Features
Proposed Anti-Terrorism Bill: Real tiger, paper tiger or mixed bag
By Nuwan Peiris
The writer is an Attorney, Chartered Shipbroker (UK) and UN-ITLOS Nippon Fellow 2012/2013. He holds M.Sc. Logistics (BCU-UK), LL.M (International Maritime Law) (IMO-IMLI), LL. M (International Trade Law) (Wales), LL.B (O.U.S.L).
“No generalization is wholly true – not even this one.” – Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes
The recent Anti-Terrorism Bill (ATA) has garnered more attention than one could ever imagine for a law. Emotional and sweeping generalizations are made by all and sundry on the proposed ATA. Even the recently enacted 21st Amendment did not receive so much attention from the public. Why is it that a law like the proposed ATA receives so much attention? There seems to be a legitimate fear that the proposed ATA may be no different to the existing law, namely PTA (Prevention of Terrorism Act), if not worse.
But what is the reality? Who drafted this proposed ATA? From the skilled draftsmanship associated with the proposed ATA, the draft law requires an in-depth analysis for a proper understanding unlike some of the recently introduced laws by the government.
Weaker than UK Law – Why?
In essence, the proposed ATA seems to be a strategically diluted version of the UK’s Anti-Terrorism Act 2000 – incorporating the amendments that were introduced by the UK after the London bombing. Worse still, proposed ATA is inconsequential in its effect when it comes to combating global terrorism as far as some of the fundamental provisions are concerned; in other words, a feeble draft law compared to the Patriot Act of the USA which became law after the 9/11 attacks. However, the proposed ATA may be an abusive weapon as far its enforcement orders are concerned, such as the Miscellaneous Orders contained in Part X. In short, the proposed ATA is a mixed bag. For example, most of the protestors’ dissent to the proposed law gyrates on these abusive enforcement orders.
How does a draft law like this instant one finds its way, from nowhere, to the official gazette without much public discussion? The purpose of this very brief write-up is to urge the Government in power and the opposition parties to prevent the proposed ATA being tabled in the Parliament, instead to appoint a Select Committee in the Parliament comprising of varied interests so that the matter can be reconsidered and better reforms of the ATA can be effected with consensus.
And the important point to consider by this proposed Select Committee in the Parliament is to introduce an ATA to tackle global terrorism effectively, and promulgate a law that is in line with the Anti-Terrorism Act 2000 of the UK (as amended), and better still the Patriot Act of USA – and be mindful not to introduce a version that is weaker than the UK law. Hence, the President, the Prime Minister, and the Justice Minister should be advised to set-up a Select Committee in the Parliament, so that the proposed ATA can be changed to become an acceptable legal instrument in combating global terrorism, and avoid becoming a law which is far weaker than the UK law on terrorism.
If the proposed ATA becomes law, this law may not have the same effectiveness in combating global terrorism especially given the weak substantive provisions in clauses 2 and 3, coupled with arbitrary procedural provisions that may lead to abuse in implementation. Such a proposed ATA will serve neither the purpose of combating global terrorism nor ensuring procedural fairness to the ones who are caught up as suspects. A middle of nowhere legislation, although drafted well disguised, may not serve Sri Lanka well, noting that further legislation similar to Bio-Security Act 2015 from Australia is needed to combat biological and chemical attacks. What is needed is to have extensive deliberations in a fresh Parliamentary Select Committee, where all of us can share and contribute with our experience to the formulation of a far-sighted ATA.
Why is ATA weaker than UK and USA laws?
There are two fundamental provisions in the proposed ATA – clauses 2 and 3. Clause 2 deals with jurisdiction and clause 3 deals with the offence of terrorism.This is the typical structure of an ATA law in many countries, and drafts men followed the universal structure – and we see nothing wrong in this. Here, Clause 2 becomes the international jurisdiction base for the implementation of the proposed ATA.
Clause 3 contains the offence of terrorism that becomes the basis on which other offences and provisions are built upon. Clause 3 is the mother provision, and the rest of the offences are the offspring of Clause 3 – which is typical of any ATA in the world including the UK.
Clause 2 – the clause on jurisdiction – becomes the basis for enforcement powers mentioned in the Part X of proposed ATA. Whilst the enforcement powers in the Miscellaneous Part – that comprises of Proscription Orders, Prohibition Orders, Restriction Orders etc., which is less judicially accountable – are wide and arbitrary when applied within Sri Lanka; on the contrary, its overall reach and enforcement of such Orders in the context of global terrorism is ‘fragile’ given the limitations in Clause 2.
Both Clauses 2 and 3 are the foundational structure of the proposed ATA, and the enforcement provisions contained in the rest of the ATA, including Part X forms the superstructure. Let us examine each of these aspects.
Clause 2 – Jurisdiction
There is extra-territorial application of the proposed ATA. This is a salient feature, and this is far better drafted than the ill-fated, and now demised, Counter-Terrorism Bill that was presented in 2018.
An extract of Clause 2 is as follows;
“2. (1) The provisions of this Act shall apply to any person who commits an offence under this Act, whether within or outside the territorial limits of Sri Lanka, including- …”
First limb of Clause 2(1) ends with the word ‘including’ – but given the subsequent sub-clauses it is unclear whether such sub-clauses are in fact have limiting effects on the wide scope of the first operative limb – namely, “[the] provisions of this Act shall apply to any person who commits an offence under this Act, whether within or outside the territorial limits of Sri Lanka.” It is preferable that the word, ‘including’ is replaced by the words ‘including, but not limited to -’.
Overall, it is unclear whether Sri Lanka has jurisdiction over a purely international crime of terrorism committed in violation of clause 3 of the proposed ATA. Say, if an African terrorist group (which is not proscribed as per clause 82 of the ATA) launches a pirate attack on a foreign flagged vessel in the Indian high seas, and one of the members of said terror group ends up on the shores of Sri Lanka, it is unclear whether such terrorist can be investigated and prosecuted in Sri Lanka. The entire commission of the act is in the high seas, and the said terror group is unknown to Sri Lanka, yet ends up in Sri Lanka. In this example, the ambit of the applicability of clause 2 remains questionable to exercise jurisdiction by Sri Lanka.
Or else, if assistance is sought from our State, and the government dispatches a naval convoy to help the distressed vessel, and having offered assistance in the high seas, and the crew and the vessel is brought to Sri Lanka for medical treatment, can the Sri Lankan authority initiate investigations on this matter that occurred exclusively in the High seas? The legal regime of the high seas is contained in Part VII of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982, and the high seas are beyond the jurisdiction of any national jurisdiction of any State. Although, clause 2(c) seems to be broad enough to cover such foreign citizens by the use of words ‘any person’, clause 2(d) seems to limit the applicability of clause 2(c). Whether this is specifically brought to the attention of the government and MPs are uncertain. Also noteworthy is the uncertainty pervading the inclusive nature of clause 2(1) by the use of the words ‘including’ at the early stages, as noted by me earlier. All this, compounds the uncertainty to the jurisdictional ambit of the applicability of the proposed ATA. Therefore, there is a need to revisit the jurisdictional ambit of clause 2.
Similarly, there are many drawbacks in clause 2, and the application of the said jurisdictional clause must be considered in the light of the public international law and its bases on international jurisdiction, and how much of such international State rights that should be contained in a proposed ATA in line with similar legislation like Patriot Act of the USA or Anti-Terrorism Act 2000 of the UK. Curtailing such international rights that legitimately belong to Sri Lanka without a rational policy basis is not acceptable. Hence the proposed ATA should be reconsidered for the want of workable jurisdiction. The writer is fully aware of the criticisms on the counter terrorism laws of the UK and USA. Whether Sri Lanka wishes to retract from UK’s/USA’s positions need to be objectively decided by the policy makers with wider consultation.
Another example of a defect in clause 2 is that sub-clause (d) says, that a person who had been a citizen of Sri Lanka commits the offence of terrorism within the territory of the Republic of Sri Lanka, say today, but found out later; and he subsequently shifts his habitual residence from Sri Lanka; for the provisions of the proposed ATA to be applied the concurrence of the foreign State of which he is a citizen is required. The problem continues further. Also, what if that foreign citizen later visits Sri Lanka, or he is intercepted by a Sri Lankan naval operation in the high seas and brought to the shores of Sri Lanka; does Sri Lanka have the jurisdiction to prosecute this person – although such foreign citizen now does not have any habitual residence in Sri Lanka? It is questionable whether clause 2 covers such a situation. That means, clause 2(c) seems to be broad enough to cover such foreign citizens by the use of the words ‘any person’, but clause 2(d) seems to limit the applicability of clause 2(c).
There are so many defects in clause 2. But the scope and the space of this write-up does not allow me to expand. There is provision for extra-territorial jurisdiction in the UK’s Terrorism Act 2000 for terrorist financing and terrorist bombing offences in line with the UN Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist bombings and the UN Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism. The appeal to the government is to reconsider the proposed ATA.
Clause 3 – The Offence of Terrorism
The offence of terrorism under clause 3 forms the basis for a number of criminal offenses; and triggers the application of many provisions including the encouragement of terrorism, and wide-ranging powers, like the designation and proscription of terrorist organizations; and other enforcement powers and orders.
Similarly, the Terrorism Act 2000 of the UK, includes acts of terrorism committed both in and outside of the UK, as the use or threat of one or more of the actions listed in the section, and under the Act, terrorism is currently defined as “the use or threat [of action] designed to “influence” the government or to intimidate the public or a section of the public, and the use or threat is made for the purposes of advancing a political, religious or ideological cause. (Vide, Section 1(1) of the Terrorism Act 2000 of the UK.)
Lord Carlile’s report on “The Definition of Terrorism,” March 2007, reviewed the scope of the definition of the Anti terrorism Act of the UK and stated that the UK definition is “consistent with international comparators and treaties, and is useful and broadly fit for purpose”. In his report, Lord Carlile recommended amending the language so that only actions or the threat of action designed “to intimidate” the government, instead of the much broader word “influence”, fall within the definition.
The present the section 1(1) of the UK reads as follows;
In this Act “terrorism” means the use or threat of action where—
(a)the action falls within subsection (2),
(b)the use or threat is designed to influence the government or an international governmental organisation or to intimidate the public or a section of the public, and
(c)the use or threat is made for the purpose of advancing a political, religious, racial or ideological cause.
The words such as “influence” can be considered much wider than the word “wrongfully” that is mentioned in clause 3(1) of our proposed ATA.
Further, the UK Act in section 4(1) contains broad definitions. For e.g. the reference to any person or to property is a reference to any person, or to property, wherever situated, and a reference to the public includes a reference to the public of any country, and “the government” means the government of the United Kingdom, of a Part of the United Kingdom or of a country other than the United Kingdom. However such effective and broad definitions do not exist in our proposed ATA.
Further, Section 38B(1) and (2) of the Terrorism Act 2000 of the UK says that it is an offence if one does not inform the police if he believes that someone he knows is in preparation of acts of terrorism. The maximum sentence in respect of Section 38B of the Act is for a term not exceeding five years’ imprisonment, although it is a defence to prove that he had a reasonable excuse for not making the disclosure.
It is also observed that the intention is expressly required as the mental element of the crime in clause 3, whereas the word ‘knowledge’ would be preferable given the complexity involved in the crime. However, section 1 of the UK Anti-terrorism Act seems to require no overburden of such intention or knowledge to the extent of proposed ATA.
The frequently cited leading case on strict liability and the presumption of ‘mens rea’ is Sweet v Parsley [1970] AC 132. But the recent case supreme court judgment of PWR (AP) (Appellant) v Director of Public Prosecutions (Respondent) [2022] UKSC 2 held that such presumption is rebutted for the offence contained in section 13. All this shows how broadly the UK s Anti-Terrorism Act is applied, which is a clear lesson for us.
It is in this context that our proposed ATA should be reviewed as to its narrowness in combating global terrorism, and abusive in enforcing miscellaneous orders on the contrary.
The General Fears about Proposed ATA
There is an overwhelming agitation that the proposed ATA will turn out to be draconian law – just as bad as the existing PTA, if not worse. Fears have been galvanised to such an extent that many opposition parties and activists have decided to challenge the proposed ATA in the Supreme Court.
A common question they ask is whether any trade union activists or media activists that protest in public or air their voice against the government be dealt with under the proposed ATA. Such possibilities are rare given the highly structured nature of the mother clause 3 and her associated offspring provisions. The threshold tests that are needed to graduate an act to one of terrorism that gets caught in clause 3 or its associated provisions is placed at a high level, and it is very unlikely that mere protests would classify as an act of terrorism. Many, if not all the offences are directly connected to clause 3, as noted above. It is very unlikely that a final conviction from a court of law will victimize a group of mere protesters or a group of media activists engaged in criticising the government. If such be the case, the UK’s Anti-Terrorism Act 2000 would have led to far greater concerns, since, as I indicated above, the proposed ATA law in Sri Lanka is much narrower than that of the UK’s 2000 Act.
However, it needs to be observed that enforcement/miscellaneous powers that are widely couched in Part X can nevertheless be abused in the short term, and innocent people may be apprehended as suspects. Therefore a group of protesters or media activists can be harassed in the short run given the weaknesses in the enforcement procedures. Hence, it is the enforcement powers and procedures that need a revamp for the want of a greater judicial scrutiny.
One more point on Part X – miscellaneous powers in the proposed ATA. Take a look at the Anti-Terrorism Act 2000 of the UK. There is far greater judicial accountability in the UK regime, for eg., detailed de-proscription procedures in the UK law compared to the proposed ATA etc. global terror networks are complex and dangerous.
Take this example. Assume that a terror group takes an LNG carrier and her crew as hostage in the outer harbour of Colombo Port, where the sabotaging of this carrier would cause enormous destruction similar to the explosion of a nuclear bomb. The hostage situation goes on for 10 days in outer harbor. Fortunately, in the early hours of the hostage crisis Sri Lanka arrests a suspect in the Port connected to the hostage crisis. It is not advisable to bring in a human rights oversight body to question the well being of the suspect taken to custody in the first few days, since the hostage crisis is ongoing and the counter-terrorism operations are still going on. And the arrested suspect may be needed for hostage negotiation and other counter-terrorism measures. It is best advised that the proposed ATA is revisited given the serious lacuna it has with regard to the weaknesses even on the procedural provisions in addressing organized global terror networks.
The writer is aware of the statements so far issued by the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) and Center for Policy Alternatives (CPA). It is noted that all these observations are primarily, if not exclusively, centred on the required procedural due process in the enforcement powers, rather than on the restrictive nature of clauses such as 2 and 3. The concerns such as lack of a proper definition of terrorism, ‘glorification’ being made an offence after the London bombing, and other substantive due process concerns etc., nevertheless exist in the UK/USA Laws, and there is no necessity for Sri Lanka to deviate from these advanced foreign legal regimes without broader expert consultation, and if a deviation from the UK/USA laws are warranted such policy must be carefully considered.
Finally – A call for a fresh Parliamentary Select Committee, a call to calm down for the public and a plea for the government to delay the proposed law:
The overabundance of criticisms from the trade unions, professional bodies, religious bodies and the NGOs need to be tempered with wiser counsel in the interest of the country. The government should also be mindful to restrain itself from introducing sweeping powers for procedural enforcement which have less judicial scrutiny. This write-up once again reiterates its clarion call to halt this legislation being pushed so hurriedly through the legislative deliberation process. We call upon all the professional/religious bodies, trade unions, NGOs and the political parties to request the powers that be to have a Parliamentary Select Committee so that an objectively drafted ATA can be finalised to one which the government and the citizens in this country want and can agree.
(The writer is an Attorney, Chartered Shipbroker (UK) and UN-ITLOS Nippon Fellow 2012/2013. He holds M.Sc. Logistics (BCU-UK), LL.M (International Maritime Law) (IMO-IMLI), LL. M (International Trade Law) (Wales), LL.B (O.U.S.L).
Features
Sri Lanka’s rice conundrum: Time to stop managing crises and start fixing the system
Prof. Ranjith Senaratne,
Emeritus Professor in Crop Science and former Vice-Chancellor,
University of Ruhuna and General President of the Sri Lanka Association for the Advancement of Science (2023) and
Prof. Prasad Jayaweera,
Dean, Faculty of Computing, University of Sri Jayawardenapura
Rice is not merely another crop in Sri Lanka. It is our staple food, an integral part of our history and culture, and a foundation of the civilisation that flourished around our ancient hydraulic systems. Revered as Buddha Bhogaya, the Buddha’s crop, rice has sustained our people for more than two millennia. Yet, remarkably, a country with such a profound relationship with rice continues to lurch from one rice crisis to another.
At one time, we have a surplus. At another, we face shortages. Prices rise sharply, consumers complain, farmers struggle to obtain remunerative prices, millers and traders become the focus of public attention, imports are hurriedly arranged, and governments announce yet another set of measures to contain the crisis. Then, after the immediate problem subsides, the matter recedes from the national agenda, until the next crisis arrives.
Why does this keep happening despite decades of agricultural research, policy interventions, expert committees and public debate?
Perhaps because we have been asking the wrong question. The fundamental problem is not simply how to produce more rice. Nor is it merely a question of prices, imports, fertiliser, farmers, millers or markets. The rice conundrum is a complex national systems problem.
We cannot solve a system by fixing its parts in isolation
Sri Lanka’s rice sector is an intricate web of interconnected systems involving agriculture, land, water, climate, technology, finance, energy, transport, markets, trade, governance, institutions and consumer behaviour. A decision made in one part of this system can have consequences, sometimes unintended, in another.
A change in fertiliser policy, for example, can affect productivity and production costs, which in turn influence farmer profitability, market prices and the need for imports. Irrigation decisions affect not only production, but also water availability, energy use and environmental sustainability. Guaranteed prices influence farmers’ cropping decisions, while import policies can simultaneously protect consumers and weaken incentives for domestic production. Likewise, market concentration can affect both the price received by farmers and the price paid by consumers. This is precisely why isolated interventions so often produce disappointing results. We keep treating symptoms while leaving the underlying system largely untouched.
For decades, we have generated valuable scientific knowledge on individual aspects of rice production and marketing. But knowledge generated within disciplinary and institutional silos does not automatically translate into solutions to complex real-world problems. What is needed now is a fundamentally different way of thinking.
From a “rice crop” to a “rice system”
The first step is to stop looking at rice simply as something that is grown in a paddy field.
The rice system begins with land, water, seed, inputs, technology and finance. It extends through cultivation, harvesting, drying, milling, storage, transport, wholesale and retail marketing, and finally to the consumer’s table. At every stage, there are different interests, incentives, constraints and actors: farmers, farmer organisations, input suppliers, machinery operators, millers, traders, wholesalers, retailers, financial institutions, government agencies, researchers and consumers.
And hovering over the entire system are climate change, changing consumer preferences, technological transformation and national economic conditions. A weakness anywhere in this chain can compromise the performance of the whole system.
Consider post-harvest losses. If significant quantities of rice are lost because of inadequate drying, storage or processing facilities, increasing production alone cannot solve the problem. Similarly, if farmers produce efficiently but face weak markets and poor bargaining power, productivity gains may not translate into improved livelihoods.
The question, therefore, should not be “How much rice can we produce?” but “How can we make the entire rice system work better?”
That requires us to see the connections.
The missing ingredient: reliable, real-time information
There is another fundamental weakness that deserves urgent attention: we still lack a comprehensive, integrated, interoperable and reliable national information system for rice. Information is scattered among different institutions, often collected using different methodologies and not necessarily available when decisions need to be made.
How much rice will actually be produced? How much is in storage? What is the likely demand? Where are the emerging production shortfalls? What are the stocks held by different actors? How are prices moving along the value chain? What are the likely consequences of climate conditions? Without timely and reliable answers to such questions, policymakers are forced to make critical decisions with incomplete information. This is not merely an administrative inconvenience. It is a national food-security vulnerability.
Sri Lanka should therefore seriously consider establishing a National Rice Intelligence and Decision Support System (NRIDSS), an integrated digital platform that brings together relevant real-time information from agriculture, meteorology, irrigation, markets, trade, statistics and other institutions. Such a system could support production forecasting, market monitoring, import decisions, early warning and evidence-based policy formulation. In an increasingly uncertain climate and volatile global economy, this should no longer be regarded as a luxury. It is becoming an essential component of national food-system governance.
The deeper problems cannot be ignored
A systems approach would also force us to confront some uncomfortable structural realities. Why does productivity remain relatively low despite decades of research? Why are so many holdings too small to achieve economies of scale? Why are modern technologies and precision agriculture not being adopted more rapidly? Why do farmers often have limited bargaining power? Why do substantial losses occur after harvesting? Why can market power become concentrated in a relatively small number of actors? Why are guaranteed prices sometimes announced too late to influence farmers’ production decisions? Why are policy interventions so often reactive rather than proactive? And how will droughts, floods, temperature extremes, changing rainfall patterns and emerging pests affect the stability of rice production in the years ahead? These are not separate questions. They are parts of the same system.
From crisis management to systems governance
Sri Lanka does not need another isolated discussion about rice. What is needed is a national policy dialogue and action forum that brings all relevant actors together, not merely to exchange speeches, but to develop a shared understanding of the system and agree on what needs to be done. Such collaboration must go beyond consultation or the exchange of views. The different parties need to work together from problem definition through to implementation, bringing their diverse knowledge, perspectives, interests and practical experience into a common process.
Farmers bring contextual and experiential knowledge; industry actors understand market realities and operational constraints; scientists contribute evidence and analytical capabilities; policymakers bring institutional and regulatory perspectives; while technology and data specialists can provide new tools for understanding and managing the system. When these different perspectives are brought together systematically, they can reveal interdependencies, challenge assumptions, identify feasible interventions and generate solutions that are evidence-based, practically implementable and socially acceptable.
This is the essence of a transdisciplinary systems approach: not simply working across disciplines, but bringing together multiple stakeholders and multiple forms of knowledge to co-create solutions and share responsibility for outcomes. The process should therefore go beyond presentations and speeches. It should involve systems mapping, causal analysis, stakeholder dialogue, scenario planning and the participatory identification of the critical bottlenecks and leverage points in the rice system. Most importantly, it should distinguish between what is urgent and what is important, and between interventions that merely alleviate symptoms and those capable of changing the underlying behaviour of the system itself.
We need an implementation roadmap, not another report
There is, however, one important caveat. Sri Lanka has no shortage of reports, recommendations and policy documents. What we often lack is sustained implementation. Any national initiative on the rice conundrum must therefore end not with another set of broad recommendations but with a prioritised national action roadmap. It should identify short-, medium- and long-term actions, assign institutional responsibilities, establish timelines and define measurable indicators of progress. The ultimate objective should be to move Sri Lanka from reactive crisis management to proactive systems governance.
A national opportunity
The rice conundrum may, in fact, provide Sri Lanka with an opportunity that extends well beyond rice to deal with other important crops. If we can demonstrate that a complex national problem can be addressed by bringing together science, policy, stakeholder knowledge, real-time information and systems thinking, the approach could become a model for addressing other persistent challenges, from climate resilience and water security to energy, food systems and disaster risk.
The choice before us is therefore quite stark. We can continue responding to each rice crisis as it emerges, adjusting prices, arranging imports, appealing to millers, reassuring consumers and supporting farmers, only to repeat the cycle later. Or we can step back and ask a more fundamental question:
What is it about the way our rice system is structured and governed that continually produces these crises?
That is the question that needs to be answered. Sri Lanka has the scientific expertise, institutional capacity and stakeholder knowledge required to do so. What is needed now is the willingness to bring these fragmented sources of knowledge together and examine the rice sector as one interconnected system.
Our ancient civilisation understood the importance of interconnectedness: land, water, agriculture and society were organised as parts of a larger whole. Perhaps, in confronting the modern rice conundrum, we need to rediscover that systems wisdom, this time supported by modern science, technology, real-time data and transdisciplinary thinking. The time has come to stop merely managing the rice crisis. It is time to fix the system that keeps producing it.
It is against this backdrop that the Sri Lanka Association for the Advancement of Science (SLAAS) proposes to convene shortly a “National Policy Dialogue and Action Forum on the Rice Conundrum in Sri Lanka”, bringing together the key stakeholders across the rice system. The Forum is intended to provide a platform for moving beyond piecemeal and reactive interventions towards a coordinated, evidence-based and transdisciplinary systems approach, one capable of generating lasting and pragmatic solutions to what has become an “island-shaking national issue”.
Features
This curse of partisan politics in Sri Lanka
78 Years of Demagoguery, Not Democracy
by Brigadier Ranjan de Silva
rpcdesilva@gmail.com
On the 4th of February every year, we raise the lion flag and speak of democracy. We speak of 78 years of “self-rule.” But honesty demands we ask: what kind of rule have we actually had? It was not democracy. Democracy is government for the common good, constrained by law, informed by reason, and accountable to truth.
What Sri Lanka has had for 78 years is demagoguery — government by manipulation, by party, and by passion.
Defining the Curse:
The dictionary defines demagoguery as “political activity that seeks support by appealing to the desires and prejudices of ordinary people rather than by rational argument.” Its tools are simple: divide the people, promise the impossible, demonize the opponent, and govern for the next election, not the next generation. That is the political culture we inherited in 1948 and perfected since.
78 Years of Evidence:
The record is not ambiguous. Policy by Pendulum – 1948–2024. Instead of a national development plan, we got a partisan wrecking ball. 1956: The “Sinhala Only Act” was passed not after linguistic study, but as an election mobilization tool. 1970-77: The SLFP nationalized private enterprise and imposed import controls. 1977: The UNP reversed course with an open economy overnight. 2005-2014: Mega infrastructure was built on Chinese loans with no feasibility transparency. 2015-2019: Those same projects were called “white elephants” and stalled. 2020-2021: The organic fertilizer ban was announced as a populist “green” policy, reversed 6 months later after it collapsed agriculture and food prices. The Colombo Port City, Hambantota Port, and the Central Expressway all followed the same pattern: started, stopped, rebranded. The country pays twice. The party takes credit once. Economics as Election Candy. Demagoguery is expensive. 1960s: Subsidized rice to win rural votes, leading to the 1971 food crisis.
2005-2014:
Fuel subsidies and public sector hiring sprees that doubled the wage bill. 2019:
Unfunded tax cuts that removed Rs. 500 billion in annual revenue with no offset. By April 2022, external debt hit $51 Billion and we defaulted for the first time. The party that cut taxes was not in power to manage the IMF program. The party that inherited it was blamed for the austerity. This is the cycle. Institutions captured. A democracy needs referees. We turned them into party cadres. The 17th Amendment 2001 created independent commissions. The 18th Amendment 2010 abolished them. The 19th 2015 restored them. The 20th 2020 gutted them again. Police transfers, university vice-chancellors, and state bank chairmen have all been decided by party headquarters, not merit.
When the institution serves the party, the citizen gets leftovers.
Identity over Ideas: From 1956 to 1983 to 2009 to 2022, our elections have been won on fear, not spreadsheets. “They will erase your language.” “They will sell the country.” “Only we can protect Buddhism/the minorities/the nation.”
Rational debate on debt, productivity, or climate adaptation never wins a rally. Prejudice does. That is demagoguery by definition.
Party Interest subverted the National Interest. The core damage of 78 years of partisan politics is this: the nation became secondary to the party. Need power sector reform? Impossible, because our unions will strike. Need to cut 300,000 ghost employees? Impossible, because our voters will defect. Need a 20-year education and export plan? Impossible, because it won’t show results before the next election. So, we borrowed. We patched. We lied. The result: a railway system that still runs on 1950s engines, hospitals without paracetamol in 2022, and a brain drain of 300,000+ skilled workers since the crisis. The parties rotated. The country declined.
The Opposition’s Original Sin and here, all parties share guilt equally. In opposition, the job is not to govern. It is to destroy. The UNP in the 60s called the SLFP “communist.” The SLFP in the 70s called the UNP “imperialist.” The JVP called both “traitors.” The SJB, SLPP, and NPP today use the same script with new logos. Every tax is “anti-people.” Every reform is “a sell-out.” Every crisis is proof the other side is evil and must be removed at any cost. Then they win. And implement 80% of what they opposed. Because demagoguery has no principles, only positions. 78 years of unmerciful, bad-faith criticism has not produced accountability. It has produced cynicism. The public now believes all politicians are the same — because for 78 years, they have behaved the same.
Breaking the Curse:
Changing the party in power will not end this. We must change the incentives that reward demagoguery. Three reforms are non-negotiable: Bind future Parliaments to national policy. Pass 10-year frameworks for energy, education, and public debt with 2/3 majority protection. Infrastructure and fiscal rules should outlast one government, as they do in Chile and New Zealand. Depoliticize the state. Independent commissions for police, elections, public service, and bribery must have constitutional budgets and appointment panels that exclude MPs. No more 18th/20th Amendment style rollbacks. Demand better from voters We must stop rewarding the best slogan and start demanding the best spreadsheet. Town halls over rallies. Costings over promises. A 5-year plan over a 5-minute speech.
In 1948, we did not inherit democracy. We inherited an election. For 78 years we have used that election to choose our favourite demagogue. The prize has been debt, division, and decay. The curse of partisan politics will only end when citizens and leaders agree on one principle: Party second. Country first. Until then, February 4th will remain a ceremony, not a celebration.
Features
Developing markets for fruits, vegetables and flowers in the Gulf
Export diversification – Missing the wood for the trees – Part II
by Gomi Senadhira
Sri Lanka established its diplomatic presence in the Gulf region only in the early 1980s. First, a small embassy was opened in Abu Dhabi, covering the UAE. Then in 1982, embassies were opened in Jeddah and Kuwait. The embassy in Jeddah covered Saudi Arabia while Kuwait was responsible for Kuwait, Oman, Qatar and Bahrain. Commercial Diplomats were also assigned to these two embassies. A senior private sector executive, with experience in marketing, was posted to Jedda as the commercial counsellor. I was posted to Kuwait as a second secretary (Commercial). Our instructions were very clear. Focus not only on traditional exports. Product diversification was a priority.
Developing Markets for Agricultural Products
At that time, Minister Lalith Athulathmudali had just launched his Export Production Villages (EPV) programme. He believed that the EPVs working closely with the exporters would provide an ideal opportunity for rural households to directly benefit from the government’s new open trade policy. Agricultural products, particularly fruits and vegetables, were a key component of this approach and the ministry thought that the Gulf countries, with large Sri Lankan communities, would have a ready-made market for these items. Thus, from day one we were compelled to explore the market for nontraditional exports; fruits and vegetables (F&Vs) were on the top of our priority list.
From cane baskets to cardboard boxes
Fortunately, the market for the F&Vs products in the region was at a very early stage of development. That provided an opportunity for Sri Lankan exporters, who were also inexperienced, to work with the importers and grow together. For example, in Kuwait, one of our first customers for F&Vs was a small supermarket where the manager was a Sri Lankan. After the first shipment arrived, he invited me to inspect the shipment. I visited the supermarket and was shocked by what I saw. While produce from other countries was packed nicely in cardboard boxes, our packaging mirrored transport to Manning market, cane baskets! As a result, fresh produce had suffered significant damage. A long report, with photographs, to the trade ministry produced an immediate response. After all, this was a pet project of the Minister. Within weeks, shipments were packed in cardboard boxes. Immediately afterwards, an expert on packaging from the Commonwealth Secretariat was sent to Kuwait with an official from the EDB to study the problem.
By then, we had also managed to develop a friendship with the management of the Salmiya supermarket, a large upmarket supermarket patronised by wealthy Kuwaitis and expats. It was a cooperative and the chairman was a Kuwaiti public servant. I could only meet him after 6 PM when his large office functioned as a diwaniya, a cherished cultural space in Kuwaiti society. Guests moved in and out the room. I had to spend time with them sipping many cups of tea. Though that meant at least two hours on each visit, it helped greatly to develop a close relationship. The general manager was an efficient and friendly Palestinian. After many visits we had succeeded in getting an order for F&Vs. The day after the first shipment arrived, I got an urgent call from the GM to come and inspect it. Once again, I was in for a surprise. Inside the cold room, the consignments from other countries were stacked neatly on top of each other, while vegetable boxes from Sri Lanka had collapsed once placed on top of each other, crushing the produce within.
Fortunately, our packaging experts arrived in Kuwait soon after this incident. They spent two days in the Salmiya Supermarket, studying the packaging from other origins. We were also successful in assuring the GM our packaging would improve. After that, packaging improved and exports moved smoothly. With that, Sri Lanka emerged as a small but reliable supplier to the mainstream market, not just the ethnic segment of the market.
Export of Fresh Vegetables by Sea
Towards the end of my tour, a Sri Lankan businessman requested me to find a buyer for cabbages, which he was prepared to export in large quantities by sea. I introduced him to the largest fruit and vegetable importer in Kuwait. Their regular suppliers of similar vegetables were Jordan, Lebanon and Syria. Luckily, the company was keen to diversify the supply sources. A few weeks later, the first container load of cabbages from Sri Lanka arrived in Kuwait. Immediately after the arrival of the container, I visited the company. They were pleased with the quality and the price and were looking forward to importing more fruits and vegetables. Unfortunately, that turned out to be a one-off event. Later on, when I was back in Sri Lanka, the exporter informed me that he couldn’t continue with it due to the problems with the local supply chains.
Floriculture
During the period I was asked by the EDB to explore the market for floricultural products, more particularly for cut flowers. At that time Kuwait was a relatively large importer of cut flowers and live plants. The main suppliers were the Netherlands and Colombia. Importers were also reluctant to move out of the established supply chain, particularly due to “snob value” associated with the product from Europe. However, after some difficulties, one importer agreed to place a pre-paid trial order. After the arrival of that shipment, he was impressed by the quality of the product and the orders expanded rapidly. As a result, by the end of 1985 Kuwait had become a major buyer of Sri Lanka’s floricultural products.
From village to global markets
As a result of the proactive promotional work undertaken by the EDB and the embassies in the region, by 1985, Sri Lanka had managed to acquire a small but significant share of the F&V and floriculture markets in the GCC countries. We had also identified domestic supply chain issues that hindered exports. All that was done, long before Southeast Asian or African countries even entered into that market. In fact, my Southeast Asian colleagues used to contact me often to reserve “durian” for them at the “Sri Lankan supermarket”.
Most importantly, a substantially large share of produce from Sri Lanka in Kuwaiti supermarkets originated in the EPVs. Of course, that didn’t just happen. The ministry (or the minister) using the carrot and stick approach “encouraged” exporters to buy the produce directly from the newly established EPVs. (The writer can be reached at senadhiragomi@gmail.com)
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