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UNHRC’s repeated resolutions without resolution

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by Neville Ladduwahetty

September is the month when the UN Human Rights Council presents its latest Resolution on Sri Lanka. It is reported that the latest version has graduated from violations of human rights and international humanitarian law to include violations of “economic crimes”. Whatever the scope of the Resolution, the dogged fact remains that every sovereign country is compelled to function within the provisions of its own Constitution, because it is the fundamental law as recognized by the Vienna Convention; a fact unequivocally stated by the President and Foreign Minister of this Government, and repeated earlier by previous governments. This fundamental fact was the rationale for rejecting the former co-sponsored Resolution UNHRC 30/1. Therefore, if the UNHRC is serious about its Resolutions, it has to start with Sri Lanka’s Constitution. Incorporating provisions in Resolutions beyond the provisions of the Constitution become a meaningless and distracting exercise for all concerned, without Resolution.

Chapter III of the Constitution of Sri Lanka is titled “Fundamental Rights”. Under Fundamental Rights, there are NO provisions that address “violations of human rights and violations of international humanitarian law”, nor is there any provision for “economic crimes”. The only provision that is of relevance is under Article 13, and in particular 13 (6) on Fundamental Rights.

This Article 13 (1) states: “No person shall be held guilty of an offence on account of any act or omission which did not, at the time of such act or omission constitute such an offence, and no penalty shall be imposed for any offence more severe than the penalty in force at the time such offence was committed”.

If a person is “guilty of an offence”, the punishment for such an offence should be as contained in Sri Lanka’s Penal Code.

THE PENAL CODE

CHAPTER I

Paragraph 2 (1) of the Penal Code states: “Every person shall be liable to punishment under this Code, and not otherwise, for every act or omission contrary to the provisions thereof, of which he shall be guilty within Sri Lanka.

CHAPTER II

GENERAL EXPLANATIONS

Paragraph 5 states: “Throughout this Code every definition of an offence, every penal provision, and every illustration of every such definition or penal provision shall be understood subject to the exceptions contained in Chapter IV, “General Exceptions”, though these exceptions are not repeated in such definition, penal provision, or illustration”.

ESTABLISHING GUILT

Therefore, any person “guilty of an offence” should conform to the definition stated in the Penal Code of Sri Lanka. However, the Constitution under the second paragraph of Article 13 (6) states: “Nothing in this article shall prejudice the trial and punishment of any person for an acct or omission which, at the time when it was committed, was criminal according to the general principles of law recognized by the community of nations”.

This means that even if a person is NOT guilty of an offence under the Penal Code, he/she could be guilty of a criminal act under provisions “of law recognized by the community of nations”. The issue then resolves itself into identifying the relevant instruments that contain the “general principles of law” to establish guilt for acts that are recognized by the community of nations.

Therefore, under provisions of the Constitution a person could be found guilty of an offence either under provisions of the Penal Code or under provisions contained in instruments of law recognized by the community of nations.

INSTRUMENTS REGOGNIZED by the COMMUNITY of NATIONS

The context for determining whether an offence was committed or not should be based on the acknowledged fact that conflict was an Armed Conflict and therefore the applicable law is International Humanitarian Law; a fact acknowledged by the representatives of the LTTE to the European Court. Furthermore, since the conflict was a Non-International Armed Conflict the applicable legal framework is the Additional Protocol II of 1977. This Protocol is an extension of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. Although Sri Lanka has not formally ratified Protocol II, it is today accepted as an instrument of international customary law accepted by the community of nations.

Therefore, any questions of guilt for offences committed during the Armed Conflict should either be based on provisions of the Penal Code or procedures laid out in Article 6. “Penal prosecution” of Additional Protocol II. Part II of the Additional Protocol Paragraphs 2 (a) to (h) and 3 (a) to (c) specify what constitutes violations that ‘shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever”.

NATIONAL LAWS COMPLEMENTTARY to INTERNATIONAL LAWS

Domestic Laws should take primacy over provisions of international law as recognized by the Rome Statute in its Preamble that states: “Emphasizing that the International Criminal Court established under the Statute shall be complementary to national criminal jurisprudence”. Endorsing the principle of complementarity, Justice A.R.B. Amerasinghe states: “The ultimate goal of international norm-setting is their full and effective implementation through domestic procedures without the need for recourse to international mechanisms. In fact, access to international mechanisms is usually limited and may be resorted to only if domestic mechanisms are not available or inadequate…. The effective protection of human rights depends in the first instance upon national courts, legislatures, and public officers, and only in the last resort upon the international machinery and fora” (Amerasinghe, “Our Fundamental Rights of Personal Security and Physical Liberty” p. 2)

Therefore, it is only in instances where acts committed that cannot be categorized as violations under the Penal Code, that provisions contained in Additional Protocol II under Article 6: “Penal prosecution” should be followed.

Article 6: Penal prosecutions

1. “This Article applies to the prosecution and punishment of criminal offences related to the armed conflict”.

2. “No sentence shall be passed and no penalty shall be executed on a person found guilty of an offence except pursuant to a conviction pronounced by a court offering the essential guarantees of independence and impartiality”. In particular:

(a) “The procedure shall provide for an accused to be informed without delay of the particulars of the offence alleged against him and shall afford the accused before and during his trial all necessary rights and means of defence”;

(b) “No one shall be convicted of an offence except on the basis of individual penal responsibility”;

(c) “No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence, under the law, at the time when it was committed; nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than that which was applicable at the time when the criminal offence was committed; if, after the commission of the offence, provision is made by law for the imposition of a lighter penalty, the offender shall benefit thereby”;

(d) “Anyone charged with an offence is presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law”;

(e) Anyone charged with an offence shall have the right to be tried in his presence”;

(f) “No one shall be compelled to testify against himself or to confess guilt”.

3. “A convicted person shall be advised on conviction of his judicial and other remedies and of the time-limits within which they may be exercised”.

4. “The death penalty shall not be pronounced on persons who were under the age of eighteen years at the time of the offence and shall not be carried out on pregnant women or mothers of young children”.

5. “At the end of hostilities, the authorities in power shall endeavour to grant the broadest possible amnesty to persons who have participated in the armed conflict, or those deprived of their liberty for reasons related to the armed conflict, whether they are interned or detained”.

Article 25 (2) of the Rome Statute states: “A person who commits within the jurisdiction of the Court shall be individually responsible and liable for punishment in accordance with the Statute”

The material presented relating to Penal prosecutions contained in the Additional Protocol II and the Rome Statue clearly establish that the procedures that should be followed to establish guilt SHOULD be based on “individual penal responsibility”.

Furthermore, since guilt is based on “individual penal responsibility” Command Responsibility is not recognized either by Protocol II or the Rome Statute.

Under the circumstances blacklisting entire fighting divisions reflects ignorance of International Humanitarian Law applicable to Non-International Armed Conflict.

However, since the Protocol II does not specify what the punishment should be for the offences committed, punishment for such should be guided by provisions in Sri Lanka’s Penal Code. This is in keeping with the recognized principle of complementarity that recognizes the primacy of national laws that complement international laws.

DOMESTIC MECHANISM

During the course of the Foreign Minister Ali Sabry’s address, at the 51st Secession of the UN Human Rights Council, he stated: “We endeavor to establish a credible truth-seeking mechanism within the framework of the Constitution. The contours of a model that would suit the particular conditions of Sri Lanka are under discussion”. When the Minister of Justice, Prison Affairs and Constitutional Reforms, Dr. Wijeyedasa Rajapakse, was asked by the Sunday Observer “about the possibility of the international mechanism coming with hybrid Courts to address war crimes in Sri Lanka, he is reported to have stated: “It is likely. That is why we are going to propose the setting up of a domestic truth-seeking mechanism with special courts that can respond to rights violation cases involving the LTTE and the military. We are currently discussing the situation with countries such as the US, China, UK, and the European Union to promote the domestic mechanism.” (Sunday Observer, September 18, 2022).

Establishing the “Truth” by means of a truth-seeking domestic mechanism depends on the degree of certainty of evidence presented. Such degrees of certainty are needed whether “truth” is established by existing provisions or by fresh domestic mechanisms. However, the intention to set up “special courts” that could respond to violations by the LTTE or the military would then have to function alongside existing High Courts that are in place under the 13th Amendment to the Constitution that are mandated to address violations specified in the Penal Code. Whether such an arrangement is constitutionally acceptable or not is a matter that needs to be explored.

It is apparent from these comments that the reason to endeavor the setting up a “domestic truth-seeking mechanism with special courts” is to satisfy US, China, UK and the European Union with whom Sri Lanka is having discussions, that Sri Lanka is serious about addressing possible human rights law and humanitarian law violations that could have occurred during the Armed Conflict. During these discussions it would make a significant difference to these discussions if Sri Lanka makes them aware of the outstanding determinations made by the Supreme Court of Sri Lanka relating to Human Rights violations.

The fact that the UNHRC and the Core Group backed by local entities seem to be ignorant of such determinations by the Supreme Court of Sri Lanka, and the fact that the scope of national laws complemented by international laws do already exist and have the capacity to address alleged violations, is because Sri Lanka has made no attempt to present them. This may also be the possible reason for demanding hybrid courts to address violations, if any, that may have occurred during the armed conflict.

EXISTING DOMESTIC MECHANISMS to ADDRESS VIOLATIONS

Article 154P (1) of the 13th Amendment to the Constitution states: “There shall be a High Court for each Province …Each such High Court shall be designated as the High Court of the relevant Province”.

Article 154P (6) of the 13th Amendment states: “Subject to the provisions of the Constitution and any law, any person aggrieved by a final order, judgment or sentence of any such Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction under paragraph (3) (b) or (3) (c) or (4) may appeal therefrom to the Court of Appeal in accordance with Article 138”.

In addition to such avenues to pursue the interests of aggrieved parties relating to investigations such persons could lodge a complaint with Sri Lanka’s Human Rights Council under provisions of Part II “POWERS OF INVESTIGATION” of the Human Rights Commission of Sri Lanka Act, No. 21 of 1996, PART II POWERS OF INVESTIGATION OF THE COMMISSION.

Paragraph 14 of the above Act states: “The Commission may, on its own motion or on a complaint made to it by an aggrieved person or group of persons or a person acting on behalf of an aggrieved person or a group of persons, investigate an allegation at the infringement or imminent infringement of a fundamental right of such person or group of persons caused”.

It is therefore crystal clear that provisions currently exist between provisions in the 13th Amendment to the Constitution and the remit of the Sri Lanka’s Human Rights Commission for an aggrieved party to seek redress in relation to serious violations. One such landmark judgment given by the Court of Appeal relating to Disappearances is given below, in order to demonstrate that the existing jurisprudence is sufficient to address issues relating to serious violations.

DISAPPEARANCES

K. LEEDA VIOLET AND OTHERS V T.P. VIDANAPATHIRANA AND OTHERS H.C.A.164/89, H.C.A.171/89 AND H.C.A.166/89 DECIDED ON 2 DECEMBER 1994.

S.N.SILVA.J. PRESIDENT OF THE COURT OF APPEAL

“In HCA 164/89 the Petitioner Leeda Violet, being the mother of the corpus, Y. Wimalpala, father of the corpus and T. Lilinona gave in support of the petition. According to their evidence the corpus, being the eldest son of the Petitioner and her husband Wimalpala, was 26 years of age at the time of his arrest…. At about 4.30 p.m. a party of police officers came in several vehicles. Thereafter he (the officer in-charge) arrested the persons who were near the shop selling fishing gear. Some persons who were on the beach were also arrested… Those arrested were asked to kneel on the road. Thereafter the 1st Respondent asked those persons to get into the vehicles and took them to the Dikwella Police Station. It is stated that about 30 persons were arrested. The Petitioners in HCA 164/89 and HCA 171/89 followed the police vehicles and went up to the Police Station”.

The final paragraph of the judgment states: “The Petitioners filed these applications in April 1989. There were initial hearings before this Court and protracted inquiries before the Magistrate Court. Thereafter the cases were adjourned for further hearing before this Court. It is obvious that the Petitioners have incurred heavy expenditure in these proceedings. They have boldly pursued these applications, which is commendable conduct considering that the 1st Respondent continues to hold office…. Several applications with regard to other disappearances reported from the same place have been dismissed for non-prosecution. In these circumstances as a measure of exemplary costs, I direct that the Respondent to pay each petitioner in the above application a sum of Rs. 100,000/= as exemplary costs…. Also direct the Registrar of this Court to forward copies of the proceedings recorded in the Magistrate’s Court to the Inspector General of Police who is hereby directed to consider the evidence recorded as information of the commission of cognizable offences. He will take necessary steps to conduct proper investigations and to take steps according to the law…” (A.R.B Amerasinghe, Ibid p. 336-340)

TORTURE

On the topic of Torture, Cruel, Inhuman, Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Justice Amerasinghe in the book cited above states: “The Supreme Court of Sri Lanka has over and over again emphasized that even persons whose records are not particularly meritorious should enjoy the Constitutional Guarantee of personal liberty and security and that even ‘notorious’ or hard core criminals should not be subject to torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment” (Ibid, p. 29).

THE QUESTION of PROOF

“In Malinda Channa Pieris and others v A.G. and others, it was pointed out that, having regard to the gravity of the matter in issue, a high degree of certainty is required before the balance of probability might be said to tilt in favoure of a petitioner endeavouring to discharge his burden of proving that he was subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; and unless has adduced sufficient evidence to satisfy the Court…” (Ibid, p.43).

Internationally too, the allegation must be proved before the relevant Article is held to have been violated. Thus for instance in Fillastre v Bolivia, the UN Committee on Human Rights held that there was no violation of Article 10 of the ICCPR because the allegations that the conditions of detention were inhuman and degrading had not been substantiated or corroborated” (Ibid, p. 44).

MEANING of ARREST

Article 13 (1) of the Constitution states: “No person shall be arrested except according to procedures established by law. Any person arrested shall be informed of the reason for his arrest”.

Article 13 (2) states: “Every person held in custody, detained or otherwise deprived of personal liberty shall be brought before the judge of the nearest competent court according to procedures established by law, and shall not be further held in custody, detained or deprived of personal liberty except upon and in terms of the order of such judge made in accordance with procedures established by law”.

“So long as the grounds for arrest are made known, the Constitutional requirement that reason for arrest should be given will be satisfied. The police do not have to quote chapter and verse from statutes and legal literature to justify the arrest. There is no obligation on the police to quote the law applicable”, said Samarakoon C.J. “On the other hand… He must be given the grounds – the material facts and particulars – for his arrest, for it is then that the man will have information that will enable him to take meaningful steps towards regaining his liberty” (Ibid, p. 115).

CONCLUSION

The Foreign Minister Ali Sabry during the course of his address, at the 51st Secession of the UN Human Rights Council, stated: “We endeavor to establish a credible truth-seeking mechanism within the framework of the Constitution. The contours of a model that would suit the particular conditions of Sri Lanka are under discussion”. Whether the intended mechanism is compatible with existing systems under the 13th Amendment is an issue that needs resolution.

Establishing the “truth”, whatever the mechanism, depends on the evidence presented because only evidence that has a “high degree of credibility” is what is accepted as evidence both nationally and internationally. For instance, in Fillastre v Bolivia, the UN Committee on Human Rights held that there was no violation of Article 10 of the ICCPR because the allegations that the conditions of detention were inhuman and degrading had not been substantiated or corroborated” (A.R. B. Amerasinghe, “Our Fundamental Rights of Personal Security and Physical Liberty” p. 44).

Such evidence could be presented to any of the High Courts established under the 13th Amendment or the new Domestic Mechanism contemplated. For instance, the landmark judgment presented above, with the decision by the then President of the Court of Appeal, S.N. Silva J. reflects the scope of existing national mechanisms to address serious violations, regardless of whether or not they come within the rubric of human rights or humanitarian law. Furthermore, an aggrieved party who is not satisfied with the diligence of the investigations could appeal to Sri Lanka’s Human Rights Commission to undertake under provisions of Part II “POWERS OF INVESTIGATION” of the Human Rights Commission of Sri Lanka Act, No. 21 of 1996, PART II POWERS OF INVESTIGATION OF THE COMMISSION Therefore, aggrieved parties should be encouraged and urged to exploit the full potential of existing domestic mechanisms to redress their grievances.

If the evidence reaches the standard of “high degree of credibility”, the next step is for Domestic mechanisms provided in the Constitution to apply, and the procedures for prosecution and punishment in keeping with provisions of Sri Lanka’s Penal Code, to proceed. However, if the evidence relates to violations outside its scope, they could still apply to acts that are “recognized by the community of nations” as per the second paragraph of Article 13 (6) of the Constitution. The evidence, however must relate to “individual penal responsibility”, as called for by the Additional Protocol II applicable to the

Non-International Armed Conflict and by the Rome Statute. Therefore, the call to blacklist entire fighting divisions reflects a total ignorance of such internationally recognized provisions. Furthermore, Additional Protocol Ii does not recognize Command Responsibility.

As for the punishment, what is provided nationally is Sri Lanka’s Penal Code. Therefore, even if an individual is guilty for a violation and is recognized as such by the community of nations, the punishment has to be in keeping with provisions in Sri Lanka’s Penal Code.

Presented above are topics such as DISAPPEARANCES, TORTURE, THE QUESTION of PROOF and MEANING of ARREST contained in Justice A.R.B. Amarasinghe’s book titled “Our Fundamental Rights of Personal Security and Physical Liberty” (1995) and how they were addressed under provisions of existing Domestic Mechanisms in Sri Lanka.

The case presented under DISAPPEARANCES was first filed in April 1989 and the decision was made in December 1994; a matter of 5 years and 8 months. It is most likely that the evidence gathered by the Office of the UNHRC is several decades old. How such evidence would stand the test of “high degree of credibility”, before an incident could be categorized as a violation is a factor that could be challenged.

Few are aware of these facts, and least of all the UNHRC. Instead of pleading our case in Geneva, this body of evidence should be brought to the attention of the UNHRC, Diplomatic Representatives in Sri Lanka and to those who are committed to Human Rights issues. In addition, the Government should document regularly the current status of every complaint filed with the High Courts or any of the Superior Courts relating to human rights and humanitarian law violations to demonstrate the manner in which the domestic system is working. The fact that achievements gained through Domestic Mechanisms have not received the publicity it deserves has resulted in acquiring the image that impunity reigns in Sri Lanka.



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The NPP Government is more than a JVP offspring:

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Rohana Wijeweera

It is also different from all past governments as it faces new and different challenges

No one knows whether the already broken ceasefire between the US and Iran, with Israel as a reluctant adjunct, will last the full 10 days, or what will come thereafter. The world’s economic woes are not over and the markets are yo-yoing in response to Trump’s twitches and Iran’s gate keeping at the Strait of Hormuz. The gloomy expert foretelling is that full economic normalcy will not return until the year is over even if the war were to end with the ceasefire. That means continuing challenges for Sri Lanka and more of the tough learning in the art of governing for the NPP.

The NPP government has been doing what most governments in Asia have been doing to cope with the current global crisis, which is also an Asian crisis insofar as oil supplies and other supply chains are concerned. What the government can and must do additionally is to be totally candid with the people and keep them informed of everything that it is doing – from monitoring import prices to the timely arranging of supplies, all the details of tender, the tracking of arrivals, and keeping the distribution flow through the market without bottlenecks. That way the government can eliminate upstream tender rackets and downstream hoarding swindles. People do not expect miracles from their government, only honest, sincere and serious effort in difficult circumstances. Backed up by clear communication and constant public engagement.

But nothing is going to stop the flow of criticisms against the NPP government. That is a fact of Sri Lankan politics. Even though the opposition forces are weak and have little traction and even less credibility, there has not been any drought in the criticisms levelled against the still fledgling government. These criticisms can be categorized as ideological, institutional and oppositional criticisms, with each category having its own constituency and/or commentators. The three categories invariably overlap and there are instances of criticisms that excite only the pundits but have no political resonance.

April 5 anniversary nostalgia

There is also a new line of criticism that might be inspired by the April 5 anniversary nostalgia for the 1971 JVP insurrection. This new line traces the NPP government to the distant roots of the JVP – its April 1965 founding “in a working-class home in Akmeemana, Galle” by a 22-year old Rohana Wijeweera and seven others; the short lived 1971 insurrection that was easily defeated; and the much longer and more devastating second (1987 to 1989) insurrection that led to the elimination of the JVP’s frontline leaders including Wijeweera, and brought about a change in the JVP’s political direction with commitment to parliamentary democracy. So far, so good, as history goes.

But where the nostalgic narrative starts to bend is in attempting a straight line connection from the 1965 Akmeemana origins of the JVP to the national electoral victories of the NPP in 2024. And the bend gets broken in trying to bridge the gap between the “founding anti-imperialist economics” of the JVP and the practical imperatives of the NPP government in “governing a debt-laden small open economy.” Yet this line of criticism differs from the other lines of criticism that I have alluded to, but more so for its moral purpose than for its analytical clarity. The search for clarity could begin with question – why is the NPP government more than a JVP offspring? The answer is not so simple, but it is also not too complicated.

For starters, the JVP was a political response to the national and global conditions of the 1960s and 1970s, piggybacking socialism on the bandwagon of ethno-nationalism in a bi-polar world that was ideologically split between status quo capitalism and the alternative of socialism. The NPP government, on the other hand, is not only a response to, but is also a product of the conditions of the 2010s and 2020s. The twain cannot be more different. Nothing is the same between then and now, locally and globally.

A pragmatic way to look at the differences between the origins of the JVP and the circumstances of the NPP government is to look at the very range of criticisms that are levelled against the NPP government. What I categorize as ideological criticisms include criticisms of the government’s pro-IMF and allegedly neo-liberal economic policies, as well as the government’s foreign policy stances – on Israel, on the current US-Israel war against Iran, the geopolitics of the Indian Ocean, and the apparent closeness to the Modi government in India. These criticisms emanate from the non-JVP left and Sinhala Buddhist nationalists.

Strands of nationalism

To digress briefly, there are several strands in the overall bundle of Sri Lankan nationalism. There is the liberal inclusive strand, the left-progressive strand, the exclusive Sinhala Buddhist Nationalist (SBN) strand, and the defensive strands of minority nationalisms. Given Sri Lanka’s historical political formations and alliances, much overlapping goes on between the different strands. The overlapping gets selective on an issue by issue basis, which in itself is not unwelcome insofar as it promotes plurality in place of exclusivity.

Historically as well, and certainly after 1956, the SBN strand has been the dominant strand of nationalism in Sri Lanka and has had the most influential say in every government until now. Past versions of the JVP frequently straddled the dominant SBN space. Currently, however, the dominant SBN strand is in one of its more dormant phases and the NPP government could be a reason for the current dormancy. This is an obvious difference between the old JVP and the new NPP.

A second set of criticisms, or institutional criticisms, emanate from political liberals and human rights activists and these are about the NPP government’s actions or non-actions in regard to constitutional changes, the future of the elected executive presidency, the status of provincial devolution and the timing of provincial council elections, progress on human rights issues, the resolution of unfinished postwar businesses including the amnesia over mass graves. These criticisms and the issues they represent are also in varying ways the primary concerns of the island’s Tamils, Muslims and the Malaiyaka (planntationn) Tamils. As with the overlapping between the left and the non-minority nationalists, there is also overlapping between the liberal activists and minority representatives.

A third category includes what might be called oppositional criticisms and they counterpose the JVP’s past against the NPP’s present, call into question the JVP’s commitment to multi-party democracy and raise alarms about a creeping constitutional dictatorship. This category also includes criticisms of the NPP government’s lack of governmental experience and competence; alleged instances of abuse of power, mismanagement and even corruption; alleged harassment of past politicians; and the failure to find the alleged mastermind behind the 2019 Easter bombings. At a policy and implementational level, there have been criticisms of the government’s educational reforms and electricity reforms, the responses to cyclone Ditwah, and the current global oil and economic crises. The purveyors of oppositional criticisms are drawn from the general political class which includes political parties, current and past parliamentarians, as well as media pundits.

Criticisms as expectations

What is common to all three categories of criticisms is that they collectively represent what were understood to be promises by the NPP before the elections, and have become expectations of the NPP government after the elections. It is the range and nature of these criticisms and the corresponding expectations that make the NPP government a lot more than a mere JVP offspring, and significantly differentiate it from every previous government.

The deliverables that are expected of the NPP government were never a part of the vocabulary of the original JVP platform and programs. The very mode of parliamentary politics was ideologically anathema to the JVP of Akmeemana. And there was no mention of or concern for minority rights, or constitutional reforms. On foreign policy, it was all India phobia without Anglo mania – a halfway variation of Sri Lanka’s mainstream foreign policy of Anglo mania and India phobia. For a party of the rural proletariat, the JVP was virulently opposed to the plantation proletariat. The JVP’s version of anti-imperialist economics would hardly have excited the Sri Lankan electorate at any time, and certainly not at the present time.

At the same time, the NPP government is also the only government that has genealogical antecedents to a political movement or organization like the JVP. That in itself makes the NPP government unique among Sri Lanka’s other governments. The formation of the NPP is the culmination of the evolution of the JVP that began after the second insurrection with the shedding of political violence, acceptance of political plurality and commitment to electoral democracy.

But the evolution was not entirely a process of internal transformation. It was also a response to a rapidly and radically changing circumstances both within Sri Lanka and beyond. This evolution has not been a rejection of the founding socialist purposes of the JVP in 1968, but their adaptation in the endless political search, under constantly changing conditions, for a non-violent, socialist and democratic framework that would facilitate the full development of the human potential of all Sri Lankans.

The burden of expectations is unmistakable, but what is also remarkable is their comprehensiveness and the NPP’s formal commitment to all of them at the same time. No previous government shouldered such an extensive burden or showed such a willing commitment to each and every one of the expectations. In the brewing global economic crisis, the criticisms, expectations and the priorities of the government will invariably be focussed on keeping the economy alive and alleviating the day-to-day difficulties of millions of Sri Lankan families. While what the NPP government can and must do may not differ much from what other Asian governments – from Pakistan to Vietnam – are doing, it could and should do better than what any and all past Sri Lankan governments did when facing economic challenges.

by Rajan Philips

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A Fragile Ceasefire: Pakistan’s Glory and Israel’s Sabotage

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Smokes over Beirut: Israel’s Ceasefire Attack on Hezbollah in Lebanon

After threatening to annihilate one of the planet’s oldest civilizations, TACO* Trump chickened out again by grasping the ceasefire lifeline that Pakistan had assiduously prepared. Trump needed the ceasefire badly to stem the mounting opposition to the war in America. Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu wanted the war to continue because he needed it badly for his political survival. So, he contrived a fiction and convinced Trump that Lebanon is not included in the ceasefire. Trump as usual may not have noticed that Pakistan’s Prime Minister Shehbaz Shariff had clearly indicated Lebanon’s inclusion in his announcement of the ceasefire at 7:50 PM, Tuesday, on X. Ten minutes before Donald Trump’s fake deadline.

True to form on Wednesday, Israel unleashed the heaviest assault by far on Lebanon, reportedly killing over 300 people, the highest single-day death toll in the current war. Iran responded by re-closing the Strait of Hormuz and questioning the need for talks in Islamabad over the weekend. There were other incidents as well, with an oil refinery attacked in Iran, and Iranian drones and missiles slamming oil and gas infrastructure in UAE, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Qatar.

The US tried to insist that Lebanon is not part of the ceasefire, with the argumentative US Vice President JD Vance, who was in Budapest, Hungary, campaigning for Viktor Orban, calling the whole thing a matter of “bad faith negotiation” as well as “legitimate misunderstanding” on the part of Iran, and warning Iran that “it would be dumb to jeopardise its ceasefire with Washington over Israel’s attacks in Lebanon.”

But as the attack in Lebanon drew international condemnation – from Pope Leo to UN Secretary General António Guterres, and several world leaders, and amidst fears of Lebanon becoming another Gaza with 1,500 people including 130 children killed and more than a million people displaced, Washington got Israel to stop its “lawn mowing” in southern Lebanon.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu agreed to “open direct negotiations with Lebanon as soon as possible,”. Lebanese President Joeseph Aoun has also called for “a ceasefire between Israel and Lebanon, followed by direct negotiations between them.” Israel’s involvement in Lebanon remains a wild card that threatens the ceasefire and could scuttle the talks between the US and Iran scheduled for Saturday in Islamabad.

Losers and Winners

After the ceasefire, both the Trump Administration and Iran have claimed total victories while the Israeli government wants the war to continue. The truth is that after more than a month into nonstop bombing of Iran, America and Israel have won nothing. Only Iran has won something it did not have when Trump and Netanyahu started their war. Iran now has not only a say over but control of the Strait of Hormuz. The ceasefire acknowledges this. Both Trump and Netanyahu are under fire in their respective countries and have no allies in the world except one another.

The real diplomatic winner is Pakistan. Salman Rushdie’s palimpsest-country has emerged as a key player in global politics and an influential mediator in a volatile region. Pakistan’s Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and Chief of Defence Field Marshal Asim Munir have both been praised by President Trump and credited for achieving the current ceasefire. The Iranian regime has also been effusive in its praise of Pakistan’s efforts.

It is Pakistan that persisted with the effort after initial attempts at backdoor diplomacy by Egypt, Pakistan and Türkiye started floundering. Sharing a 900 km border and deep cultural history with Iran, and having a skirmish of its own on the eastern front with Afghanistan, Pakistan has all the reason to contain and potentially resolve the current conflict in Iran. Although a majority Sunni Muslim country, Pakistan is home to the second largest Shia Muslim population after Iran, and is the easterly terminus of the Shia Arc that stretches from Lebanon. The country also has a mutual defense pact with Saudi Arabia that includes Pakistan’s nuclear cover for the Kingdom. An open conflict between Iran and Saudi Arabia would have put Pakistan in a dangerously awkward position.

It is now known and Trump has acknowledged that China had a hand in helping Iran get to the diplomatic table. Pakistan used its connections well to get Chinese diplomatic reinforcement. Pakistani Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar flew to Beijing to brief his Chinese counterpart and secured China’s public support for the diplomatic efforts. The visit produced a Five-Point Plan that became a sequel to America’s 15-point proposal and the eventual ten-point offer by Iran.

There is no consensus between parties as to which points are where and who is agreeing to what. The chaos is par for the course the way Donald Trumps conducts global affairs. So, all kudos to Pakistan for quietly persisting with old school toing and froing and producing a semblance of an agreement on a tweet without a parchment.

It is also noteworthy that Israel has been excluded from all the diplomatic efforts so far. And it is remarkable, but should not be surprising, the way Trump has sidelined Isreal from the talks. Prime Minister Netanyahu has been enjoying overwhelming support of Israelis for starting the war of his life against Iran and getting the US to spearhead it. But now the country is getting confused and is exposed to Iranian missiles and drones far more than ever before. The Israeli opposition is finally coming alive realizing what little has Netanyahu’s wars have achieved and at what cost. Israel has alienated a majority of Americans and has no ally anywhere else.

It will be a busy Saturday in Islamabad, where the US and Iranian delegations are set to meet. Iran would seem to have insisted and secured the assurance that the US delegation will be led by Vice President Vance, while including Trump’s personal diplomats – Steve Witkoff and son-in-law Jared Kushner. Iran has not announced its team but it is expected to be led, for protocol parity, by Iran’s Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, and will likely include its suave Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi. Vice President Vance’s attendance will be the most senior US engagement with Iran since Secretary of State John Kerry negotiated the 2015 nuclear deal under President Obama.

The physical arrangements for the talks are still not public although Islamabad has been turned into a security fortress given the stakes and risks involved. The talks are expected to be ‘indirect’, with the two delegations in separate rooms and Pakistani officials shuttling between them. The status of Iran’s enriched uranium and the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz will be the major points of contention. After Netanyahu’s overreach on Wednesday, Lebanon is also on the short list

The 2015 nuclear deal (the Joint Comprehensive Action Plan) took months of negotiations and involved multiple parties besides the US and Iran, including China, France, Germany, UK, Russia and the EU. That served the cause of regional and world peace well until Trump tore up the deal to spite Obama. It would be too much to expect anything similar after a weekend encounter in Islamabad. But if the talks could lead to at least a permanent ceasefire and the return to diplomacy that would be a huge achievement.

(*As of 2025–2026, Donald Trump is nicknamed “TACO Trump” by Wall Street traders and investors as an acronym for “”. This term highlights a perceived pattern of him making strong tariff threats that cause market panic, only to later retreat or weaken them, causing a rebound.)

by Rajan Philips

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CIA’s hidden weapon in Iran

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We are passing through the ten-day interregnum called a ceasefire over the War on Iran. The world may breathe briefly, but this pause is not reassurance—it is a deliberate interlude, a vacuum in which every actor positions for the next escalation. Iran is far from secure. Behind the veneer of calm, external powers and local forces are preparing, arming, and coordinating. The United States is unlikely to deploy conventional ground troops; the next moves will be executed through proxies whose behaviour will defy expectation. These insurgents are shaped, guided, and amplified by intelligence and technology, capable of moving silently, striking precisely, and vanishing before retaliation. The ceasefire is not peace—it is the prelude to disruption.

The Kurds, historically instruments of Tehran against Baghdad, are now vectors for the next insurgency inside Iran. This movement is neither organic nor local. It is externally orchestrated, with the CIA as the principal architect. History provides the blueprint: under Mohammad-Reza Shah Pahlavi, Kurdish uprisings were manipulated, never supported out of sympathy. They were instruments of leverage against Iraq, a way to weaken a rival while projecting influence beyond Iran’s borders. Colonel Isa Pejman, Iranian military intelligence officer who played a role in Kurdish affairs, recalled proposing support for a military insurgency in Iraq, only for the Shah to respond coldly: “[Mustafa] Barzani killed my Army soldiers… please forget it. The zeitgeist and regional context have been completely transformed.” The Kurds were pawns, but pawns with strategic weight. Pejman later noted: “When the Shah wrote on the back of the letter ‘Accepted’ to General Pakravan, I felt I was the true leader of the Kurdish movement.” The seeds planted then are now being activated under new, technologically empowered auspices.

Iran’s geographic vulnerabilities make this possible. The Shah understood the trap: a vast territory with porous borders, squeezed by Soviet pressure from the north and radical Arab states from the west. “We are in a really terrible situation since Moscow’s twin pincers coming down through Kabul and Baghdad surround us,” he warned Asadollah Alam. From Soviet support for the Mahabad Republic to Barzani’s dream of a unified Kurdistan, Tehran knew an autonomous Kurdish bloc could destabilize both Iraq and Iran. “Since the formation of the Soviet-backed Mahabad Republic, the Shah had been considerably worried about the Kurdish threat,” a US assessment concluded.

Today, the Kurds’ significance is operational, not symbolic. The CIA’s recent rescue of a downed F-15 airman using Ghost Murmur, a quantum magnetometry system, demonstrated the reach of technology in intelligence operations. The airman survived two days on Iranian soil before extraction. This was not a simple rescue; it was proof that highly mobile, technologically augmented operations can penetrate Iranian territory with surgical precision. The same logic applies to insurgency preparation: when individuals can be tracked through electromagnetic signatures, AI-enhanced surveillance, and drones, proxy forces can be armed, guided, and coordinated with unprecedented efficiency. The Kurds are no longer pawns—they are a living network capable of fracturing Iranian cohesion while providing deniability to foreign powers.

Iran’s engagement with Iraqi Kurds was always containment, not empowerment. The Shah’s goal was never Kurdish independence. “We do not approve an independent [Iraqi] Kurdistan,” he stated explicitly. Yet their utility as instruments of regional strategy was undeniable. The CIA’s revival of these networks continues a long-standing pattern: insurgent groups integrated into the wider calculus of international power. Israel, Iran, and the Kurds formed a triangular strategic relationship that terrified Baghdad. “For Baghdad, an Iranian-Israeli-Kurdish triangular alliance was an existential threat,” contemporary reports noted. This is the template for modern manipulation: a networked insurgency, externally supported, capable of destabilizing regimes from within while giving foreign powers plausible deniability.

Iran today faces fragility. Years of sanctions, repression, and targeted strikes have weakened educational and scientific hubs; Sharif University in Tehran, one of the country’s leading scientific centres, was bombed. Leaders, scholars, and innovators have been eliminated. Military readiness is compromised. Generations-long setbacks leave Iran exposed. Against this backdrop, a Kurdish insurgency armed with drones, AI-supported surveillance, and precision munitions could do more than disrupt—it could fracture the state internally. The current ten-day ceasefire is a mirage; the next wave of revolt is already being orchestrated.

CIA involvement is deliberate. Operations are coordinated with allied intelligence agencies, leveraging Kurdish grievances, mobility, and ethnolinguistic networks. The Kurds’ spread across Iran, Iraq, Turkey, and Syria provides operational depth—allowing insurgents to strike, vanish, and regroup with impunity. Barzani understood leverage decades ago: “We could be useful to the United States… Look at our strategic location on the flank of any possible Soviet advance into the Middle East.” Today, the calculation is inverted: Kurds are no longer instruments against Baghdad; they are potential disruptors inside Tehran itself.

Technology is central. Ghost Murmur’s ability to detect a single heartbeat remotely exemplifies how intelligence can underpin insurgent networks. Drones, satellite communications, AI predictive modeling, and battlefield sensors create an infrastructure that can transform a dispersed Kurdish insurgency into a high-precision operation. Iran can no longer rely on fortifications or loyalty alone; the external environment has been recalibrated by technology.

History provides the roadmap. The Shah’s betrayal of Barzani after the 1975 Algiers Agreement demonstrated that external actors can manipulate both Iranian ambitions and Kurdish loyalties. “The Shah sold out the Kurds,” Yitzhak Rabin told Kissinger. “We could not station our troops there and keep fighting forever,” the Shah explained to Alam. The Kurds are a pivot, not a cause. Networks once acting under Tehran’s influence are now being repurposed against it.

The insurgency exploits societal fissures. Kurdish discontent in Iran, suppressed for decades, provides fertile ground. Historical betrayal fuels modern narratives: “Barzani claimed that ‘Isa Pejman sold us out to the Shah and the Shah sold us out to the US.’” Intelligence agencies weaponize these grievances, pairing them with training, technological augmentation, and covert support.

Geopolitically, the stakes are immense. The Shah’s defensive-offensive doctrine projected Iranian influence outward to neutralize threats. Today, the logic is inverted: the same networks used to contain Iraq are being readied to contain Iran. A technologically augmented Kurdish insurgency, covertly backed, could achieve in months what decades of sanctions, diplomacy, or repression have failed to accomplish.

The operation will be asymmetric, high-tech, and dispersed. UAVs, quantum-enhanced surveillance, encrypted communications, and AI-directed logistics will dominate. Conventional Iranian forces are vulnerable to this type of warfare. As Pejman reflected decades ago, “Our Army was fighting there, rather than the Kurds who were harshly defeated… How could we keep such a place?” Today, the challenge is magnified by intelligence superiority on the insurgents’ side.

This is not a temporary flare-up. The CIA and its allies are constructing a generational network of influence. Experience from Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon proves these networks endure once operationalised. The Shah recognized this: “Iran’s non-state foreign policy under the Shah’s reign left a lasting legacy for the post-Revolution era.” Today, those instruments are being remade as vectors of foreign influence inside Iran.

The future is stark. Iran faces not simply external threats, but a carefully engineered insurgency exploiting historical grievances, technological superiority, and precise intelligence. The Kurds are central. History, technology, and geopolitical calculation converge to create a transformative threat. Tehran’s miscalculations, betrayals, and suppressed grievances now form the lattice for this insurgency. The Kurds are positioned not just as an ethnic minority, but as a vector of international strategy—Tehran may be powerless to stop it.

Iran’s containment strategies have been weaponized, fused with technology, and inverted against it. The ghosts of Barzani’s Peshmerga, the shadows of Algiers, and the Shah’s strategic vision now converge with Ghost Murmur, drones, and AI. Tehran faces a paradox: the instruments it once controlled are now calibrated to undermine its authority. The next Kurdish revolt will not only fight in the mountains but in the electromagnetic shadows where intelligence operates, consequences are lethal, and visibility is scarce.

by Nilantha Ilangamuwa

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