment itself was, at the time, under challenge) was impeached, and the political discourse seems to shift towards more democracy, transparency and accountability. The vigilance of the engaged citizen (as opposed to the mere voter) was evident in the pushback which led to the resignation of a Speaker as well as a Minister.
Some may say that these changes were too little and too late. After all, the Online Safety Act and the Prevention of Terrorism Act remain on our law books and we are still governed by an Executive President. Some others may argue that these are signs of a significant paradigm shift that is underway. Since 2025, the number of investigations, prosecutions and convictions related to bribery and corruption has been unprecedented, the President’s Fund is being accessed by people on the basis of financial need and there seems to be a change in the political culture. Whether these changes may be consolidated, it is too early to tell.
Policy and the 22nd Amendment
The 22nd Amendment to our Constitution suggests that political tactics familiar to the old order of things (to the extent that that order is in our past), are re-emerging. A proposal for a constitutional amendment which is piece-meal (with no convincing explanation for its selectivity), is published in the gazette without public consultation – not even consultations with relevant professional bodies – and is enacted without bi-partisan consensus. A recent example of a similar approach is the expansion of the number of judges in the Supreme Court and Court of Appeal by way of amendments at the Committee Stage of the 20th Amendment in 2020, with no transparency or consultation and with political justification post-Amendment. Many questions arise and remain unanswered. Among the many issues that plague our courts, on what basis were these issues prioritised for reform? As in the past, the process has been opaque and rushed. In turn this has led to polarised debates which carry the risk of compromising the confidence in the Government.
Laws delays, one of the stated concerns that the 22nd Amendment seeks to address, is at crisis levels in Sri Lanka. It is certainly a concern for citizens but it is a concern along with the extremely weak mechanism for legal aid, the lack of accessibility of court procedures and the difficulties we face for instance at a police station. We have a right to know why amidst all these serious and ubiquitous issues, the government prioritised constitutional reform in this selective manner. Constitutional reform must demonstrate a compelling link between the aspirations of the people for democracy, for human dignity and the flourishing of life. If the plight or aspirations of people are weaponised by political forces or elected representatives, we carry the burden of calling that out.
My own view is that a review of the age of retirement of judges is long overdue, but whether and how it ought to apply to sitting judges, carries the real or perceived risk of undermining the independence of the judiciary. Moreover, that is certainly not the only reform that is long overdue. The minimum criteria for the appointment of a judge to our superior courts is governed by convention (sometimes in the breach), not by law. In fact, the law does not lay down any criteria for appointment to our superior courts despite the Court’s assertion in its Determination on the 22nd Amendment bill that judges are appointed on merit, ‘competence and ability to work hard’ (p 87). While procedures and mechanisms are in place for disciplinary measures for the judiciary of lower courts, there is no such mechanism for the superior courts. The rules of the Constitutional Council (a matter that has been disputed in litigation) do not provide guidance on the process to be adopted for approval /disapproval of nominations made by the President to these courts. There is no judicial review of legislation in Sri Lanka. In fact, we are governed under a constitution that provides for the enactment of constitutional amendments or law reform that are inconsistent with the Constitution (with approval at a referendum). These are some aspects that require review and discussion in relation to the further improvement of the judicial branch of the state in Sri Lanka. Many of us consider these reforms not just important but also urgent.
Special Determinations and their Scope
Generally, after a Bill is placed in the Order Paper of Parliament, any citizen may challenge it before the Supreme Court and the Court communicates its determination to the President and to the Speaker within three weeks (Article 121). When a Bill proposes to amend the Constitution, it requires approval by 2/3 absolute majority in Parliament. Therefore, if a Bill is challenged, the Court has to determine whether it also requires approval by the people at a referendum. The approval of the people is required if the Court determines that the Bill or any of its clauses is inconsistent with the entrenched clauses of our Constitution listed in Article 83. There are 10 entrenched clauses in our Constitution including the clause on Buddhism and freedom from torture. These clauses may only be amended with 2/3 in Parliament and approval by the People.
The presentation of the Bill and proceedings before Court is a reminder, yet again, of the sheer inadequacy of the manner in which the Constitution is amended or how we engage in law reform. Within a matter of three weeks, the Supreme Court is required to exercise its ‘pre-enactment’ judicial review. In this case, 65 petitioners rushed to Court to challenge the 22A bill and eight others the amendment to the Judicature Act. The hearings are conducted under severe time-pressure, including, in this instance, without a right of reply for the petitioners to the submissions by the Attorney-General. In the proceedings related to pre-enactment review, I cannot help but notice the irony of the process. At least in theory, the Attorney-General is the guardian of the Constitution and, therefore, is required to act in trust, for the benefit of the People. In these hearings, however, the Attorney-General, by and large, presents and defends the policies of the government. In theory, the government represents the people. The petitioners, too, bring to Court the concerns of the people (to the extent that they are presented by the petitioners) through counsel who often appear pro-bono for them. One possible way out of this dilemma is to consider a possibility for the Attorney-General to participate in these proceedings on the basis of the Constitution and for the government to retain its own counsel to make submissions defending its policies.
Two Constitutional Issues
The Court was faced with two constitutional questions in hearing these petitions. First, whether the petitions required the full court to hear and determine the matter since the Bill involved the retirement age of the sitting judges as well. Second, the Court had to determine whether the proposed amendment had a negative impact on judicial independence, whether judicial independence was an aspect of the entrenched clauses of our Constitution and if both those questions were answered in the affirmative, whether the Bill required approval at a referendum. Previously, the Court has determined that in reviewing a Bill, Court will not inquire into the desirability of the proposed reform but limit itself to determining whether any clauses of a Bill are inconsistent with the entrenched clauses of Constitution and would therefore require approval by the people at a referendum.
Constituting the Bench
In the Supreme Court, benches ordinarily comprise three judges, and the Chief Justice is vested with discretion to constitute larger benches of five or more judges (Article 132). In ‘the opinion of the Chief Justice’ the question involved must be one of ‘general and public importance’. The decision to constitute a larger bench may be the Chief Justice’s decision, or on the request of at least two of the judges hearing the matter or at the request of a petitioner. In the Dissolution case (2018) the Chief Justice himself constituted a Bench of seven judges.
The Chief Justice had constituted a Bench of five judges to hear this matter, of different years of seniority in the Court. Court rejected the request for a full bench on the basis that the Bench did not have a conflict of interest and that a five-judge Bench was the appropriate use of the resources of the Court, particularly in light of the fact that the Court was due to hear petitions regarding another bill at the same time. For the first time, the Court comments on the administrative functions of the Chief Justice, the difficulties in case management under resource constraints and the internal procedures of a bench when dealing with a Special Determination. Ironically, this reminds us that for several months, the vacancies in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal have remained while the President and the Government claim that they are committed to addressing laws delays.
Even if the Court had taken the view that there was a conflict of interest, as a matter of necessity, the Court had to make a determination on this Bill. The Court, in its wisdom, determined that a five-judge bench was constitutionally adequate. Yet, it could be argued, that in this context, a full bench or a fuller bench, would have satisfied all concerned that the Court had taken the maximum measures it could, to avoid any perceptions of a conflict of interest. That interest of the Court and of our constitutional system, arguably is constitutionally more important than ensuring efficiency in case-management.
The Bill and Independence of the Judiciary
The independence of the judiciary includes the following dimensions: personal and institutional; negative and positive; the actual and the perceived; and procedural and substantive. These dimensions require a principled assessment as well as a situated or contextual assessment.
‘Independence of the Judiciary’ is explicitly mentioned only twice in our Constitution: in the preamble, as part of our ‘intangible heritage’ which ‘guarantees’ our dignity and well-being and as the sub-heading for chapter XV of the Constitution. The independence of the judiciary, as part of our intangible heritage, has to be understood as a foundational constitutional concept and as a constitutional principle. In its operationalisation, the concept and the principle have to be interpreted and applied in context. This is where the contestations on the 22nd Amendment come alive. None of the entrenched clauses directly refers to the independence of the judiciary. However, in its recent jurisprudence, the Court has held that the independence of the judiciary has to be read into Article 3 of our Constitution, which is entrenched. Article 3 states that ‘sovereignty is in the People and is inalienable’ and further that our sovereignty includes ‘powers of government, fundamental rights and the franchise.’ In this Determination, Court endorses this interpretation.
The Court rightly notes that matters of policy are not reviewable by court except if such policies are vague or manifestly unreasonable. The Court determines that petitioners were wrong to argue that the extension of the age of retirement of the judiciary was an encroachment on the independence of the judiciary. Notably, the Court does not explain the independence of the judiciary as a constitutional concept except to note that the Constitution ‘guarantees that Judges will be able to make decisions free of influence and based only on relevant facts and law.’ (p 74). The Court further notes that while a reduction of the term or a reduction in the salaries of judges would undermine judicial independence, the increase of salaries of judges could hardly be considered as impacting judicial independence.
The Court considered several comparative examples in considering whether or not the extension of the age of retirement has been determined to have undermined the independence of the judiciary elsewhere. However, in each of those examples the broader constitutional context has a material bearing on the conclusions reached. In India, the selection of judges for appointment is through the Collegium System which comprises the judiciary. In the UK, the age of retirement was raised after extensive consultation between July – October 2020. As reported by the UK government, 1004 responses were received from the judiciary, the legal profession and other stakeholders. It is thereafter that the decision was implemented. It is relevant to note here that despite the lack of consultation, the lower judiciary and the Bar went on record opposing this Amendment.
In its wisdom, the Court agreed with the submissions made by the Attorney-General that since the extension of the age of retirement applied to all the judges, it was non-discriminatory and non-discretionary and therefore was ‘not at the whim and fancy of the Executive.’ (p 83) The Court reproduces a Note to the Cabinet (3 July 2026) which sets out the reasons for the Government’s policy decision. Notably, in a sector where no constitutional reforms have been made, except to require approval for appointments by the Constitutional Council, the Note provides no justification for selectively focusing on the age of retirement. The excerpts of the Note reproduced in the Determination make no reference to the other two reforms proposed.
The Social Justice Questions and Constitutionalism
For us, the constitutional questions have to be answered within the broader political context. From the citizen’s perspective, even the increase of the salaries of judges, if implemented under questionable, selective or opaque circumstances, can give rise to questions, concerns and a weakening of public confidence. Facts take colour from their context. This reminds me of another question on which there has been some debate in Sri Lanka, which is, whether Sri Lanka should establish a separate Constitutional Court which will adjudicate on constitutional matters thereby permitting a broader jurisdiction and mandate.
Some others have even described law as a colonial tool that has oppressed most in society. Some have argued that social justice requires that we marginalise or even dispense with commitments to liberal values such as rules of procedure and values of democracy such as diversity of opinion. That Sri Lankans have experienced exploitation, that democracy has been abused for state capture, through its Constitution and law, is true. As much as the law has been a tool for exploitation and abuse, it has also been a tool for liberation and social justice. Victims of human rights violations and abuse of law, often the vulnerable in our society, often have no recourse but the law. They seek it, even if to fail. Justice, too, is heavily contested and should remain so. Its meaning cannot be the monopoly of one social class, a political party or a ruling elite. At the same time, there ought to be commitments we can make as a polity to values, procedures and substantive outcomes that bring liberal commitments to rights and procedure with those of social justice. Furthermore, we must avoid the trap of romanticising ‘the people.’ We, the people, have actively sought and cultivated political patronage and participated in practices that undermine our common good, such as daily acts of violence, racism, patriarchy, corruption, abuse whether at home, at work or in the public domain.
Returning to the question of law, constitutions and justice, we should be vary of a ‘them vs us’ approach, particularly when they are propagated by those with political, cultural or economic power. The Constitution allows the Cabinet to place a bill before the People for their approval through a referendum (Article 120). Perhaps, taking this path, even if it carries a significant financial cost, may have allowed the government to put to rest the opposition to the 22nd Amendment. It is ironic that under a Constitution that declares the people to be sovereign, the only time a bill has been put to the people, was to postpone the exercise of their franchise (4th Amendment to the Constitution 1982).
Illiberal Slippage and/or Democratic Backsliding?
Serious issues of constitutional politics of this nature require that a strong government (which is what we have, with a charismatic leader and 2/3 in Parliament) is matched by a strong Opposition. What we have, instead, for the most part, are some politicians and political parties that have no credibility on matters related to the judiciary, mobilising against the government and claiming to defend the independence of the judiciary. While that tragi-comedy writes itself, we the citizens ought to be concerned about the lack of healthy political competition, an essential feature of a sustainable democracy and the disregard by the government of the reasonable voices within the Opposition.
Illiberal slippage or democratic backsliding has been identified as a risk for regimes that have led a transition to democracy. In a system headed by an Executive President, such a risk is all too real, as we know all too well. Ad hoc, piece-meal constitutional amendments of this nature place us on that path. In this political moment, many truths compete with each other. It is true that Sri Lanka made a distinct transition to democracy. It was made in stages starting from 2022. No single political party or social movement can claim that transition as their own. We cannot deny the organic dynamics of that transition. It is true that this transition has a class dimension to it. For certain, the political elite of the past enjoy diminished political capital and mileage, at least for now. The professional elite, depending on one’s perspective, too, arguably enjoy diminished traction. The ground beneath us is shifting. It is also true that within the limited electoral cycle, limited political capital, and in a context where former authoritarian forces remain electorally relevant, institutional reform is difficult. Situated in this broader context, there is cause for concern about the 22nd Amendment. It has weakened our transition to democracy and placed our constitutional recovery at risk.
(I write as an engaged citizen who studies constitutional law. The views expressed here are my own.)
Features
Why do students ‘fear’ algebra?
by R N A de Silva
rnades@gmail.com
“I was good with numbers and liked mathematics, but it changed when letters started to replace numbers”- such sentiments are common expressions that we hear. Perhaps the challenges that the students face in mathematics as a school subject are mainly due to the fear of algebra. For many students the transition into secondary education brings this profound sense of academic dread – algebra. This anxiety is more a structural byproduct of human minds adapt to radical shifts in thinking than a personal failure of the individual student. Many students who have been dealing only with numbers suddenly feel that they are in unfamiliar territory as they have to combine numbers with letters, symbols and rules. Dismantling this fear has to be done by the educators through reshaping how it is introduced and contextualised so that it becomes an accessible gateway of logical reasoning.
Let us look at the reasons for the development of the fear of algebra.
The Challenge of the ‘unknown’
In the first few years of formal schooling, mathematics becomes a tangible experience. They can count with their fingers or tools like counters and beads. They can measure lengths of tables or rooms or divide boxes or fruits into fractions. The operations are predictable and visible. There is stability in numbers as three is always a three. Algebra disrupts this stability. Letters such as x and y are introduced which do not possess fixed values. Suddenly, they are asked to manipulate symbols which they cannot physically see. This demand for abstract thinking can leave students bewildered. When a student enters this stage prematurely or without adequate background, the brain struggles to attach meaning to symbols.
Foundational gaps
As mathematics is uniquely sequential and cumulative, a weak grasp of basic skills may hinder progress in algebra. If a student leaves primary school with a shaky understanding of mathematical operations, it will be a disruption to their ability to follow algebraic steps. Solving an algebraic equation such as 3x – 2 = 10 consists of two levels of cognitive processing. Determining the properties applicable to isolate the variable requires higher order strategic thinking while executing the basic arithmetic operations requires lower order execution. If difficulties arise with lower order execution, they lose track of the broader algebraic strategy. Building confidence starts with consistent practice of foundational skills.
Fear of making mistakes
In general, a problem in algebra may involve a multi-step process unlike in a standard arithmetic problem. This increases the chances of making mistakes thus resulting in an incorrect final answer although the process is correct. Unfortunately, the traditional grading systems often rely heavily on the final result than the logical process. This can lead to an intense fear of failure. Subsequently, this threat of failure may turn into a highly stressful experience.
Now, let us consider strategies to eliminate or minimise the growth of the fear of algebra.
Using concrete examples to clarify abstract ideas
It is essential for teachers to use concrete examples to bridge the gap between simple mathematics and symbolic reasoning, rather than forcing students to jump to abstractness unassisted. A few examples are given below.
Solving an equation such as 3x + 10 = 100 can be introduced in the form of a story. ‘I went to a shop and gave the shopkeeper Rs 100 asking for three candies. He gave me three candies and also Rs 10 as balance. What is the price that I have paid for a candy?’ The gradual introduction of a variable will be made easier with such narratives.
Equations can also be framed as games of balancing on a scale to understand what you do to one side of the scale need to be done on the other side too to maintain balance. (See figure 1)
Factorisation is an area that many students struggle with. The need for a quadratic expression to be converted to a product can be shown through tiles that need to be fully covered in a rectangular area. Factors of X^2 + 5x + 6 can be manipulated with tiles as shown below to obtain the answer as (x + 3)(x + 2). (See figure 2)
With such demonstration, symbols lose their mystical quality.
Embrace mistakes as stepping stones
Errors should be treated as valuable diagnostic data by the teachers where the students are able to dissect where a problem went wrong. Creating a supportive learning environment that normalises mistakes as learning opportunities helps reduce anxiety and encourages persistence.
Assessment should also be done to reward logical reasoning and correct algebraic procedures without giving too much weight to minor arithmetical errors. Formative assessments need to be conducted regularly as algebra is introduced, before the students become overwhelmed by the complexities of cumulative assessments.
Connect with real life applications
Many students fail to see how algebra connects to everyday life, making it harder for them to stay motivated. Wherever possible, teachers can demonstrate practical uses of algebra such as tracking expenses to find the balance remaining after expenditure, estimating travel time or fuel consumption, use of recipes dealing with proportion, tiling the floor of a room and finding measurements for a scaled model of a building. Showing how algebra helps in designing games or solving real-world problems enhances interest and comprehension.
Algebra may feel intimidating at first, but it is an opportunity for students to sharpen their reasoning, resilience and problem-solving skills. When the anxiety is eliminated, algebra reveals itself as an extremely useful and elegant toolkit for problem solving. Using appropriate teaching methods algebra can be transformed from an intimidating barrier into a powerful bridge to intellectual exercise. “An ounce of algebra is worth a ton of verbal argument.” said John Haldane.
(The writer is a senior mathematics examiner of the International Baccalaureate Organisation)
Features
Two Badulla forests covering nearly 200 hectares gazetted as reserves
By Ifham Nizam
Two forest areas in the Badulla District — Mahiyanganaya Moopalana, covering 29.79 hectares, and Mahiyanganaya Heerussagala, covering 168.09 hectares — have been officially gazetted as forest reserves, bringing a combined 197.88 hectares of ecologically important land under formal protection.
The two forests, located in the Riddimaliyadda Divisional Secretariat Division within the Mahiyanganaya forest range, are dry-monsoon forests that provide habitats for a variety of native plant and animal species.
The declarations form part of the Government’s Vanaspathi forest conservation programme, under which 20 forests, covering a total of 9,538.68 hectares, across six districts, were granted protected status. The latest additions have taken the forest area, protected under the programme, to nearly 65,000 hectares, according to reports.
Environment Minister Dr. Dammika Patabendi and Deputy Minister Anton Jayakody were associated with the conservation programme.
Commenting on the significance of the declarations, Dr. Patabendi said the reserves are intended to deliver long-term environmental, ecological and social benefits.
“Through the declaration of these reserves, we aim to protect Sri Lanka’s biodiversity, safeguard water sources and watershed areas, create opportunities for eco-tourism, and preserve areas of archaeological importance found within these forests,” the Minister said.
Moopalana Forest
The 29.79-hectare Moopalana Forest is a dry-monsoon forest containing a range of natural resources and providing habitat for native species.
The forest is also linked to the livelihoods of surrounding rural communities. Local people obtain forest-based products such as rattan, veniwel and kitul, making the area significant, not only for biodiversity conservation, but also for traditional livelihood activities.
Several small waterways that become active during the rainy season are also found within the forest.
Heerussagala Forest
The larger 168.09-hectare Heerussagala Forest is likewise a dry-monsoon forest with important ecological resources and habitats for native flora and fauna.
The forest also has a direct connection with the local water system, with Nagadeepa Wewa being fed by the forest area.
Adding to its significance is the nearby Nagadeepa Temple, an area associated with archaeological value.
The protection of the forest, therefore, encompasses ecological, water-resource and cultural considerations.
The Ministry of Environment states that its broader approach to environmental management is based on sustainable natural-resource management, with government agencies, communities and other stakeholders participating in conservation efforts.
The gazetting of Moopalana and Heerussagala consequently places nearly 200 hectares of Badulla’s dry-monsoon forest under formal protection, strengthening the legal framework for conserving their biodiversity, water resources and associated cultural values.
The two forests are among 20 forest areas officially declared reserves in the latest phase of the Vanaspathi programme, which covers forests in Badulla, Anuradhapura, Ampara, Kegalle, Nuwara Eliya and Vavuniya.
For the communities surrounding these forests, their protection also represents the preservation of natural resources that support local livelihoods and water systems — while ensuring that these forest ecosystems remain part of Sri Lanka’s natural heritage for future generations, says Environment Ministry Consultant Dr. Ravindra Kariyawasam.
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