Features
Back in the saddle as Secretary/PM:Ranil-CBK tensions after 2001 election
A day after the December 5, 2001 general election results were out, I got a call from Ranil Wickremesinghe’s private office at Cambridge Terrace. It was Dayaratne, Ranil’s personal secretary, with a message that the ‘boss’ wanted to see me urgently.
Ranil was brief and to the point as usual. He wasted no time on the formalities. He returned my congratulatory handshake with his normal perfunctory acknowledgement. He waved me to a chair.
“Brad,” he said, “I have a problem.”
I thought I would be flippant; after all it was a moment for celebration.
“Not one, I think you have got quite a few.”
“No, but there is a serious one,” said Ranil. “What’s that?”
“I don’t have a secretary.”
I was relieved. All he wanted were a few good names.
“That’s not too difficult, I can suggest a few names,” I ventured. “No, no, I want you.”
That really floored me.
“Me! Do you know how old I am?”” You must be about sixty five.”
“No. I am 71. I don’t think I can last the pace.” “But you are well, aren’t you. You look okay.” He looked so earnest. I played for time.
“I can help you out for about three months and then…
“No. Come for about a year and we’ll see … “
I knew I’d had it. I tried once more to obtain release. on my 72nd birthday dinner at which he was a special invitee, but I don’t think he was listening. Today April 2, 2004, as the country votes again at the general elections that President Chandrika Kumaratunga has called, I would have been with him over two years and three months.
Ranil had won the 2001 December election with a comfortable majority. From the opposition, and with a formidable array of forces against him he had prevailed and brought off a comprehensive victory. The final results showed the following alignment of seats in Parliament:
Party No of Votes Seats
UNP 4,086,026 109
PA 3,330,815 77
JVP 518,774 16
He had focused on a single issue that of bringing peace once more to people and a country devastated by 20 years of war. I felt I could not in good faith turn down his invitation. After all it would only be for a few months during which we, he and I, would find someone else for the job.
I had not thought of re-entering government service ever again. I had officially retired many years ago and was enjoying my life in semi-retirement. I had a sinecure’ in the private sector as chairman of a shipping company (where I was literally all at sea!) and with lots of free time in the late afternoon for seminars and such like. I must have been very regular at these seminars since some observant people apparently gained the impression that I had a permanent job at the International Centre for Ethnic Studies (ICES). I had some time too for golf, whose mysterious ways I now decided to take up for diligent study on a free morning.
There was also another project I had planned to do which had already been long delayed. This was to write a book on the lives of the prime ministers and presidents whom I had worked with. Where would I have time for this if I went back to work as secretary to the prime minister? And this time not even as an advisor which I had been to Premadasa when he was president, but as a full- fledged public official with all the financial and establishment responsibilities that such a position entailed. What would my erstwhile friends say? ‘Never know when to give up’; ‘still after the power and glory’, etc. And the all-knowing media? Wasn’t ‘Uncle Brad’ far too old and so on? To most of these I properly belonged, like others of my age, now `lean and slippered’, to lounging around the house and having a beer with my buddies at sundown at the local pub.
But there was one important matter which, if I could stir myself to help Ranil, would be still worthwhile doing. Perhaps the last hurrah! He was going to stop the war. He had made a promise to do that and I reckoned that he had the guts to keep his word. No one before had succeeded or even gone half-way.
I had seen throughout the years, the pain, the fear and the sense of loss which conflict brought in its wake to ordinary people. I had seen it in Ampara; in the faces of the young men and women captured after the JVP uprising and awaiting an uncertain future; I had been witness to it in 1983 in the heartbreaking refugee camps throughout_the country. I had seen it at the funerals and in the homes of soldiers and friends slain in battles far away.
I found it incomprehensible to see the disbelief on the faces of the young widows as they refused to reconcile themselves to the fact that their husbands are most likely injured or even dead when engaged in war. (I used to ask myself whether they had not known that death or serious injury was part of a soldier’s lot; or had the astrologers prediction and the prayers they daily offered to the gods dulled them into thinking that what to them was ‘impossible’ would not come their way).
I was appalled at the massive destruction of private property and public assets that security ‘operations’ and the bomb attacks of the terrorists in both north and south had caused over the 20 years of war.
Much of the time I had spent in the company of civil society NGO groups was in discussion on the hapless condition, particularly, of women and children whose hopes and expectations had been destroyed by the unending conflict.
Some of the `consultancies’ I had done for the UN system, particularly in the protection of children, had highlighted the dreadful consequences of the war. Perhaps the ‘pluses’ of being able to do something substantial through being at the prime minister’s office, of stopping the daily killing and maiming of both soldiers and civilians, might be time worthwhile spent in this last official chapter of my life.
This would probably compensate for the daily grind of dressing up in the morning, foregoing the long afternoon nap, poring through those bulky files and lengthy minutes, chairing unending meetings and pushing generally indifferent and demotivated staff. Everything would be different now; at Temple Trees and even in the prime minister’s office, from what I had known several years ago.
Then there was also another personal reason as to why I thought I should work for Ranil now that he had asked me to. When I left for the IPPF job in 1984, Ranil, who was then the minister of education, had written an extraordinarily nice letter of appreciation for something I had done. I reproduce this letter later in this book. I had thought it special at the time, and it had been with me all these years. The last line was close to becoming prophetic. It seemed that I now had in my final years, a chance to make it happen!
The challenge of the Peace Process
Ranil knew of the difficulties in managing something as challenging as the peace process in Sri Lanka. The LTTE was deemed at most times to be intractable with fixed goals which were unchangeable, military cadres well resourced and, over the many years of conflict, now vastly experienced in both guerrilla and conventional warfare strategies. They were being assisted by a formidable diaspora across the world.
There was a long history of the breaking of truce agreements which the LTTE had entered into with the governments of the day. How was Ranil going to achieve the impossible of transforming this group of committed fighters into becoming a peaceful partner in political negotiations; one which would not break the truce when the going gets difficult? It was a high-risk venture he was going into where others before him had paid dearly and some with their lives.
There would also be the opposition from within to contend with. Those who had said, and would continue to say, that there should be no compromise with terrorism or armed insurgency against the state. They would continue to deny the reality that beating the LTTE or any such armed force that throve on ethno-nationalism and backed by a powerful diaspora, was unachievable except at great cost. The past battles’ had proved this beyond doubt and the people had finally spoken out that they wanted peace, literally at any price.
Yet there were many who would scoff at peace through negotiations with a long-time enemy. They would include elements of the political opposition, the military, nationalist minded NGOs, the media, and the majority’ of the Sinhalese diaspora’ abroad.
Ranil conceived an approach and plan of action which would address the reality he was confronted with. He spelt it out to Parliament and the people in a broad-ranging speech he delivered on January 22, 2002. His approach’ dealt with both the domestic and international imperatives. He realized a well-founded peace process needed the following basic elements:
= An experienced facilitator who is trusted by both sides.
= An agreement in writing laying down the parameters for a durable cease-fire subscribed to by both leaders of the parties to the conflict, namely Prabhakaran, on behalf of the LTTE and himself on behalf of the government.
= An official institutional structure which could manage the manifold requirements needed to keep the negotiations between the parties on track.
= An effective mechanism to coordinate the relief, rehabilitation and development activities which would sustain the process.
To buttress and support this he would need to establish an `international safety-net’ composed of the leading nations of the world to guarantee, and intervene whenever necessary, to achieve the shared goal of a negotiated political settlement of the national problem.
It was a task of enormous proportions and there had been many political leaders who had tried and failed. In addition he had a formidable political opponent from within to contend with. He was not, as the others who had tried to bring peace before him had been, the constitutional head of government. The president of the country, Chandrika Kumaratunga was the constitutional head of state and government and although she too was in favour of peace through negotiation, she could be expected to be fastidious in the manner she would oversee Ranil’s strategy and methodology, in the name of national security, sovereignty, territorial integrity and so on.
But through it all, winning the confidence of the Norwegian facilitator, pushing through the cease-fire agreement, gaining the goodwill of the Tamil diaspora, and a considerable section of the Sinhalese as well, and securing the commitment of a powerful array of the developed countries, Ranil succeeded in making peace actually come to pass. Overall it was a magnificent display of bold and innovative strategising, tenacity of purpose, the mobilizing of a devoted team of workers and infinite patience. Only. someone with an extraordinary sense of mission could have managed all the uncertainties and imponderables which this long-endured national problem posed.
In addition to the constant presidential challenges, he had a range of domestic forces opposed to what he was doing. There was the bedrock of nationalistic feeling stemming from a long history of perception of the Tamil community as aliens and outsiders, who had literally no place in the country which belonged to the majority, the Sinhalese. A strident reflection of this opinion came from the now resurgent JVP, who were again making a strong mark in the political field. There were also a heterogeneous grouping of intellectuals, serious students of the subject, who had come to the determination that the demands of the LTTE, were too much and should never be conceded. The price of peace was in their view becoming too high to pay.
There were several media men and women, including one or two editors of mainline newspapers themselves, who regularly questioned the wisdom of embarking on a path which would inevitably end up in changing the nature of the Sri Lankan polity. In their view, and apparently a large part of the population supported their position, Sri Lanka had always” been one united state and its constitution should therefore remain immutably unitary in structure. Federalism was the `F word’ in all its possible connotations. To many of these groups, the proposed fundamental structural change (here both the president and the prime minister found agreement in opposing this line) from a unitary style constitution to one that was federal was anathema. They would regularly highlight in their editorials the dangers of several aspects of the peace process and by implication, the naivety, and in some instances even the treachery, of those engaged in the venture.
Throughout the two years process, what was unhelpful was the non-collaborative attitude that the president took. There was evident hostility at some of the actions of the Norwegian facilitator in the person of the Norwegian ambassador in Colombo and the head of mission of the monitoring force, the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM). These were seen as being partial and on the side of the LTTE, something that others too were saying but particularly decisive as it came from the head of the state.
The president was also said to be involved in ordering the sinking of a LTTE vessel, alleged by Anton Balasingham to be a merchant ship and at the time of attack by the Navy, in international waters. It was well known that as commander-in-chief of the three armed services, the president could give direct orders to the Navy Commander. She held the chair of the National Security Council (NSC) and remained in constant contact with the service commanders throughout the cease-fire period.
The tactic of the defence ministry virtually run by Ranil as prime minister on the other hand had been to shadow the vessel and put the international monitors on board to verify what was really on board after it moved into Sri Lankan waters. This would have enabled a verification of whether in fact, as alleged, the vessel carried arms and ammunition, or merchandise as claimed by the LTTE. There were numerous other incidents too in which the terms of the Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) were either breached or came close to being broken.
No cease-fire agreement could cover every possible eventuality that could arise and this led to an exchange between the president and her defence minister, the laconic Tilak Marapone, PC, which illustrates the sense of humour of Chandrika Kumaratunga and the bitter-sweet nature of the relationships between the president and the government.
Apparently after one particular close encounter between the LTTE and the army, which might have been regarded as a violation of the cease-fire agreement, Tilak, on being upbraided by Chandrika soon after a meeting of the National Security Council” for his lack of attention to such lapses, nonchalantly suggested that there were occasions when it was necessary to, as they say ‘turn a blind eye’ to such happenings. Quick as a flash Chandrika retorted that if that was so, it was she more than him, who could afford to do so!
It takes two to tango as the saying goes and there was much that Ranil could have done by sharing information and more consultation to change the confrontational attitude the president took about most of the actions he initiated. Ranil always countered this charge by insisting that she was being informed by their mutual friend Lakshman Kadirgamar whom he regularly met, and who was the president’s special advisor. But this was obviously no substitute to a regular face-to-face encounter between the two protagonists.
I personally felt that the president believed that the peace process which was rightfully her’s to move forward with, had been now usurped by an outsider. What was most galling was that the outsider, Ranil, was now seen to be making unexpected progress towards a settlement. She, the president, had been the originator of the negotiation approach to a political settlement. Her father, S W R D Bandaranaike had many years earlier made the first moves in this direction through the famous Bandaranaike Chelvanayakam Pact. She and her late husband Vijaya Kumaratunga had intensely believed in the negotiation approach for years.
In 1994 when she got the chance, she had, first as prime minister for a few months and later as president, initiated “Talks” by sending a delegation to Jaffna. That attempt faltered after some months and an intense period of conflict had followed. In 2000, she had come up with significant proposals in a draft constitution which was presented in Parliament.
Ranil and the UNP who had participated in some of the discussions had rejected the draft out of hand. Copies of the draft Constitution had been burnt on the floor of Parliament. Ranil was perceived by her as always being on the opposite side, inhibiting her attempts at resolution of the problem. In her view the UNP had been doing so ever since its opposition to the B-C Pact in 1957.
(Excerpted from Rendering Unto Caesar, the Bradman Weerakoon autobiography) ✍️
Features
Sri Lanka’s vanishing wetlands put elusive otter under growing threat
The world marked World Otter Day 2026 recently. Conservationists are warning that Sri Lanka’s rapidly disappearing wetlands, polluted waterways and unplanned development are placing increasing pressure on one of the island’s most elusive freshwater predators, the Eurasian otter (Lutra lutra).
The species, locally known as “Diya Balla”, is the only otter found in Sri Lanka and is regarded as a key indicator of healthy freshwater ecosystems. Yet despite its ecological importance, experts say the animal remains poorly studied and largely overlooked in national conservation planning.
Naturalist and conservationist Chaminda Jayasekara, who has spent years documenting otters in Sri Lanka, said the species is facing mounting environmental pressures across the island.
Speaking to The Island, Jayasekara said habitat destruction, chemical pollution, road kills, sand mining, and increasing human disturbance are fragmenting the waterways on which otters depend.
“Otters are extremely sensitive animals. When wetlands are degraded or rivers become polluted, they disappear very quickly. Their survival is directly linked to the health of freshwater ecosystems,” he said.
Jayasekara, who specialised in MSc Environmental Management at the University of Hertfordshire, noted that while the species has been recorded across Sri Lanka’s wet zone, dry zone and coastal wetlands, scientific data on population numbers and distribution remain limited.
According to him, the decline of wetlands has become one of the most serious environmental issues facing Sri Lanka. Marshes, mangroves, irrigation tanks and riverine habitats are increasingly being altered by urban expansion, tourism infrastructure, encroachment and agricultural runoff.
He warns that the loss of these habitats not only threatens otters, but also weakens flood control systems, freshwater security and biodiversity resilience at a time when climate-related disasters are becoming more frequent.
Jayasekara said otters play a vital ecological role by helping maintain balanced fish populations and healthy aquatic ecosystems.
“When otters thrive, it tells us the river system is functioning properly. Their presence is a sign that water quality, fish diversity and habitat conditions remain healthy,” he explained.
One of the best-known locations for otter sightings in Sri Lanka is Aranga Pond, within the Horton Plains National Park, where the species has adapted to the island’s cold montane ecosystem.
However, conservationists stress that even protected areas are not immune to broader environmental degradation occurring outside park boundaries.
Jayasekara’s own work on otters gained prominence through long-term conservation efforts at Jetwing Vil Uyana, where a former degraded chena landscape was restored into a functioning wetland ecosystem.
The restored habitat eventually attracted Eurasian otters, fishing cats, grey slender lorises and numerous wetland bird species.
Over 14 years, Jayasekara carried out field observations, camera trapping and awareness programmes involving hotel staff, surrounding schools and local communities.
“What happened at Vil Uyana clearly showed that habitat restoration works. If degraded ecosystems are given time to recover, wildlife can return naturally,” he said.
He added that wetland restoration should become a central component of Sri Lanka’s environmental policy, particularly as climate change intensifies droughts, floods and biodiversity loss.

Chaminda collecting scat for research purposes in Sigiriya
He says wetlands are among the planet’s most productive ecosystems, functioning as natural water filters and carbon sinks while providing breeding grounds for fish, amphibians and aquatic mammals.
Yet globally, wetlands are disappearing at an alarming rate, and Sri Lanka is no exception.
Conservation groups have repeatedly warned that illegal waste disposal, pesticide contamination and poorly planned infrastructure projects are severely affecting freshwater ecosystems throughout the country.
Jayasekara also highlighted the importance of stronger environmental education and community participation in conservation.
“Awareness is still very limited. Many people living close to wetlands do not realise the ecological importance of otters or the threats they face,” he said.
According to him, involving local communities in conservation monitoring is essential if Sri Lanka hopes to safeguard the species in the long term.
He also pointed to the growing international interest in otter conservation.
In November 2025, Jayasekara represented Sri Lanka at the International Eurasian Otter Conservation Workshop held at Colchester Zoo and organised by the International Otter Survival Fund.
The workshop brought together nearly 100 researchers, conservationists and wildlife experts from 33 countries to discuss emerging threats facing Eurasian otter populations.
Jayasekara presented Sri Lanka’s experience under the theme Rewilding Through Hospitality, focusing on how habitat restoration and sustainable tourism practices at Vil Uyana contributed to otter conservation.
“The international response was extremely encouraging. Many delegates were surprised that a tourism property in Sri Lanka had quietly carried out wetland conservation work for more than a decade,” he said.
Discussions at the workshop also examined wider environmental concerns including river pollution, declining fish stocks, illegal killings and habitat fragmentation affecting otter populations across Europe and Asia.
New conservation technologies such as AI-assisted wildlife tracking and environmental DNA surveys were also highlighted as emerging tools for monitoring elusive species.
Jayasekara said Sri Lanka urgently requires more scientific surveys, stronger environmental law enforcement and greater investment in freshwater conservation research.
He warned that unless wetlands and waterways are protected, several lesser-known freshwater species could face severe decline in the coming decades.
Environmentalists say otter conservation should not be viewed in isolation but as part of a broader effort to protect entire freshwater ecosystems that millions of Sri Lankans depend on for drinking water, irrigation and livelihoods.
He further noted that healthy wetlands also strengthen climate resilience by absorbing floodwaters, reducing soil erosion and supporting groundwater recharge.
As Sri Lanka experiences increasingly erratic weather patterns linked to climate change, conservationists argue that protecting wetlands is becoming both an ecological and economic necessity.
Jayasekara believes Sri Lanka still has an opportunity to become a regional example in balancing tourism, biodiversity conservation and habitat restoration.
“The otter teaches us an important lesson,” he said. “If rivers are protected and wetlands are respected, nature has an incredible ability to recover.”
This year’s observance of World Otter Day 2026 is, therefore, serving not only as a celebration of one of the world’s most charismatic mammals, but also as a reminder of the urgent need to conserve the fragile freshwater ecosystems upon which both wildlife and human communities ultimately depend.

Eurasian otter
By Ifham Nizam
Features
Malaiyaha Tamil people: Healing the Oldest Wound of Independence
In their Vesak messages this year, President Anura Kumara Dissanayake and Prime Minister Harini Amarasuriya highlighted the values of reconciliation, coexistence and justice as essential to Sri Lanka’s future. President Dissanayake emphasised that Buddhism’s teachings remain deeply relevant to contemporary society and described Vesak as a symbol of “mutual understanding, unity and coexistence among all communities” and of reconciliation itself. Prime Minister Amarasuriya similarly called for the building of a society in which justice is assured to all irrespective of caste, race or religion. These messages were not merely religious aspirations, they were a direct challenge to the most serious failures in Sri Lanka’s post-independence history. These include the three-decade-long war, its human rights violations and the inability to implement a political solution.
These have been and continue to be the challenges that have prevented Sri Lanka from reaching its full potential. Added to this have been the persistence of social and economic inequalities that continue to marginalise communities at the bottom of the social hierarchy. One of the most enduring examples of such injustice is the experience of the Malaiyaha Tamil community. The scale of the original exclusion is worth understanding clearly. According to the 1946 Census, the Malaiyaha Tamil community numbered approximately 780,600 persons and constituted 11.73 percent of the country’s population making them the second largest ethnic community, larger than the Sri Lankan Tamil community who numbered 733,700 or 11.02 percent of the population at the time
The denial of citizenship and voting rights to the Malaiyaha Tamil community was the first major injustice inflicted on an ethnic minority in post-independence Sri Lanka. The consequences were devastating and long-lasting. A community that had contributed enormously to the country’s economy through its labour on the plantations was excluded from political participation and denied basic rights. This was a political and moral failure that cast a long shadow over the country’s post-independence history. Responsibility for that injustice needs to be shared widely. Political leaders across ethnic lines failed to resist it. The result was the marginalisation of a community whose contribution to national prosperity far exceeded the recognition it received. Today, nearly eight decades later, Sri Lanka has an opportunity to correct that historic wrong but only if economic reform is matched by genuine social inclusion.
Longstanding Grievances
The NPP government has repeatedly acknowledged the need to address the longstanding grievances of the Malaiyaha Tamil people. In its election manifesto, the NPP pledged to improve living conditions in plantation areas, strengthen land and housing rights, ensure equal access to education and public services, and integrate plantation communities more fully into national development. The NPP’s Nuwara Eliya Declaration of 2023 similarly recognised that the plantation community had suffered generations of exclusion and promised measures to address disparities in housing, land ownership, infrastructure, education and economic opportunity. The need for such action is plain to see. While citizenship issues have largely been resolved over time, the socio-economic consequences of decades of exclusion remain deeply entrenched and continue to shape daily life in plantation communities. A conference organised by the Institute of Social Development to mark International Tea Day on May 21 at the BMICH brought out this and many other salient issues. Headed by P Muthulingam the organisation has advocated for the rights of the Malaiyaha Tamil people for the past 35 years to be equal citizens who enjoy social and economic justice.
The central problem facing many plantation workers is the low level of income they receive. Daily wages remain among the lowest in the country relative to the difficulty and intensity of the work. Plantation labour continues to depend heavily on methods that have changed little over generations. Productivity remains low compared to competing tea-producing countries — not because workers lack capability, but because sustained investment in their welfare, skills and economic mobility has been withheld. Workers consequently remain trapped in a cycle of low wages and limited economic mobility. Their housing situation compounds these difficulties. Many plantation families continue to live in housing owned either by plantation companies or the state. Lack of secure ownership limits their ability to accumulate assets, access credit or make independent decisions regarding their future. When Cyclone Ditwah damaged plantation housing, it exposed the inability of those living in that housing to access state compensation as they did not own the housing in which they lived.
The problems extend beyond the central highlands. Plantation workers living in private estates and smallholdings in other parts of the country face similar challenges. A recent Amnesty International report documented serious abuses affecting Malaiyaha Tamil workers in private tea estates in the Southern Province. These include wage withholding, debt dependency, restrictions on movement and intimidation and practices the report argued correspond to internationally recognised indicators of forced labour. These findings are not peripheral. They reveal that the structural exclusion of the Malaiyaha Tamil community is not a relic of the past but an active, ongoing condition. Economic vulnerability and social marginalisation continue to leave many plantation workers without effective protection or access to justice. It is against this backdrop that the government’s recent plantation reform initiative assumes special significance.
Second Phase
The government has announced the second phase of a programme to make underutilised plantation lands and assets available for investment. The objective is to transform underperforming assets into productive enterprises capable of generating employment, attracting investment and revitalising regional economies. The programme seeks to modernise the plantation sector, improve productivity and create new opportunities in tourism, renewable energy and export-oriented industries. These objectives are necessary and welcome. However, economic reform alone will not be sufficient and Sri Lanka’s own history provides the warning. Previous rounds of plantation modernisation pursued productivity gains without addressing the structural disempowerment of the people at the centre of the industry. The result was investment that generated wealth without distributing it. The workers who produced the wealth were once again treated as labour inputs rather than as beneficiaries. If the current reform follows the same logic, it risks reproducing the same failure.
For reform to succeed, plantation workers must be recognised not merely as a labour force but as stakeholders with rights, aspirations and a legitimate claim to share in the benefits of development. Housing ownership, secure land tenure, quality education, vocational training and entrepreneurship need to be built into the reform process from the outset. The government’s commitments to the Malaiyaha Tamil community therefore need to be incorporated into every stage of the reform process. On the contentious question of land, the government should consider establishing an independent national land commission. Such a body should include respected government officials, professionals and representatives from all ethnic and religious communities. It should review land policy comprehensively, develop transparent principles for allocation and use, ensure fairness in decision making and provide a trusted mechanism for resolving disputes. A credible land commission would help build public confidence that land reforms are being undertaken in the national interest rather than for the benefit of particular groups.
The correction of historic injustices should not be viewed as a concession to one community. It should be understood as an investment in national unity, because societies do not become stronger by maintaining the exclusion of those they have wronged. On the contrary, they become stronger by ending it. The first great injustice committed against an ethnic minority after independence cannot be undone. But its consequences can be addressed, and doing so would strengthen reconciliation, enhance social cohesion and bring Sri Lanka closer to the vision of a country in which all communities live with equal dignity and equal hope. This is what the Vesak messages of the President and Prime Minister promised. The plantation reform now underway is the moment to make good on that promise not in words alone, but in sustained policy that endures beyond any single government and reaches the people who have waited longest for it.
by Jehan Perera
Features
IMF relief is not economic recovery: Sri Lanka’s real test begins now
The IMF’s latest decision to release approximately US$695 million to Sri Lanka provides an important measure of financial relief, but it should not be mistaken for full economic recovery. While the approval reflects progress in stabilisation, fiscal discipline, and reform implementation, the country still faces deep structural weaknesses, social pressures, and external risks. The real test begins now: whether Sri Lanka can convert this temporary breathing space into lasting reform, productive growth, stronger institutions, and national resilience. This moment should not be used for political celebration, but for serious national reflection and responsible action. Sri Lanka must now resolve to support a clear policy direction, a practical reform programme, and a long-term national development path — not merely an individual, a party, or a political camp.
1. IMF Relief: A Necessary Step, but Not a Final Solution
The IMF Executive Board recently completed the combined Fifth and Sixth Reviews under Sri Lanka’s Extended Fund Facility, allowing the country immediate access to SDR 508 million, approximately US$695 million. This decision represents an important step in Sri Lanka’s ongoing economic recovery process following the severe crisis that led to sovereign debt default, shortages of essential goods, high inflation, and the collapse of foreign reserves in 2022.
However, this decision must be understood with great sensitivity. IMF relief is not the same as full economic recovery. It gives Sri Lanka temporary breathing space, helps rebuild a certain level of international confidence, and supports the continuation of the reform programme. However, this relief is not a magic solution that can automatically resolve the country’s deep-rooted economic problems. Fundamental challenges such as the debt burden, weak productive capacity, low export earnings, poor public revenue performance, weak fiscal management, excessive dependence on imports, corruption, and inefficient state-owned enterprises still remain unresolved. Addressing these challenges requires domestic reforms, disciplined policies, stronger production and export capacity, and a long-term national development programme. Therefore, the IMF decision should not be treated as a political victory or as proof of complete economic success. Rather, it should be seen as a reminder that Sri Lanka still has a long and difficult journey ahead.
2. Sri Lanka’s Progress Recognised by the IMF and Its Limits
The IMF’s approval indicates that Sri Lanka has made progress in several important areas. Inflation has been brought under control compared to the extreme levels experienced during the crisis. Foreign reserves have improved, the exchange rate has shown greater stability, and fiscal management has become more disciplined. The government has also continued to implement reforms in taxation, public finance, energy pricing, and debt restructuring.
According to the IMF assessment, performance under the programme has generally been strong. Several quantitative performance targets have been met, while many structural benchmarks have either been achieved or implemented with some delay. This shows that Sri Lanka has remained broadly committed to the reform path agreed under the IMF-supported programme.
Yet this progress remains fragile. Stability achieved through external support must now be converted into genuine economic strength.
3. Conditions and Responsibilities Attached to the IMF Programme
IMF support does not come merely as financial relief; it comes with a set of important reform conditions and responsibilities that Sri Lanka must fulfil. Key among them are maintaining fiscal discipline, improving government revenue, continuing cost-reflective pricing for fuel and electricity, strengthening public financial management, restructuring state-owned enterprises, protecting institutional independence, and preventing the accumulation of new external payment arrears.
The main objective of these conditions is to restore macroeconomic stability, strengthen fiscal credibility, and rebuild international confidence in Sri Lanka. However, these reforms also carry social and political consequences. Higher taxes, market-based utility pricing, and strict expenditure controls can place a heavy burden on ordinary citizens, especially low-income families, small businesses, pensioners, and salaried workers. Therefore, in implementing reforms, economic discipline alone is not enough. Fairness, transparency, and social sensitivity towards vulnerable groups must also be treated as essential priorities.
4.The Impact of IMF Conditions on People and the Economy
One major social consequence of the IMF programme is the increased pressure it can place on household incomes and living standards. When electricity, fuel, and other essential services are priced on a cost-recovery basis, people may have to face a higher cost of living. Although such reforms are necessary to reduce the losses of state-owned enterprises and maintain fiscal discipline, they can weaken the purchasing power of ordinary citizens if strong social protection programmes are not in place.
Another important consequence is the pressure placed on the operating costs and stability of small and medium-sized enterprises. Higher taxes, increased utility costs, fuel and electricity expenses, and the rising cost of borrowing can affect business survival, job creation, and new investment decisions. If reforms are implemented without sufficient attention to production, exports, and small businesses, the country may achieve short-term fiscal stability, but long-term economic growth could remain weak.
There is also a political risk that cannot be ignored. If people feel that the burden of reform is not being shared fairly, reform fatigue and public frustration may emerge. If ordinary citizens are expected to make sacrifices while corruption, waste, and political privileges continue, public confidence in the reform process will decline. Therefore, for IMF-supported reforms to succeed, fairness, transparency, and social sensitivity must be firmly ensured alongside economic discipline.
5. The Real Test Before Sri Lanka
Sri Lanka’s real test begins now. Beyond temporary financial relief, the country must now prove that it can build a strong economy that generates income and can withstand external shocks. Therefore, our objective should not be limited to securing the next IMF tranche. While an IMF tranche may provide short-term breathing space, it does not guarantee long-term economic independence or stability. The real objective should be to create an economy that does not have to return to the IMF repeatedly during every crisis, but can stand on its own productive strength, export earnings, and fiscal discipline.
This requires fiscal discipline. However, discipline alone is not enough; economic growth is also necessary. Taxation is necessary. But increasing taxes alone is not a solution; production, investment, and exports must also be expanded. Debt restructuring is necessary. But beyond reducing the debt burden, Sri Lanka must also build an economic foundation that does not depend excessively on borrowing in the future. Sacrifices may be asked of the people. But for those sacrifices to be fair, accountability, transparency, and exemplary conduct from leaders are also essential.
Economic recovery cannot be sustained in the long term through financial assistance alone. Such support can provide breathing space during a crisis, but a country is rebuilt on the strength of its own institutions, productive capacity, export competitiveness, and public trust. Therefore, what Sri Lanka needs today is strong institutions, income-generating industries, a broader export base, food security, energy security, and a system of governance that people can trust.
6. Policy Priorities for Sustainable Recovery
Sri Lanka must now move from crisis management to national transformation. First, fiscal discipline should continue, but it must be fair. Revenue mobilisation should not rely only on increasing taxes on the same groups of people. The tax base must be broadened, tax administration must be improved, and tax evasion must be reduced.
Second, social protection must be strengthened. The most vulnerable groups should be protected through well-targeted assistance. Reforms will be more acceptable if people feel that the poor, elderly, disabled, and low-income families are not abandoned.
Third, state-owned enterprise reform should be carried out with transparency and public accountability. The objective should not merely be privatisation, but efficiency, professionalism, financial discipline, and better service delivery.
Fourth, Sri Lanka must prioritise export-led growth. The country cannot build a stable future by depending mainly on borrowing, remittances, and consumption. Agriculture, tourism, manufacturing, IT services, logistics, education, and value-added exports must become central pillars of national development.
Fifth, governance reform is essential. Without reducing corruption, political interference, wasteful expenditure, and weak implementation, no IMF programme can create lasting recovery. Economic reform and governance reform must move together.
7. From Temporary Relief to Lasting Recovery
The IMF decision gives Sri Lanka an important opportunity. It provides the country with space to strengthen economic stability, rebuild international confidence, and move forward with essential reforms. However, it is not a guarantee of success. It is only a step that gives the country some breathing space. It is now Sri Lanka’s responsibility to use that space wisely, with discipline and accountability to the people.
The country must now decide whether it will continue the old cycle of crises, debt, temporary relief, and political blame, or whether it will build a new national programme based on discipline, productive capacity, fairness, and accountability.
At this moment, true success cannot be measured by the amount of money received. It must be measured by whether Sri Lanka can build an economy that produces more, exports more, saves more, is governed better, and protects its people more effectively. The real victory is not receiving IMF relief, but building a strong national economy that will not depend excessively on such relief in the future.
Public Appeal: Let Us Choose a Programme, Not a Personality
This US$695 million will not solve every problem in our country. It may provide temporary financial relief and support the continuation of reforms, but it cannot replace the hard work required to build a productive, disciplined, inclusive, and self-reliant economy.
Therefore, this is the right time for all Sri Lankans to rise above narrow political loyalties and support a clear policy direction, a practical reform programme, and a long-term national development agenda — not merely an individual, a party, or a political camp. What Sri Lanka needs today is not the victory of a personality, but the victory of a responsible national programme that can restore confidence, protect the vulnerable, promote production, strengthen exports, ensure accountability, and secure a better future for the next generation. The question before us is simple but decisive: are we ready to make that choice?
by Prof. Ranjith Bandara,
PhD (Qld.,)
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