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THE ANTI-CORRUPTION BILL

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Dr Nihal Jayawickrama

The Minister of Justice has published an Anti-Corruption Bill. Drafted in 2018, it is described as a Bill to give effect to the 2003 UN Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC). However, it is not designed to achieve that objective in any manner or form. UNCAC, noting that the illicit acquisition of personal wealth can be particularly damaging to democratic institutions, national economies, and the rule of law, proceeds to set out in five chapters (i) Preventive Measures; (ii) Criminalization and law enforcement; (iii) International Co-operation; (iv) Asset Recovery; and (v) Technical Assistance and Information Exchange. The only reference to UNCAC in the entirety of this Bill is the designation of the Director-General (who shall not be “a convicted criminal” or a “person of unsound mind”) as the competent authority for the purpose of giving effect to UNCAC.

Asset Declarations

The Bill is 50 pages in length and contains 164 sections. The first 78 sections are concerned with the establishment of a new Commission to Investigate Allegations of Corruption. The next 13 sections require hundreds of thousands of individuals to submit Declarations of their Assets, redacted versions of which will then be made accessible to the public through a centralized electronic system. Those required to submit Declarations include even private staff of Pradeshiya Sabha members, and all staff of newspaper and media companies. Also required to do so are executives of trade unions, Army, Navy and Air Force officers, and staff officers of companies. A person submitting a Declaration is required to include the assets and liabilities of “all persons who share the common household”.

The next 68 clauses define the offences, commencing with the offering of a bribe to a Judge of the Supreme Court, and ending with bribery in private sector entities. Perhaps forgetful that section 88 permits the public to access redacted versions of every Declaration placed on the centralized electronic system, section 95 states that any person who accesses the centralized electronic system illegally will be guilty of an offence punishable with a fine of one million rupees and a sentence of eight years rigorous imprisonment.

Corruption

Twenty five years ago, Transparency International, a “not-for-profit organization” incorporated under German law (which I had the opportunity of serving as Executive Director at its international secretariat in Berlin) defined corruption as “the misuse of public power for private profit”. In that sense, the focus is essentially on the behaviour of officials in the public sector, whether politicians or civil servants, whether policymakers or administrators, through which they improperly and unlawfully enrich themselves, or those close to them, by the misuse of the public power entrusted to them. The reasons why they resort to corruption are many and varied. Some may be driven to it by poverty or the inability to match their expenses to their legitimate incomes. For others, the compelling factor is obviously avarice. Whether caused by human need or human greed, corruption has a devastating effect on the governance of a country.

Corruption involving public officials falls broadly into two categories. Conventional bribery or “petty corruption” occurs when an official demands or expects “speed money” or “grease payments” for doing an act which he or she is ordinarily required by law to do (such as processing an application for a licence, issuing an official document, clearing goods through customs, or providing a utility service), or when a bribe is paid to obtain a service which the official is prohibited from providing (such as tax evasion or avoidance of prosecution, or preferential access to state employment, housing, medical care or education).

A national household survey on corruption in a South Asian country revealed that 41% of households paid a “donation” for the admission of children into schools, while 36% made payments to or through hospital staff or other “influential persons” to secure admission into hospitals. Sixty five percent had bribed land registrars for recording a false lower sale price of a land transaction; 33% paid money to obtain electricity connections, while 32% paid less for water “by arrangement with the meter reader”. Forty seven percent were able to reduce the tax assessment on house and property “by arrangement with municipal staff on payment of money”, while 65% found it impossible to obtain trade licenses without money or influence. Sixty three percent of those involved in litigation had paid bribes to either court officials or the opponents’ lawyers, 89% of those surveyed being of the view that judges were corrupt.

“Grand corruption” occurs when a person in a high position who formulates government policy or is able to influence government decision-making, seeks, as a quid quo pro, payment, usually offshore and in foreign currency, for exercising the extensive discretionary powers vested in him or her. Grand corruption plays a significant role in four main categories of supply to government: the purchase of aircraft, ships and military supplies; the purchase of capital goods required for major industrial and agro-industrial projects; major civil engineering contracts, such as in respect of dams, bridges, highways, airports and hospitals; and the on-going purchase of bulk supplies, such as oil, fertilizers and cement, where distribution is through a parastatal company, or where there is a need for standardization, such as repeat orders for pharmaceuticals and school textbooks.

There are several reasons why, in respect of such transactions, an official may be bribed. First, a firm may pay to be included in the list of prequalified bidders. Second, it may pay for inside information. Third, a bribe may induce the official to structure the bidding specifications so that the corrupt firm is the only qualified supplier. Fourth, a firm may pay to be selected as the winning contractor. Fifth, once a firm has been selected as the contractor, it may pay to set inflated prices or to skimp on quality. While the amounts involved in these transactions may range from $100,000 to $100 million, a leading commentator with experience of Asian business dismisses the possibility of a five percent commission being paid to a senior official, a permanent secretary, a minister, or a head of state, as a “laughably low rate”.

The actual scale of corruption and the extent to which it exists in a particular country are difficult to quantify or measure in precise terms. Except for petty corruption, which many individuals may experience during their daily lives, most other forms of corruption are not immediately visible. According to an official of the Asian Development Bank, over a period of 20 years, one East Asian country is estimated to have lost $48 billion due to corruption, surpassing its entire foreign debt of $40.6 billion. An internal report of another Asian government revealed that over a decade, state assets had fallen by more than $50 billion, primarily due to deliberate undervaluing by corrupt officials responsible for a privatization programme. Studies of corruption in government procurement in several Asian countries had revealed that 20 to 100% more had been paid for goods and services.

Any decision motivated by excessive greed is likely to be both irrational and short-sighted. Apart from its direct costs in terms of lost revenue, or the diversion of funds from their intended public use into private bank accounts (it was estimated that as much as $30 billion had been deposited in foreign bank accounts by political leaders from some African countries), the indirect costs of corruption are equally disastrous. Few suppliers will be willing to absorb the costs of corruption by reducing their own margins of profit. Instead, the price is increased, or the quality of the goods or services reduced to accommodate the commission demanded.

Consequently, the ordinary citizen has to contend with sub-standard and over-priced goods and services, while the distortion of the decision-making process results in wrong suppliers or contractors being chosen, and wholly unnecessary or inappropriate purchases being made or projects undertaken. Against a background littered with “white elephants”, in an environment of uncertainty, unpredictability, and declining moral values, respect for constituted authority and, therefore, the legitimacy of government, is steadily but surely eroded.

Legal Instruments

The public expects that holders of public office will possess sufficient integrity to be able to deliver to them the services they are entitled to receive from those who govern them. In the United Kingdom, the Nolan Committee (1995) listed seven principles that the British public thought should apply to all aspects of public life. They are Selflessness, Integrity, Objectivity, Accountability, Openness, Honesty, and Leadership. Legislation incorporating these principles is widely perceived as an essential element in any counter-corruption strategy, at least for the purpose of establishing a value system that would contribute to the creation of an anti-corruption culture in the country. Indeed, UNCAC requires states parties to ensure that Codes of Conduct are established for public officials, members of the judiciary, and the prosecution service.

Eliminating corruption is not simply a matter of enacting laws. When laws do exist, they may not be applied at all or, when they are, they may tend to be directed at “small fry” rather than “big fish”, or selectively at political opponents no longer holding public office. Therefore, the mere criminalization of bribery is inadequate and ineffective. The overall objective of utilizing the law must be to convert corruption from being perceived as a “low risk, high profit” activity into one which is generally regarded as “high risk, low profit”; in other words, to increase the likelihood of corruption being detected and punished, and to reduce the likelihood of an individual being able to profit from his or her corrupt acts, whether as bribe giver or bribe receiver. For this objective to be realized, there must not only be comprehensive anti-corruption legislation, but also independent agencies capable of enforcing such legislation against all who breach it, free of political influence. Both the law and its enforcement must, of course, not infringe the internationally recognized minimum guarantees for the protection of human rights.

To counter systemic corruption, a package of laws may be required, comprising most, if not all, of the following:A law that criminalizes the offering and soliciting, and the giving and accepting, of a bribe. There is no justification for drawing a distinction between “active” and “passive” bribery. The anti-social nature of the act requires that both parties be penalized.

A law that criminalizes the possession of unexplained wealth, described in some jurisdictions as “Illicit Enrichment”. This offence introduces a rebuttable presumption that a person who holds, or has held public office, who is, or has been, maintaining a standard of living, or is in possession of money or property significantly disproportionate to his official emoluments, is presumed to have acquired such money, property or other wealth through corruption.

A law that enables the tracing, seizure, freezing and forfeiture of the illicit earnings from corruption. Such a law should also render a contract induced by corruption both void and unenforceable, and a licence or permit obtained through corruption void; and disqualify from tendering for public contracts any person, whether natural or legal, who has been convicted of corruption.

A law that requires the regular declaration of the assets, income, liabilities and lifestyles of decision-makers and other public officials who hold positions where they transact with the public and are well-placed to extract bribes. The public must have the right and the opportunity to access such declarations, and there must be in place an effective system for independent verification and regular monitoring of the declarations.

A law to identify, and prevent or resolve, a conflict of interests. A conflict of interests will arise when the private interests of a public official clash or even coincide with the public interest and is sufficient to influence or appear to influence the exercise of official duties.

A law to enable the citizen to obtain information in the possession of the state, i.e. an access to information law. The right to know is inextricably linked to accountability.

A constitutionally entrenched Bill of Rights. A Bill of Rights based on the two international human rights covenants may enable the citizen to counter corruption from a different perspective. For instance, privileged treatment secured by an individual by the payment of a bribe to a public official is an infringement of the principle of non-discrimination.

The common law principles of administrative law. These require that a public official, when exercising a discretionary power, should, for example, pursue only the purposes for which the power has been conferred, or be without bias and observe objectivity and impartiality, considering only factors relevant to a particular case.

A strong recovery mechanism under the civil law (as distinct from the criminal law). The Heath Special Investigating Unit in South Africa demonstrated that this is very effective in dealing with the consequences of corruption. In the civil court, the burden of proof is not as demanding (“balance of probabilities” rather than “beyond a reasonable doubt”). The reach of the civil law is broader and may extend to undoing “trusts” and “gifts” in the name of, or to, family members, friends, and lawyers, where illicitly acquired assets are safely lodged; while judgments obtained in civil courts are usually enforceable in foreign jurisdictions to which assets may have been moved.

Minimizing Opportunity

Unlike many other forms of criminal activity, the benefits of corruption flow to those on both sides of the equation, the payer, and the receiver. Experience, however, demonstrates that corruption can be curbed by limiting the situations in which it can occur and by reducing the benefits to both recipient and payer (i.e., by rendering both more vulnerable to detection and sanction). Therefore, since corruption takes place where there is a meeting of opportunity and inclination, a strategy to contain corruption must address both these elements.

Opportunity can be minimized through systemic reform such as: Narrowly defining the discretionary element in decision-making. Discretionary power is a powerful source of potential corruption. The wider the discretion, the greater the opportunity for corruption. While it is unrealistic to envisage, and indeed undesirable to create, a situation where the discretionary element is altogether eliminated, it is nevertheless possible to limit the scope for abuse by providing clear, public guidelines containing objective criteria for the exercise of discretion; and by instituting a swift and appropriate appeal mechanism.

Re-designing, if not discontinuing, the mass of rules, regulations, procedures, and formalities. This is the raw material on which corrupt officials thrive. There is a direct connection between the complexity of the organization of government and the levels of corruption within it. The more steps there are to be taken and the more approvals needed before a business can be commenced or a building constructed, the greater the number of people involved and the greater the number of “gatekeepers” who are able to exact a toll from those who cannot wait or who believe it is necessary to provide sweeteners. Many rules and regulations serve no broad public purpose, and many procedures and formalities are unnecessarily complex and cumbersome.

Establishing improved, readily accessible, and transparent public procurement procedures. The opening of bids should be public, and all decisions should be fully recorded. Indeed, records should be maintained to explain and justify all decisions and actions, thereby ensuring accountability.

Privatization (the removal of state-run enterprises to the private sector). Private sector accounting methods and the need to operate on a commercially viable basis are strong incentives to adopt and implement internal anti-corruption strategies. However, there ought to be sound social, economic and political reasons for privatization, apart from the need to curb corruption, since the creation of monopoly situations through privatization may bring with it other equally abusive practices.

Administrative reforms that minimize the opportunities for corrupt practices. For example, by providing rival sources of supply, such as establishing several offices for the issue of driving licences, the monopoly power of bureaucrats could be reduced. Similarly, the problem of disappearing records in a court registry may be met by ensuring that authenticated records are supplied to the litigants as well.

The “demystification of government”. This is achieved by rendering the decision-making processes transparent by, for example, publishing a tax collector’s handbook.Protection for Whistleblowers. “Whistleblowing” is the act of reporting to an authority an illegal conduct, a violation of professional ethics, or an act which endangers public health or safety. Whistleblowers serve the interests of society by encouraging lawful behaviour and public accountability and, therefore, need to be protected from victimization.

A meritocratic civil service. A civil service recruited on the basis of merit, adequately remunerated, and assured of career advancement solely on the basis of merit, is, of course, a sine qua non for minimizing the opportunities for corruption.

Reducing Inclination

To reduce the inclination to engage in a corrupt transaction, it is necessary to strengthen the processes by which corruption is intended to be curbed. These processes constitute the integrity system of a country. It is the national integrity system that delivers the checks and balances and the accountability factor that are critical to any efforts to contain corruption. The “pillars” that support a country’s integrity system include an elected legislature; an independent, impartial and informed judiciary; a free media; an independent prosecuting agency; an Auditor-General with responsibility for auditing government income and expenditure; an Ombudsman who receives and investigates allegations of maladministration; and an independent commission against corruption charged with the implementation of anti-corruption legislation. These pillars are interdependent. If one pillar weakens, an increased load is placed on the others. If several weaken, their load will tilt, and the integrity system may collapse altogether.

Conclusion

For an anti-corruption strategy to succeed in the contemporary context, it should begin with an immediate focus on the re-shaping of attitudes, not only of the people whose comfortable co-existence with corruption was rudely shaken by the recent financial crisis, but also of their political leaders. A genuine political commitment and determination to combat corruption is essential. As the section of society that bears the brunt of corruption on a daily basis, civil society is best placed to reverse the public apathy and tolerance of corruption. If ordinary people expect to pay bribes and are accustomed to dealing with the State through payoffs, a radical change in attitudes will be necessary before any anti-corruption strategy can get off the ground. The third partner in the coalition is the private corporate sector. The most compelling reason for it to be involved is self-interest: neither customer confidence nor their good reputations prevail against a rival who has bribed the decision-maker.

The emphasis of an anti-corruption strategy should also be on reforming systems, not indulging in “witch-hunts”. It is important to define the most promising areas and to focus on them. Initial success in one area will lend credibility to the reform process. It is often suggested that the key to change is the “frying of big fish”. Since it is wholly unrealistic to expect a government to make a sacrificial offering of its own “big fish”, the “biggest fish” available for frying will invariably be from the opposition. Indeed, a pre-occupation with prosecutions and inquiries into the present or the past will detract from the urgency of an anti-corruption strategy that involves legal and institutional change. It often makes sense to wipe the slate clean and look forward into the future rather than remain focused on the past.

Dr. Nihal Jayawickrama, as a Consultant to the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, participated in the drafting of UNCAC and later prepared the Implementation Guide and Evaluative Framework for Article 11 relating to the Judiciary and the Prosecution Service.



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Regime change and the vacuum:Strategic lessons of Iraq and Libya

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Post-Gaddafi Civil war: the rebellion triggered by the arab spring of 2011 soon toppled the regime of Muammar Gaddafi. the power vacuum created by Gaddafi’s ouster has been exploited by local actors, as well as extraneous actors, with the only intention of making libya a war theatre for proxy wars and political disintegration

by Col. (R) Nalin Herath

There is a question that the international community must periodically ask itself: What happens to a State after its regime has been ousted?

The question is particularly relevant when examining Iraq and Libya. Saddam Hussein and Muammar Gaddafi were authoritarian rulers. Their governments were associated with political repression, human-rights violations and the suppression of political opposition. None of this should be ignored or excused. But recognising the failures of authoritarian rule does not prevent us from asking another, equally important strategic question:

Did the removal of these regimes adequately prepare for what came next?

The experience of Iraq and Libya suggests that removing a ruler is considerably easier than replacing the political, administrative and security architecture around that ruler.

Danger of confusing regime change with State reconstruction

A state is more than its leader. It consists of institutions, security forces, civil servants, courts, political structures, infrastructure, economic systems and, perhaps most importantly, an accepted monopoly over the legitimate use of force. When an authoritarian system has concentrated enormous power around one individual, removing that individual can expose weaknesses that were previously hidden. The strategic mistake is to assume that once the dictator has gone, a democratic and stable state will naturally emerge. History does not support such an assumption. The aftermath of Iraq demonstrates this particularly clearly. Following the 2003 invasion, the Coalition Provisional Authority issued Order No. 2, formally dissolving the Iraqi Ministry of Defence and the Iraqi Army, among other security institutions. A US congressional report later documented the enormous consequences of this decision, including the disappearance of hundreds of thousands of military personnel from the institutional framework of the state. Whatever the intentions behind the decision, the strategic consequence was that an established security structure had to be rebuilt while the country was simultaneously experiencing political upheaval and growing violence. That is a dangerous combination.

Iraq: Removing the structure before building the replacement

Saddam Hussein’s government was unquestionably authoritarian. It also reflected a complicated sectarian and political structure in which members of the Sunni minority occupied disproportionate positions of power despite being a demographic minority. But the question for strategic planners should not simply be whether Saddam deserved to remain in power. The question should have been:

What institutional structure would replace the system once he was removed?

An army can be politically controlled without being politically representative. A bureaucracy can serve an authoritarian government while still providing essential state functions. A security institution can be reformed without necessarily being destroyed. The distinction between reforming institutions and eliminating institutions is therefore critical. The post-2003 experience demonstrated the consequences of institutional disruption. Security vacuums contributed to insurgency and instability, while the process of rebuilding Iraq’s security forces took place amid an increasingly deteriorating security environment. The lesson is not that authoritarian institutions should never be reformed. The lesson is that state capacity should not be casually destroyed without a credible replacement.

Libya: prosperity, authoritarianism and institutional fragility

Libya presents an even more complicated case. Gaddafi’s government was authoritarian and deeply personalised. Political freedom was severely restricted, and the security apparatus was deliberately structured around regime survival. Yet Libya, under Gaddafi, also used substantial oil revenues to fund education, healthcare, infrastructure and social services. World Bank data from around the end of the Gaddafi era show life expectancy reaching approximately 75 years by 2011, skilled attendance at birth at 100 percent and measles immunisation at 98 percent. This does not prove that Gaddafi’s system was politically legitimate. It demonstrates something different: economic and social outcomes can coexist with authoritarian political structures.

The Great Man-Made River illustrates the scale of Libya’s investment ambitions. The World Bank described the project as one of the world’s largest engineering schemes, involving thousands of kilometres of planned pipelines to transport water from deep desert aquifers toward the populated coastal belt. The original project was estimated at approximately US$ 25 billion over several phases. Again, this should not become nostalgia for dictatorship. It should become a lesson in state capacity.

What happened after Gaddafi?

The post-2011 experience is perhaps the clearest illustration of the vacuum problem. Libya did not simply move from dictatorship to a consolidated democratic state. Instead, competing armed groups, political factions and institutions emerged. A UN economic and social affairs analysis concluded that the fall of the Gaddafi regime exposed weak state institutions and that the post-Gaddafi period was characterised by the proliferation of armed militias and institutional fragmentation.

The World Bank has similarly described how the security vacuum allowed armed groups to expand, while attempts to integrate them into the formal security apparatus produced a hybrid system in which state institutions and powerful armed groups operated alongside one another. This is the heart of the lesson. The consequences of regime change were also evident in Libya. The 2012 Benghazi attack, later portrayed in 13 Hours: The Secret Soldiers of Benghazi, illustrated the security vacuum that emerged after Gaddafi’s fall. The collapse of central authority allowed militias and competing armed groups to fill the space left by weakened state institutions. The lesson is clear: removing a regime may achieve military victory, but without a credible plan to rebuild the state, victory can quickly become a security vacuum.

When the state withdraws, something else occupies the space. If the replacement is not a legitimate national institution, the vacuum can be filled by militias, tribes, ideological movements, criminal networks or competing political authorities. The vacuum does not remain empty.

Terrorism question

There is another uncomfortable issue. Authoritarian regimes frequently suppress political and armed movements through coercive security systems. When those systems disappear abruptly, previously contained organisations can find new operating space. This does not mean that dictatorship is an appropriate method of counterterrorism. It means that counterterrorism cannot be separated from State capacity. The international community therefore needs to distinguish between defeating a particular terrorist organisation and maintaining the institutional conditions that prevent multiple armed actors from competing for power. The destruction of one regime does not automatically eliminate the forces that created insecurity. Sometimes it creates an environment in which those forces multiply.

Strategic mistake: winning the war but losing the peace

Military intervention can have a clearly defined operational objective. State reconstruction does not. A military campaign may successfully remove a government in weeks or months. Building legitimate institutions can take decades.This creates a fundamental strategic asymmetry. The shorter the planning horizon for intervention, the greater the danger of a long-term vacuum. The international community therefore needs to think beyond the first question: How do we remove the regime?

It must ask: Who governs the country the next morning? Who controls the borders? Who controls the security forces? Who pays government employees? Who maintains electricity, water and hospitals? Who protects critical infrastructure? Who administers justice? Who prevents armed groups from becoming alternative governments? Who provides political legitimacy? And perhaps most importantly: Who possesses the authority to enforce the decisions of the new state? If there are no convincing answers, regime change is only the beginning of the problem.

The lesson should not be that the United States or its allies should never intervene. Nor should it be that Saddam Hussein or Muammar Gaddafi should be rehabilitated as models of governance. The lesson is more practical. Regime change must never be confused with state-building.

Before dismantling an established political order, external powers need a credible understanding of the institutions that will replace it. Security-sector reform should normally distinguish between individuals who must be removed and institutions that must be preserved. A national army may need reform. A ministry may need restructuring. A security service may need accountability and civilian oversight. But destroying institutional capacity without having an operational replacement can create consequences far beyond the original objective.

Wider geopolitical lesson

The consequences of Iraq and Libya did not remain within their borders. State fragmentation affects neighbouring countries, migration, organised crime, arms trafficking, terrorism, energy markets and regional power competition. In today’s interconnected world, a failed transition in one country can become a security problem for an entire region. That is why intervention planning should include not only military objectives but also political, economic, humanitarian and security-sector objectives. The most important planning document may therefore not be the operational plan for removing the regime. It may be the plan for Day One after the regime has disappeared.

History should not be written as a simple choice between dictatorship and democracy. The real strategic challenge is more complicated. Saddam Hussein and Muammar Gaddafi were dictators. Their governments committed serious abuses, and their populations had legitimate grievances. But the failures of authoritarian rule do not automatically justify the destruction of state institutions without a credible plan for rebuilding them. The experience of Iraq and Libya demonstrates a fundamental principle of international security: A political vacuum is not neutral space. Someone will fill it. If legitimate national institutions cannot fill that space, armed groups, sectarian interests, extremist organisations or foreign-backed factions may do so. The ultimate lesson for the United States, its allies and the wider international community is therefore straightforward:

Removing a regime may win the immediate battle. Building a legitimate, functioning and secure state determines whether the intervention succeeds in the long term. The world should learn to ask not only “How do we remove the dictator?”. It must also ask:

“What happens to the country when he is gone?”

That may be the most important strategic question of all.

(The writer is the Secretary General of the Ceylon Chamber of Shipping, former Director General of the Institute of National Security Studies (INSS), and former Spokesman of the Ministry of Defence. He is also a Non-Resident Fellow at the London Dialogue. His areas of expertise include international relations, geopolitics, maritime affairs, national security, economic policy, and strategic governance. He is a consultant at JITT Group and a member of World Pace Board.).

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‘Death at the Sign of the Rook’

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Tales of Mystery and Suspense – 23

By Prof. Rajiva Wijesinha

As I have noted with regard to the adventures of John Rebus, I am indebted to Dinali Fernando and her husband Steve for whole hosts of thrillers. The latter strongly recommended Kate Atkinson when I borrowed four books. I wondered about this, for I had not been too impressed with her debut novel, Behind the Scenes at the Museum, which was amongst the entries I had to judge for the Eurasian section of the Commonwealth Writing Prize. Two decades later, I had forgotten what it had been about.

But I am glad Steve persuaded me to read her. Kate Atkinson is distinctively British, and Death at the Sign of the Rook is set in a country house and the surrounding village, and seems a modern descendant of the laidback Agatha Christies I so much enjoy.

There are, however, many differences in that we have a policeman who can go rogue, like Rebus, with again a female sidekick who has a mind of her own, again like Rebus. But Jackson Brodie has retired and set up as a private investigator, while Reggie, a young lady, is still in the police.

There is a lesbian couple living in the converted dairy of the manor house, as has occurred in Agatha Christie too, in A Murder is Announced. But they are peripheral to the story, unlike Ben, the brother of one of them who left the army after losing a leg in Afghanistan. When he turns up at the Manor House to shelter from a snowstorm, along with its chatelaine, Lady Milton, he is asked to answer the door as various characters turn up, including Jackson and Reggie, who then starts fantasising about him.

The others who turn up are two couples, one from America, who have paid for a murder weekend at the hotel. The family is impoverished, and has sold lots of pictures to survive, but most recently a Turner had been stolen, almost certainly by Lady Milton’s housekeeper Sophie, who vanished one night along with the picture. Reggie had been involved in that investigation, but there had been no trace of either picture or young lady.

Jackson Brodie suspects a connection between that theft and the one he has been called in to investigate, which has not been reported to the police. The picture hung opposite the bed of an old woman whose carer vanished after she died, along with it. Her children, adopted twins, have asked Jackson to investigate and also try to trace the carer, though he suspects something strange in that they did not go to the police.

Kate Atkinson

Brodie, in studying the stolen art, is also struck by the disappearance of a Rembrandt from a house in Scotland, along with a member of the cleaning staff. He thinks the three women might be the same one.

But Brodie’s assumption that the three women who vanished when valuable pictures did were identical would not have helped except that Beatrice, as she was also called, kept turning up, including to the funeral home where the old lady’s body was kept. And then that picture turned up, in the village church, and was found by the local vicar, Simon Cate, whose life story is also a prominent feature of the novel. He was an aspiring actor but then smitten by faith, and became a priest, but in time he lost his faith. His wife left him after the death of their son, and he is now in this backwater, where he feels he is of no use to anyone. But he has a great feel for living beings, and his most successful service has been one in which he blessed pets. And he was deeply concerned about the bees that Ben looks after for his sister and her wife.

He too staggers into the manor house in the midst of the storm, in which everyone concerned loses their way comprehensively. But amongst those Ben lets in is a man in a tracksuit with cuts and bruises, who then vanishes after he has been led to a bedroom, when Ben went in search of brandy. We soon work out that it is the escaped murderer about whom Reggie has been alerted.

Simon also turns up, through the back door, carrying the picture and also a gun, for he has found the dead body of one of his parishioners when he went to her house in search of his mobile phone. She had been shot and he had picked up the gun he found there. But he could not tell the police, for though he called he had lost his voice, and for the last few days had communicated only through writing.

This chaotic mix of characters at the manor house is further complicated by the group of players putting on the murder mystery play though some members have either cried off or died before reaching the venue. So, there is much doubling up and confusion over who is an actor and who is not.

The grand now largely empty rooms of the manor house, and its various odd passages and multiple doors, make it a splendid set for the lunacy that runs on and on. Reggie finds herself in a pantry Atkinsonwith a dead body, though this turns out to be the nanny who fell down the stairs and was put there by Lady Milton’s younger son. And there is high drama on the roof when the murderer nearly kills Ben, but he is saved by Reggie, and when he tries to kill Brody with an axe, he is shot by Beatrice, who has been the maid who served at the dinner before the murder mystery play, and explains to Brody how she has managed all her thefts.

And then in the melee, she vanishes on a motorbike, along with the daughter of the old lady’s adopted daughter, the only person who seemed to grieve at the funeral, and to whom the old lady had left her house in a codicil to her will, which her children have not known about. She leaves the picture to the carer, but it is brought to Simon Cate as he lies in hospital, recovering from a heart attack which adds confusion to the play.

Wonderfully convoluted, but all very clear, despite the headlong pace of the book and its shifts from one scene to another, from one character to another (or rather combinations of them) and from one-time span to another. A writer and a detective well worth looking out for. e more books by her on Dinali’s shelves.

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Safety, security and teamwork in aviation

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Indian Captain Smit Machchhar injured in the cockpit attack

by Capt. (Ret.).G.A. Fernando, MBA

There are three essential components to a commercial airline operation: safety, security and teamwork.

Aviation and teamwork at the ‘sharp’ end of a commercial aircraft, i.e. the flight deck, is unique. Unlike many other teams, it may be quite literally the first and the last time a particular combination of small teams of two, three, or four individual airmen (or women) will fly together. Sometimes even in the same airline that employs them.

Therefore, to make conditions safe and practical, while understanding and trusting tech other, they have to rely on a series of Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs), and ‘Normal’ and ‘Emergency’ checklists for every conceivable situation. That is, to be able to do the right things, and do things right. In fact, there is a saying in aviation to the effect that ‘if you make a mistake in aviation, be original and make a new one’.

To ensure that safety standards are constantly maintained, airline pilots’ proficiency is tested every six months, in simulators, under the supervision of examiners from the civil aviation regulator. In Sri Lanka that organisaton is the Civil Aviation Authority-Sri Lanka (CAASL). Three simulator checks are conducted every 12 months in keeping with the tenet that ‘practice makes perfect’. A pithy adage not confined to the world of aviation warns that ‘prior preparation prevents piss-poor performance’.

The simulator exercises include rejected takeoffs, including in cross-wind situations, landings, engine fires and/or engine failures from a variety of causes, cabin pressurisation failure, precision and non-precision approaches, and landings in bad visibility – amongst other conditions that could be expected in actual flight.

In addition, a flight in a real airplane, on a regular passenger service under the supervision of an examiner from the airline, is undertaken to ensure that the company’s standard practices and procedures are carried out and maintained as prescribed in the airline’s manuals. These publications are in turn approved by the national regulator.

Crash axe

Finally, flight crew members must take a written test annually, on emergency equipment locations and procedures, with 90% as the pass mark.

Since the mid-1980s it has been mandatory for airline pilots to undertake a Crew Resource Management (CRM) programme once every two years. This training essentially emphasises what to do and what not to do to, in a specific emergency situation, or even during normal operations, to make the team cohesive and effective. During the course, the CRM facilitators discuss recent incidents and accidents that have occurred. Results of those events are recorded and could be retrieved, when necessary, by the official aviation bodies.

Not unexpectedly, it is demanding on a pilot to fulfill these requirements on a regular basis throughout his/her career, along with presenting for a bi-annual medical examination, all with the objective of retaining one’s licence to operate an aircraft. It may not be understood, therefore, by persons outside the aviation industry, or even some working in other aspects of an airline organisation, that it is often the passion for flight that keeps many pilots doing what they do to earn a living.

Security

Another important factor is the challenge of maintaining security in all aspects of airline operations, not least in the cockpit. The challenges are many, with new ones surfacing almost every day. It is therefore essential to be always prepared for the activities and ‘methods’ of perpetrators seeking to wreak evil on an aircraft and its occupants. As it is impossible for any airline or national security organisation to cover all aspects, systematic management of risks to effect a safe outcome becomes imperative.

Flydubai Incident

In the recent Flydubai incident of 30 September, 2026, a first officer (co-pilot) attacked the captain of the flight with a crash axe to accomplish his sinister motives, into which investigations are continuing. For the time being, it prompts the questions: should the crash axe be easily accessible to the flight crew? Or even be there at all? I believe it is a case of assessing the greater risk.

With regard to that event, and the circumstances that led to it, other deterrents could have been applied more thoroughly. For example, more thorough screening of pilots’ and other crewpersons’ backgrounds, with emphasis on their mental health, ideological affiliations and previous employment history. Separately, during a time of conflict in the Middle East, should Flydubai have even been operating between Dubai and Tel Aviv? Notwithstanding that cost-cutting and profit maximisation are key aims of any business, an airline’s apparent failure to conduct adequate psychological profiling of flight crew members, while continuing to operate ‘profitable’ routes, regardless of potential danger, can only be regarded and condemned as greed and disregard for human lives.

( Captain. Fernando, RCyAF, SLAF, Air Ceylon, Air Lanka, Singapore Airlines (SIA), SriLankan Airlines, Former Chief Pilot, Air Lanka Boeing 737, Former Deputy Chief Pilot, Lockheed L 1011, Former Crew Resource Management (CRM) Facilitator, SIA, Former Deputy Director (Air Operations) CAASL, Former President, Aircraft Owners and Operators Association Sri Lanka (AOAOASL), President, The Colombo Flying Club, Representative for Aviation, Organisation of Professional Associations (OPA), Hony, and Member Sri Lanka Society of Transport and Logistics.)

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