Features
Serious flaws in Geneva resolution
By Neville Ladduwahetty
Resolution A/HRC/46/L.Rev.1 dated 16 March 2021 has been adopted by the UN Human Rights Council based on procedures and practices adopted by Committees of the General Assembly. Of the 47 Members in the Council, 22 Member States cast an affirmative vote, 11 members opposed it, and 14 abstained. The procedure adopted does not recognize the number of votes that abstained. Therefore, adoption of the Resolution was based on 22 affirmative votes, which is less than half the 47-members in the Council. This outcome should be a cause to fault the Council for adopting a procedure that permits a Resolution to be adopted even when more than half of its members decided not to support it for whatever reason.
However, other agencies of the UN adopt other procedures. For instance, the 15-member Security Council requires nine affirmative votes for a decision to be adopted. Others who see a moral obligation to the institution they represent require half plus one for a decision to be adopted. Simple majorities in most Parliaments require half plus one of its elected members for a Bill to become Law. Therefore, there is nothing comical if perceived from another perspective, that the resolution did not secure a majority of the 47 Member Human Rights Council and furthermore, that 25 Members did not affirmatively support the Resolution. The lesson, in particular for the Human Rights Council, is that the basis for adopting a Resolution should be revisited, because the current practice allows Resolutions to be adopted by less than half the number in the Council. This is not good enough a threshold for a UN institution as vital as the Human Rights Council where much is at stake for all States.
Notwithstanding all of the above, the hard reality is that the Resolution was adopted. Another hard reality that is of serious consequence is that the adoption of the Resolution comes at a great cost to the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter. In fact, having stated at the very outset that the Resolution is “Guided by the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations …” the Resolution goes on to violate Article 1(2) and Article 2(7) of the Charter. In addition, it recalls co-sponsored Resolutions of 2015, 2017, and 2019, despite withdrawal from co-sponsorship because they violate Sri Lanka’s Constitution; a right granted under the Vienna Convention and furthermore, violates the mandate granted to the Human Rights Council under General Assembly Resolution 60/251. Under these circumstances, such a flawed Resolution should not be adopted, particularly with votes less than half the membership in the Council.
Article 1(2) states: “To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples…”. AND Article 2(7) states: “Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state…”.
Article 1(2): Right of Self-Determination
The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights AND the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights state in Article 1 of their respective Covenants:
“All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development”.
In view of the people’s right to freely determine its political status, the Resolution of the Core-Group states: “…to ensure that all provincial councils, including the northern and eastern provincial councils, are able to operate effectively, in accordance with the thirteenth amendment to the Constitution of Sri Lanka” (Preamble to the Resolution)
COMMENT: This is a violation of the right of self-determination of a people to freely administer and govern themselves because it binds the people of Sri Lanka to a particular form of internal Government, and denies them the opportunity to self-determine a form of Local Government that best serves them. Therefore. this provision amounts to a denial of the fundamental freedom of a Peoples to govern themselves under a form of Government of their choosing. For the Human Rights Council to impose restrictions on how a Member State should govern itself is a denial of their fundamental right to self-determination.
The Preamble states: “Noting the enactment of the twentieth amendment to the Constitution of Sri Lanka, while stressing the importance of democratic governance and independent oversight of key institutions”.
COMMENT: The need to remind the people of Sri Lanka the “importance of democratic governance and oversight key institutions” is an insult in view of the fact that the amendment is a product the people of Sri Lanka have determined in keeping with their right of self-determination. Furthermore, Sri Lanka is not the only country to function under a Presidential system of government under provisions of separation of power and the internal arrangements in each are different as they are with the systems of governance in each state that supported the Resolution. Under the circumstances, the need to draw special attention to arrangements in Sri Lanka is a slur on what Sri Lanka has rightfully determined for itself.
It is indeed comical for the U.K. as the sponsor of the Resolution to “stress the importance of democratic governance”, when three-fourths (¾) of U.K. Parliament was for staying in the European Union whereas the majority of the people of U.K. wanted to leave the EU, thus laying bare the U.K.’s deficit in democratic governance.
Article 2(7): Domestic Jurisdiction
Section 2 of the Resolution states: “…implement the recommendations made by the Office and to give due consideration to the recommendations made by the special procedures ….”
Section 7 of the Resolution ‘expresses serious concern at the trends emerging over the past year, which represent a clear early warning sign of a deteriorating situation of human rights in Sri Lanka, including the accelerating militarization of civilian government functions; the erosion of the independence of the judiciary and key institutions; ongoing impunity and political obstruction; policies that adversely affect the right to freedom of religion or belief; increased marginalization of persons belonging to the Tamil and Muslim communities; surveillance and intimidation of civil society; restrictions on media; freedom, and shrinking democratic space; arbitrary detentions; alleged torture and sexual and gender-based violence’.
COMMENT: Section 7 of the Resolution is influenced by the Report of the Office of the High Commissioner. It contains comments and observations that violate provisions of Article 2(7) of the UN Charter in respect of issues that are “essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state” cited above.
Unlike under normal circumstances, the literal interpretation of Article 2(7) that prohibits UN from intervening in issues domestic as enunciated by Professor Kelsen and others of similar view, is justified under the extremely extraordinary background that Sri Lanka and the rest of mankind had to face due to the COVID-19 pandemic. This view was underscored by the UN when it decided NOT to intervene in issues domestic relating to how member states coped with the COVI-19 pandemic. What the Resolution addressed instead was the situation that prevailed in Sri Lanka in the background of a terrorist attack by Muslim extremists in 2019, and the measures adopted to cope with the pandemic in the absence of international guidelines that the UN should have spearheaded.
The extraordinary circumstances referred to above started with a new President being elected in November 2019. A bare two months later, starting January 2020, Sri Lanka encountered its first COVID-19 patient. Until August 2020 when a new Parliament was elected, it was the Executive that had to deal with the unprecedented challenges of COVID-19 pandemic.
In fact, most countries were at a loss as to what strategies to adopt to deal with the pandemic. Furthermore, a fact that should not be overlooked is that during the period of review by the Council, the Legislative and Executive Branches of the government in Sri Lanka had existed only for four months.
At the end of the day, governments have to make hard choices. In the background of a raging pandemic the choice is whether to implement strict controls by deploying personnel known for their ability to ensure strict adherence to health guidelines, or to relax them. Those countries that have decided to leave it to individuals as a matter of individual choice have experienced far more deaths than countries such as Sri Lanka that decided otherwise. Are they guilty of fratricide? To fault elected representatives for the choices they made in the fulfillment of their responsibilities to their people, is to place individual choice at a premium over state-initiated guidelines to contain a global crisis. Not to recognize the positive results in terms of lives saved because of the measures adopted by the government is not to recognize the most fundamental of all human rights which is right to life.
The impression conveyed upon perusing the list of societal shortcomings cited in Section 7 is that they are unique to Sri Lanka. On the other hand, over the span of one year there would be instances of societal shortcomings similar to those cited in Section 7, in every country. For instance, in other countries too, policies exist that affect freedom of religion or belief; marginalization of persons or groups; restrictions on media freedom; shrinking democratic space; sexual and gender-based violence etc. Such shortcomings exist, albeit to different degrees, in all of the 22 countries that supported the Resolution despite the existence of independent institutions, or how liberal and democratic their policies are. Therefore, what is so special or unique about Sri Lanka for it to deserve special attention?
Mandate of the Human Rights Council
Section 6 of the Resolution states: “Recognizes the importance of preserving and analyzing evidence relating to violations and abuses of human rights and related crimes in Sri Lanka…and to develop possible strategies for future accountability processes for gross violations of human rights or serious violations of international humanitarian law…and to support relevant judicial proceedings in Member States with competent jurisdiction”.
COMMENT: The Human Rights Council has NO MANDATE nor the COMPETENCE to collect evidence relating to international humanitarian law or to support judicial proceedings in Member States. The Council is expected to function within the mandate stated in UN Resolution 60/251. The relevant provisions are:
3. Decides also that the Council should address situations of violations of human rights, including gross and systematic violations, and make recommendations thereon. It should also promote the effective coordination and the mainstreaming of human rights within the United Nations system;
4. Decides further that the work of the Council shall be guided by the principles of universality, impartiality, objectivity and non-selectivity, constructive international dialogue and cooperation, with a view to enhancing the promotion and protection of all human rights, civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights, including the right to development…”.
The mandate of the Council does not authorize it to share its findings with other Member states for them to engage in judicial proceedings because it violates the “principle of equal sovereignty” (Article 1(1) of the Charter. If they do, what about the evidence sequestered for thirty years? Instead, what the Council is supposed to do, is to make recommendations to the states concerned. By focusing on Sri Lanka, the Council is being selective, thus violating the principles it is supposed to follow as stated in Paragraph 4 cited above.
A fact that should be borne in mind is that no investigations that could lead to a prosecution would be possible, using any evidence gathered for the purpose of future accountability exercises because access to victims and witnesses would not be possible due to Paragraph 25 of the OISL Report relating to confidentiality in the OISL Report.
CONCLUSION
Resolution A/HRC/46/L.Rev.1 dated 16 March 2021 has been adopted by the UN Human Rights Council based on the procedures and practices adopted by Committees of the General Assembly. Since the procedure adopted does not take into account the 14 abstained votes, the 22 members who supported the resolution prevailed over the 11 that opposed. Consequently, the procedure adopted enabled the Council to adopt the Resolutions based on votes that were less than half of the 47-member Council.
While the procedure adopted by the Council is acceptable for Committees of the General Assembly, the Human Rights Council is in a league by itself. Since its decisions impact on nearly every aspect of human life, the procedures and practices it adopts should be unique and stand alone. Another Council of similar standing is the Security Council. The procedure adopted by them is that out of its fifteen members at least nine should vote affirmatively for a decision to be adopted. Democratic Parliaments require half plus one of its members for a Bill or decision to have any legitimacy. Therefore, Sri Lanka should take the initiative to table a Resolution in the General Assembly calling on the Human Rights Council to take a fresh approach in the adoption of Resolutions. The outcome of such an approach should as a minimum be that even if the abstaining votes are not recognized, no Resolution should be adopted without half plus one of its members casting an affirmative vote for it to have any legitimacy i.e., more than 24 affirmative votes.
Having stated at the very outset that the resolution is “Guided by the purposes and principles of the Charter”, the Resolution goes on to violate Article 1(2) and 2(7) of the Charter, right of a State to withdraw from an undertaking if it is in conflict with the “internal law of fundamental importance” to the State based on a right granted under Article 46 of the Vienna Convention, and violates the mandate granted to the Human Rights Council. If a Resolution violates the stated purposes and principles of the UN Charter, the General Assembly should take note and declare such a Resolution unadoptable.
The call on the Sri Lankan government to hold Provincial Council elections and to ensure that all Provincial Councils operate effectively in accordance with the 13th Amendment is a violation of Article 1(2) because it denies the right of self-determination to institute local government arrangements that suit them best and to bind the people of Sri Lanka to internal arrangements of governance set by external entities.
Article 2(7) does not “authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state…”. In keeping with this provision the UN did NOT intervene in the decisions taken by member states to handle the enormous challenges arising from the COVID-19 pandemic. Having stayed in the sidelines they have decided to single out Sri Lanka to document what the Council determines as shortcomings in the manner Sri Lanka coped with the crisis presented by the COVI-19 pandemic in a background of a Muslim terrorist attack that denied the fundamental right to life of hundreds.
The resolution is not binding on Sri Lanka. Furthermore, as stated above it violates certain provisions of the UN Charter and holds Sri Lanka to commitments it withdrew from on legitimate grounds. What Sri Lanka could do is table a Resolution in the General Assembly highlighting the issues at stake and seek redress. In addition, such a Resolution should propose a revision on the lines suggested above to the procedures adopted by the Human Rights Council in respect of how it decides to adopt Resolutions since current procedures are totally inappropriate for an all-important institution as the Human Rights Council.
Features
Defend civic space upon which peace is built
by Jehan Perera
International Peace Day was observed on 21 September. It finds Sri Lanka with a genuine achievement to record and a demanding test to meet. The UN’s theme this year was “Invest in Peace: For Everyone, Everywhere, Every Day.” It also honoured the “everyday architects of peace”—people driving local action and building a lasting peace from the ground up. In the 2026 Global Peace Index, Sri Lanka rose 30 places, from 97th to 67th among 163 countries. Over the same period, global peacefulness declined for the twelfth consecutive year to its lowest level since the index began, and South Asia suffered the sharpest regional deterioration. The test is whether the government will protect the civic space in which those architects of peace work.
Sri Lanka’s improvement is real and deserves acknowledgement. In this year’s review, issued a few weeks ago, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights acknowledged progress in the form of action against corruption, arrests and investigations linked to political killings, enforced disappearances and the 2019 Easter Sunday attacks, and continued official denunciation of racism. A ranking, however, records conditions at a particular moment. It does not guarantee that they will last. Sustainable peace will depend on three factors. These are whether the government addresses the unresolved causes of conflict, whether it strengthens accountability for past and present abuses, and whether it protects the civic space in which peace is built from below. On the first two the record is incomplete. On the third, the draft NGO law threatens to weaken the very organisations that press for the other two.
What holds Sri Lanka back from a higher place are the same things that fed the war at home and also feed international conflict that rages elsewhere in the world. These are racism or ethnic nationalism that is narrow-focused, corruption and lawlessness. Equality, accountability and the rule of law are their remedies. The present government has committed itself to these, and is a significant improvement over governments of the recent past. But these pillars are not held up by governments alone. Peace is made in villages, workplaces and university campuses. It is made by families who insist on the truth about their disappeared, by journalists and lawyers who expose abuse, and by community organisations that bring Tamils, Muslims and Sinhalese into practical cooperation.
Unfinished Work
The UN High Commissioner’s report to the current Human Rights Council session, covering October 2025 to July 2026, shows how much remains to be done. The Prevention of Terrorism Act is still being applied, producing arbitrary arrests and long detention without charge. The report calls for a moratorium pending repeal and for the release of long-term detainees. Military-occupied land has not been released, memorialisation lacks support, and tensions over land and religious sites persist. The Batticaloa district illustrates how such problems endure. In the past three years, two Presidents, Ranil Wickremesinghe and Anura Kumara Dissanayake, have visited and instructed that the dispute over grazing land in Mailaththamadu and Mathavanai be resolved. It is a dispute between Tamil cattle farmers and outside Sinhala cultivators, and it has not been resolved. When two Presidents issue instructions and nothing changes, the fault lies in the machinery of State. An unresolved dispute does not stand still. It hardens into the next grievance.
Accountability shows the same pattern. The report documents torture and deaths in custody, and surveillance and intimidation of activists, journalists and civil society. Serious cases remain stalled for years, among them the killing of seventeen aid workers of Action Contre la Faim in Muttur two decades ago. Sharper still is the case of the Eastern University refugee camp at Vantharamoolai, where in 1990 the army took away 158 persons in a single day. They were never seen again. The camp’s officer-in-charge, Dr T. Jayasingam, later Vice Chancellor of the university, identified the officers responsible. More than three decades on, those officers have not been questioned. These cases are still remembered because families, survivors and independent witnesses have refused to let them be forgotten. Meanwhile several commissions of inquiry have completed their investigations but nothing further has happened.
What South Africa, Argentina and other post-conflict societies have found indispensable are four pillars of what is called “Transitional Justice” which are truth, accountability, reparations and non-recurrence. In Sri Lanka’s circumstances, truth means credible, independent investigation of what happened to the disappeared, and support for memorialisation. Accountability means prosecuting Muttur, Vantharamoolai and comparable cases, and removing credibly accused persons from senior office. Reparations mean compensation for victims and the return of military-held land. Non-recurrence means repealing the Prevention of Terrorism Act, releasing those held under it in the meantime, and resolving local disputes such as Mailaththamadu before delay hardens them. A country that buries its past does not escape it. The past returns in the next generation.
Civil Society
It is against this background that the draft NGO law is most troubling. The proposed legislation contains sweeping provisions for State oversight and control of civil society organisations. Among these are enforcing a licensing requirement on NGOs, which is to be renewed every three years, and severe penalties for not submitting reports on time, or for spending on emergency flood relief (for instance) when the NGOs mandate is peacebuilding (as an example) with possible sanctions including deregistration and having to shut down. Civil society groups have warned that it would confer excessive discretion over their registration and operations. Officials in Sri Lanka have abused such powers in the past. Additional power without effective checks invites further abuse. Sound regulation would have clear criteria for registration, an independent registrar and a right of appeal to the courts. What cannot be justified is a regime in which registration becomes a licence to be withheld from organisations that scrutinise policy, expose abuses or advocate for the rights of citizens.
Democracy is based on checks and balances. Those who press for accountability are part of those checks. The contradiction is plain. A government that has pledged accountability, equality and the rule of law ought not to be preparing to weaken the very organisations that press for their fulfilment. The organisations most exposed are those working on disappearances, land, memorialisation and reconciliation in the North and East, where the State’s record is weakest and the need for independent witnesses greatest. Silencing them would not remove the grievances they document. It would remove the channel through which those grievances are addressed peacefully. The government appears to be relenting, which is welcome, but a pause is not a withdrawal. The bill should be withdrawn and any replacement drafted in genuine consultation with those it would govern.
Investment in peace as called for by the UN in its International Peace Day theme implies commitment over time, with returns that come slowly. Sri Lanka’s 30-place rise on the Global Peace Index is a first dividend and nothing more. It can be built upon only if the government matches its commitments with action: withdrawing or fundamentally redrafting the NGO law, repealing or suspending the Prevention of Terrorism Act, and bringing Muttur, Vantharamoolai and Mailaththamadu to resolution. A higher place in a global index is not a certificate of success. Sri Lanka’s higher ranking is an encouraging start, but it will endure only if the space in which citizens speak, question and organise is protected. Peace is built from below, and a government that is serious about it will treat civil society as a partner rather than a threat.
Features
Africa is buying: Sri Lanka must start selling
A call to Sri Lankan exporters and agencies: Can Sri Lanka compete with China and India in Africa?
By Kana V. Kananathan
Former Ambassador
Sri Lanka has spent decades concentrating its exports on traditional markets in Europe, North America and Asia. Yet across the Indian Ocean lies a rapidly expanding market that remains significantly underdeveloped by Sri Lankan exporters: Africa.
The opportunity is not theoretical. Sri Lanka already exports packaging, textiles, rubber products, pharmaceuticals, paper, machinery and electrical goods to African markets. The question is whether these modest beginnings can be transformed into a serious export strategy—and whether Sri Lanka can compete against the enormous commercial presence of China and India.
The answer is yes—but Sri Lanka must compete differently.
Kenya: Gateway to East Africa
Kenya should be the starting point.
Sri Lanka exported approximately US$32.08 million to Kenya in 2025, while importing US$11.41 million. But US$32 million is tiny compared with the opportunity: Kenya imported more than US$24 billion in 2025. Even a 1% share of that market would represent nearly US$240 million in annual exports.
And the commercial base already exists. Sri Lanka’s 2025 exports to Kenya included approximately US$9.99 million in paper and paperboard products, US$9.73 million in knitted fabrics, US$3.64 million in pharmaceuticals, US$1.24 million in rubber products and US$1.20 million in machinery.
Kenya’s import structure is equally revealing. In the third quarter of 2025, industrial supplies represented 34.4% of imports, machinery and capital equipment 19.2%, food and beverages 9.0%, and consumer goods 7.3%. The opportunity for Sri Lanka, therefore, extends well beyond consumer goods—we can become a supplier to African industry.
But competition is fierce. Asia supplied around 70% of Kenya’s imports in 2025, with imports from China rising 16.5% and those from India 11.3%.
Sri Lanka cannot challenge China and India across every product category. Nor should it try. We must target sectors where quality, specialisation, reliability, technical capability, smaller production runs and flexibility matter more than simply offering the lowest price.
Where Can Sri Lanka Compete?
Packaging is an obvious starting point. Cartons, boxes, bags and labels are already among Sri Lanka’s exports to Kenya. Importantly, some Sri Lankan companies operating in Kenya are themselves importing these products from Sri Lanka. The market already exists; the challenge is to scale it.
As Africa’s food-processing, pharmaceutical, apparel and consumer-goods industries expand, demand for sophisticated packaging will grow with them. Sri Lanka already possesses the manufacturing capability and industry experience to capture a larger share.
Industrial rubber products, tyres, gloves and specialised rubber components offer another opportunity where Sri Lanka has established manufacturing expertise.
The apparel supply chain is equally promising. Rather than competing directly with African garment factories, Sri Lanka can supply fabrics, elastics, labels, packaging and specialised textile inputs.
Some Sri Lankan apparel manufacturing and export companies already established in Kenya, Togo, Ghana and Ethiopia are importing several of these inputs from Sri Lanka. The supply chain, therefore, already exists. The next step is to move beyond supplying Sri Lankan-owned factories and become a competitive input supplier to the wider African apparel industry.
Other sectors deserving systematic market development include pharmaceuticals and medical consumables, processed foods, biscuits and confectionery, coconut products, cinnamon and spices, electrical products and cables, industrial chemicals, ceramics, light engineering, agricultural equipment and food-processing machinery.
Sri Lanka should also look beyond physical goods. IT, fintech, banking technology, engineering, healthcare, hospitality management and professional services largely escape the freight disadvantage confronting merchandise exports.
The Tariff Problem Can Become an Opportunity
Market access cannot be discussed without tariffs.The East African Community applies a Common External Tariff with bands of 0%, 10%, 25% and 35%, while certain sensitive products attract still higher protection. Simply filling containers in Colombo with finished consumer goods will therefore not always be commercially competitive.
But that obstacle points towards a bigger opportunity: manufacture in Africa.
Sri Lankan businesses could export intermediate materials while undertaking final assembly, manufacturing, processing or packaging in Kenya. Packaging companies could establish converting plants; electrical manufacturers could assemble locally; pharmaceutical companies could explore manufacturing or packaging partnerships; and food companies could undertake final processing closer to consumers.
Kenya would then become more than an export destination. It could become Sri Lanka’s manufacturing and distribution gateway into East and Central Africa.
With the East African Community now comprising eight partner states and extending geographically from the Indian Ocean towards the Atlantic, establishing a regional presence is increasingly more important than viewing each African country in isolation.
West Africa Cannot Be Ignored
Sri Lanka simultaneously needs a West African strategy.
Ghana offers potential as an English-speaking commercial gateway and host of the AfCFTA Secretariat. Nigeria, with its enormous population and consumer economy, should be approached as a major market in its own right, despite its greater regulatory, currency and operational complexity.
ECOWAS tariff bands of 0%, 5%, 10%, 20% and 35% again make product selection critical. Sri Lanka should concentrate on products with sufficient differentiation and margins to absorb freight, tariffs and distributor costs.
Pharmaceuticals demonstrate both the opportunity and the challenge. Nigeria imported approximately US$766 million in pharmaceuticals in 2025, with India supplying roughly US$394 million and China US$131 million. Ghana imported approximately US$301 million, with India supplying about US$140 million.
Sri Lanka cannot simply offer another generic product and expect to beat India on price. We must identify specialised products, reliable supply arrangements, partnerships and, where commercially justified, local production or packaging.
Stop Promoting Sectors—Identify Products
Sri Lanka now needs an Africa Export Opportunity Study based on individual products, not broad sectors.
The Export Development Board, Foreign Ministry, chambers and private sector should jointly identify 15–20 priority products. For each product, Sri Lanka should calculate the HS code, African annual import demand, principal suppliers, Chinese and Indian market shares, applicable duties, freight from Colombo, regulatory requirements, distributor margins and final landed price.
That will tell us where Sri Lanka genuinely has a competitive advantage.
The Commercial Test
Before spending resources promoting a product, apply one simple test:
African import demand + Sri Lankan production capability + tariff + freight + distributor margin + regulatory cost = final landed competitiveness against China, India and local African production.
Only products that pass this test should receive concentrated export-promotion resources.
This would move Sri Lanka away from exhibitions, delegations and general discussions towards what ultimately matters: specific products, specific buyers, specific distributors and actual export orders.
Give Our Missions Targets
Commercial diplomacy must become results-driven. The Government should set clear annual trade and investment targets for every Sri Lankan mission in Africa.
Missions should be evaluated not merely on diplomatic activity, but on buyers and distributors identified, business introductions made, investments facilitated, market barriers resolved and measurable exports generated.
In a competitive Africa, our missions must become active economic frontlines not merely diplomatic outposts.
A practical strategy could operate through three commercial gateways: Nairobi for East and Central Africa, Accra for selected West African markets and Lagos for Nigeria.
Sri Lanka’s total exports of goods and services reached approximately US$17.25 billion in 2025. Capturing even a small additional share of Africa’s enormous import market could, therefore, make a meaningful contribution to export earnings, investment and foreign-exchange generation.
Africa Will Not Wait
Sri Lankan exporters must stop looking at Africa as a distant or difficult market and start treating it as a strategic growth market.
We cannot compete with China and India on scale, but we can compete on quality, specialisation, flexibility and reliability. Exporters must identify country-specific opportunities, establish strong local distributors, build partnerships with African businesses and use Sri Lankan companies already operating on the continent as gateways into regional supply chains.
Where freight and tariffs weaken competitiveness, businesses must be prepared to move towards local assembly, joint ventures and manufacturing in Africa. Exporters cannot do it alone. They need aggressive, measurable and results-driven commercial diplomacy from Sri Lanka’s missions.
Africa is buying. Its markets are being captured now. Sri Lanka must stop watching from the sidelines. We must enter, compete, build our presence and secure our share.
(Ambassador Kana Kananathan is a businessman, Diplomat, lobbyist and an expert in African affairs, with over four decades of experience on the African continent. A long-time resident of Africa, he served as Sri Lanka’s envoy to Uganda and Kenya, with concurrent accreditation to 22 African Nations, and was the permanent representative to UN Habitat and UN environmental Programme. Over the years, he has been the Elections Monitor across the continent, working closely with African governments, and built enduring partnerships with African leaders. He also served as Economic and Investments Advisor to former President Professor Alpha Condé of the Republic of Guinea)
Features
Memories and Midnight Magic: Recipe for a perfect 31st Night dance
The heart of a great 31st Night dance is memory, and memories come rushing back when those 70s, 80s and 90s golden oldies begin to play — those timeless tunes that make revellers, young and old, rush to the floor and dance the night away.
A perfect 31st Night is not just a party. It is a journey. A journey through time.
The music should flow like a love story. Start slow, start soft. Let couples glide into a waltz for romance. Let the floor come alive with a twist, a rock ‘n’ roll, a jive. Let nostalgia build with beautiful sing-along oldies generally associated with a New Year’s Eve dance.
This is the art that many of our entertainers seem to have forgotten.
The final hour, before midnight, is sacred. It should be collective energy at its peak. The entire crowd, on the dance floor, linking arms, swaying together, singing, at the top of their voices, those sing-along favourites.
Yes, I’m referring to those immortal, nostalgic favourites that unite the world: ‘This Land Is Your Land,’ ‘You Are My Sunshine,’ ‘When The Saints Go Marching In,’ ‘Roll Out The Barrel,’ ‘Celebration,’ ‘She’ll Be Coming Round The Mountain,’ ‘Happy Days Are Here Again,’ and so many more.
One wonders if some of our modern entertainers have even heard of these nostalgia anthems that traditionally lead up to the dawning of the New Year! This is not just music; this is ritual.
Then comes THE moment: Lights dim. Music pauses. A hush falls. The countdown begins — 10, 9, 8… — hugs, wishes, tears of joy, and then … ‘Auld Lang Syne.’ Hands crossed, voices united, bidding farewell to the old and welcoming the new. That moment makes or breaks the night.
Here is the truth that many genuine 31st Night revellers feel but hesitate to say — an overdose of baila music at New Year’s Eve events is NOT welcome.
Of course, baila is required. Baila is our Sri Lankan heartbeat! But a 31st Night dance is for everyone.
When it’s ONLY baila, the twist and rock n’ roll lovers, the waltz kings and queens feel left out. And they are the very people who MADE nostalgia! They are the die-hard revellers who have kept the 31st Night spirit alive for decades.
A family mentioned to me that they went along with friends for a 31st Night dance, in the city, to usher in 2026, and were thoroughly disappointed with the setup.
The bands in attendance, they said, failed to generate the excitement generally associated with a 31st Night event.
If given a free hand, the music at certain Colombo venues will be mostly baila, and that is going to disappoint many. Some are already worried that it will be just a baila scene this year, as well.
A memorable 31st Night respects all rhythms … yes, a waltz for romance, a twist and rock n’ roll for that 60s magic, a cha-cha, a slow foxtrot, and then the baila, after the countdown anthem.
That balance is what makes it inclusive, classy, and truly fun-filled.
Organisers, especially in Colombo, should keep this in mind: let it be 70% nostalgia – Western, and 30% baila, with the last hour left for pure baila madness, after the New Year is in!
Organisers must work out the programme for their 31st Night and instruct the entertainers to follow those instructions. The band should not dictate the night; the spirit of nostalgia should.
This New Year, let’s give Colombo what it truly wants — memories, midnight magic, and music for every soul on the floor.
Let’s dance into 2027 with class.
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