Features
Human rights and US double standards
By Daya Gamage
Foreign Service National Political Specialist (ret) U.S. Department of State
In November 2019, President Donald Trump granted clemency to three controversial US military figures charged with war crimes, arguing that such moves would give American troops “the confidence to fight” without worrying about potential legal repercussions. Two army officers were granted full pardons for the murder of Afghans. Trump also restored the rank of a special warfare operator who had been tried for a string of alleged war crimes. It was claimed that the criminal charges were an overreaction to actions taken in the chaos and confusion of battle. Such actions validate the widely-held view that the US does not hold itself to the same standards it tries to impose on them.
If Sri Lanka has an iota of dignity – I am not suggesting a free-for-all with Washington – it should make ‘some’ diplomatic moves on the basis of the following:
The American Service-Members Protection Act (ASPA) was an amendment to the 2002 Supplemental Appropriations Act (House Resolution 4775) passed in response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the launch of the so-called Global War on Terror. The ASPA aims to “protect U.S. military personnel and other elected and appointed officials of the Government against prosecution by an international criminal court to which the U.S. is not a party.” Among other defencive provisions the Act prohibits federal, state and local governments and agencies (including courts and law enforcement agencies) from assisting the International Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague. It even prohibits U.S. military aid to countries that are parties to the Court. In 2002, during the administration of Prime Minister Wickremesinghe, Sri Lanka signed with the U.S. an “Article 98 Agreement,” agreeing not to hand over U.S. nationals to the Court. This was done under pressure during the 2002-2004 ‘Peace Talks’ in which Secretary of State Gen. Colin Powel and his Deputy Richard Armitage were directly involved in lifting the terrorist/separatist LTTE on par with the legitimate government of Sri Lanka.
This shows the hypocrisy and double standards of Washington policymakers who, with no substantial data and evidence, relied on information furnished by an NGO to blacklist former Navy Commander, Admiral of the Fleet Wasantha Karannagoda.
In September 2009, four months after the conclusion of the Eelam War IV, the US Senate Appropriations Committee had mandated that the State Department prepare a report on possible war crimes committed during the final phase of the conflict during 2008-2009 in Sri Lanka. (It should be mentioned that when the ICC decided to send officials during the Trump administration to Washington to interview USG personnel on US atrocities in Afghanistan, USG suspended their visas and declared that the US was a sovereign nation for such interference). The report was completed in October despite acknowledged evidentiary limitations, but the allegations it uncovered of abuses by government officials defined thereafter the policy of the US and some EU countries toward the Government of Sri Lanka (GoSL). The report’s findings, based largely on hearsay, also created an atmosphere of credibility about human rights violations that was exploited for anti-Colombo propaganda by activist sections of the Tamil Diaspora. The US Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues articulated a double standard that was common in the US foreign policy establishment at that time. He acknowledged “that honestly in a conflict like that against the LTTE it was necessary to use very strong force to defeat a group that was committing horrendous crimes against the civilian population. But on the other hand, that action had to comply with the laws of war.” A democratic government, in other words, was held responsible to rules of warfare that autocratic insurgents were not, even though that would mean that the democratic government could be handicapped in defending its sovereignty, system of government, and domestic rule of law. Such accountability, of course, did not apply to the US.
These disgraceful double standards of Washington policymakers and lawmakers in dealing with Sri Lanka’s ‘national issues’ since the advent of the separatist war in the north in the 1980s are now very broadly dealt with by two personnel who worked within the U.S. Department of State for thirty years in the area of foreign affairs: One is this writer who is a retired Foreign Service National Political Specialist once accredited to the Political Section of the U.S. Embassy in Colombo, and the other, Dr. Robert K. Boggs, a retired Senior Foreign Service (FS) and Intelligence Officer who served as Political Counselor at the Colombo Diplomatic Mission and in many senior positions in the State Department in Washington. Their investigative work is still in progress. Their manuscript ‘Defending Democracy: Lessons in Strategic Diplomacy from U.S.-Sri Lankan Relations” is nearing completion with alarming disclosures, provocative analyses and interpretations based on their up-close and personal knowledge and understanding of Washington’s foreign policy trajectory in Sri Lanka – then and now – and how it used ‘double standards’ in handling its foreign relations with Sri Lanka reducing Sri Lanka to some level of a client state. Sri Lanka’s own infantile behaviour, ignorance of its own strengths and inarticulate manner in which it was handling foreign relations since the 1980s contributed too to become a subservient state allowing ‘national issues’ to become ‘global’ ones.
‘Moral Arbiter’
How can the US be a moral arbiter in the war against terrorism if it has never tried or prosecuted most of the Americans responsible for kidnappings, secret detentions and torture of suspects abroad after 9/11? Why has it so uncritically accepted the civilian casualty figures of international NGOs, however righteously motivated, regarding hostilities in Sri Lanka but consistently rejected them regarding its own collateral killings? And does the U.S. really believe that, because it tries sincerely to minimise harm to civilians, it is morally justified in pursuing tactics that inevitably will cause casualties among non-combatants? If so, do the compulsions of military tactics not similarly exonerate other governments fighting other groups recognised by the international community as terrorists? Are no allowances granted to military forces that do not have the U.S.’ access to precise overhead targeting intelligence and so-called precision weapons? If the U.S. can excuse itself from culpability for civilian deaths it causes in counterinsurgency operations in poor countries far from North America, are foreign governments not also excused for using their full offensive capabilities to defeat domestic terrorists posing immediate threats to their national integrity and democracy? Abuses by the United States do not excuse abuses by Sri Lanka, but U.S. abuses tarnish the U.S.’ moral authority, weaken U.S. claims to international leadership, provoke deep resentment of the U.S., and provoke even more anti-U.S. terrorism.
Contradictory position
Compounding its hypocrisy in Sri Lanka is the long US record of self-righteously shielding its own military from investigation by international human rights tribunals. Since 1986 the USG has adopted the contradictory position of supporting the rule of law in the international system by participating in litigation before the International Court of Justice (ICJ), but at the same time refusing to submit itself to the authority of the International Criminal Court (ICC) on the grounds that this would violate U.S. sovereignty. While Sri Lankan forces were fighting the LTTE, the US was unleashing massive amounts of firepower in Iraq that killed thousands of civilians. In Afghanistan the U.S. allied itself with, and thus strengthened, war lords and provincial officials with strong records as counterinsurgency fighters, but has ignored credible reports of these allies’ corruption and human rights abuses. At the same time, the U.S. has become increasingly reliant in its international campaign against extremism on air power, including armed drones that routinely injures and kills civilians. Yet in September 2018 the US National Security Advisor, John Bolton, threatened sanctions against the “illegitimate” ICC if it investigated credible allegations of war crimes by U.S. military and intelligence personnel in Afghanistan. In earlier diatribes against the ICC, Bolton reportedly acknowledged that the U.S. needed immunity because its use of torture, harsh imprisonment and some counterterrorist tactics constituted crimes under international law, which he dismissed.
At the time that the United States was pressuring Colombo to accept “national, international, and hybrid mechanisms to clarify the fate and whereabouts of the disappeared,” the USG had not itself ratified the UN convention of 2006 requiring state party to criminalise enforced disappearances and take steps to hold those responsible to account. Sri Lanka need not have ‘confronted’ the US, but it had no guts to question it. The US jointly with Sri Lanka during the Wickremesinghe-Sirisena regime presented the 30/1 Resolution in UNHRC in October 2015 for ‘hybrid’ commission.
Despite a resolution passed by the U.S. House of Representatives on November 19, 2020 calling on the USG to ratify the international convention, this still has not happened. The U.S.’ long history of rejecting accountability is strongly rooted in legislation.
Washington has used different standards for the legitimate administration in Sri Lanka which was combating a separatist-terrorist movement, and its overseas advocates, fundraisers and advisors. It needs to be stressed here that Washington ignored the atrocities committed by the Tamil Tigers. A democratic government was made to abide by the rules of warfare, but the terrorists were not required to do so. Such accountability, of course, did not apply to the US.
This point of view may have been based on a legal interpretation common in the past that if a state actor in an internal conflict is a party to international covenants of humanitarian law, the state actor needs to abide by the provisions ratified by the United Nations and is responsible for any violation of International Humanitarian Law (IHL). In contrast, if the opponent of the legally constituted government is an armed non-state actor (ANSA) and therefore not a signatory to international covenants, the general opinion was that it has no obligation to uphold the provisions. However, due to the growing number of internal armed conflicts that emerged over the years, the international community was forced to realize that new interpretations or legal instruments were needed to regulate non-international conflicts with non-state participants.
Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, later Protocol II, several other treaties and customary law all deal with non- international armed conflicts. Neither the U.S. nor the GSL is a signatory of Protocol II, but both are parties to Article 3. The latter requires that each Party to a conflict in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties is proscribed from a range of inhumane behaviours, including cruel treatment and torture, the taking of hostages, and extra-legal executions. Construed broadly, many of the provisions of the Article are applicable not only to the LTTE fighting cadre but also to non-combatants supporting them by fundraising, propaganda, legal counselling, and the like. If the USG were serious about accountability, it would call for surviving Tiger leaders and their international accessories to be tried in international courts. Any questions about the legality of such action in U.S. courts were resolved in June 2010, when the US Supreme Court upheld a federal law that makes it a crime to provide material support to foreign terrorist organisations, even if that help is itself not violent. Chief Justice John Roberts, writing for the majority, said the law’s prohibition on some types of intangible assistance to groups the State Department determines engage in terrorism does not violate the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.
Despite this growing body of support for legal action against non-state terrorists, the USG continues to target only the GSL for human rights violations.
In February 2020, for example, the USG announced sanctions against Sri Lankan military chief Lt. Gen. Shavendra Silva, who served as a division commander leading the final assault against the Tigers. At the end of April 2023, Admiral of the Fleet Wasantha Karannagoda was declared persona-non-grata in the United States by Washington. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo announced that the U.S. would impose individual sanctions against Gen. Silva, denying him and his family admittance to the U.S., “due to gross violations of human rights.” The State Department declared the same, imposing individual sanctions against Karannagoda. Nothing similar has been said or done with regard to the expatriate Tamils, now domiciled in Western countries, who served as advisors and agents to LTTE leader Prabhakaran and his top lieutenants.
In June 2010 the US Supreme Court upheld the federal law criminalizing material support to foreign terrorist organisations in a case brought by the LTTE and the Kurdish PKK, contesting their designations as FTOs. In its written opinion the Court stated, inter alia, that:
“The PKK and the LTTE are deadly groups. It is not difficult to conclude, as Congress did, that the taint of their violent activities is so great that working in coordination with them or at their command legitimises and furthers their terrorist means. Moreover, material support meant to promote peaceable, lawful conduct can be diverted to advance terrorism in multiple ways. The record shows that designated foreign terrorist organisations do not maintain organisational firewalls between social, political, and terrorist operations, or financial firewalls between funds raised for humanitarian activities and those used to carry out terrorist attacks. Providing material support in any form would also undermine cooperative international efforts to prevent terrorism and strain the United States’ relationships with its allies, including those that are defending themselves against violent insurgencies waged by foreign terrorist groups.”
It is clear from the foregoing that the USG has the legal tools to pursue its own residents and citizens who helped to defend and empower the LTTE. Unfortunately, despite more than a decade of efforts to pressure the GSL to accept accountability for war crimes committed by its forces, the USG has not taken commensurate steps to pursue accountability for LTTE supporters at home. There are believed to be thousands of former LTTE activists living safely in the US, Canada, and Europe who have never had to face justice for their roles in enabling more than two decades of vicious crimes and human rights abuses. Many continue to use their foreign domiciles as platforms from which to militate for a separate Tamil homeland and to demonise the Colombo government. Had the USG, coordinating with its law enforcement partners internationally, worked to disable the LTTE’s support network during the war, it could have contributed to a negotiated settlement or at least saved countless lives.
A high-profile example of an expatriate activist in the U.S. is Visvanathan Rudrakumaran, who, according to his own website, served during the war as “international legal advisor to Prabhakaran and in-charge of [the LTTE’s] international and diplomatic affairs.”
This writer and his co-author have gone deep into this issue of Washington’s faulty foreign relations and the blatant double standards when dealing with Sri Lanka. Similarly, we have unearthed how Sri Lanka, since the 1980s, has failed not only to defend herself but her inability to make Washington policymakers and lawmakers conversant with the ground situation. In these series of articles, this writer expects professionals and erudite parliamentarians to bring these matters for public debate even now.
(The writer Daya Gamage is a retired Foreign Service National Political Specialist of the U.S. Department of State once accredited to the Political Section of the U.S. Embassy in Colombo)
Features
Day of Judgements and Political Fallouts
Rajan Philips
The second anniversary of Anura Kumara Dissanayake’s election as President has come and gone, but not before getting marked by a spate of judgements delivered and announced on a single day following the anniversary. Far away in New York, it has been a week of speeches by state and government leaders making their pilgrimage to the 81st Annual Sessions of the United Nations that is entering its ninth decade. President AKD did not make the trip this year to the UN Sessions, which are now reduced to being a convenient meeting place for world leaders to hold sideline meetings on bilateral as well as other contentious matters.
Sri Lanka is not in the crosshairs of any such contentions, but there are enough internal crosshairs that the NPP government and a feckless opposition are constantly trying to avoid. The day of judgements too has come and gone. All in all, it was a good day for the NPP government, at least in the sense that the government suffered no reputational damage from any of the three judgements. There were two Supreme Court rulings, one on the bill for the 22nd Amendment to the Constitution and another on the constitutionality of the Anti-Corruption Amendment Bill. The third court ruling was the verdict given by the Colombo Permanent High Court following the Trial-at-Bar of 24 people accused for their role in the 2019 Easter attacks.
Easter Justice
The three trial-at-bar judges, Navaratne Marasinghe, Ramanathan Kannan and Sujeewa Nissanka, reached a unanimous verdict and found 15 of the accused guilty and found the other nine not guilty and released them forthwith. The accused were spared of the death sentence, but the lengths of rigorous imprisonment sentences are just as bad. One was sentenced to 260 years, four got 240 years each, five 220 years, and another five 200 years. In addition, the court ordered the instant confiscation of the movable and immovable assets of all 15 found guilty.
The verdict marks a substantial milestone in the search for justice on behalf of the victims of the Easter attacks. The government can claim some political credit for the conclusion of the trial after seven years of fits and starts, and high level stymying under three presidents who preceded President AKD. Much greater credit of course belongs to the hundreds of law enforcement officials who built up a mammoth case of 23,270 charges against 25 suspects (one of whom died in hospital during the trial) and won convictions of 15 of them.
But this is not the end of the journey for those seeking Easter justice based on the whole truth. There are other trials going on and the elusive mastermind is yet to be found. Mohammed Ibrahim Mohammed Nawfar (alias Naufar Moulavi) is one of the 15 convicted by the Permanent High Court. Naufar Moulavi was identified in May 2021 as the mastermind by the Gotabaya Rajapaksa government. The government claimed that FBI investigation had confirmed it. This claim is not supported by the FBI affidavit filed by agent Merrilee R. Goodwin in a US Court in California, in December 2020.
The purpose of the FBI affidavit was to support the indictment of Mohammed (Moulavi) Naufar, Mohamed Anwar Mohamed Riskan and Ahamed Milhan Hayathu Mohamed “for conspiring to provide, providing, and attempting to provide material support to a foreign terrorist organization, namely ISIS” (Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham), in violation of US laws. But neither Naufar nor the other two were identified as masterminds. The only mastermind identified in the affidavit is “Jahran Mohamed Cassim, also known as (“aka”) Mohamad Cassim Mohamad Zahran, aka Zahran Hashim (“Zahran”). Zahran killed himself in the suicide bomb he detonated, along with scores of victims, and spared himself from earthly trials.
To close the loop on this, the three men identified in the FBI affidavit, namely, Moulavi Naufar, Mohamed Riskan and Ahamed Milhan, are among the 15 convicted by the trial-at-bar High Court. But their conviction does not bring closure to the enduring question whether there was a political mastermind(s) behind the 2019 Easter attacks. There is still no clarity on what the former Attorney General Dappula De Livera publicly alluded to as evidence of “a grand conspiracy behind the attacks that killed 269 people and injured over 500.”
That was on 18 May 2021, and the statement was a follow up to the letter that Mr. De Livera had written on the state of the police investigations, to then Inspector General of Police (IGP), the late C. D. Wickramaratne. Mr. De Livera soon went on to retire after a remarkable prosecutorial career, and reportedly turned down the government’s offer of appointment as High Commissioner to Canada. Mr. Wickramaratne himself has since died under rather tragic circumstances.
Those who allege that the Catholic Church is making unproven allegations about Easter attacks masterminds, conveniently gloss over the fact that the Church is not accusing anybody of being a mastermind, but is only asking for a thorough inquiry that will put to rest, once and for all, the perennial question about the Easter mastermind. The difference now is that after suffering frustrations with three presidents and their governments, the Church is experiencing a positive response from the current president and his NPP government.
Amendment Politics
Aside from the lawfare politics of the Easter attacks, the politics of the 22nd Amendment to the Constitution is running its course after the Supreme Court ruling that a referendum is not required for the amending bill to become law, but only a two-thirds majority in parliament. The ruling was widely expected but not because of some ‘fix’, but because it would have been silly to find a judicial reason to have a referendum on the retirement ages of judges. This is not to absolve the government for its missteps on this matter and for putting everyone through months of constitutional contortions. Rather it is to highlight the absurdity of getting exercised virtually over every constitutional amendment and insisting that enacting the amendment without a referendum is tantamount to an assault on democracy. The referendum requirement has become a constitutional curse.
The 1972 Constitution of the First Republic had a very straightforward amending procedure with no referendum requirement, so straightforward that JR Jayewardene was able to throw out a whole (1972) constitution lock, stock and barrel, and replace it with his new constitution of a totally different (presidential) persuasion, simply through a parliamentary select committee process and a two thirds majority in parliament. No one called for a referendum to justify so momentous a change, but now a referendum is required to determine at what age a superior court judge can retire. Nonetheless, as President Jayewardene’s admirers and followers celebrate his 120th birth anniversary, there is no gainsaying that regardless of whether one agrees or disagrees with his presidential achievements and legacies, JR Jayewardene was without question the most consequential political leader of Sri Lanka in the 20th century.
In the 21st century and on the 22nd amendment, with no referendum required, the Bar Association is changing tack and calling on parliamentarians to vote with their conscience, without toeing the party line. After Friday’s vote, it may want to poll the MPs to find out who among them voted listened to their conscience, and who toed the party line. The Association may be having a difficult time going through the withdrawal syndrome after months of heightened exertions. As for the opposition and Sajith Premadasa, the latter has simply promised that a future SJB government will repeal the 22nd Amendment. To what end? To reenact another episode of confusion and distraction.
An Economynext commentator has described the Supreme Court ruling on the referendum requirement for 22A, as being “surgical in its constitutional analysis.” Well said. The ruling plausibly addresses every good and bad argument that was flung at the judges and demonstrates, citing copious precedents, that at the end of the day, no matter who the individual judges and their abilities are, and what anyone thinks of them, the ‘Court’ can find its collective voice and express itself with clarity and authority.
The same Economynext commentary interprets the 22nd Amendment as “a foundational prerequisite for operationalizing the newly enacted, stringent Anti-Corruption Act, which is a key commitment of the government era for the IMF.” The commentary suggests that “multiple clauses in the 22nd Amendment are designed to satisfy governance and anti-corruption structural benchmarks within the ongoing IMF Extended Fund Facility (EFF) agreement.” While noting the risk of scaring investors who might view 22A as being anti-democratic and antithetical to judicial independence, the commentary goes on to opine that the passage of 22A combined with a strong and systematic anti-corruption drive could be a boost to investor confidence, especially in the critical sectors of logistics, renewable energy and technology.
The above is an interesting interpretation even though I am not sure whether anyone associated with the government has formulated the intentions of the 22nd Amendment quite this way. Objectively, the argument is plausible and will justifiably rile the ire of the left opposition to the NPP government and its inclination towards the IMF. At the same time, there is no mistaking the government’s intention and determination to fight corruption in politics and public life. Apart from, or rather as part of, its arresting politics, the government is also going ahead with the passage of the Anti-Corruption (Amendment) Bill, which too has had its determination by the Supreme Court, albeit by a different three-judge Bench, almost concurrently with the 22A ruling by the five-judge Bench. The Supreme Court’s determination on the Anti-Corruption Bill was triggered after it was challenged by Transparency International Sri Lanka.
But unlike the SC ruling on 22A, the ruling on the Anti-Corruption Bill singles out a provision as requiring approval in a referendum for its enactment. The provision involves Clause 17 of the Bill which elevates the bail granting threshold for determination by a High Court and not a Magistrates Court as currently practised. The subject offence involves a bribe not less than Rs. 100,000, or causing a government loss of not less than Rs. 500,000. The Court held that such a change infringes the fundamental rights of citizens against arbitrary detention and will require a referendum approval. The Bill of course could be passed without a referendum after removing the specific provision. Remarkably, the government argued that the proposed amendments to the Anti-Corruption Act are necessary to remove current bottlenecks, achieve conformance with UN standards, and comply with the IMF program in Sri Lanka.
Features
Father’s horoscope reading on the worst time in my life seemed coming true
Little breathing space between papers at the final exam and my mind goes blank answering Sinhala paper
(Excerpted from The Art of Governance, autobiography of MDD Pieris)
Then came the final blow. When the time table for the final examination was out, I discovered that I would have to answer all my nine papers, of three hours each at one continuous stretch without even a half days break! I was due to answer the European history paper one afternoon; then go on next morning to British history; afternoon to Ceylon history; the next morning to English Poetry; afternoon to English drama; the following morning to English prose; and that same afternoon to suddenly switch from thinking and writing in English to thinking and writing in Sinhala, answering the first of the three papers in Sinhala, with the other two coming morning and afternoon the following day! Several of my friends urged me to go and speak to the university administration about a change, but at the same time, others who had had difficulties and sought recourse reported that they were rather rudely treated by the officers concerned.
This deterred me from going. I was a polite person by nature and just as in the case of Mr. Athulathmudali about whose insistence on politeness I have already written about, I too resented the prospect of being treated rudely. Therefore, I decided, quite foolishly no doubt, and come what may to go through and sit for the nine papers in four and half continuous days. Thus began the most difficult and harrowing period of my life, a period even worse than the experience at the university entrance examination.
In that instance, there was certainly disappointment and frustration but since I was attempting a near impossibility, there was less stress because mentally I was prepared for failure. This was reflected in a reasonably good appetite, and the ability to sleep. This time, at the final examinations, I lost both. Normal eating was impossible. My stomach was in knots. I just went through the motions and nibbled something and basically sustained myself with a combination of powdered milk and Ovaltine. Sleep became disturbed. After six hours of strenuous concentration a day answering question papers, there was little the mind could absorb by way of preparation for the next day.
During the day, nothing was possible since the morning’s paper was over at noon, and by the time you walked back from the Arts block to Marrs Hall just to look at the food and freshen up and then walk back to the examination hall to be there about 10 minutes before the 2 p.m. start of the next paper, there was neither time nor inclination to look at or absorb anything. I did try to look through whatever I could for the next days two papers during the night whilst keeping in mind the necessity to get some rest and sleep. Therefore, I did try to get six hours of sleep in the night. But it turned out to be an unhealthy and disturbed sleep leaving you not fresh, but jaded in the morning.
The mind was overactive. By this time, the numbers in the hall had dwindled due to the vacation. Only the few sitting for their final examination were in residence, and they were busy with their studies. There was therefore also a sense of loneliness and isolation prevailing. Added to all this was the horrible thought of failing and having to repeat all nine papers the following year. One had very much to try to find some degree of good cheer from within one’s own resources. Given my predicament I had precious little of that.
In these almost nightmarish conditions, I struggled through eight of the nine papers. The last paper during the final afternoon was the third paper in Sinhala literature, which was on prose. I still have a vivid memory of that afternoon. Rain clouds were building up and as we got down to answering the paper, it was getting quite dark. The lights shone brightly in the examination hall. There were five questions to be answered and I had just finished answering one, and had barely started on the next, when my mind went completely blank. I have never experienced such a thing before or since. The thinking processes suddenly stopped as if a plug had been pulled out from an electricity supply. I was in the middle of a sentence, I found impossible to complete. It was total disconnection.
There was just nothing I could do except to lay down my pen and gaze out of the window. There were two things in my favour at this critical moment. I possessed a temperament that didn’t panic easily or once embarked on a course, give up easily. I therefore calmly decided to stop trying to struggle, and relax. I was aware that precious minutes were ticking by. But I knew that what could not be cured must be endured, and that any attempt at force and struggle would only serve to aggravate the situation. That part of my mind was clear and rational. I spent almost 20 precious minutes doing nothing. Then gradually I found that I was able to focus once again.
I cautiously and with a degree of fear took up my pen and leaving room to complete the question I had begun to write on, started on a new question. The ideas flowed once again. I had however to be careful. There was no guarantee that everything would not come to a stop once again. I had already lost valuable time. Any further problem now would be the end of the paper and the end of perhaps the whole examination. I therefore deliberately slowed down my pace of writing and wrote slowly and steadily not pushing myself.
When the time came for the papers to be collected I had been able to answer only three out of the five questions in full. For the balance two, I was only just able to write down a few points. Answers in continuous prose were not possible. Up to this time, I had hope of at least passing the whole examination and obtaining my degree. Now, I was not so sure. There was a distinct possibility, I would fail the last Sinhala paper.
The next day I went home to Colombo, utterly drained. It appeared that my father’s prediction after reading my horoscope was not only accurate but frighteningly so. I too believed with him that there could not possibly be a worse period in the future. Starting from the stress of suddenly having to change schools in mid university entrance course to the end of my participation in school cricket through contracting measles, to the enormous trials and tribulations of the university entrance, to the disappointment of not being able to read for English “honours,” and now this situation at the final examination was almost too much for one person to take.
I was in a state which perhaps verged on a nervous breakdown, For a good two weeks at home, I was listless, unable to concentrate on anything. I could not read anything. Even the newspapers repelled me. The sound of music was irritating, and sleep desultory. I was taken to see the doctor, who advised complete rest. He did not give medicine. It was clear that I had severely overtaxed the system, and time would be the healer, as indeed was so gradually much to the great relief of my parents and myself. The newspaper once again began to interest me, and gradually books. Even then, I could not read for long periods for some time. I used to lose concentration and the mind began to wander.
In due course, I received a letter from the university, inviting me to teach an English course to the new batch of students about to enter the university. This was the vacation course in English for them. But I was just in no mood to teach. I was now back to normal, but did not wish to take upon myself the responsibilities of a teaching assignment. Therefore, I wrote back politely declining. But the letter from the university was a boost to my confidence. I knew that I would not have been called unless I had fared reasonably well, at least in my English papers, and got at a minimum a “B.” But what of the rest? I was still apprehensive. What came to mind was the unfinished Sinhala paper, and its possible impact on the whole examination.
Assistant Librarian Vidyodaya University
When the results came in due course, to my great relief I had passed. There was no question of a class. Nor was I expecting one. What I dreaded was sitting for the whole examination once again. I could now get this episode of my life out of the way and decide how to proceed. By this time the new Vidyodaya University had just begun to function. My father was a member of the Governing Council of the Vidyodaya Pirivena, the Vidyadhara Sabha and for long an associate and a friend of the renowned scholar Ven. Weliwitiye Soratha, the head of the Pirivena, who was the first Vice Chancellor of the new university.
Our family had many connections with Vidyodaya, including my maternal grandfather Mr. C. Don Bastian Jayaweera Bandara, himself a renowned scholar, writer, publisher and social worker, having had his higher education there. I for my part, for a period studied Sinhala under Ven. Soratha. Busy as he was, he found the time to teach me because of these family connections. I must have been a good student in his opinion, because he very graciously presented me a two volume set of his monumental work of the Sinhala dictionary, a task which he undertook and completed all by himself, a set which is one of my valued possessions even today.
When it became known that I had passed out, Vidyodaya was keen to have me and my father was equally keen that I should help out in whatever capacity. Finally, I was appointed as an Assistant Librarian and along with others, plunged into the task of setting up a proper library for the new university. At this time, the university functioned in the premises of the Vidyodaya Pirivena at Maligakande and it was rapidly becoming apparent that space was becoming a serious problem.
One of the most important tasks of a librarian is to classify knowledge accurately and correctly and this had to be carefully done. The system of classification adopted at the time was the Dewey Decimal System, and I spent much time at home poring over the volumes containing the system, so that during the working day classification and the typing of the card indexes, etc., could proceed with speed. Accuracy and speed were both necessary, accuracy, because a misclassified book is a lost book, speed because hundreds of books were lying on the floors, in cartons, in crates, on windowsills and all over the place.
I found the wide reading that I had done whilst at Peradeniya now of great assistance. With a quick perusal I was able to determine the classifications and sub-classifications. This was important. For instance, if one took up a book on European history, one had to determine whether it should be classified and appear on the shelves as general history; a history of a period; diplomatic history; economic history; social and cultural history; military history; a history of important treaties, and so on. This was so for all subjects and the wider your reading the easier it was.
But always at the end of the day was a general conference at which we took up for discussions amongst other matters, certain books which were exceedingly difficult to classify, partly because their contents approached the borders of many different subjects. Titles were frequently misleading. For instance, the book “Two eggs on my plate,” had nothing to do with cuisine. It was a tense memoir of certain military activities during World War II.
Features
The Cinnamon Captain’s Circuit
Three Maps of Ceylon Cinnamon
From the Pathfinder Collection
By Jennifer Moragoda
jennifermoragoda787@gmail.com
A remarkable Dutch map of Ceylon made in 1719 allows us to follow cinnamon through the country almost village by village.
Part of a series of thirty-six maps showing territories of the Dutch East India Company, it was drawn by Joannes van Campen and shows mainly the south-western portion of the island then under Company control. The twelve korales or provinces are distinguished by colour and extend, in the map’s description, from the river Caymelle to the Valave. Brohier notes that Caymelle was the Dutch name for the Maha Oya. A brown line marks the boundary of the Kandyan king’s territory. Within this political geography, a red line encloses what might otherwise be described simply as ‘Canelle Landen’: “the expanse of the luxuriant cinnamon bushes from the Chilaw river to the hook of Dondra.”
What makes the map extraordinary, however, is its detail. It marks the old administrative divisions through which the cinnamon country extended; villages and places associated with the seasonal work of the peelers; the forty-six numbered points along the annual route of the Cinnamon Captain; and the five coastal places to which the peeled bark was delivered.
Two further Dutch maps narrow the lens. A plan of Salpiti Korale maps cinnamon gardens and grounds among localities that are now part of greater Colombo and its suburbs. At an even more microscopic level, three drawings of a single chena near Hanwella represent individual trees by letters and colour and enumerate them.
Together they preserve an unusually detailed geography of Ceylon cinnamon and the enterprise built around it under the Dutch.
Much of that detail can be recovered today through the meticulous work of R. L. Brohier and J. H. O. Paulusz. Their descriptions and translations of Dutch maps and records provide the context that makes otherwise cryptic routes, symbols and localities intelligible.
A Circuit Through Cinnamon Country
Van Campen’s map immediately provides an overview of the country from which cinnamon was obtained. It is divided according to the old Sinhalese territorial and administrative divisions of korales and pattus. Many of their names, and the places associated with them, remain recognizable today, although their old boundaries are now less familiar. The map may surprise modern readers who are unaware that its cinnamon country extended as far north as the Chilaw River and south to Dondra.
The map also makes clear that the geography of cinnamon did not coincide neatly with political boundaries. It marks the limits of Dutch territory and the adjoining lands of the Kandyan king, while cinnamon also grew beyond Dutch-controlled territory. Access to cinnamon in Kandyan territory could therefore depend upon relations with the Kandyan court.
The most striking feature of the map is the minute detail with which this cinnamon geography is recorded. Forty-six numbered points trace the ordinary land route followed by the Cinnamon Captain, head of the Mahabadda or Cinnamon Department, on his annual general visitation at the commencement of the harvest. Starting from Colombo, his circuit took him north and then through a succession of korales to the south before he returned along the coast to Colombo.
The route recorded in Brohier and Paulusz runs through Negombo, Pittigal Korale, Hapitigam Korale, Sinna Korale, Rayigam Korale, Pasdun Korale, Wallalawiti Korale, Galle Korale, Beligama Korale, Morawa Korale and Dolosdas Korale, the latter embracing the Gangaboda and Welaboda Pattus of Matara and the eastern and western Giruwa Pattus of Hambantota.
On the map, the numbered stations allow that journey to be followed across the country. Even where individual names become difficult to decipher on a reduced reproduction, the extent of the circuit can be grasped.
But another set of small red circles gives the map an even more unusual human geography. In the words of its description, these indicate the villages and places “in which and near which” the cinnamon peelers commonly pitched their tents during the peeling season “in order to gather that costly bark.” These temporary encampments belonged to the older system of harvesting in which parties of peelers travelled through the cinnamon country, cutting suitable stems and bringing them back in bundles to be peeled and fashioned into quills.
The red circles are scattered through the cinnamon country densely enough that the map gives a visual impression of the scale of the seasonal harvest before one has deciphered every locality. J. H. O. Paulusz considered the map “of unusual value, indeed indispensable for studying the history of the Salagama community because it illustrates their manner of life, the districts in which they lived, and the hardships and dangers they endured.”
The Captain’s numbered route and the peelers’ encampments therefore record two related geographies. One is the official circuit of inspection. The other is the far more dispersed geography of the people actually gathering and preparing the cinnamon.
The map completes the picture by identifying five coastal delivery points—Negombo, Colombo, Beruwala, Galle and Matara—to which the peeled bark was “carried on their shoulders and transported with great labour.” Taken together, these details allow the old cinnamon enterprise to be visualized almost in motion: the Captain moving between his 46 stations; peelers establishing seasonal camps in and near particular villages; cinnamon being gathered and prepared in the surrounding country; and the finished bark moving towards five points on the coast.
The map also bears the letters A–H on a smaller circuit associated with Maradana, “where the best of that fragrant bark is peeled.” Brohier’s explanatory note identifies the area within this orbit as including Maradana, Wellicadde, Kirilepona and Bamblepitie—names recognizable today as Maradana, Welikada, Kirulapone and Bambalapitiya. These are now parts of a densely built city; on Van Campen’s map they belonged to the geography of cinnamon.
That juxtaposition is one of the pleasures of reading the old maps. Familiar names survive, but the landscapes attached to them have changed almost beyond recognition.
Salpiti Korale, Plot by Plot
A second map sharpens the focus further.
Where Van Campen’s map provides an overview of the geographical reach and movement of the cinnamon enterprise, the detailed plan of Salpiti Korale attaches cinnamon more closely to individual grounds and localities in and around what is now greater Colombo. Similar detailed plans were drawn for other korales and areas in which cinnamon grew.
The plate itself carries a striking collection of names familiar to a modern resident: Kotte, Mirihana, Welikada, Nawala, Pepiliyana, Kollupitiya, Wellawatte and Galkissa, or Mount Lavinia, among others. They appear beside or among numbered and outlined cinnamon grounds. The importance of the map is not that all of modern Colombo lay within Salpiti Korale—it did not—but that it allows particular 18th-century cinnamon localities around the expanding city and its eastern and southern approaches to be set against places we know today.
A related survey shows how closely Dutch mapping followed Colombo’s expansion. Brohier notes that, as settlement spread beyond the Fort and Pettah, a map made about 1766 by Lieutenant C. D. Wentzel surveyed the Colombo district for a radius of five miles in all directions from the Fort. Particular care was taken to mark the cinnamon-growing districts, partly for the information of the authorities and partly as a warning to inhabitants.
The records preserve some striking glimpses of areas we do not normally associate with cinnamon. A Dutch governor deplored the number of valuable bushes being “pitifully cut down for firewood especially near Liveramentu (Thimbirigasyaya-Narahenpita) where it grows luxuriantly.”
It is difficult now to associate Thimbirigasyaya and Narahenpita with luxuriant cinnamon, yet that is precisely why this cartographic detail matters. Pepiliyana, Nawala, Welikada, Wellawatte and other familiar names cease for a moment to be simply modern suburbs and become part of an older cinnamon geography.
In this sense, the Salpiti map performs a different task from Van Campen’s. The first shows the astonishing geographical reach of the cinnamon enterprise. Salpiti brings us down almost plot by plot.
Down to the Individual Tree
A third example reduces the scale to a single piece of ground. Three charts dated 1720 depict a chena called Katugalavila in the village of Degambedda in Hevagam Korale, about half an hour’s journey from the fort at Hanwella. The original survey was by L. Boomgart; the version reproduced by Brohier and Paulusz is an 1899 facsimile by M. F. N. Rotteveel.
The three drawings show the same ground before clearing, after cutting and burning, and after planting and regrowth. Seventeen kinds of tree are identified by letters, with their Sinhala names recorded in Dutch spelling. Before clearing, the plot contained five cinnamon trees; in the third stage it contained 229 cinnamon shoots and young trees. Brohier called the plan both “a picture of the ground” and a “working-plan,” and remarked on its striking representation of detail and use of colour.
This small survey is useful here chiefly because it shows just how far Dutch cartographic attention could descend: from an extensive cinnamon country, to individual grounds, and finally to individual trees.
The 1719 map shows the cinnamon country extending from the Chilaw River to Dondra. The Salpiti Korale map brings us into recognizable localities around Colombo and its suburbs. At Degambedda, near Hanwella, the cartographic lens descends to a single chena and finally to individual cinnamon trees.
Taken together, the three maps turn the broad designation Canelle Landen into something much more precise: a country of rivers, political boundaries and old administrative divisions; roads, villages and seasonal encampments; identifiable cinnamon grounds; and, finally, individual plants.
They also help explain the practical appeal of later attempts to concentrate cinnamon production in more accessible and systematically cultivated grounds. Van Campen’s map makes visible the enormous geographical reach of the older, dispersed system—the distances travelled, the seasonal encampments and the labour required to bring the prepared bark to the coast. The hardships of that system are less visible on the map itself, but they are amply recorded in the contemporary documentation. The later transformation of cinnamon cultivation is another chapter. These maps preserve the geography that preceded it.
Retracing the Circuit
There is a modern postscript to this story. In recent years, the Pekoe Trail, a long-distance walking route through the tea estates of the hill country, has offered a new way of experiencing Ceylon’s montane landscape and tea heritage. The Cinnamon Captain’s circuit suggests the possibility of a low-country counterpart.
It need not be a walking trail. Selected stages of the forty-six-point circuit could be retraced largely by road, linking surviving place names and old cinnamon localities with places where cinnamon is still cultivated today. The korales no longer function as administrative divisions, roads have changed and much of the old cinnamon country has been transformed or built over, but enough of the underlying geography survives to make the old route intelligible.
Three centuries ago the circuit was travelled at the commencement of the harvest by an official inspecting the cinnamon country. Retraced today, it could offer a way of rediscovering a geography that these extraordinary maps have preserved in remarkable detail.
Notes: This article draws extensively on Volume II of R. L. Brohier and J. H. O. Paulusz’s Land, Maps & Surveys: A Descriptive Catalogue of Historical Maps in the Surveyor General’s Office, whose detailed descriptions, annotations and translations of Dutch maps and records make it possible to reconstruct much of the geography discussed here.
Images 3–5 reproduced from R. L. Brohier and J. H. O. Paulusz, Land, Maps & Surveys, Vol. II (1951).
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