Features
Experimenting with State-Owned Enterprises
by Neville Ladduwahetty
The total number of Sri Lanka’s State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) is reported to be 527. Of these, 55 are categorized as strategically important. According to Public Finance Data and Analysis, only 11 out of 52 SOEs have Published Financial Data up to 2022. Consequently, except for the common knowledge that the overwhelming majority of SOEs are loss making institutions, no one has a clue as to the extent of the cumulative losses incurred, nor the number employed by the SOEs.
Against this background, the public has raised concern about the privatization of the SOEs, especially the strategically important ones. The government has appointed Suresh Shah as the Head of State-Owned Enterprises Restructuring Unit (SOERU) to review and address issues relating to SOEs.
During a seminar held at the Organization of Professional Associations (OPA), Shah reportedly said: ‘To ensure transparency and effective management, the draft legislation is based on nine guiding principles stipulated in the Cabinet-approved SOE reform policy, covering board appointments, policies, financial aspects and others. Around 85 SOEs have been identified as commercial entities, out of 138 considered’.
What happens to the rest? According to Shah ‘A key highlight of the upcoming legislation is to bring SOEs under a Holding Company (HoCo) which would drive comprehensive reforms of state enterprises, the management and governance of state enterprises, and state’s portfolio of enterprises. The proposed HoCo is modelled after Singapore’s Temasek. However, it would take time and effort for this entity to evolve into modern day Temasek’ (Mirror Business, February 02, 2024).
HISTORY of Sri LANKA’s SOEs
Since Independence, the public has heard ad nauseam, words such as “transparency and effective management”. Some include “accountability” as well. The fact that the draft legislation is based on “nine guiding principles” is no assurance that the HoCo would be free to live by them without interference of one kind or another. Before addressing reforms, it is necessary to understand WHY SOEs are in the state they are in today.
SOEs are used as vehicles to practise unabated nepotism that permits the appointment of the kith and kin of politicians to the Boards of SOEs and to give employment to political loyalists for favours done during elections. Consequently, most SOEs are compelled to carry the baggage of incompetent managers who are clueless to manage a bloated workforce. It is this reality that makes SOEs loss-making institutions from the very outset. Even profit making SOEs have to cater to the behest of their political masters.
For instance, SriLankan Airlines, which was a profitable institution under an effective management, began to incur losses after the removal of key personnel because they opted to cater to the obligations of their customers in preference to the convenience of those who appointed them. Similarly, the Chairman of SLT, who ran that institution profitably, was removed, without any explanation, and a new board appointed. A request was made to them to withdraw the case they had filed against the proposed merger between Dialog Axiata and Airtel. The refusal to oblige resulted in the board being asked to resign. A new board has now been appointed.
This is the culture in which the HoCo with its ‘nine guiding principles stipulated in the Cabinet approved SOE reform policy’ would have to operate. It is a far cry from the culture in Singapore, where Temasek operates. Does the fact that only around 85 have been identified as commercial entities mean that the remaining 442, out of the total of 527 SOEs, are allowed to hang out to dry as loss-making entities because the prospect of their survival under the HoCo is remote.
Therefore, instead of limiting the scope to SOEs with commercial value, a serious attempt should be made by the SOERU to develop a strategy to make the SOEs a collective mix of profitable and loss-making entities for the service they provide so that taken as a collective, SOEs are not a burden to the State. Instead of such an approach, the objective of the SOERU appears to be to identify those that could be attractive to the private sector because of their commercial value.
In this regard, policies adopted by the private actor could go beyond the limits of commercial valuations, to others, such as Security. For instance, the attempt to sell the government’s share in Sri Lanka Telecom to either of the two shortlisted companies of Indian and Chinese origins may not only have foreign policy implications but also cause security concerns as well.
PROPOSED REFORMS for SOEs
In addition to the intended reforms proposed by SOERU at the OPA seminar, the Secretary to the Ministry of Finance has said that one of the key legislations the government is working on relates to the SOE reform Bill. What is interesting is that both the Secretary and the SOERU representative emphasised the importance of transparent procedures in the selection of Members to the Boards of SOEs. While it is indeed heartening to hear the importance given to transparency in selecting Board Members with the right credentials, history tells us that however right the credentials are, there is no guarantee that the policies they opt for would turn out to be relevant to meet the ever-changing challenges.
Instances of this kind of mismatch abound. We have had individuals with outstanding credentials in economics who advocated lowering taxes and printing money with consequences, the likes of which Sri Lanka had not experienced. Perhaps, their policies may have been right under different circumstances, but they certainly did not prove right for the economic circumstances Sri Lanka was in when they were proposed. There were others who advocated banning the import of chemical fertiliser and replacing it with compost.
They did not realise that the high yield seed paddy that was used by the farmers not only increased their incomes but also enabled the State to feed the nation which depended on the use of chemical fertiliser. Furthermore, a fact recognised by agricultural research scientists is that high yield seed paddy is not compatible with compost because of low yields. Another is the instance where a highly placed bureaucrat advocated the import of urea because it was cheaper than producing it locally, and called for the dismantling and selling the urea plant. Soon afterwards, the sale prices of imported urea increased.
PROPOSED STRATEGY
The lesson to be learnt from the few experiences cited above is that while it is important to select the right Members for the Boards of SOEs, it is equally or even more important that they adopt the right policies. Since the reason for the failure of most SOEs is fundamentally one of poor or bad management resulting from the reasons cited above, it is absolutely vital that each SOE operates under agreed guidelines that are monitored regularly by the Oversight Committees of Parliament. Furthermore, since policies need to change with changing circumstances and challenges, structural arrangements that permit regular reviews are an absolute necessity.
The following procedures are recommended to ensure that each of the 527 SOEs function and perform under the close scrutiny of Parliament:
* NO SOE should be privatised, whether they have commercial value or not. 85 of the SOEs with commercial value are invariably located on prime land. Privatising such SOEs would tempt investors to sell such lands and gain healthy returns with no regard to the contributions made to the state from their operations and the personnel employed by them.
* Each SOE should be assigned to a particular Oversight Committee of Parliament.
* Each Oversight Committee should call upon SOEs assigned to them to submit a comprehensive Policy Statement with the participation of the workforce outlining the strategies they plan to adopt to realise their objectives.
* These policy statements should be reviewed by each Oversight Committee, with the assistance of experts in the related fields, and a mutually acceptable consensus reached with each SOE, which then would become the Operating Guidelines for each SOE.
· The performance of each SOE should be reviewed by the respective Oversight Committee at regular intervals to evaluate performance and accountability.
CONCLUSION
It is reported that the government appointed State-Owner Enterprises Restructuring Unit (SOERU) is preparing legislation to address issues relating to the existing 527 SOEs. In the meantime, the Ministry of Finance is also engaged in a State-owned enterprises reform Bill. This combined effort to reform SOEs is because over the years they have become a serious financial liability to the State.
According to the SOERU, of the 138 SOEs considered, 85 have been identified as commercial entities and plans are for 17 to be formally wound down. Presumably, out of the 527 total SOEs and the 85 identified as commercial entities, the remaining 442 SOEs (less the 17 to be wound down) would have to function under forthcoming legislation that includes a Holding Company (HoCo) that would be modelled after Singapore’s Temasek, notwithstanding the cultural and historical disparity that exists between the two countries.
The need to reform SOEs so that they could be made to function as financially viable entities and in the process for them to make a positive contribution towards serving the interests of the State and provide gainful employment to thousands is long overdue. However, if the intended reforms are to have a positive impact, the reformers should acknowledge that the reason for the dire state of most SOEs today is because they have been made dysfunctional by the practices adopted by successive governments.
Judging from the sketchy media reports, the focus of the reforms appears to be on ‘transparent mechanisms to appoint board members to SOEs and put an end to the current tradition of political appointments’. Even if reforms ensure that appointments to the boards of SOEs are free of politics, it is a combination of effective boards backed by sound policies that make institutions viable and effective. Therefore, the drafts of policies developed by boards should be vetted by the workforce since the success of policies depends on their commitment to the implementation of the policy.
The draft policies developed by each SOE should be reviewed by the Parliamentary Oversight Committee and consensus reached so that such policies become the Operating Guidelines against which each SOE is regularly assessed in respect of its operations. Since policies are not static, regular reviews by Oversight Committees would enable policies to be modified to meet ever changing challenges.
What is of concern is the government’s intent to privatise most of the 85 SOEs that have commercial value regardless of whether they are profit-making or not. Since most of the SOEs are located on prime State Lands, privatising them would mean transferring state assets to private companies. Such an outcome may even amount to winding down some SOEs to the detriment of those currently employed.
The need to privatise key SOEs has arisen because successive governments have made them loss-making or less effective by resorting to practices in violation of “immutable republican principles of REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY”. This makes it obligatory for the incumbent government to honour their pledge to the people and seek their approval at a referendum before disposing of assets.
Features
Blueprint for Sri Lanka’s road to 7% growth by 2029 – II
Beyond Stabilisation:
“Development is not about where you are today, but where you can be tomorrow if you make the right investments today.” – Lee Kuan Yew
The first part of this article yesterday (18) asked what growth model Sri Lanka should pursue.
The second seeks to show how to achieve it; how much investment is needed; where it should go, and how progress should be measured. It should move decisively from economic philosophy to economic architecture or from Economic Diagnosis to Economic Engineering.
Introduction: The Missing Growth Blueprint
Sri Lanka’s economic debate has reached an important turning point.
For three years, policymakers, economists, international institutions, and business leaders have focused primarily on stabilization. Inflation has been controlled, foreign reserves have improved, debt restructuring has progressed, and government revenue has increased significantly.
These achievements were necessary. But they are not sufficient.
The question facing Sri Lanka today is no longer whether the economy can be stabilized. The more important question is whether the country can transform itself into a dynamic, investment-driven, export-oriented economy capable of achieving sustained growth of 7% by 2029.
This requires moving from economic diagnosis to economic engineering.
Engineering demands numbers, targets, institutions, timelines, and accountability.
The challenge is therefore straightforward:
What investment strategy can lift Sri Lanka from a 3-4% growth path to a 7% growth path by 2029?
How Much Investment Is Needed To Reach 7% Growth?
Economic growth does not occur by declaration. It requires investment.
Historically, countries that achieved sustained growth rates above 6% maintained investment levels of approximately 30-35% of GDP. Sri Lanka currently invests considerably less (i.e., 27%) than this benchmark.
Assuming Sri Lanka’s real economy (currently US$88 billion) reaches approximately US$100 billion by 2029, total annual investment requirements could exceed US$30 billion. Given current investment levels, the country may need an additional US$8-10 billion annually in productive investment by the end of the decade. This investment cannot come solely from government spending.
A realistic financing framework could include:
· Domestic private investment – 40%
· Foreign direct investment – 30%
· Public infrastructure investment – 20%
· Development finance and PPPs – 10%
The real policy challenge is not simply attracting more investment.
It is attracting the right investment.
Which Sectors Can Generate 7% Growth?
Sri Lanka cannot achieve 7% growth through tourism alone, nor through agriculture alone.
Growth must be diversified across several strategic sectors.
Export Manufacturing & import substitution such as Green Energy (2.0 percentage points)
Manufacturing should become the largest contributor to future growth.
Priority sectors include:
· Electronics assembly
· Medical devices
· Rubber-based products
· Engineering components
· Boat building
· Food processing
Integration into Asian production networks could dramatically expand manufacturing exports.
Information Technology And Knowledge Services (1.0 percentage point)
Sri Lanka already possesses strong human capital advantages.
The country can expand:
· Software development
· Artificial intelligence applications
· Business process outsourcing
· Financial technology services
· Professional consulting exports
· Tourism And Hospitality (1.0 percentage point)
The objective should be quality rather than quantity.
Higher-value tourism can generate greater foreign exchange earnings without excessive environmental pressure.
Logistics And Maritime Services (1.0 percentage point)
Sri Lanka’s geographical location remains one of its greatest assets.
Port development, shipping services, logistics hubs, and regional distribution centres could create a powerful growth engine.
Agriculture And Dairy Modernisation (0.5 percentage point)
Modern agriculture should focus on productivity rather than acreage expansion.
Dairy development alone could reduce imports while increasing rural incomes.
Innovation And Entrepreneurship (0.5 percentage point)
A stronger startup ecosystem (i.e, Entrepreneurs and innovators, Investors and venture capital funds, Banks and financial institutions, Universities and research centers , Government agencies and policies, Business incubators and accelerators, Legal, accounting, and consulting services) could become a significant source of future growth and employment.
Collectively, these sectors could generate the foundations for a 7% growth trajectory.
Why RCEP Could Add One To Two Percentage Points To Growth
One of the most under-discussed opportunities in Sri Lanka’s economic future is regional integration. The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) encompasses some of the world’s fastest-growing economies and production networks. The success stories of Vietnam, Malaysia, and Thailand demonstrate that participation in regional value chains often matters more than domestic market size.
RCEP membership or deep integration could generate benefits through:
Greater Market Access
Sri Lankan exporters would gain improved access to rapidly expanding Asian markets.
Increased Foreign Direct Investment
Investors frequently prefer locations connected to large trade agreements.
Technology Transfer
Regional production networks facilitate knowledge diffusion and technology acquisition.
Supply Chain Participation
Sri Lanka could specialise in selected components, services, and logistics activities rather than atte
mpting complete industrial self-sufficiency.
The strategic significance of RCEP extends far beyond trade.
It represents a gateway into the economic architecture of Asia.
The National Growth Dashboard 2026-2029
One weakness of Sri Lankan policymaking has been the absence of measurable national performance indicators.
A National Growth Dashboard should be publicly reported every quarter.
Growth Indicators
· GDP growth rate
· Per capita income growth
· Labour productivity growth
Investment Indicators
· Total investment as a percentage of GDP
· Foreign direct investment inflows
· Public infrastructure investment
Export Indicators
· Total exports
· High-value export share
· Export diversification index
Innovation Indicators
· Research expenditure
· Patents registered
· Startup creation
Human Capital Indicators
· Graduate employment rates
· Technical skills certification
· Labour force participation
Rural Development Indicators
· Agricultural productivity & Extensive cooperatives
· Dairy self-sufficiency ratio
· Rural household income
What gets measured gets managed. What is not measured is usually ignored.
Lessons from Singapore: Strategic Investment Targeting
Singapore never relied on chance.
It deliberately identified sectors capable of transforming the economy and directed institutions, incentives, infrastructure, and education towards those priorities.
The country’s Economic Development Board became one of the most successful investment agencies in the world.
The lesson for Sri Lanka is clear:
Investment promotion must become strategic rather than reactive.
The country should actively pursue investors in sectors aligned with national growth priorities.
Lessons from Vietnam, Ireland, South Korea, And New Zealand
Vietnam
Vietnam teaches the importance of export-oriented manufacturing and integration into regional value chains.
Ireland
Ireland demonstrates how education, foreign investment, and technology can transform a small economy into a global innovation hub.
South Korea
South Korea illustrates the power of long-term industrial policy, export discipline, and technological upgrading.
New Zealand
New Zealand provides lessons in agricultural productivity, governance quality, and value-added exports.
The common lesson from all four countries is simple:
Growth was planned, targeted, measured, and relentlessly pursued.
None relied on policy improvisation.
Why Sri Lanka Remains Trapped In Economic Diagnosis
Sri Lanka has no shortage of economic diagnoses.
For decades economists have identified:
· weak exports,
· low productivity,
· inadequate investment,
· poor innovation,
· Governance weaknesses.
The diagnosis has remained remarkably consistent.
Yet implementation has remained weak.
Three factors explain this.
First
Policy discontinuity across governments.
Second
A tendency to prioritise short-term political considerations over long-term economic strategy.
Third
The absence of a national consensus on the desired economic model.
Countries succeed when political parties compete over implementation.
Sri Lanka often debates fundamentals repeatedly without resolving them.
The Need For A National Economic Transformation Compact
Achieving 7% growth cannot be the responsibility of a single government.
It requires a national compact involving:
· Government
· Opposition
· Private sector
· Universities
· Trade unions
· Development partners
The objective should be a shared commitment to a growth strategy extending beyond electoral cycles.
Economic transformation requires consistency.
Investors place capital where policies are predictable and institutions are credible.
The greatest gift Sri Lanka can provide to investors is confidence in policy continuity.
Summary
Sri Lanka’s next challenge is not stabilisation but transformation.
To achieve sustained growth of 7% by 2029, the country may require an additional US$8-10 billion in productive investment annually.
Growth should be driven by six strategic sectors:
· Export manufacturing
· Information technology and knowledge services
· Tourism and hospitality
· Logistics and maritime services
· Agriculture and dairy modernisation
· Innovation and entrepreneurship
Regional integration through RCEP could add one to two percentage points to long-term growth by improving market access, attracting investment, and integrating Sri Lanka into Asian supply chains.
A National Growth Dashboard should monitor progress through measurable indicators and improve policy accountability. Most importantly, Sri Lanka must move beyond diagnosing economic problems and begin engineering practical solutions.
Conclusion
History will not judge Sri Lanka by how successfully it emerged from the crisis of 2022. History will judge whether the country used that crisis as a platform for transformation.
The choice facing Sri Lanka is stark.
One path leads to recurring cycles of stabilisation, modest growth, debt accumulation, and periodic crises. The other leads to investment-led growth, export expansion, technological upgrading, and deeper integration with Asia.
The difference between these two futures is not luck. It is strategy.
The time has come for Sri Lanka to stop asking why growth is insufficient and start designing the institutions, policies, and investments required to achieve it.
Economic diagnosis has served its purpose. The next chapter must be economic engineering. Only then can Sri Lanka transform recovery into prosperity and aspiration into achievement.
I believe this second article is potentially more important than the first because it introduces something largely missing from Sri Lanka’s policy discourse: a quantified growth framework linking investment → sectors → exports → RCEP integration → measurable outcomes. It shifts the debate from “what is wrong?” to “what exactly must be done, by whom, and by when?”—which is where genuine policy innovation begins.
*The writer, among many, served as the Special Advisor to the Office of the President of Namibia from 2006 to 2012 and was a Senior Consultant with the UNDP for 20 years. He was a Senior Economist with the Central Bank of Sri Lanka (1972-1993). He can be reached via asoka.seneviratne@gmail.com
by Prof. Asoka S. Seneviratne
Features
Maritime security cooperation with India – A strategic imperative for Sri Lanka’s sovereignty and progress
As a retired Senior Superintendent of Police with decades of experience in intelligence, counter-terrorism, and strategic security coordination, I have repeatedly seen how short-sighted decisions undermine long-term national resilience. The adage “penny wise, pound foolish” perfectly encapsulates Sri Lanka’s vulnerabilities exposed during the 2022 economic collapse. Austerity measures, delayed reforms, and isolationist tendencies conserved minor resources in the moment but inflicted catastrophic costs in stability, public trust, and security capacity. Today, as we consolidate recovery under the National People’s Power government, embracing deeper maritime security cooperation with India stands as a wise counter to such false economies, investing prudently now to safeguard our sovereignty, economy, and peace for generations.
The 2002 Norway-brokered Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) with the LTTE is now a closed chapter in our history. Formally abrogated by the government in 2008, it paved the way for the decisive military victory in 2009 that ended three decades of separatist terrorism. Its present status is one of hard-earned reflection: a reminder of the perils of fragile truces without genuine political will, but also of the enduring success of intelligence-led, whole-of-government strategies that delivered a unified Sri Lanka.
Post-2009, with no active internal armed conflict, our security focus has evolved to hybrid and transnational threats, drug trafficking, IUU fishing, arms smuggling, terrorist financing, and great-power manoeuvring in the Indian Ocean. The 2022 crisis, however, tested this peace. Fuel shortages, power blackouts, and protest strains diverted naval and police resources, highlighting how economic fragility directly erodes maritime domain awareness and operational readiness.
India’s role as the indispensable first responder during that crisis, extending nearly USD 4 billion in credit lines, currency swaps, and essential supplies, prevented total collapse and laid the groundwork for today’s elevated partnership. What began as economic solidarity has matured into structured defence cooperation.
The landmark April 2025 MoU on Defence Cooperation, signed during Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Colombo, represents a pivotal shift. This five-year framework, the first comprehensive bilateral defence pact in decades, building on the 1987 Indo-Sri Lanka Accord, institutionalizes training, equipment support, joint exercises, intelligence sharing, and maritime operations. It directly counters the “pound foolish” risks of under-investment that plagued our 2022 response.
Maritime security is the linchpin. Sri Lanka’s vast Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and position astride critical sea lanes make it a natural hub, and a potential chokepoint, for regional stability. Threats like narcotics smuggling through porous sea routes, illegal fishing by foreign vessels, and potential infiltration demand robust monitoring. India has stepped up decisively: operationalising the Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre (MRCC) for the Sri Lanka Navy in 2024, supporting Indian aircraft surveillance from Trincomalee, and facilitating regular hydrographic surveys and ship visits. Annual exercises like SLINEX-2025 have enhanced naval interoperability, with joint patrols and drills reinforcing rule-based maritime order. Participation in the Colombo Security Conclave (CSC), alongside Maldives, Mauritius, Bangladesh, Seychelles, and others, extends this into practical multilateralism focused on Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA), counter-terrorism, cyber security, and disaster response.
From an intelligence practitioner’s lens, honed at the State Intelligence Service Counter Terrorism Desk and during high-profile event security for CHOGM and World Cups this cooperation amplifies our HUMINT and technical capabilities without sacrificing autonomy. Shared information through platforms like the Information Fusion Centre-Indian Ocean Region (IFC-IOR) closes gaps that economic crises widen. It echoes our LTTE defeat: proactive, collaborative disruption of threats before they escalate. Post-Easter Sunday 2019 lessons on inter-agency coordination find new expression in these bilateral mechanisms, reducing vulnerabilities to hybrid warfare, disinformation, and economic espionage.
Critics may invoke sovereignty concerns or past sensitivities, but pragmatism demands we reject penny-wise isolation. The 2025 MoU includes termination clauses for flexibility, ensuring decisions remain Colombo-driven. Diversification is key: balancing ties with India alongside China (via BRI projects), Japan (drones and hydrography), the US, UK, and Gulf partners prevents over-dependence while maximizing gains. The CSC framework exemplifies inclusive, non-exclusionary regionalism, precisely the model needed to navigate Indo-Pacific dynamics.
Economically, maritime security underpins recovery. Secure sea lanes boost tourism, fisheries, and trade, sectors devastated in 2022. Joint capacity building (over 1,200 annual training slots for Sri Lankan forces) and blue economy initiatives create jobs and resilience, averting future “pound foolish” collapses. In a climate-vulnerable nation, cooperation on sustainable fisheries and disaster response further mitigates risks.
Sri Lanka must assertively embrace and lead multilateral Indo-Pacific cooperation as the indispensable driver of its long-term progress, security, and sovereignty. The hard lessons of the 2022 crisis leave no room for hesitation: penny-wise short-termism must give way to pound-wise strategic vision. We should fully operationalize the India defence MoU through sustained joint and intelligence fusion, while elevating the Colombo Security Conclave into a robust, action-oriented Indo-Pacific platform for maritime domain awareness, counter-trafficking, cyber resilience, and humanitarian response.
Sri Lanka is uniquely positioned to play a bridging leadership role, convening island nations, advancing inclusive initiatives under frameworks like the Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative, and fostering minilateral and multilateral ties that include India, the Quad partners, ASEAN, and other responsible actors, without compromising our traditional non-alignment.
Bipartisan political consensus on these pillars, insulated from electoral politics, is urgent and non-negotiable. Isolationism invites exploitation and repeats past failures; assertive multilateral leadership in the Indo-Pacific secures our sea lanes, rebuilds economic vitality, strengthens interfaith harmony, and honours the sacrifices that delivered victory over terrorism in 2009. By championing such cooperative architectures, Sri Lanka transforms its strategic geography from vulnerability into enduring strength. The moment demands bold action, our nation’s destiny, regional stability, and future generations require nothing less.
( 34 sources )
Mahil Dole, SSP (Retired), is fthe former Head of the Counter-Terrorism Division of the State Intelligence Service of Sri Lanka, and has served as Head of the Sri Lankan Delegation at three BIMSTEC Security Conferences. With over 40 years of experience in policing and intelligence, he writes on regional security, interfaith relations, and geopolitical strategy.
This opinion draws on public records and professional experience. The views expressed are personal.
By Mahil Dole
Superintendent of Police (Retd.) and Former Member,
Sri Lanka Wakfs Board (Served Additional Terms)
Colombo, June 2026
Features
Dudley: Remembering gentleman Prime Minister on his 113th birth anniversary
When Dudley Senanayake died in 1973, nearly 1.8 million people lined the streets of Colombo to say goodbye to their much-loved leader. In a country of 12 million, that was one in every seven persons. It wasn’t a state-mobilised crowd or a political rally. They were mostly farmers from the Dry Zone who worked on the lands he had irrigated, teachers who benefitted from his school expansion scheme, civil servants, traders, students—ordinary people who walked for hours just to stand in silence as his cortege passed.
They came because they had never seen him act like a ruler. He lived like one of them: refusing special queues, apologising for accidental bumps, paying for things himself, treating political opponents with respect. For many, it was the first time they had grieved a leader they had never met personally, but whose decency they trusted. His funeral became less about death and more about a public reaffirmation that integrity in politics was possible, and that the people had noticed it.
The reluctant heir
Dudley was born under an auspicious sign. His father, D. S. Senanayake was at a temple ceremony in Bothale, Mirigama, when the news came. The temple astrologer predicted a great future for the child. History proved him right, though not in the way most expected. Dudley’s greatness lay not in how much power he wielded, but in how little he clung to it.
Dudley left S. Thomas’ College, Mount. Lavinia, as its best all-round student—equally at home in classrooms, on the cricket field, the football pitch, on the rugby grounds and the athletic track. At Cambridge, he won a Blue in cricket and earned degrees in Natural Sciences and Law. He returned to practise law, and entered politics only because his father persuaded him to do so. Public life was not his ambition; it became his duty.
As Prime Minister four times, twice in the 1950s and twice in the 1960s; his signature is on the irrigation schemes and agricultural programmes that fed the Dry Zone. But those who met him remember something more: his humanity.
The man without pretension
The following information was shared by Dr. Karunasena Kodithuwakku and the late Rukman Senanayake during informal conversations.
When the Queen of England, Queen Elizabeth II and the British Parliament decided to confer a Knighthood (the title ‘sir’) on Hon Dudley Senanayake in the 1950’s and informed him accordingly, Dudley declined the Honour graciously, declaring “I prefer to be known as plain Dudley Senanayake like now, rather than as ‘Sir Dudley Senanayake.”
In Kandy during his third term, Dudley accidentally bumped into a senior government valuer in the corridor of Queen’s Hotel. Before the man could speak, Dudley apologised. Later that day at the YMBA foundation stone laying ceremony, officials joked that they expected a larger donation from him. He opened his cheque book, looked at it, and said, “Give me the cheque I gave. Rs. 250? That’s my brother’s signature. I don’t have even that much.”
He had his hair cut at a salon in Colpetty. When the head barber tried to move him ahead of the queue, Dudley said, “No, no, I will wait for my turn.”
A senior politician from Kegalle visited him urgently in 1965. The secretary told him to be at Woodlands before 7 a.m. When Dudley saw him, he invited him to breakfast. The man was overwhelmed. “I can’t believe how I am welcomed here,” he said. “At my former leader’s house, I’m not even allowed to sit on a low bench.”
Dudley was however careful to protect the dignity of the country that he represented. As Prime Minister, he received an invitation to the Royal Coronation of Queen Elizabeth II in 1953. After accepting the invitation with due honour, Dudley went to England and was staying in a hotel when a high official of the British government paid him an unexpected visit. This was to appraise him of a change in plans.
“Hon. Prime Minister, I’m sorry to inform you that a difficulty has arisen regarding providing you with a separate horse carriage as informed earlier. Would you please share a carriage with Hon. (so and so) of Africa and grace the occasion?” Dudley was very annoyed, and told the official “Please inform your government that I expect a separate horse carriage to be provided for me too, just like for all the other Leaders as promised. Otherwise, I would consider it an insult to my country and will return to my country immediately without attending the Royal event.” It is reported that the British government promptly complied with Dudley’s request.
Simplicity that disarmed everyone
Even as Prime Minister, Dudley refused the trappings of office. One day in 1965-70 he told his security not to follow him and drove his Triumph Coupe alone to Mirissa. He spent the day photographing the beach and drove back safely. The police kept watch from a distance. Another morning he set off for Nuwara Eliya for a round of golf, again asking his security officers to stay back. A few hours later they found him at Ramboda Pass, sitting on a culvert smoking his pipe, the radiator of his car boiling over. He was relieved to see them and asked them to take him for his game—in their vehicle.
Traffic police once chased a speeding car only to find the PM at the wheel, pipe in hand. On Galle Road, he spotted an old friend at a bus stop, stopped the official car, and said, “Hey, what are you doing here? Jump in!” He took the man to Woodlands for tea and snacks, then drove him to Fort Railway Station himself. The friend was a Tamil gentleman who had captained Royal when Dudley captained S. Thomas’. Titles meant nothing to him.
His humour was self-deprecating. At an All Ceylon Agricultural Officers Association AGM, the president pleaded with him and Minister M.D. Banda to “breed and recruit” more officers for the five-year plan. Dudley replied, “You all know I am not capable of breeding humans. You’ll have to ask the Honourable Minister—he’s already produced seven children!” The hall erupted in laughter.
A leader remembered
The day after the 1970 election defeat, party members went to see him in their numbers. Our family too was amongst them. He came up to our mother and said softly, “I’m very sorry, Mrs. Banda.” Even in defeat, his first thought was for others, especially for people like M.D. Banda, who had never lost an election before.
Dudley drew crowds not with slogans, but with sincerity. He never asked people to lower themselves to meet him. He met them where they were. In an age of political theatre, he was simply, stubbornly, decent.
During the period 1965-1970, when Dudley was Prime Minister, the Opposition led by Madam Sirima Bandaranayake, made allegations against Robert Senanayake (Dudley’s brother) regarding certain Foreign Exchange issues in Parliament. Dudley got up and urged the Speaker to
a. Appoint a Parliamentary select committee to investigate the allegations against his brother.
b. Appoint a Member of Parliament from the Opposition as its Chairman
c. Appoint the majority of the Select Committee members also from the Opposition.
According to the findings of the Select Committee and as reported to Parliament later, Robert Senanayake was completely exonerated. The entire leadership of the Opposition apologised profusely to Dudley.
An important point about this episode is a statement made by Dudley himself in Parliament prior to appointing the Select Committee. He declared that if his brother was found guilty of having indulged in any malpractice by word or deed, he (Dudley) would forthwith resign as PM.
That is why Sri Lanka remembers him not as a politician, but as “the gentleman Prime Minister.”
On 19 June, the day of his birthday, it is heartening to remember that such leadership once walked amongst us.
(The writer is the late Minister M.D. Banda’s eldest son.)
By Gamini Leeniyagolla
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