Features
Trump tariffs and their effect on world trade and economy with particular
reference to Sri Lanka – Part III
(Continued from yesterday)
Textile Industry Significance
The textile and apparel sector holds outsised importance in Sri Lanka’s economy. It accounts for approximately 40% of the country’s total exports and directly employs around 350,000 workers, predominantly women from rural areas, for whom these jobs represent a crucial pathway out of poverty. When indirect employment in supporting industries is included, the sector supports the livelihoods of over one million Sri Lankans.
The industry’s development was initially facilitated through quotas assigned by the Multi-Fiber Agreement (1974-1994), which allocated specific export volumes to developing countries. When this agreement expired, Sri Lanka managed to maintain its position in global apparel supply chains by focusing on higher-value products, ethical manufacturing practices, and reliability. The country has positioned itself as a producer of quality garments, particularly lingerie, activewear, and swimwear for major global brands.
However, this success has created a structural dependency on continued access to markets in wealthy countries, particularly the United States. As the Secretary General of the Joint Apparel Association Forum, the main representative body for Sri Lanka’s
apparel and textile exporters, bluntly stated following the tariff announcement, “We have no alternate market that we can possibly target instead of the US.”
This dependency is reinforced by the industry’s integration into global supply chains dominated by U.S. brands and retailers. Many Sri Lankan factories operate on thin margins as contract manufacturers for these international companies, with limited ability to quickly pivot to new markets or product categories. The industry has also made significant investments in compliance with U.S. buyer requirements and sustainability certifications, creating path dependencies that make rapid adaptation to new market conditions extremely challenging.
The textile and apparel sector’s significance extends beyond its direct economic contributions. It has been a crucial source of foreign exchange earnings for a country that has consistently run trade deficits and struggled with external debt sustainability. In the ten years leading up to Sri Lanka’s default on external debt (2012-2021), debt repayments amounted to an average of 41% of export earnings, highlighting how vital steady export revenues are to the country’s ability to service its international obligations.
The sector has also played an important role in Sri Lanka’s social development, providing formal employment opportunities for women and contributing to poverty reduction in rural areas. Many of the industry’s workers are the primary breadwinners for their families, and their wages support extended family networks in economically disadvantaged regions of the country.
Given this context, the imposition of a 44% tariff on Sri Lankan goods, with the textile and apparel sector likely to bear the brunt of the impact, represents not merely an economic challenge but a potential social crisis for hundreds of thousands of vulnerable workers and their dependents.
SPECIFIC IMPACT OF TRUMP TARIFFS ON SRI LANKA
The imposition of a 44% tariff on Sri Lankan exports to the United States represents a seismic shock to an economy still recovering from its worst crisis in decades. This section examines the immediate economic consequences, the implications for Sri Lanka’s debt sustainability, and the broader social and political ramifications of this dramatic policy shift.
Immediate Economic Consequences
The most immediate impact of President Trump’s tariffs will be a severe erosion of Sri Lankan goods’ competitiveness in the U.S. market. A 44% price increase effectively prices many Sri Lankan products out of reach for American consumers and businesses, particularly in price-sensitive categories like apparel, where margins are already thin and competition from other producing countries is intense.
Economic analysts project significant declines in export volumes as a result. The PublicFinance.lk think tank estimates that the new tariff rates will lead to a 20% fall in exports to America and an annual loss of approximately $300 million in foreign exchange earnings. Given that Sri Lanka’s total merchandise exports in 2024 were around $13 billion, this represents a substantial blow to the country’s trade balance and economic growth prospects.
The textile and apparel sector will bear the brunt of this impact. Industry representatives have warned that numerous factories may be forced to reduce production or close entirely if they cannot quickly find alternative markets for their products. The Joint Apparel Association Forum has indicated that smaller manufacturers with less diversified customer bases and limited financial reserves will be particularly vulnerable to closure.
These production cutbacks and potential closures would translate directly into job losses. Conservative estimates suggest that tens of thousands of workers in the textile sector could lose their livelihoods if the tariffs remain in place for an extended period. Given that many of these workers are women from rural areas with limited alternative employment opportunities, the social impact of these job losses would be particularly severe.
Beyond the direct effects on textile exports, the tariffs will have ripple effects throughout Sri Lanka’s economy. Supporting industries such as packaging, logistics, and input suppliers will face reduced demand. The loss of foreign exchange earnings will put pressure on the Sri Lankan rupee, potentially leading to currency depreciation that would increase the cost of essential imports including fuel, food, and medicine.
The timing of these tariffs is especially problematic given Sri Lanka’s fragile economic recovery. After experiencing a GDP contraction of 7.8% in 2022 during the height of the economic crisis, the country had only recently returned to modest growth. The IMF had projected GDP growth of 3.1% for 2025, but this forecast now appears overly optimistic in light of the tariff shock. Some economists are already revising their growth projections downward, with some suggesting growth could fall below 2% if the full impact of the tariffs materializes. We must hope they will be proven wrong.
Impact on Sri Lanka’s Debt Sustainability
Perhaps the most concerning aspect of Trump’s tariffs is their potential to undermine Sri Lanka’s hard-won progress on debt sustainability. After defaulting on its external debt in April 2022, the country has undergone a painful restructuring process that concluded only in December 2024. This restructuring was predicated on assumptions about Sri Lanka’s future ability to generate foreign exchange to service its remaining debt obligations.
The IMF’s debt sustainability analysis, which formed the basis for the restructuring agreement, focused almost exclusively on debt as a share of GDP while making insufficient distinction between domestic and foreign debt. This approach has been criticized for ignoring the structural trade deficit and the critical importance of foreign currency earnings to Sri Lanka’s ability to meet its external obligations.
The $300 million annual reduction in export earnings projected as a result of the tariffs directly threatens these calculations. Sri Lanka’s external debt stood at approximately $55 billion in 2023 (about 65% of its GDP), and even after restructuring, debt service payments will consume a significant portion of the country’s foreign exchange earnings in coming years.
In the decade preceding Sri Lanka’s default (2012-2021), debt repayments consumed an average of 41% of export earnings, an unsustainably high ratio that contributed directly to the eventual crisis. The loss of export revenues due to President Trump’s tariffs risks pushing this ratio back toward dangerous levels, potentially setting the stage for renewed debt distress despite the recent restructuring.
This situation highlights a fundamental flaw in the approach taken by international financial institutions to debt sustainability in developing countries. Unlike the treatment afforded to West Germany through the London Debt Agreement of 1953, where future debt repayments were explicitly linked to the country’s trade surplus and capped at 3% of export earnings—Sri Lanka and similar countries are expected to meet rigid repayment schedules regardless of their trade performance or external shocks beyond their control.
The tariffs thus expose the precariousness of Sri Lanka’s economic recovery and the fragility of the international debt architecture that underpins it. Without significant adjustments to account for this external shock, the country could find itself sliding back toward debt distress despite all the sacrifices made by its people during the recent adjustment period.
Social and Political Implications
The economic consequences of Trump’s tariffs will inevitably translate into social and political challenges for Sri Lanka. The country has already experienced significant social strain due to the austerity measures implemented under the IMF program, including tax increases, subsidy reductions, and public sector wage restraint. The additional economic pain caused by export losses and job cuts risks exacerbating social tensions and potentially triggering renewed protests.
The textile industry’s workforce is predominantly female, with many workers supporting extended family networks. Job losses in this sector would therefore have disproportionate impacts on women’s economic empowerment and household welfare, potentially reversing progress on gender equality and poverty reduction. Many of these workers come from rural areas where alternative formal employment opportunities are scarce, raising the spectre of increased rural poverty and potential migration pressures.
Politically, the tariff shock presents a significant challenge for President Anura Kumara Dissanayake’s government, which came to power promising economic revival and relief from the hardships of the crisis period. The administration has appointed an advisory committee consisting of government officials and private sector representatives to study the impact of the tariffs and develop response strategies, but its options are constrained by limited fiscal space and the conditions of the IMF programme.
The situation also raises questions about Sri Lanka’s foreign policy orientation. The country has traditionally maintained balanced relationships with major powers, including the United States, China, and India. However, the unilateral imposition of punitive tariffs by the United States may prompt some policymakers to reconsider this balance and potentially look more favourably on economic engagement with China, which has been a major infrastructure investor in Sri Lanka through its Belt and Road Initiative.
Such a reorientation would have significant geopolitical implications in the Indian Ocean region, where great power competition has intensified in recent years. It could potentially accelerate the fragmentation of the global economy into competing blocs, a trend that President Trump’s broader tariff policy seems designed to encourage despite its economic costs.
The social and political fallout from the tariffs thus extends far beyond immediate economic indicators, potentially reshaping Sri Lanka’s development trajectory and its place in the regional and global order. For a country still recovering from political instability triggered by economic crisis, these additional pressures come at a particularly vulnerable moment.
BROADER IMPLICATIONS FOR DEVELOPING ECONOMIES
Sri Lanka’s experience with Trump’s tariffs is not unique. The sweeping nature of these trade measures has created similar challenges for developing economies across the Global South, revealing structural vulnerabilities in the international economic system and raising fundamental questions about the sustainability of export-led development models in an era of rising protectionism.
Comparative Analysis with Other Affected Developing Countries
While Sri Lanka faces a punishing 44% tariff rate, it is not alone in confronting severe trade barriers. Bangladesh, another South Asian country heavily dependent on textile exports, has been hit with a 37% tariff. Like Sri Lanka, Bangladesh has built its development strategy around its garment industry, which accounts for more than 80% of its export earnings and employs approximately 4 million workers, mostly women.
Other significantly affected developing economies include Vietnam (46% tariff), Cambodia (49%), Pakistan (29%), and several African nations that had previously benefited from preferential access to the U.S. market through programs like the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). Many of these countries share common characteristics, relatively low per capita incomes, heavy reliance on a narrow range of export products, and limited domestic markets that make export-oriented growth their primary development pathway.
The pattern of tariff rates reveals a troubling dynamic, some of the highest tariffs have been imposed on countries that can least afford the economic shock. While wealthy nations like Japan or Germany certainly face challenges from these trade
barriers, they possess diversified economies, substantial domestic markets, and financial resources to cushion the impact. By contrast, countries like Sri Lanka or Bangladesh have far fewer economic buffers and face potentially devastating consequences from similar or higher tariff rates.
This disparity highlights how President Trump’s “reciprocal tariff” formula, ostensibly designed to create a level playing field, actually reinforces existing power imbalances in the global economy. By treating trade deficits as the primary metric for determining tariff rates, the policy ignores the vast differences in economic development, productive capacity, and financial resilience between countries at different stages of development.
Structural Vulnerabilities of Export-Dependent Economies
The tariff shock has exposed fundamental vulnerabilities in the export-led development model that has dominated economic thinking about the Global South for decades. Since the 1980s, international financial institutions have consistently advised developing countries to orient their economies toward export markets, specialize according to comparative advantage, and integrate into global value chains as a path to economic growth and poverty reduction.
This model has delivered significant benefits in many cases. Countries like Vietnam, Bangladesh, and, to some extent, Sri Lanka have achieved impressive poverty reduction and economic growth by expanding their manufacturing exports. However, President Trump’s tariffs reveal the precariousness of development strategies built on continued access to wealthy consumer markets, particularly the United States.
Several structural vulnerabilities have become apparent,
1. First, export concentration creates acute dependency on a small number of markets and products. When Sri Lanka sends 23% of its exports to the United States and concentrates 40% of its total exports in textiles and apparel, it becomes extraordinarily vulnerable to policy changes affecting that specific market-product combination.
Diversification, both of export markets and products, has often been acknowledged as desirable in theory but has proven difficult to implement in practice due to established trade patterns, buyer relationships, and specialized production capabilities.
2. Second, participation in global value chains often traps developing countries in lower-value segments of production with limited opportunities for upgrading. Sri Lanka’s textile industry, while more advanced than some of its regional competitors, still primarily engages in contract manufacturing rather than controlling higher-value activities like design, branding, or retail. This position in the value chain yields lower returns and creates dependency on decisions made by lead firms in wealthy countries.
3. Third, the mobility of capital relative to labour creates a fundamental power imbalance. If tariffs make production in Sri Lanka uneconomical, global brands can relatively quickly shift their sourcing to other countries with lower tariffs or costs. However, Sri Lankan workers cannot similarly relocate, leaving them bearing the brunt of adjustment costs through unemployment and wage depression.
4. Fourth, developing countries typically lack the fiscal space to provide adequate social protection during economic shocks. Unlike wealthy nations that can deploy extensive safety nets during trade disruptions, countries like Sri Lanka, already implementing austerity measures under IMF programmes, have limited capacity to support displaced workers or affected industries. This exacerbates the social costs of trade shocks and can trigger political instability. (To be continued)
(The writer served as the Minister of Justice, Finance and Foreign Affairs of Sri Lanka)
Disclaimer:
This article contains projections and scenario-based analysis based on current economic trends, policy statements, and historical behaviour patterns. While every effort has been made to ensure factual accuracy, using publicly available data and established economic models, certain details, particularly regarding future policy decisions and their impacts, remain hypothetical. These projections are intended to inform discussion and analysis, not to predict outcomes with certainty.
Features
Constitutional inconsistencies relating to franchise
The Preamble to Sri Lanka’s Constitution states: “The PEOPLE of SRI LANKA having by their Mandate … entrusted and empowered their Representatives … to draft, adopt and operate a new Republican Constitution in order to achieve the goals of a DEMOCRATIC SOCIALIST REPUBLIC, whilst ratifying the immutable republican principles of REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRATIC”.
The intent of this exercise is to ascertain whether the practices as adopted by successive Governments to elect the People’s representatives are in keeping with the “immutable principles of Representative Democracy”.
According to Article 3 of the Constitution: “Sovereignty includes the powers of government, fundamental rights and the franchisee”. Furthermore, Article 3 is an entrenched article – Article 83. According to Chapter XIV, titled “The Franchise And Elections”, Article 88 states: “Every person shall, unless disqualified….be qualified to be an elector at the election of the President and of the Members of Parliament or to vote at a Referendum”. Therefore, it is the electors in the Electoral Districts, as determined by the Delimitation Commission (DC), that elect the President and Members of Parliament.
EXISTING INCONSISTENCIIES
= The first relates to Article 96 (1). This states: “The (DC) shall divide into not less than twenty and not more than twenty-four electoral districts…”. The reason for the upper limit for Electoral Districts is perhaps because Sri Lanka was originally divided into twenty-for Administrative Districts (now 25), and 96 (3) establishes a relationship between Electoral Districts and Administrative Districts when it states: “Where a Province is divided into a number of electoral districts the Delimitation Commission shall have regard to the existing administrative districts so as to ensure as far as practicable that each electoral district shall be an administrative district or a combination of two or more administrative districts or more electoral districts together constitute an administrative district”
Despite the fact that the Constitutional direction to the DC was that the Electoral District was to “have regard to the existing Administrative District”, the number of Electoral Districts established by the DC is twenty-two (22) while the number of Administrative Districts are now twenty-five (25). Although the provision to combine Administrative Districts into one Electoral District exists, the reason for the difference is reportedly because the DC decided to factor in issues, such as land which is extraneous to franchise thus compromising the sanctity of franchise and the sovereignty of the electors. On the other hand, if the Electoral District is coterminous with the Administrative District, not only would it protect the elector’s Franchise but also enable the elected members to address the administrative interests of the electors. Would such an opportunity not give substance to the “immutable republican principle of Representative Democracy”?
= The second inconsistency relates to Article 96 (4). This states: “The electoral districts of each Province shall together be entitled to return four members, (independently of the numbers which they are entitled to return by reference to the number of electors whose names appear in the registers of electors of such electoral districts), and the Delimitation Commission shall apportion such entitlement equitably among such electoral districts”.
Consequently, the four members to be returned from each of the nine Provinces amounts to thirty-six additional members, shall be apportioned equitably by the DC among the twenty-two (22) Electoral Districts together with the one hundred and sixty members from the electoral registers, thus making a total of one hundred and ninety-six members being elected through the franchise of the electors. The balance twenty-nine through the National List nominated by Political Parties is also elected by the electors, thus making a total of two hundred and twenty-five (225) Members of Parliament elected through Electoral Districts.
The irony however, is that although Members of Parliament are elected through Electoral Districts, all Executive Powers of the Line Ministries of the Central Government are implemented by the District Secretaries in the twenty-five Administrative Districts. The present convoluted process of appointing a Parliament through Electoral Districts and administering its functions through Administrative Districts cannot be justified. What would be more meaningful is to make Administrative Districts also perform Electoral functions such as appointing the Members of Parliament.
= The third inconsistency relates to the election of Members for Provincial Councils. According to the Provincials Councils Act: “Every administrative district in a Province shall for the purposes of elections to the Provincial Council established for that province, constitute an electoral area”
This is a departure from the practice adopted to elect Members to Parliament since they are based on outcomes from twenty-two (22) Electoral Districts. Therefore, it is worth exploring why Members to Parliament and Provincial Councils cannot be elected using the existing 25 Administrative Districts.
RECOMMENDATIONS
The intention is for an arrangement where Administrative Districts are also assigned electoral functions, so that both Members to Parliament and Provincial Councils could be elected by a single unit. The advantage would be that Administrative Districts could carry out Central Government functions under a District Secretary as at present, a parallel unit within the Administrative District could be set up to implement devolved powers in each of the Administrative Districts, while retaining the existing structural arrangements of Provincial Councils. This would facilitate the coordination of devolved powers with Central Government activities, thus improving productivity of each.
CONCLUSION
The current practice is that while representative of the Government of Sri Lanka is elected by Electoral Districts as stated above, Provincial Councils in the periphery with less powers than the Government are elected by electors in Administrative Districts of each Province. If elections to Parliament and to Provincial Councils are elected by electors in each of the twenty-five Administrative Districts, perhaps one election could elect Members to both bodies.
In view of the significant cost savings involved, it is imperative that serious consideration is given to equip Administrative Districts to serve as Electoral Districts for Parliamentary Elections as well as for Provincial Council Elections, since such an arrangement would further fortify the “immutable republican principle of Representative Democracy”. Furthermore, since such an arrangement would be closer to the People, services to them would be better served.
By Neville Ladduwahetty
Features
Power cuts are here! But we have a way out!
The much-dreaded power cuts are already here though not declared as such. The tragedy is that the power cuts are not due to inadequate electricity supply, but the inability of the power and energy authorities to use the abundant solar and wind power installed without any financial or economic burden on the state. They ought to admit their lack of wisdom to be mindful of the rapid changes in the sector and the need to be equipped.
Fuel Prices have been increased again up to the 2022 levels. Therefore another Electricity tariff hike is inevitable. Perhaps, the government may hold it back until September, when the next tariff revision is due. An appeal has been made to “prosumers” to switch off their solar PV system in the fear of grid stability being affected. While there is excess solar power, which they are unable to manage, even when the demand is below the installed capacity and high contribution of hydro, solar and wind. May 31 (Sunday) energy mix indicated substantial use of oil in CEB-owned power plants and those belonging to the Independent Power Producers (IPPs) . What is the rationale? One would believe that even the hydro reservoir water can be saved for use during the night, without curtailing solar and wind power. It will be said that the system is very complex and beyond the understanding of mere mortals like ordinary “prosumers”, who have added over 2300 MW to the grid, entirely at their expense and at rates well below the average cost of generation. (See Image 1)
Storage Batteries and Renewable Transition
The fact that the growing need for storage batteries to optimise the utilisation of variable renewable energy (VRE) has been felt for the last decade or more, and nothing was done about it, is never mentioned in their laments.
However, there is a glimmer of hope due to the initiatives taken by the Public Utilities Commission of Sri Lanka (PUCSL). An increase in the demand due to a general GDP growth will have to be met using renewable resources. It has been clearly noted that such alternatives must be developed while curtailing the use of oil and ensuring the uninterrupted power to the consumers.
Recognising this need and the fact that fastest intervention is possible by promoting BESS (Battery Energy Storage Systems) to be added to all existing renewable energy sources, the PUCSL has initiated stakeholder consultation to determine the feed-in tariff payable for each type of BESS. A detailed methodology for determining the FIT has been circulated. The identified types of BESS discussed were as follows”
1. Power Plants
a. Mini -Hydro
b. Mini – Hydro-Local: mini hydro plants that at least use locally manufactured turbines
c. Wind
d. Wind – Local: Wind plants that at least use locally manufactured turbine blades
e. Biomass – Dendro – Biomass plants that use sustainably grown fuel wood
f. Biomass – Agricultural/Industrial Waste; Biomass fired plants use byproducts, like paddy husk, sawdust, sugar cane bagasse, etc.
g. Municipal Solid Waste
h. Waste Heat Recovery
i. Ground Mounted Solar PV
j. Floating Solar PV
2. Prosumers
a. Roof Top Solar PV
b. Rooftop Solar PV with Battery Energy Storage System (BESS)
c. Prosumers with behind the meter Battery Energy Storage System (BESS)
3. Power Plants with BESS
We mentioned in an earlier article that the PUCSL proposed a scheme whereby we can get rid of use of oil for power generation in stages, commencing with elimination of the diesel use by 2027 and all imported oils by 2030.
Stakeholder Meeting & Feed In Tariff( FIT)
The PUCSL has been empowered by the new Electricity Act No 36 (as amended), which came into full force on 09 March, 2026, with responsibility for calculating and announcing all FIT schemes, both for purchase and sale of electricity to consumers.
A well-represented stakeholder meeting was held recently, when the proposed methodology for determining the FIT of each type of BESS was given to them to provide further specific inputs. It is, therefore, realistic to expect such a FIT to be declared by the end of June, 2026.
While this is a welcome and progressive step unlike the ad hoc process adopted hitherto. But the fact remains that the responsibility for the effective use of FIT to attract investors to add the BESS at different scales, lies with the one or more of the newly appointed companies to take over the functions of the former Ceylon Electricity Board (CEB).
Government Recognition of Fossil Fuel Risks
The current government has reportedly recognised the danger of overdependence on imported fossil fuels, which we have absolutely no control over. This is something we have been stressing for a long time. However, better late than never. As a matter of interest, we show the degree of fossil fuel dependence and its adverse impact on the economy. (See Graph 1)
It is to be noted that earnings from our traditional exports of tea, rubber and coconuts fail to meet the ever-increasing cost of importing fossil fuels. Time was when earnings from these exports barely helped meet the cost of import of fuels which was back in 2010. The rupee cost of imports is shown in Billions to keep the data columns within the bounds of the chart. This is the factor which affects you and me directly.
However, we earnestly urge the government to direct the electricity companies to take immediate action to prepare the grid which costs only a fraction of the values predicted by the CEB to institute their schemes which are not in line with the ground reality to accept the BESS system once the FIT is announced. Reasonable BESS and FIT will help attract investors with the assurance of short-term and long-term improvement, at no cost to the state.
Solar PV & BESS Proposal
We proposed some time back of the opportunity for those “prosumers” using 300 units per month, for installing solar PV with adequately sized batteries, which is more economical than drawing power from the grid, and to gain the happy situation, to be insulated from the danger of power cuts and further increases in consumer tariff.
The PUCSL intervention to declare a BESS tariff will add a great impetus to those who are willing to adopt the above proposal. They will be encouraged to increase the capacity of their installations as well as the battery capacity so that the excess can be exported to the grid during peak hours, when firm economic power is most needed. Such additional features would enhance their financial returns and would enable rapid elimination of the use of diesel during peak hours. In recent months with the depreciation of the rupee, coupled with the increase of costs of solar panels, inverters and batteries, our original analysis of financial viability of this interevention was facing some uncertainties. As such, we welcome this move by the PUCSL, whereby the consumers would have a steady revenue in addition to the savings on their monthly electricity bills. It is likely that the level of FIT and the permitted number of exports will be adequate to work with the increased costs, as shown. (See Table 1)
It must be noted that the cost values are highly volatile ,and some variations are to be expected. FIT for export on energy is stated as 60% of the current peak time energy charge of Rs 106/kWh.
This revolution is well within the means of the over 200,000 potential “Prosumers” who consume over 250 units per month. While they would fulfil their own goal of being immune to any power cuts as well as being insulated from future tariff increases, they would be serving the country by progressively eliminating the need for any fossil fuels for power generation. For example, if 50,000 of them add 10 kWh of battery capacity, the peak power demand can be reduced by 500 MW, thereby obviating the need for using the most expensive diesel during the peak period. Very special advantages can be derived by those also purchasing EVs instead of petrol and diesel vehicles. It will be possible to save on LPG, which costs Rs 4,700.00 per cylinder at present. Thus, the excuse for demanding ever increasing consumer tariff in the future will not be available. As such this move would help all consumers down to the lowest level of consumers.
It is hoped that the energy authorities recognise this reality and support the PUCSL proposals by approving the BESS FIT system and directing all Utility companies to adopt the same and urgently initiate action to install the simple infrastructure additions to accept the BESS energy, as proposed. If they care to review this proposal having discarded biases and any other agendas, they, too, will benefit.
Conclusion
The inescapable conclusion one can derive from the above is that the solution to the crisis is available from the consumers themselves in a manner that is attractive and profitabe to them. It would also be of major assistance for the Utility to manage the sector effectively and efficiently. In addition, all consumers will benefit by gradually weaning themselves away from the grid an use of oil for power generation. This would obviate any more demands for consumer tariff increases by the National System Operator. The PUCSL has taken an essential first step with its intention to declare a BESS FIT. It is up to the government to ensure that the Ministry and the Utility companies adopt the correct stance and make a commitment to ensure the success of this scheme as soon as possible.
by Eng Parakrama Jayasinghe
Past President and Council Member
Bio Energy Association of Sri Lanka
Features
Is power devolution under JVP-NPP a political daydream?
The JVP General Secretary Tilvin Silva’s recent remarks at a news conference in Jaffna where he ruled out the possibility of holding provincial council elections this year has been widely reported and widely criticized. About the same time there was another media event in Jaffna that went largely unnoticed and unreported outside Jaffna. What was said at the second media event may carry far more political implications than Tilvin Silva’s election timing talk. A veteran Tamil political participant made the startling yet not implausible statement that the prospect of having political devolution under the JVP-NPP government is becoming “a daydream”. The statement was made by Dr. K. Vigneswaran, who served as Provincial Secretary to the only North-East Provincial Council Government that was elected under the auspices of the Thirteenth Amendment.
Dr. Vigneswaran is a Professional Civil Engineer who studied at Royal College, graduated with First Class Honours in Engineering in 1964, and went on to complete a pioneering PhD at the university of Waterloo, Canada, applying the finite element method (FEM) in the field of Geotechnical Engineering. His engineering career has always been at the Irrigation Department where he rose to a Deputy Director. That was when the department was in its golden years, and Vigneswaran was known for his technical mentorship, meticulous administrative skills, and for knowing the fine print of everything. While at the Irrigation Department, Vigneswaran married Ramya de Silva, a fellow irrigation Engineer. After 1983, Vigneswaran became a fulltime political activist and a powerful resource in Tamil politics, but with unwavering commitment to nonviolence, democracy and federalism. The family moved first to India and then Canada, and Vigneswaran has been shuttling between Canada and Sri Lanka.
Devolution: Tortuous Trajectory
Since 1987, the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement, and the 13th Amendment, Vigneswaran has been a permanent fixture in all the politics and institutional dynamic of implementing 13A and establishing provincial councils. He served as Secretary to the only elected Provincial Government for the Northern and Eastern Provinces. After 1994 and the election of Chandrika Kumaratunga as President, Vigneswaran became a key participant in all the civil society efforts and government initiatives to restore the PCs and implement 13A, both during the Kumaratunga presidency and the succeeding administrations of Mahinda Rajapaksa and the Sirisena-Wickremesinghe duo.
Devolution efforts stalled after the election of Gotabaya Rajapaksa, who in so many words declared that he had no time for 13A or PCs in his presidential agenda, whatever it was. Only that his whole agenda turned out to be a wholesale disaster for the country. Already by then, all the nine Provincial Councils had fallen into abeyance with the cancellation of the 1988 PC elections by the Sirisena-Wickremesinghe duo, with the TNA standing by. The abeyance continues under the JVP-NPP government with no apparent end in sight after Tilvin de Silva’s statement in Jaffna.
I say all this to provide the proper context for Vigneswaran’s statement in Jaffna that the prospects for power devolution under the JVP-NPP government are becoming a political daydream. He said something else as well: that of all the government leaders he has encountered over the years, the only leader who has been genuinely sincere about power devolution is former President Chandrika Kumaratunga, and no one else. I am constrained to add that the insincere category would include Ranil Wickremesinghe, who for all his handsome promises, never matched any of them with experiential sincerity. The present JVP-NPP government still has time to show that they are not an insincere lot.
It is not my purpose to agree with or question Dr. Vigneswaran’s assertions, but to use them as cue and context to comment on the widening mismatch between the JVP-NPP government’s promises and its practices on the matter of power devolution and the restoration of the PC system. With a stalling economy, rising prices and external shocks, it is obvious that the government has all the economic matters to worry about, but that does not mean that it can ignore all the other government responsibilities. No government is put in power to solve a single problem or address a single issue. It is in the nature of governments to deal with multiple problems with varying priorities. Otherwise you could have a single cabinet minister to deal with one problem at a time. That is never going to be the case.
The economy is of course the top of mind priority for the government even as it is a top of mind concern for the people. Even on the economic front, the government is holding steady but is showing little progress. And there are other government initiatives where political accountability will call for answers: to wit, the catchall Clean Sri Lanka programme, ambitious educational reforms, contentious energy sector reforms and, yes, power devolution as well as the overpromised constitutional reforms. Not to mention the sprawling unforced errors over substandard coal imports, foreign exchange fraud, and the chronic neglect of developing the renewable energy sector. Correcting these fields of errors may require a separate ministry for each.
Devolution: Daydream or Deliverable
On the PC system and constitutional reform, there has been scant progress in spite of handsome promises. On both, the government is inadvertently deepening the holes that it had dug itself into through indifference, inaction or procrastination, or all of them and more. In the matter of devolution and provincial councils, the government can simply defuse the situation by directing the Election Commission to conduct elections at the earliest opportunity that is logistically possible. Making his statement in Jaffna, Mr. Tilvin Silva alluded to funding shortfall and legal complications as reasons for the necessity to postpone PC elections until next year. Neither reason holds water.
The funding question would seem to have been put to rest by the statement of Health Minister and Cabinet Spokesman Nalinda Jayatissa, presumably reflecting cabinet consensus, that there are no funding issues and if needed additional funds could be arranged through supplementary allocations. It is also disingenuous to cite legal complications as a reason. The so called legal complications arose because of the collective stupidity of the Sirisena-Wickremesinghe parliament that included the then miniscule NPP and the politically-lost TNA. The JVP-NPP has now ballooned from a handful MPs to a two-thirds majority and it can expedite any legislation that it wants to enable the PC elections to be held without delays.
Alternatively, the elections can be held under the old arrangement of proportional representation with assurance by political parties to honour their commitment to fielding more female candidates. Already at a gathering of all political parties, including the NPP (but not the JVP), and civil society groups, convened by People’s Action For Free & Fair Elections (PAFFREL), the political parties jointly committed to a 25% quota for women and youth under the old electoral system. The ongoing parliamentary committee exercise studying the legal matter, headed by the overstretched Foreign Minister Vijitha Herath, is also an unnecessary red herring. The Election Commission is ready to go under whatever law or electoral system that is before it. So, there is no reason to hide behind legal complications to further delay the PC elections.
Somewhat amusingly, Public and Parliamentary Affairs Minister Ananda Wijepala has trotted out the argument that the NPP government has already conducted two nationwide elections during the one and a half years it has been in office, and that unlike the Ranil Wickremesinghe government the JVP-NPP is not in the business “to delay elections for our personal benefit” – whatever that means. Unfortunately, the good minister is missing the point. The question is not how many elections can the JVP-NPP hold in how many years, but how many years do people in the provinces have to wait before they vote in another provincial election? How many more years? That really is the question.
We know the current situation in the provinces. There are provincial governments but no elected provincial councils. The government administration in every province is being run by the President of the Republic through his handpicked governors and unelected government officials. This is a travesty of democracy and the euthanizing of the PC system. Already under 13A, the office of the provincial governors has been constitutionally and legally compared to the office of the Governors of old Ceylon who represented the monarch in what was then a crown colony. The irony is that a JVP-NPP President may have inadvertently positioned himself as the monarch of all he provincially surveys, courtesy of the Thirteenth Amendment!
The JVP was in the forefront of the litigation that caused the demerger of the Northern and Eastern Provinces. If Dr. Vigneswaran’s assertion were to prove correct, a potential dissolution of the provincial system under the JVP-NPP government would be the consummation of the JVP’s original opposition to the introduction of the provincial council system itself. The whole system may not be eradicated, but it could be devoured of its democratic essence while preserving the administrative shell as the medium for the country’s president to overreach into the provinces. That would be worse than a daydream, a real nightmare.
by Rajan Philips ✍️
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