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US lawmakers’ ignorance of civilian casualties in Lanka’s war on terrorism

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US Congress

by Daya Gamage
Foreign Service National Political Specialist (ret) US Department of State


Declaring that the government of Sri Lanka, while combating ‘Tamil Organizations’ which were fighting for a Tamil Homeland in the North-East, committed genocide against the Tamil people, a resolution was tabled in the US House of Representatives, on May 15, 2024, to coincide with the 15th anniversary of the conclusion of the LTTE’s terrorist war; it states, “Recognizing the hundreds of thousands of lives lost during Sri Lanka’s almost 30-year armed conflict, which ended 15 years ago on May 18, 2009, and ensuring nonrecurrence of past violence, including the Tamil Genocide, by supporting the right to self-determination of Eelam Tamil people and their call for an independence referendum for a lasting peaceful resolution”.

The Resolution also quotes the then State Department Assistant Secretary Richard Boucher, during a visit to wartime Sri Lanka on June 1, 2006 as having said, “There are legitimate issues that are raised by the Tamil community, and they have a very legitimate desire, as anybody would, to be able to control their own lives, to rule their own destinies and to govern themselves in their homeland; in the areas they’ve traditionally inhabited.”

Ill-conceived use of Boucher’s pronouncement

It is ill-conceived to use Boucher’s 2006 pronouncement in the year 2024 when Government of Sri Lanka’s ‘Census of Population and Housing’ even in the Year 2012 – well acknowledged by official reports of the World Bank – that of the 11.14 percent of Sri Lankan Tamils (excluding the near 5 percent Tamils of Indian Origin living in the plantation areas in the centre of the country) only 7.81 percent is living in the North-East (Tamil Homeland) and 3.34 percent domiciled in the rest of the country in the Sinhalese-majority districts with gainful employment, access to housing, education and economic opportunities away from the so-called Tamil Homeland in the North-East. In 2012, the percentage of Sri Lanka Tamils living outside the North and the East is 42.76 percent, and in the Year 2024 it is closer to 50 percent.

If someone explained these demographic data to Members of the U.S. House of Representatives wouldn’t they entertain a second thought as to in what manner 50 percent of Tamils could claim a ‘Tamil Homeland’ when another (close to) 50 percent is left out? Let’s bring to the attention of American lawmakers and policymakers cogent facts related to ‘genocide’ and ‘civilian casualties’ and also ‘encourage’ ‘others’ that have ‘legitimate and moral authority’ to use their ‘diplomatic overtures’ to educate Washington. Since the military battle between the Government of Sri Lanka (GSL) and the Tamil Tigers ended in May 2009, the issue of civilian casualties during the final months of the battle and the human shield associated with it emerged when Sri Lanka’s accountability and transparency were focused on the Office of Secretary-General of the United Nations, the US Department of State, the US Congress, global human rights organisations and in many Western administrations.

Human shields

Following the deaths of the Tamil Tigers, the issue of human shield – to which the non-state actor was solely responsible and well known to the international community – became a secondary issue while the civilian casualties were given much prominence. Insinuating that civilian casualties were largely due to GSL’s military offensive, accountability and transparency figured prominently in Resolutions adopted by the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) in Geneva since 2012 and subsequently in 2015, 2016 and 2017; they called for a hybrid investigative mechanism to probe as to whether Sri Lanka violated international humanitarian law (IHL).

The prominence given to civilian casualty issue – leading to the allegation of genocide – eclipsed the issue of the use of human shields by the Tamil Tigers. The interconnection of both issues was ignored as they were not simultaneously discussed. It should be critically noted why those who demand accountability and transparency from Sri Lanka failed to include human shields used by the LTTE as a factor in the alleged excessive force analysis.

In a non-international armed conflict, it is appropriate to unearth the legal framework and mechanisms which are associated with the presence of civilians in a battlefield. Since the Eelam War IV (2006-2009) ended, Sri Lanka has been subjected to serious scrutiny of the manner in which it conducted the offensive during the final months. It is vital to note here in what form these allegations of international observers reached the UN and policy-framers/policy-makers of Western nations – in most cases Washington – leading to the accusation that Sri Lanka the IHL and committed war crimes leaving aside larger issues.

International observers rushing to judgment

In the case of Sri Lanka, the tendency of international observers to rush to judgment – and censure –is evident from the exaggerated civilian fatality figures cited extensively in their reports. The number of unarmed Tamils killed during the final stage of the war (January – May 2009) has been arbitrarily placed at 40,000. These deaths are blamed largely on the Sri Lankan military personnel who were accused of using excessive and indiscriminate force, and thereby committing war crimes.

The figure of 40,000 was arrived at by subtracting the number of internally displaced civilians from the UN’s estimate of the number of civilians caught up in the final offensive. According to a diplomatic cable from the US Embassy in April 2009 to the State Department, the UN had estimated that from January 20 to April 6, civilian fatalities numbered 4, 164 and 10,002 others were wounded.

An unpublished report by the United Nations country team in Sri Lanka stated that from August 2008 to May 13, 2009 (six days before the war ended), the number of civilians killed was 7,721. The International Committee of the Red Cross, the only outside agency, which was present in the war zone during the final phase, used various statistical indicators to conclude that the total number of noncombatants killed was around 7,000. On 09 March, the UN Country Team, for the first and only time, briefed diplomats in Colombo on the civilian casualty figures it had collected from the Humanitarian Convoy 11 (they were allowed in the battle zone).

According to this briefing, 2,683 civilians died between 20 January and 7 March, and 7,241 persons were injured. But the UN Country Team did not indicate to the diplomats that the vast majority of the civilian casualties were due to government shelling. (United Nations, “Report of the Secretary-General’s Internal Review Panel on UN Actions in Sri Lanka” 2012 Page 11). The British military attaché in Colombo reported that about a quarter of those killed were possibly Tamil Tigers who had discarded their uniforms. Despite all these contradictory fatality figures, a commission appointed by the UN Secretary General deemed the figure of 40,000 definitive, and all western governments have since accepted it unquestioningly.

Battlefield reality

Quite apart from the numbers killed and wounded is the question of Sri Lankan behaviour in prosecuting the offensive and how it is to be judged in terms of the law of war. Critics claim that the Sri Lankan forces used excessive force, and especially artillery, indiscriminately; some even claim that civilians were targeted intentionally. In fact, the reason that so many Tamil civilians were interspersed with Tiger combatants in the battle zone is that the latter forced large numbers of civilians to accompany them as they retreated towards the coast, and used them as human shields as government forces closed in.

There are well documented reports of Tigers shooting civilians who tried to save themselves by swimming away across the lagoon. Given the Tigers’ ruthless treatment of civilians throughout the war, there is even a prima facie case to be made that the LTTE leadership welcomed civilian fatalities as a way of galvanising foreign powers to bring Colombo under international pressure to declare a ceasefire.

The LTTE political commissar Puleedevan told some friends in Europe, “just as in Kosovo if enough civilians died the world would be forced to step in”, (Quoted in Frances Harrison’s Still Counting the Dead: Survivors of Sri Lanka’s Hidden War – London: Portobello, 2012)

International Humanitarian Law

International humanitarian law (IHL) provides the legal framework for those who are fighting for one of the parties to an armed conflict, and for those affected by the effects of hostilities. IHL aims to protect those who are not taking part in the hostilities. However, IHL acknowledges that civilians and civilian objects may legitimately be affected by warfare and the existence of collateral damage. Even though civilians and civilian objects may not be directly targeted, the IHL principle of proportionality allows civilian casualties and damage to civilian objects, under the restriction that these are not excessive to the military advantage anticipated.

The IHL principle of proportionality is commonly understood to be stipulated in article 51 (5) (b) of Additional Protocol I (1977) to the Geneva Conventions: “[Prohibited are attacks] … which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.”

During the final phases of the Eelam War IV – February through May 2009 – the GSL military had gained the upper hand, and the retreating Tigers in a desperate bid to prevent the Army from advancing, stepped up the forcible conscription and used civilians as human shields. The American lawmakers who tabled the Resolution this month either turned a blind eye to these facts or the pro-LTTE groups pulled the wool over their eyes.

The LTTE political commissar Puleedevan outlined his outfit’s strategy when he stated “just as in Kosovo if enough civilians died the world would be forced to step in”. The LTTE wanted a pause in fighting for its top leadership to flee to the North African state of Eritrea. According to the 15 December 2006 US Senate Foreign Relations Committee investigative report the African nation was providing military assistance to the LTTE.

The GSL was under severe pressure during this final state from the International Community (IC) to agree to a ceasefire to protect the civilians shield as harm to civilians could be interpreted as proof of the use of force excessive relative to the anticipated military advantage and thus disproportionate and prohibited under IHL.

Parity of status for LTTE

It may be recalled that IC, through the Norwegian facilitators, gave parity of status to the LTTE by bringing it to the negotiating table (2002-2004) with the GSL in 2002-2004 although the LTTE had been designated a terrorist organisation in many EU countries and the US. As Ambassador Robert Blake noted in a diplomatic cable “(the) Army has a generally good track record of taking care to minimize civilian casualties during its advances…”, if the GSL military forces, which were under legal constraints, had not refrained from attacking there would have been many more thousands of civilian casualties at the time of the conclusion of the war, as remarked by the ICRC Asia Head to a State Department official. These legal and moral constraints exercised by the GSL military were highlighted by Jacques de Maio, the ICRC’ Head of Operation for South Asia when he met US Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issue – John Clint Williamson for a classified briefing – on July 9, 2009 along with several INGO heads in Geneva, Switzerland. The ICRC was the only international organization the GSL allowed in the northern battle field for humanitarian work.

The diplomatic cable sent by Ambassador Williamson to Washington – https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09GENEVA584_a.html on the issue of potential violations of IHL, quoted Maio as saying that “the Sri Lankan military was somewhat responsive to accusations of violations of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and was open to adapting its actions to reduce casualties […] He could cite examples of where the Army had stopped shelling when ICRC informed them it was killing civilians. In fact, the Army could have won the military battle faster with higher civilian casualties, yet chose a slower approach which led to a greater number of Sri Lankan military deaths ….”

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Features

Rebuilding the country requires consultation

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A positive feature of the government that is emerging is its responsiveness to public opinion. The manner in which it has been responding to the furore over the Grade 6 English Reader, in which a weblink to a gay dating site was inserted, has been constructive. Government leaders have taken pains to explain the mishap and reassure everyone concerned that it was not meant to be there and would be removed. They have been meeting religious prelates, educationists and community leaders. In a context where public trust in institutions has been badly eroded over many years, such responsiveness matters. It signals that the government sees itself as accountable to society, including to parents, teachers, and those concerned about the values transmitted through the school system.

This incident also appears to have strengthened unity within the government. The attempt by some opposition politicians and gender misogynists to pin responsibility for this lapse on Prime Minister Dr Harini Amarasuriya, who is also the Minister of Education, has prompted other senior members of the government to come to her defence. This is contrary to speculation that the powerful JVP component of the government is unhappy with the prime minister. More importantly, it demonstrates an understanding within the government that individual ministers should not be scapegoated for systemic shortcomings. Effective governance depends on collective responsibility and solidarity within the leadership, especially during moments of public controversy.

The continuing important role of the prime minister in the government is evident in her meetings with international dignitaries and also in addressing the general public. Last week she chaired the inaugural meeting of the Presidential Task Force to Rebuild Sri Lanka in the aftermath of Cyclone Ditwah. The composition of the task force once again reflects the responsiveness of the government to public opinion. Unlike previous mechanisms set up by governments, which were either all male or without ethnic minority representation, this one includes both, and also includes civil society representation. Decision-making bodies in which there is diversity are more likely to command public legitimacy.

Task Force

The Presidential Task Force to Rebuild Sri Lanka overlooks eight committees to manage different aspects of the recovery, each headed by a sector minister. These committees will focus on Needs Assessment, Restoration of Public Infrastructure, Housing, Local Economies and Livelihoods, Social Infrastructure, Finance and Funding, Data and Information Systems, and Public Communication. This structure appears comprehensive and well designed. However, experience from post-disaster reconstruction in countries such as Indonesia and Sri Lanka after the 2004 tsunami suggests that institutional design alone does not guarantee success. What matters equally is how far these committees engage with those on the ground and remain open to feedback that may complicate, slow down, or even challenge initial plans.

An option that the task force might wish to consider is to develop a linkage with civil society groups with expertise in the areas that the task force is expected to work. The CSO Collective for Emergency Relief has set up several committees that could be linked to the committees supervised by the task force. Such linkages would not weaken the government’s authority but strengthen it by grounding policy in lived realities. Recent findings emphasise the idea of “co-production”, where state and society jointly shape solutions in which sustainable outcomes often emerge when communities are treated not as passive beneficiaries but as partners in problem-solving.

Cyclone Ditwah destroyed more than physical infrastructure. It also destroyed communities. Some were swallowed by landslides and floods, while many others will need to be moved from their homes as they live in areas vulnerable to future disasters. The trauma of displacement is not merely material but social and psychological. Moving communities to new locations requires careful planning. It is not simply a matter of providing people with houses. They need to be relocated to locations and in a manner that permits communities to live together and to have livelihoods. This will require consultation with those who are displaced. Post-disaster evaluations have acknowledged that relocation schemes imposed without community consent often fail, leading to abandonment of new settlements or the emergence of new forms of marginalisation. Even today, abandoned tsunami housing is to be seen in various places that were affected by the 2004 tsunami.

Malaiyaha Tamils

The large-scale reconstruction that needs to take place in parts of the country most severely affected by Cyclone Ditwah also brings an opportunity to deal with the special problems of the Malaiyaha Tamil population. These are people of recent Indian origin who were unjustly treated at the time of Independence and denied rights of citizenship such as land ownership and the vote. This has been a festering problem and a blot on the conscience of the country. The need to resettle people living in those parts of the hill country which are vulnerable to landslides is an opportunity to do justice by the Malaiyaha Tamil community. Technocratic solutions such as high-rise apartments or English-style townhouses that have or are being contemplated may be cost-effective, but may also be culturally inappropriate and socially disruptive. The task is not simply to build houses but to rebuild communities.

The resettlement of people who have lost their homes and communities requires consultation with them. In the same manner, the education reform programme, of which the textbook controversy is only a small part, too needs to be discussed with concerned stakeholders including school teachers and university faculty. Opening up for discussion does not mean giving up one’s own position or values. Rather, it means recognising that better solutions emerge when different perspectives are heard and negotiated. Consultation takes time and can be frustrating, particularly in contexts of crisis where pressure for quick results is intense. However, solutions developed with stakeholder participation are more resilient and less costly in the long run.

Rebuilding after Cyclone Ditwah, addressing historical injustices faced by the Malaiyaha Tamil community, advancing education reform, changing the electoral system to hold provincial elections without further delay and other challenges facing the government, including national reconciliation, all require dialogue across differences and patience with disagreement. Opening up for discussion is not to give up on one’s own position or values, but to listen, to learn, and to arrive at solutions that have wider acceptance. Consultation needs to be treated as an investment in sustainability and legitimacy and not as an obstacle to rapid decisionmaking. Addressing the problems together, especially engagement with affected parties and those who work with them, offers the best chance of rebuilding not only physical infrastructure but also trust between the government and people in the year ahead.

 

by Jehan Perera

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PSTA: Terrorism without terror continues

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When the government appointed a committee, led by Rienzie Arsekularatne, Senior President’s Counsel, to draft a new law to replace the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA), as promised by the ruling NPP, the writer, in an article published in this journal in July 2025, expressed optimism that, given Arsekularatne’s experience in criminal justice, he would be able to address issues from the perspectives of the State, criminal justice, human rights, suspects, accused, activists, and victims. The draft Protection of the State from Terrorism Act (PSTA), produced by the Committee, has been sharply criticised by individuals and organisations who expected a better outcome that aligns with modern criminal justice and human rights principles.

This article is limited to a discussion of the definition of terrorism. As the writer explained previously, the dangers of an overly broad definition go beyond conviction and increased punishment. Special laws on terrorism allow deviations from standard laws in areas such as preventive detention, arrest, administrative detention, restrictions on judicial decisions regarding bail, lengthy pre-trial detention, the use of confessions, superadded punishments, such as confiscation of property and cancellation of professional licences, banning organisations, and restrictions on publications, among others. The misuse of such laws is not uncommon. Drastic legislation, such as the PTA and emergency regulations, although intended to be used to curb intense violence and deal with emergencies, has been exploited to suppress political opposition.

 

International Standards

The writer’s basic premise is that, for an act to come within the definition of terrorism, it must either involve “terror” or a “state of intense or overwhelming fear” or be committed to achieve an objective of an individual or organisation that uses “terror” or a “state of intense or overwhelming fear” to realise its aims. The UN General Assembly has accepted that the threshold for a possible general offence of terrorism is the provocation of “a state of terror” (Resolution 60/43). The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe has taken a similar view, using the phrase “to create a climate of terror.”

In his 2023 report on the implementation of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, the Secretary-General warned that vague and overly broad definitions of terrorism in domestic law, often lacking adequate safeguards, violate the principle of legality under international human rights law. He noted that such laws lead to heavy-handed, ineffective, and counterproductive counter-terrorism practices and are frequently misused to target civil society actors and human rights defenders by labelling them as terrorists to obstruct their work.

The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) has stressed in its Handbook on Criminal Justice Responses to Terrorism that definitions of terrorist acts must use precise and unambiguous language, narrowly define punishable conduct and clearly distinguish it from non-punishable behaviour or offences subject to other penalties. The handbook was developed over several months by a team of international experts, including the writer, and was finalised at a workshop in Vienna.

 

Anti-Terrorism Bill, 2023

A five-member Bench of the Supreme Court that examined the Anti-Terrorism Bill, 2023, agreed with the petitioners that the definition of terrorism in the Bill was too broad and infringed Article 12(1) of the Constitution, and recommended that an exemption (“carve out”) similar to that used in New Zealand under which “the fact that a person engages in any protest, advocacy, or dissent, or engages in any strike, lockout, or other industrial action, is not, by itself, a sufficient basis for inferring that the person” committed the wrongful acts that would otherwise constitute terrorism.

While recognising the Court’s finding that the definition was too broad, the writer argued, in his previous article, that the political, administrative, and law enforcement cultures of the country concerned are crucial factors to consider. Countries such as New Zealand are well ahead of developing nations, where the risk of misuse is higher, and, therefore, definitions should be narrower, with broader and more precise exemptions. How such a “carve out” would play out in practice is uncertain.

In the Supreme Court, it was submitted that for an act to constitute an offence, under a special law on terrorism, there must be terror unleashed in the commission of the act, or it must be carried out in pursuance of the object of an organisation that uses terror to achieve its objectives. In general, only acts that aim at creating “terror” or a “state of intense or overwhelming fear” should come under the definition of terrorism. There can be terrorism-related acts without violence, for example, when a member of an extremist organisation remotely sabotages an electronic, automated or computerised system in pursuance of the organisation’s goal. But when the same act is committed by, say, a whizz-kid without such a connection, that would be illegal and should be punished, but not under a special law on terrorism. In its determination of the Bill, the Court did not address this submission.

 

PSTA Proposal

Proposed section 3(1) of the PSTA reads:

Any person who, intentionally or knowingly, commits any act which causes a consequence specified in subsection (2), for the purpose of-

(a) provoking a state of terror;

(b) intimidating the public or any section of the public;

(c) compelling the Government of Sri Lanka, or any other Government, or an international organisation, to do or to abstain from doing any act; or

(d) propagating war, or violating territorial integrity or infringing the sovereignty of Sri Lanka or any other sovereign country, commits the offence of terrorism.

The consequences listed in sub-section (2) include: death; hurt; hostage-taking; abduction or kidnapping; serious damage to any place of public use, any public property, any public or private transportation system or any infrastructure facility or environment; robbery, extortion or theft of public or private property; serious risk to the health and safety of the public or a section of the public; serious obstruction or damage to, or interference with, any electronic or automated or computerised system or network or cyber environment of domains assigned to, or websites registered with such domains assigned to Sri Lanka; destruction of, or serious damage to, religious or cultural property; serious obstruction or damage to, or interference with any electronic, analogue, digital or other wire-linked or wireless transmission system, including signal transmission and any other frequency-based transmission system; without lawful authority, importing, exporting, manufacturing, collecting, obtaining, supplying, trafficking, possessing or using firearms, offensive weapons, ammunition, explosives, articles or things used in the manufacture of explosives or combustible or corrosive substances and biological, chemical, electric, electronic or nuclear weapons, other nuclear explosive devices, nuclear material, radioactive substances, or radiation-emitting devices.

Under section 3(5), “any person who commits an act which constitutes an offence under the nine international treaties on terrorism, ratified by Sri Lanka, also commits the offence of terrorism.” No one would contest that.

The New Zealand “carve-out” is found in sub-section (4): “The fact that a person engages in any protest, advocacy or dissent or engages in any strike, lockout or other industrial action, is not by itself a sufficient basis for inferring that such person (a) commits or attempts, abets, conspires, or prepares to commit the act with the intention or knowledge specified in subsection (1); or (b) is intending to cause or knowingly causes an outcome specified in subsection (2).”

While the Arsekularatne Committee has proposed, including the New Zealand “carve out”, it has ignored a crucial qualification in section 5(2) of that country’s Terrorism Suppression Act, that for an act to be considered a terrorist act, it must be carried out for one or more purposes that are or include advancing “an ideological, political, or religious cause”, with the intention of either intimidating a population or coercing or forcing a government or an international organisation to do or abstain from doing any act.

When the Committee was appointed, the Human Rights Commission of Sri Lanka opined that any new offence with respect to “terrorism” should contain a specific and narrow definition of terrorism, such as the following: “Any person who by the use of force or violence unlawfully targets the civilian population or a segment of the civilian population with the intent to spread fear among such population or segment thereof in furtherance of a political, ideological, or religious cause commits the offence of terrorism”.

The writer submits that, rather than bringing in the requirement of “a political, ideological, or religious cause”, it would be prudent to qualify proposed section 3(1) by the requirement that only acts that aim at creating “terror” or a “state of intense or overwhelming fear” or are carried out to achieve a goal of an individual or organisation that employs “terror” or a “state of intense or overwhelming fear” to attain its objectives should come under the definition of terrorism. Such a threshold is recognised internationally; no “carve out” is then needed, and the concerns of the Human Rights Commission would also be addressed.

 

by Dr. Jayampathy Wickramaratne
President’s Counsel

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ROCK meets REGGAE 2026

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JAYASRI: From Vienna, Austria

We generally have in our midst the famous JAYASRI twins, Rohitha and Rohan, who are based in Austria but make it a point to entertain their fans in Sri Lanka on a regular basis.

Well, rock and reggae fans get ready for a major happening on 28th February (Oops, a special day where I’m concerned!) as the much-awaited ROCK meets REGGAE event booms into action at the Nelum Pokuna outdoor theatre.

It was seven years ago, in 2019, that the last ROCK meets REGGAE concert was held in Colombo, and then the Covid scene cropped up.

Chitral Somapala with BLACK MAJESTY

This year’s event will feature our rock star Chitral Somapala with the Australian Rock+Metal band BLACK MAJESTY, and the reggae twins Rohitha and Rohan Jayalath with the original JAYASRI – the full band, with seven members from Vienna, Austria.

According to Rohitha, the JAYASRI outfit is enthusiastically looking forward to entertaining music lovers here with their brand of music.

Their playlist for 28th February will consist of the songs they do at festivals in Europe, as well as originals, and also English and Sinhala hits, and selected covers.

Says Rohitha: “We have put up a great team, here in Sri Lanka, to give this event an international setting and maintain high standards, and this will be a great experience for our Sri Lankan music lovers … not only for Rock and Reggae fans. Yes, there will be some opening acts, and many surprises, as well.”

Rohitha, Chitral and Rohan: Big scene at ROCK meets REGGAE

Rohitha and Rohan also conveyed their love and festive blessings to everyone in Sri Lanka, stating “This Christmas was different as our country faced a catastrophic situation and, indeed, it’s a great time to help and share the real love of Jesus Christ by helping the poor, the needy and the homeless people. Let’s RISE UP as a great nation in 2026.”

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