Opinion
Hidden truth of Sri Lanka’s debt story: The untold narrative behind the report
This article presents a quantitative and critical analysis of the volume, composition, and utilization of public debt in Sri Lanka during the period 2024–2026. In general discourse, attention is primarily focused on the size of debt alone. However, this article reveals a broader economic reality by examining the interconnections among debt sources, patterns of utilisation, and repayment capacity.
In particular, when factors such as high debt-to-national-income ratios, limited revenue-generating capacity, and a heavy reliance on recurrent expenditure are considered together, Sri Lanka’s debt problem appears not merely as a numerical issue, but as the outcome of a systemic imbalance. Furthermore, the article highlights that external factors—such as geopolitical instability in the Middle East—are likely to further intensify these challenges.
1. Introduction
During the period from September 2024 to March 2026, a multi-layered discourse has emerged regarding the volume of debt obtained by the Government of Sri Lanka and the manner in which it has been utilised. Within these discussions, particular attention has been given to the increase in debt levels. While this is a valid and necessary concern, it is essential not to accept the issue at face value, but rather to analyze it critically within a broader economic context.
The primary focus should not be limited to the narrow question of “how much debt has the government borrowed?” but should instead extend to a broader set of questions: “from where has this debt been obtained, for what purposes has it been used, and what is the country’s capacity to repay it?” In other words, a complete and accurate understanding of the economic picture can only be achieved by analysing the interconnections among debt volume, utilization, and revenue-generating capacity.
Within this context, it is estimated that by the end of 2023, Sri Lanka’s total public debt stood between LKR 27–30 trillion (Central Bank of Sri Lanka, 2023; IMF, 2024). At the same time, the debt-to-GDP ratio is observed to be in the range of 110%–128%, while the burden of debt servicing relative to government revenue remains at a high level of approximately 60%–70%. In addition, the revenue-to-GDP ratio stands at only around 8%–10%, which is considered a structural fiscal weakness (World Bank, 2023).
Against this backdrop, it becomes evident that during the period 2024–2026, Sri Lanka is not on a path of deleveraging, but rather in a transitional phase centered on debt restructuring and economic stabilisation. Therefore, this article seeks to provide a deeper and more comprehensive understanding by analyzing not only the size of debt, but also its utilisation, structure, and policy implications.
2. Total Public Debt as at End-2023
As at the end of 2023, Sri Lanka’s total public debt is estimated to be between LKR 27–30 trillion. The debt-to-GDP ratio exceeds the commonly accepted safe threshold of 70% and remains within the range of 110%–128% (CBSL, 2023; IMF, 2024). In addition, the burden of debt servicing relative to government revenue is at a very high level, in some instances reaching approximately 60%–70% of revenue. At the same time, government revenue as a percentage of GDP stands at only around 8%–10%, which is below the required level for emerging economies.
When these indicators are considered together, a clear imbalance emerges between the rising debt burden and the country’s limited revenue-generating capacity.
Furthermore, the composition of debt and external economic linkages intensify this vulnerability. It is estimated that approximately 40%–45% of total debt is external, making the country highly sensitive to exchange rate fluctuations. Moreover, imports account for around 25%–35% of GDP, while exports remain at only about 20%–22%, resulting in a trade deficit and increasing the demand for foreign exchange (World Bank, 2023).
Consequently, external debt repayments depend heavily on export earnings and foreign employment income. Under these conditions, new borrowing often appears to be used for servicing existing debt, thereby creating a debt cycle that does not contribute to long-term economic growth.
Therefore, Sri Lanka’s debt problem should not be understood merely as a numerical issue, but rather as a manifestation of a deep structural imbalance among revenue capacity, economic structure, and patterns of debt utilisation.
3. Debt Situation During the 2024–2026 Period
An analysis of Sri Lanka’s debt utilisation patterns during the period 2024–2026 clearly indicates that new borrowing has been used primarily not to generate economic growth, but to manage existing debt and support short-term stabilisation.
Under the International Monetary Fund program, a significant portion of the funds obtained has been directed toward debt servicing, interest payments, and requirements related to debt restructuring (IMF, 2024). In addition, based on the composition of government expenditure, a high proportion is allocated to recurrent expenditure, while capital expenditure remains relatively limited. Typically, nearly 70% of total government expenditure is directed toward recurrent expenditure, while capital expenditure accounts for around 20%–30% (CBSL, 2023).
This pattern of utilisation demonstrates that borrowing is being used to sustain existing fiscal pressures rather than to enhance revenue-generating capacity. In particular, the use of new borrowing to repay existing debt (debt rollover) further reinforces a debt cycle, thereby constraining long-term economic growth. Moreover, the import-dependent economic structure and shortages in foreign exchange further reduce the efficiency of debt utilisation.
Accordingly, during the period 2024–2026, Sri Lanka’s borrowing can be characterized not as growth-oriented borrowing, but rather as survival-oriented borrowing. This clearly represents a significant challenge to long-term economic stability.
4. Future Challenges
An analysis of Sri Lanka’s current economic condition clearly indicates that the country has not yet fully emerged from the crisis. It is not in a phase of debt reduction, but rather has entered a stage of debt restructuring and stabilisation. Total public debt remains at a high level, and a debt-to-GDP ratio exceeding 100% raises serious concerns regarding debt sustainability.
Although debt restructuring has been implemented under the International Monetary Fund program, it primarily serves as a short-term relief measure, and a comprehensive long-term solution has yet to be achieved. Furthermore, the fact that new borrowing is largely used for debt rollovers and short-term economic stabilization indicates that the country remains in a debt stabilisation stage.
Moreover, the current pattern of debt utilization and the overall economic structure further deepen future challenges. A significant portion of borrowed funds is directed toward servicing existing debt, financing recurrent government expenditure, and maintaining short-term stability, thereby limiting productive investment. At the same time, despite efforts to increase government revenue, the high burden of debt servicing and expenditure levels constrain fiscal space.
In terms of foreign exchange, reliance on export earnings and foreign employment income, combined with an import-dependent economic structure, continues to expose the country to external economic risks.
Within this context, ongoing geopolitical instability in the Middle East represents an additional source of pressure for an import-dependent economy such as Sri Lanka. In particular, volatility in fuel prices, security risks along key maritime routes, and potential impacts on foreign employment income could weaken the country’s foreign exchange position and overall economic stabilisation process.
In effect, the interaction between internal economic imbalances and external instability creates a condition of double vulnerability for Sri Lanka.
Despite positive signals such as declining inflation, exchange rate stabilization, and support from the International Monetary Fund, economic growth remains weak, private investment is low, and cost-of-living pressures persist. These conditions confirm that significant and complex policy challenges lie ahead.
The interaction of internal imbalances and external instability creates a condition of double vulnerability for Sri Lanka.
5. Conclusion Remarks
This analysis demonstrates that Sri Lanka’s current debt situation is not merely a numerical issue, but the outcome of a deep systemic imbalance among economic structure, public financial management, and policy decisions. During the period 2024–2026, the country is not on a path of debt reduction, but rather in a stabilisation phase based on debt management and restructuring.
New borrowing is largely used not to generate economic growth, but to manage existing fiscal pressures. This further intensifies the imbalance between the quality of debt utilisation and the country’s revenue-generating capacity.
However, when one reads between the lines of these figures and reports, many unspoken realities become evident. Decisions related to borrowing and its utilisation are closely linked to policy priorities, political objectives, and the quality of governance. Therefore, analysing numbers alone is insufficient; it is essential to critically examine the decisions, priorities, and responsibilities that lie behind them.
Accordingly, moving forward requires not only controlling the volume of debt, but also transforming the manner in which it is utilised and the policy decision-making framework that underpins it. Only through productive investment, revenue growth, and strong public financial management can Sri Lanka transition from a debt-dependent economy to one characterised by stable and sustainable long-term growth.
In conclusion, Sri Lanka’s debt narrative is not merely a story of numbers—it is a comprehensive reflection of the country’s economic decisions, patterns of utilisation, and often unspoken priorities.
References
Central Bank of Sri Lanka (CBSL) (2023) Annual Report 2023. Colombo: Central Bank of Sri Lanka.
International Monetary Fund (IMF) (2024) Sri Lanka: Debt Sustainability Analysis and Program Review. Washington, DC: IMF.
Ministry of Finance (2026) Sri Lanka Government Debt Report: September 2024 – March 2026. Colombo: Ministry of Finance, Sri Lanka.
World Bank (2023) Sri Lanka Development Update: Restoring Stability and Growth. Washington, DC: World Bank.
International Energy Agency (IEA) (2023) Sri Lanka Energy Profile. Paris: IEA.
by Professor Ranjith Bandara
Opinion
A journalist who wrote across the divide
by Jehan Perera
There are some journalists whose work we read and then move on. And there are others whose writing makes us stop, think and look at the country differently. D. B. S. Jeyaraj who passed away on 17 May 2026 was one of them. Whenever I saw an article by DBS, as he was widely known, appear in a newspaper, it was the first I read. He was primarily a columnist and political analyst, with a deep knowledge of the history of Sri Lanka’s ethnic conflict. But his columns were not simply analysis or opinion. They were rooted in what was happening in Sri Lanka and in what people involved in those developments were saying. We could see this in his frequent references to first-hand comments from people he had spoken to. He did this both when he lived in Sri Lanka and later, when he was living in Canada. That was no easy task.
In a 2013 interview, after returning to Sri Lanka for the first time in 25 years, DBS described how he had continued to report on Sri Lanka from Canada by maintaining contacts at home. He said that he broke his rest daily to communicate with contacts in Sri Lanka and that this dual existence of living physically in Canada and mentally in Sri Lanka took a heavy toll on his health and finances. But that commitment mattered and allowed him to write about Sri Lanka from afar without losing touch with what was happening on the ground. His writings gave readers a sense of what was happening in the north and east, as well as of politics more generally in Sri Lanka.
Speaking at the commemoration and book launch organised by the Tamil Media Alliance last week, Vijitha Yapa, the founding editor of The Island and Sunday Times, under whom DBS worked, captured an important quality of his journalism when he said, “DBS had no venom. That was his greatness.” He also recalled how DBS stood up to pressure and threats and continued writing about the Tamil community while insisting on fair play irrespective of race or religion. M. A. Sumanthiran, General Secretary of the ITAK, put another aspect of DBS’s contribution even more directly: “Truth is the first casualty of war. DBS fought to keep the truth alive.” He recalled that DBS always cross-checked his news and noted that even those who hated him read his columns to find the truth.
These observations capture two qualities that made DBS special. The first was his commitment to truth and, second, was his ability to write about a deeply divisive subject without venom. DBS was a Tamil writing about the north and east and the Tamil national question in a deeply polarised environment. Yet he wrote for the mainstream English-language press and was widely read not only by Tamils but also by people from other communities. His writing helped make the concerns, political aspirations and historical experiences of the Tamil community accessible to readers beyond it. His importance was not limited to his being a Tamil journalist. His writing mattered because it addressed the country as a whole. Issues and perspectives that might otherwise have remained within particular communities could become part of a wider national debate.
Another noteworthy feature of DBS was his ability to be realistic in his assessments. With his wide knowledge of history, he understood that each side in the national conflict had its own history, fears and perceptions of threat. He recognised that the conflict could not be properly understood through the narrative of one side alone. He understood that there could be no unilateral solution imposed by one side or the other. That realism is particularly important in a country where political positions have often been presented as if the concerns of one community could be resolved without addressing those of another. A journalist who understands this complexity needs to do more than simply take sides. He or she can help readers understand why the conflict has endured, why trust has been so difficult to establish, and why lasting peace requires more than one dominant story.
There was also something revealing about DBS’s return to Sri Lanka in 2013. In the interview he gave during that visit, he said he deliberately avoided politics. He wanted to experience the country from the perspective of an ordinary person rather than through the views of politicians or political associates. He observed a disconnect between the needs of the people and those of the political class. In retrospect, that observation was remarkably prescient. The disconnect he identified in 2013 would become dramatically visible in the Aragalaya of 2022.
In the same interview, he offered an observation that deserves to be remembered. A journalist may not be able to write all that he or she wants because of external constraints, he said. But no journalist should write what he or she does not want to write because of external pressure. His commitment to independent journalism came at a considerable personal cost. He was arrested and detained by the Sri Lankan Police in 1987 after his reporting on the war in Jaffna, and in 1993, while living in Canada, he was brutally assaulted by LTTE supporters who fractured both his legs.
For all these reasons, I consider DBS to have been a mentor of mine. I never said so to him. Mentors are not always people who formally teach us or with whom we have a close personal relationship. Sometimes they are people whose work we follow, whose judgement we respect and whose example helps shape our own understanding of what we should strive to do. DBS was such a person for me. His passing has left a gap. His journalism was informed by history but connected to the present, rooted in facts but open to interpretation, and concerned with the realities of all communities.
The collection of his writings launched in his memory by the Tamil Media Alliance is therefore more than a record of an important period in Sri Lanka’s history. It is also a reminder of what journalism can be at its best. DBS showed that a journalist could understand one community without becoming confined to it, analyse conflict without being partisan, and take a position without losing sight of complexity. Above all, he showed the value of journalism that seeks to keep the truth alive. For those who read him regularly, the greatest reminder of his absence is the absence of his next column.
Opinion
Who committed genocide and created mass graves in Sri Lanka?
by N. A. de S. Amaratunga
At a time when the word genocide is used with political motive and defensive war misconstrued as genocide, and a brutal genocide is taking place on a global scale with impunity, one should reflect on genocide committed by those who falsely accuse the Sri Lankan armed forces and the government for such crimes. The British who systematically annihilated people including “babies suckling”, in Uva-Wellassa in 1818 and the LTTE, which carried out numerous massacres to drive away the Sinhalese and Muslims in the so-called border villages are now shamelessly levelling unsubstantiated allegations of genocide against the Sri Lankan military. The British, jointly with the US, massacred about a million people, including children, in Iraq on a fabricated charge of possessing weapons of mass destruction. The British helped the LTTE continue their genocide of the Sinhalese and Muslims in the North and the East in an attempt to drive them away and grab their lands, and such crimes constitute genocide according to 1948 Genocide Convention.
“Slaughter every man, woman and child”
“Slaughter every man, woman, and child (including babies suckling at the breast)” was the order given by Governor Robert Brownrigg (3rd British Governor of Ceylon from 1813 – 1820) to Maj. Gen. Hay MacDowell in 1818. The British left the entire Uva-Wellassa region in a state of famine and starvation. The British used the scorched earth policy including mass murder and genocide of Sinhala civilians to crush the rebellion. British human rights campaigners now pointing accusing fingers at Sri Lanka have forgotten the Madulla Massacre, which led to razing and annihilating entire villages. In the entire Uva region members of the male population above the age of 18 were killed in revenge for resisting British imperial occupation under Governor Brownrigg.
Britain at present is leading a core group at the UNHRC Geneva, which bashes Sri Lanka for alleged human rights violations. Britain seems to have no remorse about its genocidal violence in Sri Lanka and happily leads the way in castigating Sri Lanka on unsubstantiated allegations of human right violations during the war against the LTTE. The US, which is the biggest war criminal in the world, is supporting these neo-colonial strategies to control and exploit the poor countries.
The Chemmani mass grave
The Chemmani mass grave has become a political tool liberally used by the pro-LTTE groups and their supporters in the West and also their local agents to pressure the government to take action against the war winning armed forces. Let the government be urged to get to the bottom of the mass graves found in the North and elsewhere. People of this country owe it to the armed forces who saved their country to ensure that the name of the national military is cleared. And if there are any war criminals among them, punish them after conviction. Sri Lanka is not Israel, the US or the UK.
The Genocide Convention was conceived largely in response to World War II, which saw atrocities such as the Holocaust that lacked an adequate description or legal definition. Polish-Jewish lawyer Raphael Lemkin, who coined the term genocide in 1944 to describe Nazi policies in occupied Europe and the Armenian genocide, campaigned for its recognition as a crime under international law. Lemkin also linked colonialism with genocide, mentioning colonial genocides outside of Europe in his writings. The Convention defines genocide as any of five “acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group.” These five acts include killing members of the group, causing them serious bodily or mental harm, imposing living conditions intended to destroy the group, preventing births, and forcibly transferring children out of the group. Victims are targeted because of their real or perceived membership of a group, not randomly.
Genocide in Gaza
However, Israel in collaboration with the United States, which has the worst record in genocidal warfare, has violated this Convention with impunity in Gaza, knowing that the rest of the world cannot act against it except condemn its actions. The UN has miserably failed to take any action against Israel, though it has the necessary tools like the Convention mentioned above. Its Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Turk visited the Chemmani mass grave and issued a strongly-worded statement calling for investigation under international supervision. He has not visited the place where genocide is currently taking place in broad daylight. Neither has the UNHRC made any worthwhile response in respect of Iraq, Syria, Libya and other parts of the world, where the US and Europe have been engaged in genocidal warfare. This type of double standards will further erode the credibility of the UNHRC, and if countries tend to ignore its writ, it has itself to blame.
We still don’t know the identities of the people whose skeletal remains have been found in the Chemmani mass grave. It was a prolonged war situation that created these graves. There were allegations of killings, including civilians, by both parties to the war.
The Office of Missing Persons has received about 10,000 complaints about missing persons from the north and east and investigations into these complaints are ongoing (source – reports of the OMP). Apart from verbal complaints there is very little incriminating evidence, if at all, against the armed forces. A few isolated incidents where excesses were committed have been investigated and action is being taken against the suspects.
Campaign by Pro-LTTE groups
Pro-LTTE groups are trying their utmost to connect the missing persons with the mass graves. They claim that the people who went missing were buried in the Chemmani mass grave. The Island journalist Shamindra Ferdinando dealt with this matter comprehensively in the Midweek Review on 9 September. He shows that the narrative built up by the pro-LTTE groups and the Western imperialists regarding the alleged disappearances could be more myth than fact.
The LTTE massacred hundreds of civilians in cold blood in many places, such as Sri Maha Bodhi, Aluth Oya, Aranthalawa (where the victims were Buddhist monks), Kattankudy mosque, Palliyagodella, Eravur, Gonagala and Kebethigollewa. Most of those killings, committed outside the war zone, were aimed at terrorising the ordinary people, and that amounts to genocide according to 1948 Genocide Convention. The LTTE carried out many bomb attacks on civilian targets, such as the Central Bus Station in Pettah, the Central Bank, crowded trains and buses. In the eastern villages people were bludgeoned and slashed to death so that ammunition could be saved.
Apart from killing and injuring, the LTTE chased away Muslims and Sinhalese from the Northern province, which amounted to ethnic cleansing, an act of genocide according to the above mentioned Convention. The people who were chased away have not yet returned to their homes and property, perhaps because of the memory of terror they had experienced in the North. Aren’t these acts of genocide ? The 1948 Convention defines genocide as any of five “acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group.”
Attacks on centres of worship like temples and mosques and killing of priests are unpardonable acts of terror aimed at destroying religious groups. Similarly murdering surrendered police officers is butchery of the worst kind. It was such acts of naked terrorism and insane mass murder that made the FBI label the LTTE “the most brutal terrorist organization in the world”.
Silence of UNHRC
Isn’t the UNHRC keen to ensure that justice is done for the victims of genocide committed by the LTTE? Perhaps, we should not make such a request to an organisation that keeps mum while genocide is rampant in the contemporary world ? Palestinians are being systematically murdered and driven away from their country with the UNHCR doing nothing to protect them. The US President is threatening the countries which support the Palestinians.
Sri Lanka must call for an international investigation into genocide committed by the LTTE.
Opinion
From Galkissa (Mount Lavinia) to Tambuttegama
‘Before I took this position, I knew so little about them that I didn’t even know their names. I had not met them in any context outside the present.’ (My translation.) President Dissanayake, recently speaking about judges of the Supreme Court and of the Appeals Court.
by Usvatte
Nothing announces more loudly the gaping distance between the social strata from which our rulers, prior to 2024 came, and those of the present government come. That response came from President Dissanayake when he was accused of raising the age of retirement of judges to help his favourites. He could not possibly have had favourites among persons wholly strangers to him. That charge, therefore, prima facie, must fail.
Those who ruled this country as politicians and senior public servants, judges, lawyers and other professionals, generally prior to 2024, commonly went to schools in Colombo or its neighbourhood. Leaders even from Jaffna, Anuradhapura, Kandy, Ratnapura and Galle had been educated in schools in Colombo or their equivalents in other urban centres. They had met each other either as relatives, friends, school mates, debaters or competitors on playgrounds. Three of four who were our first prime ministers attended S. Thomas’ College, Galkissa; the other Royal College, Colombo. Of the first four prime ministers, two went to Cambridge and one to Oxford. There, then followed a family, two of whom attended the highly reputed St. Bridget’s Convent, in Colombo, two others having attended S. Thomas,’ and Oxford, and one, the redoubtable Sciences Po in Paris. Two more came from Royal College, Colombo, and a third claimed that he attended St. Joseph’s, Maradana. So, did we spend the first near-half-century of an independent country. These ladies and gentlemen, together with many others, with roughly similar backgrounds, established a form of government new to our society. A part of the achievements of that leadership was an excellent (within the resources they had) public health scheme and a school system that, in time, reached almost every child.
Unlike the earlier rulers, Dissanayake attended government schools in Tambuttegama and Kelaniya University. He studied science and mathematics. He can differentiate an equation for you and speak intelligently about Paul Dirac and Higgs boson with the same felicity as accusations against former politicians. There is a Prime Minister who can talk to you impromptu on August Compte and Claude Le`vi-Strauss. She did go to prestigious schools in Colombo but decided to throw her lot with those that had not. (That was not uncommon in periods of radical change in several societies in the past.) There are ministers in this government who have travelled regularly by train, without snatching gold necklaces on women passengers. Others have pushed themselves into crowded buses, to get home before dark on roads unlit for miles. Many have taught in rural schools in Pooneryn or Nikaweratiya. Few have travelled by motor car to schools in major towns including Colombo and its environs. Few have lived in or have homes in major towns including the national capital. One MP says that she was born in a ‘line room’ in a tea plantation. One must know the poverty, squalor and violence of these habitats to measure the social distance she has travelled. The new political leaders are culturally very different from the old. (I avoid the term class because the term has connotations which are not seen here.) Those people are the salt of this earth, representative of common people in this country. We now have in Parliament a House of Representatives full of Commons. We look forward to them for leadership to move this society from the morass it is in.
A coterie of people from the deep south of the country, who were elected to office with much optimism, turned out to be a deep disappointment and turned this country into a kleptocracy and a haven for druggists and gangsters. The offspring of leading politicians in the group that went to those same good schools that I mentioned above, have been accused in our courts of heinous crimes. Some crowd our prisons. They evidently plundered the public purse, pushed the country into debt both local and foreign, corrupted processes of governance including the judiciary and let the country into a venomously poisonous murky backwater from which young people flee as soon as they can collect the airfare for a one way ticket to Dubai or obtain a visa to South Korea.
The present government was formed by young people who have yet to be tried. The electorate, by an overwhelming majority, elected them to Parliament. The President was elected by a thin margin. In my understanding, this government has yet to suffer sinking damage. They have faced several squalls and one or two have been thrown overboard but the ship has survived and plunged ahead in heavy seas. A major storm has been brewed and the government has been battered. But the rudder is in place, the engine room is dry, there is ample fuel and the crew is fresh and willing. On the radar, I read heavier storms developing ahead and these will severely test the skills of the captain and his mates. Despite loud and wide claims to the contrary, I do not see a sharper captain or more skilled and less tainted sailors who can guide this ship safely over choppy seas over the next few years. A capacity to speak English fluently, hold a firm handshake and wear a necktie neatly do make a good brown sahib (Tarzie Vittachi) but not necessarily a Manmohan Singh or a Zhu Rongji or, indeed, a Lee Kwan Yu. Those that batter the government, except for a few outstanding scholars and fine lawyers, are laden with so much foul lead that any vessel carrying them must instantly seek the bottom. The new politicians have not been tested with temptation. Who can, I certainly cannot, give them a carte blanche of good behaviour? Time will test them? The government has demonstrated competence ample to win that chance.
There is much talk that the government did not consult stakeholders when they introduced legislation to raise the age at which judges in courts will retire. Who expects a government to foresee every emergency and write it into its election manifesto? What indeed is at stake and who holds the stakes? The government holds forth that what is at stake is the administration of fair justice to both those who come to courts accused of crimes and those who seek redress for harm inflicted on them by those who broke the law. They are the janathava who hold the highest stakes. ‘Will my case be heard to a close and the accused be duly punished? And where is justice? Will the accused die before the case will be heard to a close in 2038, when I myself might be dead? Will those who plundered the government Treasury and their progeny live in splendid luxury while those who lost loved ones, limbs and all they possessed suffer both misery and penury? Is that not foul justice? Is that just at all?’ The government, both in public and implicitly, has consulted these stakeholders amply. The fast disposal of cases of where politicians and others had committed serious crimes was a major plank in the platform on which the JJB sought election. I don’t recall that any party either at a general election or the one to elect a president challenged that course. True enough, they did not seek a mandate to paint the east window of the magistrate’s court in Meegahakotuva.
How many of you have read in an election manifesto in the United Kingdom, Angola, Paraguay or Mongolia an undertaking to raise the wages of judges of the supreme court? Lawyers are not stakeholders in this principal contest. They, of course, are more than amicus curiae.
Highly regarded scholars in law, eminent lawyers in practice, trade unions and politicians who want to test the last chance they have to come to power now protest that the rule of law is at risk of loss, that the executive and legislative branches of government may subject the judicial branch under their subjugation and with that bury democratic governance. Like most eventualities that are possible. But what is the probability that that eventuality will come about? (An unkind professor once said, ‘It is possible that all of you will win first class honours. But what is probable is that one will.) Were the government to raise the age of retirement of judges, in what manner is the rule of law denied; in what manner will democracy cease to be? The probability that any political party that may come to power will kill the independence of the judiciary, deny the rule of law and establish a dictatorship is exactly the same as the NPP government may do so. The president of BASL made a declaration, a few weeks back, that the 22nd Amendment to the Constitution, which is the offending piece of legislation, would no longer be inimical to democracy, if it were to be effective from 01 January 2027. Is there a long rahu kala in kethu dasa inimical to democracy from September 01 to December 31, 2026? What is the poison in the proposed 22nd Amendment that will be wafted away between now and 01 January 2027? In the absence of a satisfactory answer to that question, what is the objection to the proposed Amendment?
Among the three branches of government, the judiciary is the weakest. It has no tanks; it has no money. The executive branch appoints them and the legislative, may lawfully, remove them. Yet the judiciary branch is so important for democratic governance that the fundamental laws of governance (the Constitution), courts themselves under the law and long custom, bind the other two branches and the general public to good behaviour. Democratic governance is possible only when those three branches check each the others’ excesses and support their good functioning. The judicial branch is no less important than the other two.
A well-functioning judiciary is at stake. The government has put out the beginning of a solution. BASL and the learned professors with it, possibly could not have a stake in delaying judicial procedures and denying justice to close perhaps to 5 million citizens. The stakes they play for must be different. The public will be grateful if they would disclose them.
In time, I expect new casus belli and more violent skirmishes, because the lines now have been drawn.
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