Features
Grandpa’s Grandpass
by Dr Srilal Fernando
Though I was born in Panadura, a small village south of Colombo, my parents moved to a property in Colombo to facilitate my travelling to school. The property was located between Grandpass and Mutwal and formed part of a large estate called Mahawatte which was a grant of 58 acres to my grandfather’s grandfather’s grandfather, Renaldus D’Andrado in 1788.
Delving into the family papers, the originals of which are in the Sri Lanka National Archives, was a fascinating journey into the history of the family and the areas around Grandpass. The documents form a folio called the D’Andrado Manuscripts, and these were published in the National Archives Journal Vol II of 1984 edited by J.H.O. Paulusz – retired Government archivist. Among these papers are the Act of appointment of Renaldus D’Andrado as Mudaliyar dated January 15, 1787, his last will, a plan of partition of his estate among his descendants, and the genealogical table of the de Fonseka, D’Andrado and related families. He was also nominated as one of the executors of his will by the Maha Mudliyar, the redoubtable Nicholas Dias Abeysinghe1 a remarkable man who died in 1795. The book Chieftains of Ceyon by J.C. Van Sandon has an account of him.
All six children of my grandfather Francis Samuel de Fonseka, had land along Mahawatte Road. I grew up there, and on return from England, built a house on the lawn of my mother’s property. My grandfather however never resided in Mahawatte, choosing to live in a house called “St Patrick’s” overlooking the Kelani River, close to the former country residence of Dutch Governors. His eldest son Patrick John de Fonseka was born on St Patrick’s Day.
Grandpass derives its name from the Portuguese who called it Grande Passo, and in British times came to be known as Grandpass. Before the arrival of the Europeans it was called Nagalagam Tota implying that it was a place of crossing the Kelani River even then. The road that runs from the river is called Nagalagam Street and joins Grandpass Road which continues to Pettah and Colombo Fort. In British times and till the 1950’s, trams ran along Nagalagam Street from Grandpass to Fort. As a child I recollect travelling in this tram. This was later replaced by trolley buses which ran along Prince of Wales Avenue later named Sirimavo Bandaranaike Mawatha. The name Grandpass suggested that there existed a small pass and indeed there was one called Petit Pas. It was at the point where there was a sluice gate over the San Sebastian Canal close to the present Colombo Kachcheri. A painting of the original building De Uytvlught on the Rijksmuseum in Amsterdam shows a splendid building which in 1852 was altered and now forms the Colombo Kachcheri. A painting of the sluice gate by J.L.K. Van Dort in 1888 exists in the Royal Institute of Linguistics and Anthropology in Leidan.
San Sebastian Canal is a man made canal which connected the Kelani River to the Beira Lake. In older times the Beira Lake was much bigger than it is now, and connected to the Colombo Harbour close to the place where the old Parliament building stands. It was the most important waterway through which export produce was transported for shipping. Parts of the waterway still exists, but landfill has made it narrow and since the advent of the road transport, its commercial importance has deteriorated.
San Sebastian Canal joined the Kelani River at Grandpass and this became the hub where all produce transported along the river in flat bottom barges (Paruwas) was transferred on to the canals. Cinnamon, food, sand and building products were transported this way.
Grandpass was also the main ferry across the Kelani River. It was the main Gateway to Colombo and the caretaker of the ferry had an important role to play and became an income generating source for the Dutch Company. His duties included checking the locals for arms and ammunition. Iron, gunpowder and saltpetre could not be transported into the city and duties were imposed. Arrack transported into the city was taxed at this point. A toll was charged for the use of the ferry.
In British times it continued its importance and in 1822 the river was spanned by a “bridge of boats”, a pontoon bridge which was in use till 1895. A painting of this, by the Irish artist Andrew Nicholl in
1848 is in the Colombo Museum. An original sketch done by him, now in my possession is reproduced here. The bridge of boats consisted of 21 boats anchored side by side, and a carriageway about 500 feet long ran from Grandpass to the other side of the river. For one hour each day the land traffic was stopped and two boats moved to allow river traffic. In 1895 the Victoria Bridge was built and took its place.
There were several other ferry points across the Kelani River. One was down river near Mutwal and connected the present day Sri Wickrema Mawata to Wattala on the other side. It was called Pas Betal and was the place where the Dutch having captured Negombo entered the outskirts of Colombo. Many years later the British did the same. Other ferries existed up river at Kelani Mulla, Kaduwela and Hangwella.
Ferry Crossing at Grandpass, Watercolour, 1755, Rijksmuseum
Grandpass and its surroundings in Dutch times was the favoured area for the Governors and senior officials to build their country residences. It was easily accessed with good roads, received a cool breeze in a hot climate ,and everything grew abundantly.
Governor Rickloff Van Goens 1664-1675 had a large property which was called Van Goens Village or Van Goensdorp. His son who too became Governor improved the property. Governor Iman Falck 1765-85 had a villa in Grandpass with cinnamon planted in the garden. He encouraged the cultivation of cinnamon. Till that time what was harvested was the cinnamon growing wild.
Governor Johann Van Angelbeek 1795-1796 had a country house at Grandpass. There is a detailed description of this house in Rev. James Cordiner’s, A Description of Ceylon published in 1807.
“At grandpass stands a country seat built by the late Dutch Governor Van Angelbeek. Besides a row of offices and a handsome farmyard there are two houses of one floor each for the accommodation of the family. These lie parallel to one another, and it is necessary to pass through the first to get to the second, which is raised on an embankment of the river. The stream is seen gliding along from the windows and is broad, deep and rapid. The opposite banks are clothed in thick woods.” He also mentions that after the takeover by the British, General Hay MacDowell and his staff lived there for several months at a time.
Governor’s House at Grandpass, Watercolour, Rijksmuseum
“General MacDowell was in the habit of receiving boxes of trees and shrubs by almost every ship; and one acre and a half of ground was completely filled with them”.
He introduced Mangosteen to Ceylon and it is most likely that the first plants were at Grandpass. He is also credited with introducing many other plants, including nutmeg, cloves, apples, asparagus to Ceylon.
J.P. Lewis in his notes on Pioneers of Natural History in Ceylon says that General MacDowell on his departure in 1804 left directions with his nephew John MacDowell of the Civil Service “to give a few plants of each sort to every person who promised to nourish them”.
“His house it may be mentioned was at Grandpass, a country seat built by the late Dutch Governor Van Angelbeek”.
Lewis also mentions that Joseph Jonville, a Frenchman, was the first Superintendent of the Botanical Garden started by Governor North on the opposite bank at Peliyagoda called “Ortafoula”. Later, on Jonville’s condemnation of the first site the gardens were moved to Slave Island and named “Kew”.
Cordiner mentions that on the opposite bank of the river Governor North built a temporary bungalow where he held grand entertainments. “Excellent boats carried the party, a band and other luxuries of the feast.”.
He mentions that “on the main roads, one leading to Grandpass and the other leading to Cotta, there are many commodious houses inhabited by the Dutch and European families.
The local elite too had houses in and around Grandpass and the area leading up to Hultsdorf.
A watercolour painting of the last Dutch Governor’s house in 1757 is in the Rijksmuseum in Amsterdam. It is reproduced in Dr R.K. de Silva’s book. Two engravings, one from the front and the other from the rear is presented in Valentijn’s book of travel in 1726.
The location of the house is described in Dr R.K. de Silva’s book as North East of the present Madampitiya Road and the ferry at Grandpass. The scene shows the house looking North East from Nagalagam Street with the San Sebastian Canal on the right with the bridge over it.
Incidentally, the Town house in Colombo Fort belonging to the last Dutch Governor Van Angelbeek became the house occupied by General MacDowell for a time. It became vested in the British Government and became the King’s House, Queen’s House and now President’s House.
Large houses with extensive land, with numerous specimens of flora and fauna dotted the area extending up to Mutwal.
In British times, there is a detailed description of the Whist Bungalow in Ernst Haekel’s book “A Visit to Ceylon.” He stayed there for two weeks, a guest at the then owner Stipperger, the agent for Austrian Lloyd Shipping Company. Haeckel, a naturalist and Professor in the University of Jena, gives a very detailed description of the house and the gardens. His detailed botanical drawings inspired the Spanish Architect Antoni Gaudi. Another house in Mutwal still preserved is Elie House.
This was the preferred area of residence well into the 19th Century with schools such as St Thomas’ College starting off there. The then Catholic Bishop of Colombo acquired land to start St Joseph’s College, but eventually chose a more central location on cheaper land reclaimed from the Beira Lake. In the late 19th Century as cheap land cleared of cinnamon became available more people moved to the new area. Another factor was that the move of the main port from Galle to Colombo and the replacement of sailing ships to coal driven steam ships. This required coal bunkering. Coal was stored in old ships along the coast line near Mutwal and the wind blew the coal dust on to the shore and this became very unhygienic. Added to this, was the large scale commercialisation of the buildings leading to overcrowding and the large houses and gardens being carved up. Property prices had escalated and it was much more affordable to buy property in the recently opened Cinnamon Gardens.
Grandpass is described in most of the books on early Ceylon including the book by Robert Percival in 1803, the first book on Ceylon after the British take over.
Governor North brought in Robert Arbuthnot as the Chief Secretary for Ceylon. He in turn brought his brother George as Deputy Secretary, George kept a detailed diary which was later published by his heirs. He describes the houses occupied by General MacDowell, as quoted in the article “When North was Governor” by J.P. Lewis in the Ceylon and Antiquarian Literary Register in 1923.
An article by L.T. Gratien “Colombo in the 17th Century” in the C.A.L.R. States “at Grandpass was a noble house where Kandyan envoys used to reside when they visited Colombo. Later on, a house on Wolvendaal hill was set apart for the convoys and the house at Grandpass became the Dutch Governor’s country seat. There begun the cultivation of silkworms which gave Sedawatte its name and here in the next century was formed the first Cinnamon Estate.”
With the passage of time the areas around Grandpass has become less than salubrious. Large warehouses have come up and the area commercialised. The slums have been replaced by low to middle class housing complexes. It is no longer “Grand” and many will “Pass” by without any inkling of the rich history of the area.
References
1. The d’Andrado Manuscripts – J.H.O. Paulusz
The Sri Lanka Archives Volume 11 1984
2. Notes on some Singhalese families
Paul Pieris
3. The Chieftains of Ceylon – J.C. Van Sanden
1936
4. Changing Face of Colombo R.L. Brohier
1984
5. Old and New East Indies
Francois Valentijn 1724
6. Illustrations and Views of Dutch Ceylon 1602-1796
Dr R.K. de Silva and WGM Beumer 1988
7. Website deFonseka.com – Courtesy Jayashanth deFonseka
8. Account of Ceylon Robert Percival
1803
9. A Description of Ceylon – James Cordiner 1807
10. A Visit to Ceylon – Ernst Haekel 1883
11. When North was Governor – J.P. Lewis
Ceylon Antiquary and Literary Register 1923
12. Colombo in the 17th Century – L.J. Gratien
Ceylon Antiquary and Literary Register Volume VIII Part IV 1923
13. Good ole Grandpass Dr K.D. Paranavitana Newspaper Article 2006
14. Some pioneers of the Natural History of Ceylon – J.P. Lewis
Spolia Zeylanica 1915
Features
US-Iran war, global exchange rates and Sri Lankan Rupee
When the strait shuts:
In the early hours of February 28, 2026, the world changed. Joint United States and Israeli airstrikes on Iran, meticulously planned, devastatingly executed, killed Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, destroyed large swathes of Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, and triggered the most consequential military confrontation in the Middle East since the Iraq War. What followed was not merely a regional conflict. It was an economic earthquake felt from the trading floors of New York to the fuel queues of Colombo.
We are going to examine how a war fought in the Persian Gulf rewrote exchange rates across the global economy, and why a small island in the Indian Ocean, still recovering from its own financial near-death experience four years ago, found itself once again staring into an economic abyss.
From Maximum Pressure to Maximum Destruction
On February 28, the strikes began. The operation was vast and transformative. Iran’s air defences were systematically destroyed. Its missile production facilities were crippled. And its political leadership was decapitated. In response, Tehran did something it had always threatened but never done: it closed the Strait of Hormuz.
That decision, to block the 21-mile-wide waterway through which approximately 20% of global oil supplies flow, set off a chain of economic consequences that no government, central bank, or multilateral institution had fully stress-tested for.
The Oil Shock and What It Did to Currency Markets
The numbers tell the story with stark clarity. Brent crude, which had been trading at $71.32 per barrel on February 27, jumped 8% to $77.24 in the first two trading days of the conflict. Within a week, following the declaration that the Strait was “closed,” WTI crude surged more than 35%, the biggest weekly gain since the futures contract began in 1983, ending the week at $90.90. Brent climbed 28% to $92.69 in the same period. By early March, Brent had surged past $120 per barrel. The International Energy Agency characterised it as the “largest supply disruption in the history of the global oil market.”
This was not merely an oil price story. Oil is the world’s most foundational commodity, priced in US dollars, embedded in the cost of virtually every manufactured good, agricultural product, and service. When oil prices surge by 45%, as they did between February and April 2026, the consequences ripple through exchange rates with a logic that is both mechanical and unforgiving.
For oil-importing emerging market currencies, the mathematics were brutal. When oil prices rise in dollars and a country pays for oil in dollars, there are two simultaneous pressures on the exchange rate. First, the country must acquire more dollars to pay for the same volume of imports, increasing demand for the greenback and putting downward pressure on the domestic currency. Second, higher oil prices widen the current account deficit, removing the trade-balance support that usually anchors currencies. This double blow struck Asian, African, and Latin American currencies with particular force. Gasoline prices rose in 106 countries in the three weeks following the start of the conflict. The European Central Bank postponed planned interest rate cuts, raised its inflation forecast, and cut its growth projections.
Oil exporters told a different story. The Gulf states, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Kuwait, saw windfall revenues at the very moment their physical infrastructure was under threat. Iran’s strikes on Saudi Arabian oil refineries and energy facilities injected volatility into the already fractured GCC calculus: higher oil revenues on one hand, higher security costs and diplomatic complexity on the other.
The Ceasefire and Its Limits
After five weeks of fighting, Pakistan and China delivered a joint peace initiative on March 31, 2026. On April 7–8, the United States and Iran agreed to a two-week ceasefire, with Iran committing to reopen the Strait of Hormuz. Markets reacted with violent relief. The S&P 500 and Nasdaq surged 3–4% in futures markets overnight. Oil prices fell nearly 25% from their peak. Equities that had slid 8–12% from pre-conflict highs began recovering.
But the ceasefire was “relief, not resolution.” The Strait of Hormuz remained at just 5% of pre-conflict shipping traffic five weeks after the ceasefire announcement. Supply chains do not unsnarl overnight. On May 7, the United States conducted further airstrikes on military sites in southern Iran and Tehran following Iranian targeting of US warships. A memorandum of understanding, intended to bring the conflict to a formal end within 60 days, was announced by mediators on June 14, with signing set for June 19. As of this writing, the conflict has not been formally resolved and nuclear negotiations are expected to begin under the framework.
Goldman Sachs projected that under an adverse scenario, 10 weeks of disruption and infrastructure damage, Brent could peak at $160 per barrel before settling at $115 in the fourth quarter of 2026. Even the base case of $105–115 per barrel through mid-year represents a sustained energy shock with no parallel in the post-2008 global economy.
Sri Lanka: The Compound Vulnerability
Sri Lanka has a particular relationship with oil price shocks that is unlike almost any other country of its size. It imports 100% of its oil. Its domestic energy infrastructure is built almost entirely around petroleum products. Its foreign exchange reserves, rebuilt painstakingly from near-zero during the 2022 crisis to $6.46 billion by the time the NPP government assumed office, have since grown sluggishly reaching only $6.87 billion by early 2026, a modest gain that offered little buffer against a shock of this magnitude, remain thin relative to the country’s import requirements. And it routes the overwhelming majority of its oil imports through the Strait of Hormuz.
When that strait closed in March, 2026, Sri Lanka’s exposure was immediate, structural, and arithmetically severe. The fuel import bill jumped 74.7% year-on-year to US$630 million in March, 2026, alone. Reserves fell 3.8% to approximately $6.7 billion after the country spent $1.5 billion on fuel imports in the first four months of the year. Sri Lanka’s monthly storage capacity covers only one month of consumption, making it acutely vulnerable to supply disruptions that persist beyond a few weeks.
The exchange rate impact was direct and rapid. The Sri Lankan rupee, which had traded at approximately Rs. 300 to the US dollar at the start of 2026, fell sharply from early March. The currency tumbled 8.7% from its pre-conflict level within weeks. By late May 2026, commercial bank selling rates stood at approximately Rs. 334 per dollar, a 5.4% year-to-date depreciation against the greenback.
Every rupee of depreciation compounds the damage: a dollar-priced barrel of oil that cost Rs. 21,300 at Rs. 300/$ costs Rs. 23,700 at Rs. 334/$, before accounting for the price rise in the barrel itself.
The compounding of the exchange rate depreciation on top of the oil price surge created a fuel price crisis that has no precedent in the post-2022 recovery period. Petrol 92 at CEYPETCO stations, which stood at Rs. 293 per litre 12 weeks before, had risen to Rs. 434 per litre by late May, a 48% increase in the space of three months. The true import and distribution cost of diesel was approximately Rs. 750 per litre, requiring a government subsidy of Rs. 57 billion over a three-month period to keep pump prices at Rs. 407.
The Central Bank’s Painful Choice
The Central Bank of Sri Lanka faced the classic emerging market dilemma that oil shocks create: a currency under pressure from capital outflows and import costs, combined with inflation driven by energy prices, in a context where raising interest rates to defend the currency would choke off the economic recovery that the country had barely begun.
On May 26, 2026, the CBSL made its call. It raised the overnight policy rate by 100 basis points to 8.75%, its first monetary tightening in three years, and the largest single hike since the depths of the financial crisis in March 2023. Seven out of twelve economists polled by Reuters had predicted only a 25-basis-point move. The shock was deliberate: the CBSL was signalling that price stability had been elevated over growth promotion.
The consequences were immediate. The Colombo Stock Exchange fell 0.8% on the day of the announcement. Growth forecasts were cut, from 4.2% to 3.0% by at least one major equity research firm. The Central Bank Governor acknowledged that the 4–5% growth projection for 2026 was now achievable only “at the lower band.” Capital Economics observed that the rate hike “highlights the country’s vulnerability to the crisis in the Middle East, and is unlikely to be the last unless the crisis subsides soon.
More encouragingly, BMI (a Fitch Solutions unit) projected that the rupee could recover to Rs. 320 per dollar by year-end, on the assumption that the Iran war concludes by June and oil prices ease. An IMF board meeting was scheduled to approve a $700 million tranche to Sri Lanka under the ongoing $2.9 billion programme, a lifeline that, if disbursed, would provide critical reserve support.
The Broader Lesson
What the 2026 Iran war has demonstrated, with a clarity that no academic model can replicate, is that geopolitical shocks are not symmetric in their exchange rate effects. The same event that provides a windfall for oil exporters imposes a compound penalty on oil importers, and the penalty is largest for countries whose currencies are weakest, whose reserves are thinnest, whose import dependence is highest, and whose recovery from previous crises is most recent.
Sri Lanka is, in 2026, the canonical case study. It has done almost everything right since 2022: restructured its debt, rebuilt reserves, maintained an IMF programme, restored exchange rate stability, and begun recovering economically. None of that inoculated it against an exogenous shock of this magnitude. The rupee’s 8.7% fall from pre-conflict levels, the $1.5 billion fuel import bill in four months, the 100-basis-point emergency rate hike, these are the costs a small, import-dependent, oil-importing island economy pays when the world’s energy arteries are severed by war.
There is a policy lesson embedded in these numbers. Sri Lanka’s energy vulnerability, its total dependence on imported fossil fuels routed through a single geopolitical chokepoint, is not merely an economic problem. It is a national security problem. The Strait of Hormuz is not a permanent fixture of reliable global trade. The 2026 war has proven, at enormous cost, that it can be closed. Any serious national energy strategy must treat that closure not as a tail risk but as a planning scenario.
The hard work of diversifying energy sources, accelerating renewable capacity, building strategic petroleum reserves, and reducing the share of petroleum in the import bill is not merely desirable. Since February 28, 2026, it has become existential.
(The writer, a senior Chartered Accountant and professional banker, is Professor at SLIIT, Malabe.
Views expressed in this article are personal.)
Features
Forest cover loss threatens rare freshwater fish in Sinharaja streams
When discussions turn to Sri Lanka’s freshwater fish diversity and the urgent need to conserve it, attention is often focused on rivers, streams, reservoirs and water quality.
Yet scientists are increasingly finding that what happens on the land surrounding these waterways can be just as important as what happens in the water itself.
A recent study led by researcher Janamina Bandara of the Wildlife Conservation Society, Galle, together with researchers Sudath Nanayakkara and Sahan Randeniya, highlights how changes in forest cover caused by human activities can significantly influence freshwater fish populations in the hill streams surrounding the Sinharaja rainforest.
Their research sheds light on a relatively understudied aspect of tropical freshwater ecosystems—how alterations to vegetation cover, particularly through commercial cultivation such as tea and cardamom plantations, affect fish communities inhabiting headwater streams.
Hidden Riches of Tropical Streams

Forest plant saplings
Sri Lanka’s freshwater ecosystems are globally recognised for their remarkable biodiversity and high levels of endemism. However, despite their ecological significance, many ecological processes operating within these habitats remain poorly understood.
“Freshwater ecosystems in the tropics harbour extraordinary biodiversity, but many of the ecological relationships within these systems are still not fully documented,” researcher Janamina Bandara told The Island.
The study focused on sub-montane streams in the Sinharaja landscape, examining how varying levels of forest cover influence freshwater fish assemblages.
Researchers investigated whether fish communities differed between streams flowing through relatively undisturbed forests and those surrounded by modified vegetation resulting from agricultural activities.
Spotlight on a Critically Endangered Species

Leaf litter bay / Restoration activities
Particular attention was given to the critically endangered Rakwana loach (Schistura madhavai), a highly restricted endemic fish species first described from the Suriyakanda-Rakwana region.
Commonly referred to as a hill-stream loach, the species inhabits clear, fast-flowing streams and is considered highly sensitive to environmental disturbances.
According to Bandara, while broad community-level analyses did not reveal dramatic differences across all fish populations, species-specific responses painted a very different picture.
“Our findings show that Schistura madhavai exhibits a clear preference for streams flowing through intact forest habitats,” he explained. “The species becomes less common in areas where surrounding vegetation has been altered by human activities.”
Why Forests Matter to Fish
Forests bordering streams play multiple ecological roles. They regulate water temperature by providing shade, contribute organic matter that supports aquatic food webs, stabilise stream banks and help maintain water quality.
When these forests are removed or replaced with plantation crops, the resulting environmental changes can cascade through freshwater ecosystems.
Bandara noted that altered forest cover can influence water chemistry, microclimatic conditions, stream-bed composition and the availability of food resources.
“As riparian vegetation changes, a series of environmental conditions within the stream also change. Sensitive species such as Schistura madhavai appear particularly vulnerable to these shifts and may gradually disappear from modified habitats,” he said.
The research suggests that even subtle changes in habitat structure can have disproportionate impacts on species with narrow ecological requirements.
The Importance of Looking Beyond Numbers

Schistura madhavai
One of the most intriguing findings of the study is that ecosystem degradation may not always be apparent when scientists assess entire fish communities collectively.
In some instances, environmental variables appeared to have little effect on overall fish abundance or diversity. However, when individual species were examined separately, clear patterns emerged.
For example, variations in the amount of detritus—organic matter that accumulates on stream beds and serves as a vital food resource—did not significantly affect the overall fish assemblage. Yet for certain species, including habitat specialists, such changes proved critically important.
“This highlights a key conservation challenge,” Bandara said. “If we only look at total fish numbers or community-wide patterns, we may overlook serious declines occurring among environmentally sensitive species.”
Indicator Species as Ecological Sentinels
The findings underscore the importance of using so-called “indicator species” in environmental monitoring programmes.
Indicator species are organisms whose presence, absence or abundance reflects the health of an ecosystem. Because they respond rapidly to environmental change, they can provide early warnings of ecological degradation.
The Rakwana loach appears to fit this role exceptionally well.
“Species with narrow habitat requirements often act as ecological sentinels,” Bandara observed. “Monitoring them can provide a much clearer picture of ecosystem health than relying solely on broad biodiversity assessments.”
For conservation practitioners, this means that protecting sensitive endemic species may also help safeguard entire freshwater ecosystems.
Restoring Streamside Forests
Perhaps the study’s most important conservation message concerns the restoration of degraded riparian forests—the vegetation growing alongside streams and rivers.
Researchers argue that restoring these streamside habitats should be a priority in freshwater biodiversity conservation efforts.
Healthy riparian vegetation provides shade, reduces erosion, filters pollutants, enhances habitat complexity and supports the intricate ecological interactions upon which aquatic life depends.
“The restoration of degraded riparian forests is likely to be one of the most effective conservation measures for protecting freshwater biodiversity,” Bandara emphasised.
Such efforts could prove particularly valuable in landscapes where agricultural expansion has fragmented natural habitats.

Awareness sessions
A Broader Lesson for Conservation
The study offers a timely reminder that freshwater conservation cannot be achieved by focusing exclusively on water bodies themselves. The surrounding landscape matters immensely.
From the mist-laden streams flowing down the Sinharaja foothills to the countless rivulets nourishing Sri Lanka’s river systems, the fate of freshwater biodiversity is intimately linked to the health of adjacent forests.
As conservationists grapple with accelerating habitat loss and climate-related pressures, the research demonstrates that protecting and restoring forest cover may be just as important as safeguarding the streams themselves.
In the case of the elusive Rakwana loach, the message is clear: save the forest, and you may save the fish.
For Sri Lanka’s unique freshwater biodiversity, that lesson could not be more important.
By Ifham Nizam
Features
Turning Promises into Justice
Sri Lankans have reason to take satisfaction in their country’s latest international achievement. Sri Lanka has climbed 14 places in the 2026 Global Peace Index to rank 67 in the world out of 163 countries that were assessed. At a time when global peacefulness is reported to be at its lowest level since the inception of the Index, and when more countries are experiencing deterioration than improvement, Sri Lanka’s progress stands out. The ranking reflects the country’s recovery from nearly three decades of war, its efforts to strengthen political stability and public security, and its resilience in overcoming the economic and political crises of recent years. The Global Peace Index assesses the strength of institutions, societal safety and security, and the capacity of societies to manage conflict peacefully.
The challenge is to consolidate the gains that have been made and address those unresolved issues that continue to cast a shadow over the country’s future. It is in this context that two recent announcements by the government assume particular significance. Foreign Minister Vijitha Herath has announced that the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA), one of the most controversial laws in the country, will be repealed and replaced within two months. A report prepared by a committee appointed to make recommendations has already been handed over to him. According to the minister, the new legislation, to be known as the State Prevention of Terrorism Act, incorporates recommendations from civil society and is intended to comply with international standards on counter terrorism.
At the same time, Justice and National Integration Minister Harshana Nanayakkara has reaffirmed the government’s commitment to uncovering the truth about missing persons. During a visit to the Chemmani mass grave excavation site in Jaffna, he stated that the excavations should be completed expeditiously so that justice can be done and assured that the necessary resources have been allocated for the task. The excavations are taking place under judicial supervision with the participation of forensic experts, archaeologists, lawyers and representatives of the Office on Missing Persons. These commitments made by the government address two of the most contentious issues that have troubled Sri Lanka for decades. They also suggest that the government believes the country is now in a position to deal with difficult questions from its past rather than postpone them indefinitely.
After Breakthroughs
The timing of the pledge to repeal the PTA is particularly noteworthy. For many years successive governments promised to replace the law but failed to do so. Sri Lanka undertook to repeal it in 2017 as part of its commitments linked to retaining GSP Plus trade concessions by the European Union. Yet despite repeated assurances the law remained in force. The question therefore arises as to why the government now appears determined to act. One possible explanation is that the Easter Sunday investigations have reached a decisive stage. The investigation into the bombings that killed more than 260 people in 2019 appears to have made significant breakthroughs. If these investigations continue along their present course, it is possible that accountability will extend beyond those who directly carried out the attacks to those who may have facilitated, enabled or been part of a wider criminal conspiracy.
There is broad agreement within society that those who masterminded the dastardly Easter bombing must be held accountable and that the victims deserve the truth and justice. However, it is important that the process by which responsibility is determined is seen by the public to be fair, lawful and impartial. If those accused are convicted following a transparent judicial process that respects due process and the rule of law, the outcome is far more likely to gain acceptance across society. This is where the repeal of the PTA becomes important. A transition from a law associated with prolonged detention and exceptional powers to one that is more consistent with human rights standards would strengthen rather than weaken the legitimacy of the investigations. Accountability obtained through a process that is visibly fair will be more durable and less vulnerable to allegations of political motivation or selective justice.
The Chemmani excavations may also provide an example of how such credibility can be built. The process is taking place under judicial supervision and in full public view with the participation of independent experts. Whatever conclusions emerge, and follow up action is decided on, the process itself should command respect because it is transparent and accountable. The same principles can be applied to the Easter Sunday investigations. Public confidence is strengthened when investigations are conducted openly, when legal safeguards are respected and when the rights of both victims and accused persons are protected. The significance of these investigations may extend beyond the tragedy itself. There is likely to be an overlap between those who are eventually found responsible for the Easter Sunday conspiracy and elements of the state apparatus that exercised power during the final stages of the war.
Setting Precedent
For many years Sri Lanka has struggled to address allegations of wartime abuses. The issue has remained politically sensitive because it touches upon the conduct of those who were regarded by many as wartime heroes. Yet if the Easter Sunday investigations establish that senior officials can be investigated and held accountable when evidence warrants it, an important precedent will have been set. Once the deck is cleared through the Easter Sunday investigations and the judicial process that follows, it may become less difficult to address allegations relating to wartime abuses, including those connected to sites such as Chemmani where evidence is now being painstakingly uncovered. This would also strengthen Sri Lanka’s position internationally.
Since the end of the war in 2009, the country has remained under varying degrees of scrutiny by the United Nations Human Rights Council. In October 2025, the Council renewed the mandate of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights to continue collecting and preserving evidence relating to past violations. The next review of Sri Lanka is due in September this year. The government now has an opportunity to demonstrate that Sri Lanka is capable of addressing difficult issues through its own institutions and according to its own democratic values. The commitments to repeal the PTA and to pursue investigations into missing persons can be seen in that light. Those who were victimized query as to what happened to their loved ones and to the information they know full well they entrusted to the government authorities and to the commissions of inquiry that were appointed. These are opportunities to show that accountability and national ownership can go hand in hand.
Reconciliation requires the difficult task of remembering truthfully. Too often Sri Lanka has sought stability by postponing difficult questions. Yet unresolved grievances do not disappear. They persist across generations and continue to shape political attitudes and communal relationships. Sri Lanka’s rise in the Global Peace Index is an achievement worth celebrating. But the true measure of peace is not only the absence of conflict. It is the presence of justice, trust and confidence in public institutions. The government’s commitments on PTA repeal, the Easter Sunday investigations and the search for truth regarding the disappeared suggest an awareness that old approaches have run their course. The government has an opportunity to break with the patterns of the past. The test now lies in implementation.
by Jehan Perera
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