Features

Proposed Anti-Terrorism Bill: Real tiger, paper tiger or mixed bag

Published

3 years ago

2023/04/23

By Nuwan Peiris

The writer is an Attorney, Chartered Shipbroker (UK) and UN-ITLOS Nippon Fellow 2012/2013. He holds M.Sc. Logistics (BCU-UK), LL.M (International Maritime Law) (IMO-IMLI), LL. M (International Trade Law) (Wales), LL.B (O.U.S.L).

“No generalization is wholly true – not even this one.” – Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes

The recent Anti-Terrorism Bill (ATA) has garnered more attention than one could ever imagine for a law. Emotional and sweeping generalizations are made by all and sundry on the proposed ATA. Even the recently enacted 21st Amendment did not receive so much attention from the public. Why is it that a law like the proposed ATA receives so much attention? There seems to be a legitimate fear that the proposed ATA may be no different to the existing law, namely PTA (Prevention of Terrorism Act), if not worse.

But what is the reality? Who drafted this proposed ATA? From the skilled draftsmanship associated with the proposed ATA, the draft law requires an in-depth analysis for a proper understanding unlike some of the recently introduced laws by the government.

Weaker than UK Law – Why?

In essence, the proposed ATA seems to be a strategically diluted version of the UK’s Anti-Terrorism Act 2000 – incorporating the amendments that were introduced by the UK after the London bombing. Worse still, proposed ATA is inconsequential in its effect when it comes to combating global terrorism as far as some of the fundamental provisions are concerned; in other words, a feeble draft law compared to the Patriot Act of the USA which became law after the 9/11 attacks. However, the proposed ATA may be an abusive weapon as far its enforcement orders are concerned, such as the Miscellaneous Orders contained in Part X. In short, the proposed ATA is a mixed bag. For example, most of the protestors’ dissent to the proposed law gyrates on these abusive enforcement orders.

How does a draft law like this instant one finds its way, from nowhere, to the official gazette without much public discussion? The purpose of this very brief write-up is to urge the Government in power and the opposition parties to prevent the proposed ATA being tabled in the Parliament, instead to appoint a Select Committee in the Parliament comprising of varied interests so that the matter can be reconsidered and better reforms of the ATA can be effected with consensus.

And the important point to consider by this proposed Select Committee in the Parliament is to introduce an ATA to tackle global terrorism effectively, and promulgate a law that is in line with the Anti-Terrorism Act 2000 of the UK (as amended), and better still the Patriot Act of USA – and be mindful not to introduce a version that is weaker than the UK law. Hence, the President, the Prime Minister, and the Justice Minister should be advised to set-up a Select Committee in the Parliament, so that the proposed ATA can be changed to become an acceptable legal instrument in combating global terrorism, and avoid becoming a law which is far weaker than the UK law on terrorism.

If the proposed ATA becomes law, this law may not have the same effectiveness in combating global terrorism especially given the weak substantive provisions in clauses 2 and 3, coupled with arbitrary procedural provisions that may lead to abuse in implementation. Such a proposed ATA will serve neither the purpose of combating global terrorism nor ensuring procedural fairness to the ones who are caught up as suspects. A middle of nowhere legislation, although drafted well disguised, may not serve Sri Lanka well, noting that further legislation similar to Bio-Security Act 2015 from Australia is needed to combat biological and chemical attacks. What is needed is to have extensive deliberations in a fresh Parliamentary Select Committee, where all of us can share and contribute with our experience to the formulation of a far-sighted ATA.

Why is ATA weaker than UK and USA laws?

There are two fundamental provisions in the proposed ATA – clauses 2 and 3. Clause 2 deals with jurisdiction and clause 3 deals with the offence of terrorism.This is the typical structure of an ATA law in many countries, and drafts men followed the universal structure – and we see nothing wrong in this. Here, Clause 2 becomes the international jurisdiction base for the implementation of the proposed ATA.

Clause 3 contains the offence of terrorism that becomes the basis on which other offences and provisions are built upon. Clause 3 is the mother provision, and the rest of the offences are the offspring of Clause 3 – which is typical of any ATA in the world including the UK.

Clause 2 – the clause on jurisdiction – becomes the basis for enforcement powers mentioned in the Part X of proposed ATA. Whilst the enforcement powers in the Miscellaneous Part – that comprises of Proscription Orders, Prohibition Orders, Restriction Orders etc., which is less judicially accountable – are wide and arbitrary when applied within Sri Lanka; on the contrary, its overall reach and enforcement of such Orders in the context of global terrorism is ‘fragile’ given the limitations in Clause 2.

Both Clauses 2 and 3 are the foundational structure of the proposed ATA, and the enforcement provisions contained in the rest of the ATA, including Part X forms the superstructure. Let us examine each of these aspects.

Clause 2 – Jurisdiction

There is extra-territorial application of the proposed ATA. This is a salient feature, and this is far better drafted than the ill-fated, and now demised, Counter-Terrorism Bill that was presented in 2018.

An extract of Clause 2 is as follows;

“2. (1) The provisions of this Act shall apply to any person who commits an offence under this Act, whether within or outside the territorial limits of Sri Lanka, including- …”

First limb of Clause 2(1) ends with the word ‘including’ – but given the subsequent sub-clauses it is unclear whether such sub-clauses are in fact have limiting effects on the wide scope of the first operative limb – namely, “[the] provisions of this Act shall apply to any person who commits an offence under this Act, whether within or outside the territorial limits of Sri Lanka.” It is preferable that the word, ‘including’ is replaced by the words ‘including, but not limited to -’.

Overall, it is unclear whether Sri Lanka has jurisdiction over a purely international crime of terrorism committed in violation of clause 3 of the proposed ATA. Say, if an African terrorist group (which is not proscribed as per clause 82 of the ATA) launches a pirate attack on a foreign flagged vessel in the Indian high seas, and one of the members of said terror group ends up on the shores of Sri Lanka, it is unclear whether such terrorist can be investigated and prosecuted in Sri Lanka. The entire commission of the act is in the high seas, and the said terror group is unknown to Sri Lanka, yet ends up in Sri Lanka. In this example, the ambit of the applicability of clause 2 remains questionable to exercise jurisdiction by Sri Lanka.

Or else, if assistance is sought from our State, and the government dispatches a naval convoy to help the distressed vessel, and having offered assistance in the high seas, and the crew and the vessel is brought to Sri Lanka for medical treatment, can the Sri Lankan authority initiate investigations on this matter that occurred exclusively in the High seas? The legal regime of the high seas is contained in Part VII of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982, and the high seas are beyond the jurisdiction of any national jurisdiction of any State. Although, clause 2(c) seems to be broad enough to cover such foreign citizens by the use of words ‘any person’, clause 2(d) seems to limit the applicability of clause 2(c). Whether this is specifically brought to the attention of the government and MPs are uncertain. Also noteworthy is the uncertainty pervading the inclusive nature of clause 2(1) by the use of the words ‘including’ at the early stages, as noted by me earlier. All this, compounds the uncertainty to the jurisdictional ambit of the applicability of the proposed ATA. Therefore, there is a need to revisit the jurisdictional ambit of clause 2.

Similarly, there are many drawbacks in clause 2, and the application of the said jurisdictional clause must be considered in the light of the public international law and its bases on international jurisdiction, and how much of such international State rights that should be contained in a proposed ATA in line with similar legislation like Patriot Act of the USA or Anti-Terrorism Act 2000 of the UK. Curtailing such international rights that legitimately belong to Sri Lanka without a rational policy basis is not acceptable. Hence the proposed ATA should be reconsidered for the want of workable jurisdiction. The writer is fully aware of the criticisms on the counter terrorism laws of the UK and USA. Whether Sri Lanka wishes to retract from UK’s/USA’s positions need to be objectively decided by the policy makers with wider consultation.

Another example of a defect in clause 2 is that sub-clause (d) says, that a person who had been a citizen of Sri Lanka commits the offence of terrorism within the territory of the Republic of Sri Lanka, say today, but found out later; and he subsequently shifts his habitual residence from Sri Lanka; for the provisions of the proposed ATA to be applied the concurrence of the foreign State of which he is a citizen is required. The problem continues further. Also, what if that foreign citizen later visits Sri Lanka, or he is intercepted by a Sri Lankan naval operation in the high seas and brought to the shores of Sri Lanka; does Sri Lanka have the jurisdiction to prosecute this person – although such foreign citizen now does not have any habitual residence in Sri Lanka? It is questionable whether clause 2 covers such a situation. That means, clause 2(c) seems to be broad enough to cover such foreign citizens by the use of the words ‘any person’, but clause 2(d) seems to limit the applicability of clause 2(c).

There are so many defects in clause 2. But the scope and the space of this write-up does not allow me to expand. There is provision for extra-territorial jurisdiction in the UK’s Terrorism Act 2000 for terrorist financing and terrorist bombing offences in line with the UN Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist bombings and the UN Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism. The appeal to the government is to reconsider the proposed ATA.

Clause 3 – The Offence of Terrorism

The offence of terrorism under clause 3 forms the basis for a number of criminal offenses; and triggers the application of many provisions including the encouragement of terrorism, and wide-ranging powers, like the designation and proscription of terrorist organizations; and other enforcement powers and orders.

Similarly, the Terrorism Act 2000 of the UK, includes acts of terrorism committed both in and outside of the UK, as the use or threat of one or more of the actions listed in the section, and under the Act, terrorism is currently defined as “the use or threat [of action] designed to “influence” the government or to intimidate the public or a section of the public, and the use or threat is made for the purposes of advancing a political, religious or ideological cause. (Vide, Section 1(1) of the Terrorism Act 2000 of the UK.)

Lord Carlile’s report on “The Definition of Terrorism,” March 2007, reviewed the scope of the definition of the Anti terrorism Act of the UK and stated that the UK definition is “consistent with international comparators and treaties, and is useful and broadly fit for purpose”. In his report, Lord Carlile recommended amending the language so that only actions or the threat of action designed “to intimidate” the government, instead of the much broader word “influence”, fall within the definition.

The present the section 1(1) of the UK reads as follows;

In this Act “terrorism” means the use or threat of action where—

(a)the action falls within subsection (2),

(b)the use or threat is designed to influence the government or an international governmental organisation or to intimidate the public or a section of the public, and

(c)the use or threat is made for the purpose of advancing a political, religious, racial or ideological cause.

The words such as “influence” can be considered much wider than the word “wrongfully” that is mentioned in clause 3(1) of our proposed ATA.

Further, the UK Act in section 4(1) contains broad definitions. For e.g. the reference to any person or to property is a reference to any person, or to property, wherever situated, and a reference to the public includes a reference to the public of any country, and “the government” means the government of the United Kingdom, of a Part of the United Kingdom or of a country other than the United Kingdom. However such effective and broad definitions do not exist in our proposed ATA.

Further, Section 38B(1) and (2) of the Terrorism Act 2000 of the UK says that it is an offence if one does not inform the police if he believes that someone he knows is in preparation of acts of terrorism. The maximum sentence in respect of Section 38B of the Act is for a term not exceeding five years’ imprisonment, although it is a defence to prove that he had a reasonable excuse for not making the disclosure.

It is also observed that the intention is expressly required as the mental element of the crime in clause 3, whereas the word ‘knowledge’ would be preferable given the complexity involved in the crime. However, section 1 of the UK Anti-terrorism Act seems to require no overburden of such intention or knowledge to the extent of proposed ATA.

The frequently cited leading case on strict liability and the presumption of ‘mens rea’ is Sweet v Parsley [1970] AC 132. But the recent case supreme court judgment of PWR (AP) (Appellant) v Director of Public Prosecutions (Respondent) [2022] UKSC 2 held that such presumption is rebutted for the offence contained in section 13. All this shows how broadly the UK s Anti-Terrorism Act is applied, which is a clear lesson for us.

It is in this context that our proposed ATA should be reviewed as to its narrowness in combating global terrorism, and abusive in enforcing miscellaneous orders on the contrary.

The General Fears about Proposed ATA

There is an overwhelming agitation that the proposed ATA will turn out to be draconian law – just as bad as the existing PTA, if not worse. Fears have been galvanised to such an extent that many opposition parties and activists have decided to challenge the proposed ATA in the Supreme Court.

A common question they ask is whether any trade union activists or media activists that protest in public or air their voice against the government be dealt with under the proposed ATA. Such possibilities are rare given the highly structured nature of the mother clause 3 and her associated offspring provisions. The threshold tests that are needed to graduate an act to one of terrorism that gets caught in clause 3 or its associated provisions is placed at a high level, and it is very unlikely that mere protests would classify as an act of terrorism. Many, if not all the offences are directly connected to clause 3, as noted above. It is very unlikely that a final conviction from a court of law will victimize a group of mere protesters or a group of media activists engaged in criticising the government. If such be the case, the UK’s Anti-Terrorism Act 2000 would have led to far greater concerns, since, as I indicated above, the proposed ATA law in Sri Lanka is much narrower than that of the UK’s 2000 Act.

However, it needs to be observed that enforcement/miscellaneous powers that are widely couched in Part X can nevertheless be abused in the short term, and innocent people may be apprehended as suspects. Therefore a group of protesters or media activists can be harassed in the short run given the weaknesses in the enforcement procedures. Hence, it is the enforcement powers and procedures that need a revamp for the want of a greater judicial scrutiny.

One more point on Part X – miscellaneous powers in the proposed ATA. Take a look at the Anti-Terrorism Act 2000 of the UK. There is far greater judicial accountability in the UK regime, for eg., detailed de-proscription procedures in the UK law compared to the proposed ATA etc. global terror networks are complex and dangerous.

Take this example. Assume that a terror group takes an LNG carrier and her crew as hostage in the outer harbour of Colombo Port, where the sabotaging of this carrier would cause enormous destruction similar to the explosion of a nuclear bomb. The hostage situation goes on for 10 days in outer harbor. Fortunately, in the early hours of the hostage crisis Sri Lanka arrests a suspect in the Port connected to the hostage crisis. It is not advisable to bring in a human rights oversight body to question the well being of the suspect taken to custody in the first few days, since the hostage crisis is ongoing and the counter-terrorism operations are still going on. And the arrested suspect may be needed for hostage negotiation and other counter-terrorism measures. It is best advised that the proposed ATA is revisited given the serious lacuna it has with regard to the weaknesses even on the procedural provisions in addressing organized global terror networks.

The writer is aware of the statements so far issued by the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) and Center for Policy Alternatives (CPA). It is noted that all these observations are primarily, if not exclusively, centred on the required procedural due process in the enforcement powers, rather than on the restrictive nature of clauses such as 2 and 3. The concerns such as lack of a proper definition of terrorism, ‘glorification’ being made an offence after the London bombing, and other substantive due process concerns etc., nevertheless exist in the UK/USA Laws, and there is no necessity for Sri Lanka to deviate from these advanced foreign legal regimes without broader expert consultation, and if a deviation from the UK/USA laws are warranted such policy must be carefully considered.

Finally – A call for a fresh Parliamentary Select Committee, a call to calm down for the public and a plea for the government to delay the proposed law:

The overabundance of criticisms from the trade unions, professional bodies, religious bodies and the NGOs need to be tempered with wiser counsel in the interest of the country. The government should also be mindful to restrain itself from introducing sweeping powers for procedural enforcement which have less judicial scrutiny. This write-up once again reiterates its clarion call to halt this legislation being pushed so hurriedly through the legislative deliberation process. We call upon all the professional/religious bodies, trade unions, NGOs and the political parties to request the powers that be to have a Parliamentary Select Committee so that an objectively drafted ATA can be finalised to one which the government and the citizens in this country want and can agree.

(The writer is an Attorney, Chartered Shipbroker (UK) and UN-ITLOS Nippon Fellow 2012/2013. He holds M.Sc. Logistics (BCU-UK), LL.M (International Maritime Law) (IMO-IMLI), LL. M (International Trade Law) (Wales), LL.B (O.U.S.L).

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Features

Power crept into the Sangha and is now tearing it apart

Published

15 hours ago

2026/06/5

Thilina Walpola

A file photo of Buddhist monks engaged in a protest

For more than a century, Sri Lankan society has lived with a quiet contradiction at the heart of its religious life. On the one hand, the Buddhist monk is revered as the embodiment of moral discipline, selfrestraint, and renunciation. On the other, the modern monk has become a public figure, political actor, administrator, media personality, and in some cases power broker whose influence extends far beyond the temple. This contradiction has been tolerated, even celebrated, for decades. But recent events, most notably a widely publicised case involving a senior monk accused of grave moral misconduct, have forced the country to confront a painful truth: the institutional conditions that make such scandals possible are not new. They are the predictable outcome of a long historical process that H. L. Seneviratne described with remarkable clarity in The Work of Kings. The moral deterioration visible today is not an aberration. It is the culmination of a centurylong transformation in the identity, function, and authority of the Sangha.

To understand how we arrived at this moment, it is necessary to revisit the argument Seneviratne made nearly three decades ago. His thesis was simple but profound: the modern Sri Lankan monkhood has taken on the ‘work of kings.’ By this he meant that monks, instead of confining themselves to the renunciant life prescribed by the Vinaya, have assumed the secular responsibilities once associated with precolonial kingship, such as protecting the religion, organising society, guiding the nation, and enforcing moral order. This shift, he argued, was not a natural evolution of Buddhist tradition but a modern invention shaped by colonialism, nationalism, and the anxieties of a society struggling to redefine itself in the face of foreign domination. The monk became a symbol of national identity, a guardian of cultural authenticity, and a leader in the struggle for political autonomy. In the process, the boundaries that once separated the monastic from the worldly began to dissolve.

Transformation

The consequences of this transformation were not immediately visible. For decades, the activist monk was celebrated as a patriot, a reformer, and a moral guide. His involvement in education, social welfare, and nationalist mobilisation was seen as a necessary response to colonial pressures and missionary competition. But beneath the surface, the foundations of monastic discipline were slowly eroding. The Vinaya, which had served for centuries as a rigorous framework for regulating monastic life, was increasingly overshadowed by the demands of public engagement. The communal structures that once ensured accountability, senior supervision, collective confession, and the daily rhythms of monastic routine, were weakened by the pressures of modernity. Monks who travelled constantly, managed institutions, or lived independently in urban temples found themselves outside the traditional systems of oversight that had long protected the integrity of the Sangha.

Scandal

It is within this historical context that the recent scandal must be understood. The case shocked the nation not only because of the severity of the allegations but because it shattered the public’s assumption that the monkhood remains a bastion of moral purity. Yet the shock itself reveals a collective denial. For years, Sri Lankan society has been aware, sometimes quietly, sometimes openly—of the growing gap between the ideal of the monk and the realities of modern monastic life. Stories of misconduct, financial irregularities, political manipulation, and abuse of authority have circulated with increasing frequency. But each incident has been treated as an isolated failure, a personal weakness, or an unfortunate exception. What has been missing is recognition that these incidents are symptoms of a deeper structural problem.

Seneviratne’s analysis helps illuminate this problem. When monks take on the work of kings, they inevitably enter domains of power that expose them to temptations the Vinaya was designed to avoid. Handling money, managing institutions, cultivating political patrons, and exercising authority over laypeople create opportunities for ego, ambition, and moral compromise. The monk who becomes a public figure is no longer shielded by the anonymity and humility of the renunciant life. Instead, he becomes a celebrity, a leader, and in some cases an object of uncritical devotion. This elevation brings with it a dangerous form of immunity. Laypeople who revere a monk for his public achievements may hesitate to question his behaviour. Politicians who rely on monastic support may protect him from scrutiny. The media, which often treats monks as moral authorities, may be reluctant to investigate allegations that challenge the sanctity of the robe.

The recent scandal illustrates how these dynamics can converge. The monk at the centre of the case was not an obscure figure. He was a respected preacher, charismatic leader, and head of a prominent institution. His public image was built on years of service, teaching, and community engagement. Yet it was precisely this public stature that allowed him to operate without meaningful oversight. The institutional structures around him, administrators, lay supporters, and junior monks, were either unwilling or unable to challenge his authority. The very qualities that made him a respected figure in the eyes of the public also made him untouchable within his own institution. When allegations finally emerged, they revealed not only personal wrongdoing but a systemic failure of accountability.

Failure that is not unique

This failure is not unique to one temple or one monk. It reflects a broader pattern within the modern Sangha. As monastic institutions have grown in size, wealth, and influence, their internal governance has struggled to keep pace. Many temples operate as semiautonomous entities controlled by a single monk or a small group of monks. Financial transparency is limited, administrative oversight is weak, and the mechanisms for addressing misconduct are often informal or ineffective. The traditional structures of monastic discipline, such as the Sangharama procedures for adjudicating offences, are rarely used in modern contexts, partly because they require collective participation and partly because they are illsuited to the complexities of contemporary institutional life. In practice, this means that monks who wield significant authority can act with little fear of internal sanction.

The politicisation of the Sangha has further complicated matters. Since the midtwentieth century, monks have played an increasingly prominent role in electoral politics, nationalist movements, and public policy debates. This involvement has given them access to political networks that can be mobilised to protect their interests. It has also created a culture in which monks are valued not for their adherence to the Vinaya but for their ability to influence public opinion, mobilise voters, or lend moral legitimacy to political causes. In such an environment, the monk who is politically useful may be shielded from criticism, while the monk who adheres strictly to the renunciant ideal may find himself marginalised or ignored.

The result is a profound distortion of monastic identity. The monk who once sought liberation from worldly attachments is now encouraged to cultivate influence, authority, and public recognition. The monk who once lived under the strict supervision of senior elders now operates in a world where independence is celebrated and oversight is minimal. The monk who once relied on laypeople for basic sustenance now controls vast resources, manages institutions, and commands the loyalty of thousands of followers. This inversion of traditional roles has created a fertile ground for moral deterioration.

Yet it would be a mistake to interpret this deterioration as evidence that the Sangha as a whole is corrupt. Many monks continue to live lives of remarkable discipline, humility, and spiritual dedication. In remote forest monasteries, small village temples, and meditation centres across the country, monks quietly uphold the ancient ideals of the renunciant life. They are not the ones who appear on television, lead political rallies, or manage large institutions. Their work is invisible, their influence subtle, and their commitment unwavering. The crisis facing the Sangha today is not a crisis of individual morality but a crisis of institutional identity. It is the product of a centurylong transformation that has blurred the boundaries between the monastic and the secular, the spiritual and the political, the renunciant and the worldly.

If Sri Lanka is to address this crisis, it must begin by acknowledging the structural nature of the problem. The temptation to treat each scandal as an isolated incident must be resisted. Instead, the country must confront the uncomfortable reality that the modern configuration of monastic life is fundamentally at odds with the principles of the Vinaya. The Sangha cannot simultaneously function as a political force, a social service provider, a media institution, and a spiritual community without compromising its integrity. The more monks are drawn into the world, the more vulnerable they become to the moral dangers that the Buddha warned against.

Reform, therefore, must focus not only on punishing individual offenders but on rethinking the institutional structures that enable misconduct. This includes strengthening internal governance, enhancing financial transparency, restoring the authority of senior elders, and reestablishing the communal practices that once ensured accountability. It also requires a broader cultural shift in how laypeople relate to monks. Blind devotion must give way to informed respect. Reverence must be balanced with responsibility. The robe must be honoured, but it must not be used as a shield against scrutiny.

Seneviratne’s work offers a valuable starting point for this rethinking. His analysis reminds us that the crisis facing the Sangha is not the result of moral decline alone but of historical forces that reshaped the identity of the monkhood. By tracing the evolution of the activist monk, he shows how the Sangha became entangled in the political and social structures of the modern nationstate. This entanglement has brought both benefits and dangers. It has allowed monks to play important roles in education, social welfare, and national development. But it has also exposed them to the corrupting influences of power, wealth, and public acclaim.

The challenge now is to disentangle the Sangha from these influences without undermining its ability to serve society. This will not be easy. The activist monk has become deeply embedded in the cultural and political fabric of the country. Many laypeople expect monks to be leaders, reformers, and guardians of national identity. Politicians rely on monastic support to legitimise their agendas. Media institutions depend on monks for content, commentary, and moral authority. Reversing this trend will require a collective effort from monks, laypeople, and political leaders alike.

Ultimately, the future of the Sangha depends on its ability to reclaim the renunciant ideal that lies at the heart of Buddhist monasticism. This does not mean withdrawing from society entirely, but it does mean reestablishing the boundaries that protect the monk from the dangers of worldly involvement. It means recognising that the true strength of the Sangha lies not in its political influence or institutional power but in its moral authority, its spiritual discipline, and its commitment to the path of liberation. The recent scandal, painful as it is, may serve as a catalyst for this reevaluation. It has exposed the vulnerabilities of the modern monastic system and forced the country to confront the consequences of a centurylong transformation.

To understand how the Vihara Devalegam Act relates to the perceived moral deformation of the clergy, it is necessary to examine how property management, state law, and monastic discipline intersect in the modern era. Historically stemming from the Buddhist Temporalities Ordinance No. 19 of 1931, this act serves as the primary legal framework governing the ‘temporalities’—meaning the secular wealth, extensive landholdings, and material donations belonging to Buddhist temples and shrines. While ancient kings granted these vast tracts of land to support the monkhood’s spiritual pursuits, the modern codification of this law has inadvertently fostered a system where property rights frequently supersede spiritual accountability.

The core of the crisis lies in the commercialisation of the monastic order that this legal framework enables. By treating temple lands as economic assets and vesting absolute administrative power in individual chief monks or lay trustees, the act has contributed to the rise of what critics term a monastic middle class. Access to vast, unregulated financial resources, rent from lands, and corporate donations has fundamentally shifted the focus of certain segments of the clergy away from the traditional path of worldly renunciation and spiritual guidance. Instead, it has driven a preoccupation with business investments, the accumulation of private capital, and luxury lifestyles, which deeply alienates a public looking to the Sangha for moral leadership.

The institutional flaws embedded in the Vihara Devalegam Act find a stark, real-world manifestation in the recent criminal case involving Venerable Pallegama Hemarathana Thero. As the chief priest of Anuradhapura and the custodian of the Atamasthana—the eight highly venerated Buddhist shrines, including the sacred Jaya Sri Maha Bodhi—Hemarathana Thero occupied one of the most powerful and wealthy positions within the Sri Lankan Sangha. His arrest on charges of sexual abuse of a minor girl perfectly illustrates how the structural defects of the Act facilitate not only moral decay but also the systemic obstruction of justice.

The core of this intersection lies in the vast, unaccountable wealth generated by the temporalities of the Anuradhapura shrines. Under the Vihara Devalegam Act, the chief custodian exercises immense, virtually unchecked control over temple revenues, state-backed land management, and millions of rupees in daily donations from millions of global pilgrims. It is precisely this immense financial liquidity that enabled the alleged deployment of vast sums of money to the victim’s family.

Furthermore, the situation underscores the profound policy failures cited regarding the helplessness of the monastic hierarchy and state enforcement. When child protection authorities initially attempted to act, the National Child Protection Authority noted severe delays and institutional resistance, stating they practically had to force the police to execute the arrest. The monk’s immediate retreat to a private hospital in Colombo upon the advancement of the criminal probe, followed by his release on bail, mirrors the exact loop described where wealthy monastics deploy high-priced legal defence teams funded directly or indirectly by their institutional positions. Because the Vihara Devalegam Act does not provide a mechanism for the immediate, unconditional forfeiture of temporal administrative rights upon a criminal indictment, the accused retains his structural power throughout the legal process. The Pallegama Thero scandal stands as definitive proof that without a fundamental overhaul of how temple wealth is legally governed and disciplined, the material benefits guaranteed by ancient temporalities will continue to shield the worst elements of moral deformation from the rule of law.

If Sri Lanka can learn from this moment and if it can recognise the structural roots of the crisis and commit to meaningful reform, then the Sangha may yet emerge stronger, more disciplined, and more faithful to its ancient ideals. But if the country continues to treat each scandal as an isolated failure and if it continues to ignore the deeper institutional problems that Seneviratne identified, then the moral deterioration we see today will only deepen. The work of kings, when performed by monks, carries a heavy price. It is time to decide whether that price is worth paying.

by Professor Amarasiri de Silva

Features

Kondachchi wind farm and battery storage project to boost energy security, says Power Ministry Secretary

Published

15 hours ago

2026/06/5

Thilina Walpola

The Power and Energy Ministry’s drive towards energy security and renewable energy expansion received a major boost yesterday with the signing of a tripartite cooperation agreement for the development of the 150 MW Kondachchi Wind Power Project and an integrated Battery Energy Storage System (BESS) in Mannar.

The agreement was signed at the Ministry of Power auditorium under the patronage of Power Minister Anura Karunatilaka and Deputy Power Minister Arkam Ilyas.

Speaking at the event, Ministry Secretary G. M. R. D. Aponsu described the project as a transformative investment that would strengthen the country’s electricity network while supporting Sri Lanka’s transition towards cleaner energy sources.

“The Kondachchi Wind Power Project represents a significant milestone in Sri Lanka’s renewable energy journey. By combining large-scale wind generation with advanced battery energy storage technology, we are creating a more resilient and reliable power system capable of meeting future energy demands while reducing dependence on imported fossil fuels,” Aponsu said.

The project will be developed at Silavathurai in the Kondachchi area of Mannar on lands owned by the Sri Lanka Cashew Corporation. It is expected to utilise some 31 modern wind turbines with a total installed capacity of at least 150 MW.

Aponsu said the inclusion of an integrated battery storage facility would help address the variability associated with wind power generation and ensure stable electricity supply to the national grid.

“The battery energy storage component is a key feature of this project. It will enable the efficient integration of renewable energy into the grid and enhance overall system stability, which is essential as Sri Lanka increases the share of renewables in its energy mix,” he said.

According to the Ministry, the wind farm is expected to generate nearly 525 gigawatt-hours of electricity annually, significantly reducing the country’s expenditure on imported fuel and strengthening national energy security.

The project is also expected to contribute to Sri Lanka’s climate commitments by reducing carbon dioxide emissions by an estimated 372,750 tonnes annually.

“This investment delivers both economic and environmental benefits. It will reduce greenhouse gas emissions, support sustainable development objectives and help Sri Lanka move closer to achieving its renewable energy and climate targets,” Aponsu noted.

The project will be implemented under a Public-Private Partnership (PPP) arrangement using the Build, Own and Operate (BOO) model. The Asian Development Bank is providing technical and financial advisory support through its Transaction Advisory Services programme.

The signing ceremony was attended by Pradeep Perera, Chairman of the National System Operator (Pvt) Ltd., and Takeyo Koike, Head of Market Development and Public-Private Partnership Division of the ADB, among other distinguished guests.

The Ministry said comprehensive Environmental Impact Assessments and avifaunal studies have been undertaken to ensure minimal impacts on bird populations, nearby communities and agricultural lands. A dedicated 220-kilovolt transmission system will also be constructed to connect the project to the national grid.

“The Kondachchi Wind Farm is a strategic national project that will help secure Sri Lanka’s energy future while accelerating the country’s transition towards sustainable and affordable electricity generation,” Aponsu said.

Energy sector experts view the project as one of the most important renewable energy initiatives currently being pursued in Sri Lanka, combining utility-scale wind generation with modern energy storage technology to enhance grid reliability and long-term energy sustainability.

By Ifham Nizam

Features

Saudi Arabia sets new benchmark in Hajj management as 1.7 million pilgrims complete sacred journey

Published

15 hours ago

2026/06/5

Thilina Walpola

Ambassador Al-Kahtani

Interview with Khalid Hamoud Al-Kahtani, Ambassador of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to Sri Lanka

Saudi Arabia has once again demonstrated its unparalleled capacity to manage one of the world’s largest annual religious gatherings, with this year’s Hajj pilgrimage concluding successfully despite extreme temperatures and the immense logistical challenge of accommodating more than 1.7 million pilgrims from around the world.

In an exclusive interview with The Island, Khalid Hamoud Al-Kahtani, Ambassador of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to Sri Lanka, described the 2026 Hajj season as a resounding success, crediting the achievement to the visionary leadership of the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques, His Royal Highness the Crown Prince and Prime Minister, and the coordinated efforts of multiple government agencies working around the clock to serve pilgrims.

The Ambassador noted that nearly 3,500 Sri Lankan pilgrims participated in this year’s Hajj under the quota allocated to Sri Lanka, benefiting from enhanced healthcare services, sophisticated crowd-management systems, expanded shaded areas and cutting-edge digital solutions introduced by the Kingdom.

With Saudi Arabia continuing to invest heavily in infrastructure, technology and pilgrim services under Vision 2030, Ambassador Al-Kahtani said the Kingdom remains committed to ensuring that pilgrims from around the world perform their religious duties in safety, comfort and tranquility.

The Saudi envoy also highlighted the growing partnership between Saudi Arabia and Sri Lanka, emphasising expanding cooperation not only in Hajj affairs but also in trade, investment, education, culture and institutional exchanges.

Following are excerpts of the interview:

Q: How do you assess this year’s Hajj season?

Ambassador Al-Kahtani: This year’s Hajj season was a resounding success, thanks to the Almighty Allah and the integrated efforts of the government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, led by the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques and His Royal Highness the Crown Prince and Prime Minister. This success was reflected in the efficiency of crowd management, the quality of services provided to the Hajj pilgrims and the effective coordination among the various relevant authorities, which enabled pilgrims to perform their rituals in an atmosphere of security, tranquility and ease.

Q: How many Sri Lankan pilgrims performed Hajj this year?

Ambassador Al-Kahtani: The number of Hajj pilgrims from the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka reached approximately 3,500, within the quota allocated to Sri Lanka for this season.

Q: Are there any discussions regarding increasing Sri Lanka’s quota in the future?

Ambassador Al-Kahtani:Hajj quotas are determined according to approved regulatory mechanisms that take into account a range of considerations. The relevant authorities in the Kingdom continue to study various aspects related to developing Hajj services and accommodating the allocated numbers for all countries, in coordination with the concerned parties.

Q: What were the most prominent special arrangements implemented this year?

Ambassador Al-Kahtani: The operational plans for this season focused on enhancing the safety and comfort of the Hajj pilgrims, especially given the climatic conditions and high temperatures. Measures included expanding shaded areas, increasing water distribution points and enhancing health and ambulance services, in addition to developing the transportation system and traffic management within the holy sites.

Q: What are the most prominent digital systems and smart services that were provided?

Ambassador Al-Kahtani:The Kingdom continues to implement its digital transformation objectives for the Hajj and Umrah system. The scope of electronic services offered through the Nusuk platform and application has been expanded, along with the development of digital systems for issuing permits, managing crowds, guidance and health services. This contributes to increasing the efficiency of services and improving the pilgrim’s experience at all stages of their journey.

Q: How were the challenges of overcrowding and heat addressed?

Ambassador Al-Kahtani: The relevant authorities adopted an integrated crowd-management system based on modern technologies and real-time data analysis. This was coupled with intensified health-awareness campaigns, expanded organised movement routes and increased deployment of field, medical and emergency teams. These measures support the safety of the Hajj pilgrims and reduce the risks associated with crowd density and climatic conditions.

Q: Were there special services for the elderly and sick?

Ambassador Al-Kahtani: Yes. The Kingdom paid special attention to the elderly and people with special health needs by providing specialized medical services, assistive transportation and facilities equipped to meet their needs, in addition to field teams working to provide humanitarian support and necessary healthcare throughout the Hajj period.

Q: How successful was the Kingdom in combating irregular Hajj permits?

Ambassador Al-Kahtani: The relevant authorities in the Kingdom continued to rigorously implement the regulations and instructions governing Hajj, utilising modern technologies and advanced monitoring procedures to reduce violations related to irregular Hajj. These efforts contributed to enhancing the safety of pilgrims, improving crowd-management efficiency and maintaining the smooth flow of movement within the holy sites.

Q: How would you describe Saudi-Sri Lankan cooperation in organising Hajj?

Ambassador Al-Kahtani: Cooperation between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Republic of Sri Lanka is characterised by continuous and constructive coordination in all matters related to Hajj. The relevant authorities in both countries work jointly to ensure the provision of the best services for Sri Lankan pilgrims and enable them to perform their rituals with ease and peace of mind.

Q: How many Hajj pilgrims were there globally, and what were the main challenges?

Ambassador Al-Kahtani: According to official statistics, the number of Hajj pilgrims this year reached 1,707,301 from various countries around the world. The main challenges included managing large crowds, ensuring public safety and providing health, transportation and accommodation services within a specific geographical and temporal scope. These challenges were addressed through advanced and integrated operational plans, which contributed to the smooth and successful completion of the Hajj season.

Q: Are there any future expansion projects?

Ambassador Al-Kahtani: The Kingdom continues to implement strategic development projects within the framework of Vision 2030, including developing the infrastructure in Makkah and the Holy Sites, and enhancing transportation networks and smart services. This contributes to raising the quality of services provided to pilgrims and Umrah performers and improving their long-term experience.

Q: How are Saudi-Sri Lankan relations strengthened outside the context of Hajj?

Ambassador Al-Kahtani: Relations between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Republic of Sri Lanka are witnessing continuous development in many areas, including political, economic, trade, cultural and educational cooperation, in addition to developing exchanges between institutions and the private sector. This reflects the two countries’ keenness to strengthen the bilateral partnership and achieve common interests.

Q: What message would you like to convey to Sri Lankan Muslims?

Ambassador Al-Kahtani: We extend our sincere congratulations to the Hajj pilgrims who have completed their Hajj rituals, and we ask Almighty Allah to accept their pilgrimage. We also assure Muslims in Sri Lanka that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia places serving the Two Holy Mosques and the guests of Almighty Allah at the forefront of its priorities and continues to develop the Hajj and Umrah system to achieve the highest standards of quality and safety.

By Ifham Nizam