Features
Events leading to the signing of the Indo-Lanka Agreement

JR tells Rajiv “We can forgive but we cannot forget”
(Excerpted from volume ii of the Amunugama autobiography)
It was at this dismal stage that a new development in the long drawn out negotiations emerged. Due to his cricketing contacts Gamini became close to N Ram of the Kasturi family controlling `The Hindu’ newspaper which though originating in Madras had an all-India coverage with a strong presence in New Delhi. This was later seen when ‘The Hindu’ destabilized the Rajiv regime with their ‘scoop’ on the Bofors scandal.
The Kasturis were Brahmins who were on top of the South Indian social register. In their background correspondence Ram and Gamini had the concurrence of Rajiv Gandhi, if not of the Indian foreign policy establishment. It is said in JRJ’s biography by Wriggins and De Silva that at this stage the LTTE through back channels had indicated that they were in favour of an agreement if the Northern and Eastern provinces were joined. A new element of an Indian guarantee of an enforcement of an agreement between the two parties now entered the scene.
As Bernard Tillekeratne has written “Ram’s letter of 12th June 198 7….. outlined a set of proposals on the important precondition that India would be the mediator in all the discussions and even more importantly that it would underwrite the implementation of any agreement reached. This letter was one of the first positive developments that culminated in the Indo-Lanka Accord of 29th July 1987”.
Regarding the allocation of powers to the Provincial Councils JRJ cut the Gordian knot by suggesting that we adopt ‘in toto’ the provisions of the Indian constitution regarding the devolution of powers to the States. Thus, there would be three lists as in India – the powers of the Centre, the powers of the Provincial Councils and a concurrent list in which certain powers were exercised by both the centre and the periphery.
Earlier the discussion centered on devolution only to the North-Eastern Provincial Council. JRJ decided that all areas in the country should be brought under the second tier scheme. Once this formula was accepted the difficult task of ‘selling’ it to the Sinhala and LTTE protagonists were undertaken by the two parties. The Indian operation was undertaken by Dixit and his political secretary in Colombo. After his deputy met Prabhakaran and his advisors in the Vanni several times, though it was later disputed by the LTTE, Dixit informed New Delhi that he had succeeded in persuading the LTTE leaders to lay down their arms once the agreement was signed.
JRJ was for the immediate signing of the accord as he knew that opposition would build up not only from the SLFP and JVP but also from factions within his own Government. It became clear that Premadasa was against such an agreement and was being set up as a virulent opponent of India with Athulathmudali’s encouragement. Once I was asked to bring some documents to the Cabinet room while Cabinet sessions were in progress. As I climbed up the stairs I ran into Prime Minister Premadasa rushing down the steps in anger. However there was no one following him to cool him down as they usually do in those Cabinet dramas.
Gamani Jayasuriya who represented the Sinhala Buddhist lobby resigned in protest. During this time I associated with Gamani Jayasuriya as we were both members of the Governing Council of CNAPT (Ceylon National Association for the Prevention of Tubercolosis)in which my friend of University days, Fonseka, was secretary. Fonseka, who was a well-known astrologer, had predicted that Gamani would be the Prime Minister when this fracas was over. After resigning Gamani would visit Fonseka almost daily to check whether his prediction was coming true. In the event it did not happen and Gamani died suddenly, a very disappointed man. All this showed that the time was fraught with confusion and society was in turmoil which was to break out in a long period of terror.
Indo-Lanka Accord
I was one of the few participants who was present at President’s House when the Indo-Lanka accord was signed in the afternoon of July 29. I accompanied Gamini Dissanayake for the signing of the accord by Rajiv Gandhi and JRJ. Rajiv was accompanied by Foreign Minister Narasimha Rao and advisor Natwar Singh. On our side, Foreign Minister Hameed, Hurulle, Minister of Buddhist Affairs, Minister Devanayagam representing the Tamils and the Eastern Province and Gamini Dissanayake were present. The Prime Minister Premadasa, Athulathmudali and, surprisingly, Ronnie de Mel boycotted the meeting.
It was clear that both Rajiv and JRJ looked on Gamini as the coming man in Sri Lanka. In JRJ’s eyes his search for a loyal follower for future UNP leadership was focused now without a doubt on Gamini. When all the signing was done Rajiv went up to a mike set up in the spacious garden and said a few words of conciliation. All eyes were on JRJ when he ambled up to the mike cool as he could be under the circumstances, and gave a mini lecture on Indo-Sri Lanka relations. He ended up by looking Rajiv straight in the eye and, distilling in words the agony that India had imposed on him by their derailing of his efforts to remake Sri Lanka, said to India; “We can forgive but we cannot forget”. He then led Rajiv on foot to his office in President’s square for a no holds barred Press Conference presided over by the two leaders.
This Press Conference was a historic one. The whole of Colombo was shut down and there was an eerie silence in the administrative square which housed the President’s office. The area was guarded by a strong police contingent. Only a few hours before, the armed services had evicted a large contingent of protesters led by Bhikkhus and the SLFP, who had staged a sit in near the Fort Railway station. Mrs. Bandaranaike herself had been present and had been bundled out by the Police adding to the violence that was unleashed by UNP goons against the protesters who were non-violent.
We could hear the police sirens from the battle grounds in the Pettah. Later we heard that about a dozen protesters were killed. There were reports that gangs of protesters were approaching Colombo city from the suburbs. JR appeared to be unfazed before the media but I knew that he was worried by the rising violence which was passing from SLFP control to the violent hotheads of the JVP. JRJ dominated the press conference with his short introduction and the taking of questions from the global media.
When asked by the press as to the delay in reaching an agreement he blamed himself He said, “It was a lack of courage on my part, a lack of intelligence on my part, a lack of foresight on my part”. It was a bravura performance rarely seen in modern politics. Rajiv looked on stunned by JRJ’s candour. The press then asked him ‘who else’ hoping to cast the net wide. JRJ replied with a smile ‘the media’ drawing a laugh from Rajiv and the hard-bitten journalists who had come to cover the historic event.
Looking back this conference was the biggest event dominated by JRJ during the last days of his regime. He spoke bravely when the country was in flames and his own fate was in the balance. From now on he was put on the defensive by the JVP, supported by the SUP, which unleashed a violence in the South which could not be contained by him and was to spill over to the Premadasa era till the JVP leaders were physically eliminated in 1989. Sri Lanka entered an era of uncertainty and social disruption which blighted the legacy of President Jayewardene which held spectacular promise in its first years. The monolithic UNP which held sway earlier was fragmented and it took all the leader’s skills to even keep it together and pass the baton on to Premadasa. But on that day the future was uncertain and posters threatening to ‘Kill the old man’ began to appear all over the country. An attempt was made on Rajiv’s life by a JVP indoctrinated naval rating and two Indian destroyers steamed into Colombo harbour to show that India will not stand idly by. It was a time of a national tragedy and all eyes were on the implementation of the Accord. The violence unleashed by the JVP compelled JRJ to ask Rajiv for the induction of the Indian Peace Keeping Force [IPKF] which was the first time after independence that a foreign military force was stationed in strength in the country with their own command structure and tasks which were identified by their own leaders.
The President could not deal with the military situation in his own country as he could not do battle in both the North and South of the country at the same time. It must be mentioned here that our military top brass concurred with this decision though they were unhappy to be ‘confined to barracks in the North’. This was particularly so because the Jawans’ who were flown in from South Indian bases were of poor quality.
On a visit to Katunayake I saw them emplane for the North from there. Sonic were dragging well fed goats with them, obviously for a tasty ‘mutton curry’ in their camp. Others were crowding the duty free shop buying everything available on their payday. Though they were under orders to confine themselves to the Northern and Eastern theatre, their intelligence had not indicated that Trincomalee district was multi-ethnic. Due to the activity of the IPKF and the LTTE and the enforced inactivity of the Sri Lankan army, the Sinhalese and Muslims of the East started to stream south for safety, adding more pressure on JRJ who could not depend on Premadasa or Lalith to support him. Only Gamini Dissanayake stood by him and I shuttled between ‘Braemar’ at id Dixit’s residence to seek information on the plans of the IPKF, since the chain of command was broken. To make matters worse, Dixit himself was not kept informed by the Indian Military in Trincomalee and he was getting alarmed and even threatening quit if he was being undercut by Delhi.
LTTE and JVP Reaction
According to the Indo-Lanka agreement the LTTE was to hand over their weapons to the Sri Lankan armed forces under Indian supervision. What actually happened was a farce which was enacted by the LTTE in violation of the agreement. The LTTE hid its heavy weapons and only offered a token pistol to the army. The other Tamil parties were ready to comply but had the legitimate fear that once they disarmed, they would be massacred by the LTTE. Government made plans for reconstruction of the North and East. The Indian High Commission under Dixit went on overdrive to please Rajiv but the media and the opposition in the South began a virulent campaign against the Indians. For the first time the hitherto monolithic UNP began to crack, largely because the PM and his coterie of MPs showed their displeasure in no uncertain terms.
Premadasa made his famous Angoda Temple speech criticizing the Accord and by implication the President. SLBC brought the tapes of the speech to me and asked for instructions regarding broadcasting it that night with the news. At this point news of my dilemma had reached Premadasa through his henchmen in SLBC.I got a call from Wijayadasa the PM’s Secretary, telling me that his boss was very disturbed by the delay and that I should not be guided by Gamini Dissanayake’s advice on this matter. It was a hot potato and I took the tapes and the DG of SLBC Anura Goonesekere to ‘Braemar’ for the President’s instructions. JRJ was worried and did not have his usual ‘sang froid’. He asked me what we should do and I suggested that we should use an edited version leaving out the venomous attacks. He agreed and we broadcast a watered down version that night.
That seemed to have satisfied the PM who had been informed by his henchmen that we would censor his speech ‘in toto’. Perhaps he was spoiling for a fight on this issue. JRJ on the other hand was very keen to retain the PM’s support at this crucial juncture. He was aware that the SLFP had dangled a carrot before Premadasa saying that the SLFP would back him and Mrs. B would not enter the fray if he sabotaged the Accord. It was a time of moves and countermoves and the Government which was designed to last forever and a day was on the edge of crumbling. Two Southern MPs who had ridden on JRJ’s coattails did not vote for the 13th amendment designed to give effect to the Accord. Another MP from the south who was considered to be a tough guy from Tangalle was murdered by the JVP on his way back from Colombo to his electorate.
The JVP under Rohana Wijeweera who was in hiding with his top leaders as his party was proscribed, launched a murderous attack on all those who supported the Accord, including the leaders of the left-particularly the LSSP, CP and the NLSSP who though advocates of revolution were ill prepared for political violence on this massive scale. While the LTTE had murdered left leaders of the North, the JVP followed suit by murdering leftists in the South. The CP which was active in the grassroots in the South and was a rival to the JVP was decimated.
An early indication of the ruthlessness of the JVP was the horrific murder of the popular student leader of the Colombo campus named Daya Pathirana who opposed their taking control of the student movement which was a power base for their politics. Another innovation of the JVP was the mass induction of young monks, particularly from the universities, as a cover for their political work and military operations. As De Silva and Wriggins have written, many of these monks made bloodcurdling threats which even embarrassed JVP members. As the encounters became even more violent some of these monks gave up robes and emerged as front line leaders of the party. Others, as I have described earlier, jumped ship by migrating to Europe where their supporters had infiltrated the new temples built by JVP oriented migrants in the hig cities.
Interlude
While the JVP and its allies stepped up their protests, the North saw a period of peace which was acclaimed by the international community. A relief and rehabilitation package was negotiated with international donors and inter district movement, particularly visits of Buddhists to Nagadipa, was encouraged. University administrators held their annual conference in Jaffna and we were able to arrange special railway trips from Colombo to Jaffna. Local and foreign journalists were encouraged to report from the North and business slowly resumed, particularly in respect of agricultural produce which was in high demand in the South. The situation was slowly returning to normal when several unfortunate events, some by design, upset the fragile peace. The first was the internecine conflict between the Tamil militants.
Many non LTTE groups became close to the IPKF and on occasion became their informers and proxies. At this stage the LTTE launched murderous attacks on the other Tamil parties partly because they had not given up their claim to be the ‘sole representative’ of the Tamil people and partly because the truce with the Sinhala forces enabled them to turn their attention to the rivals closer home who were being disarmed by the IPKF. The upshot was that ‘the short stay’ of the IPKF promised by Rajiv became a farce and they got bogged down in a disastrous war which finally led to the assassination of Rajiv himself. The LTTE was refusing to play by the Indian playbook and the country was slipping further and further into a cycle of violence over which nobody had control. This was a nightmare period for JRJ, who assailed in the North and South, had to confront dissatisfaction within his party ranks, led by the PM no less. Soon it became life threatening to the party leaders when an assassination attempt was launched by a JVP cadre who was a senior member in the party, inside Parliament itself The mistrust in the party had grown to such an extent that the PM was initially suspected of being one of the conspirators.
Assassination Attempt
While the UNP parliamentary group was meeting as customary in a committee room in parliament an employee opened a door to the room and lobbed a hand grenade into it. Without doubt the target was JRJ whom the JVP had built up as a hate figure. Luckily for the 81 year old President the grenade hit his desk and rolled away from him and exploded further away killing the MP for Morawaka, Abeywickreme. Lalith Athulathmudali was seriously injured and had to be rushed for emergency surgery. the Prime Minister was also injured but not seriously. According to the President he had been saved because the PM had pushed him under the table so that the shrapnel did not hit him. Within a short time after the attack I got a telephone call to say that the President wanted me to come immediately to the Army OPS Combine office in Flower road.
When I went there JRJ had just arrived with blood splattered all over his tunic. He was in shock and asked us what we should do? I had read much about the Kennedy assassination and told him that we had to immediately do two things. One was to ensure that there was no further attacks due from a wide ranging conspiracy and secondly to inform the country that he was safe and that the conspiracy had failed. He agreed and I sent for a Rupavahini camera crew and alerted the channels about an imminent announcement by the President.
JRJ wanted a few minutes to compose himself and faced the cameras in a live broadcast with the blood on his tunic seen clearly. He identified the attack as an assault on democracy and went out of his way to assure the public that the PM, though slightly injured, was safe. That took the sting out of the speculation that the PM had engineered this attack. It was a miracle that the President had survived but it added to his woes as a leader and encouraged some ministers, especially Ronnie de Mel and Nissanka Wijeratne to think of jumping ship. JRJ by shrewdly bringing in the PM as a victim ensured that the party would not be weakened further. The Thirteenth Amendment
Action now shifted to the 13th amendment which was to give legal effect to the provisions of the Indo-Lanka agreement. Challenges to it were launched by different opposing parties including the alliance of major opponents called the Mavbima Surakeeme Viyaparaya [MSV] which was led by Maduluwawe Sobhita. It was a powerful organization and with the JVP raising the ante with violence, the judgement of the full bench of the Supreme Court on the Constitutional amendment bill became absolutely crucial.
JRJ was confident of his two third majority in Parliament. But if it came to a need for approval in a referendum, the bill was as good as dead. Everybody was on tenterhooks while awaiting the verdict. Premadasa also realized at this juncture that he had gone too far. This was a period when, for the first time, JRJ and Premadasa were really estranged. With all the hostility to Premadasa in the party JRJ had stood by him and had given him his due. He remembered the time when he and Dudley had paid a salary to the up-and-coming Premadasa with their personal funds. Even at this stage he was loath to discipline the PM but he sent a clear message that he was annoyed by removing Sirisena Cooray from the Executive Committee of the party, together with Ronnie de Mel who had resigned from the Cabinet by then.
Premadasa then pulled back stating that he was willing to abide by the decision of the Supreme Court regarding the 13th amendment. This was because he had been assured by Raja Wanasundera who was a senior judge sitting on this very bench, that a referendum will become necessary. Raja was a close friend of M Fernando who acted as Premadasa’s emissary on this issue. But this tactic backfired because Justice Parinda Ranasinghe provided a majority to the verdict of the Bench of judges which held that a referendum was not necessary and that the amendment could be passed with a two third majority in Parliament. JR cracked the whip, and the Bill was passed in the midst of unprecedented security, when the MPs had to be bussed with an armed escort to Parliament and back to the heavily guarded hotel in Colombo which was booked for them. The PM true to his word moved the Bill in Parliament. But Colombo was like a war zone and the Government appeared to be tottering. This was a nightmare for JRJ, with his party officials being killed en masse and even some of his MPS like De Silva of Habaraduwa and Tikiri Banda of Galagedera being killed in a brutal fashion.
Features
Sri Lanka’s Foreign Policy amid Geopolitical Transformations: 1990-2024 – Part I

Sri Lanka’s survival and independence have historically depended on accurately identifying foreign policy priorities, selecting viable strategies as a small island state, and advancing them with prudence. This requires an objective assessment of the shifting geopolitical landscape through a distinctly Sri Lankan strategic lens. Consequently, foreign policy has been central to Sri Lanka’s statecraft, warranted by its pivotal location in the Indian Ocean—adjacent to South Asia yet separated by a narrow stretch of water.
Amid pivotal geopolitical transformations in motion across South Asia, in the Indian Ocean, and beyond, the formulation and implementation of Sri Lanka’s foreign policy has never been more critical to its national security. Despite the pressing need for a cohesive policy framework, Sri Lanka’s foreign policy, over the past few decades, has struggled to effectively respond to the challenges posed by shifting geopolitical dynamics. This article examines the evolution of Sri Lanka’s foreign policy and its inconsistencies amid shifting geopolitical dynamics since the end of the Cold War.
First
, the article examines geopolitical shifts in three key spaces—South Asia, the Indian Ocean, and the global arena—since the end of the Cold War, from Sri Lanka’s strategic perspective. Building on this, second, it analyses Sri Lanka’s foreign policy responses, emphasising its role as a key instrument of statecraft. Third, it explores the link between Sri Lanka’s foreign policy dilemmas during this period and the ongoing crisis of the post-colonial state. Finally, the article concludes that while geopolitical constraints persist, Sri Lanka’s ability to adopt a more proactive foreign policy depends on internal political and economic reforms that strengthen democracy and inclusivity.
Shifting South Asian Strategic Dynamics
Geopolitical concerns in South Asia—Sri Lanka’s immediate sphere—take precedence, as the country is inherently tied to the Indo-centric South Asian socio-cultural milieu. Sri Lanka’s foreign policy has long faced challenges in navigating its relationship with India, conditioned by a perceived disparity in power capabilities between the two countries. This dynamic has made the ‘India factor’ a persistent consideration in Sri Lanka’s strategic thinking. As Ivor Jennings observed in 1951, ‘India thus appears as a friendly but potentially dangerous neighbour, to whom one must be polite but a little distant’ (Jennings, 1951, 113).The importance of managing the ‘India Factor’ in Sri Lankan foreign policy has grown further with India’s advancements in military strength, economic development, and the knowledge industry, positioning it as a rising global great power on Sri Lanka’s doorstep.
India’s Strategic Rise
Over the past three decades, South Asia’s geopolitical landscape has undergone a profound transformation, driven by India’s strategic rise as a global great power. Barry Buzan (2002:2) foresees this shift within the South Asian regional system as a transition from asymmetric bipolarity to India-centric unipolarity. India’s continuous military advancements have elevated it to the fourth position in the Global Firepower (GFP) index, highlighting its formidable conventional war-making capabilities across land, sea, and air (Global Firepower, 2024). It currently lays claims to being the world’s third-largest military, the fourth-largest Air Force, and the fifth-largest Navy.
India consistently ranks among the fastest-growing major economies, often surpassing the global average. According to Forbes India, India is projected to be the world’s fifth-largest economy in 2025, with a real GDP growth rate of 6.5% (Forbes, January 10, 2025). India’s strategic ascendance is increasingly driven by its advancements in the knowledge industry. The country is actively embracing the Fourth Industrial Revolution (4IR) and emerging as the Digital Public Infrastructure (DPI) hub of South Asia. However, India’s rise has a paradoxical impact on its neighbours. On one hand, it offers them an opportunity to integrate into a rapidly expanding economic engine. On the other, it heightens concerns over India’s dominance, leaving them feeling increasingly overshadowed by the regional giant.
Despite significant geo-strategic transformations, the longstanding antagonism and strategic rivalry between India and Pakistan have persisted into the new millennium, continuing to shape South Asia’s security landscape. Born in 1947 amid mutual hostility, the two countries remained locked in a multi-dimensional conflict encompassing territorial disputes, power equilibrium, threat perceptions, accusations of interference in each other’s domestic affairs, and divergent foreign policy approaches. The acquisition of nuclear weapons by both countries in 1998 added a new dimension to their rivalry.
The SAARC process has been a notable casualty of the enduring Indo-Pakistani rivalry. Since India’s boycott of the Islamabad Summit in response to the 2016 Uri attack in Kashmir, the SAARC process has remained in limbo. Countries like Sri Lanka, which seek to maintain equally amicable relations with both India and Pakistan, often find themselves in awkward positions due to the ongoing rivalry between them. One of the key challenges for Sri Lanka’s foreign policy is maintaining strong relations with Pakistan while ensuring its ties with India remain unaffected. India now actively promotes regional cooperation bodies in South Asia, excluding Pakistan, favouring broader frameworks such as BIMSTEC. While Sri Lanka can benefit greatly from engaging with these regional initiatives, it must carefully navigate its involvement to avoid inadvertently aligning with India’s efforts to contain Pakistan. Maintaining this balance will require sharp diplomatic acumen.
India’s expansive naval strategy, especially its development of onshore naval infrastructure, has positioned Sri Lanka within its maritime sphere of influence. As part of the Maritime Infrastructure Perspective Plan (MIPP) launched in 2015 to enhance operational readiness and surveillance capabilities, India is developing an alternative nuclear submarine base for the Eastern Command under Project Varsha (Deccan Chronicle, 22.11.2016). This base is located in Rambilli village, 50 km southwest of Visakhapatnam and 1,200 km from Colombo (Chang, 2024). Additionally, INS Dega, the naval air base at Visakhapatnam, is being expanded to accommodate Vikrant’s MiG-29K and Tejas fighter aircraft.
Another key strategic development in India’s ascent that warrants serious attention in Sri Lanka’s foreign policy formulation is India’s progress in missile delivery systems (ICBMs and SLBMs) and nuclear-powered submarines. In 1998, India made it clear that its future nuclear deterrence would be based on a nuclear triad consisting of land-based Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and strategic bombers (Rehman, 2015). Since then, India has steadily advanced in this direction. The expansion of India’s missile delivery systems, including ICBMs and SLBMs, serves as a reminder that Sri Lanka exists under the strategic shadow of a major global power.
The development of India’s nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) accelerated after 2016. The first in this class, INS Arihant (S2), was commissioned in August 2016, followed by the launch of INS Arighat in November 2021. Designed for strategic deterrence, INS Arighat is equipped to carry the Sagarika K-4 submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), with a range of 3,500 kilometers, as well as the K-5, a long-range SLBM capable of reaching 5,000 kilometers. The submarine is based at INS Varsha (Deb, 2021).
India has significantly advanced its missile delivery systems, improving both their range and precision. In 2021, it successfully tested the Agni-5, a nuclear-capable intercontinental ballistic missile with a range of 5,000 kilometers. On March 11, 2024, India joined the ranks of global powers possessing Multiple Independently Targetable Re-entry Vehicle (MIRV) technology (The Hindu, January 4, 2022). These advancements elevate the Bay of Bengal as a pivotal arena in the naval competition between India and China, carrying profound political and strategic implications for Sri Lanka, which seeks to maintain equally friendly relations with both countries.
Further, India’s remarkable strides in space research have cemented its status as a global power. A defining moment in this journey was the historic lunar landing on 23 August 2023, when Chandrayaan-3 successfully deployed two robotic marvels: the Vikram lander and its companion rover, Pragyan. They made a graceful touchdown in the Moon’s southern polar region, making India the fourth nation to achieve a successful lunar landing. This milestone has further reinforced India’s position as an emerging great power, enhancing its credentials to assert itself more confidently in South Asian, Indian Ocean, and global power dynamics.
India envisions a stable and secure South Asia as essential to its emergence as a great power in the Indian Ocean and global strategic arenas. However, it does not consider Pakistan to be a part of this stability that it seeks. Accordingly, when India launched the ‘Neighbourhood First Policy’ in 2008 to strengthen regional ties, Pakistan was excluded. India’s ‘Neighbourhood First Policy’ gained renewed momentum after 2015 under Prime Minister Narendra Modi. His approach to South Asia is embedded in a broader narrative emphasising the deep-rooted cultural, economic, and social exchanges between India and other South Asian countries over centuries. India’s promotion of heritage tourism, particularly the ‘Ramayana Trail’ in Sri Lanka, should be viewed through this strategic lens as part of its broader strategic narrative.
Evolving Indian Ocean Geo-political Dynamics
The Indian Ocean constitutes the next geopolitical frame for Sri Lanka’s foreign policy. The Indian Ocean is a huge bay bordered by the Afro-Asian landmass and Australia on three sides and the South Asian peninsula extends into the Indian Ocean basin centrally. Situated at the southern tip of South Asia, Sri Lanka extends strategically into the heart of the Indian Ocean, shaping its geopolitical significance and strategic imperatives for maintaining sovereignty. Historically, Sri Lanka has often been caught in the power struggles of extra-regional actors in the Indian Ocean, repeatedly at the expense of its independence.
Sri Lanka’s leadership at the time of independence was acutely aware of the strategic significance of the Indian Ocean for the nation’s survival. The first Prime Minister D.S. Senanayake, who was also the Minister of Defence and External Affair, stated in Parliament that: “We are in a dangerous position, because we are on one of the strategic highways of the world. The country that captures Ceylon would dominate the Indian Ocean. Nor is it only a question of protecting ourselves against invasion and air attack. If we have no imports for three months, we would starve, and we have therefore to protect our sea and air communications” (Hansard’s Parliamentary Debates, House of Representative. Vol. I, 1 December 1947, c. 444)
As naval competition between superpowers during the Cold War extended to the Indian Ocean, following the British naval withdrawal in the late 1960s, Sri Lanka, under Prime Minister Sirimavo Bandaranaike, played a key diplomatic role in keeping the region free from extra-regional naval rivalry by mobilising the countries that were members of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). In 1971, Sri Lanka sponsored a proposal at the UN General Assembly to establish the Indian Ocean as a Peace Zone (IOPZ). While the initiative initially gained traction, it stalled at the committee stage and ultimately lost momentum.
The maritime security architecture of the Indian Ocean entered a new phase after the end of the Cold War. The United States became the single superpower in the Indian Ocean with an ocean-wide naval presence bolstered by the fully fledged Diego Garcia base. Correspondingly, the regional strategic linkages that evolved in the context of the Cold War were eventually dismantled, giving way to new strategic relationships. Additionally, three key developments with profound implications for Sri Lanka should be noted: India’s projection of political and naval power into the deeper Indian Ocean, China’s rapid economic and military rise in the region, and the entry of other extra-regional powers into Indian Ocean politics. Although Sri Lanka adopted a broader strategic perspective and a more proactive foreign policy in the 1970s, its approach to geopolitical developments in the Indian Ocean in the post-Cold War era became increasingly shaped by domestic challenges—particularly countering the LTTE threat and addressing post-war exigencies.
India’s Expanding Naval Diplomatic Role in the Indian Ocean
Parallel to its strategic rise, India has intensified its engagement in the broader strategic landscape of the Indian Ocean with renewed vigor. This expansion extends beyond its traditional focus on the South Asian strategic theatre, reflecting a more assertive and multidimensional approach to regional security, economic connectivity, and maritime diplomacy. India’s active participation in multilateral security frameworks, infrastructure investments in critical maritime hubs and strategic alignments with major global powers signify its role in the changing naval security architecture of the Indian Ocean. India’s shifting strategic posture in the Indian Ocean is reflected in the 2015 strategy document Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy. It broadens the definition of India’s maritime neighbors beyond those sharing maritime boundaries to include all nations within the Indian Ocean region (Ensuring Secure Seas, p. 23).
In 2015, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi launched his signature Indian Ocean diplomacy initiative, Security and Growth for All in the Region (SAGAR) to foster trust and transparency, uphold international maritime norms, respect mutual interests, resolve disputes peacefully, and enhance maritime cooperation. Strategic engagement with the littoral states in the Indian Ocean region, especially Sri Lanka, the Maldives, Seychelles, and Mauritius and Madagascar has emerged as a key component of India’s Indian Ocean naval diplomacy.
The Seychelles archipelago, located approximately 600 miles east of the Diego Garcia base, holds particular significance in India’s maritime strategy. During Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s official visit to Seychelles in March 2015, India and Seychelles signed four agreements. A key strategic outcome of the visit was Seychelles’ agreement to lease Assumption Island, one of its 115 islands, to India—a move that reinforced Seychelles’ alignment with India’s broader naval diplomacy in the Indian Ocean
Similarly, Mauritius holds a central position in India’s naval diplomacy in the Indian Ocean. During Prime Minister Modi’s visit to Mauritius in March 2015, India signed a Memorandum of Understanding with Mauritius to establish a new base on North Agalega Island, a 12-kilometer-long and 1.5-kilometer-wide Island. The base is crucial for air and surface maritime patrols in the southwest Indian Ocean. It will also serve as an intelligence outpost. In September 2016, defense and security cooperation between India and Mauritius deepened alongside the signing of the ‘Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Partnership Agreement’ (CECPA).
India’s expanding strategic interests across the Indian Ocean are reflected in its growing economic, educational, and defense collaborations with Madagascar. In 2007, India established its first overseas listening post in northern Madagascar to monitor shipping activities and intercept marine communications in the Indian Ocean. This initiative provided India with a naval foothold near South Africa and key sea-lanes in the southwestern Indian Ocean. The significance of India’s defense ties with Madagascar is further highlighted by Madagascar’s participation in China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). As a crucial hub along the Maritime Silk Road connecting Africa, Madagascar’s strategic importance is underscored in the broader geopolitical landscape.
Another element of India’s expanding naval diplomacy in the Indian Ocean is its participation in both unilateral and multilateral anti-piracy operations. India’s commitment to regional security was reinforced in 2008 when it established a ‘Strategic Partnership’ with Oman, securing berthing and replenishment facilities for its navy, along with a strategically significant listening post in the Western Indian Ocean. India’s naval presence in the Arabian Gulf gains additional significance amid reports of a new Chinese naval base in Djibouti and recent submarine deployments. Successful anti-piracy missions in the western Indian Ocean underscore India’s growing influence in the region’s evolving naval security architecture.
India increasingly views its vast Diaspora as a soft power tool to bolster its status as an Indian Ocean power. In June 2014, it launched the Mausam project to reinforce its cultural ties across the region, showcasing its heritage, traditions, and contributions to global arts, literature, cinema, yoga, and cuisine. This initiative complements India’s expanding naval diplomacy and strategic presence in the Indian Ocean. Over the years, it has established listening facilities, airfields, and port infrastructure in key locations such as northern Madagascar, Agaléga Island (Mauritius), and Assumption Island (Seychelles). This has led India Today to ask: “Could this mark the emergence of an Indian ‘String of Flowers’ to counter China’s ‘String of Pearls’?” (The be continued)
by Gamini Keerawella
Features
Greener Pastures, Mental Health and Deception in Marriage:

Exploring Sunethra Rajakarunanayake’s Visachakayo
Sunethra Rajakarunanayake’s Sinhala novel Visachakayo (published in 2023) is a thriller in its own sense due to its daring exploration of social themes that modern Sinhala writers fail to touch. To me, the novel is a mosaic that explores pressing issues that middle-class Sri Lankans go through in the 21st Century. The narrative is seen from the perspective of Akshara, a Tamil girl whom the reader first meets in an infamous ‘Visa Queue’ to get her passport to go to England.
Akshara lives with her grandmother ‘Ammamma’ and her aunt ‘Periyamma’ (the younger sister of her mother). Both Ammamma and Periyamma look after her in the absence of her mother, Chinthamani who passed away a long time ago. Akshara’s father lives in Jaffna, with the kids of the second marriage. Later, we are told that Akshara’s father had to marry the second wife due to the loss of his wife’s first husband, who was an LTTE cadre. The second marriage of men seems to be a common theme in the novel due to their commitments to the family as an act of duty and honour.
The most iconic character in the novel is Preethiraj, ‘the man with a big heart’ who functions as a father figure to the other characters in the novel. It is through Preethiraj’s memory that the reader becomes aware of sociological themes in the novel: displacement and immigration, the institution of marriage and mental health issues. Preethiraj (fondly known as Preethi) is the son of Pushpawathi, the second wife of Akshara’s grandfather. Preethi goes to Royal College, but he has to relocate to Jaffna in 1958. Preethi endures social injustice in both public and private spheres. His studious sister, a medical student, labels him as a ‘lunatic’, while his mother condemns him as the ‘odd one’.
The novel intersects between the three themes: immigration and displacement, mental health issues and the institution of marriage. Almost all the characters have to go through displacement, suffer from intricacies of love laws and marriage rules like in The God of Small Things by Arundathi Roy. The writer offers a nuanced analysis of these three themes. For example, take mental health issues. The novel portrays a spectrum of mental health issues, such as schizophrenia, psychosis, Othello Syndrome, depression, autism and even malingering. At times, the representation of such ailments is extremely sarcastic:
“Hm… Canadian citizenship is an easy solution to secure those opportunities. However, unless I am asked to intervene, I will not meddle with their affairs. The son of one of my friends was introduced to a pretty girl. They liked her, not because of her money, but because of her looks and her ability to play the piano. But later, they discovered she has schizophrenia. Now their son follows whatever she says to save the marriage. My friend says she has lost her son” (p.20).
“Those opportunities” refer to material wealth including money and property in Colombo. Here, Rajakarunanayake does not fail to capture the extreme materialism and consumerism. However, in general, her representation of human follies is extremely humane.
The title ‘Visachakayo’ is another interesting coinage that reflects the plight of Sri Lankans who migrate to the ‘global north’ in search of greener pastures. Akshara’s friend, Subhani, who has migrated to England, explains that the term ‘Visachaya’ captures the in-between status of immigrants who are waiting for PR in a foreign country. Subhani mockingly says that they are equal to beggars who beg for visas. Subhani’s coinage and other accounts of Sri Lankan immigrants in England, the novel shows how difficult it is for an immigrant from the ‘global south’ to fight for a living in a country like England where immigrants come to resolve their financial struggles back home.
The novel is an eye-opener in many ways. First, it is an attempt to bridge the gap caused by the Sinhala-Tamil ethnic strife. It is also a cultural mosaic that captures both the joys and sorrows of Sinhala, Tamil and Burgher families in Sri Lanka. The novel also delves into mental health issues, categorically tied to marriage, a daring task even for a seasoned writer. However, Rajakarunanayake’s writing style compels the reader to adopt a more humane and empathetic approach towards individuals grappling with mental health challenges at various stages of their lives. The linguistic technique of using ‘ne’ tag at the end of sentences creates a conversational tone, making the narrative as if it is a conversation between a therapist and a patient. Her writing style also resembles that of Sri Lankan and Indian diasporic writers, a style that is used when writing about the motherland in exile, of which food becomes a critical trope in the narrative that unites the characters who live in exile.
Rajakarunanayake has done a commendable job in the representation of social issues, making this novel a must-read for anyone who is interested in researching social dynamics of contemporary Sri Lanka. It soon needs to be translated into English which will offer a unique experience to Sri Lankan English and international readers. A good book is something that affects the reader. Visachakayo has this quality, and it makes the reader revisit the past, reflect on the present and anticipate the future with hope for humanity just as Preethi does regardless of hardships he endured in the theatre of life.
By C. M. Arsakulasuriya
Features
A strategy for Mahaweli authority to meet future challenges amidst moves to close it down

The potential available in lands under Mahaweli Project, which cover about one third of farming areas of the Dry Zone, could easily help the country become self-sufficient in healthy foods, provided it is managed properly. However, at present, the main focus of the Mahaweli Authority of Sri Lanka (MASL) is mainly on Operation & Maintenance of Canal network feeding the farms. Main purpose of the Mahaweli Restructuring & Rehabilitation Project (MRRP) funded by the World Bank in 2000 was to diversify that objective to cover enhancement of agriculture aspects also. System H Irrigation Systems covering about 20,000 Hectares commanded under Kalawewa Tank located in the Anuradhapura District was used as a pilot area to initiate this effort. However, only the Canal Rehabilitation component of the MRRP was attended because of the government policy at that time. Restructuring component is still awaiting to be completed. Only, a strategy called Water Quota was introduced under the MRRP to initiate the restructuring component. However, the management restructuring required addressing the agriculture component expected under MRRP is still not attended.
Propose Strategy
Total length of the canal network which needs seasonal maintenance is about 1,000 Km in a typical large-scale irrigation project such as Kalawewa. Main role of the Resident Project Managers (RPM) appointed to manage such projects should be to enhance the food production jointly with the Farmer Organizations. Therefore, the abbreviation used for RPM should be redefined as Resident Production Manager. The role of a Production Manager is not limited to maintenance of canal networks as adapted presently. In the current production phase, Irrigation projects should be perceived as a Food Producing “Factory” – where water is the main raw material. Farmers as the owners of the factory, play the role of the labour force of the factory. The Production Manager’s focus should be to maximize food production, deviating from Rice Only Mode, to cater the market needs earning profits for the farmers who are the owners of the “factory”. Canal systems within the project area which need regular maintenance are just “Belts” conveying raw materials (water) in a Typical Factory.
Required Management Shift
In order to implement the above management concept, there is a need for a paradigm shift in managing large scale irrigation projects. In the new approach, the main purpose of managing irrigation systems is to deliver water to the farm gate at the right time in the right quantity. It is a big challenge to operate a canal network about 1000 KM long feeding about 20,000 Hectare in a typical Irrigation System such as Kalawewa.
It is also very pathetic to observe that main clients of irrigation projects (farmers providing labor force) are now dying of various diseases caused by indiscriminate use of agrochemicals. Therefore, there is a need to minimize the damages caused to the ecosystems where these food production factories are located. Therefore, the management objectives should also be focused on producing multiple types of organically grown crops, profitably without polluting the soil and groundwater aquifers causing diseases like Kidney Failures.
Proposed Management Structure
Existing management staff should either be trained or new recruitments having Production Engineering background, should be made. Water should be perceived as the most limited input, which needs to be managed profitably jointly with the farming community. Each Production Manager could be allocated a Fixed Volume of water annually, and their performance could be measured in terms of $s earned for the country per Unit Volume of water, while economically upgrading a healthy lifestyle of the farmers by using climate smart agriculture.
In addition to the government salary, the production management staff should also be compensated in the form of incentives, calculated in proportion to income generated by them from their management areas. It should be a Win-Win situation for both farmers as well as officers responsible for managing the food production factory. Operation of the Main Canal to cater flexible needs of each factory is the main responsibility of the Resident Production Manager. In other countries, the term used to measure their performance is $ earned per gallon of water to the country, without damaging the ecosystem.
Recent Efforts
Mahaweli Authority introduced some of the concepts explained in this note during 2000 to 2006, under MRRP. It was done by operating the Distributary canals feeding each block as elongated Village Tanks. It was known as the Bulk Water Allocation (BWA) strategy. Recently an attempt was made to digitize the same concept, by independently arranging funds from ICTA / World Bank. In that project, called Eazy Water, a SMS communication system was introduced, so that they can order water from the Main Reservoir by sending a SMS, when they need rather; than depend on time tables decided by authorities as normally practiced.
Though the BWA was practiced successfully until 2015, the new generation of managers did not continue it beyond 2015.
Conclusion
The recent Cabinet decision to close down the MASL should prompt the MASL officers to reactivate the BWA approach again. Farmer Organisations at the distributary canal level responsible for managing canal networks covering about 400 Hectares can be registered as farmer cooperatives. For example, there are about 50 farmer cooperatives in a typical irrigation project such as Kalawewa. This transformation should be a gradual process which would take at least two years. I am sure the World Bank would definitely fund this project during the transition period because it is a continuation of the MRRP to address the restructuring component which was not attended by them in 2000 because of government policy at that time. System H could be used as a pilot demonstration area. Guidelines introduced under the MRRP could be used as tools to manage the main canal. World Bank funded Agribusiness Value Chain Support with CSIAP (Climate Smart Irrigated Agriculture Project) under the Ministry of Agriculture which is presently in progress could also provide necessary guidelines to initiate this project.
by Eng. Mahinda Panapitiya
Engineer who worked for Mahaweli Project since its inception
-
Business20 hours ago
Colombo Coffee wins coveted management awards
-
Features2 days ago
Starlink in the Global South
-
Business3 days ago
Daraz Sri Lanka ushers in the New Year with 4.4 Avurudu Wasi Pro Max – Sri Lanka’s biggest online Avurudu sale
-
Business4 days ago
Strengthening SDG integration into provincial planning and development process
-
Business3 days ago
New SL Sovereign Bonds win foreign investor confidence
-
Sports5 days ago
To play or not to play is Richmond’s decision
-
Features2 days ago
Modi’s Sri Lanka Sojourn
-
Sports4 days ago
New Zealand under 85kg rugby team set for historic tour of Sri Lanka