Features

The Catastrophic Impact of Tropical Cyclone Ditwah on Sri Lanka:

Published

1 month ago

2025/12/7

Nail heads are connected by beams. In between, vegetation introduced by hydroseeding. Soil nailing with shotcrete Facing, Improvement of surface drainage. Pictures adapted from internet.

A Comprehensive Examination of Human Loss, Environmental Devastation, and Governance Failure

Tropical Cyclone Ditwah, which blew its way across Sri Lanka between November 27 and November 30, 2025, has emerged as one of the lengthiest, destructive natural disasters in the country’s modern history. Although it did not surpass the human death toll of the 2004 Boxing Day Tsunami, which claimed approximately 40,000 lives, its scale of destruction, economic cost, geographic spread, and the depth of infrastructural collapse have collectively positioned Ditwah as the most economically devastating catastrophe Sri Lanka has faced since independence.

The cyclone’s arrival exposed not only the vulnerability of the island’s terrain, especially its central hill country, but also the alarming weaknesses in governance, preparedness, and coordinated emergency response within the incumbent administration. For days, the cyclone battered the central highlands with relentless rainfall, triggering landslides, avalanches of mud, and sudden reservoir spillovers that swept through valleys, villages, and towns with little warning.

More than 550 millimetres of rain fell within twenty-four hours across several districts, overwhelming all natural and engineered waterways and turning mountain slopes into sheets of sliding earth. The regions of Badulla, Kandy, Matale, and Nuwara Eliya suffered the heaviest toll, with nearby communities in Kurunegala, the North, North Central, and Eastern provinces also sustaining widespread damage as rivers overflowed, irrigation systems collapsed, and entire settlements found themselves submerged or erased.

In the chaos that followed Ditwah’s landfall, the human cost became painfully apparent. By six o’clock in the evening on December 2, government estimates and independent assessments suggested that more than 1.5 million Sri Lankans had sought refuge in schools, temples, community halls, churches, and makeshift shelters while reported death tall is around 500+. Though the magnitude of the destruction clearly suggests a far higher death toll, with estimates likely exceeding 1,000.

Many arrived at these makeshift facilities barefoot, injured, drenched, and carrying nothing but the clothes they had been wearing when they fled. Homes had crumbled on top of families as hillsides collapsed. Water had risen unexpectedly in the dead of night. Tidal surges along rivers, exacerbated by sudden spill releases from large reservoirs, had torn homes from their foundations. More than 500,000 families were directly or indirectly affected; thousands of houses were utterly destroyed. In several districts, mudslides buried entire neighbourhoods, leaving only rooftops visible above the soil or nothing at all.

Some of the most harrowing stories came from Gampola, Minipe, Kotmale, and Walapane, where rescue teams reported scenes reminiscent of the worst tragedies Sri Lanka has ever endured. In more than one location, entire extended families had been wiped out, leaving not a single surviving relative. Such complete erasure of households had not been seen in this magnitude since the tsunami of 2004.

The question many Sri Lankans are now asking is whether the disaster had to be so severe. Local and international meteorological agencies issued repeated warnings days before Ditwah made landfall, but these warnings failed to translate into effective readiness or evacuation protocols. Despite the clearly predicted rainfall patterns and the heightened probability of landslides in the central hills, the government’s disaster management apparatus was sluggish, uncoordinated, and riddled with political interference.

Local authorities complained that they have not received coordinated instructions from political authorities within the government. District-level officers struggled to determine which chain of command to follow during financial disbursement for welfare and support: either presidential directions or newly implemented Anti-corruption Act. Reservoir management units did not synchronize their operations, and spill gates were opened abruptly in several major reservoirs, including Kotmale, Randenigala, Victoria, and Moragahakanda.

These sudden releases unleashed violent torrents downstream, catching residents off guard and amplifying both human and property losses. In many cases, villagers reported that they heard the roar of rushing water minutes before their homes were consumed. The failure to provide timely evacuation notices or spill warnings has become a major point of public anger, with many accusing the government of negligence, complacency, and a failure to act decisively in the face of impending catastrophe.

The chief custodian of the Sacred Tooth Relic in Kandy, Pradeep Nilanga Dela, together with the Buddhist clergy, was among the first to respond by providing food and essential support to affected communities despite shortcomings in the government’s disaster-management mechanism. The Sri Lanka Army, Navy, Air Force, and Police also extended tremendous assistance in evacuation efforts, although these operations were at times uncoordinated due to the scale of the crisis.

Local communities and youth groups, including well-known YouTubers such as Kelum Jayasumana, Waruna Rajapaksha, Sepal Amarasinghe, and Iraj Weeraratne, as well as Milinda Rajapaksha of Biththalksala, the ThreePosha group, and many other volunteer organizations, played a major role in providing food and relief to nearly 1.5 million displaced people across the country. Buddhist temples islandwide have been offering profound and continuous support to these humanitarian activities.

Hundreds of university students, especially those trapped in hostels at the severely affected University of Peradeniya, received meals and essential supplies predominantly from the Sri Dalada Maligawa, Kandy. At the time of writing, several evacuation sites and affected groups are still awaiting adequate welfare assistance. The Sabaragamuwa University community, electronic media giants such as Hiru, Derana along with many Old Boys’ Associations of prominent colleges, were also among the major responders. The Government Medical Officers’ Association (GMOA), in collaboration with medical students from universities that were not impacted, established medical camps and an online counseling service to support victims. Sri Lanka’s private tuition providers, including prominent educators such as Dinesh Muthugala, along with many other community support groups, also stepped forward to fill critical gaps left by the failures in the state disaster-response system.

The impact on the central highlands has been particularly severe, with the mountainous terrain amplifying the destructive potential of heavy rainfall. The steep slopes of Badulla, Matale, Kotmale, Gampola, Walapane, and Minipe turned into dangerous channels for mud and debris. Landslides were so extensive in some locations that rescue workers described entire landscapes as “unrecognizable.” Roads disappeared under several metres of mud. Tea plantations that had stood for generations were stripped bare. Estate line rooms were flattened, and in some cases, completely buried.

Hundreds are still missing in these areas, and officials warn that many bodies may never be recovered due to the unstable soil and the scale of the terrain collapse. Survivors who lost their families wander through temporary shelters in a state of shock, clinging to photographs, schoolbooks, or items pulled from the mud—often the last remaining evidence that their loved ones existed.

Yet, Ditwah’s significance extends beyond its immediate human tragedy. It struck at a time when the country’s economic and infrastructural landscape had evolved dramatically compared to 2004. When the tsunami hit, Sri Lanka had limited large-scale infrastructure, modest tourist development, and a smaller network of modern roads. Reconstruction, though painful, did not involve rebuilding the colossal national assets that today define the country’s economy.

In contrast, by 2025, Sri Lanka had spent more than a decade investing in large development projects, much of which occurred during the 2010–2015 period under President Mahinda Rajapaksa. Those years saw the construction of highways, expressways, expanded ports, new airports, modern bridges, and upgraded transport systems that reshaped the national economy and positioned Sri Lanka as a tourist and logistical hub in South Asia. This infrastructure was designed to endure decades. Yet Ditwah’s ferocity inflicted damage that experts believe may take years – and in some cases, perhaps a generation – to repair.

Ironically, it was the infrastructure of the Rajapaksa era that prevented the disaster from becoming even more deadly. As Ditwah knocked out nearly every A-class and B-class road in the central, northern, and eastern regions, the country’s expressway network remained largely operational. The Southern Expressway, the Katunayake Expressway, and the Outer Circular Expressway served as the only reliable land routes for emergency convoys, medical transfers, and military deployments.

Without these expressways, Sri Lanka’s most affected regions would have been completely isolated, making the delivery of relief and rescue assets far slower, more dangerous, and potentially impossible. Rescue workers, emergency physicians, and the armed forces relied heavily on these highways to access the worst-hit districts. Food, medicine, water, and fuel were transported almost exclusively through these corridors during the first 72 hours of the crisis. The fact that the expressway system withstood the cyclone has prompted both relief and reflection. While it stands as a testament to long-term infrastructure planning, it also underscores the fragility of the rest of the country’s transport network, which collapsed under the combined force of rainfall, flooding, and landslides.

The disruption to education has been severe. Schools across the island remain closed until December 16, while universities are shut until December 8 due to damaged buildings, inaccessible roads, and their repurposing as emergency shelters. The GCE Advanced Level examination, which was underway when the cyclone struck, has been canceled and postponed indefinitely, leaving hundreds of thousands of students in uncertainty.

The psychological toll on young people, especially those displaced with their families or who lost homes or relatives, will likely take months to properly assess. Many students interviewed at shelters said they felt as though their future had collapsed along with their homes. Some described leaving exam halls only to find rivers overflowing, walls cracking, and chaos erupting around them. The sudden halt of a national examination -a rare event – underscores the magnitude of Ditwah’s disruption of daily life.

Economically, Sri Lanka faces a long and arduous recovery. The destruction of tea estates in Nuwara Eliya, Badulla, and Kandy poses a significant blow to one of the country’s most valuable export sectors. Landslides have ruined slopes that have taken decades to cultivate. Vegetables, which the central highlands supply to much of the nation, have been lost in enormous quantities. The North Central and Eastern provinces, which function as key rice-producing regions, suffered severe flooding that destroyed large stretches of paddy fields.

Irrigation channels, small-scale tanks, and large reservoirs have been damaged, blocked, or filled with silt. Livestock losses across multiple districts add a further layer of agricultural disruption. Economists warn that food prices will rise sharply in the coming months, export earnings will fall, and supply shortages may persist well into 2026. Reconstruction of roads, bridges, culverts, water systems, and damaged power infrastructure is expected to consume vast resources at a time when Sri Lanka’s economy is still struggling with debt, inflation, and reduced fiscal capacity.

This disaster has also forced a critical public conversation about preparedness, governance, and the apparent failures of state institutions. Many citizens argue that while the cyclone itself was unstoppable, its deadliest consequences were not. The lack of coordinated communication, delayed evacuations, and sudden, poorly managed reservoir spillway releases have drawn intense scrutiny. Freelance investigations have already begun into whether certain reservoir operations violated established safety and warning protocols.

Some experts warn that political interference in technical decisions may have contributed to the chaos. Reports from district engineers suggest that requests for controlled, phased releases were ignored or overridden until the situation became unmanageable, forcing emergency gate openings that released thousands of cubic meters of water at once. Communities downstream -some of which had no history of flooding-were hit without warning. Survivors describe hearing what sounded like “a waterfall appearing from nowhere” before torrents engulfed their homes.

In the aftermath, the emotional weight of the disaster is overwhelming. Journalists and aid workers entering Gampola, Walapane, Minipe, and Kotmale have described scenes of profound grief and desolation. Parents sit silently beside the ruins of their homes, unsure whether their missing children are buried beneath the soil or carried away by floodwaters. Elderly survivors wander through shelters unable to locate relatives or neighbours. In some communities, mass graves have been dug for unidentified victims, echoing the darkest days of 2004. Funeral rites are performed in hurried, crowded shelters as survivors try to reconcile the magnitude of their loss. Entire generations of families have been wiped out in some hillside villages, leaving only distant relatives to grieve on their behalf.

Despite the overwhelming tragedy, stories of courage have also emerged. Volunteers, both local and international, have rushed into danger zones, pulling survivors from collapsed structures, carrying injured elders across flooded roads, and working around the clock to distribute food and clean water. Medical teams have set up mobile clinics along expressway exits and in remote rural schools. The armed forces have deployed helicopters to airlift trapped residents from landslide-prone ridges.

Yet even these remarkable efforts cannot mask the sobering reality: the scale of the disaster far exceeded the capacity of Sri Lanka’s emergency response systems. The country now stands at a crossroads, confronting questions that cannot be postponed. How can Sri Lanka adapt to a future in which extreme weather events are accelerating due to global climate change? Are existing disaster-response frameworks adequate for the new climate reality? What reforms are required to ensure that reservoir management, early warning systems, and evacuation protocols function with precision and authority? And most importantly, what political and administrative changes are necessary to prevent preventable loss of life during future crises?

Cyclone Ditwah will be remembered not only for the destruction it unleashed, but for the uncomfortable truths it revealed. It exposed the fragility of the nation’s governance structures, the consequences of political fragmentation, and the urgent need for professionalized disaster management. At the same time, it highlighted the enduring value of robust infrastructure, exemplified by the expressway network that served as a lifeline when the rest of the country was cut off.

While the human death toll, though painfully high, may remain below that of the 2004 tsunami, the economic damage is without precedent. Rebuilding will take years. Restoring agricultural productivity will take seasons. Reconstructing roads, bridges, schools, and reservoirs will require financial resources that Sri Lanka can scarcely afford. But the deepest scars will be carried by the families who have lost everything, by the children whose education has been shattered, and by the communities that now exist only as memories beneath landslides and floodwaters.

As Sri Lanka begins the long road to recovery, Ditwah stands as a stark reminder that natural disasters, when met with insufficient preparedness and fragmented governance, become national tragedies of far greater magnitude. Techniques such as soil nailing with a shotcrete facing, along with improved surface drainage systems-including the construction of basin drains at valley points to collect runoff and channel it into cascade drains-are essential methods that Sri Lanka must adopt to prevent landslides in the future (Figure 1 and Figure 2). The storm has passed, but its impact will shape the nation’s future for decades to come.

Sri Lanka now needs strong international support to recover from the massive losses caused by Ditwah. This recovery effort requires close collaboration with global partners, including India, the United States, Russia, the European Union, Japan, and China, as well as both G8 and BRICS nations. Notably, India’s prompt response—along with the statements and commitments made by the Indian Finance Minister and Prime Minister Narendra Modi has been especially appreciated. Their call to initiate a Sri Lanka Rebuilding Donor Conference could play a pivotal role in the country’s recovery and long-term reconstruction. It is essential that the Government of Sri Lanka begins this process immediately, without any delay.

About the Writer:

Writer is senior academic at Sabaragamuwa University of Sri Lanka, Fulbright scholar, Indian Science Research Fellow, Australian Endeavor fellow and also visiting Professor in University of Nebraska, Lincoln, USA. His international experience in various policy events and also experience in disaster and human and animal catastrophic management during 2019-2022 is significant, He served as Chairman National Livestock Development Board during 2019-2022 and also served as Dean- Faculty of Agriculture at Sabaragamuwa University of Sri Lanka.

E mail; . magamage@agri.sab.ac.lk.

By Prof. MPS Magamage
Faculty of Agricultural Sciences,
Sabaragamuwa University of Sri Lanka

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Features

Theocratic Iran facing unprecedented challenge

Published

19 hours ago

2026/01/15

Sahan Weerasooriya

Anti-government protests in Tehran (BBC)

The world is having the evidence of its eyes all over again that ‘economics drives politics’ and this time around the proof is coming from theocratic Iran. Iranians in their tens of thousands are on the country’s streets calling for a regime change right now but it is all too plain that the wellsprings of the unprecedented revolt against the state are economic in nature. It is widespread financial hardship and currency depreciation, for example, that triggered the uprising in the first place.

However, there is no denying that Iran’s current movement for drastic political change has within its fold multiple other forces, besides the economically affected, that are urging a comprehensive transformation as it were of the country’s political system to enable the equitable empowerment of the people. For example, the call has been gaining ground with increasing intensity over the weeks that the country’s number one theocratic ruler, President Ali Khamenei, steps down from power.

That is, the validity and continuation of theocratic rule is coming to be questioned unprecedentedly and with increasing audibility and boldness by the public. Besides, there is apparently fierce opposition to the concentration of political power at the pinnacle of the Iranian power structure.

Popular revolts have been breaking out every now and then of course in Iran over the years, but the current protest is remarkable for its social diversity and the numbers it has been attracting over the past few weeks. It could be described as a popular revolt in the genuine sense of the phrase. Not to be also forgotten is the number of casualties claimed by the unrest, which stands at some 2000.

Of considerable note is the fact that many Iranian youths have been killed in the revolt. It points to the fact that youth disaffection against the state has been on the rise as well and could be at boiling point. From the viewpoint of future democratic development in Iran, this trend needs to be seen as positive.

Politically-conscious youngsters prioritize self-expression among other fundamental human rights and stifling their channels of self-expression, for example, by shutting down Internet communication links, would be tantamount to suppressing youth aspirations with a heavy hand. It should come as no surprise that they are protesting strongly against the state as well.

Another notable phenomenon is the increasing disaffection among sections of Iran’s women. They too are on the streets in defiance of the authorities. A turning point in this regard was the death of Mahsa Amini in 2022, which apparently befell her all because she defied state orders to be dressed in the Hijab. On that occasion as well, the event brought protesters in considerable numbers onto the streets of Tehran and other cities.

Once again, from the viewpoint of democratic development the increasing participation of Iranian women in popular revolts should be considered thought-provoking. It points to a heightening political consciousness among Iranian women which may not be easy to suppress going forward. It could also mean that paternalism and its related practices and social forms may need to be re-assessed by the authorities.

It is entirely a matter for the Iranian people to address the above questions, the neglect of which could prove counter-productive for them, but it is all too clear that a relaxing of authoritarian control over the state and society would win favour among a considerable section of the populace.

However, it is far too early to conclude that Iran is at risk of imploding. This should be seen as quite a distance away in consideration of the fact that the Iranian government is continuing to possess its coercive power. Unless the country’s law enforcement authorities turn against the state as well this coercive capability will remain with Iran’s theocratic rulers and the latter will be in a position to quash popular revolts and continue in power. But the ruling authorities could not afford the luxury of presuming that all will be well at home, going into the future.

Meanwhile US President Donald Trump has assured the Iranian people of his assistance but it is not clear as to what form such support would take and when it would be delivered. The most important way in which the Trump administration could help the Iranian people is by helping in the process of empowering them equitably and this could be primarily achieved only by democratizing the Iranian state.

It is difficult to see the US doing this to even a minor measure under President Trump. This is because the latter’s principal preoccupation is to make the ‘US Great Once again’, and little else. To achieve the latter, the US will be doing battle with its international rivals to climb to the pinnacle of the international political system as the unchallengeable principal power in every conceivable respect.

That is, Realpolitik considerations would be the main ‘stuff and substance’ of US foreign policy with a corresponding downplaying of things that matter for a major democratic power, including the promotion of worldwide democratic development and the rendering of humanitarian assistance where it is most needed. The US’ increasing disengagement from UN development agencies alone proves the latter.

Given the above foreign policy proclivities it is highly unlikely that the Iranian people would be assisted in any substantive way by the Trump administration. On the other hand, the possibility of US military strikes on Iranian military targets in the days ahead cannot be ruled out.

The latter interventions would be seen as necessary by the US to keep the Middle Eastern military balance in favour of Israel. Consequently, any US-initiated peace moves in the real sense of the phrase in the Middle East would need to be ruled out in the foreseeable future. In other words, Middle East peace will remain elusive.

Interestingly, the leadership moves the Trump administration is hoping to make in Venezuela, post-Maduro, reflect glaringly on its foreign policy preoccupations. Apparently, Trump will be preferring to ‘work with’ Delcy Rodriguez, acting President of Venezuela, rather than Maria Corina Machado, the principal opponent of Nicolas Maduro, who helped sustain the opposition to Maduro in the lead-up to the latter’s ouster and clearly the democratic candidate for the position of Venezuelan President.

The latter development could be considered a downgrading of the democratic process and a virtual ‘slap in its face’. While the democratic rights of the Venezuelan people will go disregarded by the US, a comparative ‘strong woman’ will receive the Trump administration’s blessings. She will perhaps be groomed by Trump to protect the US’s security and economic interests in South America, while his administration side-steps the promotion of the democratic empowerment of Venezuelans.

Features

Silk City: A blueprint for municipal-led economic transformation in Sri Lanka

Published

19 hours ago

2026/01/15

Sahan Weerasooriya

Mayor Saman Samarakoon (L) / J.M.C. Jayasekera (R)

Maharagama today stands at a crossroads. With the emergence of new political leadership, growing public expectations, and the convergence of professional goodwill, the Maharagama Municipal Council (MMC) has been presented with a rare opportunity to redefine the city’s future. At the heart of this moment lies the Silk City (Seda Nagaraya) Initiative (SNI)—a bold yet pragmatic development blueprint designed to transform Maharagama into a modern, vibrant, and economically dynamic urban hub.

This is not merely another urban development proposal. Silk City is a strategic springboard—a comprehensive economic and cultural vision that seeks to reposition Maharagama as Sri Lanka’s foremost textile-driven commercial city, while enhancing livability, employment, and urban dignity for its residents. The Silk City concept represents more than a development plan: it is a comprehensive economic blueprint designed to redefine Maharagama as Sri Lanka’s foremost textile-driven commercial and cultural hub.

A Vision Rooted in Reality

What makes the Silk City Initiative stand apart is its grounding in economic realism. Carefully designed around the geographical, commercial, and social realities of Maharagama, the concept builds on the city’s long-established strengths—particularly its dominance as a textile and retail centre—while addressing modern urban challenges.

The timing could not be more critical. With Mayor Saman Samarakoon assuming leadership at a moment of heightened political goodwill and public anticipation, MMC is uniquely positioned to embark on a transformation of unprecedented scale. Leadership, legitimacy, and opportunity have aligned—a combination that cities rarely experience.

A Voluntary Gift of National Value

In an exceptional and commendable development, the Maharagama Municipal Council has received—entirely free of charge—a comprehensive development proposal titled “Silk City – Seda Nagaraya.” Authored by Deshamanya, Deshashkthi J. M. C. Jayasekera, a distinguished Chartered Accountant and Chairman of the JMC Management Institute, the proposal reflects meticulous research, professional depth, and long-term strategic thinking.

It must be added here that this silk city project has received the political blessings of the Parliamentarians who represented the Maharagama electorate. They are none other than Sunil Kumara Gamage, Minister of Sports and Youth Affairs, Sunil Watagala, Deputy Minister of Public Security and Devananda Suraweera, Member of Parliament.

The blueprint outlines ten integrated sectoral projects, including : A modern city vision, Tourism and cultural city development, Clean and green city initiatives, Religious and ethical city concepts, Garden city aesthetics, Public safety and beautification, Textile and creative industries as the economic core

Together, these elements form a five-year transformation agenda, capable of elevating Maharagama into a model municipal economy and a 24-hour urban hub within the Colombo Metropolitan Region

Why Maharagama, Why Now?

Maharagama’s transformation is not an abstract ambition—it is a logical evolution. Strategically located and commercially vibrant, the city already attracts thousands of shoppers daily. With structured investment, branding, and infrastructure support, Maharagama can evolve into a sleepless commercial destination, a cultural and tourism node, and a magnet for both local and international consumers.

Such a transformation aligns seamlessly with modern urban development models promoted by international development agencies—models that prioritise productivity, employment creation, poverty reduction, and improved quality of life.

Rationale for Transformation

Maharagama has long held a strategic advantage as one of Sri Lanka’s textile and retail centers. With proper planning and investment, this identity can be leveraged to convert the city into a branded urban destination, a sleepless commercial hub, a tourism and cultural attraction, and a vibrant economic engine within the Colombo Metropolitan Region. Such transformation is consistent with modern city development models promoted by international funding agencies that seek to raise local productivity, employment, quality of life, alleviation of urban poverty, attraction and retaining a huge customer base both local and international to the city)

Current Opportunity

The convergence of the following factors make this moment and climate especially critical. Among them the new political leadership with strong public support, availability of a professionally developed concept paper, growing public demand for modernisation, interest among public, private, business community and civil society leaders to contribute, possibility of leveraging traditional strengths (textile industry and commercial vibrancy are notable strengths.

The Silk City initiative therefore represents a timely and strategic window for Maharagama to secure national attention, donor interest and investor confidence.

A Window That Must Not Be Missed

Several factors make this moment decisive: Strong new political leadership with public mandate, Availability of a professionally developed concept, Rising citizen demand for modernization, Willingness of professionals, businesses, and civil society to contribute. The city’s established textile and commercial base

Taken together, these conditions create a strategic window to attract national attention, donor interest, and investor confidence.

But windows close.

Hard Truths: Challenges That Must Be Addressed

Ambition alone will not deliver transformation. The Silk City Initiative demands honest recognition of institutional constraints. MMC currently faces: Limited technical and project management capacity, rigid public-sector regulatory frameworks that slow procurement and partnerships, severe financial limitations, with internal revenues insufficient even for routine operations, the absence of a fully formalised, high-caliber Steering Committee.

Moreover, this is a mega urban project, requiring feasibility studies, impact assessments, bankable proposals, international partnerships, and sustained political and community backing.

A Strategic Roadmap for Leadership

For Mayor Saman Samarakoon, this represents a once-in-a-generation leadership moment. Key strategic actions are essential: 1.Immediate establishment of a credible Steering Committee, drawing expertise from government, private sector, academia, and civil society. 2. Creation of a dedicated Project Management Unit (PMU) with professional specialists. 3. Aggressive mobilisation of external funding, including central government support, international donors, bilateral partners, development banks, and corporate CSR initiatives. 4. Strategic political engagement to secure legitimacy and national backing. 5. Quick-win projects to build public confidence and momentum. 6. A structured communications strategy to brand and promote Silk City nationally and internationally. Firm positioning of textiles and creative industries as the heart of Maharagama’s economic identity

If successfully implemented, Silk City will not only redefine Maharagama’s future but also ensure that the names of those who led this transformation are etched permanently in the civic history of the city.

Voluntary Gift of National Value

Maharagama is intrinsically intertwined with the textile industry. Small scale and domestic textile industry play a pivotal role. Textile industry generates a couple of billion of rupees to the Maharagama City per annum. It is the one and only city that has a sleepless night and this textile hub provides ready-made garments to the entire country. Prices are comparatively cheaper. If this textile industry can be vertically and horizontally developed, a substantial income can be generated thus providing employment to vulnerable segments of employees who are mostly women. Paucity of textile technology and capital investment impede the growth of the industry. If Maharagama can collaborate with the Bombay of India textile industry, there would be an unbelievable transition. How Sri Lanka could pursue this goal. A blueprint for the development of the textile industry for the Maharagama City will be dealt with in a separate article due to time space.

It is achievable if the right structures, leadership commitments and partnerships are put in place without delay.

No municipal council in recent memory has been presented with such a pragmatic, forward-thinking and well-timed proposal. Likewise, few Mayors will ever be positioned as you are today — with the ability to initiate a transformation that will redefine the future of Maharagama for generations. It will not be a difficult task for Saman Samarakoon, Mayor of the MMC to accomplish the onerous tasks contained in the projects, with the acumen and experience he gained from his illustrious as a Commander of the SL Navy with the support of the councilors, Municipal staff and the members of the Parliamentarians and the committed team of the Silk-City Project.

Voluntary Gift of National Value

Maharagama is intrinsically intertwined with the textile industry. The textile industries play a pivotal role. This textile hub provides ready-made garments to the entire country. Prices are comparatively cheaper. If this textile industry can be vertically and horizontally developed, a substantial income can be generated thus providing employment to vulnerable segments of employees who are mostly women.

Paucity of textile technology and capital investment impede the growth of the industry. If Maharagama can collaborate with the Bombay of India textile industry, there would be an unbelievable transition. A blueprint for the development of the textile industry for the Maharagama City will be dealt with in a separate article.

J.A.A.S Ranasinghe
Productivity Specialist and Management Consultant
(The writer can becontacted via Email:rathula49@gmail.com)

Features

Reading our unfinished economic story through Bandula Gunawardena’s ‘IMF Prakeerna Visadum’

Published

19 hours ago

2026/01/15

Sahan Weerasooriya

Book Review

Why Sri Lanka’s Return to the IMF Demands Deeper Reflection

By mid-2022, the term “economic crisis” ceased to be an abstract concept for most Sri Lankans. It was no longer confined to academic papers, policy briefings, or statistical tables. Instead, it became a lived and deeply personal experience. Fuel queues stretched for kilometres under the burning sun. Cooking gas vanished from household shelves. Essential medicines became difficult—sometimes impossible—to find. Food prices rose relentlessly, pushing basic nutrition beyond the reach of many families, while real incomes steadily eroded.

What had long existed as graphs, ratios, and warning signals in economic reports suddenly entered daily life with unforgiving force. The crisis was no longer something discussed on television panels or debated in Parliament; it was something felt at the kitchen table, at the bus stop, and in hospital corridors.

Amid this social and economic turmoil came another announcement—less dramatic in appearance, but far more consequential in its implications. Sri Lanka would once again seek assistance from the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

The announcement immediately divided public opinion. For some, the IMF represented an unavoidable lifeline—a last resort to stabilise a collapsing economy. For others, it symbolised a loss of economic sovereignty and a painful surrender to external control. Emotions ran high. Debates became polarised. Public discourse quickly hardened into slogans, accusations, and ideological posturing.

Yet beneath the noise, anger, and fear lay a more fundamental question—one that demanded calm reflection rather than emotional reaction:

Why did Sri Lanka have to return to the IMF at all?

This question does not lend itself to simple or comforting answers. It cannot be explained by a single policy mistake, a single government, or a single external shock. Instead, it requires an honest examination of decades of economic decision-making, institutional weaknesses, policy inconsistency, and political avoidance. It requires looking beyond the immediate crisis and asking how Sri Lanka repeatedly reached a point where IMF assistance became the only viable option.

Few recent works attempt this difficult task as seriously and thoughtfully as Dr. Bandula Gunawardena’s IMF Prakeerna Visadum. Rather than offering slogans or seeking easy culprits, the book situates Sri Lanka’s IMF engagement within a broader historical and structural narrative. In doing so, it shifts the debate away from blame and toward understanding—a necessary first step if the country is to ensure that this crisis does not become yet another chapter in a familiar and painful cycle.

Returning to the IMF: Accident or Inevitability?

The central argument of IMF Prakeerna Visadum is at once simple and deeply unsettling. It challenges a comforting narrative that has gained popularity in times of crisis and replaces it with a far more demanding truth:

Sri Lanka’s economic crisis was not created by the IMF.
IMF intervention became inevitable because Sri Lanka avoided structural reform for far too long.

This framing fundamentally alters the terms of the national debate. It shifts attention away from external blame and towards internal responsibility. Instead of asking whether the IMF is good or bad, Dr. Gunawardena asks a more difficult and more important question: what kind of economy repeatedly drives itself to a point where IMF assistance becomes unavoidable?

The book refuses the two easy positions that dominate public discussion. It neither defends the IMF uncritically as a benevolent saviour nor demonises it as the architect of Sri Lanka’s suffering. Instead, IMF intervention is placed within a broader historical and structural context—one shaped primarily by domestic policy choices, institutional weaknesses, and political avoidance.

Public discourse often portrays IMF programmes as the starting point of economic hardship. Dr. Gunawardena corrects this misconception by restoring the correct chronology—an essential step for any honest assessment of the crisis.

The IMF did not arrive at the beginning of Sri Lanka’s collapse.

It arrived after the collapse had already begun.

By the time negotiations commenced, Sri Lanka had exhausted its foreign exchange reserves, lost access to international capital markets, officially defaulted on its external debt, and entered a phase of runaway inflation and acute shortages.

Fuel queues, shortages of essential medicines, and scarcities of basic food items were not the product of IMF conditionality. They were the direct outcome of prolonged foreign-exchange depletion combined with years of policy mismanagement. Import restrictions were imposed not because the IMF demanded them, but because the country simply could not pay its bills.

From this perspective, the IMF programme did not introduce austerity into a functioning economy. It formalised an adjustment that had already become unavoidable. The economy was already contracting, consumption was already constrained, and living standards were already falling. The IMF framework sought to impose order, sequencing, and credibility on a collapse that was already under way.

Seen through this lens, the return to the IMF was not a freely chosen policy option, but the end result of years of postponed decisions and missed opportunities.

A Long IMF Relationship, Short National Memory

Sri Lanka’s engagement with the IMF is neither new nor exceptional. For decades, governments of all political persuasions have turned to the Fund whenever balance-of-payments pressures became acute. Each engagement was presented as a temporary rescue—an extraordinary response to an unusual storm.

Yet, as Dr. Gunawardena meticulously documents, the storms were not unusual. What was striking was not the frequency of crises, but the remarkable consistency of their underlying causes.

Fiscal indiscipline persisted even during periods of growth. Government revenue remained structurally weak. Public debt expanded rapidly, often financing recurrent expenditure rather than productive investment. Meanwhile, the external sector failed to generate sufficient foreign exchange to sustain a consumption-led growth model.

IMF programmes brought temporary stability. Inflation eased. Reserves stabilised. Growth resumed. But once external pressure diminished, reform momentum faded. Political priorities shifted. Structural weaknesses quietly re-emerged.

This recurring pattern—crisis, adjustment, partial compliance, and relapse—became a defining feature of Sri Lanka’s economic management. The most recent crisis differed only in scale. This time, there was no room left to postpone adjustment.

Fiscal Fragility: The Core of the Crisis

A central focus of IMF Prakeerna Visadum is Sri Lanka’s chronically weak fiscal structure. Despite relatively strong social indicators and a capable administrative state, government revenue as a share of GDP remained exceptionally low.

Frequent tax changes, politically motivated exemptions, and weak enforcement steadily eroded the tax base. Instead of building a stable revenue system, governments relied increasingly on borrowing—both domestic and external.

Much of this borrowing financed subsidies, transfers, and public sector wages rather than productivity-enhancing investment. Over time, debt servicing crowded out development spending, shrinking fiscal space.

Fiscal reform failed not because it was technically impossible, Dr. Gunawardena argues, but because it was politically inconvenient. The costs were immediate and visible; the benefits long-term and diffuse. The eventual debt default was therefore not a surprise, but a delayed consequence.

The External Sector Trap

Sri Lanka’s narrow export base—apparel, tea, tourism, and remittances—generated foreign exchange but masked deeper weaknesses. Export diversification stagnated. Industrial upgrading lagged. Integration into global value chains remained limited.

Meanwhile, import-intensive consumption expanded. When external shocks arrived—global crises, pandemics, commodity price spikes—the economy had little resilience.

Exchange-rate flexibility alone cannot generate exports. Trade liberalisation without an industrial strategy redistributes pain rather than creates growth.

Monetary Policy and the Cost of Lost Credibility

Prolonged monetary accommodation, often driven by political pressure, fuelled inflation, depleted reserves, and eroded confidence. Once credibility was lost, restoring it required painful adjustment.

Macroeconomic credibility, Dr. Gunawardena reminds us, is a national asset. Once squandered, it is extraordinarily expensive to rebuild.

IMF Conditionality: Stabilisation Without Development?

IMF programmes stabilise economies, but they do not automatically deliver inclusive growth. In Sri Lanka, adjustment raised living costs and reduced real incomes. Social safety nets expanded, but gaps persisted.

This raises a critical question: can stabilisation succeed politically if it fails socially?

Political Economy: The Missing Middle

Reforms collided repeatedly with electoral incentives and patronage networks. IMF programmes exposed contradictions but could not resolve them. Without domestic ownership, reform risks becoming compliance rather than transformation.

Beyond Blame: A Diagnostic Moment

The book’s greatest strength lies in its refusal to engage in blame politics. IMF intervention is treated as a diagnostic signal, not a cause—a warning light illuminating unresolved structural failures.

The real challenge is not exiting an IMF programme, but exiting the cycle that makes IMF programmes inevitable.

A Strong Public Appeal: Why This Book Must Be Read

This is not an anti-IMF book.
It is not a pro-IMF book.
It is a pro-Sri Lanka book.

Published by Sarasaviya Publishers, IMF Prakeerna Visadum equips readers not with anger, but with clarity—offering history, evidence, and honest reflection when the country needs them most.

Conclusion: Will We Learn This Time?

The IMF can stabilise an economy.
It cannot build institutions.
It cannot create competitiveness.
It cannot deliver inclusive development.

Those responsibilities remain domestic.

The question before Sri Lanka is simple but profound:
Will we repeat the cycle, or finally learn the lesson?

The answer does not lie in Washington.
It lies with us.

By Professor Ranjith Bandara
Emeritus Professor, University of Colombo