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Domestic Debt Restructuring – An Alternate View

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by Romesh Bandaranaike, Ph.D.

There have been substantial and wide spread criticisms of the recently instituted Domestic Debt Restructuring (DDR) scheme carried out by Central Bank of Sri Lanka (CBSL), to reduce the Sri Lanka Government’s requirements for funding. In this article I argue that the scheme, as structured and carried out by CBSL, is appropriate, given the ground realities in the country, and that the critics have ignored a number of factors which forced CBSL to design the scheme as it did. I then suggest additional steps the Government could take to further improve its financial position in connection with past Bond issues.

The DDR Scheme

Faced with massive shortfalls in revenue, the Government recently carried out a “restructuring” of the debts it owed on Sri Lanka Rupee denominated Treasury Bills and Bonds in an effort to substantially improve Government finances, including the funds needed to service these Bills/Bonds. The two key elements of the DDR are a) Converting all Treasury Bills presently owned by CBSL to longer term Treasury Bonds, thereby substantially delaying the payment dates on these Bills; and b) Effectively “forcing” the Employees Provident Fund (EPF) and other superannuation funds to exchange most of the Bonds they hold for 12 year Bonds with somewhat lower interest payments.

They did this by threatening to increase the tax rates that EPF pays on its annual income to 30% from the present 14%, if they did not accept the Bond exchange. Since such an increase was financially worse for EPF compared with the Bond exchange, EPF opted for the latter.

CBSL estimates that the scheme would reduce the Gross Financing Needs (GFN) of the Government by 1.5%, 1% by the CBSL Bill-Bond exchange and 0.5% by the EPF Bond exchange.

The Criticisms

The principal criticisms of the DDR, from the public, Trade Unions, Economic Think Tanks, and numerous “Experts,” is that the entire burden of the DDR is being placed on the backs of the retirement savings of “poor workers” who are the members of EPF.

CBSL has justified the proposed increase in the tax rates for EPF and other superannuation funds to 30% from the present 14% on the basis that the banks have to pay the higher tax rate of 30% plus VAT. Dr. Wijewardena, a former CBSL Deputy Governor, has written several articles criticizing CBSL for not presenting the correct picture in this regard and not disclosing full information on the impacts of the restructuring on EPF members’ returns. Dr. W’s main argument is that, in the case of the banks, the tax rate applies to “net interest”, whereas, in the case of the EPF, it applies to “gross interest.” For the banks, net interest is interest earnings on its loans less the interest it pays to depositors.

In the case of EPF, Dr. W points out that EPF is not allowed to subtract the interest it pays to EPF account holders to determine its income and tax liability, and that CBSL comparison of bank and EPF tax rates is therefore misleading. In a subsequent article by Dr. W, he criticizes CBSL/EPF for not fully disclosing the cost to EPF holders of accepting the proposed DDR compared with an increase in EPF’s tax rate to 30% and the justification for accepting the Bond exchange rather than the tax increase to 30%. He goes on to add that CBSL has a conflict of interest as both the developer of Government policy and as the administrator of EPF.

My Responses to the Criticisms

The criticism that the entire burden of the DDR is on the backs of workers is factually incorrect. As stated above, two-third of the 1.5% reduction in GFN (1%) is being achieved by exchanging the Treasury Bills held by CBSL for long term Bonds. Only 0.5% of the reduction is from the exchange of Bonds held by the EPF and other superannuation funds. In other words, 67% of the restructuring cost is borne by CBSL (in effect by all citizens), while only 33% is borne by EPF account holders. Furthermore, only workers in the formal private sector contribute to the EPF/ETF, while workers in the informal private sector (e.g. farmers, fishermen, small transporters, traders and construction workers) and Government employees do not.

As a result, only about 25-30% of the workers in the country have EPF accounts. Therefore, 70-75% of workers in the country will not suffer any burden due to the EPF bond restructuring. Finally, the workers with EPF accounts also include middle and senior management of companies who cannot be called “poor workers” as referred to in the various criticisms of the present DDR scheme. It is true that this category may only be a very small percentage of those holding EPF accounts. However, their account balances are likely to be very much higher than other EPF members and the impact of the restructuring on them will be proportional to these balances.

It would be ideal if the EPF could release statistics in this regard which will allow an assessment of this element. For example, the fraction of the total EPF funds held by those with EPF balances of over Rs 5 million (say), since such persons cannot be classified as “poor workers.” Workers who have balances in EPF/ETF, built up as a result of deductions from their salaries and additional higher contributions from their employers, at least have a retirement fund they can turn to, even if it is somewhat less because of the DDR. It could conceivably be argued that the 70-75% of workers who do not have such balances, mostly working in the informal sector, are worse off or poorer than those with EPF balances. This would be a justification for placing the burden of part of the DDR on EPF account holders rather than on other, even “poorer”, workers.

In response to Dr. W’s criticisms that EPF and bank tax rates are not comparable the way CBSL has done; each year, EPF determines a percentage it will pay/accrue to the account of each EPF account holder based on the earnings by the EPF that year. This percentage is not an interest similar to that paid by banks to its depositors and is not a cost that is deductible by EPF to calculate its tax liability each year. It is simply a percentage decided by the EPF administrators to allocate the profits after tax earned by the EPF during the year. Calling this percentage an “interest” is a misnomer. Account holders in EPF are akin to shareholders in banks and not depositors.

The amounts credited by EPF to a member’s account each year, based on EPF’s earnings during the year, is not a cost incurred by EPF in generating these earnings. It is something closer to a dividend paid by a bank to its shareholders in the form of additional shares. If EPF is allowed to determine its tax liabilities by subtracting these accrued amounts, banks should be able to deduct dividend costs in determining their tax liabilities. Dr. W’s criticism of the non-comparability of bank and EPF tax rates cannot be sustained.

Dr. W uses CBSL/EPF’s own numbers on the differences in returns under the two scenarios EPF has been offered and simply multiplies it by the total EPF Bond holding value to arrive at the cost to EPF of accepting the Bond exchange. This is something that could have readily been done by anyone and Dr. W’s implication that CBSL/EPF is hiding/not fully disclosing something in its statement cannot be sustained.

The CBSL/EPF analysis is simply to show that the return to EPF is better under the scenario where it accepts the DDR option, compared to rejecting the DDR option and being subject to a 30% tax rate. This information is more than sufficient for EPF to recommend to its Board that it should accept the DDR. Dr. W than goes into the past history of taxation rates applicable to the EPF and points out that as originally envisaged EPF earnings were to be tax exempt.

He shows calculations of the losses to EPF holders of the present DDR, compared with a situation if EPF earnings were tax exempt. This is a straw man put up by Dr. W to be knocked down as part of his criticism of CBSL/EPF. It is the tax rates that are applicable to EPF today, before the DDR, that are relevant and it would have been nonsensical for CBSL to show calculations based on what if the tax rates were those that existed many years ago.

With respect to the criticism that CBSL has a conflict of interest in both being the administrator of EPF and the policy advisor recommending the DDR, I do not see any conflict. CBSL, as advisor to the Government, has made the DDR proposal which allows EPF to choose between two options, accept the proposed DDR Bond exchange or reject it and be subject to a 30% tax rate. As the administrator of the EPF, CBSL has simply analysed these two options and clearly shown that the EPF is better off accepting the Bond exchange compared with rejecting it and being subject to a 30% tax rate.

Other Relevant Issues

It is telling that none of those criticizing the present process have offered any viable alternative DDR arrangement to achieve the same objectives as the present exercise. In saying this, I am ignoring the suggestions by some parties who say there would be no need for the exercise if “The money stolen by the Rajapaksa’s is recovered” or “The large corruption in Government is reduced,” and so on. Such actions, even if they were possible, are not alternatives, because they cannot be achieved in the short or medium term, which is one of the key objectives of the DDR. Verite Research did, some time ago before the announcement of the present DDR, present some analysis on a possible DDR which included sharing the cut across all Bond holders, but, for the reasons I refer to below, this is not a viable arrangement.

CBSL in its original presentation to the Cabinet, and subsequently to the public, argued that it would be prudent to exclude the Banks from the DDR exercise, because these institutions were already under stress as a result of COVID related business failures and because the banks would also be taking a hit from the future restructuring of USD Bonds, some of which are held by them.

CBSL was of the view that such an exclusion was essential to ensure financial system stability. None of those criticizing the present DDR arrangements have objected to this and I concur with that view. Even if the banks are able to bear the burden of some restructuring of the domestic bonds they hold, bank stability is also dependent on public perception, and excluding them from the DDR has certainly had a positive impact on such perception.

There are two unstated conditions applicable to the DDR exercise which have received no mention in the ongoing discussions. First, the DDR should be concluded in a short time frame since it will be a pre-condition to the restructuring of foreign currency debt. Second, it must be carried out in a legally valid manner. A Government Bond is a legal contract between the Government and the holder of the Bond.

The Government is legally obligated to pay the interest coupon and the principal of the Bond on specified dates according to this legal contract. The Government has no legal authority to change the conditions of this Bond. It could, of course, pass a new law in Parliament giving itself the authority to make changes to existing Bonds. In doing so, however, if all Bond holders are not treated equally (in particular, if the bank holdings of Bonds are excluded), there are bound to be legal challenges in the Courts to any such changes, and the changes may well be struck down by the Courts.

Even if such changes are not struck down, this process can take considerable time to be determined and would not be achievable in the time frame required for the DDR process to be concluded as discussed previously. The present DDR has finessed the issue of different treatments of Bond holders by making it “voluntary”, albeit by holding a gun to the head of the EPF and superannuation funds in the manner detailed earlier. This is draconian, but effective.

As per CBSL statistics presented in connection with the original DDR proposal, the total outstanding amount of Treasury Bonds at that time was Rs. 8,700 billion. Of this amount Rs 1,644 billion is held by “Others”, after excluding the banks and EPF and superannuation funds being subject to the DDR. Even if the banks are excluded from the DDR to ensure “financial system stability” reasons mentioned previously, it would have been ideal if the “Others” holding the Rs 1,644 billion in outstanding Bonds were subject to some “restructuring”, in the form of cuts in coupon rates and/or face value, or an extension of the tenor of these Bonds.

If this was done, the benefit of these cuts could have been passed on in the form of a reduction in the burden passed onto EPF and superannuation funds. However, such an unequal treatment where some Bond holders (the banks) are excluded, even if the necessary legislation is passed, would certainly have resulted in legal challenges which would, at the least, have delayed the process as I have pointed out earlier, or even been found unconstitutional by the Courts.

Further Actions in Respect of Bonds

Very high yield rate Bonds (over 20% yield) were issued by the Government during the period prior to the announcement of the DDR (April 8, 2022 to March 13, 2023) as a consequence of severe financial shortages faced by the Government. Bidders for these Bonds added a premium to the bid yield rates, expecting a future restructuring of these Bonds as part of the DDR they knew was coming. By being excluded from the DDR, these Bond holders have enjoyed a “windfall profit.” It is not possible to specifically target these Bonds for a cut in coupons or face value, because many of the original holders may have sold some of these Bonds and have already earned the windfall profits.

[The buyers of the Bonds would only receive a “normal” profit in the form of coupon payments and final redemption.] Furthermore, in the case of individual Bond holders, their windfall profit would be in the form of a capital gain, which only attracts a tax rate of 10%. Corporates/ banks in the same situation would be paying a tax of 30% on their capital gains. I propose that the Government should “claw back” some of these profits by imposing a special windfall tax rate of 50% applicable to all profits derived from these Bonds. If the original purchaser has not sold the Bonds, the coupon interest and the capital gains on final face value redemption should also be taxed at 50%.

There would be some complications in structuring this tax, since some high yield Bonds may have changed hands within the period that high yield Bonds were still being issued, which means that the initial purchaser would only have made a small capital gain and the next buyer would still be enjoying the high coupon rate or subsequently selling the Bond for a large capital gain. A proper structuring of the 50% windfall tax can ensure that the taxes fall on those making the windfall profits. A tax of the type proposed will clearly be borne by the wealthy, who would have been the purchasers of these Bonds, and go some way towards balancing the burden imposed on less wealthy parties as a result of the DDR.

To place this suggestion in perspective, between April 8, 2022 and March 13, 2023 all Bonds issued by CBSL had yield rates in excess of 20%. The total face value of such Bonds was Rs 1,233 billion. The weighted average yield on these Bonds was 27.89% and the weighted average coupons in these Bonds was 19.09%. The latest four-year Bond yield rate is approximately 15% and this is likely to drop further.

As a result, any seller today of an average high yield Bond would make a significant capital gain on the sale and would need to pay substantial taxes to the Government at the proposed 50% windfall tax rate. As per CBSL statistics in the original CBSL presentation to the Cabinet, approximately 63.5% of all Bonds at that time were held by the banks and the “Other” category. If this percentage is also applicable to the high yield Bonds referred to above, the banks and the “Other” category would be holding Rs 777 billion of these Bonds.

Advocata has recently analysed EPF’s Bond portfolio prior to the DDR Bond exchange and concluded that EPF’s share of high yield Bonds was proportionately much less than for other Bond holders. Therefore, banks and “Others” would probably be holding even more than the above mentioned Rs 777 billion in such high yield Bonds which, in turn, will mean that a 50% windfall tax on the profits from these Bonds will result in substantial tax revenues for the Government.

An aside at this point is that for some unclear reason there is no withholding tax (WHT) applied to the interest earnings on Bonds as in the case of interest earnings from deposits in banks and finance companies. I have made inquiries as to why this is so from several senior Government officials and have not received any explanation for the practice.

It may well be that some Bond holders do not even have income tax files and that they are evading all taxes payable on Bond interest. Since Bond holders are all likely to be at the highest tax bracket given the minimum sizes of Bond investments, I suggest that a WHT of 30% be applied to all Bond interest payments. Holders are free to file tax returns and seek a refund if they have been taxed in excess of their liability due to such a WHT. I have been told there is some complication in applying WHT to Bond interest held by foreigners. If that is indeed the case, foreign holdings of Bonds could be excluded.

Conclusions

The economy of the country is in dire straits as a result primarily of bad/foolish policies of recent past Governments (including those by CBSL under its previous two Governors and Monetary Boards at that time) coupled with the endemic corruption inherent in the system. The present Governor of CBSL and his professional colleagues are facing very difficult conditions and are striving to get the country’s finances back on track.

I can understand trade unions, workers and other similar entities objecting to the implementation of policies which directly impact them, irrespective of whether such policies are needed to solve the country’s issues. But, why is it that so called “experts” and think tanks do not recognize the ground realities of what is practically achievable and support the efforts of CBSL rather than criticizing these efforts in print and at discussion forums?

(The author is an economist with wide experience in policy formulation and implementation in the Ministry of Finance and has worked at CEO level in both public and private sectors.



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Meet the women protecting India’s snow leopards

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These women work with the local forest department to track and protect the snow leopard species [BBC]

In one of India’s coldest and most remote regions, a group of women have taken on an unlikely role: protecting one of Asia’s most elusive predators, the snow leopard.

Snow leopards are found in just 12 countries across Central and South Asia. India is home to one of the world’s largest populations, with a nationwide survey in 2023 – the first comprehensive count ever carried out in the country – estimating more than 700 animals, .

One of the places they roam is around Kibber village in Himachal Pradesh state’s Spiti Valley, a stark, high-altitude cold desert along the Himalayan belt. Here, snow leopards are often called the “ghosts of the mountains”, slipping silently across rocky slopes and rarely revealing themselves.

For generations, the animals were seen largely as a threat, for attacking livestock. But attitudes in Kibber and neighbouring villages are beginning to shift, as people increasingly recognise the snow leopard’s role as a top predator in the food chain and its importance in maintaining the region’s fragile mountain ecosystem.

Nearly a dozen local women are now working alongside the Himachal Pradesh forest department and conservationists to track and protect the species, playing a growing role in conservation efforts.

Locally, the snow leopard is known as Shen and the women call their group “Shenmo”. Trained to install and monitor camera traps, they handle devices fitted with unique IDs and memory cards that automatically photograph snow leopards as they pass.

“Earlier, men used to go and install the cameras and we kept wondering why couldn’t we do it too,” says Lobzang Yangchen, a local coordinator working with a small group supported by the non-profit Nature Conservation Foundation (NCF) in collaboration with the forest department.

Yangchen was among the women who helped collect data for Himachal Pradesh’s snow leopard survey in 2024, which found that the state was home to 83 snow leopards – up from 51 in 2021.

Spiti Wildlife Division A snow leopard looks into the camera
Snow leopards are often called the “ghosts of the mountains” because they are so hard to spot [BBC]

The survey documented snow leopards and 43 other species using camera traps spread across an area of nearly 26,000sq km (10,000sq miles). Individual leopards were identified by the unique rosette patterns on their fur, a standard technique used for spotted big cats. The findings are now feeding into wider conservation and habitat-management plans.

“Their contribution was critical to identifying individual animals,” says Goldy Chhabra, deputy conservator of forests with the Spiti Wildlife Division.

Collecting the data is demanding work. Most of it takes place in winter, when heavy snowfall pushes snow leopards and their prey to lower altitudes, making their routes easier to track.

On survey days, the women wake up early, finish household chores and gather at a base camp before travelling by vehicle as far as the terrain allows. From there, they trek several kilometres to reach camera sites, often at altitudes above 14,000ft (4,300m), where the thin air makes even simple movement exhausting.

The BBC accompanied the group on one such trek in December. After hours of walking in biting cold, the women suddenly stopped on a narrow trail.

Yangchen points to pugmarks in the dust: “This shows the snow leopard has been here recently. These pugmarks are fresh.”

Devesh Chopra/BBC A woman wearing a black and red scarf writes something in her notebook and a camera trap is placed in front of her.
The women set up cameras with unique IDs and memory cards, which capture an image of a snow leopard as soon as it passes through [BBC]

Along with pugmarks, the team looks for other signs, including scrapes and scent‑marking spots, before carefully fixing a camera to a rock along the trail.

One woman then carries out a “walk test”, crawling along the path to check whether the camera’s height and angle will capture a clear image.

The group then moves on to older sites, retrieving memory cards and replacing batteries installed weeks earlier.

By mid-afternoon, they return to camp to log and analyse the images using specialised software – tools many had never encountered before.

“I studied only until grade five,” says Chhering Lanzom. “At first, I was scared to use the computer. But slowly, we learned how to use the keyboard and mouse.”

The women joined the camera-trapping programme in 2023. Initially, conservation was not their motivation. But winters in the Spiti Valley are long and quiet, with little agricultural work to fall back on.

“At first, this work on snow leopards didn’t interest us,” Lobzang says. “We joined because we were curious and we could earn a small income.”

The women earn between 500 ($5.46; £4) and 700 rupees a day.

But beyond the money, the work has helped transform how the community views the animal.

Spiti Wildlife Division A woman looks at a computer screen which has a grab of a leopard.
Images captured by the camera traps are analysed using a special software [BBC]

“Earlier, we thought the snow leopard was our enemy,” says Dolma Zangmo, a local resident. “Now we think their conservation is important.”

Alongside survey work, the women help villagers access government insurance schemes for their livestock and promote the use of predator‑proof corrals – stone or mesh enclosures that protect animals at night.

Their efforts come at a time of growing recognition for the region. Spiti Valley has recently been included in the Cold Desert Biosphere Reserve, a Unesco-recognised network aimed at conserving fragile ecosystems while supporting local livelihoods.

As climate change reshapes the fragile trans-Himalayan landscape, conservationists say such community participation will be crucial to safeguarding species like the snow leopard.

“Once communities are involved, conservation becomes more sustainable,” says Deepshikha Sharma, programme manager with NCF’s High Altitudes initiative.

“These women are not just assisting, they are becoming practitioners of wildlife conservation and monitoring,” she adds.

As for the women, their work makes them feel closer to their home, the village and the mountains that raised them, they say.

“We were born here, this is all we know,” Lobzang says. “Sometimes we feel afraid because these snow leopards are after all predatory animals, but this is where we belong.”

[BBC]

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Freedom for giants: What Udawalawe really tells about human–elephant conflict

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Too many vehicles entering national parks

If elephants are truly to be given “freedom” in Udawalawe, the solution is not simply to open gates or redraw park boundaries. The map itself tells the real story — a story of shrinking habitats, broken corridors, and more than a decade of silent but relentless ecological destruction.

“Look at Udawalawe today and compare it with satellite maps from ten years ago,” says Sameera Weerathunga, one of Sri Lanka’s most consistent and vocal elephant conservation activists. “You don’t need complicated science. You can literally see what we have done to them.”

What we commonly describe as the human–elephant conflict (HEC) is, in reality, a land-use conflict driven by development policies that ignore ecological realities. Elephants are not invading villages; villages, farms, highways and megaprojects have steadily invaded elephant landscapes.

Udawalawe: From Landscape to Island

Udawalawe National Park was once part of a vast ecological network connecting the southern dry zone to the central highlands and eastern forests. Elephants moved freely between Udawalawe, Lunugamvehera, Bundala, Gal Oya and even parts of the Walawe river basin, following seasonal water and food availability.

Today, Udawalawe appears on the map as a shrinking green island surrounded by human settlements, monoculture plantations, reservoirs, electric fences and asphalt.

“For elephants, Udawalawe is like a prison surrounded by invisible walls,” Sameera explains. “We expect animals that evolved to roam hundreds of square nationakilometres to survive inside a box created by humans.”

Elephants are ecosystem engineers. They shape forests by dispersing seeds, opening pathways, and regulating vegetation. Their survival depends on movement — not containment. But in Udawalawa, movement is precisely what has been taken away.

Over the past decade, ancient elephant corridors have been blocked or erased by:

Irrigation and agricultural expansion

Tourism resorts and safari infrastructure

New roads, highways and power lines

Human settlements inside former forest reserves

Sameera

“The destruction didn’t happen overnight,” Sameera says. “It happened project by project, fence by fence, without anyone looking at the cumulative impact.”

The Illusion of Protection

Sri Lanka prides itself on its protected area network. Yet most national parks function as ecological islands rather than connected systems.

“We think declaring land as a ‘national park’ is enough,” Sameera argues. “But protection without connectivity is just slow extinction.”

Udawalawe currently holds far more elephants than it can sustainably support. The result is habitat degradation inside the park, increased competition for resources, and escalating conflict along the boundaries.

“When elephants cannot move naturally, they turn to crops, tanks and villages,” Sameera says. “And then we blame the elephant for being a problem.”

The Other Side of the Map: Wanni and Hambantota

Sameera often points to the irony visible on the very same map. While elephants are squeezed into overcrowded parks in the south, large landscapes remain in the Wanni, parts of Hambantota and the eastern dry zone where elephant density is naturally lower and ecological space still exists.

“We keep talking about Udawalawe as if it’s the only place elephants exist,” he says. “But the real question is why we are not restoring and reconnecting landscapes elsewhere.”

The Hambantota MER (Managed Elephant Reserve), for instance, was originally designed as a landscape-level solution. The idea was not to trap elephants inside fences, but to manage land use so that people and elephants could coexist through zoning, seasonal access, and corridor protection.

“But what happened?” Sameera asks. “Instead of managing land, we managed elephants. We translocated them, fenced them, chased them, tranquilised them. And the conflict only got worse.”

The Failure of Translocation

For decades, Sri Lanka relied heavily on elephant translocation as a conflict management tool. Hundreds of elephants were captured from conflict zones and released into national parks like Udawalawa, Yala and Wilpattu.

Elephant deaths

The logic was simple: remove the elephant, remove the problem.

The reality was tragic.

“Most translocated elephants try to return home,” Sameera explains. “They walk hundreds of kilometres, crossing highways, railway lines and villages. Many die from exhaustion, accidents or gunshots. Others become even more aggressive.”

Scientific studies now confirm what conservationists warned from the beginning: translocation increases stress, mortality, and conflict. Displaced elephants often lose social structures, familiar landscapes, and access to traditional water sources.

“You cannot solve a spatial problem with a transport solution,” Sameera says bluntly.

In many cases, the same elephant is captured and moved multiple times — a process that only deepens trauma and behavioural change.

Freedom Is Not About Removing Fences

The popular slogan “give elephants freedom” has become emotionally powerful but scientifically misleading. Elephants do not need symbolic freedom; they need functional landscapes.

Real solutions lie in:

Restoring elephant corridors

Preventing development in key migratory routes

Creating buffer zones with elephant-friendly crops

Community-based land-use planning

Landscape-level conservation instead of park-based thinking

“We must stop treating national parks like wildlife prisons and villages like war zones,” Sameera insists. “The real battlefield is land policy.”

Electric fences, for instance, are often promoted as a solution. But fences merely shift conflict from one village to another.

“A fence does not create peace,” Sameera says. “It just moves the problem down the line.”

A Crisis Created by Humans

Sri Lanka loses more than 400 elephants and nearly 100 humans every year due to HEC — one of the highest rates globally.

Yet Sameera refuses to call it a wildlife problem.

“This is a human-created crisis,” he says. “Elephants are only responding to what we’ve done to their world.”

From expressways cutting through forests to solar farms replacing scrublands, development continues without ecological memory or long-term planning.

“We plan five-year political cycles,” Sameera notes. “Elephants plan in centuries.”

The tragedy is not just ecological. It is moral.

“We are destroying a species that is central to our culture, religion, tourism and identity,” Sameera says. “And then we act surprised when they fight back.”

The Question We Avoid Asking

If Udawalawe is overcrowded, if Yala is saturated, if Wilpattu is bursting — then the real question is not where to put elephants.

The real question is: Where have we left space for wildness in Sri Lanka?

Sameera believes the future lies not in more fences or more parks, but in reimagining land itself.

“Conservation cannot survive as an island inside a development ocean,” he says. “Either we redesign Sri Lanka to include elephants, or one day we’ll only see them in logos, statues and children’s books.”

And the map will show nothing but empty green patches — places where giants once walked, and humans chose. roads instead.

By Ifham Nizam

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Challenges faced by the media in South Asia in fostering regionalism

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Main speaker Roman Gautam (R) and Executive Director, RCSS, Ambassador (Retd) Ravinatha Aryasinha.

SAARC or the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation has been declared ‘dead’ by some sections in South Asia and the idea seems to be catching on. Over the years the evidence seems to have been building that this is so, but a matter that requires thorough probing is whether the media in South Asia, given the vital part it could play in fostering regional amity, has had a role too in bringing about SAARC’s apparent demise.

That South Asian governments have had a hand in the ‘SAARC debacle’ is plain to see. For example, it is beyond doubt that the India-Pakistan rivalry has invariably got in the way, particularly over the past 15 years or thereabouts, of the Indian and Pakistani governments sitting at the negotiating table and in a spirit of reconciliation resolving the vexatious issues growing out of the SAARC exercise. The inaction had a paralyzing effect on the organization.

Unfortunately the rest of South Asian governments too have not seen it to be in the collective interest of the region to explore ways of jump-starting the SAARC process and sustaining it. That is, a lack of statesmanship on the part of the SAARC Eight is clearly in evidence. Narrow national interests have been allowed to hijack and derail the cooperative process that ought to be at the heart of the SAARC initiative.

However, a dimension that has hitherto gone comparatively unaddressed is the largely negative role sections of the media in the SAARC region could play in debilitating regional cooperation and amity. We had some thought-provoking ‘takes’ on this question recently from Roman Gautam, the editor of ‘Himal Southasian’.

Gautam was delivering the third of talks on February 2nd in the RCSS Strategic Dialogue Series under the aegis of the Regional Centre for Strategic Studies, Colombo, at the latter’s conference hall. The forum was ably presided over by RCSS Executive Director and Ambassador (Retd.) Ravinatha Aryasinha who, among other things, ensured lively participation on the part of the attendees at the Q&A which followed the main presentation. The talk was titled, ‘Where does the media stand in connecting (or dividing) Southasia?’.

Gautam singled out those sections of the Indian media that are tamely subservient to Indian governments, including those that are professedly independent, for the glaring lack of, among other things, regionalism or collective amity within South Asia. These sections of the media, it was pointed out, pander easily to the narratives framed by the Indian centre on developments in the region and fall easy prey, as it were, to the nationalist forces that are supportive of the latter. Consequently, divisive forces within the region receive a boost which is hugely detrimental to regional cooperation.

Two cases in point, Gautam pointed out, were the recent political upheavals in Nepal and Bangladesh. In each of these cases stray opinions favorable to India voiced by a few participants in the relevant protests were clung on to by sections of the Indian media covering these trouble spots. In the case of Nepal, to consider one example, a young protester’s single comment to the effect that Nepal too needed a firm leader like Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi was seized upon by the Indian media and fed to audiences at home in a sensational, exaggerated fashion. No effort was made by the Indian media to canvass more opinions on this matter or to extensively research the issue.

In the case of Bangladesh, widely held rumours that the Hindus in the country were being hunted and killed, pogrom fashion, and that the crisis was all about this was propagated by the relevant sections of the Indian media. This was a clear pandering to religious extremist sentiment in India. Once again, essentially hearsay stories were given prominence with hardly any effort at understanding what the crisis was really all about. There is no doubt that anti-Muslim sentiment in India would have been further fueled.

Gautam was of the view that, in the main, it is fear of victimization of the relevant sections of the media by the Indian centre and anxiety over financial reprisals and like punitive measures by the latter that prompted the media to frame their narratives in these terms. It is important to keep in mind these ‘structures’ within which the Indian media works, we were told. The issue in other words, is a question of the media completely subjugating themselves to the ruling powers.

Basically, the need for financial survival on the part of the Indian media, it was pointed out, prompted it to subscribe to the prejudices and partialities of the Indian centre. A failure to abide by the official line could spell financial ruin for the media.

A principal question that occurred to this columnist was whether the ‘Indian media’ referred to by Gautam referred to the totality of the Indian media or whether he had in mind some divisive, chauvinistic and narrow-based elements within it. If the latter is the case it would not be fair to generalize one’s comments to cover the entirety of the Indian media. Nevertheless, it is a matter for further research.

However, an overall point made by the speaker that as a result of the above referred to negative media practices South Asian regionalism has suffered badly needs to be taken. Certainly, as matters stand currently, there is a very real information gap about South Asian realities among South Asian publics and harmful media practices account considerably for such ignorance which gets in the way of South Asian cooperation and amity.

Moreover, divisive, chauvinistic media are widespread and active in South Asia. Sri Lanka has a fair share of this species of media and the latter are not doing the country any good, leave alone the region. All in all, the democratic spirit has gone well into decline all over the region.

The above is a huge problem that needs to be managed reflectively by democratic rulers and their allied publics in South Asia and the region’s more enlightened media could play a constructive role in taking up this challenge. The latter need to take the initiative to come together and deliberate on the questions at hand. To succeed in such efforts they do not need the backing of governments. What is of paramount importance is the vision and grit to go the extra mile.

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