Connect with us

Features

In Sri Lanka opposition parties remain as fragmented as ever

Published

on

JVP/NPP leader Anura Kumara Dissanayake addressing recent rally

By Uditha Devapriya and Rumeth Jayasinghe

Like most South Asian countries, Sri Lanka will face elections this year. Both the government and the Opposition are busy preparing themselves for polls.Presidential elections are expected to take place in September or October 2024, though timelines have not been announced yet. Some analysts believe general elections will follow a presidential election, while others believe they will precede it.

The island nation, which faced its worst economic crisis in 2022, has managed to bring about some stability – though politically and economically, this stability remains fragile, if deceptive, certainly superficial.

The government, headed by Ranil Wickremesinghe, has seemingly managed to get things back in order. The country has imposed on itself several painful austerity measures, with assistance from the IMF, World Bank, and Asian Development Bank, in addition to support from other countries, including India.

Since 2022, Sri Lanka’s economy has seemingly fared well. The country managed to secure an agreement with the IMF on an Extended Fund Facility (EFF) programme in 2023. While the economy grew by 1.6 percent in the third quarter of 2023, inflation, which stood at 56 percent in December 2022, came down to 4.2 percent a year later.

However, while the situation has improved on some fronts, political uncertainty looms large over the island, as policy decisions have fuelled polarisation nearly everywhere. They have also ruptured conventional political divisions and patterns.

So far, Sri Lanka has made progress on restructuring bilateral debt of around USD 11 billion. It expects to come into an agreement with private creditors and bondholders, though the latter remain cautious if not wary.

One of Sri Lanka’s main pillars, tourism, has achieved much growth. Tourist arrivals surged from 194,495 in 2021 to 1,487,303 in 2023, partly due to an ambitious tourism promotional campaign which involved a prominent international influencer.

Once starved of tourists, the country is now witnessing an explosion in hotel bookings, well beyond existing capacity. Indeed, in a strange twist, the Department of Immigration and Emigration recently issued a notification requesting Russian and Ukrainian tourists to leave the island within 14 days, due to nationals of these countries setting up businesses at the expense of locals. A “White Only” party in the south organised in a Russian cafe had aggravated the situation. This is a far cry from 2021 and 2022, when the government was virtually begging for tourists.

However, while there have been improvements in these sectors, they are seen as benefiting a certain privileged class. The Opposition and sections of the public have opposed the government’s economic reforms, including the restructuring of the country’s State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs), which is expected to be completed shortly.

Tax reforms have also garnered criticism. Recent hikes in income and Value Added Taxes have imposed a huge burden on the country’s lower and middle-classes, including professionals and small and medium business owners.

Not surprisingly, these have polarised politics in Sri Lanka. They have been fuelled by the regime’s lurch towards authoritarianism. The recent Online Safety Act, for instance, has sparked criticism from civil society. Scandals, particularly one involving a former Health Minister, who has since been remanded, have taken centre stage.

All these have made the government more vulnerable. Yet far from bolstering unity within the Opposition, the Opposition remains as fragmented as ever.

The Main Opposition: Samagi Jana Balawegaya

The country’s main Opposition Samagi Jana Balavegaya, performed modestly at general elections in 2020, gaining 23.92 percent of the vote. Its leader, Sajith Premadasa, once an ally of Ranil Wickremesinghe, has become a fierce critic of his government.

Capitalising on widespread discontent, his party has vowed to reverse many of the policies being enforced by the government. Yet the SJB faces a tricky situation. On the one hand, as the main Opposition, it has organised numerous protests against the regime’s austerity measures and tax hikes. On the other hand, many of its MPs have aligned themselves with the economic ideology underpinning those reforms.

A recently unveiled economic policy document states that the party supports engagement with the IMF. This has led leftwing MPs to accuse the SJB of being no different to the government. The SJB, in turn, has accused these MPs of being “clueless” with regard to economic reforms, fuelling further divisions within the Opposition.

Complicating matters further, the party has invited to its fold several individuals who were associated with the Gotabaya Rajapaksa government. These include ex-military officials. The party itself is chaired by a former Army Commander, Sarath Fonseka. The inclusion of ex-SLPP stalwarts has driven a wedge between him and Sajith Premadasa, to a point where he is now touting himself as a presidential candidate in his own right.

Swinging to the Left: National People’s Power (NPP)

Widely seen as the most popular party in Sri Lanka, the National People’s Power is tipped to be a frontrunner at upcoming elections.

More than any other political outfit, it is the NPP that has tapped into public discontent with the government. It has based its campaign on promises of eradicating corruption. This, of course, was one of the themes of the protests that drove Gotabaya Rajapaksa out of power. It continues to resonate with the country’s youth, the peasantry, and the working classes, vast swathes of whom have swung to the Left.

Ideologically, the party is seen as favouring public ownership, State-led industrialisation, and nationalisation. It is fiercely opposed to ongoing reforms. Its stance on debt restructuring, though, remains less than clear. While it is opposed to the austerity that restructuring has imposed on the middle and lower classes, it has stated that upon coming to power it will renegotiate, not abandon, the IMF agreement. The IMF itself met with its MPs last January. Details of the meeting, however, have not been released.

The NPP is the parliamentary wing of the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna, which was formed in the 1960s as an anti-establishment outfit, in opposition even to the mainstream Left. At the height of the country’s ethnic conflict in the 1980s, it was banned by the then government. This pushed it out of the democratic mainstream, leading to a protracted insurrection which was motivated, and driven, by Indian intervention in the country.

Since entering democratic politics in the 1990s, the JVP has softened its stances, though on several issues – especially the India-imposed 13th Amendment – it remains of the same opinion as before. It frequently denounces mainstream political parties, though it too was part of coalition politics. Yet it is seen by the country’s youth and lower middle-classes as being clean and free of corruption, a cut above the rest.

In that sense, the Indian government’s decision to invite the NPP to Delhi, where the party delegation met External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar, affirms their growing importance not just at home, but also abroad.

Minority Politics: ITAK

The success of these parties will depend a lot on the alliances it forges with other parties. Though nationalism, particularly Sinhala Buddhist nationalism, has played a major part in elections in Sri Lanka, almost all parties have dallied with minority outfits. In 2019, for instance, the SLPP openly courted Muslim votes, even in the backdrop of the Easter attacks, while the UNP secured support from the country’s main Tamil party.

Since the 2020 general election, however, there has been a seismic shift in minority politics. This has been especially evident in Tamil politics. The biggest Tamil political party, the Ilankai Tamil Arasu Kachchi (ITAK), recently witnessed a change in its leadership, from a figure seen as a moderate to a more militant hardliner.

This prefigures a pivotal shift in the tactics of Tamil parties. Earlier, minority parties pursued negotiations with major parties with the objective of obtaining concessions on issues like devolution of power and, in the country’s Northern Province, the return of lands owned by the military to their previous owners.

The situation has changed dramatically today. At the last general election, ITAK retained its dominant position in the Northern Province. Yet two rival parties – the Tamil National People’s Front (TNPF), formed in 2010, and the Tamil People’s National Alliance (TPNA), formed in 2020 – secured enough seats to enter parliament. Both have gone beyond the ITAK’s politics of compromise, advocating for autonomy for Tamils.

S. Sridharan, the ITAK’s new leader, is a fitting symbol of these shifts. Described by the press as a “hardline apologist of the LTTE” – the separatist outfit that waged a war against the Sri Lankan government for 30 years – Sridharan has insisted on a new and more viable solution to the problems of his community.

One of the first things he did as party leader was to visit a cemetery for LTTE cadres in Jaffna. Since then, he has expressed reservations about the 13th Amendment and highlighted the need to go beyond devolution of power. Like his counterparts in other Tamil parties, he has pushed for a federal State. Crucially, he has stated he will do all he can to mobilise Tamil nationalist forces “as they were before 2009”, that is, before the LTTE’s military defeat at the hands of the Sri Lankan government.

So far, neither the government nor the Opposition – be it SJB or NPP – has responded to Sridharan’s calls. Yet alliances with minority parties have become a sine qua non of Sri Lankan politics. It is hence likely that government and Opposition will vie for minority votes through these parties closer to the election.

However, at a time when Sinhala dominated parties from both sides are mobilising nationalist sentiments against one another, it remains to be seen how far they will go to court minorities. While the President himself has made overtures to ITAK, convening a meeting, of Buddhist monks and members of the Tamil diaspora, Sridharan’s victory signals a rupture in minority politics in the island. In the long term, that will dampen prospects of a rapprochement between Tamil parties and the government.

The situation is the same with the Opposition. Both the SJB and NPP are courting disaffected voters from the SLPP camp. Some of these groups, such as ex-army officials, disagree heavily with the politics and ideologies of parties like the ITAK.

The Opposition faces a dilemma here. On the one hand, these groups can help erode the SLPP’s hold over nationalist votes. On the other hand, they can also erode the Opposition’s prospects within minority communities. While it is unlikely that minority parties will fully give up cohabiting with mainstream outfits, the SJB’s and NPP’s reaching out to ex-military types may cost both parties support from outfits like ITAK.

The Future: A (Very) Big Question Mark

Described as Asia’s oldest democracy, Sri Lanka faces a rather tricky crossroads this year. With rising tensions in the Indo-Pacific and the prospect of a forever war in the Middle-East, the island’s domestic politics will shape its foreign policy.

Of course, it is economics, not foreign policy, that has taken centre-stage for now. The big question on everyone’s lips is when Sri Lanka will begin to recover.

Such questions, however, cannot be answered or resolved easily.

Different parties have proposed and presented different solutions to Sri Lanka’s economic crisis. At the centre of it all is one issue. For how long can the country continue inflicting austerity on itself, and for how long can the government survive?

Colombo-based economists argue that IMF reforms should be continued and amplified. Yet the backlash those reforms have generated will be picked up by Opposition parties – even those which are fundamentally in agreement with them.

Thus, while the leader of the SJB has publicly stated that he will renegotiate Sri Lanka’s agreement with the IMF if he comes into power, party MPs have advocated for careful engagement with the IMF. Such contradictions are natural in a country where parties face different electorates and try to pander to all of them.

As for the government, it seems content in churning out narratives of stability. This is a line few people seem to be buying. While the situation has changed from what it was in 2022 – there are no miles-long queues for fuel and gas – that offers little consolation in light of the price and tax hikes which most people have had to put up with.

The situation has become so divisive, in fact, that a video of US Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs Donald Lu describing Sri Lanka as a comeback story provoked outrage across social media, with several Sri Lankans questioning how he could remain indifferent to, and ignorant of, ground realities.

Against such a backdrop, it is difficult to say who will win elections and what the winner will do with the country. Certainly, the NPP has gained ground, while the SJB’s confused response to economic reforms has cost it popular support. Yet the NPP remains derided by mainstream parties, including the Opposition.

Critically, none of the three major parties battling for votes – SLPP, SJB, and NPP – has fully reached out to minority parties, in particular to Tamil parties.

The SLPP and SJB have, to be sure, forged alliances with certain groups. This is far from the case with the NPP. The NPP has so far been content in promoting its corruption-free record everywhere. The question is how effective such messaging will be with voters in the island’s North and East who have traditionally supported communal parties.

To be sure, it must be admitted that disaffection with the mainstream has grown so much that people are shifting to the Left, particularly to the NPP. To a considerable extent, this disaffection has cut across ethnic and religious divisions.

Whether that will translate into votes, of course, remains to be seen. But it has certainly boosted the NPP’s prospects. This has made it a clear frontrunner, in an election that is sure to be dominated by much uncertainty, chaos, and speculation.

Uditha Devapriya is a writer, researcher, and analyst based in Sri Lanka who contributes to a number of publications on topics such as history, art and culture, politics, and foreign policy. He can be reached at .

Rumeth Jayasinghe is an undergraduate at the University of Peradeniya who is pursuing economics. He can be reached at .

A version of this article was published in The Diplomat.



Continue Reading
Advertisement
Click to comment

Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *

Features

Addressing human rights needs multi-pronged approach

Published

on

Volker Türk

by Jehan Perera

The ongoing 63rd session of the United Nations Human Rights Council, which runs from September 7 to October 7, 2026, in Geneva is important to Sri Lanka. Its outcome will send a signal to other international actors, including the European Union, as to whether Sri Lanka’s reform policy is on track. The written update on Sri Lanka, prepared by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights under High Commissioner Volker Türk and presented by Deputy High Commissioner Nada Al-Nashif, has taken a more holistic approach to the government’s performance over the past year. It acknowledged the progress Sri Lanka has made under the NPP government in relation to accountability for financial fraud and other economic crimes. At the same time, the High Commissioner’s update made clear that progress in relation to economic crime cannot be equated with progress in relation to accountability for grave human rights violations committed during the armed conflict and in other periods of political violence.

The government may have felt sufficiently confident that its response to the High Commissioner’s update could be handled by its representative in Geneva and did not require the attendance of Foreign Minister Vijitha Herath. Sri Lanka’s representative Sumith Dassanayake called for a fundamental review of country-specific mandates within the UN Human Rights Council. Sri Lanka has been facing repeated scrutiny in the form of successive UNHRC resolutions from 2012 onwards. Ambassador Dassanayake argued that such mandates should not continue indefinitely and must be regularly assessed against measurable objectives and tangible outcomes. This may reflect confidence that its record of reform is beginning to receive recognition internationally. The reports and statements at the Human Rights Council acknowledged progress in the government’s efforts to address corruption and economic crime.

The government’s anti-corruption drive has included investigations into allegations involving individuals who held the highest political offices in the country. The arrest of former President Ranil Wickremesinghe in connection with alleged misuse of public funds, and the investigation into the controversial SriLankan Airlines Airbus transaction involving former President Mahinda Rajapaksa’s son, are examples of the reach of these investigations. The arrest of SLPP National Organiser and Member of Parliament Namal Rajapaksa in connection with allegations relating to the Airbus purchase scandal has also demonstrated that the government is willing to pursue cases involving politically powerful figures.

Wide Range

The ongoing investigations appear to encompass a wide range of parliamentarians and government members, both past and present. They suggest that accountability for corruption is not being confined to lower-level officials or to individuals who lack political influence. This is precisely the kind of accountability that the public has long demanded and that previous governments have too often failed to deliver. The government is also reaching into the upper levels of the military hierarchies of the past. The case in which 11 young men, most of them Tamil, disappeared after being abducted in Colombo between 2008 and 2009 involved allegations that some families were asked to pay ransoms. The investigation into this case has reached senior military figures. The willingness to pursue such cases is important because it challenges the assumption that those who exercised power during the war are beyond the reach of the law. Such cases would provide a practical test of whether the government’s commitment to accountability for economic crimes is part of a broader commitment to the rule of law.

Success in prosecuting corruption cannot substitute for justice for those who were unlawfully killed, disappeared, tortured or otherwise victimised. The UN report noted that there had been no recognition or accountability for crimes under international law, gross human rights violations and serious violations of international humanitarian law committed by all parties during the war. The government has yet to establish a credible and effective process to address the many cases of enforced disappearance, extrajudicial killing, torture and other serious violations. The government needs to take the international commitments it has inherited on human rights issues seriously. It needs to adopt a multi-pronged approach and go beyond focusing primarily on financial and corruption-related accountability.

Need Action

As a member of the international community, Sri Lanka has a responsibility to abide by the commitments it has made. It cannot selectively uphold international obligations postponing those that are politically difficult. Also, as a small country, Sri Lanka has a self-interest in ensuring the survival of international law, which is all that it has to protect it from the depredations of the bigger international actors. The erosion of international law by powerful states makes it all the more important that smaller states uphold the principles on which the international system is based. Sri Lanka cannot credibly appeal to international law when it is threatened from outside while disregarding its own obligations within. Sri Lanka also needs to win the confidence of its own population that it is committed to justice and equality for all. Public opinion polls and community-level research have disclosed that ethnic and religious minorities are appreciative of the sense of greater security they enjoy under the present government from ethnic or religious extremists.

But a sense of security is not the same as the fulfilment of rights. As far as the Tamil people are concerned, the government has yet to deliver on several of its specific promises. These include the long-standing problems of missing persons, the release of political prisoners who have been members of Tamil militant organisations, and the return of land taken over for military purposes during the war. The issue of Buddhist statues and archaeological sites found on their properties which are then taken from their control continue to trouble them especially as they see no signs of resolution of those disputes. The issue of pastureland in the east of the country in Mylathamadu is particularly concerning to them as they see orders by successive presidents, both President Ranil Wickremesinghe and President Anura Kumara Dissanayake, being disregarded on the ground. The Mylathamadu pastureland dispute is where traditional Tamil dairy farmers have engaged in multi-year protests against the ongoing encroachment of their ancestral grazing lands by Sinhalese crop cultivators relocated under government development schemes.

The government’s failure to hold Provincial Council elections is particularly troubling. The provincial council system is the only one that can provide the Tamil people and other ethnic minorities the opportunity to wield political power and exercise a measure of self-determination in the areas in which they are the numerical majority. The continued postponement of Provincial Council elections therefore has consequences that go beyond an ordinary electoral delay. It deprives communities of an important constitutional avenue for democratic participation and power-sharing. The ethnic and religious minorities appreciate what the government is doing in the larger national interest, but they must not be made to feel that their special concerns are being ignored. The government cannot resolve Sri Lanka’s entire legacy of rights violations overnight. But it does need to demonstrate that it is willing to move forward on multiple fronts, not only on a few.

Continue Reading

Features

The emptying university: why are academics leaving?

Published

on

by Hasini Lecamwasam

Brain drain in Sri Lanka is at an all-time high. The latest Human Flight and Brain Drain Index for 2024 shows that we are 16th of 175 countries on this count, and first in South Asia. That this is a crisis goes without saying. Brain drain affects all sectors, and is a huge strain on the resources of a developing country. Particularly in Sri Lanka, where considerable public investment is made in the moulding of professionals through the system of free education, this amounts to transferring the resources of poorer countries to richer ones with top migration destinations. It is, therefore, important to consider the push and pull factors behind skilled outmigration, specifically from the public university system of Sri Lanka, a key focus of the Kuppi column.

From frustration to exit

Several bitter realities in our crumbling public university system act as push factors in the migration decisions of academics. Many essays on this column have, over several years, attempted to highlight numerous aspects of this erosion. Perhaps, primary among them is the lack of adequate funding, which has debilitating ramifications for the system: very little investment is made in the up-keep of infrastructure (and even less in its expansion), resulting in serious constraints in accommodating growing batches of students and the wellbeing of the staff (particularly in regional universities); research funding is negligible, severely curtailing academics’ ability to effectively discharge their primary duty of teaching which should ideally be informed by their research (and the research of others, access to which is also, unfortunately, mediated by funding); a funding crunch also means a slash in (or greater constraints on) recruitments, increasing the workloads of academics, currently in service, and eating into the quality of their teaching and research.

What recruitments are done frustrate those with any faith in merit. As many of our interventions in this column have shown, recruitment processes are characterised by archaic selection criteria that place very little weight on a candidate’s postgraduate growth and the advantages of interdisciplinary training. Added to this is the general preference for ‘culturally compliant’ candidates who would not rock the boat too much. The combined effect is that those with the capacity and spirit to try out innovations in education are discouraged from joining or staying on in the public university system. Some, or many, of them may instead seek appointments abroad.

A thread that binds all of these problems together is pervasive hierarchy which, again, many interventions on this column have sought to highlight. It is the interest in preserving hierarchy that leads to the preference for alumni in recruitment processes. Hierarchy within universities can be particularly frustrating for younger faculty and women, who typically have to bear the brunt of the workload of their senior, often male, colleagues. In a context of funding, and, therefore, recruitment, restrictions, this translates into a disproportionate burden being placed on junior (usually female) faculty, seriously hindering their prospects of growing into successful academics due to the time constraints within which they have to operate. Junior academics, therefore, are more likely to look to educational institutions abroad for what they hope would be a different work culture that respects them more.

Ideological ruses

On top of these structural frustrations are also the workings of neoliberal ideology. For one, the nature of relations between the global metropole and peripheral countries like Sri Lanka largely dictates what is desirable and what is not. The apparent lifestyles of Western countries – from food to clothing, housing, appliances, and so on – have continued to lure people from the periphery with the promise of a ‘better’ life, alongside better career advancement opportunities. This, of course, masks much of the struggle that goes on behind the scenes to survive in Western societies. For instance, in most cases highly attractive public infrastructure such as roads, public transport, clean air, quality control of food, and so on belie the astronomical privatised costs of healthcare and education. Health insurance is usually mandatory and steep in most high-income settings, while even subsidised education (for which eligibility criteria are strict) creates a serious dent in household earnings. Of course, the happy images of glossy trams and gleeful international travellers don’t convey this.

A second ideological ruse is the myth of greater opportunities and recognition abroad. While there is no denying that local skilled sectors – be it higher education, health, civil service, or private white-collar positions – are replete with issues that inhibit merit-based professional advancement, the notion that things are fundamentally different in Western countries stems from an uninformed optimism. As is now increasingly known and discussed, Western labour markets are notoriously racialised, and equivalent skills are rarely treated as such. Instead, it is usually demanded that skilled migrants clear certain formal examinations in their host countries. In fields like medicine, this is followed by an interview that may also be racially prejudiced. Once these initial steps are cleared, remuneration reverts to square one irrespective of experience accumulated abroad, not to mention the many subtle aggressions, rejections, and trials one has to go through in the negotiation of everyday life. In the many cases where professional qualifications are used as leverage for a move abroad, sights are set on a better future for one’s children, which again is informed by the misplaced faith in greater opportunities and a lack of awareness of the factors outlined above. Needless to say, in the global swing to the Right, things have become even more challenging. In such a context, considering the few rare cases where skilled migrants live extremely comfortable lives as the norm becomes a dangerous misconception.

The two ideological pull factors mentioned above are complemented by a push factor, which has to do with a highly classed understanding of what a white-collar professional is due in their society. Many of these aspirations are clearly articulated in academic trade union action demanding separate quotas for school entry, increased fuel allowances, winning back the presently stalled vehicle permit scheme, salary hikes, and so on. While working people have every right to agitate for better material conditions, insofar as it remains unconnected to a broader movement for improving the conditions of the lot of the working class, it remains self-serving and very much within the class logic of capitalist society. Since these demands are articulated as a means of maintaining distinction, it is clear that they are not envisaged as part of a class movement. The frustration of not having these needs for distinction satisfied may push some to seek greener pastures abroad, at least financially, (perhaps as a means of social mobility based on it), only to be disappointed on most occasions.

What is to be done?

Addressing the systemic push factors listed above requires, first and foremost, greater allocations for free public higher education. This would immediately translate into more recruitments and less work per academic, and better research and teaching in the long haul. An increase in funding would also ideally lead to greater infrastructural investments, especially including improving the living conditions of those who work in regional universities amid untold hardships. Next, fairer, more creative, and, therefore, more effective recruitment policies are badly needed to attract talented individuals to university positions. Rather than carving out a ‘special category’ for academics to achieve this purpose, which is informed by a classed logic, this needs to be done through fundamental reforms in recruitment processes. Third, a persistent attack on the entrenched hierarchy within universities through internal reform is much called for. Reforming recruitment practices will go a long way towards addressing this. Measures should also be taken to introduce more stringent policies against SGBV (not to mention ragging, even though it is not directly connected to brain drain). Such measures would create a safer, fairer, and more attractive workplace, which would give more reasons for people to stay.

On top of greater allocations, we also need a transformation of our aspirations themselves if this situation is to change. That necessitates a kind of education capable of questioning the ‘paradise’ conception of Western societies, and lays bare their colonial material and ideological dimensions, in both their historical and contemporary manifestations. These colonial understandings of the ‘good life’, moreover, have devastating ecological implications for the planet, not to mention social justice. An education with the ability to transform this mindset would hopefully prove to be more than a mere path to social mobility, rather being a tool of social emancipation that renders mobility moot.

(Hasini Lecamwasam is with the Department of Political Science, University of Peradeniya)

Kuppi is a politics and pedagogy happening on the margins of the lecture hall that parodies, subverts, and simultaneously reaffirms social hierarchies.

Continue Reading

Features

Friends favourite Suzi Croner returns for Oktoberfest 2026

Published

on

Charming audiences in Switzerland as Suzi Flückiger, Sri Lanka’s own Suzi Croner is coming home… for a very special occasion.

The bubbly former frontline vocalist of 90s band Friends will take the stage at a popular venue in Colombo for Oktoberfest 2026.

Known in Europe for her country and classic hits, Suzi has remained a much-loved name back home. This will be a rare chance for local fans to see her live and celebrate the voice behind so many Friends memories.

Oktoberfest 2026 in Colombo promises an evening of live music, traditional Bavarian food and beer, colourful dirndls and lederhosen, folk dancing, and plenty of community cheer.

Suzi Croner (Flückiger)

Against this lively backdrop, Suzi will take the stage for a special solo set, featuring her own pre-recorded music. She performed at the event last year too, as a solo artiste, but a German band providing the music.

This year, however she says, it’s a different scene.

“The novel attraction will be the dancers from Germany — all girls, clad in German outfits,” Suzi said. She added that the event will also highlight the activities generally connected with Oktoberfest, which should generate a lot of fun and excitement for those who join her in Colombo next month.

Suzi has become a much-in-demand artiste in Europe, and has even performed Down Under, in Melbourne.

In Switzerland, where she has been based for the past 42 years, she continues to charm audiences with country and classic hits, performing at private events and community nights across Europe.

“My weekends are generally loaded with my work as a singer,” she said. “And I also play tennis three times a week, because I need to keep fit to entertain my audience in an active way.”

Her repertoire is made up mainly of Swiss, German and English songs.

And true to form, Suzi loves springing surprises.

“So watch out when you join me at Oktoberfest 2026, in Colombo!” she said.

Continue Reading

Trending