Features
Events leading to the signing of the Indo-Lanka Agreement
JR tells Rajiv “We can forgive but we cannot forget”
(Excerpted from volume ii of the Amunugama autobiography)
It was at this dismal stage that a new development in the long drawn out negotiations emerged. Due to his cricketing contacts Gamini became close to N Ram of the Kasturi family controlling `The Hindu’ newspaper which though originating in Madras had an all-India coverage with a strong presence in New Delhi. This was later seen when ‘The Hindu’ destabilized the Rajiv regime with their ‘scoop’ on the Bofors scandal.
The Kasturis were Brahmins who were on top of the South Indian social register. In their background correspondence Ram and Gamini had the concurrence of Rajiv Gandhi, if not of the Indian foreign policy establishment. It is said in JRJ’s biography by Wriggins and De Silva that at this stage the LTTE through back channels had indicated that they were in favour of an agreement if the Northern and Eastern provinces were joined. A new element of an Indian guarantee of an enforcement of an agreement between the two parties now entered the scene.
As Bernard Tillekeratne has written “Ram’s letter of 12th June 198 7….. outlined a set of proposals on the important precondition that India would be the mediator in all the discussions and even more importantly that it would underwrite the implementation of any agreement reached. This letter was one of the first positive developments that culminated in the Indo-Lanka Accord of 29th July 1987”.
Regarding the allocation of powers to the Provincial Councils JRJ cut the Gordian knot by suggesting that we adopt ‘in toto’ the provisions of the Indian constitution regarding the devolution of powers to the States. Thus, there would be three lists as in India – the powers of the Centre, the powers of the Provincial Councils and a concurrent list in which certain powers were exercised by both the centre and the periphery.
Earlier the discussion centered on devolution only to the North-Eastern Provincial Council. JRJ decided that all areas in the country should be brought under the second tier scheme. Once this formula was accepted the difficult task of ‘selling’ it to the Sinhala and LTTE protagonists were undertaken by the two parties. The Indian operation was undertaken by Dixit and his political secretary in Colombo. After his deputy met Prabhakaran and his advisors in the Vanni several times, though it was later disputed by the LTTE, Dixit informed New Delhi that he had succeeded in persuading the LTTE leaders to lay down their arms once the agreement was signed.
JRJ was for the immediate signing of the accord as he knew that opposition would build up not only from the SLFP and JVP but also from factions within his own Government. It became clear that Premadasa was against such an agreement and was being set up as a virulent opponent of India with Athulathmudali’s encouragement. Once I was asked to bring some documents to the Cabinet room while Cabinet sessions were in progress. As I climbed up the stairs I ran into Prime Minister Premadasa rushing down the steps in anger. However there was no one following him to cool him down as they usually do in those Cabinet dramas.
Gamani Jayasuriya who represented the Sinhala Buddhist lobby resigned in protest. During this time I associated with Gamani Jayasuriya as we were both members of the Governing Council of CNAPT (Ceylon National Association for the Prevention of Tubercolosis)in which my friend of University days, Fonseka, was secretary. Fonseka, who was a well-known astrologer, had predicted that Gamani would be the Prime Minister when this fracas was over. After resigning Gamani would visit Fonseka almost daily to check whether his prediction was coming true. In the event it did not happen and Gamani died suddenly, a very disappointed man. All this showed that the time was fraught with confusion and society was in turmoil which was to break out in a long period of terror.
Indo-Lanka Accord
I was one of the few participants who was present at President’s House when the Indo-Lanka accord was signed in the afternoon of July 29. I accompanied Gamini Dissanayake for the signing of the accord by Rajiv Gandhi and JRJ. Rajiv was accompanied by Foreign Minister Narasimha Rao and advisor Natwar Singh. On our side, Foreign Minister Hameed, Hurulle, Minister of Buddhist Affairs, Minister Devanayagam representing the Tamils and the Eastern Province and Gamini Dissanayake were present. The Prime Minister Premadasa, Athulathmudali and, surprisingly, Ronnie de Mel boycotted the meeting.
It was clear that both Rajiv and JRJ looked on Gamini as the coming man in Sri Lanka. In JRJ’s eyes his search for a loyal follower for future UNP leadership was focused now without a doubt on Gamini. When all the signing was done Rajiv went up to a mike set up in the spacious garden and said a few words of conciliation. All eyes were on JRJ when he ambled up to the mike cool as he could be under the circumstances, and gave a mini lecture on Indo-Sri Lanka relations. He ended up by looking Rajiv straight in the eye and, distilling in words the agony that India had imposed on him by their derailing of his efforts to remake Sri Lanka, said to India; “We can forgive but we cannot forget”. He then led Rajiv on foot to his office in President’s square for a no holds barred Press Conference presided over by the two leaders.
This Press Conference was a historic one. The whole of Colombo was shut down and there was an eerie silence in the administrative square which housed the President’s office. The area was guarded by a strong police contingent. Only a few hours before, the armed services had evicted a large contingent of protesters led by Bhikkhus and the SLFP, who had staged a sit in near the Fort Railway station. Mrs. Bandaranaike herself had been present and had been bundled out by the Police adding to the violence that was unleashed by UNP goons against the protesters who were non-violent.
We could hear the police sirens from the battle grounds in the Pettah. Later we heard that about a dozen protesters were killed. There were reports that gangs of protesters were approaching Colombo city from the suburbs. JR appeared to be unfazed before the media but I knew that he was worried by the rising violence which was passing from SLFP control to the violent hotheads of the JVP. JRJ dominated the press conference with his short introduction and the taking of questions from the global media.
When asked by the press as to the delay in reaching an agreement he blamed himself He said, “It was a lack of courage on my part, a lack of intelligence on my part, a lack of foresight on my part”. It was a bravura performance rarely seen in modern politics. Rajiv looked on stunned by JRJ’s candour. The press then asked him ‘who else’ hoping to cast the net wide. JRJ replied with a smile ‘the media’ drawing a laugh from Rajiv and the hard-bitten journalists who had come to cover the historic event.
Looking back this conference was the biggest event dominated by JRJ during the last days of his regime. He spoke bravely when the country was in flames and his own fate was in the balance. From now on he was put on the defensive by the JVP, supported by the SUP, which unleashed a violence in the South which could not be contained by him and was to spill over to the Premadasa era till the JVP leaders were physically eliminated in 1989. Sri Lanka entered an era of uncertainty and social disruption which blighted the legacy of President Jayewardene which held spectacular promise in its first years. The monolithic UNP which held sway earlier was fragmented and it took all the leader’s skills to even keep it together and pass the baton on to Premadasa. But on that day the future was uncertain and posters threatening to ‘Kill the old man’ began to appear all over the country. An attempt was made on Rajiv’s life by a JVP indoctrinated naval rating and two Indian destroyers steamed into Colombo harbour to show that India will not stand idly by. It was a time of a national tragedy and all eyes were on the implementation of the Accord. The violence unleashed by the JVP compelled JRJ to ask Rajiv for the induction of the Indian Peace Keeping Force [IPKF] which was the first time after independence that a foreign military force was stationed in strength in the country with their own command structure and tasks which were identified by their own leaders.
The President could not deal with the military situation in his own country as he could not do battle in both the North and South of the country at the same time. It must be mentioned here that our military top brass concurred with this decision though they were unhappy to be ‘confined to barracks in the North’. This was particularly so because the Jawans’ who were flown in from South Indian bases were of poor quality.
On a visit to Katunayake I saw them emplane for the North from there. Sonic were dragging well fed goats with them, obviously for a tasty ‘mutton curry’ in their camp. Others were crowding the duty free shop buying everything available on their payday. Though they were under orders to confine themselves to the Northern and Eastern theatre, their intelligence had not indicated that Trincomalee district was multi-ethnic. Due to the activity of the IPKF and the LTTE and the enforced inactivity of the Sri Lankan army, the Sinhalese and Muslims of the East started to stream south for safety, adding more pressure on JRJ who could not depend on Premadasa or Lalith to support him. Only Gamini Dissanayake stood by him and I shuttled between ‘Braemar’ at id Dixit’s residence to seek information on the plans of the IPKF, since the chain of command was broken. To make matters worse, Dixit himself was not kept informed by the Indian Military in Trincomalee and he was getting alarmed and even threatening quit if he was being undercut by Delhi.
LTTE and JVP Reaction
According to the Indo-Lanka agreement the LTTE was to hand over their weapons to the Sri Lankan armed forces under Indian supervision. What actually happened was a farce which was enacted by the LTTE in violation of the agreement. The LTTE hid its heavy weapons and only offered a token pistol to the army. The other Tamil parties were ready to comply but had the legitimate fear that once they disarmed, they would be massacred by the LTTE. Government made plans for reconstruction of the North and East. The Indian High Commission under Dixit went on overdrive to please Rajiv but the media and the opposition in the South began a virulent campaign against the Indians. For the first time the hitherto monolithic UNP began to crack, largely because the PM and his coterie of MPs showed their displeasure in no uncertain terms.
Premadasa made his famous Angoda Temple speech criticizing the Accord and by implication the President. SLBC brought the tapes of the speech to me and asked for instructions regarding broadcasting it that night with the news. At this point news of my dilemma had reached Premadasa through his henchmen in SLBC.I got a call from Wijayadasa the PM’s Secretary, telling me that his boss was very disturbed by the delay and that I should not be guided by Gamini Dissanayake’s advice on this matter. It was a hot potato and I took the tapes and the DG of SLBC Anura Goonesekere to ‘Braemar’ for the President’s instructions. JRJ was worried and did not have his usual ‘sang froid’. He asked me what we should do and I suggested that we should use an edited version leaving out the venomous attacks. He agreed and we broadcast a watered down version that night.
That seemed to have satisfied the PM who had been informed by his henchmen that we would censor his speech ‘in toto’. Perhaps he was spoiling for a fight on this issue. JRJ on the other hand was very keen to retain the PM’s support at this crucial juncture. He was aware that the SLFP had dangled a carrot before Premadasa saying that the SLFP would back him and Mrs. B would not enter the fray if he sabotaged the Accord. It was a time of moves and countermoves and the Government which was designed to last forever and a day was on the edge of crumbling. Two Southern MPs who had ridden on JRJ’s coattails did not vote for the 13th amendment designed to give effect to the Accord. Another MP from the south who was considered to be a tough guy from Tangalle was murdered by the JVP on his way back from Colombo to his electorate.
The JVP under Rohana Wijeweera who was in hiding with his top leaders as his party was proscribed, launched a murderous attack on all those who supported the Accord, including the leaders of the left-particularly the LSSP, CP and the NLSSP who though advocates of revolution were ill prepared for political violence on this massive scale. While the LTTE had murdered left leaders of the North, the JVP followed suit by murdering leftists in the South. The CP which was active in the grassroots in the South and was a rival to the JVP was decimated.
An early indication of the ruthlessness of the JVP was the horrific murder of the popular student leader of the Colombo campus named Daya Pathirana who opposed their taking control of the student movement which was a power base for their politics. Another innovation of the JVP was the mass induction of young monks, particularly from the universities, as a cover for their political work and military operations. As De Silva and Wriggins have written, many of these monks made bloodcurdling threats which even embarrassed JVP members. As the encounters became even more violent some of these monks gave up robes and emerged as front line leaders of the party. Others, as I have described earlier, jumped ship by migrating to Europe where their supporters had infiltrated the new temples built by JVP oriented migrants in the hig cities.
Interlude
While the JVP and its allies stepped up their protests, the North saw a period of peace which was acclaimed by the international community. A relief and rehabilitation package was negotiated with international donors and inter district movement, particularly visits of Buddhists to Nagadipa, was encouraged. University administrators held their annual conference in Jaffna and we were able to arrange special railway trips from Colombo to Jaffna. Local and foreign journalists were encouraged to report from the North and business slowly resumed, particularly in respect of agricultural produce which was in high demand in the South. The situation was slowly returning to normal when several unfortunate events, some by design, upset the fragile peace. The first was the internecine conflict between the Tamil militants.
Many non LTTE groups became close to the IPKF and on occasion became their informers and proxies. At this stage the LTTE launched murderous attacks on the other Tamil parties partly because they had not given up their claim to be the ‘sole representative’ of the Tamil people and partly because the truce with the Sinhala forces enabled them to turn their attention to the rivals closer home who were being disarmed by the IPKF. The upshot was that ‘the short stay’ of the IPKF promised by Rajiv became a farce and they got bogged down in a disastrous war which finally led to the assassination of Rajiv himself. The LTTE was refusing to play by the Indian playbook and the country was slipping further and further into a cycle of violence over which nobody had control. This was a nightmare period for JRJ, who assailed in the North and South, had to confront dissatisfaction within his party ranks, led by the PM no less. Soon it became life threatening to the party leaders when an assassination attempt was launched by a JVP cadre who was a senior member in the party, inside Parliament itself The mistrust in the party had grown to such an extent that the PM was initially suspected of being one of the conspirators.
Assassination Attempt
While the UNP parliamentary group was meeting as customary in a committee room in parliament an employee opened a door to the room and lobbed a hand grenade into it. Without doubt the target was JRJ whom the JVP had built up as a hate figure. Luckily for the 81 year old President the grenade hit his desk and rolled away from him and exploded further away killing the MP for Morawaka, Abeywickreme. Lalith Athulathmudali was seriously injured and had to be rushed for emergency surgery. the Prime Minister was also injured but not seriously. According to the President he had been saved because the PM had pushed him under the table so that the shrapnel did not hit him. Within a short time after the attack I got a telephone call to say that the President wanted me to come immediately to the Army OPS Combine office in Flower road.
When I went there JRJ had just arrived with blood splattered all over his tunic. He was in shock and asked us what we should do? I had read much about the Kennedy assassination and told him that we had to immediately do two things. One was to ensure that there was no further attacks due from a wide ranging conspiracy and secondly to inform the country that he was safe and that the conspiracy had failed. He agreed and I sent for a Rupavahini camera crew and alerted the channels about an imminent announcement by the President.
JRJ wanted a few minutes to compose himself and faced the cameras in a live broadcast with the blood on his tunic seen clearly. He identified the attack as an assault on democracy and went out of his way to assure the public that the PM, though slightly injured, was safe. That took the sting out of the speculation that the PM had engineered this attack. It was a miracle that the President had survived but it added to his woes as a leader and encouraged some ministers, especially Ronnie de Mel and Nissanka Wijeratne to think of jumping ship. JRJ by shrewdly bringing in the PM as a victim ensured that the party would not be weakened further. The Thirteenth Amendment
Action now shifted to the 13th amendment which was to give legal effect to the provisions of the Indo-Lanka agreement. Challenges to it were launched by different opposing parties including the alliance of major opponents called the Mavbima Surakeeme Viyaparaya [MSV] which was led by Maduluwawe Sobhita. It was a powerful organization and with the JVP raising the ante with violence, the judgement of the full bench of the Supreme Court on the Constitutional amendment bill became absolutely crucial.
JRJ was confident of his two third majority in Parliament. But if it came to a need for approval in a referendum, the bill was as good as dead. Everybody was on tenterhooks while awaiting the verdict. Premadasa also realized at this juncture that he had gone too far. This was a period when, for the first time, JRJ and Premadasa were really estranged. With all the hostility to Premadasa in the party JRJ had stood by him and had given him his due. He remembered the time when he and Dudley had paid a salary to the up-and-coming Premadasa with their personal funds. Even at this stage he was loath to discipline the PM but he sent a clear message that he was annoyed by removing Sirisena Cooray from the Executive Committee of the party, together with Ronnie de Mel who had resigned from the Cabinet by then.
Premadasa then pulled back stating that he was willing to abide by the decision of the Supreme Court regarding the 13th amendment. This was because he had been assured by Raja Wanasundera who was a senior judge sitting on this very bench, that a referendum will become necessary. Raja was a close friend of M Fernando who acted as Premadasa’s emissary on this issue. But this tactic backfired because Justice Parinda Ranasinghe provided a majority to the verdict of the Bench of judges which held that a referendum was not necessary and that the amendment could be passed with a two third majority in Parliament. JR cracked the whip, and the Bill was passed in the midst of unprecedented security, when the MPs had to be bussed with an armed escort to Parliament and back to the heavily guarded hotel in Colombo which was booked for them. The PM true to his word moved the Bill in Parliament. But Colombo was like a war zone and the Government appeared to be tottering. This was a nightmare for JRJ, with his party officials being killed en masse and even some of his MPS like De Silva of Habaraduwa and Tikiri Banda of Galagedera being killed in a brutal fashion.
Features
Your six-year-old needs a tablet like a fish needs a smartphone
THE GREAT DIGITAL RETHINK — PART II
Nordic countries handed tablets to toddlers and called it early childhood education. Now they’re taking the tablets back, handing out pencils, and hoping nobody noticed. Meanwhile, the Global South is still signing the tablet contracts. Someone should probably warn them.
The Tablet Arrives in Preschool
It is 2013, a government minister stands in a preschool in Stockholm, handing a shiny tablet to a four-year-old. Press cameras click. A press release announces that Sweden is building the digital classrooms of the future. The child, who until recently had been learning to hold a crayon, now swipes confidently at a screen. Innovation! Progress! The future!
Fast forward to 2023, the same Swedish government, or at least its successors, announces that preschools were wrong to make digital devices mandatory. Children’s reading comprehension is declining. Books are going back on the shelves. Pencils are making a comeback. The preschool tablets are being quietly wheeled into storage, and nobody wants to talk about the press release.
What Finland Actually Did — And Is Now Undoing
Finland has long held a special place in the global education imagination. When PISA scores are published and Finland sits at or near the top, education ministers from Seoul to São Paulo take note and wonder what they are doing wrong. Finland is the benchmark. Finland is the proof that good education is possible.
Which makes it all the more significant that Finland, in 2025, passed legislation banning mobile phones from classrooms. Not just recommending restraint. Not just issuing guidelines. Banning them, with teachers empowered to confiscate devices that disrupt learning. The law covers both primary and secondary schools. It came after years of evidence that children were distracted, and that Finland’s own PISA scores had been falling.
But the phone ban is only part of the story. The deeper shift in Finnish primary education has been a quiet reassertion of analogue fundamentals. Early literacy is being treated again as a craft that requires time, patience, practice and, crucially, a pencil.
Sweden gave tablets to toddlers. Then took them back. The pencils were in a drawer the whole time.
Sweden’s Spectacular U-Turn
Sweden’s reversal is arguably the most dramatic in recent educational history, because Sweden had gone further than most in embracing early-years digitalisation. The country had not merely allowed devices in preschool, it had in places mandated them, treating digital interaction as a developmental right alongside physical play and social learning. There was a logic to it, however misplaced: if the future is digital, surely children should encounter that future as early as possible.
The problem is that young children are not miniature adults navigating a digital workplace. They are human beings in the early stages of acquiring language, developing fine-motor-skills, building concentration and learning to regulate their own attention. These are not processes that are enhanced by a swipeable screen. Research on early childhood development is consistent on this point: young children learn language through conversation, storytelling, and physical manipulation of objects. They learn to write by writing, by the slow, muscular, tactile process of forming letters with a hand.
By 2023, Swedish education authorities had seen enough. Reading comprehension scores were down. Handwriting was deteriorating. Teachers were reporting that children were arriving in primary school unable to hold a pen properly. The policy reversed. Books came back. Cursive writing was reintroduced. The national curriculum was amended. And Sweden became, instead, a cautionary tale about what happens when you swap crayons for touchscreens before children have learned what crayons are for.
Australia: Banning Phones at Lunch
Australia’s approach to primary school digitalisation has been somewhat less ideologically charged than Scandinavia’s, and accordingly its reversal has been more pragmatic than philosophical. Australian states and territories arrived at phone bans largely through the accumulating pressure of parent complaints, teacher frustration and growing evidence that smartphones were damaging the social fabric of school life, not just in classrooms, but in playgrounds.
Queensland’s ‘away for the day’ policy, introduced in Term 1 of 2024, was notable precisely because it extended beyond lesson time to cover break times as well. This was a direct acknowledgement that the problem was not simply digital distraction during learning, it was the way that always-on connectivity was transforming childhood itself. Children who spend every break time on a phone are not playing, not resolving social conflicts face to face, not developing the unstructured social skills that primary school has always, if accidentally, taught.
The cyberbullying dimension added particular urgency in Australia, where research showed that many incidents of online harassment between primary-school children were occurring during school hours, facilitated by the phones sitting in their pockets. Banning the phone at the school gate did not solve the problem of online cruelty, but it did remove the school day as a venue for it.
The Science of the Pencil
The cognitive argument for handwriting in primary education is, it turns out, and far more interesting than the popular ‘screens bad, pencils good’ slogan suggests. The research on note-taking in university students, the finding that handwritten notes produce better conceptual understanding than typed notes, has a more fundamental parallel in primary education.
When a young child learns to write by hand, they are not merely practising a motor skill. They are encoding letters through physical movement, which activates memory systems that visual recognition alone does not reach. Studies in developmental psychology suggest that children who learn to write letters by hand recognise them faster and more accurately than those who learn through typing or tracing on screens. The hand, it appears, teaches the brain in ways the finger-swipe does not.
This does not mean that digital tools have no place in primary education, nobody sensible is arguing that children should graduate from primary school unable to use a keyboard. The question is sequencing and proportion. The emerging consensus, hard-won through a decade of failed experiments, is that foundational literacy and numeracy need to be established through analogue means before digital tools are introduced as supplements. Screens can follow pencils. Pencils, it turns out, cannot follow screens without catching up on what was missed.
The hand teaches the brain in ways the finger-swipe does not. And it took a decade of falling scores to rediscover this.
The Rest of the World Is Still Buying Tablets
Here is the uncomfortable part. While Finland legislates, Sweden reverses course and Australia bans phones from playgrounds, a large portion of the world’s primary schools are doing the opposite. Governments across South and Southeast Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America are actively expanding device programmes in primary schools. Tablets are being distributed. Interactive whiteboards are being installed. AI tutoring apps are being piloted. The logic is identical to the logic Finland and Sweden followed 15 years ago: modernise, digitalise, equip children for the future.
The vendors selling these systems are not telling ministers about the Swedish U-turn. The development banks financing device programmes are not adjusting their models to reflect the OECD’s inverted-U curve. The international consultants advising education ministries are largely still working from a playbook written in 2010.
The lesson of the Nordic reversal is not that screens are evil, it is that screens at the wrong stage, in the wrong proportion, without the right pedagogical framework, undermine the very foundations they are supposed to build on. That lesson is available. The question is whether anyone is listening.
What Primary Schools Actually Need
Literacy and numeracy are not enhanced by early device saturation. They are built through reading aloud, through writing by hand, through mathematical reasoning with physical objects, and through the irreplaceable medium of a skilled teacher who knows their students.
Technology in primary education works best when it supplements a strong foundation, not when it substitutes for one that has not yet been built. Sweden and Finland did not fail because they used technology. They failed because they used it too extensively, and without asking what it was actually for. That question — what is this for? — is the one that every primary school system in the world should be asking before it signs another tablet contract.
SERIES ROADMAP Part I: From Ed-Tech Enthusiasm to De-Digitalisation | Part II: Phones, Pens & Early Literacy (this article) | Part III: Attention, Algorithms & Adolescents | Part IV: Universities, AI & the Handwritten Exam | Part V: A Critical Theory of Educational De-Digitalisation
(The writer, a senior Chartered Accountant and professional banker, is Professor at SLIIT, Malabe. The views and opinions expressed in this article are personal.)
Features
Government is willing to address the past
Minister Bimal Rathnayake has urged all Sri Lankan refugees in India to return to Sri Lanka, stating that provision has been made for their reintegration. He called on India to grant citizenship to those who wished to stay on in India, but added that the government would welcome them back with both hands if they chose Sri Lanka. He gave due credit to the Organisation for Eelam Refugees Rehabilitation (OfERR), an NGO led by S. C. Chandrahasan, the son of S. J. V. Chelvanayakam, widely regarded as the foremost advocate of a federal solution and a historic leader of the Federal Party. OfERR has for decades assisted refugees, particularly Sri Lankan Tamils in India, with documentation, advocacy and voluntary repatriation support. Given the slow pace of resettlement of Ditwah cyclone victims, the government will need to make adequate preparations for an influx of Indian returnees for which it will need all possible assistance. The minister’s acknowledgement indicates that the government appreciates the work of NGOs when they directly assist people.
The issue of Sri Lankan refugees in India is a legacy of the three-decade long war that induced mass migration of Tamil people to foreign countries. According to widely cited estimates, the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora today exceeds one million and is often placed between 1 and 1.5 million globally, with large communities in Canada, the United Kingdom and Australia. India, particularly Tamil Nadu, continues to host a significant refugee population. Current figures indicate that approximately 58,000 to 60,000 Sri Lankan Tamil refugees live in camps in India, with a further 30,000 to 35,000 living outside camps, bringing the total to around 90,000. These numbers have declined over time but remain one of the most visible human legacies of the conflict.
The fact that the government has chosen to make this announcement at this time indicates that it is not attempting to gloss over the human rights issues of the past that continue into the present. Those who suffered victimisation during the war may be encouraged that their concerns remain on the national agenda and have not been forgotten. Apart from those who continue to be refugees in India, there are more than 14,000 complaints of missing persons still under investigation according to the Office on Missing Persons, which has received tens of thousands of complaints since its establishment. There are also unresolved issues of land taken over by the military as high security zones, though some land has been released, and prisoners held in long term detention under the Prevention of Terrorism Act, which the government has pledged to repeal and replace.
Sequenced Response
In addressing the issue of Sri Lankan Tamil refugees in India, the government is sending a message to the Tamil people that it is not going to gloss over the past. The indications are that the government is sequencing its responses to problems arising from the past. The government faces a range of urgent challenges, some inherited from previous governments, such as war era human rights concerns, and others that have arisen more recently after it took office. The most impactful of these crises are not of its own making. Global economic instability has affected Sri Lanka significantly. The Middle East war has contributed to a shortage of essential fuels and fertilizers worldwide. Sri Lanka is particularly vulnerable to rising fuel prices. Just months prior to these global pressures, Sri Lanka faced severe climate related shocks, including being hit by a cyclone that led to floods and landslides across multiple districts and caused loss of life and extensive damage to property and livelihoods.
From the beginning of its term, the government has been compelled to prioritise economic recovery and corruption linked to the economy, which were central to its electoral mandate. As the International Monetary Fund has emphasised, Sri Lanka must continue reforms to restore macroeconomic stability, reduce debt vulnerabilities and strengthen governance. The economic problems that the government must address are urgent and affect all communities, whether in the north or south, and across Sinhalese, Tamil and Muslim populations. These problems cannot be postponed. However, issues such as dealing with the past, holding provincial council elections and reforming the constitution are not experienced as equally urgent by the majority, even though they are of deep importance to minorities. Indeed, the provincial council system was designed to address the concerns of the minorities and a solution to their problems.
Unresolved grievances tend to reappear in new forms when not addressed through political processes. Therefore, they need to be addressed sooner rather than later, even if they are not the most immediate priorities for the government. It must not be forgotten that the ethnic conflict and the three decade long war it generated was the single most destructive blow to the country, greatly diminishing its prospects for rapid economic development. Prolonged conflict reduced investment, diverted public expenditure and weakened institutions. If Sri Lanka’s early leaders had been able to negotiate peacefully and resolve their differences, the country might have fulfilled predictions that it could become the “Switzerland of the East.”
Present Opportunity
The present government has a rare opportunity to address the issues of the past in a way that ensures long term peace and justice. It has a two thirds majority in parliament, giving it the constitutional space to undertake significant reforms. It has also demonstrated a more inclusive approach to ethnic and religious minorities than many earlier governments which either mobilized ethnic nationalism for its own purposes or feared it too much to take political risks to undertake necessary reforms. Public trust in the government, as noted by international observers, remains relatively strong. During her recent visit, IMF Director General Kristalina Georgieva stated that “there is a window of opportunity for Sri Lanka,” noting that public trust in the government provides a foundation for reform.
It also appears that decades of public education on democracy, human rights and coexistence have had positive effects. This education, carried out by civil society organisations over several decades, sometimes in support of government initiatives and more often in the face of government opposition, provides a foundation for political reform aimed at justice and reconciliation. Civil society initiatives, inter-ethnic dialogue and rights-based advocacy have contributed to shaping a more informed public about controversial issues such as power-sharing, federalism and accountability for war crimes. The government would do well to expand the appreciation it has deservedly given to OfERR to other NGOs that have dedicated themselves addressing the ethnic and religious mistrust in the country and creating greater social cohesion.
The challenge for the government is to engage in reconciliation without undue delay, even as other pressures continue to grow. Sequencing is necessary, but indefinite postponement carries risks. If this opportunity for conflict resolution is not taken, it may be a long time before another presents itself. Sri Lanka may then continue to underperform economically, remaining an ethnically divided polity, not in open warfare, but constrained by unresolved tensions. The government’s recent reference to Tamil refugees in India is therefore significant. It shows that even while prioritising urgent economic and global challenges, it has not forgotten the past. Sri Lanka has a government with both the mandate and the capacity to address that past in a manner that secures a more stable and just future for all its people.
By Jehan Perera
Features
Strategic diplomacy at Sea: Reading the signals from Hormuz
The unfolding tensions and diplomatic manoeuvres around the Strait of Hormuz offer more than a snapshot of regional instability. They reveal a deeper transformation in global statecraft, one where influence is exercised through calibrated engagement rather than outright confrontation. This is strategic diplomacy in its modern form: restrained, calculated, and layered with competing interests.
At first glance, the current developments may appear as routine diplomatic exchanges aimed at preventing escalation. However, beneath the surface lies a complex web of signalling among major and middle powers. The United States seeks to maintain deterrence without triggering an open conflict. Iran aims to resist pressure while avoiding isolation. Meanwhile, China and India, two rising powers with expanding global interests are navigating the situation with careful precision.
China’s position is anchored in economic pragmatism. As a major importer of Gulf energy, Beijing has a direct stake in ensuring that the Strait of Hormuz remains open and stable. Any disruption would reverberate through its industrial base and global supply chains. Consequently, China advocates de-escalation and diplomatic resolution. Yet, this is not purely altruistic. Stability serves China’s long-term strategic ambitions, including the protection of its Belt and Road investments and maritime routes. At the same time, Beijing remains alert to India’s growing diplomatic footprint in the region. Should India deepen its engagement with Iran and other Gulf actors, it could gradually reshape the strategic balance in areas traditionally influenced by China.
India’s approach, in contrast, reflects a confident and increasingly sophisticated foreign policy. By engaging Iran directly, while maintaining working relationships with Western powers, New Delhi is positioning itself as a credible intermediary. This is not merely about energy security, though that remains a key driver. It is also about strategic autonomy the ability to act independently in a multipolar world. India’s diplomacy signals that it is no longer a passive player but an active shaper of regional outcomes. Its engagement with Iran, particularly in the context of connectivity and trade routes, underscores its intent to secure long-term strategic access while countering potential encirclement.
Iran, for its part, views the situation through the lens of survival and strategic resilience. Years of sanctions and pressure have shaped a cautious but pragmatic diplomatic posture. Engagement with external actors, including India and China, provides Tehran with avenues to ease isolation and assert relevance. However, Iran’s trust deficit remains significant. Its diplomacy is transactional, focused on immediate gains rather than long-term alignment. The current environment offers opportunities for tactical advantage, but Iran is unlikely to make concessions that could compromise its core strategic objectives.
Even actors on the periphery, such as North Korea, are closely observing these developments. Pyongyang interprets global events through a narrow but consistent framework: regime survival through deterrence. The situation around Iran reinforces its belief that leverage, particularly military capability, is a prerequisite for meaningful negotiation. While North Korea is not directly involved, it draws lessons that may shape its own strategic calculations.
What emerges from these varied perspectives is a clear departure from traditional bloc-based geopolitics. The world is moving towards a more fluid and fragmented order, where alignments are temporary and issue-specific. States cooperate on certain matters while competing with others. This creates a dynamic but unpredictable environment, where misinterpretation and miscalculation remain constant risks.
It is within this evolving context that Sri Lanka’s strategic relevance becomes increasingly visible. The recent visit by the US Special Envoy for South and Central Asia, Sergio Gor, to the Colombo Port; is not a routine diplomatic courtesy call. It is a signal. Ports are no longer just commercial gateways; they are strategic assets embedded in global power competition. A visit of this nature underscores how Sri Lanka’s maritime infrastructure is being viewed through a geopolitical lens particularly in relation to sea lane security, logistics, and regional influence.
Such engagements reflect a broader reality: global powers are not only watching the Strait of Hormuz but are also positioning themselves along the wider Indian Ocean network that connects it. Colombo, situated along one of the busiest east–west shipping routes, becomes part of this extended strategic theatre. The presence and interest of external actors in Sri Lanka’s ports highlight an emerging pattern of influence without overt control a hallmark of modern strategic diplomacy.
For Sri Lanka, these developments are far from abstract. The island’s strategic location along major Indian Ocean shipping routes places it at the intersection of these global currents. The Strait of Hormuz is a vital artery for global energy flows, and any disruption would have immediate consequences for Sri Lanka’s economy, particularly in terms of fuel prices and supply stability.
Moreover, Sri Lanka must manage the competing interests of larger powers operating within its vicinity. India’s expanding regional role, China’s entrenched economic presence, and the growing attention from the United States all converge in the Indian Ocean. This requires a careful balancing act. Aligning too closely with any one power risks alienating others, while inaction could leave Sri Lanka vulnerable to external pressures.
The appropriate response lies in adopting a robust foreign policy that engages all major stakeholders while preserving national autonomy. This involves strengthening diplomatic channels, enhancing maritime security capabilities, and investing in strategic foresight. Sri Lanka must also recognise the growing importance of non-traditional security domains, including cyber threats and information warfare, which increasingly accompany geopolitical competition.
Equally important is the need for internal coherence. Effective diplomacy abroad must be supported by institutional strength at home. Policy consistency, professional expertise, and strategic clarity are essential if Sri Lanka is to navigate an increasingly complex international environment.
The situation in the Strait of Hormuz thus serves as both a warning and an opportunity. It highlights the fragility of global systems, but also underscores the potential for skilled diplomacy to manage tensions. For Sri Lanka, the challenge is not merely to observe these developments, but to position itself wisely within them.
In a world where power is no longer exercised solely through force, but through influence and presence, strategic diplomacy becomes not just an option, but a necessity. The nations that succeed will be those that understand this shift now and act with clarity, balance, and foresight.
Mahil Dole is a senior Sri Lankan police officer with over four decades of experience in law enforcement and intelligence. He previously served as Head of the Counter-Terrorism Division of the State Intelligence Service and has conducted extensive interviews with more than 100 suicide cadres linked to terrorist organisations. He is a graduate of the Asia-Pacific Centre for Security Studies (Hawaii).
By Mahil Dole
Senior Police Officer (Retd.), Former Head of Counter-Terrorism Division, State Intelligence Service, Sri Lanka
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