Connect with us

Features

Visit to Brussels and quiet diplomacy with the Soviets in Colombo

Published

on

Sirimavo Bandaranaike

Person identified as KGB agent at embassy sent off sans publicity

(Excerpted from the autobiography of MDD Pieris, Secretary to the Prime Minister)

At the end of the (London security) course, High Commissioner Tilak Gooneratne, who had an appointment in the European Common Market in Brussels with Sir Christopher Soames, External Commissioner for the European Common Market, took me along with him. He knew Sir Christopher, who was the son-in-law of Sir Winston Churchill, quite well and was keen that I should meet him, and also see at first hand certain common market arrangements.

He telephoned the Prime Minister and obtained her permission for me to accompany him to Brussels. Generously, Tilak wanted me to have a larger experience, and therefore decided not to fly. Instead, we drove to Dover, took the channel ferry to Calais, and then drove on to Brussels. We had an interesting meeting with Sir Christopher and drove to Bonn for a late lunch, with C. Gunasingham who was acting for the Ambassador at the time. The next day, we took the ferry, this time from Ostend, and came back to Britain.

One has to be deeply grateful to people like Tilak, who always took such an interest, a great deal of trouble, and incurred personal expense in broadening the horizons of those who had to deal with him. His wife Pam, a cultured and refined lady, matched his generosity, by taking us to the theatre to see some excellent plays, whenever, we had a free evening. They were also willing hosts who opened their residence and their dining table and were genuinely happy when you came.

When I got back, I briefed the Prime Minister on the intelligence I had received, when in London. She got down WT Jayasinghe and instructed him to call the Soviet Ambassador to the Ministry and merely say that we would like the person concerned to leave the country within 10 days. He was further instructed to tell the Ambassador, if he asked for reasons, that we are in possession of information, that would make his further stay in Sri Lanka detrimental to the very good relations we enjoyed with the Soviet Union, and that it was in the interests of both countries that this whole thing was done quietly and without publicity. In the end, things were done very quietly indeed. The Soviet Ambassador, when confronted with our request, had merely stated that if this is what the Prime Minister wanted, he would comply. No reasons were asked.

Visit to the USSR

A few months after this episode, the Prime Minister had to visit the USSR. This visit was in the pipeline for sometime, and dates were finally fixed for November 1974. The Soviets sent a special four engine Turbo-prop plane to take the Prime Minister and party to the USSR and bring them back. These arrangements made it possible for a larger delegation than usual to accompany her.

The principal members of the delegation were myself, Tissa Wijeyeratne; Dr. Mackie Ratwatte; Elmo Seneviratne, Director Economic Affairs of the Foreign Ministry; Mr. A.B. Elkaduwe, Additional Secretary, Ministry of Industries and Scientific Affairs; Mr. Balasubramaniam, Director (West) of the Foreign Ministry; Mr. Austin Fernando, Director External Resources; and Mr. D.P. Amerasinghe, Additional Private Secretary to the Prime Minister. There was also an aide, Mr. M.M. Weerasena of the Prime Minister’s office and a representative of the Sri Lanka Broadcasting Corporation.

The Prime Minister’s son Anura also accompanied us and Mr. Nishanov, the Ambassador for the USSR in Sri Lanka came on the flight. We took off on November 10, 1974 and flew direct to Tashkent, a journey of some seven hours 40 minutes. We were put up for the night in a state guest house. Our bedrooms were large and the furniture heavy. My bed was very large and with an iron frame. The mattress was hard and seemed designed more to produce straight and hard backs than afford comfort.

After dinner, when I went to sleep, I found the room grossly overheated and quite uncomfortable. On investigation I found that what we had was central heating with no possibility of regulation from the room. The guest house was a sprawling complex with long corridors, and when I opened the door of my room, to see whether I could bring this problem to someone’s attention, all was silent and there was no one in sight. There was no choice but to bear the discomfort for a few hours.

It was, however, much worse than I had anticipated. Sleep was out of the question. I was bathed in sweat. The windows appeared to be sealed. I tossed and turned with abandon, and sometime during the night, there was a loud crack and the bed broke and one side slumped and sagged at an angle! The satisfaction of breaking such a massive looking bed, somewhat compensated for the lack of sleep. There was nothing left to do now, but to collect some of the bedclothes and settle down on the floor.

The next morning, at breakfast I proudly announced my feat of the previous night to a gathering which included the Prime Minister and the Soviet Ambassador. Everyone was quite amused except the Ambassador, who looked embarrassed. It appeared that all had suffered from the problem of over heated rooms during the night. Only I had the distinction of breaking the bed as a response.

After breakfast, we re-joined the flight and set out for Moscow. It took five and a half hours. As we got down in Moscow, it was bitterly cold. The wind cut through, what now appeared to be our inadequate protection, except for the Prime Minister and one or two others, who seemed to be more prepared. We were met at the airport by Prime Minister Kosygin, Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko and other Soviet dignitaries, and after the playing of National Anthems, were witnesses to a march past of smart goose-stepping troops.

We were housed in a large dacha, set in extensive wooded grounds. The rooms were once again large, but to our relief the heating system was much better. If at all, it was a little more on the cold side. Our hosts were very thoughtful and most of us were presented with heavy overcoats which were a great help. It was doubtful whether such heavy coats could have been obtained in many countries and certainly not in Sri Lanka. Wearing one of them and walking about provided protection and exercise at the same time.

From the time we settled in, there was work to do. We had a draft communique almost ready, to which we had to add a few finishing touches, and we knew the Soviets had one too. They fixed the unusual hour of 10.15 in the night, to start joint discussions on the communiques. Tissa, with his Communist Party training explained that this was not unusual at all. He said that these were all tactics to wear down the other side and get what they want. Once we knew this, it was possible to steel one’s mind and to evoke the mental strength and stamina that were necessary.

We met in the Soviet Foreign Ministry at 10 p.m. In addition to myself, our side included our Ambassador Dr. Soma Weeratunge; Tissa Wijeratne; Dr. Wiswa Warnapala, from the University of Peradeniya, who was on a few years attachment to our Embassy in a senior diplomatic position; and Mr. Balasubramaniam of the Foreign Ministry. First, there was the haggling about which draft to be used. Eventually, we agreed to use the Soviet draft as a basis, subject to discussions on the wording.

Here, it was our intention to bring in the wording from our draft, or wording as approximate as possible, into the main communique. This was not easy. The Soviets were attempting to get us to subscribe to at the time, their relatively new concept of Asian Collective Security, which was going to be under their auspices. We were on the other hand a country active in the Non-aligned Movement, and with an influence in the movement which was disproportionate to our size or population. We also had very good relations with the West. We were not willing to come under the tutelage of any power bloc.

The discussion dragged on till 1.15 a.m. and ended inconclusively on several important points. It was decided to meet again later in the day, the new day already having dawned.

Later, we had formal talks in the Kremlin with Prime Minister Kosygin and his team, which included Foreign Minister Gromyko and other important Ministers. This meeting followed a lunch hosted by the Soviet Prime Minister. During the official discussions, Mrs. Bandaranaike bargained closely on many issues pertaining to Soviet aid to Sri Lanka. She wanted to get the best terms and the best deal possible. At one stage, Mr. Kosygin banteringly wagged a finger and said, “you are a hard lady.” Mrs. Bandaranaike replied that if she was hard, it was on behalf of her country.

The discussions were cordial, and we were able to obtain assistance for the public industrial sector, as well as a commitment to preliminary studies relating to the Samanalawewa Hydro Electric Scheme. The meeting ended during the late afternoon. During the early evening the Soviet Prime Minister was taking the Prime Minister to the Bolshoi Ballet. The Ambassador, Mackie and I were also invited. But there was no question of my going. We had work to do on the communique with the Soviet side.

I told Tissa to lead the discussions. With his old Communist background, during which he had also had a stint of training in the Soviet Union, he was quite proficient on their negotiating techniques and general strategy. This also gave me the time to think, whilst Tissa talked. The meeting kept dragging on. The Soviets were defending every word of their draft as if their life depended on it. Perhaps, their careers did. We for our part were not prepared to alter our foreign policy to suit anybody. We had discussed matters with the Prime Minister after our first meeting, and we knew we had her full backing on the Issues we considered important for us.

Once the other side realized that we were unlikely to yield on some matters, and that we were in no hurry to reach agreement, although according to the programme we had to leave for Tibilisi-Georgia the following afternoon, after a luncheon signing of some agreements by the Prime Ministers, and the release of the communique, they became more accommodating. Some progress was made. There were still a very few important matters about which we were deadlocked.

At this stage, the Russians called to their aid Deputy Foreign Minister, Firyubin. He strode into the room complaining that he had been disturbed at the ballet and that this was the first time in his career that he had to be dragged out from the ballet for a matter such as this. Tissa Wijeratne, sweetly replied “Excellency, you can see the ballet tomorrow. But we are leaving tomorrow and we will never be able to see it.” The Deputy Foreign Minister grunted testily.

“What is all this?” he inquired. We politely told him. He realized that we meant business, and that we were not ready to agree on a communique at any cost. Things proceeded better thereafter, and we were eventually able to agree. By this time, it was very late, and the Prime Minister who had returned from the ballet had been wondering what had happened to us. She sent a message that she was waiting for us to return in order to have dinner. This also would have helped to expedite matters with the Russians.

When we got back finally at about 10 p.m.. the Prime Minister was pleased that we had successfully defended our positions. The discussions had gone on for some six hours, and this with very little translations required, because most of the discussions were conducted in English. We worked as a team and enjoyed working together. The Prime Minister fostered this team spirit. She was, though the leader and at a much higher level, very much a part of the team. Her refusal to have dinner without us underlined this, and proved to be a great boost to us.

There was an interesting sequel to our prolonged discussions. That night I was fast asleep, quite fatigued, well tucked under the blankets against the cold, when as if in a dream I heard the distant sound of knocking on what appeared to be my door. Soon, the knocking became quite loud, and I realized that it was indeed my door someone was knocking on. Put up suddenly from a deep and tired sleep, I took some time to get out of bed and reach the door. I was half shivering having suddenly emerged from under cosy blankets. The knocking continued.

When I finally opened the door there was a young man from the Soviet Foreign Ministry sporting a broad grin and with a sheaf of papers in his hand, which he thrust into mine saying that this was the final version of the communique and would I check it, because they had to finalize everything by 7 a.m. and have it ready for signing at lunch. By this time, I was wide awake, and suspected that this was a piece of harassment aimed to teach us a lesson for being stubborn in the negotiations.

I now wide awake therefore said, “Come in. Come in, let’s order some coffee and go through this together.” There was near panic in his face. His job seemed to be to disturb my sleep and get away. He said “No”, he had to report back to the Foreign Ministry. I said, I will telephone the Ministry and say, that in view of the obvious urgency that I want to go through the communique right now and hand it over to their official. But he mumbled some excuses, and virtually fled.

Now that I was up and alert, I thought I would go through the draft straightaway. The time was 4.30 a.m, and that’s what I did. There were just a couple of matters I wanted to clarify with the Ambassador, Tissa and Professor Wiswa Warnapala in the morning. But substantially, almost everything was in order. The next morning Tissa, said that my nights disturbance was typical Soviet tactics, and that he was not at all surprised. If they really were tactics, I fail to understand what they sought to gain by them. Certainly, it could not have been goodwill.

This whole episode, including the long drawn out negotiations on the joint communique appeared to me to illustrate the rigidity and the almost surreal nature of the system. Much time and effort were spent on relatively minor issues and any kind of compromise was hard to achieve. One felt that preoccupation with sheer process had taken a life of its own, and that the end result, which should have included the creation of respect and goodwill was lost to them.

Most of the matters addressed in the communique should not have been those which should have kept a Foreign Ministry’s chandeliers burning all night. One really wondered how a great country like the Soviet Union could function in this way. In fact, the contrast between the Soviet Union and the West was brought out subsequently when the Prime Minister visited West Germany on a State visit. I did not go on this visit. But colleagues who did told me that the two sides exchanged their drafts of the communique at the airport on arrival, and subsequently at an informal twenty minute discussion, everything was finalized! These experiences were clearly illustrative of two very different systems, one, process oriented, cumbrous and bureaucratic, and the other pragmatic, practical and expeditious.



Continue Reading
Advertisement
Click to comment

Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *

Features

The Great AI Schism: When the Titans of Tech tell us to slow down

Published

on

by Prof. C. A. Saliya

Something extraordinary happened in September 2026. The very people who have spent the last decade pouring tens of billions of dollars into building artificial intelligence, the visionaries, the investors, the CEOs, suddenly started telling the world to hit the brakes. It’s a bit like the captain of a speeding train leaning out of the window and shouting, “Actually, maybe we should slow down a bit!” The public, understandably, is confused. We’ve been told AI will cure cancer, solve climate change, and give us all free time. Now we’re being told it might kill us all. Welcome to the great AI schism.

To understand what’s happening, you have to listen to the people in the room. These are not wild-eyed doomsayers on the internet. They are the titans of the industry. And they are starting to argue with each other.


Dario Amodei: The Insider
Who Wants to Hit Pause

Dario Amodei, the CEO of Anthropic (Claude AI), is the man who kicked the hornet’s nest. In a 3,800-word essay, posted on his website in mid-September 2026, he didn’t just suggest caution, he demanded a slowdown. “We must slow the pace at which we improve the capabilities of AI models,” he wrote. His reasoning is simple and terrifying: the technology is moving faster than our ability to control it. He warned that AI could be misused for cyberattacks, bioterrorism, and serious economic disruption.

What makes Amodei’s warning so chilling is that it comes from a man whose company, Anthropic, builds one of the most powerful AI models in the world, Claude. He’s not a critic on the sidelines. He’s in the driver’s seat, and he’s telling us the car might not have brakes. In an interview with CNN’s Anderson Cooper, he said he agreed with a departing Anthropic researcher who claimed AI could “kill us all” by the end of the decade. That researcher, 27-year-old Jacob Coxon, resigned in protest, saying the people building AI “earnestly believe that it could kill us all”. When the people building the technology start resigning because they’re afraid of it, you should pay attention.

Bill Gates: The Elder Statesman with a Warning

Bill Gates has been around long enough to know a paradigm shift when he sees one. The Microsoft co-founder, who spent decades warning the world about pandemics and climate change, has now turned his attention to AI. And he’s not mincing words. In September 2026, Gates warned that AI is “powerful enough to drive events that, you know, cause a billion deaths”.

Gates is not worried about Terminator-style robots. He’s worried about people. “There’s never been a weapon as powerful as the combination of people with ill intent using the latest AI tools,” he said. His solution is simple: regulation. “No one thinks self-regulation is enough,” he told NBC’s Meet the Press. He even offered to be the man to convince President Trump to regulate AI. Gates is a pragmatist. He knows the technology is coming. He just wants to make sure it doesn’t get us first.

Sam Altman: The Showman with a Conscience (Maybe)

Sam Altman, the CEO of OpenAI (Chat GPT), has always been the industry’s greatest showman. He’s the man who told us AGI (Artificial General Intelligence) is “just around the corner” and that AI will soon be a “genie that can grant any wish”. But even Altman is now singing a different tune. In September 2026, he ruled out an OpenAI IPO in 2026, citing safety concerns. He called even a 10% risk of AI causing human extinction “unacceptable”.

“I agree with Dario that we need to pace the frontier,” Altman posted on X. This is a remarkable shift. Altman has spent years being criticised for moving too fast, for prioritising profit over safety. Now, facing mounting evidence that AI models can cause real harm, from cyberattacks to mental health crises, he’s suddenly the voice of caution. Is it genuine? Or is it a PR move? The cynics will tell you it’s the latter. But the fact remains: when Sam Altman says we need to slow down, the world listens.

Elon Musk: The Provocateur Who Saw It Coming

Elon Musk has been warning about AI for over a decade. He’s the man who called AI “more dangerous than nuclear weapons” long before it was fashionable. So it’s no surprise that he joined the chorus of slowdown calls in September 2026. But Musk being Musk, he couldn’t resist a bit of dark humour. When asked if we’re all going to die within 10 years, he replied, “I don’t want to disappoint you, but we’re all going to die someday anyway”.

But behind the joke is a serious point. Musk believes AI models could escape their constraints, take control of military systems, and even launch nuclear weapons. His solution is mutual oversight: leading AI companies should test each other’s systems for safety before release, and he even suggested a deal with China to make it happen. Musk is a provocateur, but he’s also a visionary. And his vision is one where AI is a weapon that we might not be able to control.

Satya Nadella: The Quiet Strategist

While the others are shouting about doom, Satya Nadella is quietly building an empire. The Microsoft CEO doesn’t talk about extinction risks. He talks about “agentic AI”, AI that can act autonomously, which he calls “a new paradigm”. Microsoft’s Azure cloud platform, which powers these AI agents, grew 43% in the last quarter, surpassing $100 billion in annual revenue.

Nadella’s view is simple: don’t compete to build the most powerful model; compete to control the “orchestration layer”, the systems that connect different AI models. He wants to build the infrastructure that everyone else relies on. It’s a smart play, and it’s making Microsoft a fortune. But Nadella’s silence on safety is deafening. While Amodei and Altman wrestle with their consciences, Nadella is counting the money. It’s not that he doesn’t care; it’s that his business model depends on AI being adopted, not regulated.

Jacob Coxon: The Whistleblower Who Lit the Fuse

You may not have heard of Jacob Coxon. He’s not a billionaire. He’s not a CEO. He’s a 27-year-old researcher who worked at both OpenAI and Anthropic. And in September 2026, he resigned from Anthropic with a warning that shook the industry. “Neither company is acting responsibly,” he wrote on X. “They are launching themselves directly toward a superintelligence capable of self-improvement, and gambling with our lives”.

Coxon’s warning was remarkable because it came from inside the machine. He said the people building AI “earnestly believe that it could kill us all by the end of the decade”. He called for a temporary freeze on advanced AI training. His resignation triggered a wave of concern, and even Dario Amodei admitted he agreed with Coxon more than he disagreed. Coxon is the canary in the coal mine. And the canary is not looking well.

Donald Trump: The Wildcard

And then there’s Donald Trump. The US President has consistently downplayed AI fears, calling them a “hoax” and a “sick conspiracy”. But even Trump is starting to change his tune, sort of. In September 2026, he announced plans to create an “AI Force” and appoint an AI “Czar”. He said the government would look for “bad” uses of AI through the existing criminal and civil justice systems.

But Trump’s priority is clear: winning the AI race against China. “We will not in any way hinder or stifle the growth of this incredible industry,” he said. He wants AI to account for 25% of US GDP. Trump is not a technologist. He’s a businessman and a nationalist. He sees AI as a tool for economic dominance, not an existential threat. Whether he’s right or wrong, his stance puts him at odds with almost every expert in the field.

The Bottom Line: A House Divided

So where does this leave us? We have the CEOs of the world’s leading AI companies, Amodei, Altman, and Musk, all calling for a slowdown. We have Bill Gates, the elder statesman of tech, warning of a billion deaths. We have a whistleblower who says the industry is gambling with our lives. And then we have Satya Nadella, quietly building the infrastructure that powers it all, and Donald Trump, who wants to speed up.

The irony is hard to miss. The people who built the AI train are now telling us to slow down. The people who profit from the AI economy are the ones building the tracks. And the public is caught in the middle, trying to figure out who to believe.

Maybe the most honest thing anyone said came from Jacob Coxon, the 27-year-old researcher who quit. “The people building AI earnestly believe that it could kill us all by the end of the decade,” he wrote. “This is not a marketing stunt”.

If the people building the technology believe it could kill us, perhaps we should listen. Before it’s too late.

(Prof. C. A. Saliya, is a charted accountant, academic, researcher and former banker. He is the author of SAMAJA GAVESHAKAYA and Springer Publication DOING SOCIAL RESEARCH. He can be contacted at saliya.ca@gmail.com. The views expressed in this article are his own and do not necessarily represent those of the organisations with which he is affiliated.)

Continue Reading

Features

Preventing grievances from becoming communal

Published

on

Police removing the Thileepan statue

by Jehan Perera

The death sentence on Sivarasa Anojan, a Sri Lankan citizen convicted of blasphemy in Saudi Arabia has taken a central place in national consciousness for the past several weeks. It has been in the headline news since it was first reported last month. There have been many initiatives taken locally to get a more lenient sentencing by the Saudi authorities. There is also an undercurrent that is critical of both the culture and religion from which this sentencing emanates. This also sustains the widespread publicity being given nationally to the issue. By way of contrast, the controversy caused by the forcible removal of the Thileepan statue in Jaffna has not significantly impacted upon the national consciousness. There was only passing mention of the incident in the national media which has been overtaken by other events.

However, in the north and east of the country, and in the diaspora, the removal of the Thileepan statue has become a major issue. It has led to protest marches led by university students and widespread condemnation by civil society and political groups. The issues underlying the Thileepan statue have deep undercurrents in the Tamil consciousness particularly in the north and east which time is unlikely to dispel. The real test of harmony in a multi-ethnic, multi-religious society like Sri Lanka is not whether communities coexist peacefully when nothing controversial is at stake. Rather, the test is how they respond when an event touches their identities and grievances. The death sentence imposed on Anojan in Saudi Arabia and the removal of the Thileepan statue in Jaffna carry the risk of becoming grievances to entire communities.

In the case of Anojan, a young Tamil migrant worker, he was first sentenced to five years imprisonment and a fine of three million Saudi riyals over a Facebook comment. Both he and the Saudi prosecution appealed, with the appeal court raising the sentence to death. This has led to public sympathy for him in Sri Lanka.

Appeals for clemency have come from the President, government and opposition leaders, clergy of all faiths and Muslim political leaders. At the same time there is a need to reject attempts to turn the case into a source of anti-Muslim sentiment or collective blame. Peacebuilding therefore has to be within Sri Lanka as well as diplomatic. Religious leaders and civil society in the country should be ready to quell rumour, even as Muslim, Buddhist, Hindu and Christian leaders stand together publicly.

Thileepan Statue

The Thileepan controversy has had a different trajectory. Many Tamils admire Thileepan, the LTTE name of Rasaiah Parthipan, who died on 26 September 1987 after a twelve-day fast. His demands were addressed to India but included matters pertaining to the Sri Lankan government including the release of detainees held under the Prevention of Terrorism Act. The statue put up during this year’s commemoration was removed by police in the early hours of 27 September, a day after the commemoration ended. The government’s legal concern, as articulated by its spokesperson, was the LTTE remains a proscribed organisation and before removing the statue, police had presented facts to the court. But law and memory answer different questions and the depth of Tamil anguish cannot be disregarded.

For many Tamils, remembrance of Thileepan is connected to their sense of loss and historical memory. The memorial has been destroyed and rebuilt more than once, and each destruction has added to the meaning it carries. Many who mourn Thileepan are grieving a young man who died without violence and by his own fast. They also grieve an era of loss of the struggle for Tamil rights and self-determination for which Thileepan has become a symbol. The Office for Reparations Act, No. 34 of 2018, provides for collective reparations and gives the Office for Reparations a role in policies on memorialisation. This does not automatically permit any particular statue, nor does it override laws on public places or proscribed organisations. But it shows that memorialisation is recognised within Sri Lanka’s framework for reparations and reconciliation. There is also a wider question of equality.

The JVP that now leads the NPP government was itself once proscribed when it took up arms against the state in which tens of thousands died, later entered democratic politics, and now for many years has publicly commemorated its own fallen. The opportunity to remember those who died should not belong to one community alone.

A commitment to peacebuilding requires that the same trust that has been given to former militants of one community needs to be given to members of other communities if equal citizenship and equal rights are to have meaning. Further, the Office for Reparations Act provides for reparations through livelihood. It is today a fact that those former LTTE members who went through the government’s rehabilitation process find it difficult to get jobs in the private sector.

Private sector employers are reluctant to come under surveillance for employing former LTTE members. There needs to be equal access to employment and removal of unjustified barriers to reintegration, with targeted public programmes where necessary. Until this situation is realized on the ground, the government needs to consider employing those who went through the government’s rehabilitation process and still unable to find suitable employment.

Continuing Peace

The challenge that post-war Sri Lanka faces, a full 17 years after the end of war, is to strengthen the foundations of trust between communities rather than deepen existing suspicions. Anojan is an individual Sri Lankan citizen facing a severe sentence in another country. His case should not become a reason to blame Sri Lankan Muslims. Thileepan is remembered differently by different communities, but the dispute over his memorial should not become a reason to revive the communal divisions of the past. The cases are also mirror images in an important respect. In the Anojan case, the state is an advocate pleading before another government. In the Thileepan case, the state is the actor whose decision is being judged. The first calls for quiet diplomacy and restraint in public language. The second calls for fairness and explanation, and the burden on the state is heavier.

The common roots of the two cases lie in mistrust that does not belong to one community alone. It has been produced by experiences of discrimination, violence, insecurity and loss that have been interpreted differently by different communities. Grievances turn communal when an individual is seen as a representative of a community, when institutions seem to treat communities unequally, and when people feel their pain goes unacknowledged. Each of these can be addressed. The system change that the Sri Lankan people voted for in 2024 would need to include a government that rejects collective blame, acknowledges grief and explains its decisions openly. It also requires state institutions to act transparently and consistently, so that no citizen feels that the law protects some communities more than others.

This peacebuilding imperative requires enlightened leadership as much as legal authority. It requires leaders who will speak to their own communities against prejudice, even when this is politically inconvenient. It requires religious leaders who will demonstrate solidarity across religious boundaries. And it requires civil society to recognise that peacebuilding is not simply preventing violence after tensions have risen, but is addressing the mistrust and grievances that allow tensions to rise in the first place. Sri Lanka has learned, at great cost, that communal divisions can become much larger than the events that initially give rise to them. The Anojan and Thileepan cases give Sri Lanka an opportunity to demonstrate that it has learned from its past. The test of Sri Lanka’s continuing peace is whether we can address difficult grievances without turning them into communal ones.

Continue Reading

Features

Sri Lanka Cricket Bill: Governance reform is not yet a cricket strategy – Part II

Published

on

By Sarath S. Kodithuwakku

President, Institute of Management of Sri Lanka; Senior Professor, University of Peradeniya

(Continued from yesterday)

Representation, Independence and Decision-Making

The membership-based electoral structure should provide representation without becoming a substitute for executive management. The seven Elected Directors would bring the perspectives of the SLC membership into the Board, while the seven Independent Directors would provide additional professional expertise and independence. The model’s effectiveness will, therefore, depend on whether the Board can integrate these perspectives into coherent strategic decisions while maintaining a clear boundary between governance and day-to-day management.

The equal division between Elected and Independent Directors also raises a governance-design question. An even-numbered Board can create a tie. The Bill addresses this directly: in the event of equality, the Chairperson has a casting vote; in the Chairperson’s absence, the Deputy Chairperson has a casting vote; and if both are absent, an Independent Director, elected to preside, has the casting vote. The issue is, therefore, not whether a tie can be resolved, but how this mechanism affects the balance between representation, independence and accountability.

The leadership structure reinforces this balance: the Chairperson is elected from among the Independent Directors and the Deputy Chairperson from among the Elected Directors. The casting-vote arrangement makes the Chairperson’s role and perceived independence particularly important, especially when a major strategic decision divides the two components of the Board.

The Bill’s committee provisions could support a disciplined model of delegation, but implementation will depend heavily on the terms of reference adopted by the new Board. The framework could be strengthened by requiring a published cricket-development strategy, a clear division of powers among the Board, executives and selection committees, transparent principles for major development allocations, and periodic reporting on outcomes across men’s, women’s, schools and domestic cricket. These measures would strengthen accountability without legislating the details of team selection or tournament scheduling.

From Measurement to Strategic Accountability

If the Board is to hold management accountable for strategy rather than simply for short-term results, it needs a performance framework that captures both outcomes and the capabilities that produce them.

SLC should consider requiring an explicit multi-year cricket-development strategy, supported by measurable objectives and an annual strategy review. Such a strategy should identify the development pathway from schools and grassroots cricket through domestic competitions to high performance; define major capability priorities such as coaching, sports science, data and analytics; set resource-allocation principles; and establish indicators against which progress can be assessed.

The purpose would not be to turn cricket into a bureaucratic exercise. Strategic accountability simply creates a disciplined basis for asking whether the organisation is doing what it said it would do, whether its assumptions remain valid, and whether resources are producing the intended results.

From Measurement to Organisational Learning

SLC should, therefore, consider adopting a formal Balanced Scorecard. Rather than measuring success solely through international match results or annual financial audits, the framework could track four interdependent perspectives:

Financial Sustainability:

commercial growth, financial discipline and compliance.

Internal Processes:

domestic tournament quality, development pathways and selector-process integrity.

Stakeholder Value:

grassroots development, school cricket and women’s cricket expansion.

Strategic Capability:

coaching quality, sports science, talent development, data and analytics capability, and the organisation’s ability to convert investment into sustainable performance.

The purpose of such a framework would not be to reduce cricket development to a collection of numbers. Rather, it would create a disciplined process for asking four fundamental management questions:

What did we expect to achieve?

What actually happened?

Why was there a difference?

What should we change as a result?

Evaluating these dimensions periodically would help SLC move beyond performance reporting towards genuine organisational learning.

ICC as a Stakeholder in Governance Reform

The ICC is another important stakeholder whose interests should be recognised in the reform process. SLC’s governance arrangements do not operate solely within Sri Lankan law; they also have to be compatible with the governance obligations associated with ICC membership. The ICC’s Articles of Association require each Member to provide for free and democratic elections (or nominees from outside its members) and to manage its affairs autonomously, without government or other public-body interference in the governance, regulation or administration of cricket.

International experience demonstrates that ICC engagement in member governance restructuring is not unusual. In the United States, after the ICC expelled the old national association for chronic governance failures, the ICC directly oversaw a multi-year project to design a new governance model. The ICC Board formally approved the constitution for a replacement body (USA Cricket) before it was adopted. The resulting structure combined elected constituent directors with independent directors, showing that an ICC-backed framework can accommodate both forms of representation.

In Nepal, the ICC established a Nepal Advisory Group comprising stakeholders from across the game to recommend constitutional amendments, with adoption of the revised constitution and subsequent elections forming part of the conditions for reinstatement of ICC membership.[8] The ICC subsequently facilitated an independent panel that included ICC nominees together with representatives of Nepal’s National Sports Council and the existing cricket administration to map the election process, guidelines and timelines.[9] More recently, in 2026, an ICC delegation visited Bangladesh to engage with stakeholders on governance and electoral matters.[10] The ICC has also reported that its Deputy Chair and another ICC Board representative visited Sri Lanka and met relevant stakeholders to assess ongoing developments, while the ICC Board reiterated the need for elections to be held as soon as possible.

These precedents make the ICC a legitimate stakeholder in considering the governance implications of the proposed Bill. This does not mean that the ICC should determine Sri Lanka’s domestic legislation, nor that every feature of the Bill requires prior ICC approval. It does, however, suggest that early and formal engagement with the ICC would be prudent, particularly where the proposed arrangements concern Board independence, elections, government involvement and the transition to the new governance structure.

This is particularly relevant because the Bill creates two institutional arrangements that deserve careful scrutiny from an autonomy perspective. The Transformation Committee is responsible for managing the transition until the First Board is constituted, while the Nomination Committee, although structurally independent of the SLC Board, includes representatives connected with the Sports Ministry and the National Sports Council. Neither arrangement, by itself, establishes government interference. However, taken together, they make it important that the independence of the incoming Board is demonstrable through transparent procedures rather than assumed from the structure alone.

Given the professional calibre and international exposure of the members of the Transformation Committee, it would be reasonable to expect that the importance of ICC engagement would have been recognised. Although any such consultation has not been evident in the public domain, it is therefore reasonable to expect that the ICC has either already been consulted or will be consulted before the Bill is enacted. Such engagement would allow potential incompatibilities to be identified before the new structure is enacted and implemented, rather than after the fact.

The Transition Is Itself a Governance Challenge

The transition provisions introduce a significant organisational-change challenge. Replacing the existing club- and association-based governance structure with a new hybrid Board and governance architecture is not simply a legal exercise; it is an organisational change programme. The Sri Lanka Cricket Transformation Committee is required to manage the transition until the First Board is constituted and, during that period, to establish rules covering matters including tournament structure, domestic governance, selection committee appointments, committee terms of reference, the Nomination Committee process and the election of the Elected Directors.

Structural reform on paper can encounter resistance from established interests, institutional habits and existing routines. The implementation phase will therefore require a clear change-management framework, including stakeholder engagement, transparent onboarding for Independent Directors, clarification of decision rights, alignment of legacy committees, and careful transfer of information and responsibilities.

Without attention to these organisational factors, cultural friction could undermine the intended administrative improvements. The success of the reform will therefore depend not only on the text of the legislation but also on the quality of the rules, appointments, delegation arrangements and organisational behaviours that follow it.

From Governance Reform to a Cricket Strategy

The Bill deserves credit for addressing how SLC is constituted and for creating places for specialist advice. It should not be dismissed simply because it does not prescribe a batting order or a domestic fixture list. Those are not appropriate tasks for legislation.

Its limitation is more precise: the proposed governance arrangements do not, by themselves, assure the strategic capability of the Board or the quality, independence and accountability of the decisions made beneath it. They establish the architecture. The future Board and management must supply the strategy, capabilities, discipline and learning mechanisms that make the architecture work.

A stronger reform would connect four elements: a Board selected for collective strategic capability; professional cricket management with clear delegated authority; transparent but non-mechanical selection and investment processes; and systematic evaluation of development outcomes. Within the first of these, information technology and computer science should be recognised as distinct from the broader capability to understand and govern data science, analytics and emerging AI-enabled decision support.

Ultimately, the governing question is not only who gets a seat at the SLC Board table. It is whether that Board can build, fund, execute and learn from a credible strategy for Sri Lankan cricket.

References

1. Department of Government Printing, Sri Lanka. Sri Lanka Cricket Bill, Gazette Supplement, Part II of September 25, 2026, issued on 28 September 2026.

2. International Cricket Council. Media release, 15 July 2026, reporting the ICC Board discussion of Sri Lanka Cricket and the need for elections to be held as soon as possible.

3. Sport New Zealand – Ihi Aotearoa. Nine Steps to Effective Governance, particularly Step 1: Define and Agree the Board’s Role; Step 4: Provide Strategic Leadership; Step 5: Employ and Support a Chief Executive; and Step 8: Get the Right People on Board.

4. Cricket South Africa. Governance and management frameworks, including the delegation-of-authority framework, Board committees, Cricket Committee, Cricket Pipeline Committee and CEO accountability.

5. International Cricket Council. ICC Articles of Association, provisions requiring free and democratic elections and autonomous administration without government or other public-body interference. ICC. https://images.icc-cricket.com/image/upload/prd/f7vm88yw1933dc38cgtg.pdf

6. International Cricket Council. “ICC outlines proposed USACA constitution.” ICC, 2017. https://www.icc-cricket.com/news/icc-outlines-proposed-usaca-constitution

7. International Cricket Council. “Approved constitution marks historic landmark for cricket in USA.” ICC, 2017. https://www.icc-cricket.com/media-releases/approved-constitution-marks-historic-landmark-for-cricket-in-usa

8. International Cricket Council. “ICC welcomes Nepal Special General Meeting to adopt revised constitution.” ICC, 2018. https://www.icc-cricket.com/media-releases/icc-welcomes-nepal-special-general-meeting-to-adopt-revised-constitution

9. International Cricket Council. “Independent Panel meet to progress Nepal elections under revised constitution.” ICC, 2018. https://www.icc-cricket.com/media-releases/independent-panel-meet-to-progress-nepal-elections-under-revised-constitution

10. International Cricket Council. “ICC delegation visits Bangladesh to engage with stakeholders on governance and electoral matters.” ICC, 2026. https://www.icc-cricket.com/media-releases/icc-delegation-visits-bangladesh-to-engage-with-stakeholders-on-governance-and-electoral-matters

11. International Cricket Council. “ICC Board approves governance, membership and member support decisions.” ICC, 2026; see also “ICC Board Meeting,” 2026, reporting ICC representatives’ meetings with stakeholders in Sri Lanka. https://www.icc-cricket.com/media-releases/icc-board-approves-governance-membership-and-member-support-decisions

(Concluded)

Continue Reading

Trending