Midweek Review
A triumph that can never be forgotten
The Army’s transformation from largely a ceremonial role to a fighting force cannot be examined without taking into consideration the ongoing controversy over the alleged involvement of the Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI) in the 2019 Easter Sunday carnage. Every effort should be made to ascertain the truth and punish those responsible in case the then Brigadier Suresh Sally, who had not been with DMI at the time of the near simultaneous suicide attacks, and stationed in our mission in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, engineered the project to facilitate Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s victory at the presidential election as asserted by their enemies. Sally, who later served as the head of State Intelligence Service during Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s tenure as the President has successfully disputed the primary allegation that he secretly left Malaysia to meet the Easter Sunday suicide squad at a coconut estate in the Puttalam district. Sally’s case is just another example the Army failed as an institution to address issues thereby leaving individual officers to fight their own battles. The recent harassment of retired Maj. Gen. Kithsiri Ekanayake by the Beliatta Police on the false charge of killing a woman to secure a buried treasure in the deep South is another example of utterly unfair and irresponsible action by our law enforcement.
The country’s rightfully proud Army celebrates its 76th anniversary in October this year with some of its illustrious officers placed under a cloud with regard to their conduct during the war by those who cannot stomach their dream victory over the LTTE, achieved despite various attempts made by powerful Western nations to deny us that worthy triumph over the world’s most ruthless terrorist organisation, even acknowledged by the American Federal Bureau of Investigation. Successive governments, including the war-winning Mahinda Rajapaksa administration, failed to address accountability issues properly, especially in the face of even powerful international bodies, like the UNHCR, blindly towing the Western line to hound us, thereby creating an environment conducive for those seeking to target military and political leaders.
The war-winning Army never really pushed governments to take up the accountability issues seriously though the matter had been taken up occasionally. The military’s situation is summed up by Tennyson’s epic poem “The Charge of the Light Brigade,” in the lines, “Theirs not to make reply, Theirs not to reason why, Theirs but to do and die”. Annual celebrations and religious events hadn’t been able to cover up the pathetic failure on the part of the Army to set the record straight.
No one has explained the crisis experienced by the Army better than Gajaba Regiment veteran Chagie Gallage. Having retired on 31 August, 2018, Gallage, in his farewell speech, delivered a week later at Gajaba home, at Saliyapura, Anuradhapura, highlighted his predicament as well as those of his colleagues.
Speaking on the eve of the 35th anniversary of the Gajaba Regiment, the strategist declared: “Gajaba was engraved in golden letters of the annals of the history of the Sri Lanka Army, if not in the history of Sri Lanka … and I’m certain it will never to be reversed by any. So, I’m happy to be retired being a tiny particle of that proud chapter of history, though designated as a ‘War Criminal.”
Among those who had been present at that occasion was the then Maj. Gen. Shavendra Silva set to become the Commander in the following year. Shavendra Silva, also of the celebrated Gajaba Regiment, was sanctioned two years later after he succeeded Lt. Gen. Mahesh Senanaayke. The UK sanctioned him in April this year.
Gallage was responding to Australia denying him visa for a visit between December 2016 and January 2017. Australia found fault with Gallage for commanding the 59 Division from 07 May, 2009 to 20 July, 2009. Throughout the war against the LTTE, in both the Northern and Eastern theatres, Gallage played a critical and exceptional role, including at the Anandapura battle in the first week of April 2009 that crippled the LTTE’s conventional fighting capacity.
The combined armed forces brought the war to a successful conclusion in May 2009. But for want of a cohesive strategy, the Army, Navy and Air Force never took a joint stand. Unprecedented political upheaval caused by war-winning Army Chief General Sarath Fonseka challenging Commander-in-Chief Mahinda Rajapaksa at the 2010 presidential election wrong footed the armed forces. That, too, undermined the overall defence against war crimes accusations. The now-defunct The Sunday Leader exploited Fonseka in an interview. Having accused Fonseka of killing The Sunday Leader Editor Lasantha Wickrematunga, the paper quoted the Sinha Regiment veteran as having said the 58 Division carried out field executions. By then, the Rajapaksas had exacerbated the situation by dismissing 35 senior officers as alleged by Fonseka at a public meeting in Matara on 05 October. The Rajapaksas owed the country an apology for the way they arrested Fonseka on the night of 08 February, 2010, by soldiers who stormed his political office at 1/3 Rajakeeya Mawatha (formerly Reid Avenue) near Royal College, in Colombo 7. On the eve of the Army’s 76th anniversary, the best ever Army commander launched a scathing attack on the Rajapaksas, alleging the former President Mahinda Rajapaksa of treachery. (See Fonseka’s Matara speech on page 1 of this edition).
SLA targeted
Against the backdrop of the pathetic handling of accountability issues, the UN and countries individually took action. No less a person than Ali Sabry, PC, in his capacity as the Foreign Minister in September 2022, explained the situation when the writer raised the issue at a media briefing, called by the Foreign Ministry to explain the developments with the focus on staff-level agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) with regard to USD 2.9 bn loan facility and the Geneva sessions.
Sabry declared that the entire fighting divisions, which fought on the Vanni front during Eelam War IV (2006-2009), had been ‘blacklisted’ on the basis of obviously predetermined findings made by the Geneva-based United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC).
The failure on the part of Parliament to address accountability is a mystery. However, Parliament, over the years, enacted laws which addressed the concerns of the UN and Western powers with regard to accountability issues. But, never took any meaningful measures to have the unsubstantiated war crimes allegations investigated. Instead, Parliament, in early February 2023, honoured Ban Ki-moon who, in his capacity as the Secretary General of the United Nations, set the stage for the planned attack on Sri Lanka by producing a hatchet report that found fault with the Army by his handpicked panel of experts with no chance given to either the Army or the country to reply.
In spite of wild allegations levelled against our victorious armed forces, as the war was brought to a successful conclusion, the UN had faith in the capabilities of our battle-tested military by continuing to deploy Sri Lankan troops, under its command, in several countries. That is an achievement the country can be proud of. Even during the height of war, the Army remained committed to UN deployments.
It would be pertinent to mention those who commanded the Army, after Fonseka’s retirement (December 6, 2006 to July 15, 2009). Lt. Gen. Jagath Jayasuriya (July 15, 2009, to July 31, 2013, Lt. Gen. Daya Ratnayake (August 1, 2013, to February 21, 2015), Lt. Gen. C de Silva (February 22, 2015, to June 26, 2017), Lt. Gen. Mahesh Senanayake (June 27, 2017, to August 18, 2019), Lt. Gen. Shavendra Silva (August 19, 2019, to May 31, 2022), Lt. Gen. Vikum Liyanage (June 1, 2022, to December 30, 2024) and the incumbent is Lt. Gen. Lasantha Rodrigo. Of those who commanded fighting Divisions on the northern front, during Eelam War IV, only Shavendra Silva received the opportunity to command the proud Army. President Gotabaya Rajapaksa replaced him with another Gajaba officer Vikum Liyanage soon after 09 May counter violence triggered by the senseless Temple Trees directive to SLPP goons to break up the Galle Face protest. When Galle Face protesters overran the Janadhipathi Mandiraya, forcing President Gotabaya Rajapaksa to flee Colombo, by sea, to Trincomalee, Liyanage had been in command of the Army.
UNP leader Ranil Wickremesinghe, who picked Fonseka, in consultation with the TNA and the JVP, as the common candidate at the 2010 presidential election, betrayed his own war-winning Army, five years later, when his government treacherously co-sponsored the accountability resolution at the Geneva Human Rights Council. The US Embassy, during Patricia Butenis tenure, played a critical role in the formation of that alliance. The then President Maithripala Sirisena cannot, under any circumstances, absolve himself of culpability for allowing that to happen. President Sirisena assured the Army that he would take remedial measures. But he did nothing. In fact, the US refused to issue a visa to Fonseka who was to accompany Sirisena for the UN General Assembly.
The Sirisena-Wickremesinghe duo set the stage for the humiliation of the armed forces. First they cancelled the annual victory day celebrations. There had never been a previous instance of a government here, or in any part of the world, co-sponsoring an accountability resolution against its own Army. The UN led process has reached a crucial stage with the National People’s Power (NPP) government going ahead with plans to establish an independent prosecutor’s office. Among those involved in deliberations in this regard are Attorney General Parinda Ranasinghe (Jnr), PC and President of the Bar Association of Sri Lanka, Rajeev Amarasuriya.
Glorious victories
The Army spearheaded combined armed forces campaigns against the JVP insurrection in 1971 and during its second most violent attempt to grab power between1987-1990, and separatist Tamil terrorism. In spite of the JVP receiving some backing from a few soldiers, the Marxist party could never inspire the military. The Army played a significant role in overcoming the JVP challenge during the tenures of President J. R. Jayewardene and Ranasinghe Premadasa. The systematic elimination of the JVP leadership brought the second terror campaign to an end by early 1990. The JVP couldn’t sustain operations after the execution of Rohana Wijeweera within 24 hours after his capture by the Army in the second week of November, 1989. Of the top JVP leadership, only Somawansa Amarasinghe managed to escape those hunting for him. Amarasinghe returned home in late 2001 following 12 years of self-imposed exile. On his return, Amarasinghe profusely thanked India, particularly its intelligence services, for helping him escape.
The Army suffered debacles on the northern front due to Premadasa’s reckless political strategies. Debilitating setbacks suffered in the North caused deterioration of security in the East. President Premadasa had been so foolish that he went to the extent of ordering the Army to surrender. If not for the intrepid leadership of Lt. Col Hiran Halangoda, the then Commanding Officer of the first battalion of Gemunu Watch, the East, too, would have been lost. Premadasa actually funded the LTTE to the tune of Rs 125 mn, in addition to providing arms and ammunition. Even after the LTTE murdered several hundred police personnel, who had surrendered to it on the instructions of the President, the funding continued.
Retired Army Commander Daya Ratnayake in his memoirs ‘Sri Lankawe Bedumwadi Thrasthawadaya 1975-2009’ (Separatist Terrorism in Sri Lanka 1975 to 2009) recalled the treacherous actions of the UNP government. What the Army did, at the behest of Premadasa who simply bent backwards to appease the LTTE, was unthinkable.
The then Major Ratnayake had been at the Joint Operations Headquarters (JOH), Colombo, when fighting erupted in the East, in the second week of June, 1990. The author had been the duty officer at the JOH. Ratnayake is, perhaps, one of the few military personnel to observe the then State Defence Minister, late Ranjan Wijeratne, Defence Secretary the late General Cyril Ranatunga, and then IGP, the late Ernest Perera, issuing orders from JOH for the armed forces, and police, to surrender to the LTTE.
Ratnayake named Lt. Colonel Hiran Halangode as the one who refused to heed the treacherous directive issued by the JOH. Sri Lanka never bothered to examine the conduct of political and military leadership during the conflict. Even 17 years after the conclusion of the war, no government took tangible measures to conduct a thorough examination of the conflict.
The political and military leadership should be held responsible for the overall weakening of the armed forces that resulted in the loss of a stretch of road, north of Vavuniya, right up to Elephant Pass, in 1990. That road couldn’t be totally regained in spite of several efforts, including the costly Jayasikurui operation conducted during Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga’s tenure as the President.
Finally, the Army regained that stretch of road in January 2009. That marked the completion of ground operations on the western part of the Vanni as the Army stepped up the offensive on the area east of Kandy-Jaffna A-9 road. Some of the fiercest battles of the Eelam War IV were fought in the Vanni east. Army Headquarters records reveal that as many as 2,400 officers and men perished in the Vanni east theatre where the LTTE mounted several counter attacks and at one point breached the frontline defences in February 2009 and managed to unsettle the Army. But, the Army fought valiantly to turn around the situation. By March 2009, the Army was set for the kill. During the campaign (August 2006 to May 2009) nearly 6,300 made the supreme sacrifice while about 30,000 suffered injuries.
A desperate bid to save LTTE
A few weeks before that, Norway made a desperate bid to save the LTTE. That attempt had been made while the US was exploring the possibility of evacuating the LTTE leadership. The then Norwegian Ambassador Tore Hattrem, in a note dated 16 February, 2009, sent to Basil Rajapaksa, expressed concern over the fate of those trapped on the Vanni east front. Hattrem’s note to Basil Rajapaksa revealed Norway’s serious concern over the LTTE’s refusal to release the civilians. Those who stupidly believed in the LTTE’s capacity to overwhelm the Army on the Vanni east front, were quite shocked when troops forced them to retreat on all fronts.
The following is the Norwegian note, headlined ‘Offer/Proposal to the LTTE’, and personally signed by Ambassador Hattrem:” I refer to our telephone conversation today. The proposal to the LTTE on how to release the civilian population, now trapped in the LTTE controlled area, has been transmitted to the LTTE through several channels. So far, there has been, regrettably, no response from the LTTE and it doesn’t seem to be likely that the LTTE will agree with this in the near future.”
The ICRC recognised the sacrifices made by the Army. But successive governments, as well as the Army Headquarters, lacked prudence to exploit the ICRC’s declaration.
Let me reproduce a secret US cable that was disclosed by WikiLeaks. The cable had been signed by US Ambassador to Geneva, Clint Williamson, on 15 July, 2009. Having met Jacque de Maio, ICRC Head of Operations for South Asia on 09 July, 2009, two months after the end of the war, the Ambassador wrote: “The Army was determined not to let the LTTE escape from its shrinking territory, even though this meant the civilians being kept hostage by the LTTE were at increasing risk. So, de Maio said, while one could safely say that there were ‘serious, widespread violations of IHL,’ by the Sri Lankan forces, it did not amount to genocide. He could cite examples of where the Army had stopped shelling when ICRC informed them it was killing civilians. In fact, the Army actually could have won the military battle faster with higher civilian casualties, yet chosen a slower approach which led to a greater number of Sri Lankan military deaths (emphasis is mine) He concluded, however, by asserting that the GSL failed to recognise its obligation to protect civilians, despite the approach leading to higher military casualties. From his standpoint, a soldier at war should be more likely to die than a civilian.”
Perhaps, Army Headquarters never realised the importance of ICRC’s declaration. Maybe no one in command really wanted to take it up with the political leadership.
A former colleague of mine, now overseas, in response to a recent article, under the Midweek series, pointed out how President Mahinda Rajapaksa contributed to the developing Geneva situation by not implementing Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission (LLRC) recommendations. He emphasised that it wouldn’t be fair to always allege external conspiracies and interventions, the TNA and Tamil Diaspora for pushing for war crimes investigations, when the President himself failed in his responsibility. The writer fully appreciates that opinion. The former President owed the country an explanation as his failure obviously made things difficult for the war-winning Army.
Sri Lanka never wanted to set the record straight. Successive governments played politics with the issue. In fact, war crimes narratives collapsed on the day the TNA declared its support for General Fonseka’s candidature at the 2010 presidential election and the Tamil electorate overwhelmingly voted for him. Fonseka won all predominantly Tamil-speaking electoral districts in the Northern and Eastern provinces though the rest of the country overwhelmingly rejected him. Fonseka lost by a staggering 1.8 mn votes. That defeat actually ended opportunities for him to advance his political career though once UNP leader Wickremesinghe, for reasons best known to him, accommodated Fonseka in his Yahapalana Cabinet-of-Ministers (2015-2019). That happened because M.K.D.S. Gunawardena, appointed to Parliament, passed away suddenly.
By Shamindra Ferdinando
Midweek Review
A retired General’s narrative
Regime change:

Egodawele
Gemunu Watch veteran retired Maj. Gen. K.B. Egodawele painted a bleak picture of the overall failure on the part of the Defence Ministry, National Security Council and the armed forces to deal with the Pangiriwatte, Mirihana, violent protest on 31, March, 2022. Had those responsible for overall security taken tangible measures, after the Pangiriwatte letdown, the rapid deterioration of the situation, leading to the 9 July, 2022, assault on the President’s House, could have been averted, he opined. The author explained how in the absence of even a basic plan to prevent large scale public movement/gathering, the conspirators succeeded in bringing several hundred thousand people to Colombo, that included even a train load of activists from Kandy. Egodawele quite rightly asserted that the hoodwinked ordinary innocent people had been the real strength behind the regime change operation. Egodawele raised a spate of pertinent questions regarding the security aspects, with the focus on the 09 July, 2022, assault, taking into consideration various influencing factors, including Field Marshal Sarath Fonseka’s appeal to the armed forces not to point guns at the public as they didn’t want a repetition of 9 May, 2022, at Galle Face.
Whatever the impact of politicians and religious leaders urging the armed forces not to intervene, the war-winning Army Chief’s appeal may have influenced the military and even some members of the National Security Council.
By Shamindra Ferdinando
Maj. Gen. (retd.) K.B. Egodawele believes the ban on import of chemical fertilisers and agrochemicals, in April/May 2021, that led to staggering drop in crop yields, and countrywide protests, had been a key contributing factors that helped galvanise the Western-engineered Aragalaya plot against President Gotabaya Rajapaksa, similar to parallel regime changes carried out by Washington in Pakistan, Bangladesh and Nepal.
Egodawele, who had served the President as an Additional Secretary (Administration), attached to the Presidential Secretariat, dealt with regime change in ‘Aragalaya: Adarayen Prachandathwayata (From Love to Violence). In fact, according to the ex-Gemunu Watch veteran, who retired in 2004, the crisis caused by the fertiliser ban had been the first major issue that undermined President Rajapaksa.
Turmoil over the fertiliser ban paved the way for a series of other large scale protests. Although not directly connected with the fertiliser issue, teachers’ protests, demanding higher salaries, campaign against Sir John Kotelawala National Defence University (KNDU) Bill, Muslims and Catholics’ protests, targeting the President, followed by countrywide demonstrations over the collapse of essential services and supplies, created an explosive situation. The unexplained explosions of gas cylinders, too, caused anger and confusion among the public struggling to cope up with the developing situation.
Egodawele asserted that the Tamil Diaspora played a significant role in the regime-change project, with external powers utilising political parties here to carry out the conspiracy. The author is confident that the regime change project got underway soon after the Gajaba Regiment veteran assumed Office, as the seventh executive President.
In addition to Egodawele, who launched his work in 2023, former Central Bank Governor Ajith Nivard Cabraal (2022), former parliamentarian Wimal Weerawansa (2023), renowned author Sena Thoradeniya (2023), one-time Finance Secretary Mahinda Siriwardana (2025), President Ranil Wickremesinghe’s media head Prof. Sunanda Maddumabandara (2025), political analyst Asanga Abeygunasekera (2026) and President Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s Media head/DG, Information Department Mohan Samaranayake (2026) dealt with the first successful use of calculated violence to achieve a regime change.
As a person who had a ring side view of the rapid developments, Egodawele quite rightly asserted that the crisis got out of hand due to the delay on the part of the government to reach consensus with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to secure a lifeline. Who caused the delay in Sri Lanka initiating action to obtain IMF assistance for the 18th time? Those who had read Siriwardena’s book know that direct accusations were directed at the then Central Bank Governor W.D. Lakshman and others for their failure to seek IMF assistance, thereby jeopardizing the government. Samaranayake went a step further when he questioned whether such actions had been deliberate and meant to cause the downfall of the President, elected by a huge majority.
Referring to the Covid-19 crisis that dealt a knockout blow to the already weak national economy, Egodawele declared that it wouldn’t be fair by President Gotabaya Rajapaksa to blame him for the economic fallout as previous leaders, too, contributed to the collapse. Alleging that the external and internal conspirators exploited the Covid-19 crisis to achieve their political objective, the author named the main Opposition Samagi Jana Balwegaya (SJB), the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna and JVP breakaway faction Frontline socialist party (FSP/Peratugami pakshaya) as well as other political parties and groups being among the schemers.
The Catholic Church was also accused of direct involvement in the operation against President Gotabaya Rajapaksa. However, the author’s assertion, in the foreword, that extremists took control over the protest campaign that was launched at Kohuwala by those ordinary people affected by the crisis seemed wrong.
Having perused all books which dealt with the regime change operation and discussed the issues at hand with those in government at that time, both civilian and military, The Island is of the view that the whole operation, from the very beginning, was planned and executed by political parties/groups, both in and outside Parliament. Perhaps as Samaranayake pointed out in his study of the regime change project, Switzerland, with the backing of the US, launched the operation in late November, 2029, by staging the abduction drama, with the help of Somalatha or Siriyalatha Perera (later changed to Garnier Banister Francis), a local employee at the Embassy (https://island.lk/focus-on-swiss-role-in-garnier-abduction-as-furgler-succeeds-mock/)
Egodawele’s assertion that President Gotabaya’s decision to accommodate UNP leader Ranil Wickremesinghe in his Cabinet, as Prime Minister, as a correct and prudent move, is questionable. The President had no other option but to reach consensus with Wickremesinghe after the SJB leader Sajith Premadasa declared pre-conditions for him to accept that offer. But, Wickremesinghe’s acceptance of premiership cannot be examined without taking into consideration his role in the US-India backed project. President Gotabaya Rajapaksa, too, declared that Wickremesinghe was the best person to handle the situation but, whatever the assertions, the fact remains he was part of it. The protest couldn’t have exploded at Pangiriwattte, Mirihana, outside the President’s private residence without the direct UNP involvement.
Internal strife
From the very outset, the President failed to receive the anticipated support from his team. In fact, the Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna (SLPP) hadn’t been enthusiastic in fielding the wartime Defence Secretary as their candidate but the circumstances compelled them to do so. In the absence of direct control of the SLPP that commanded a 2/3 majority in Parliament, though it secured only 145 seats at the 2020 general election, the President never really received the backing of the ruling party.
Egodawele discussed this issue to some extent as one of the major reasons for the failure on the part of the President to face daunting challenges, particularly on the economic front. The President had been furious and so disappointed over the way the Central Bank and the Treasury responded to, what he called, the global crisis, and he directly accused them of not briefing him properly. Egodawele, who had been, most probably, present at a meeting the President called on 16 June, 2020, quoted him as having declared that the Central Bank failed to submit a single proposal to strengthen the economy.
The author emphasised the increase of funds required for debt servicing from USD 2 bn in 2014 to USD 6 bn by 2019 end as a key contributing factor for the crisis that overwhelmed President Rajapaksa. Those who had been very fast to blame President Gotabaya for bankruptcy are conveniently silent on the culpability of the UNP-SLFP Yahapalanaya.
The Wickremesinghe-Sirisena duo took an estimated USD 12.05 bn in foreign currency loans through International Sovereign Bonds (ISBs). In addition to ISBs, they borrowed over Rs. 5.7 trillion in domestic (rupee-denominated) loans via treasury bills and bonds. In spite of that, Wickremesinghe emerged as the country’s saviour and he, unashamedly, exploited the situation to his advantage at the 2024 presidential election. The UNP propagated the lie that Wickremesinghe saved the country from ruins without making reference to the massive borrowings, during the Yahapalana administration, that caused irreparable damage to the country and, as to this day, we do not know what they did with such huge borrowings. At least the Rajapaksas built a brand new international airport and a harbour, along with countless other development projects, from expressways to resuscitating badly neglected road network, and even built the country’s very first coal fired power plant at Norochcholai.
Egodawele should have paid sufficient attention to President Gotabaya’s hasty declaration of sweeping tax cuts to kick start the sagging economy with private investments. Instead of defending the President’s decision, the author should have dealt with the issue with an open mind. The ill-fated tax cuts should be examined taking into consideration the drastic reduction of the Special Commodity Levy (SCL) on imported sugar, from Rs. 50 to 25 cents per kilogram, in October, 2020. Although the author made no reference to the sugar scam, the writer believes it caused massive harm to the Rajapaksa government image and it can be compared with the release of 323 plus two ‘ice’ containers from the Colombo port by the incumbent government, in January, 2025.
Such shortsighted, corrupt and fraudulent actions erode public confidence in those governing the country. That is the undeniable truth our political parties cannot comprehend. The SLPP tried its best to cover up the sugar scam and, within weeks, ended up with a massively tarnished image. It may have been a case of paying back those who funded their previous election. The cocky SLPP never ever bothered to examine its actions. Instead, the SLPP attacked, including its own if they offered a dissenting opinion. Samaranayake, in his must-read memoirs, explained the parliamentary group, at the behest of Basil Rajapaksa, harmed both the party and the administration. (https://island.lk/overall-slpp-failures-stressed-in-new-aragalaya-narrative/)
GR overwhelmed
Amidst the rapid build-up of the unrelenting campaign against him, President Gotabaya requested visiting Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, on 09 January, 2022, to help Sri Lanka in debt restructuring. Obviously, China, by then, had decided not to intervene and was an obvious spectator as the US-India sinister project developed beyond control.
The JVP/NPP that entered into seven MoUs with India, including one on defence, in April, 2025, and months later, allowed Indian takeover of the Colombo Dockyard Limited after having launched protests, in January, 2022, against President Gotabaya for reaching an agreement with India, regarding the Trincomalee oil tank farm. India neutralised our fake revolutionaries in JVP/NPP with a cue from Washington, their true master, and brought it within its orbit, and today New Delhi’s influence is growing. The recent declaration by Indian High Commissioner Santosh Jha regarding the urgent and vital need to establish an overland bridge between Rameswaram and Talaimannar underscored the gravity of the developing situation.
Egodawele discussed the acceleration of the SLPP’s internal collapse with the formation of a political group, consisting of 11 constituents/groups of the ruling coalition. The establishment of the grouping, on 02 March, 2022, forced the President to sack ministers Wimal Weerawansa and Udaya Gammanpila. According to the author, the President had been reluctant and refrained from taking a decision at a Cabinet meeting held in the morning but gave in after meeting the parliamentary group.
The President made a last ditch attempt to secure IMF help but by then the situation had deteriorated to such an extent a recovery seemed impossible. Pangiriwatte erupted in violence within days after the IMF agreed, in late March, 2022, to initiate action in response to his request. By then, the SLPP parliamentary group had been fragmented and lost direction as various interested parties sought to distance themselves from the beleaguered President.
The author has allocated an entire chapter to the Muslims’ contribution to the regime change operation. The transformation of their anger, initially over Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s support, in his capacity as the Defence Secretary, during Mahinda Rajapaksa’s presidential tenure, to ‘Bodu Bala Sena’ (BBS), to hatred, that demanded the community, as a whole, sought the President’s ouster, depicted a worrisome picture. That brought the Muslims, who had been chased out of the Northern Province in October, 1990, by the LTTE, and subjected a series of brutal massacres, together with the Tamil Diaspora, to support President Gotabaya’s violent and humiliating ouster, despite his pivotal role in eradicating the separatist terrorists, cannot be disputed, under any circumstances.
Unfortunately, President Rajapaksa, instead of addressing the developing issues, appeared to have aggravated the situation by setting “One Country, One Law” commission, under Ven. Galagodaatte Gnanasara, leader of the ultra-nationalist BBS. Obviously these fake ultra nationalist Sinhalese were like the bought over Jihadists in West Asia, who, in fact, were Western moles. But, perhaps, the author should have examined the much-touted claim that a group of Muslims carried out suicide attacks in April, 2019, to facilitate Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s victory at the presidential election as their (Muslim community) were contradictory. Had the Muslim community been so hostile towards Gotabaya Rajapaksa, why on earth would they sacrifice their own lives to help him win the presidency and then join the Tamil Diaspora and the Catholic Church in the Galle Face regime change project.
Egodawele confidently confirmed that a hasty ban on import of chemical fertilisers, and agrochemicals, was taken due to the government’s inability to pay for fertiliser imports. The author asserted that the government found it difficult to allocate as much as USD 400 mn for fertiliser imports on one occasion.
The GMOA’s role, particularly the influencing actions of its President Dr. Anuruddha Padeniya, and the Chinese carbonic fertiliser fiasco that developed into a major diplomatic issue, resulting in catastrophic Chinese response, undermined the President, who further suffered as a result of teachers’ protests demanding higher salaries, KNDU Bill as well as domestic gas cylinder explosions.
Egodawele’s narrative explained the serious shortcomings on the part of the government in responding to the rapidly developing situations. The seventh chapter that discussed the 31 March, 2022, incidents, near the President’s private residents, proved that those who had been directly responsible for security of the Head of State were clueless regarding the sinister plan hatched by the interested parties to transform the protest campaign to a violent assault. Security chiefs, as well as the intelligence staff, were obviously caught napping. The author dealt with the then Prime Minister Wickremesinghe’s visit to the Pangiriwatte residence to meet President Rajapaksa, the warning issued by the UNPer regarding the gathering of people outside the President’s residence, and secretly planned protest in addition to the one at Jubilee Post junction that seemed peaceful. The author speculated that the protest at Jubilee Post junction may have been carried out to deceive those in charge of security regarding the conspirators real and deadly intentions. The author alleged that the SJB had been involved in the conspiracy. A private television station was also accused of inviting people to join the Pengiriwatte confrontation
Declaring that the Army had been slow in responding to the situation, Egodawele commended the police for not falling to the protesters’ bid to force them to open fire. Egodawele also questioned the rationale in JVP/NPP leader Anura Kumara Dissanayake’s claim that on 01 April, 2022, there were suspicions regarding a group affiliated to the government causing property damage at Pangiriwatte. The despicable role played by a section of the lawyers, in the aftermath of the Pangiriwatte mayhem, was mentioned by Egodawele who opined that had the President taken punitive measures against all those responsible for the Pangiriwatte security failure, perhaps the subsequent events could have been avoided, or successfully dealt with.
The President’s decision to vacate the Pangiriwatte home and move to the President’s House, on the recommendation of the National Security Council, was taken on 01 April, 2022.
Necessity for a proper investigation
Egodawele carefully examined the circumstances leading to the President’s fall. He seems to believe whatever caused the unprecedented crisis the flight of the President could have been averted if the armed forces acted in unison. He dealt with various situations and possibilities while pointing the finger at the JVP/NPP as the dominant party that exploited the situation and secured the support of some retired armed forces officers and men. It would be pertinent to mention that Egodawele launched his book during Wickremesinghe’s presidency in 2023 as the JVP/NPP was making rapid progress.
The need for comprehensive investigation into regime change operations is required. The military needs to identify the shortcomings (intentional/unintentional) on their part to take remedial measures. The author referred to the Rathupaswala shooting, in 2013, and the Rambukkana incident where the Kegalle police opened fire to prevent a violent group from setting a fully loaded fuel bowser on fire, in April, 2022, as two factors that may have impacted on the police and the military. The Rajapaksas response to Rathupaswala and Rambukkana incidents may have discouraged the armed forces and police to an extent they refrained from taking action. Egodawele also found fault with the intelligence services for their failure to recognise the developing insecurity among the police and armed forces and the growing belief that the growing regime change operation was certain to succeed.
Those who are genuinely interested in the regime change project should peruse Egodawele’s easy to comprehend presentation that lucidly dealt with a crisis created by what can be described as collective blunders by successive governments, though the declaration of bankruptcy was blamed on President Gotabaya Rajapaksa.
Midweek Review
Palm leaf manuscripts of Sri Lanka – IV
Tripitaka was first recorded on palm leaves. Religious histories such as Mahavamsa and Tupavamsa were also written on palm leaves. The printed texts we read today, of ancient classics, were composed after examining and comparing several palm leaf manuscripts. We forget this when we read. We assume that they were always on paper!
It is important to remember that literacy was developed through the use of ola manuscripts. The hodiya (alphabet) was written on palm leaf. The Sinhala hodiya included additional characters to accommodate Sanskrit and Pali phonemes. There were 52 letters. The library of the National Museum, Colombo has a palm leaf hodiya.
The tradition of writing on palm leaves continued throughout the colonial period. Robert Knox, who spent nearly two decades in captivity in the Kandyan Kingdom (Udarata), while the Dutch controlled Sri Lanka’s coastal areas (17th Century), said the ‘books’ available in Sinhala homes were on religion, medicine, magic, etc. This interest continued in the years that followed. In 1930, when the Historical Manuscripts Commission surveyed palm-leaf manuscripts held in private homes in Udarata, it found manuscripts on medicine, astrology, and charms.
The tradition of writing on palm leaves was held in high esteem and was not readily abandoned, observed analysts. Ananda Coomaraswamy, who was in Sri Lanka from 1903 to 1907 during British rule, said that Kandyan craftsmen invariably prepared their jewellery drawings on ola leaves. He had encountered only a handful drawn on paper.
Sirancee Gunawardena’s book titled “Palm leaf manuscripts of Sri Lanka “(1977) is the first and probably only book which gives a comprehensive account of the palm leaf manuscripts of Sri Lanka. The book is a landmark publication. There is no other book like it on the subject. The author deserves much praise and appreciation for her painstaking work.
This book has been written primarily to encourage Sri Lankans to regard palm-leaf manuscripts as a valuable part of Sri Lanka’s heritage. Palm leaf manuscripts are historical documents and should be preserved as such, says Sirancee. They contain rich primary data, making them a valuable source for primary research as well. Some olas, at least, had beautiful handwriting and a high standard of grammar. They also contained palindromes that could be read in all four directions, she says.
The book is the product of 12 years of painstaking research. Sirancee speaks of “the joy and feeling of exultation” she experienced “peering into dusty nooks and cobweb encrusted wooden boxes and forgotten corners of libraries”. She has spoken to a number of specialists, including persons who knew how to prepare ola leaves and those who could read the manuscripts. She has personally copied scores of manuscripts and the drawings in them.
Sirancee has examined manuscripts dating from the 13th century to 19th century. She has examined the 13-century copy of Chullavagga in the Museum library. This manuscript has 144 folios, size is 23″ x 2 ½”. The writing is beautiful. It has wooden covers with a design. This may be the oldest book illustration in Sri Lanka, says Sirancee.
She was able, over a long period, to personally examine most of the ola manuscripts in the National Museum. She also examined the collections in temple libraries. The Potgul Vihara, Hanguranketa, had one of the largest and best-arranged libraries of palm-leaf manuscripts.
There was a photograph of Sirancee examining the ola manuscripts at Sri Rahula Vihara, Bentota, and another of Sirancee writing down the text as Gamariya read out from a copy of the Mahavamsa. This was probably the well-known astrologer Daniel Gamariya.
There was a great range in size and content in palm-leaf manuscripts. The average manuscript seen by Sirancee had 60–65 folios. Most manuscripts were pure text, but Vessantara Jataka and yantra manuscripts were profusely illustrated. In one manuscript, there was a drawing of the peacock vehicle of the Kataragama God. The drawing extended over three pages stitched together.
Some Vessantara Jataka olas are illustrated, event by event. These illustrations closely resemble temple fresco paintings. The Vessantara jataka manuscript at Dharmadasa Vihara, Boralesgamuwa is profusely illustrated and in colour. The Illustrations are small, in cameo form but have minute decorative details. In her book, Sirancee had reproduced the full text, including illustrations, of two Vessantara jataka texts (p 93-126,275-278). An illustrated Vidura Pandita Jataka from the Hugh Nevill collection is also reproduced in full (p 269-273).
Sirancee wants to give the reader some idea of the wide range of subjects found in palm-leaf manuscripts. She provides the following list. She notes that palm-leaf manuscripts are a source of material on ancient medicine, veterinary science, astrology, yantra and mantra practices, land endowments by kings, medieval taxation, agriculture, trade in ancient times, land grants, land transfers, royal amnesties, acupuncture, ophthalmology, music, metaphysics, and cosmology, as well as the construction of tanks, temple building, and ancient systems of taxation.
Let us take a closer look at some of the subjects mentioned above. First, it is clear that the Mahavamsa was not the only historical text found in curated palm-leaf collections. The Dipavamsa and the Rajavaliya were also included. Copies of the Rajavaliya are found in abundance in both public and private collections. These include holdings in the Colombo Museum Library, the University of Peradeniya, the British Library, and the private collections of L. S. D. Peiris and S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike.
The Rajavaliya was also found in the following temples: Subadrarama Vihara, Balapitiya; Kande Vihara, Atabage; Pallewela Sellawali Raja Maha Vihara, Halloluwa; Pravachanodaya Pirivena Temple, Molligoda, Wadduwa; and Yogilalena Temple, Sandalankara. The copy at the Sri Vardhanarama Library, Mohotimulla, is one of the oldest.
Historical Manuscripts Commission of 1930 found that family collections had various olas that gave information on the Sinhala kings, especially Udarata kings, with the exact dates and hour of their death. The Thalgodapitiya family collection had a Sri Wickrama Alankaraya by Vaidyaratne Basnayake nilame, 1882. Kurunegala Vistaraya was found in many private family collections.
The Historical Manuscripts Commission did not consider these manuscripts to be of academic importance. However, it noted that Yapahuwa temple had an ola with the dates of coronation and death of kings and other important events in the life of “all kings of Kandy”.
Buddhist temples collected ola manuscripts on Buddhism, with particular emphasis on the Dhamma. Olas containing religious texts of great significance were wrapped in silk and kept in the inner sanctum of the temple, Sirancee observes.
The histories of important stupas and temples were also written on ola manuscripts. The Tupavamsa gives the history of the Mahathupa, the Lowa Maha Paya, and the Mirisaveti Stupa. The Andreas Nell collection contains an ola manuscript describing how the four boundaries of the Ridi Vihara were determined. The Henry Parker collection includes an ola manuscript which states that, in relation to the Ridi Vihara, silver was discovered in a nearby cave by a traveller during his journey.
The temple collections included these historical texts. Nagolle Vihara had a copy of the Mahabodhivamsa. Copies of the Hathavanagalla Vihara Vamsa were distributed to neighbouring temples and can still be found today at the Attanagalla Raja Maha Vihara and the Beligammana Raja Maha Vihara.
Palm leaf manuscripts also gave the specifications for the Buddha statue. There were manuscripts on the art of making images of the Buddha, as well as hamsa, lata, kinnara and makara images. The Sariputra ola in Colombo Museum gives dimensions of images in general and Buddha in particular. It gives specifications for the standing, sitting and reclining Buddha. It is written in Sinhala, but text is in Sanskrit. It is in good handwriting.
The Historical Manuscripts Commission (1930) reported the discovery of a Pirit Pota in a family collection. The manuscript was written using black vegetable dye. According to the Commission’s report, the letters remain as black today as they were when written a century ago. The coloured floral illuminations were also executed using the same vegetable dye.
Jataka stories were held in palm leaves. Sirancee has personally examined many magnificent, large Jataka olas held in libraries. Colombo Museum had two large manuscripts containing many jataka stories. One was titled Sinhala Jataka Pota. Each had over one thousand leaves. The leaf strips were 27″ to 33″ by 2 ½. “
The Pansiya Panas Jataka manuscript owned by K.V.J. de Silva is one of the largest manuscripts Sirancee had seen and possibly the largest in Sri Lanka. It was a copy of a manuscript written in the time of king Parakrama bahu IV (1302-1326). It was written in Sinhala and had 984 folios. The folios at the end of the manuscript contained an index to the stories.
There is a manuscript of Vidura Pandita Jataka in the Hugh Nevill collection in the British Library. It is an original manuscript written in the time of king Senerat (1604-1635). It was written by Matale Rate Atapattu Amanthi of Owille in Matara (sic). The text is accompanied by very beautiful illustrations. The LSD Pieris collection has a small jataka manuscript, 10.5 cm in size, containing several illustrated jatakas. One illustration shows Siddhartha Gautama putting his bowl into the river.The most popular jataka story in Sri Lanka, is undoubtedly the Vessantara Jataka. It features prominently in our temple frescos and olas. The T. P. P. Goonetilleke collection held at Peradeniya had 30 Vessantara Jataka manuscripts. Some Vessantara manuscripts are held in private collections as heirlooms.
Legal matters were recorded on palm leaf manuscripts. Abhaya dana was written in olas. The ola had the royal sign “Sri “symbolising the king but inscribed by a Mohottala on the order of the Sannas Rala. Sirancee had come across a manuscript which stated that when a person died intestate the king inherited the lands. The LSD Pieris collection had a manuscript on a money transaction. The ola recorded that the money owed was handed over in the presence of witnesses who were named.
Land grants were recorded on olas. They were recorded on gold, silver and copper plates as well. Sirancee came across many Land grants in the collections she looked at. VP Ratnayake had a manuscript which said “By this it is declared that Godakkumbura Setunge Mudiyanse was given Pallekumbura in Udukaha pattu Kotugampola Korale on Jan 1630 by Monerawila Rajapakse, Bathwadana Nilame, who is the owner of Matale Dissawa and Sat Korale Dissawa.
P.E.E. Fernando found in the record room of the district court of Kandy, a deed of conveyance drawn up at the request of a person named Patra-Abo Sastru-raja, where he transferred to a vihara he had constructed, a house and garden called Dharmapata geratta (sic) in which he was residing, together with other lands, the boundaries of which were set out in great detail. Some movable objects such as a pitcher, palanquin and three slaves including a female slave were also offered. The document was attested by four persons and a fifth person stated that he had written the document.
Temples carefully looked after olas relating to the ownership of their temple lands. Ridi vihara has a very old manuscript titled Sangaraja Vahanseta Mahanuwara Lekan Pota with names and information on the temples given to the chief monk. When paddy lands were offered to temples, the transfer was recorded in an ola. There is an ola which stated that Pahalavela Kumbura was offered to Atkande Vihara by Teliyaskatuwe Lekam and Maddumaya.
Temples also held on to olas which gave the decisions on disputes over temple land. The high priest of Aluvihare, Matale had an ola on litigation relating to Aluvihare lands. The text is given in full by Sirancee on p 298. Uthurupaw Vihara had an ola issued by Adikara Dissawe. It contained the judgment in a land dispute which had taken place in the 15th century.
In ancient times, administration was done through olas. The Esala Perahera in Kandy has a chieftain mounted on an elephant carrying an ola which gives permission for the perahera to take place. Appointments were announced via olas. The Matale Maha Dissawe Kadaimpota, announced that ‘Niharapola Alahakoon Mohottala was appointed lekam of Tun Korale and also received the Ran Panhinda and flag.’ Administrative responsibilities were given in olas. Historical Manuscripts Commission found at the Atkande vihara, a 16th century ola giving information on the dissaves in charge of Kurunegala district.
Kadaimpot and Lekam Miti were held on ola. The Historical Manuscripts Commission found several of these in private collections. The Maya Rata Kadimpota held in a private collection, gave information on the 28 districts or towns in Maya Rata. At Padiyapelella, the Commission found a Kadaimpota dating to 14th Century, dealing with Ruhuna, Maya, Pihiti with names of subdivisions, the ratas, also Kelaniya, Panadura, Dambadeniya and so on. The Lekam Miti Pota of 1.1.1830 listed land holdings in the eastern part of Nuwarakalaviya. (To be continued)
References
Sirancee Gunawardana Palm leaf manuscripts of Sri Lanka 1977
L.S.D. Pieris Yantra drawing on palm leaf sri Lanka. 2018
1st report of the Historical Manuscripts Commission 1933, SP 9 of 1933
3rd report of Historical Manuscripts Commission 1951, SP 19 of 1951
Ismeth Raheem
https://www.sundaytimes.
lk/260426/plus/turning-back-the-pages-of-sri-lankas-paper-trail-639604.html
by KAMALIKA PIERIS
Midweek Review
A Quiet Counter-Revolution Unfolds
A peaceful counter-revolution is taking shape,
Against current ‘Digital Age’ intoxications,
At that ever-green seat of higher learning,
Wolfson College of the University of Cambridge,
Where one hour every Thursday is set apart,
For reading, writing and creative activity,
In the more time-tested analogues ways,
For those who opt for it, in an august space,
Thus paving the way for the Creator to prevail,
Over Creatures who are tending to run berserk,
More so why humans could cry out in one voice:
‘Long Live, WCSA Digital Detox Thursdays!’
By Lynn Ockersz
-
News6 days agoIMF urges Lanka not to meddle with exchange rate
-
News3 days agoLankan duo emerge winners in Latin dance championship held in Blackpool, UK
-
Business4 days agoIMF’s unstated rate:Sri Lanka’s $695m loan costs about 5.33% per annum
-
News6 days agoState of emergency extended
-
Features5 days agoAre threats to Buddha Sasana external or from within?
-
News4 days agoUNP challenges NPP move to amend Vihara – Devalagam Act
-
Business4 days agoSri Lankan scientist-innovator Milinda Edirisinghe introduces AI-integrated gem testing system to gemological world
-
News3 days agoSri Lankan teen killed in Chennai clash; three arrested
