Opinion

Returning to source with Aga

Published

5 months ago

2025/11/7

Aga

The last time I met Aga I had made up my mind to bring him a few things, stationery mostly, to help him along with his writing. His desk was a somewhat chaotic cluster of cardboard folders, containing loose sheets of paper on which had written his manuscripts – sometimes, a page would spill out onto the table and I worried how he could figure out what went where. At the centre of this celestial orbit were the party’s old weeklies and national congress reports, like a compass guiding his research.

Sadly, time got the better of us, and I never did get to refresh his stationary supply.

Aga Jayasena (15 February 1942–28 October 2025), was a communist as old as the Sri Lanka’s communist movement itself, being born less than a year before the founding of the Ceylon Communist Party (2–3 July 1943). He joined the party as a full-timer immediately after graduating from the University of Sri Jayewardenepura and cut his teeth organising peasants in Badulla and Monaragala. He recalled that he lacked the confidence to give his own speeches in his early days as an organiser, so would read aloud the articles from the communist daily Aththa. A lifelong learner, communicator, and educator, he soon found a place in the party’s central committee, politburo, education department, and as a national organiser.

I first saw Aga, and heard him speak, at the launch of his book on Frederick Engels. I was impressed but a little intimidated, he seemed to me quite stern and serious that day! It was only earlier this year that I picked up the courage to call him to do a series of interviews on his perspectives on the history of communist movement in Sri Lanka. My initial estimation of him was quite wrong, he was extremely warm and welcoming. Ah, Shiran! No point talking on the phone, come and meet me in person. After a few false starts, mainly due to his health, we met at his home in Pelawatte. Flipping through my notes, and listening to the recordings, I realise how unstructured these conversations were. We spoke for hours about various elements from history. But throughout, he was patient, kind, and analytical.

The following are some elements of what we discussed, including my own reflections and research based on the points he raised.

What stage are we in?

In his last days, Aga had thrown himself into the movement’s history to try and understand how the present came to be. He was busy writing his memoirs, including his reflections on the history of party, some of which were quite critical. In our discussions, he was emphatic about the efforts by founding leaders S. A. Wickramasinghe and M. G. Mendis to build the trade union and cooperative movements. The struggles in the trade union movements – especially the conflicts with A. E. Gunasinghe’s Ceylon Labour Party, which had taken a communal and collaborationist turn, during the strikes at the Wellawatte Spinning and Weaving Mills – pre-dated the founding of the Lanka Sama Samaja Party (LSSP). Similarly, when the communists were expelled from the LSSP in 1940, Wickramasinghe and his comrades first spent time building up the mass organisations – the Ceylon Trade Union Federation (CTFU) was established in 1941. The party had to come out of the movement, not the other way around.

For Aga, this was the key. He was critical, though not dismissive, of the penchant for conjuring up programmes on which to base a coalition. Having a programme was all good and well, but a programme needed to be creative and original, it had to identify the social forces that would propel the programme forward – who would be included and excluded in such a programme? In his words, a programme needed a “vehicle” – the mass organisations. He was strongly of the opinion that the communist movement needed to descend once again into the working class to rejuvenate itself and rebuild this vehicle.

Aga was also particular about the key theoretical questions. He asked: “What stage of the revolution are we in?” and “Is there a national question?” The questions were open ended, as if he knew the multiple-choice answers that lay before but was unsure which was correct in the current conjuncture. One thing was certain; more study was needed. But the movement lacked intellectuals of the calibre that once existed. And the tide of day-to-day crises and electoral compulsions pulled the movement ever forward, with scarcely a moment to pause, reflect, and evaluate.

Colombo to Cochin

Aga’s reading of the party’s beginnings in the working-class movement made him think about the role of Malayali workers in Ceylon. The CCP’s first mass base was among the Malayali workers. There were about 40,000 Malayalis in Ceylon by the 1940s, and around 2700 Malayali toddy tappers were organised by the CTFU-affiliated All-Ceylon Toddy Workers. In fact, the CCP itself was the product of a union between its predecessor the United Socialist Party, and the largely Malayali-based Ceylon Socialist Party. The first CCP constitution, adopted in 1944, specified that the flag should have the party’s name inscribed “in the Sinhalese, Tamil, Malayalam or English language as the case may be”. Similarly, the party’s first publications were quadrilingual – Forward (English), Janasakthi (Sinhala and Tamil), and Navasakthi (Malayalam). Columns in right-wing papers like Times of Ceylon used to derisively refer to the CCP as ‘Malayali comrades’.

Ceylonese communist ties to India were not limited to their organising the workers domiciled in Ceylon. The founders themselves had intimate connections with the Indian freedom movement – nurtured during periods of study in London and visits to India itself. In London, Wickramasinghe associated closely with Indian freedom fighter, and independent India’s first High Commissioner to the United Kingdom, V. K. Krishna Menon – the two organised a conference on ‘Socialism in India and Ceylon’. Wickramasinghe later travelled to India during the Meerut trial, and for a while lived alongside Sabarmati Ashram Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi. Then there is Buddhist monk Udakandala Sri Saranankara Thero, who studied in Santiniketan, the residential school established by Rabindranath Tagore. In India, Saranankara Thero, learned Bengali, became involved with the Indian freedom movement, and met Subhas Chandra Bose in prison.

But as independence came, efforts turned inwards towards national construction, and contradictions arose over citizenship, borders, markets, and so on. For the communists, the main international capital became the Soviet Union, which alone had the economic strength to maintain an internationally supportive network. Thus, bilateral relationships with neighbouring fraternal parties were deprioritised compared to the relationship with the Soviet Union, which served as the movement’s Mecca.

Aga wondered why that relationship with the Indian movement, particularly in Kerala, wasn’t nurtured more by both sides. Just across the Palk Straits, and over the Western Ghats, lay Kerala, which had democratically elected communists to power in 1959 (interestingly, the dismissal of this government by Nehru, with CIA-backing, occurred just months before the assassination of S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike). There are many parallels between Kerala and Sri Lanka. At the time of independence, both were plantation economies, with an underdeveloped industrial bourgeoisie and proletariat, and a dependency on food imports. Like Sri Lanka, Kerala was one of the last places on the subcontinent for a communist party cell to be formed – E. M. S. Namboodiripad attributed this to the relative underdevelopment of Kerala’s modern industries, a conclusion that may well be applied to Sri Lanka too.

Aga’s point intrigued me. Why were there no greater exchanges between the Sri Lankan and Keralite movements? Could there not have been exchanges of cadres for political education, and mutual translation of literature and poetry? Could Sri Lankan cadres not have been sent on fact-finding missions to Kerala’s vast cooperatives networks, community libraries, and healthcare centres? These questions may seem idealistic but they are very well worth asking given the close historical, cultural, and geographical links between the two polities.

Following Aga’s lead, my research led me to an interesting figure. P. Sankar was a Malayali trade unionist and founding member of the CTFU (where he was the vice president and assistant secretary), editor the CCP’s Malayalam weekly Navasakthi, and a CCP central committee member from 1943 to 1952. Sankar returned to India in 1952 – I am not sure the circumstances but it seems likely that the Ceylonese government’s policies against Indian immigrants must have played a role. Once back in Kerala, Sankar joined the Communist Party of India and was elected to the Kerala Legislative Assembly from Chittur in 1977. He died in 1991. Did he ever stay in touch with comrades in Sri Lanka?

I don’t think Aga was being Indo-centric or an Indophile when he suggested closer relations with the Indian movement. His point was that the conditions in India were far more similar to Sri Lanka than the distant Soviet Union. He argued that Sri Lankan communist youth were eager to go and study in the Soviet Union (an arrangement that evolved into a paternalistic relationship for the party) but what they learnt could not always be easily applied to Sri Lanka. I don’t know if he felt this way about his own time at the Academy of Social Science in Moscow. The Soviet Union certainly helped produce a great many Sri Lankan bureaucrats and public servants (for example, Dr. Anil Jasinghe, the health ministry secretary who helped lead the campaign against the COVID-19 pandemic, is a product of Soviet education) but not enough revolutionaries with original thinking. Aga was making an argument rooted in Sri Lankan reality.

Cream of the Crop

One memento I have from Aga is a copy of the Draft Political Report for the Eight National Congress of the Ceylon Communist Party (20–24 August 1972). The faded copy, its pages yellowed, sits on my desk as I type this. Between 1964 and 1972, a period of eight years, there were no national congresses held. Up to then, this was perhaps the longest period without a party congress. This was especially significant because it was a turbulent and transformative few years for the party, the left movement, and the country as a whole.

In 1964, the party had split along the Sino-Soviet fissure, N. Sanmugathasan took with him much of CTFU, the editors of the Sinhala and Tamil press, the peasant front organiser, and several youth front leaders. Thought its electoral impact may have been small, it was a significant blow to the unity of the mass organisations and the ideologically committed mid-level cadre. Then in 1965, Shan’s own party split, with the young Rohana Wijeweera peeling off the youth-wing and beginning to proselytise among rural educated Sinhala youth (Aga was one of those personally approached by Wijeweera) to establish the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP).

Also in 1964, the United Left Front (ULF), consisting of the LSSP, CCP, and Philip Gunawardena’s Mahajana Eksath Peramuna, collapsed due to the LSSP breaking ranks to accept a cabinet position in the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) government led by Sirimavo Bandaranaike. After decades of factionalism, the ULF had been virtually compelled to form due to unprecedent united trade union action leading to the formation of the Joint Committee of Trade Union Organisations in 1963.

Reflecting on the watershed collapse of the short-lived ULF, Aga said, “people let go of us”.

The centre-right government that took power in 1965 was the first to borrow from the International Monetary Fund. There was a renewed urgency for unity among progressive forces. By 1970, the long mooted LSSP-CCP-SLFP alignment finally came to fruition, and this United Front won the elections by a landslide. But the CCP was blocked from obtaining more than one ministerial position (the Ministry of Housing and Reconstruction held by Pieter Keuneman).

Then, in 1971, came the JVP insurrection. Aga recalled the turbulent conjuncture of that time – the assassination of Che Guevara in Bolivia in 1966 and the independent Tricontinental line of Cuba, the US war on Vietnam and the killing of Buddhist monks, and the proliferation of literature by Kim Il Sung translated into Sinhala. The insurrection shook the Old Left, which was completely taken aback by the violence. The deeply ingrained notion that there were no conditions for armed struggle in Sri Lanka were challenged. “The big question was why we didn’t see this coming”, Aga said.

Aga admitted a “soft corner” for the JVP of 1971. He was of the same generation of Rohana Wijeweera (born in 14 July 1943). He spoke of that generation in an almost bittersweet and rueful tone – they were the “cream”, he said, who could have been a powerful force for social transforma

He had just returned to the country after his political education in the Soviet Union, and communist youth all around the country were in ferment. Aga spoke as if whether he ended up on side or the other was a flip of the coin. After all, like many communists of his age, he had comrades on both sides.

In 1973, the Soviet-wing of the CCP split, a faction led by Wickramasinghe crossed over to the opposition (this group included Sarath Muttetuwegama, Aththa editor H. G. S. Ratnaweera, as well as a young Aga and D. E. W. Gunasekera). A faction led by Keuneman remained with Sirimavo Bandaranaike’s government. There were a range of reasons for this split, including the disagreement with the heavy-handed way in which the government had dealt with the JVP insurgents and the use of Criminal Justice Commissions (CJC) Act, No. 14 of 1972, which allowed evidence that would have been inadmissible under the normal procedures. This crucial period intrigued Aga. Some historical accounts claim that the Soviet embassy intervened to patch up ties between the two factions in 1976. Aga intimated that this didn’t happen on equal ground – the Soviets had “closed the tap” of financial support to Wickramasinghe’s faction.

I tend to speculate that Wickramasinghe, without the support of intellectual stalwarts – like P. Kandiah (died in 1960), G. V. S. De Silva (left the party in 1959), and Sanmugathasan and Kumarasiri (who formed the Peking faction in 1964) – perhaps lacked the theoretical confidence to mount a challenge to the Soviet-Keuneman line, and felt isolated. But that is purely my speculation. It is interesting that Sanmugathasan’s Memoirs of an Unrepentant Communist (1989) expresses venom towards Keuneman, but a reverence towards Wickramasinghe. Similarly, Kumarasiri wrote in his later years that Wickramasinghe – not Philip Gunawardena, who later allied with the UNP – was the person who came closest to deserving the title ‘Father of Socialism’ in Sri Lanka. Wickramaisnghe didn’t leave behind any memoirs, so we may never truly know his story.

I think Aga was drawn to the 1972 Draft Political Report because he felt the text contained within it some of the contradictions brewing in the party since the 1960s, and especially after the 1970 coalition and 1971 insurrection. The copy I have is in English and is missing ten pages. Some passages have been marked with a pencil, but I am not sure if this was done by Aga himself, since he would have surely read the Sinhala version instead. Here is one of the marked paragraphs:

“The Party entered the United Front without fully working out the relationship between its own programme and that of the United Front. In the absence of independent campaigns for the party programme, there was a certain ideological confusion in some party ranks and also its development and continuation of diverse ideological trends. This also created confusion among the politically advanced non-party sections, leading to doubts in their minds as to the revolutionary character of the CP. The neglect of the ideological struggle also contributed to the above.”

We Have no Mechanism

My first interview with Aga was about four months into the presidency of Anura Kumar Dissanayake (AKD) and the National People’s Power (NPP) government. Aga had an open mind about the NPP when we met. That said, he maintained it was not clear which way the government would go, and if and how the government would break from the neoliberal framework. He acknowledged that there had been a series of missed opportunities for détente between the JVP and the Communist Party of Sri Lanka over the last decade – most notably, during the joint-struggle to prevent the privatisation of Colombo Port’s East Container Terminal.

Aga understood the NPP’s decision to continue with the IMF programme, and felt it wise for the NPP to not rock the boat too much. Not because he endorsed the IMF programme but because he must have felt that the balance of power was strongly tilted in favour of the bondholders and local merchant capitalists, who could make the economy scream by withholding foreign currency, hoarding commodities, downgrading credit ratings, and so on.

He was also sympathetic to the fact that the NPP was walking into a collapsed state machinery. His choice of words, in Sinhala, still echoes in my mind – “අපිට යාන්ත්‍රණයක් නැහැ”, we have no mechanism. He felt the NPP’s first budget, constrained by the IMF’s conditions, was unable to satisfy any specific sector, but he was appreciative of the allocations towards the estate sector and the north and east. In general, he was appreciative of the NPP’s electoral gains in the north, but was critical of their lack of clarity on solving the national question. He felt that the provision of economic services and infrastructure alone would not be enough to sidestep the political question.

Aga was clearly in a nostalgic mood the times I met him. His mind kept drifting back to the fighters from history, many of whom did not leave behind any memoirs and who are not memorialised by those who remain. He wondered why his generation (the second generation of communists) never thought to sit and interview the first generation at length before they died. Tears came to his eyes as he spoke of A. Vaidialingam, one of the founders of the CCP, who few speak of today. “Vaidialingam was to the north, what Wickramasinghe was to the south”, Aga said. With Aga’s passing, that lineage is almost broken – so much of our movement’s history remains unwritten.

The last message I have from Aga is a voice note in appreciation of a talk I gave on the Bandung Spirit at the Bandaranaike Centre for International Studies earlier this year. In our interviews, he was often pensive and introspective, so it is nice to have a recording of his voice sounding so animated.

Aga’s passing strikes us just two months ahead of the 90th anniversary of the founding of the Lanka Sama Samaja Party – the beginning of the socialist movement in Sri Lanka. I hope that, like Aga, others in the left will take the time to reflect upon the past 90 years of struggle and write these histories. Not just to bask in the glories of the past, but to regain a sense of self, a confidence in our ideas and original aspirations, and a grounding to forge a way ahead.

(Shiran Illanperuma is a researcher at Tricontinental: Institute for Social Research and a co-editor of Wenhua Zongheng: A Journal of Contemporary Chinese Thought. He is a co-convenor of the Asia Progress Forum).

by Shiran Illanperuma

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Opinion

When elephants fight, it is the grass that suffers

Published

2 days ago

2026/03/27

Thilina Walpola

“As a small and open country, Singapore will always be vulnerable to what happens around us. As Lee Kuan Yew used to say: “when elephants fight, the grass suffers, but when elephants make love, the grass also suffers“. Therefore, we must be aware of what is happening around us, and prepare ourselves for changes and surprises.” – Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong, during the debate on the President’s Address in Singapore Parliament on 16 May, 2018, commenting on the uncertain external environment during the first Trump Administration.

“When elephants fight, it is the grass that suffers”

is a well-known African proverb commonly used in geopolitics to describe smaller nations caught in the crossfire of conflicts between major powers. At the 1981 Commonwealth conference, when Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere quoted this Swahili proverb, the Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew famously retorted, “When elephants make love, the grass suffers, too”. In other words, not only when big powers (such as the US, Russia, EU, China or India) clash, the surrounding “grass” (smaller nations) get “trampled” or suffer collateral damage but even when big powers collaborate or enter into friendly agreements, small nations can still be disadvantaged through unintended consequences of those deals. Since then, Singaporean leaders have often quoted this proverb to highlight the broader reality for smaller states, during great power rivalry and from their alliances. They did this to underline the need to prepare Singapore for challenges stemming from the uncertain external environment and to maintain high resilience against global crises.

Like Singapore, as a small and open country, Sri Lanka too is always vulnerable to what happens around us. Hence, we must be alert to what is happening around us, and be ready not only to face challenges but to explore opportunities.

When Elephants Fight

To begin with, President Trump’s “Operation Epic Fury”.

Did we prepare adequately for changes and surprises that could arise from the deteriorating situation in the Gulf region? For example, the impact the conflict has on the safety and welfare of Sri Lankans living in West Asia or on our petroleum and LNG imports. The situation in the Gulf remains fluid with potential for further escalation, with the possibility of a long-term conflict.

The region, which is the GCC, Iraq, Iran, Israel, Jordan, Syria and Azerbaijan (I believe exports to Azerbaijan are through Iran), accounts for slightly over $1 billion of our exports. The region is one of the most important markets for tea (US$546 million out of US$1,408 million in 2024. According to some estimates, this could even be higher). As we export mostly low-grown teas to these countries, the impact of the conflict on low-grown tea producers, who are mainly smallholders, would be extremely strong. Then there are other sectors like fruits and vegetables where the impact would be immediate, unless of course exporters manage to divert these perishable products to other markets. If the conflict continues for a few more weeks or months, managing these challenges will be a difficult task for the nation, not simply for the government. It is also necessary to remember the Russia – Ukraine war, now on to its fifth year, and its impact on Sri Lanka’s economy.

Mother of all bad timing

What is more unfortunate is that the Gulf conflict is occurring on top of an already intensifying global trade war. One observer called it the “mother of all bad timing”. The combination is deadly.

Early last year, when President Trump announced his intention to weaponise tariffs and use them as bargaining tools for his geopolitical goals, most observers anticipated that he would mainly use tariffs to limit imports from the countries with which the United States had large trade deficits: China, Mexico, Vietnam, the European Union, Japan and Canada. The main elephants, who export to the United States. But when reciprocal tariffs were declared on 2nd April, some of the highest reciprocal tariffs were on Saint Pierre and Miquelon (50%), a French territory off Canada with a population of 6000 people, and Lesotho (50%), one of the poorest countries in Southern Africa. Sri Lanka was hit with a 44% reciprocal tariff. In dollar terms, Sri Lanka’s goods trade deficit with the United States was very small (US$ 2.9 billion in 2025) when compared to those of China (US$ 295 billion in 2024) or Vietnam (US$ 123 billion in 2024).

Though the adverse impact of US additional ad valorem duty has substantially reduced due to the recent US Supreme Court decision on reciprocal tariffs, the turbulence in the US market would continue for the foreseeable future. The United States of America is the largest market for Sri Lanka and accounts for nearly 25% of our exports. Yet, Sri Lanka’s exports to the United States had remained almost stagnant (around the US $ 3 billion range) during the last ten years, due to the dilution of the competitive advantage of some of our main export products in that market. The continued instability in our largest market, where Sri Lanka is not very competitive, doesn’t bode well for Sri Lanka’s economy.

When Elephants Make Love

In rapidly shifting geopolitical environments, countries use proactive anticipatory diplomacy to minimise the adverse implications from possible disruptions and conflicts. Recently concluded Free Trade Agreement (FTA) negotiations between India and the EU (January 2026) and India and the UK (May 2025) are very good examples for such proactive diplomacy. These negotiations were formally launched in June 2007 and were on the back burner for many years. These were expedited as strategic responses to growing U.S. protectionism. Implementation of these agreements would commence during this year.

When negotiations for a free trade agreement between India and the European Union (which included the United Kingdom) were formally launched, anticipating far-reaching consequences of such an agreement on other developing countries, the Commonwealth Secretariat requested the University of Sussex to undertake a study on a possible implication of such an agreement on other low-income developing countries. The authors of that study had considered the impact of an EU–India Free Trade Agreement on the trade of excluded countries and had underlined, “The SAARC countries are, by a long way, the most vulnerable to negative impacts from the FTA. Their exports are more similar to India’s…. Bangladesh is most exposed in the EU market, followed by Pakistan and Sri Lanka.”

So, now these agreements are finalised; what will be the implications of these FTAs between India and the UK and the EU on Sri Lanka? According to available information, the FTA will be a game-changer for the Indian apparel exporters, as it would provide a nearly ten per cent tariff advantage to them. That would level the playing field for India, vis-à-vis their regional competitors. As a result, apparel exports from India to the UK and the EU are projected to increase significantly by 2030. As the sizes of the EU’s and the UK’s apparel markets are not going to expand proportionately, these growths need to come from the market shares of other main exporters like Sri Lanka.

So, “also, when elephants make love, the grass suffers.”

Impact on Sri Lanka

As a small, export dependent country with limited product and market diversification, Sri Lanka will always be vulnerable to what happens in our main markets. Therefore, we must be aware of what is happening in those markets, and prepare ourselves to face the challenges proactively. Today, amid intense geopolitical conflicts, tensions and tariff shifts, countries adopt high agility and strategic planning. If we look at what our neighbours have been doing in London, Brussels and Tokyo, we can learn some lessons on how to navigate through these turbulences.

(The writer is a retired public servant and can be reached at senadhiragomi@gmail.com)

by Gomi Senadhira

Opinion

QR-based fuel quota

Published

2 days ago

2026/03/27

Thilina Walpola

The introduction of the QR code–based fuel quota system can be seen as a timely and necessary measure, implemented as part of broader austerity efforts to manage limited fuel resources. In the face of ongoing global fuel instability and economic challenges, such a system is aimed at ensuring equitable distribution and preventing excessive consumption. While it is undeniable that this policy may disrupt the daily routines of certain segments of the population, it is important for citizens to recognize the larger national interest at stake and cooperate with these temporary measures until stability returns to the global fuel market.

At the same time, this initiative presents an important opportunity for the Government to address long-standing gaps in regulatory enforcement. In particular, the implementation of the QR code system could have been strategically linked to the issuance of valid revenue licenses for vehicles. Restricting QR code access only to vehicles that are properly registered and have paid their revenue dues would have helped strengthen compliance and improve state revenue collection.

Available data from the relevant authorities indicate that a significant number of vehicles—especially three-wheelers and motorcycles—continue to operate without valid revenue licences. This represents a substantial loss of income to the State and highlights a weakness in enforcement mechanisms. By integrating the fuel quota system with revenue license verification, the government could have effectively encouraged vehicle owners to regularise their documentation while simultaneously improving fiscal discipline.

In summary, while the QR code fuel system is a commendable step toward managing scarce resources, aligning it with existing regulatory requirements would have amplified its benefits. Such an approach would not only support fuel conservation but also enhance government revenue and promote greater accountability among vehicle owners.

Sariputhra
Colombo 05

Opinion

BRICS should step in and resolve Middle East crisis

Published

3 days ago

2026/03/26

Sahan Weerasooriya

Trump and Netanyahu

First, let us see why the war started by Israel and the US against Iran may be seen as a stupid undertaking. Israel was aiming for regional hegemony and US world dominance, which could be called an utterly foolish dream in today’s multipolar world order, which the theatre of war now reveals. They may have underestimated Iran’s capacity and also the economic fallout due to its ability to control the Strait of Hormuz.

In February 2026, reports emerged that General Dan Caine, the U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, privately warned President Trump about the significant risks of a major war with Iran, including potential U.S. casualties, depleted ammunition stockpiles and entanglement in a prolonged conflict. However, President Trump publicly dismissed these reports as incorrect. General Caine’s appointment by President Trump was considered controversial, as Caine was chosen over many active-duty four-star generals and lacks experience as a combatant commander or service chief. Under these circumstances Caine would have been expected to be subservient to Trump, yet he opted to disagree as he saw the danger. Trump countered his arguments saying it would be a quick job, take out the leadership, destroy the military structure and the people will take over the country. This did not happen and now most of the scenarios that Caine said was possible are gradually coming true.

Israel suffers damage

For Israel, too, damage is much more than expected and could prove to be decisive in its expansionist ambitions in the region if not its very existence. It had previously tried to drag former US presidents, Bush, Obama and Biden into a war with Iran, but they were aware of the underlying danger. The Gulf countries too were hit hard and the US could not protect them, and they may be regretting that they ever let the US set up military bases on their soil. Former US secretary of state Henry Kissinger once famously said, “To be America’s enemy is dangerous, to be its friend is fatal”.

The US may have succeeded in making states, such as Iraq, Syria and Libya, fail, but Iran is a different kettle of fish. Trump was jubilant after capturing the Venezuelan president and may have been planning to lay his hands on Cuba and Turkey and then try to annex Canada and Greenland. A man who promised a “no war” policy in his presidential campaign has converted his department of defence into a department of war in the real sense of the term. Trump must realise that he cannot act like a global policeman and undermine the sovereignty of other nations with impunity. Trump says “we have won” but has nothing to show as gains in the Iran war.

Trump’s concern about BRICS

Another factor in the equation is that Trump may have been concerned about the growing influence and membership of BRICS, which in effect appears to be anti-American if one were to go by its attempt to de-dollarise world trade. Of particular concern may have been the recent admission into BRICS, of several countries supposed to be staunch US allies, such as Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Egypt. Iran is an active member and was mending its fences with Saudi Arabia under the mediation of China. Further, two of the arch rivals of the US, China and Russia, are leading members of BRICS, which has become the meeting ground for the friends as well as foes of the US, under the stewardship of China. The US saw all this as a huge challenge to its dominant position in the world and Trump, who was trying to “make America great again”, saw that his dream may go up in smoke. He threatened countries which tried to adopt an alternative to the dollar with sanctions. He may have thought if Iran could be destabilised and structurally broken up, he would be able to kill two birds with one stone. He may have se an enemy of both the US and also its ally Israel and disrupt the BRICS organisation.

The war is affecting the economy of the BRICS countries quite badly. The fuel shortage due to closure of Strait of Hormuz has hit India hard and also China. The economies of the Gulf countries, whose oil is transported via the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman, have also suffered immensely. South Africa, a founding member of BRICS imports oil mainly from the Middle East. Brazil, another founder member, though an exporter of oil, imports refined fuels from the Middle East. A large portion of food requirements also of the Gulf countries come through these sea routes. Thus, the BRICS organisation must be concerned about the consequences of the war if it drags on. It obviously augers ill for the BRICS, and it must act quickly to bring about a ceasefire and an amicable settlement as soon as possible.

Jeffrey Sachs’ opinion

Prof. Jeffrey Sachs, the eminent American economist, has argued that BRICS nations have a critical responsibility to play a leading role in stopping the war in the Middle East, particularly regarding the escalating conflict between the US/Israel and Iran. He contends that because the US is pursuing “global hegemony” and attempting to control the region, BRICS serves as the only effective “standing bulwark” against American domination.

Sachs has stated that if BRICS countries, particularly India, China, and Russia, stand together and demand an end to the war, “it will actually end”. He has described this collective action as the only way to make the world safe. Arguing that the Middle East conflict is a planned campaign by the US and Israel for regional dominance rather than a defensive action, he has called on BRICS to stop the US from running the world. He warned that a continued conflict, especially one that disrupts energy supplies, will cause enormous economic costs for Asia, Europe, and the US.

Sachs has argued that India should not have joined Quad, as he views Washington as using a “divide and conquer” strategy. He has characterised the BRICS countries as a fast-growing, multipolar bulwark that rejects the notion of a single “emperor” (referring to US influence). Sachs has warned that if the conflict is not stopped, it could lead to World War III and catastrophic regional consequences (India Today).

China and Russia, though rivals of the US, have the economic and military clout to exert pressure on the US. India is a friend of both the US and Israel and could act as a mediator to bring about an end to this meaningless war. Gulf countries, some of whom are BRICS members, could make a strong appeal to their friend and benefactor, the US, to see what its senseless aggression is doing to their countries.

Unity of BRICS essential

As of 2026, the expanded BRICS group (including Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Indonesia) represents approximately 49% of the world’s population. Moreover, its collective GDP is 35 – 40% of the global GDP when measured in PPP terms, which may be considered as higher compared to G7 countries which record 30%. Thus, BRICS is a force to be reckoned with provided its members stand together. However, they have not been able to do so though it is obvious that it would be beneficial to all of them. Bilateral conflicts within the BRICS, apparently intractable, are preventing any concerted action by these countries. In this regard, as Prof. Sachs says the onus is on China, Russia and India to come together to stop the war, which if allowed to drag on, will irreparably damage the economy and unity of BRICS and worse it would never be possible to attain any of its objectives. It is time the founder members Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa got together and review its goals, the need for such an organisation as BRICS, and the present danger it faces and take remedial steps as soon as possible if it is to remain a viable force with the potential to counter the hegemonic imperialist forces.

Further, the BRICS, as it consists of stakeholders of a new world order and also countries directly involved in the Middle East turmoil, may have an important role to play in working out an arrangement that could bring permanent and stable peace to the region. Once the dust settles on the military front, and the futility of war becomes apparent it may be time for the BRICS countries to raise a voice to demand a settlement based on the two-state solution that was adopted by the UN. Though Trump brushed this UN resolution aside and started taking over Gaza, once the war is over and he contemplates the economic cost of it to the US public – it costs US 1 – 2 billion dollars a day – he may realize the need for a solution acceptable to all. There have been several US presidents who were strong proponents of the two-state solution—an independent Palestinian state alongside Israel—as a core policy goal. Key proponents included George W. Bush (who first formally backed it in 2002), Bill Clinton, Barack Obama, and Joe Biden; they have viewed it as the most viable path to peace. Israel too after sustaining enormous damage may be forced to agree to a solution, if the US pressures it. Both Trump and Netanyahu, perhaps for personal reasons, wanted a war but they did not expect it to take the turn it has taken. Netanyahu’s days in power may be numbered and Trump may be forced by Republicans to change course as the majority of the US public does not approve of the war.

Therefore, time may be opportune for BRICS to stand together and call for a permanent solution to the Palestinian problem which is at the core of the Middle East conflict. Peace in the Middle East is vital for the further development of BRICS.

by N. A. de S. Amaratunga