Features

The Commonwealth

Published

4 years ago

2022/07/31

Unlike UN bodies, the Commonwealth and its Secretariat do not have the same high profile in Sri Lanka or in any other country. That should not mean that the Commonwealth is an unimportant organization. The Commonwealth has its value in many fields, specially in promoting informal negotiations and contacts and in technical assistance. There are many similarities and connections among Commonwealth countries, largely in the fields of administration and governance and in education, and therefore important opportunities for closer interaction.

I have always thought of the Commonwealth as a useful institution and that Sri Lanka has the opportunity to make use of it more. Until the early 1970s, Commonwealth affairs were largely dealt with by the Foreign Ministry, and its technical assistance work was handled by the External Resources Division of the Planning Ministry. In the 1970s, however, there was an increasingly economic dimension to the work of the Commonwealth Secretariat and as a result I was drawn to it as Director of Economic Affairs of the Ministry of Planning.

My main engagement with the Commonwealth came through my participation at two Commonwealth Heads of Government Meetings (CHOGMs), the first one at Kingston Jamaica in May 1975 and the next one in London in June 1977. The CHOGM is a very unusual inter-governmental meeting. There were about 40 members of the Commonwealth at the time, and unlike other international gatherings, it is largely informal. The meeting is conducted in one language, English, and there are no translations and interpretations. That alone leads to a sense of informality.

The host country chairs the meeting, and although the meetings can be tense, there is no acrimony. The Heads of Governments meet round a table (at least those days), and only two officials were allowed at any one time to sit behind each Head of Government. There was opportunity for frank exchanges and across the table interventions and set piece speeches were rare. At the two CHOGMs I attended there were crowded agendas.

The Kingston meeting I attended with the Prime Minister Mrs. Bandaranaike, was fascinating. The Sri Lankan delegation consisted of, apart from the Prime Minister, Tissa Wijayaratna, Additional Secretary to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, N. Balasubramaniam, a Director at the Foreign Office, Dhanapala Samarasekara of the Foreign Ministry, Sunethra Bandaranaike, the PM’s Coordinating Secretary, Dr. Mackie Ratwatte, the PM’s Private Secretary and myself We stayed at the Sheraton Hotel in Kingston.

When we got to the hotel, we found that only four members, apart from the Prime Minister could stay as guests of the Jamaican Government. Other members of the delegation had to pay. Mrs. Bandaranaike was particular about the expenses of her visits abroad. She had a great sense of financial rectitude and accountability to Parliament. She told me and Balasubramaniam to share a room at the Sheraton so that the expenses will be low. I told the PM that I would prefer to go to another hotel close by which was cheaper. She said that it was not satisfactory as we have to be close to her. So I had to share a room with Balasubramaniam. I relate this story to illustrate Mrs. Bandaranaike’s frugality with public money. This is unimaginable nowadays.

As I said before, only two members of the delegation could sit behind the Prime Minister at any one time. I was the only one dealing with economic affairs, and as economic issues took up a lot of the time, I was inside the meeting room for most of the time. We were there for ten days, and during that time, the informality was such that you get to know other heads of government, during tea breaks and at other times. Talking of informality let me relate a few stories.

Pierre Trudeau Prime Minister of Canada was at the meeting, and he was in his prime. He had married a beauty, and they had come with their little child, and they were the great attraction in Kingston. That little child was Justin, now the Prime Minister of Canada. I met Trudeau many times during the Conference and became a nodding acquaintance. He was one of the most charming of Prime Ministers. He was friendly with Mrs. Bandaranaike, as he had visited Sri Lanka in 1973 and had been her guest.

I remember him in Colombo on that visit as I had to be present when Prime Minister Trudeau addressed a press conference at Temple Trees. Trudeau had told Mrs. Bandaranaike that he wished to meet a Sri Lankan astrologer and Mrs. Bandaranaike recommended one of them. Trudeau at that time was aged 49 and was not married. The astrologer told Trudeau that he will be married within the year and that prediction had come true. So when Trudeau met Mrs. Bandaranaike in Kingston, this matter of Sri Lankan astrology was referred to.

There was Mrs. Indira Gandhi, staying at the same Hotel Sheraton and we met many times informally. She left the Conference early, as her friend, Sarojini Naidu’s daughter had passed away. The others who were there were Lee Kuan Yew, Prime Minister of Singapore, Tanzania’s Julius Nyerere, Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia, General Gowon of Nigeria, Gough Whitlam of Australia, Wallace Rowling of New Zealand, and others.

There was also Mujibur Rahman from newly created Bangladesh. He was nurturing a strong grievance against Sri Lanka and Mrs. Bandaranaike, and he was not at all friendly. Sri Lanka had provided landing facilities to Pakistani aircraft on their way to East Bengal during the uprising and breakup from Pakistan. He was there with his young son of ten years, both to be assassinated within the next three or four months in a Bangladeshi coup.

The Foreign Minister, Kamal Hossain, whom we knew was also unfriendly, although he was to be friendly with me later on when he ran a development institute at Oxford. He and his wife visited us in Geneva years later. Michael Manley, the Prime Minister of Jamaica chaired the Conference with great panache and skill.

At the meeting itself, the main agenda item was the proposal for a new scheme for stabilization of primary commodity prices submitted by Harold Wilson, the British Prime Minister. This was at the time of North South tensions, and Harold Wilson was offering an alternative scheme to that of UNCTAD. In presenting this proposal, Harold Wilson took some time over it.

The CHOGM was meeting just the same week that the Vietnam war was ending and US forces were fleeing Vietnam. This had rattled the Singapore Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew and he made a long and rambling presentation (unlike his usual precise self) on the dangers of what is happening in South East Asia. When Harold Wilson made his proposal, Lee Kuan Yew at the end of Wilson’s speech, shouted at Wilson and said that if this kind of presentation from a prepared text was to be the pattern that will be the end of informal discussions at CHOGMs.

Wilson hit back and said that he had listened to a rambling, illogical speech from Harry (meaning Lee Kuan Yew) and that was tolerated. I saw them later shaking hands at the tea interval. The Vietnam war was a subject of discussion at the meeting, and there was a sharp exhange of views between Lee Kuan Yew and Mrs. Gandhi.

Sri Lanka had one matter of substantive interest at the meeting. We had presented a paper on the Brain Drain, following on our own report In Sri Lanka on the subject. We proposed that there can be reciprocal arrangements among Commonwealth countries. Briefly what we said was that the developed countries could contribute to the building of technical educational capacities in those countries which are losing skills, so that there are extra capacities to allow for an outflow. This triggered a valuable discussion on the brain drain but there were no firm decisions.

There was another issue where Mrs. Bandaranaike wanted me to brief her in Kingston. Harold Wilson had proposed that the subject of machinery of government be taken up for discussion at the traditional weekend retreat for heads of government. No officials are present on these occasions. Mrs. Bandaranaike wanted to take up the subject of Cabinet proceedings and cabinet agendas, where relatively minor issues are discussed, and large long term issues are neglected. She wanted to open up a discussion on the framing of cabinet agendas and cabinet committees. I briefed her and she told me later that there was a lively discussion.

An important issue at the CHOGM was the election of a new Secretary General for the Commonwealth. Arnold Smith of Canada was the first and the only SG so far, and he was there in Kingston for his last meeting. He had done a great job in building up the Secretariat. The new candidate was Sridath Ramphal from Guyana. He was the Attorney General and Foreign Minister of Guyana. The Caribbean countries were pushing for him. There was no contest and he was selected to be the SG which he held for the next 15 years.

This was far too long, and later, the CHOGM decided to restrict the tenure of an SG to two terms totalling eight years. Shridath Ramphal, unlike Arnold Smith, was a politician and a flamboyant personality whose view of the Secretariat was in contrast to his predecessor. He was a more activist Secretary General and saw his role as an equal to other heads of government.

Another matter was the appointment of a Committee of Experts to examine the current state of international economic relations from a North South perspective. This arose directly from the discussions on Harold Wilson’s paper on international trade in commodities. The Commonwealth had both developing and developed countries and it was felt that a consensual position could be developed within it, so that the North-South tensions in UN forums could be reduced.

Aliste McIntyre, Head of the Caricom Secretariat and an academic was appointed to head the Committee. They produced a very useful report. Alister was later to be deputy secretary general of UNCTAD during the days of Gamani Corea, and after his retirement he was knighted. When we were in Geneva, he was also there and we became family friends, also working together in UNCTAD.

When I lost my job in Colombo in late 1977, Alister had recommended me to Sridath Ramphal to be the Director of Economic Affairs at the Commonwealth Secretariat, but that could not materialize, as the Government of Sri Lanka was not in favour of my appointment.

Daniel Arap Moi, Vice President Kenya was there acting for Jomo Kenyatta. At that time, Sri Lanka had made a proposal, within the framework of tea negotiations, to establish an Organization of Tea Exporting Countries (OTEC). This was a proposal I had suggested to the Prime Minister and she was glad to pursue it. The objective was to take the tea negotiations out of FAO’s control, so that tea exporters can generate more goodwill and better and more innovative ideas.

Kenya had not been helpful with regard to this proposal. So I thought that an intervention by Mrs. Bandaranaike might help. At a tea break, during the conference, I suggested to Mrs. Bandaranaike that she has a word with Arap Moi. It was all very cordial and he promised to see what he can do. The next thing I heard about it was when our high commissioner in Nairobi, Kenya (W.T Wijekulasuriya, former Mayor of Galle) sent us a press cutting of a speech by Arap Moi in the Kenyan highlands where tea was grown. Arap Moi had said that the Sri Lankan Prime Minister had wanted to control the expansion of tea production in Kenya!

Queen Elizabeth 11 as Head of the Commonwealth was present at Kingston, and threw a glittering party to the Commonwealth Heads of Government on board HMS Britannia, anchored in Kingston harbour. Some of us were able to have a look in at the party. I remember Tissa Wijeyaratna being recognized by the Queen’s private secretary, Michael Charteris, whom he had known in his London days and he never forgot to mention it to us repeatedly.

There was a small but active Sri Lankan community in Kingston who felicitated the Prime Minister. Tony and Charmalene (Perera) Bennet were there and Tony, who is a chartered accountant had been in Colombo working with the United Nations and for some time in the Planning Ministry. When discussing cricket, Tony told me that he could take me to meet George Headley, the great West Indian cricketer, known as the “Black Bradman”, who was living in reirement.

So we spent a delightful morning having breakfast with George Headley at his simple residence. George Headley showed me some cricketing artifacts associated with cricketers like Wally Hammond and Nawab of Pataudi, cricketers of his generation. Tony and Charmalene have remained our friends and now they live in England.

The second CHOGM I attended was in London in May 1977.1 was in Geneva, the previous six weeks working with UNCTAD on the non aligned proposal for a Third World Bank when I got a telephone call from Dharmasiri Pieris, Secretary to the Prime Minister, asking me to go to London and assist Felix Dias Bandaranaike who was to lead the Sri Lankan delegation at the CHOGM. Mrs. Bandaranaike, who was to have come to London cancelled her visit, due to the announcement of the General Election in Sri Lanka.

Felix was in London at a clinic recuperating from an eye infection. I met him there and he wanted a few things done.The CHOGM in London was not as interesting and informal as at Kingston. The Heads of Government were more preoccupied and they had other business to conduct in London. We did not stay in the same one or two hotels as in Kingston. James Callaghan, who was the British Prime Minister chaired the meeting and I remember listening to a wide ranging survey of the global economic situation from Denis Healey, the Chancellor of the Exchequer.

From Ghana had come the army general who was then the ruler of that country (if I remember right, it was General Acheampong), resplendent in his army uniform. When he returned to Accra from the Summit meeting, he was shot dead at the airport, in a military coup. At this meeting, I renewed my contacts with Moni Malhotra of the Commonwealth Secretariat, who had been Mrs. Gandhi’s private secretary, and who was now with the Commonwealth Secretariat.

Queen Elizabeth, invited the officials, accompanying Heads of Government for a Buckingham Palace party and it was informal. I had a two minute chat with the Queen, and I told her that I had seen her on her 28th birthday in 1954 in then Ceylon. This made her think about her Ceylon visit and she had many questions to ask me. She had confused memories and she was mixing up tea plantations and elephants and the Polonnaruwa rest house.

Apart from CHOGMs, I had other interactions with the Commonwealth. One meeting I remember clearly is the Commonwealth Ministers Meeting on Food Production held in London in 1974. 1 accompanied the Minister Hector Kobbekaduwa and Mahinda Silva, the secretary of the ministry to London. It was a very pleasant visit and working with the minister and his secretary were most enjoyable. It was a roundtable meeting chaired by Judith Hart, the then Minister of Overseas Development in the UK. She was a brilliant chairperson.

We listened to a superb exposition on the problems associated with food and hunger by Michael Liption, from the Institute of Development Studies, Sussex who was advising Judith Hart (Lipton had been a member of the Seers mission to Sri Lanka). The Commonwealth also organized sometime in 1973 a meeting on Tea in London. Most tea exporting countries were in the Commonwealth.

I met Anne Weston, then with the Overseas Development Institute in London who was advising the Kenyan delegation, for the first time. Since that time, Anne has worked with me in many projects in Geneva and London. Anne later became Vice President of the North South Institute in Ottawa.

My association with the Commonwealth over a period of seven years leads me to the conclusion that it can be a very useful body for countries like Sri Lanka, if the opportunities are appropriately identified.

Mrs. Bandaranaike found CHOGMs very useful to her. While officials and even Ministers attend large numbers of conferences and seminars, Heads of Government have very little opportunity to interact personally, and the Commonwealth meetings were in the nature of a seminar or workshop on foreign, political and economic issues for them. For this to happen, CHOGMs have to be informal occasions.

What happened in Colombo in 2014 was a travesty of what a CHOGM experience should be. It is my belief that if we wish to strengthen institutions like the Commonwealth, then we should be actively engaged with them continuously so that we in Sri Lanka can influence and shape events, There is a trend now for institutions (the United Nations, the Commonwealth) to dominate the shaping of agendas and programmes, with little regard to the interest of less influential countries. A few powerful countries have come to dominate these institutions. There is no reason why we cannot reverse this trend.

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Features

Power crept into the Sangha and is now tearing it apart

Published

20 hours ago

2026/06/5

Thilina Walpola

A file photo of Buddhist monks engaged in a protest

For more than a century, Sri Lankan society has lived with a quiet contradiction at the heart of its religious life. On the one hand, the Buddhist monk is revered as the embodiment of moral discipline, selfrestraint, and renunciation. On the other, the modern monk has become a public figure, political actor, administrator, media personality, and in some cases power broker whose influence extends far beyond the temple. This contradiction has been tolerated, even celebrated, for decades. But recent events, most notably a widely publicised case involving a senior monk accused of grave moral misconduct, have forced the country to confront a painful truth: the institutional conditions that make such scandals possible are not new. They are the predictable outcome of a long historical process that H. L. Seneviratne described with remarkable clarity in The Work of Kings. The moral deterioration visible today is not an aberration. It is the culmination of a centurylong transformation in the identity, function, and authority of the Sangha.

To understand how we arrived at this moment, it is necessary to revisit the argument Seneviratne made nearly three decades ago. His thesis was simple but profound: the modern Sri Lankan monkhood has taken on the ‘work of kings.’ By this he meant that monks, instead of confining themselves to the renunciant life prescribed by the Vinaya, have assumed the secular responsibilities once associated with precolonial kingship, such as protecting the religion, organising society, guiding the nation, and enforcing moral order. This shift, he argued, was not a natural evolution of Buddhist tradition but a modern invention shaped by colonialism, nationalism, and the anxieties of a society struggling to redefine itself in the face of foreign domination. The monk became a symbol of national identity, a guardian of cultural authenticity, and a leader in the struggle for political autonomy. In the process, the boundaries that once separated the monastic from the worldly began to dissolve.

Transformation

The consequences of this transformation were not immediately visible. For decades, the activist monk was celebrated as a patriot, a reformer, and a moral guide. His involvement in education, social welfare, and nationalist mobilisation was seen as a necessary response to colonial pressures and missionary competition. But beneath the surface, the foundations of monastic discipline were slowly eroding. The Vinaya, which had served for centuries as a rigorous framework for regulating monastic life, was increasingly overshadowed by the demands of public engagement. The communal structures that once ensured accountability, senior supervision, collective confession, and the daily rhythms of monastic routine, were weakened by the pressures of modernity. Monks who travelled constantly, managed institutions, or lived independently in urban temples found themselves outside the traditional systems of oversight that had long protected the integrity of the Sangha.

Scandal

It is within this historical context that the recent scandal must be understood. The case shocked the nation not only because of the severity of the allegations but because it shattered the public’s assumption that the monkhood remains a bastion of moral purity. Yet the shock itself reveals a collective denial. For years, Sri Lankan society has been aware, sometimes quietly, sometimes openly—of the growing gap between the ideal of the monk and the realities of modern monastic life. Stories of misconduct, financial irregularities, political manipulation, and abuse of authority have circulated with increasing frequency. But each incident has been treated as an isolated failure, a personal weakness, or an unfortunate exception. What has been missing is recognition that these incidents are symptoms of a deeper structural problem.

Seneviratne’s analysis helps illuminate this problem. When monks take on the work of kings, they inevitably enter domains of power that expose them to temptations the Vinaya was designed to avoid. Handling money, managing institutions, cultivating political patrons, and exercising authority over laypeople create opportunities for ego, ambition, and moral compromise. The monk who becomes a public figure is no longer shielded by the anonymity and humility of the renunciant life. Instead, he becomes a celebrity, a leader, and in some cases an object of uncritical devotion. This elevation brings with it a dangerous form of immunity. Laypeople who revere a monk for his public achievements may hesitate to question his behaviour. Politicians who rely on monastic support may protect him from scrutiny. The media, which often treats monks as moral authorities, may be reluctant to investigate allegations that challenge the sanctity of the robe.

The recent scandal illustrates how these dynamics can converge. The monk at the centre of the case was not an obscure figure. He was a respected preacher, charismatic leader, and head of a prominent institution. His public image was built on years of service, teaching, and community engagement. Yet it was precisely this public stature that allowed him to operate without meaningful oversight. The institutional structures around him, administrators, lay supporters, and junior monks, were either unwilling or unable to challenge his authority. The very qualities that made him a respected figure in the eyes of the public also made him untouchable within his own institution. When allegations finally emerged, they revealed not only personal wrongdoing but a systemic failure of accountability.

Failure that is not unique

This failure is not unique to one temple or one monk. It reflects a broader pattern within the modern Sangha. As monastic institutions have grown in size, wealth, and influence, their internal governance has struggled to keep pace. Many temples operate as semiautonomous entities controlled by a single monk or a small group of monks. Financial transparency is limited, administrative oversight is weak, and the mechanisms for addressing misconduct are often informal or ineffective. The traditional structures of monastic discipline, such as the Sangharama procedures for adjudicating offences, are rarely used in modern contexts, partly because they require collective participation and partly because they are illsuited to the complexities of contemporary institutional life. In practice, this means that monks who wield significant authority can act with little fear of internal sanction.

The politicisation of the Sangha has further complicated matters. Since the midtwentieth century, monks have played an increasingly prominent role in electoral politics, nationalist movements, and public policy debates. This involvement has given them access to political networks that can be mobilised to protect their interests. It has also created a culture in which monks are valued not for their adherence to the Vinaya but for their ability to influence public opinion, mobilise voters, or lend moral legitimacy to political causes. In such an environment, the monk who is politically useful may be shielded from criticism, while the monk who adheres strictly to the renunciant ideal may find himself marginalised or ignored.

The result is a profound distortion of monastic identity. The monk who once sought liberation from worldly attachments is now encouraged to cultivate influence, authority, and public recognition. The monk who once lived under the strict supervision of senior elders now operates in a world where independence is celebrated and oversight is minimal. The monk who once relied on laypeople for basic sustenance now controls vast resources, manages institutions, and commands the loyalty of thousands of followers. This inversion of traditional roles has created a fertile ground for moral deterioration.

Yet it would be a mistake to interpret this deterioration as evidence that the Sangha as a whole is corrupt. Many monks continue to live lives of remarkable discipline, humility, and spiritual dedication. In remote forest monasteries, small village temples, and meditation centres across the country, monks quietly uphold the ancient ideals of the renunciant life. They are not the ones who appear on television, lead political rallies, or manage large institutions. Their work is invisible, their influence subtle, and their commitment unwavering. The crisis facing the Sangha today is not a crisis of individual morality but a crisis of institutional identity. It is the product of a centurylong transformation that has blurred the boundaries between the monastic and the secular, the spiritual and the political, the renunciant and the worldly.

If Sri Lanka is to address this crisis, it must begin by acknowledging the structural nature of the problem. The temptation to treat each scandal as an isolated incident must be resisted. Instead, the country must confront the uncomfortable reality that the modern configuration of monastic life is fundamentally at odds with the principles of the Vinaya. The Sangha cannot simultaneously function as a political force, a social service provider, a media institution, and a spiritual community without compromising its integrity. The more monks are drawn into the world, the more vulnerable they become to the moral dangers that the Buddha warned against.

Reform, therefore, must focus not only on punishing individual offenders but on rethinking the institutional structures that enable misconduct. This includes strengthening internal governance, enhancing financial transparency, restoring the authority of senior elders, and reestablishing the communal practices that once ensured accountability. It also requires a broader cultural shift in how laypeople relate to monks. Blind devotion must give way to informed respect. Reverence must be balanced with responsibility. The robe must be honoured, but it must not be used as a shield against scrutiny.

Seneviratne’s work offers a valuable starting point for this rethinking. His analysis reminds us that the crisis facing the Sangha is not the result of moral decline alone but of historical forces that reshaped the identity of the monkhood. By tracing the evolution of the activist monk, he shows how the Sangha became entangled in the political and social structures of the modern nationstate. This entanglement has brought both benefits and dangers. It has allowed monks to play important roles in education, social welfare, and national development. But it has also exposed them to the corrupting influences of power, wealth, and public acclaim.

The challenge now is to disentangle the Sangha from these influences without undermining its ability to serve society. This will not be easy. The activist monk has become deeply embedded in the cultural and political fabric of the country. Many laypeople expect monks to be leaders, reformers, and guardians of national identity. Politicians rely on monastic support to legitimise their agendas. Media institutions depend on monks for content, commentary, and moral authority. Reversing this trend will require a collective effort from monks, laypeople, and political leaders alike.

Ultimately, the future of the Sangha depends on its ability to reclaim the renunciant ideal that lies at the heart of Buddhist monasticism. This does not mean withdrawing from society entirely, but it does mean reestablishing the boundaries that protect the monk from the dangers of worldly involvement. It means recognising that the true strength of the Sangha lies not in its political influence or institutional power but in its moral authority, its spiritual discipline, and its commitment to the path of liberation. The recent scandal, painful as it is, may serve as a catalyst for this reevaluation. It has exposed the vulnerabilities of the modern monastic system and forced the country to confront the consequences of a centurylong transformation.

To understand how the Vihara Devalegam Act relates to the perceived moral deformation of the clergy, it is necessary to examine how property management, state law, and monastic discipline intersect in the modern era. Historically stemming from the Buddhist Temporalities Ordinance No. 19 of 1931, this act serves as the primary legal framework governing the ‘temporalities’—meaning the secular wealth, extensive landholdings, and material donations belonging to Buddhist temples and shrines. While ancient kings granted these vast tracts of land to support the monkhood’s spiritual pursuits, the modern codification of this law has inadvertently fostered a system where property rights frequently supersede spiritual accountability.

The core of the crisis lies in the commercialisation of the monastic order that this legal framework enables. By treating temple lands as economic assets and vesting absolute administrative power in individual chief monks or lay trustees, the act has contributed to the rise of what critics term a monastic middle class. Access to vast, unregulated financial resources, rent from lands, and corporate donations has fundamentally shifted the focus of certain segments of the clergy away from the traditional path of worldly renunciation and spiritual guidance. Instead, it has driven a preoccupation with business investments, the accumulation of private capital, and luxury lifestyles, which deeply alienates a public looking to the Sangha for moral leadership.

The institutional flaws embedded in the Vihara Devalegam Act find a stark, real-world manifestation in the recent criminal case involving Venerable Pallegama Hemarathana Thero. As the chief priest of Anuradhapura and the custodian of the Atamasthana—the eight highly venerated Buddhist shrines, including the sacred Jaya Sri Maha Bodhi—Hemarathana Thero occupied one of the most powerful and wealthy positions within the Sri Lankan Sangha. His arrest on charges of sexual abuse of a minor girl perfectly illustrates how the structural defects of the Act facilitate not only moral decay but also the systemic obstruction of justice.

The core of this intersection lies in the vast, unaccountable wealth generated by the temporalities of the Anuradhapura shrines. Under the Vihara Devalegam Act, the chief custodian exercises immense, virtually unchecked control over temple revenues, state-backed land management, and millions of rupees in daily donations from millions of global pilgrims. It is precisely this immense financial liquidity that enabled the alleged deployment of vast sums of money to the victim’s family.

Furthermore, the situation underscores the profound policy failures cited regarding the helplessness of the monastic hierarchy and state enforcement. When child protection authorities initially attempted to act, the National Child Protection Authority noted severe delays and institutional resistance, stating they practically had to force the police to execute the arrest. The monk’s immediate retreat to a private hospital in Colombo upon the advancement of the criminal probe, followed by his release on bail, mirrors the exact loop described where wealthy monastics deploy high-priced legal defence teams funded directly or indirectly by their institutional positions. Because the Vihara Devalegam Act does not provide a mechanism for the immediate, unconditional forfeiture of temporal administrative rights upon a criminal indictment, the accused retains his structural power throughout the legal process. The Pallegama Thero scandal stands as definitive proof that without a fundamental overhaul of how temple wealth is legally governed and disciplined, the material benefits guaranteed by ancient temporalities will continue to shield the worst elements of moral deformation from the rule of law.

If Sri Lanka can learn from this moment and if it can recognise the structural roots of the crisis and commit to meaningful reform, then the Sangha may yet emerge stronger, more disciplined, and more faithful to its ancient ideals. But if the country continues to treat each scandal as an isolated failure and if it continues to ignore the deeper institutional problems that Seneviratne identified, then the moral deterioration we see today will only deepen. The work of kings, when performed by monks, carries a heavy price. It is time to decide whether that price is worth paying.

by Professor Amarasiri de Silva

Features

Kondachchi wind farm and battery storage project to boost energy security, says Power Ministry Secretary

Published

20 hours ago

2026/06/5

Thilina Walpola

The Power and Energy Ministry’s drive towards energy security and renewable energy expansion received a major boost yesterday with the signing of a tripartite cooperation agreement for the development of the 150 MW Kondachchi Wind Power Project and an integrated Battery Energy Storage System (BESS) in Mannar.

The agreement was signed at the Ministry of Power auditorium under the patronage of Power Minister Anura Karunatilaka and Deputy Power Minister Arkam Ilyas.

Speaking at the event, Ministry Secretary G. M. R. D. Aponsu described the project as a transformative investment that would strengthen the country’s electricity network while supporting Sri Lanka’s transition towards cleaner energy sources.

“The Kondachchi Wind Power Project represents a significant milestone in Sri Lanka’s renewable energy journey. By combining large-scale wind generation with advanced battery energy storage technology, we are creating a more resilient and reliable power system capable of meeting future energy demands while reducing dependence on imported fossil fuels,” Aponsu said.

The project will be developed at Silavathurai in the Kondachchi area of Mannar on lands owned by the Sri Lanka Cashew Corporation. It is expected to utilise some 31 modern wind turbines with a total installed capacity of at least 150 MW.

Aponsu said the inclusion of an integrated battery storage facility would help address the variability associated with wind power generation and ensure stable electricity supply to the national grid.

“The battery energy storage component is a key feature of this project. It will enable the efficient integration of renewable energy into the grid and enhance overall system stability, which is essential as Sri Lanka increases the share of renewables in its energy mix,” he said.

According to the Ministry, the wind farm is expected to generate nearly 525 gigawatt-hours of electricity annually, significantly reducing the country’s expenditure on imported fuel and strengthening national energy security.

The project is also expected to contribute to Sri Lanka’s climate commitments by reducing carbon dioxide emissions by an estimated 372,750 tonnes annually.

“This investment delivers both economic and environmental benefits. It will reduce greenhouse gas emissions, support sustainable development objectives and help Sri Lanka move closer to achieving its renewable energy and climate targets,” Aponsu noted.

The project will be implemented under a Public-Private Partnership (PPP) arrangement using the Build, Own and Operate (BOO) model. The Asian Development Bank is providing technical and financial advisory support through its Transaction Advisory Services programme.

The signing ceremony was attended by Pradeep Perera, Chairman of the National System Operator (Pvt) Ltd., and Takeyo Koike, Head of Market Development and Public-Private Partnership Division of the ADB, among other distinguished guests.

The Ministry said comprehensive Environmental Impact Assessments and avifaunal studies have been undertaken to ensure minimal impacts on bird populations, nearby communities and agricultural lands. A dedicated 220-kilovolt transmission system will also be constructed to connect the project to the national grid.

“The Kondachchi Wind Farm is a strategic national project that will help secure Sri Lanka’s energy future while accelerating the country’s transition towards sustainable and affordable electricity generation,” Aponsu said.

Energy sector experts view the project as one of the most important renewable energy initiatives currently being pursued in Sri Lanka, combining utility-scale wind generation with modern energy storage technology to enhance grid reliability and long-term energy sustainability.

By Ifham Nizam

Features

Saudi Arabia sets new benchmark in Hajj management as 1.7 million pilgrims complete sacred journey

Published

20 hours ago

2026/06/5

Thilina Walpola

Ambassador Al-Kahtani

Interview with Khalid Hamoud Al-Kahtani, Ambassador of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to Sri Lanka

Saudi Arabia has once again demonstrated its unparalleled capacity to manage one of the world’s largest annual religious gatherings, with this year’s Hajj pilgrimage concluding successfully despite extreme temperatures and the immense logistical challenge of accommodating more than 1.7 million pilgrims from around the world.

In an exclusive interview with The Island, Khalid Hamoud Al-Kahtani, Ambassador of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to Sri Lanka, described the 2026 Hajj season as a resounding success, crediting the achievement to the visionary leadership of the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques, His Royal Highness the Crown Prince and Prime Minister, and the coordinated efforts of multiple government agencies working around the clock to serve pilgrims.

The Ambassador noted that nearly 3,500 Sri Lankan pilgrims participated in this year’s Hajj under the quota allocated to Sri Lanka, benefiting from enhanced healthcare services, sophisticated crowd-management systems, expanded shaded areas and cutting-edge digital solutions introduced by the Kingdom.

With Saudi Arabia continuing to invest heavily in infrastructure, technology and pilgrim services under Vision 2030, Ambassador Al-Kahtani said the Kingdom remains committed to ensuring that pilgrims from around the world perform their religious duties in safety, comfort and tranquility.

The Saudi envoy also highlighted the growing partnership between Saudi Arabia and Sri Lanka, emphasising expanding cooperation not only in Hajj affairs but also in trade, investment, education, culture and institutional exchanges.

Following are excerpts of the interview:

Q: How do you assess this year’s Hajj season?

Ambassador Al-Kahtani: This year’s Hajj season was a resounding success, thanks to the Almighty Allah and the integrated efforts of the government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, led by the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques and His Royal Highness the Crown Prince and Prime Minister. This success was reflected in the efficiency of crowd management, the quality of services provided to the Hajj pilgrims and the effective coordination among the various relevant authorities, which enabled pilgrims to perform their rituals in an atmosphere of security, tranquility and ease.

Q: How many Sri Lankan pilgrims performed Hajj this year?

Ambassador Al-Kahtani: The number of Hajj pilgrims from the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka reached approximately 3,500, within the quota allocated to Sri Lanka for this season.

Q: Are there any discussions regarding increasing Sri Lanka’s quota in the future?

Ambassador Al-Kahtani:Hajj quotas are determined according to approved regulatory mechanisms that take into account a range of considerations. The relevant authorities in the Kingdom continue to study various aspects related to developing Hajj services and accommodating the allocated numbers for all countries, in coordination with the concerned parties.

Q: What were the most prominent special arrangements implemented this year?

Ambassador Al-Kahtani: The operational plans for this season focused on enhancing the safety and comfort of the Hajj pilgrims, especially given the climatic conditions and high temperatures. Measures included expanding shaded areas, increasing water distribution points and enhancing health and ambulance services, in addition to developing the transportation system and traffic management within the holy sites.

Q: What are the most prominent digital systems and smart services that were provided?

Ambassador Al-Kahtani:The Kingdom continues to implement its digital transformation objectives for the Hajj and Umrah system. The scope of electronic services offered through the Nusuk platform and application has been expanded, along with the development of digital systems for issuing permits, managing crowds, guidance and health services. This contributes to increasing the efficiency of services and improving the pilgrim’s experience at all stages of their journey.

Q: How were the challenges of overcrowding and heat addressed?

Ambassador Al-Kahtani: The relevant authorities adopted an integrated crowd-management system based on modern technologies and real-time data analysis. This was coupled with intensified health-awareness campaigns, expanded organised movement routes and increased deployment of field, medical and emergency teams. These measures support the safety of the Hajj pilgrims and reduce the risks associated with crowd density and climatic conditions.

Q: Were there special services for the elderly and sick?

Ambassador Al-Kahtani: Yes. The Kingdom paid special attention to the elderly and people with special health needs by providing specialized medical services, assistive transportation and facilities equipped to meet their needs, in addition to field teams working to provide humanitarian support and necessary healthcare throughout the Hajj period.

Q: How successful was the Kingdom in combating irregular Hajj permits?

Ambassador Al-Kahtani: The relevant authorities in the Kingdom continued to rigorously implement the regulations and instructions governing Hajj, utilising modern technologies and advanced monitoring procedures to reduce violations related to irregular Hajj. These efforts contributed to enhancing the safety of pilgrims, improving crowd-management efficiency and maintaining the smooth flow of movement within the holy sites.

Q: How would you describe Saudi-Sri Lankan cooperation in organising Hajj?

Ambassador Al-Kahtani: Cooperation between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Republic of Sri Lanka is characterised by continuous and constructive coordination in all matters related to Hajj. The relevant authorities in both countries work jointly to ensure the provision of the best services for Sri Lankan pilgrims and enable them to perform their rituals with ease and peace of mind.

Q: How many Hajj pilgrims were there globally, and what were the main challenges?

Ambassador Al-Kahtani: According to official statistics, the number of Hajj pilgrims this year reached 1,707,301 from various countries around the world. The main challenges included managing large crowds, ensuring public safety and providing health, transportation and accommodation services within a specific geographical and temporal scope. These challenges were addressed through advanced and integrated operational plans, which contributed to the smooth and successful completion of the Hajj season.

Q: Are there any future expansion projects?

Ambassador Al-Kahtani: The Kingdom continues to implement strategic development projects within the framework of Vision 2030, including developing the infrastructure in Makkah and the Holy Sites, and enhancing transportation networks and smart services. This contributes to raising the quality of services provided to pilgrims and Umrah performers and improving their long-term experience.

Q: How are Saudi-Sri Lankan relations strengthened outside the context of Hajj?

Ambassador Al-Kahtani: Relations between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Republic of Sri Lanka are witnessing continuous development in many areas, including political, economic, trade, cultural and educational cooperation, in addition to developing exchanges between institutions and the private sector. This reflects the two countries’ keenness to strengthen the bilateral partnership and achieve common interests.

Q: What message would you like to convey to Sri Lankan Muslims?

Ambassador Al-Kahtani: We extend our sincere congratulations to the Hajj pilgrims who have completed their Hajj rituals, and we ask Almighty Allah to accept their pilgrimage. We also assure Muslims in Sri Lanka that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia places serving the Two Holy Mosques and the guests of Almighty Allah at the forefront of its priorities and continues to develop the Hajj and Umrah system to achieve the highest standards of quality and safety.

By Ifham Nizam