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Ranil prepares to govern the country cohabiting with President CBK

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Ranil and Chandrika. (File photo)

Since his office was now to behave in the manner of an executive prime ministerial centre which would support him as virtual head of government, Ranil set about restructuring the order of business in the house. He wanted papers and callers dealt with in a systematic, organized way. It was not going to be business as usual when the PM’s office had been a post office passing-on all and sundry to the all-powerful executive president’s office for decision. The `buck’, as Harry Truman had said, would stop here.

The first thing Ranil did was to ask me to drop in at the prime minister’s office in Britain and spend a day there looking at how No 10 (Downing Street) was organized. He thought that would be the closest model to follow. So on a trip back from Washington I spent some time at No 10. Alastair Campbell, the media guru to Prime Minister Tony Blair was not available that day but all the other heads of divisions were most helpful. The essential point I got from No 10 Downing Street was the priority the Prime Minister, Tony Blair attached to information and the media. It was all about keeping the public informed, and the prime minister’s thinking, on the major issues of the day.

The strategies included even the manner of presentation and the timing of the presentation of news to the public. A tip they suggested was to have a particular item of good news held for an appropriate action and released at that time. In a way, it was like having something in hand to be given to the media on a once-a-day basis. Interaction with the media was deemed so important in the modern prime minister’s office that Campbell or an assistant would meet with the media corps sometimes even twice a day.

Ranil built on the information I brought back from London and the Media Center at the Gramodaya in Kollupitiya and the institution of a government spokesman came out of that experience. What we clearly lacked was our own Alastair Campbell, who had earned the sobriquet of the ‘spin doctor’, although a few external advisors from Britain were immensely helpful and generous with lots of good advise. The media team was an important part of our overseas visits. There was always a good mix of state and private media men and women on the trip and they covered the news very speedily and fully, so that those back home had a regular view of what Ranil and his troupe were doing abroad. It was expensive, especially all the phone calls and sending of voice cuts and ‘photo opps’ but the public relations aspect necessitated it.

Ranil’s interest in the media and media reform

Ranil’s own background with the media, extending back through his father Esmond Wickremesinghe, Managing Director of the Associated Newspaper of Ceylon Ltd, and further back to his grandfather, the famous D R Wijewardena who was founder of Lake House, had already impelled him to set up new structures and mechanisms relating to the media. There were at least three specific areas on which he acted very fast. First of all was the legislative framework for the media. Following a series of regular meetings with the editors (this was to take place on a monthly basis), the journalists association and the Free. Media Movement he got passed through Parliament, legislation which was of extreme value for the creation of a conducive media environment that would match the highest standards required of a free media.

This legislation was to cover the concept of freedom of expression, amend the existing law regarding criminal defamation which acted as a constraint to the free expression of views, the setting up of a Press Complaints Commission to replace a moribund Press Council and to establish a Press Institute which would set, from within, standards for journalists to follow, and update their training.

The second approach was to establish a fully equipped and staffed government media centre. This was on the premise that the press was not going to be curbed again with emergency regulations which had censored the press effectively for long periods. Since a virtually free press was going to be stimulated, Ranil felt that a strong mechanism should be in place for the propagation of the government’s own position. The third idea was to work towards a gradual broad-basing of the state-owned media. This had been continually abused by the government in power.

His design for the PM’s office involved a strict separation of functions between the purely political and personal side, and the official. The secretary (myself) would in theory exercise overall supervision. But I was insulated against political and personal pressures by such issues being put up to the party and public affairs unit handled by the private secretary and two or three confidantes associated with party headquarters.

My work on the official side would be handled from the Flower Road office. Ranil left this work to be handled entirely at my discretion. As a link to him at Temple Trees, where he had a very modest set of rooms to work in as an office, he wanted me to find working space in one of the upper-floor bedrooms at Temple Trees. Later on with the help from the US$ 100 million ‘Indian line of credit’ we managed to computerise and link our two separate offices on the internet. Ranil was always very clued-in on technology and especially recognized the value of ICT (Information Communication Technology) as a tool to bring government services to the people.

The Batalanda case

One of the increasing trends in political life has been for the leader to be caught up in a public commission of inquiry. These usually refer to decisions and actions taken while one was in government and are political, in that they are brought up at the time that the person is out of office. It happened in the case of W Dahanayake around the conspiracy behind the assassination of Bandaranaike; to Sirimavo regarding her extension of the emergency, to ostensibly keep herself in power, and now in the case of Ranil Wickremesinghe about some incidents during ‘the period of terror’ between 1989 and 1992.

Ranil had to face a commission of inquiry while he was the leader of the opposition in 1998 and when he was poised to contest at the forthcoming presidential elections. It was referred to popularly as the ‘Batalanda Case’ and concerned certain activities which took place at the Batalanda Housing Scheme in the Kelaniya electorate. Ranil had used one of the bungalows in the housing scheme as an office during his period as minister of industries and scientific affairs and of youth and employment.

The specific allegation was that he was aware of certain illegal activities which took place in some of the houses in the Batalanda Housing Scheme, which were used by the police as places of unlawful detention, including the torture of persons suspected of being JVP insurgents. The commission was appointed by President Chandrika Kumaratunga in September 1995. It was given several extensions and the report was finally presented to the president only in March 1998.

The only charge against Ranil was under section (e) of the terms of reference which mandated the Commission to inquire into whether any officer or any other person was responsible for the commission of any criminal offences under any law or the use of undue influence or misuse or abuse of power in relation of any of the issues connected thereto. Ranil had to appear personally before the commission in a widely publicized session to answer the allegations against him. All that the commission could find against was that as minister of industries and scientific affairs, he had given directions regarding the allocation and lease of houses at the Batalanda Housing Scheme (which were later used as places of unlawful detention), and had at meetings given directions pertaining to the conduct of the police relating to anti-subversive activity.

Soon afterwards, Ranil won at the general election of December 2001, thereupon vindicating his conduct in the eyes of the public. Batalanda surfaced again in April 2004 in the TV debates” that have now become a popular spectacle each evening at election time. The relevance and value of these ‘inquisitorial’ inquiries appointed under the Commissions of Inquiry Act No 17 of 1948 remain moot.

Government hospitality

Ranil took great pains to see that the hospitality and the social side of the prime minister’s office functioned properly. The heavy work schedule he set himself required that there be regular working lunches and dinners at Temple Trees. The organization of these were the responsibility of Indrani Wijeratne and Hema Pieris and much effort and time was expended in delivering quality products. Maithree Wickramasinghe provided invaluable support in advising and directing how such receptions and social engagements should be done.

The decor of the public areas – the sitting and dining halls in particular – now took on an extraordinary elegance. The dinning room equipment and the curtaining and ornamentation, which over time had become worn out and stale, were modernized. The ornaments and paintings, as well as the cutlery used on formal occasions were the personal property of the Wickremesinghe’s. The kitchens were- redesigned and new kitchen staff recruited. Ranil and Maithree shared the view that rather than hire Hilton and Oberoi to provide the catering (at enormous cost) high quality capacity should be developed from within so that Temple Trees itself could do it appropriately and without the high overheads.

It needed bringing in chefs to replace the old-time ‘bungalow keeper’ but the effort was worth it. Complimentary letters soon began to come in from those who had dined at Temple Trees. The staid printed menu card on glossy paper gave way to a highly imaginative unevenly cut, rolled-up little scroll tied with coir string. On opening up you read the menu, hand-written in italics on rough, recycled elephant dung paper! It often provided a delightful, if somewhat unusual, opening conversational topic.

The beginning of the end of a chapter – November 4, 2003

Ranil knew that although he had won convincingly in the 2001 elections gaining a total of 109 seats to the PA’s 77, in terms of the 1978 Constitution, which gave the president enormous power, he would have to manage his victory somehow in the difficult political system of `cohabitation’ which was implied whenever the presidents and prime ministers came from different party groupings. This was the first occasion when the process was in fact going to be tried out, barring a few months in the Wijetunga presidency when D B was literally a ‘lame duck’.

Ranil and Chandrika had been childhood friends but the rivalry which existed between the Bandaranaikes on the one hand and the Senanayakes, Jayewardenes and now Wickremesinghes were well known. It was almost Shakespearean in its working out and there would be many rivers to cross to maintain the full six-year tenure of office to which he was entitled by his electoral victory.

His first task was to obtain from the president all of the ministries which were necessary for the exercise of full governmental power.

In the middle of December 2001 at Cabinet formation, Ranil was so strong in the country – his “I will give you peace” slogan having such an overwhelming response – that he clearly had the upper hand. There was some resistance from President Chandrika to the handing over of defence, which she claimed was her inherent responsibility as the president. But since Ranil had a clear mandate from the people to enter into political negotiations with the LTTE and establish an early cease-fire, that authority over the military establishment was absolutely essential. So he was able to wrest the defence ministry from the president’s hands and place Tilak Marapana, a one-time attorney-general of the country to be in charge of the portfolio.

The president had apparently reminded Ranil that there was the precedent of D B Wijetunga in 1994 retaining the defence portfolio while she was the prime minister in an earlier cohabitationary set-up. Ranil had countered that the two situations were not on all fours – D B having only a very short tenure of office to go before the presidential election.

The ‘Cohabitation’ between the president and Ranil did not work at all well during the months that followed. There were basic differences of policy, behaviour and styles of management between the two and rather than collaboration there was opposition, competition and alienation. Cohabitation envisaged a Cabinet meeting with the president as chair. However more often than not, the president was absent and the Cabinet had to take its decisions without her presence in the chair.

On the few occasions that she was present there was acrimonious debate between her and the more vociferous members of the Cabinet on a range of very political issues. The question of the procurement of 44 security vehicles at great cost after the assassination attempt on the president in 1999, came in for a lot of flak. Similarly, an allegation that the president was taping everything that happened in Cabinet through a secret listening device that she had hidden in her handbag raised tempers and kept her embittered. The Cabinet was one of the largest ever and often it was her, the president alone, standing up against many very critical members of the Cabinet.

(Excerpted from ‘Rendering Unto Caesar’ by Bradman Weerakoon) ✍️



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Oil prices rise like rockets, fall like feathers (if you’re lucky)

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Crude oil is the lifeblood of the global industrial economy, yet the journey from a subterranean reservoir to a litre of petrol at the forecourt involves a cascade of physical transformations, commercial transactions, and fiscal interventions that profoundly shape who bears the cost, and how much. A sudden shift in the world market price of crude, whether triggered by OPEC+ supply discipline, geopolitical disruption, or a demand shock, does not translate uniformly into consumer prices across the globe. The consequences are systematically different, depending on a country’s tax policy, exchange rate, efficiencies in refining processes, distribution processes and dependence on energy imports.

The Refining Process: From Crude to Finished Products

Crude oil is a naturally occurring mixture of hydrocarbons and its chemical composition varies by field: Heavy sour crudes from Venezuela, or Saudi Arabia, require additional processing, raising refining costs by USD 2–5 per barrel. One standard barrel contains approximately 159 litres.

Crude oil is preheated to approximately 370–400°C and the operating principle exploits differences in boiling points. The resulting fractions, collected from top to bottom, include: light petroleum gases (LPG) boiling below 40°C; naphtha and gasoline fractions in the 40–205°C range; kerosene and jet fuel between 175°C and 275°C; diesel and gas oil from 250°C to 350°C; and atmospheric residue above 350°C which is then processed in a vacuum distillation unit to recover further distillates, including lubricating oil base stocks.

Primary distillation alone is insufficient to meet market demand. Gasoline demand far exceeds the natural yield of the distillation cut. A modern complex refinery achieves the following approximate product yields from a light sweet crude: petrol/gasoline ~45%; diesel/gasoil ~25%; kerosene/jet fuel ~10%; LPG ~5%; heavy fuel oil ~10%; and other by-products ~5%. These ratios shift with crude quality and refinery configuration, and response differently to crude price changes.

The Crude Truth: How Oil Prices Punish the Poor Twice

An accounting perspective reveals a waterfall of costs, each layer added by a distinct economic actor and subject to a distinct set of market forces and regulatory interventions. A companion of the approximate cost structure for a litre of petrol at the retail level, assuming a crude oil price of USD 70 per barrel (approximately USD 0.44 per litre of crude equivalent), between advanced and emerging economies, can be explained in four layers:

Layer 1 — Crude Oil Cost (~51% of Retail Price)

The foundation of every fuel product is the crude oil acquisition cost. At USD 70/barrel, the raw material cost embedded in one litre of refined petrol is approximately USD 0.44. This figure includes wellhead lifting costs, field operating expenses, royalties, and sovereign resource taxes paid to the producing country, as well as freight and insurance for ocean tanker shipment.

For emerging economies, without domestic refining capacity, or with currencies that are not freely convertible, this layer is doubly exposed: a crude price increase is compounded by any simultaneous depreciation of the local currency.

Layer 2 — Refining Margin (~20% of Retail Price)

The gross refining margin, measured by the industry’s standard 3-2-1 crack spread;

Crack Spread (gross refining margin) = (2×Gasoline Price) + (1×Diesel Price) − (3×Crude Price)

Critically, this gross figure must not be confused with profit. A refinery typically uses 6–8% of its own crude input as process fuel, and significant variable operating costs. This gross refining margin, the difference between the value of products produced and the cost of crude, varies considerably with market conditions.

In advanced economies with large, integrated refinery systems, these margins are moderated by competition and long-term supply contracts. In emerging economies, dependent on a single import refinery or on product imports rather than crude, refining costs are effectively set by the international product market, leaving little domestic control over this cost layer.

Layer 3 — Distribution and Marketing (~11% of Retail Price)

Refined products must travel from the refinery gate to the consumer through a distribution network involving primary pipelines or product tankers, regional storage terminals, secondary truck distribution, and retail fuel stations. In advanced economies, this infrastructure is mature, privately operated, and highly efficient, contributing a relatively stable USD 0.05–0.10 per litre to the retail price. In many emerging economies, the distribution infrastructure is fragmented, underdeveloped, or state-controlled, introducing additional costs, quality inconsistencies, and opportunities for rent-seeking. In Sri Lanka, for instance, the state-owned Ceylon Petroleum Corporation has historically cross-subsidised distribution costs, masking the true economic cost until subsidy withdrawal forced rapid price adjustments in 2022.

Rent-Seeking is extracting value without creating value; essentially corruption and inefficiency

Licensing corruption:Limited fuel station licenses create artificial scarcity; Licenses sold/traded at premiums; Political connections needed to obtain licenses

Quality adulteration: Consumers pay for “petrol” but get lower-quality mix

Quota manipulation:Subsidised kerosene (meant for poor households) diverted to diesel mixing; Creates black markets during shortages

Phantom costs:

Layer 4 — Taxation (18–60% of Retail Price)

Taxation is the most variable, politically sensitive, and analytically important layer in the cost structure. In advanced economies a high tax bases serve a dual purpose: generating substantial fiscal revenue and acting as an automatic price stabiliser. When crude rises, the absolute tax component remains constant, so the percentage of the price attributable to crude increases less than proportionately at the retail level.

In contrast, emerging economies historically imposed low fuel taxes or active subsidies, particularly for diesel, LPG, and kerosene used by low-income households. Sri Lanka’s fuel tax component, prior to the 2022 crisis, was, they claim, effectively negative in real terms due to administered pricing below cost.

The Impact of a Crude Price Increase: Advanced vs. Emerging Economies

For example, if crude oil rises from USD 70 to USD 85 per barrel, an increase of approximately 21.4%. The mechanisms by which this shock is transmitted to consumers, and the capacity of economies to absorb or redistribute it, diverge dramatically along the advanced/emerging economy divide (Table 1).

Absorb shocks through tax relief

Advanced economies possess well-established fiscal frameworks that enable them to absorb temporary commodity shocks through tax relief, targeted transfers, or direct subsidies without compromising fiscal sustainability. Research by the Center for Global Development (2026) estimates the median fiscal cost of shielding consumers from the crude price increase of USD 15 scenario at approximately manageable cost of 0.4% of GDP for advanced economies.

Emerging economies face median fiscal costs of approximately 0.9% of GDP — effectively double. For Sri Lanka, entering the 2022 energy crisis with near-zero foreign reserves, even a temporary subsidy was fiscally impossible, forcing an immediate and politically destabilising pass-through of the full price increase to consumers. The lesson is stark: the ability to smooth out a commodity price shock across time is itself a function of prior fiscal strength, making the poor more vulnerable precisely because their governments are already under strain.

Inflation Pass-Through and Monetary Policy Credibility

The second transmission mechanism operates through the consumer price index and central bank behaviour. In advanced economies, fuel typically represents 3–5% of the CPI basket, and central banks enjoy high credibility in anchoring inflation expectations.

In emerging economies, fuel and food together often constitute 40–60% of CPI baskets, and central banks have historically struggled to maintain credible inflation targets. A 21% crude price increase translates into a far larger initial CPI shock. Worse, the loss of inflation credibility means that workers and businesses adjust wages and prices preemptively, generating persistent second-round inflation (> Double). To defend its inflation target, the emerging economy central bank must raise interest rates aggressively, simultaneously raising the cost of borrowing for businesses and governments, a painful policy dilemma in an economy already under stress.

Structural Current Account Vulnerability

The third and perhaps most structurally significant difference lies in the current account and foreign exchange dynamics. The advanced economies hold large reserve currencies and deep financial markets that allow them to finance import cost increases without immediate exchange rate pressure.

Sri Lanka, by contrast, allocated approximately 23% of its total import bill to petroleum products. A USD 15/barrel price increase instantly widens the current account deficit of these economies, depleting foreign exchange reserves. As reserves fall, currency markets anticipate further depreciation, precipitating speculative selling of the domestic currency. The resulting exchange rate depreciation, potentially 5–15% in a shock scenario, multiplies the cost of crude imports in local currency terms. A 21% USD price increase thus becomes a 28–39% local currency price increase at the refinery gate, before any refining, distribution, or tax component is added. This vicious cycle; crude price rise → reserve depletion → currency depreciation → amplified import cost → further reserve depletion, is a hallmark of emerging economy energy crises, and Sri Lanka’s 2022 experience illustrated it in extreme form.

Double bind when crude rises and subsidised

Countries that have historically subsidised fuel face a double bind when crude rises: the subsidy bill expands sharply (as the gap between subsidised price and market cost widens), while fiscal space contracts. The International Monetary Fund has consistently recommended subsidy reform, allowing fuel prices to reflect market cost while protecting the poor through direct cash transfers, as the fiscally sustainable path. Sri Lanka’s forced price liberalisation in 2022 (under IMF programme conditions) illustrate both the political difficulty and the macroeconomic necessity of this adjustment.

The Asymmetry of Oil Price Responses: Advanced vs. Emerging Economies

Advanced economies enjoy bidirectional flexibility in responding to oil price volatility; prices rise and fall with crude markets, leaving fiscal positions largely neutral. Emerging economies, by contrast, face a structural trap: when crude rises, subsidy bills explode, draining public finances; when crude falls, governments retain windfall savings to offset accumulated deficits rather than passing relief to consumers. Sri Lanka’s cycle from collapse to liberalisation to renewed subsidies illustrates this vividly. Underlying this is a political economy ratchet, price hikes are unavoidable, but reductions are politically captured, making permanent reform structurally elusive.

(The writer, a senior Chartered
Accountant and professional banker,
is a professor at SLIIT, Malabe. Views expressed in this article are personal.)

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Eshan Malinga keeps getting them in the second half

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Malinga took 4 for 32 against Delhi Capitals, his best bowling figures of the season so far [BCCI]

Life keeps throwing hurdles in his way, but Eshan Malinga keeps vaulting over them. Take his February from hell. For several months, Malinga had been building up to his first ever World Cup, a dream for pretty much anyone who ever picks up a cricket ball. But a week before that World Cup, Malinga dislocated his non bowling shoulder while bowling, which the team’s medical staff have since described as a freak injury they had never seen before.

“I was devastated,” Malinga says. “On top of it being my first World Cup, it was also at home and I didn’t know when I would get that chance again. There were a few days there where I did absolutely nothing.”

And yet in mid-May, here he is grinning from atop a pile of 16 IPL wickets,  having developed a serious reputation as a reverse-swing operator. Sunrisers  Hyderabad’s  explosive batters may have seized the spotlight in this frenetic IPL, but on the bowling front, no SRH bowler has neared Malinga’s wicket haul, which is fifth best in the season overall.  In a year in which they have not had Pat Cummins for seven of their 11 matches, it is Malinga who has held down the fort,  particularly in the second half of the innings.

But trading difficulty for success is just what Malinga does. What he has long been doing. Go back eight years and Malinga had never played a hard-ball cricket match. On top of which his home district of Ratnapura – at the base of Sri Lanka’s central hills – was better known for its gems and waterfalls than cricket, never having produced a men’s international. Malinga, additionally, was not even actively trying to be a cricketer. He had moved from his first school in a village called Opanayake to Ratnapura’s Sivali Central College due to strong academic results, and found, almost by accident, that his new school had a hard-ball cricket team.

But what Malinga knew at that point was that he could bowl fast. That much had been obvious growing up in Opanayaka, where despite his mother’s occasional misgivings, Malinga was highly sought after by the organisers of the village softball team (Sri Lanka has a thriving village-level softball cricket ecosystem). And as had been the case with the better-known Malinga, this one was also aware he possessed a killer yorker – a prized asset in every form of cricket, with any kind of ball.

If he’d been on track to be a softball legend, Malinga found his horizons began to expand at a spectacular rate the moment he got a hard ball in his hands. First, his yorker and his pace began to reap big wickets in the Division Three schools competition for Sivali Central, whose coach had immediately hoisted him into the team upon seeing Malinga bowl at practice one day. Then in mid-2019, about a year into playing hard-ball cricket, came the day he still reflects on as the one that changed his cricketing life. Having missed a fast-bowling competition in Ratnapura because he had been playing for his school that day, Malinga travelled to the hill town of Badulla to bowl in the competition there, and clocked 127kph on the gun, which was enough to win him first place.

This was when he first became a blip, however faint and distant, on Sri Lanka Cricket’s radar. Visions of a cricketing life began to appear as wisps of opportunity began to materialise. The next few years, Covid-riddled though they were, became a crash course into the sport for Malinga. There were coaching camps in Colombo in which the best of the rural talent was trained up and funnelled into a programme at the next level up. There were trials for first-class teams, and eventually a fledgling domestic career.

“I don’t know how many times I came to Colombo from Ratnapura during those times,” he laughs now. “It was a lot! I would leave home at about 3am, and the bus journey to Colombo took about three-and-a-half hours. Then I’d train or play the match, and the bus back home always took longer because of traffic. So every day, I was on the road for more than seven hours.”

The Malinga who made these exhausting daily commutes was, as far as the Sri Lankan cricket system was concerned, a bowler of decent rather than blinding promise. His pace had propelled him to the top of the regional pool, but at the first-class level he was still adapting his yorker and slower ball (another weapon he had developed in his softball days). If he needed another gear, Malinga found it – again almost by accident – sometime in 2022.

“I was playing an Under-23 three-day tournament, and I remember that being the first time I really started reverse-swinging the ball,” he says. “Coaches had anyway told me that with my action and my pace, it should be possible. But it started almost automatically. It’s not something I had to learn.

“But it wasn’t that easy, because it was a long process to learn how to control it. To get reverse swing, you have to release the ball at a different point than a straight ball, because you want it to still hit the stumps when it is swinging. So I scuffed up a lot of balls and trained hard to get that line right.”

And so, the Malinga that emerged at the end of 2022 had sharp enough pace, an excellent yorker, a developing slower ball, mountains of homespun tenacity, and had also discovered that he can naturally reverse-swing the ball earlier in an innings than most. You could have seen where this is going, right? All the ingredients of an ace white-ball bowler were there. And Malinga was already a master of turning wisps of opportunities into tangible advances. Over the next three years, he’d land a spot in the national fast-bowling academy, use that as a trampoline to impress in an Emerging Teams three-dayer against Bangladesh, and from there bounce into a stint at the MRF Pace Academy in 2024, before on the franchise side of things parlaying a trial at Rajasthan Royals at Kumar Sangakkara’s invitation into a decent run at the SA20 for Paarl Royals.

Having leapt up to the fringes of the Sri Lanka team over the past 18 months, Malinga has at this IPL now seized another unusual chance. The square at SRH’s home stadium is among the barest and most abrasive in the league, and Malinga’s reverse swing has prospered upon it. Of his 16 wickets this season, 11 have come at home. In the second half of the innings, when the ball is most likely to reverse, Malinga’s economy rate is 8.37 at a venue where runs have been scored at 9.38 in that period this season.

Malinga had put in a robust 2025 season for SRH as well, so there is a body of work emerging there. Perhaps this is why this year, SRH’s bowling plans have tended to follow the contours of Malinga’s own game.

“After six overs the ball gets damaged here, so we needed to make use of that. When I bowled at practice, the ball reversed, so I think a plan emerged where we were going to use the scuffed up ball and take advantage of that.

“In the first powerplay the ball comes on to the bat nicely here. After that we try to get the advantage of having an older ball. We’ve got bowlers who bowl 140kph-plus, and we have Pat Cummins, who also reverses the ball. So we make sure to look after the ball in a way that will give us reverse.”

At 25, eight years into a serious cricket career, Malinga sees himself as a work in progress. He wants to work on his powerplay bowling. His variations, he thinks, still need some work. He’d like to play Tests, where his reverse swing could really stretch its legs. And, oh, he is still waiting to play that first World Cup.

Even here, his keen nose for opportunity leads him. He points out through the course of our conversation that where the three previous World Cups had been played with a new ball at either end being used right through the innings, the next World Cup, in 2027, will feature rules that seem at least partially designed to enhance reverse swing, an older ball more suited to the craft now available towards the end of the innings.

He isn’t even a sure-fire pick in Sri Lanka’s ODI XI just yet, so this is just a flicker of an opportunity for now. But having made the journey from the village of Opanayaka to the most raucous cricketing showpiece on the planet, Malinga knows just what to do with those.

[Cricinfo]

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High Stakes in Pursuing corruption cases

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Kapila Chandrasena

The death of the most important suspect in the Sri Lankan Airlines Airbus deal has drawn intense public speculation. Kapila Chandrasena the former CEO of the heavily loss-making national airline was found dead under circumstances that the police are still investigating.

He had recently been arrested by the Commission to Investigate Allegations of Bribery or Corruption in connection with the controversial Airbus aircraft purchase agreement signed in 2013. Police investigations are continuing into the cause of death and whether or not he committed suicide. The unresolved death brings to light the high stakes involved in accountability efforts of this nature.

The uncertainty surrounding Chandrasena’s death has revived public memories of other mysterious deaths linked to corruption investigations and public scandals. Among them is the death of Rajeewa Jayaweera, a former SriLankan Airlines executive and outspoken critic of the Airbus transaction. He was following in the tradition of his father, the late foreign service officer and public servant Stanley Jayaweera who mentored the younger generation in good governance practices and formed the group “Avadhi Lanka” along with icons such as Prof Siri Hettige. Rajeewa had written a series of articles exposing irregularities in the deal before he was found dead near Independence Square in Colombo in 2020. The CCTV cameras in that high security area were turned off. Questions raised at that time whether or not he had committed suicide were not satisfactorily resolved.

The controversy about the cause of Chandrasena’s death is diverting attention away from the massive damage done to the country by the SriLankan Airlines deal itself. The value of the aircraft agreement was close to the size of the International Monetary Fund bailout package that Sri Lanka desperately needed by 2023 in order to stabilise the economy after bankruptcy. Sri Lanka’s IMF Extended Fund Facility amounted to about USD 3 billion spread over four years. The comparison shows the scale of the losses and liabilities that irresponsible and corrupt decisions have imposed on the country and which must never happen again.

Wider Pattern

The corruption linked to the Airbus transaction came fully into the open only because of investigations conducted outside Sri Lanka. In 2020 Airbus agreed to pay record penalties of more than EUR 3.6 billion to authorities in Britain, France and the United States to settle global corruption investigations. Sri Lanka was identified as one of the countries where bribes had allegedly been paid in order to secure contracts. The Airbus deal involved the purchase of six A330 aircraft and four A350 aircraft valued at approximately USD 2.3 billion. Investigations showed that Airbus paid bribes amounting to nearly USD 16 million in order to secure the contract. According to court submissions, at least part of this money amounting to USD 2 million was transferred through a shell company registered in Brunei and routed through Singapore bank accounts linked to the late airline CEO and his wife.

The commissions involved in this deal may seem comparatively small compared to the overall value of the contracts but devastating in their consequences. But they also show that a few million dollars paid secretly to decision makers could lead to the country assuming liabilities worth hundreds of millions or even billions of dollars over decades. This is why corruption is not simply a moral issue. It is a direct economic assault on the living standards of ordinary people. Money lost through corruption is money unavailable for schools, hospitals, rural development and job creation. In the end the burden falls on ordinary citizens who are left to repay debts incurred in their name without receiving commensurate benefits in return.

The SriLankan Airlines transaction gives an indication of the wider pattern of corruption and misuse of national resources that has taken place over many years. This was not an isolated incident. There were numerous large scale infrastructure and procurement projects that imposed heavy debts on the country while enriching politically connected individuals and their associates. Other projects such as the Colombo Port City, Hambantota Harbour and highway construction reveal a similar pattern.

Less publicised but equally damaging scandals have involved fertiliser medicine and energy contracts. Investigations into medicine procurement in recent years uncovered allegations that substandard pharmaceuticals had been imported at inflated prices causing both financial losses and risks to public health.

Moral Renewal

The present government appears determined to investigate major corruption cases in a manner that no previous government has attempted. Those who ransacked and bankrupted the treasury need to be dealt with according to the law. There is considerable public support for efforts to recover stolen assets and ensure accountability.

In his May Day speech President Anura Kumara Dissanayake stated that around 14 corruption cases were nearing completion in the courts this very month and called upon the public to applaud when verdicts are delivered. Political opponents of the government claim that such comments could place pressure on the judiciary and blur the separation between political leadership and the courts. But the deeper public frustration that underlies the president’s remarks also needs to be understood.

The challenge facing Sri Lanka is twofold. The country must ensure that justice is done through due process and independent institutions. If anti corruption campaigns become politicised they can lose legitimacy. But if corruption and abuse of power continue without consequences the country will remain trapped in a cycle of economic decline and moral decay. Sri Lanka also needs to confront past abuses linked to the war period. There are allegations of kidnapping, extortion, disappearances and criminal activity in which members of the security forces have been implicated. Vulnerable sections of the population suffered greatly during those years. If political leaders turned a blind eye or actively connived in such crimes they too need to be held accountable under the law. Selective justice will not heal the country. Accountability must apply across the board regardless of political position, ethnicity or institutional power.

Sri Lanka has paid a very heavy price for corruption and impunity. The economic collapse of 2022 did not occur overnight. It was the result of years of bad governance, reckless decision making, abuse of power and the misuse of public wealth. If the country is to move forward the focus cannot be diverted by sensational speculation alone. Suspicious deaths and political intrigue may dominate headlines for a few days. But the larger issue is the system that enabled corruption to flourish without accountability for so long. The real national task is to end that system. Sri Lanka cannot build a prosperous future on a foundation of corruption and impunity. Unless those who looted public wealth are held accountable and the systems that enabled them are dismantled, the country risks repeating the same cycle again.

Jehan Perera

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