Opinion
Trump tariffs and their effect on world trade and economy with particular reference to Sri Lanka – Part IV
(Continued from yesterday)
Critique of the International Trade System
President Trump’s tariffs have also highlighted fundamental inequities in the international trade and financial architecture that governs economic relations between wealthy and developing nations.
The World Trade Organization, theoretically designed to provide a rules-based trading system that benefits all members, has proven largely powerless to prevent unilateral actions by powerful economies like the United States. While China has urged the WTO to investigate President Trump’s tariffs as violations of the “most favoured nation” principle that forms the bedrock of the multilateral trading system, the organization lacks effective enforcement mechanisms against major powers.
Similarly, international financial institutions like the IMF have failed to adequately account for trade shocks in their lending programmes and debt sustainability analyses. As discussed earlier, the IMF’s approach to Sri Lanka’s debt restructuring focused primarily on fiscal consolidation while paying insufficient attention to the country’s
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structural trade deficit and vulnerability to external shocks. When Trump’s tariffs suddenly reduce Sri Lanka’s export earnings, the IMF program offers no automatic adjustment mechanisms to accommodate this changed reality.
This situation stands in stark contrast to historical examples of more equitable treatment of indebted nations. The London Debt Agreement of 1953, which restructured West Germany’s external debts, explicitly linked repayment obligations to the country’s trade performance and capped debt service at a sustainable percentage of export earnings. Such an approach recognised the fundamental importance of trade capacity to debt sustainability, a recognition largely absent from contemporary debt restructuring frameworks.
The tariff shock thus reveals not merely technical flaws in trade policy but deeper structural inequities in how the global economic system distributes risks, rewards, and adjustment costs between wealthy and developing nations. While powerful economies can unilaterally reshape trading relationships to serve their domestic political objectives, developing countries must largely accept these changes as given constraints and bear disproportionate costs of adjustment.
Potential Reshaping of Global Trade Patterns
Looking beyond the immediate disruption, President Trump’s tariffs may accelerate several longer-term shifts in global trade patterns with significant implications for developing economies.
First, we may see accelerated regionalisation of trade as countries seek to reduce vulnerability to U.S. policy shifts. Asian economies may deepen integration through mechanisms like the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), while African countries might accelerate the implementation of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA). These regional arrangements could provide alternative markets for exports previously destined for the United States, though the transition would be neither quick nor painless.
Second, China’s role as both a market and investor for developing economies may expand further. As U.S. tariffs effectively close off portions of its market, developing countries may look more intensively toward China as an export destination and source of development finance. This shift would have significant geopolitical implications, potentially accelerating the fragmentation of the global economy into competing blocs centred around major powers.
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Third, some production may relocate to avoid tariffs, creating winners and losers among developing countries. Nations with lower tariff rates or special exemptions could see increased investment as firms restructure supply chains to minimise trade costs. This dynamic could intensify competition among developing countries for foreign investment, potentially triggering a “race to the bottom” on labour and environmental standards.
Fourth, there may be renewed interest in domestic market development and South-South trade as alternatives to excessive dependence on wealthy consumer markets. While the limited purchasing power in many developing countries constrains this option in the short term, over time it could lead to more balanced and resilient development models.
These potential shifts suggest that President Trump’s tariffs may represent not merely a temporary disruption but a catalyst for more fundamental reconfiguration of global trade patterns. For developing economies like Sri Lanka, navigating this changing landscape will require strategic foresight, policy innovation, and international cooperation to ensure that the emerging trade architecture better serves their development needs than the system currently being disrupted.
POTENTIAL MITIGATION STRATEGIES FOR SRI LANKA
Faced with the severe economic challenge posed by Trump’s 44% tariff, Sri Lanka must develop a comprehensive response strategy that addresses both immediate threats and longer-term structural vulnerabilities. This section explores potential approaches at different time horizons, from emergency measures to fundamental economic reorientation.
Short-term Responses
In the immediate term, Sri Lanka’s government and private sector must focus on crisis management to minimise damage to export industries and protect vulnerable workers. Several approaches warrant consideration.
Government Support for Affected Industries
The Sri Lankan government could implement targeted support measures for export sectors most affected by the tariffs, particularly the textile and apparel industry. These might include temporary tax relief, subsidised credit facilities, or reduced
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utility rates for export-oriented manufacturers. Such measures could help companies weather the initial shock while they develop adaptation strategies.
However, Sri Lanka’s fiscal constraints present a significant challenge to implementing such support. The country’s IMF programme imposes strict limits on government spending and deficit targets, while tax increases have been a central component of the economic stabilisation strategy. Any support measures would therefore need to be carefully designed to remain within these constraints or negotiated as exceptions with the IMF based on the external nature of the shock.
One potential approach would be to reallocate existing resources rather than expanding overall spending. For instance, funds previously earmarked for export promotion in the U.S. market, if any, could be redirected toward supporting market diversification efforts or providing temporary relief to affected companies.
Diplomatic Engagement with the United States
Sri Lanka should pursue active diplomatic engagement with the United States to seek modifications to the tariff regime. While the country’s limited economic leverage makes a complete exemption unlikely, there may be opportunities to negotiate targeted relief for specific product categories or to secure technical assistance for adjustment.
The Sri Lankan government could emphasise several arguments in these discussions, the disproportionate impact of the tariffs on a country still recovering from economic crisis, the potential humanitarian consequences of mass unemployment in the textile sector, and the strategic importance of economic stability in Sri Lanka for regional security in the Indian Ocean.
One of the most compelling arguments Sri Lanka can make is the need to move beyond narrow fixation on the trade balance and instead consider a broader current account. While Sri Lanka may show a surplus in goods trade with the U.S., that figure is only a part of the story. Our economy is deeply integrated with U.S. linked services. We pay for American banking and credit card services, subscribe to streaming platforms like Netflix and Amazon, purchase of software and apps from Apple and Google, remit interest payment on loans from international banks, bond holders and multilateral institutions, and spend on tourism and education. When all of these outflows are taken into account, the so called “imbalance” is far more nuanced if not fully offset. This is why a fair and modern economic analysist must consider the full current account, not just goods trade in isolation.
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Engagement should occur through multiple channels, including direct bilateral discussions, multilateral forums like the WTO, and coordination with other affected developing countries to amplify collective concerns. Sri Lanka might also leverage its relationships with international financial institutions like the World Bank and IMF, which could highlight the risks the tariffs pose to the country’s economic recovery program.
Emergency Economic Measures
If the full impact of the tariffs materializes, Sri Lanka may need to implement emergency economic measures to maintain macroeconomic stability. These could include temporary foreign exchange controls to prioritize essential imports, accelerated disbursement of already-committed international financial support, or emergency borrowing from friendly countries or international institutions.
The Central Bank of Sri Lanka might need to adjust monetary policy to respond to potential currency pressures resulting from reduced export earnings. However, any such adjustments would need to be balanced against inflation concerns, which remain sensitive following the recent crisis.
Social Protection for Affected Workers
Protecting workers who lose jobs or face reduced hours due to the tariff impact should be a priority. The government could expand existing social safety net programs to specifically target affected textile workers, potentially with support from international donors or development agencies.
Measures might include temporary unemployment benefits, retraining programmess for displaced workers, or community-based support initiatives in areas with high concentrations of textile employment. Given fiscal constraints, international support would likely be necessary to fund such programmes adequately.
Medium to Long-term Strategies
Beyond immediate crisis response, Sri Lanka must develop strategies to reduce vulnerability to future trade shocks and create a more resilient economic model. Several approaches deserve consideration.
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Market Diversification Beyond the United States
Reducing dependence on the U.S. market represents an obvious but challenging strategy. Potential alternative markets include,
* European Union: Already Sri Lanka’s second-largest export destination, the EU offers preferential access through its GSP+ scheme. Expanding exports to Europe would require meeting stringent standards and potentially adjusting product offerings to suit European consumer preferences.
* Regional Markets: Increasing exports to India, China, and other Asian economies could leverage geographical proximity and growing middle-class consumer bases. This would require navigating complex regional trade agreements and potentially developing new product categories better suited to these markets.
* Emerging Markets: Countries in the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America represent potential growth opportunities, though penetrating these markets would require significant market research and relationship building.
The Joint Apparel Association Forum’s statement that “We have no alternate market that we can possibly target instead of the US” reflects the difficulty of this transition. Established buyer relationships, specialized production capabilities, and compliance certifications all create path dependencies that make market diversification a multi-year project rather than an immediate solution.
Product Diversification Beyond Textiles
Sri Lanka’s heavy reliance on textile and apparel exports creates vulnerability to sector-specific shocks. Diversifying the export basket could create greater resilience, though this too represents a long-term structural challenge rather than a quick fix.
Promising sectors for export diversification include:
* Information Technology and Business Process Outsourcing: Sri Lanka has developed a growing IT/BPO sector that could be expanded with appropriate investment in education, infrastructure, and international marketing.
* High-Value Agricultural Products: Speciality tea, spices, and organic produce could command premium prices in international markets while building on Sri Lanka’s agricultural traditions.
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Sustainable Manufacturing: Leveraging Sri Lanka’s relatively strong environmental credentials to develop green manufacturing capabilities in emerging sectors like electric vehicle components or renewable energy equipment.
Tourism Services: While not directly affected by goods tariffs, expanding tourism could help diversify foreign exchange earnings. However, this sector’s vulnerability to external shocks (as demonstrated during the pandemic) suggests it should be one component of a diversification strategy rather than its centrepiece.
Successful product diversification would require coordinated public-private investment in research and development, skills training, quality infrastructure, and international marketing. It would also necessitate a supportive policy environment that reduces barriers to innovation and entrepreneurship.
Value Chain Upgrading
Even within existing export sectors like textiles, Sri Lanka could pursue strategies to capture more value and reduce vulnerability to tariffs. Moving up the value chain from basic contract manufacturing to design, product development, branding, and direct-to-consumer sales could increase margins and provide greater control over market access.
Some Sri Lankan companies have already begun this transition, developing their own brands or establishing direct relationships with consumers through e-commerce platforms. Government support for such initiatives through design education, intellectual property protection, and export promotion could accelerate this evolution.
Regional Trade Integration
Deepening integration with regional trade blocs could provide both alternative markets and opportunities for participation in regional value chains. Sri Lanka is a member of the South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA) and has bilateral trade agreements with India, Pakistan, and Singapore, and more recently with Thailand, though implementation challenges have limited their effectiveness.
More ambitious regional integration through mechanisms like the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) or the proposed Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) Free
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Trade Area could create new opportunities. However, managing domestic concerns about increased competition from larger economies like India and China would require careful policy design and implementation. (To be continued)
(The writer served as the Minister of Justice, Finance and Foreign Affairs of Sri Lanka)
Disclaimer:
This article contains projections and scenario-based analysis based on current economic trends, policy statements, and historical behaviour patterns. While every effort has been made to ensure factual accuracy using publicly available data and established economic models, certain details, particularly regarding future policy decisions and their impacts, remain hypothetical. These projections are intended to inform discussion and analysis, not to predict outcomes with certainty.
(To be concluded)
Opinion
Conference “Microfinance and Credit Regulatory Authority Bill: Neither Here, Nor There”
January 21 | Olympus Auditorium, Bandaranaike Centre for International Studies (BCIS)
The National Collective of Community Savings and Credit Services Providers organised the conference “Microfinance and Credit Regulatory Authority Bill: Neither Here, Nor There” on January 21 at the Olympus Auditorium, Bandaranaike Centre for International Studies (BCIS), BMICH, to foreground the community savings and credit services as an alternative credit practice to moneylending and microfinance. While underscoring the uniqueness of community credit practices, grounded in collective rights, solidarity, mutual aid, the non-hierarchical nature of organising and long years of practice, community credit providers opposed the Asian Development Bank (ADB)-Treasury-CBSL attempt to subsume the community credit model under moneylending and microfinance in the proposed Microfinance and Credit Regulatory Authority Bill. Over 200 community credit practitioners from more than 50 community organisations from Mannar, Kilinochchi, Jaffna, Mullaitivu, Batticaloa, Anuradhapura, Polonnaruwa, Badulla, Rathnapura, and Hambanthota had gathered at the conference.
M. K. Jayathissa, a farmer leader from Hingurakgoda, Polonnaruwa, explained the microfinance crisis as resulting from the microfinancialisation of rural credit and the targeting of low-income women. He recalled his role in the farmers’ struggle against debt during the 1990s. Jayathissa linked the microfinance crisis among women and the farmers’ debt crisis to a wider crisis in food production.
Renuka Bhadrakanthi, chairperson of the Ekabaddha Praja Sanwardhana Kantha Maha Sangamaya, Weligepola, shared her three decades of experience as a community practitioner. She showed how the community credit framework helped women build assets and wealth through small savings. Unlike market-based initiatives such as microfinance and moneylending, community-controlled credit systems empowered women both with agency and material capabilities. Renuka also noted the regional diversity in organisational frameworks and credit purposes. She stressed the need for vigilance and action now, as globalisation and neoliberalism drive economic reforms aimed at capturing community wealth and making people dependent on the market.
Rajeswary Sritharan from Yuhashakthi, Mullaitivu, brought in experiences from war-torn societies. Yuhashakthi and Mahashakthi networks, operating in the Northern and Eastern provinces and comprising more than 10,000 women members, were created during the civil war to support women’s ability to control the household economy. These two networks have proven resilience against war-related dispossession and loss while also strengthening women. Rajeswary contended that self-help community credit groups are informal and unregulated, revealing that societies are governed by a collective ethos, community audits, and democratic decision-making, ensuring transparency and accountability. She pointed out that community groups do not have a history of bringing their members before the police or courts when they fail to service their debts, unlike microfinance companies. She also raised the significance of community groups such as Yuhashakthi and Mahashakthi as first responders in times of crisis, even as recently as with Ditwah, intervening and assisting affected communities much before the government could.
- Suneth Aruna Kumara
- Pubudu Manohara
- M K Jayathissa
Suneth Aruna Kumara, representing Vimukthi Gami Gowi Kantha Samithiya, Hingurakgoda, Polonnaruwa and also speaking on behalf of the microfinance-affected women, highlighted the creative space that collective forms of association have opened up for microfinance victims. “People who were hiding, afraid of debt collectors, are trying to rebuild their lives autonomously,” he said. In this journey, women are rethinking the meaning of credit, whether it is possible to create credit mechanisms that do not rely on interest income, and imaginative ways of decommodifying community relations. Suneth emphasised that women’s initiatives are emerging from their lived experiences as debtors, exploited by predatory interest rates and violent recovery practices. As a victim himself, Suneth criticised the proposed regulatory Bill for failing to adequately safeguard microfinance and credit consumers by providing legally binding safeguards. According to Suneth, the proposed Bill does not guarantee that the microfinance crisis will not recur.
Another highlight of the conference was the sharing of experiences by Malaihaya women, presented by Letchumanan Kamaleswary from the Centre for Equality and Justice. Kamaleswary described debt as ever-present in the Malaiyaha community. It forced migration from South India and kept people captive as plantation labour for over 200 years. Although the plantation management restricts all community associations within the plantations, microfinance companies can enter and operate freely. Debt is so severe that most Malaiyaha women work past their retirement age.
- Renuka Bhadrakanthi
- Rajeswary Sritharan
Pubudu Manohara, from the Rural Development Foundation in Hambanthota, traced the history of community credit projects to various state poverty alleviation programmes since 1977. These projects, affiliated with governments and supported by international groups such as the World Bank and UNDP, have survived many national and local crises. Over time, however, both the government and international organisations like the ADB have become wary of people’s ability to save. “They are afraid of our ability to create community funds,” he said.
The discussion emphasised that mobilising community groups and local political leaders is essential to oppose the Bill in its current form. Concerns arose about the negative impact of heavy regulations on community organisations and women’s resilience. “Domestic violence is rooted in economic violence. The destruction of community organisations will have a direct effect on local development and local economic activities. That will also burden the government,” said a Yuhashakthi representative from Mullathivu.
Community organisers urged the government to consult directly with them when developing regulations, emphasising that new rules should protect and strengthen community-based initiatives rather than respond to external pressures. They argued that the ADB, having promoted commercialisation of microfinance and contributed to the resulting crisis, lacks the legal and ethical standing to advocate for regulatory frameworks. Instead of receiving directives from the International Financial Institutions (IFIs), the government should converse with the grassroots communities, devising homegrown developmental solutions to regenerate local economies, empower the most vulnerable and build community wealth, the community organisers stressed.
Opinion
A puppet show?
After jog for the camera, wearing shorts in Jaffna, thanks to the freedom gained by the country being liberated from the clutches of the Tigers by the valiant efforts led by Mahinda Rajapaksa, President Anura Kumara Dissanayaka, said: “Some come past Sri Maha Bodhi and other Buddhist temples all the way to Jaffna to observe Sil, not to spread compassion but hatred.” When the need of the hour is reconciliation what an outrageous statement that was, to be made by the head of state! Will he say that the people of the North and the East bypass many Kovils straddling the area and come to Kataragama to spread hate? Probably not! His claim has become a hot topic of conversation.
Having lost a majority of the votes garnered from the North at the presidential and parliamentary elections, to the Tamil nationalist parties at the local government elections, President Dissanayake’s claim may well have been a pitiful attempt to recover lost ground in the North. But at what cost?
It all started with AKD’s refusal to refer to those brave service personnel who saved the unity and the integrity of the country as Rana Viruwo. Interestingly, the most devastating rebuke for this came from a Tamil MP, who is an avowed admirer of Prabhakaran, stating in Parliament that a Sinhala Rana Viruwa saved his life when he was about to be washed off in the flood waters resulting from Cyclone Ditwah. He teased the government by asking in ‘raw’ Sinhala Ei umbalata lejjada unta Rana Viruwo kiyanna? (Are you shy to call them war heroes?)
In addition to slinging mud at MR and harassing service personnel, there is no doubt whatsoever that AKD’s government is trying to harass any Tamil politicians who helped eradicate the Tigers. This fact is borne out by the treatment meted out to Douglas Devananda. Shamindra Ferdinando has explained this in his article, “EPDP’s Devananda and missing weapons supplied by Army” (The Island, 7 January).
NPP ministers publicly insult Buddhist monks, but whenever they are in trouble, they rush to Kandy to meet the Maha Nayakas, the latest being Harini’s visit. Instead of admitting the mistake and trying to make amends, the government went on, until it realised the futility in trying to justify the ‘Buddy’ episode. Excuses given by Harini to the Maha Nayakas, to say the least, were laughable. She had the audacity to say that though the questionable web link was printed in the textbook there were no instructions to click on it! She may continue as Prime Minister but can anyone who does not know what to do with a link or who is trying to encourage ten-year-olds to have e-buddies when the rest of the world is heading towards banning 16-year-olds from social media, continue to be the Minister of Education?
Number of MOUs/pacts signed with India, including defence, have not yet been disclosed even to Parliament. The Cabinet Spokesman once stated that the contents of those MOUs/pacts could not be divulged without the consent of India. Interestingly, we have had very frequent visits from VVIP politicians and top government officials from India, some at very short notice. One of them referred to these as ‘usual’ ones! However, what is unusual is that a party that shed a lot of blood of Sri Lankans for even selling ‘Bombay’ onions, is now in government and seems under Indian command. Perhaps, its transformation occurred when India sponsored a visit by AKD in early 2024, which helped him secure the presidency. Among the NPP’s election pledges, the most touted one was to reveal the mastermind behind the Easter Sunday attacks. It has been alleged in some quarters that India was behind the attacks. The NPP government’s silence about this speaks volumes!
It has transpired recently that it was Indian High Commissioner Gopal Baglay who pressured Speaker Mahinda Yapa Abeywardena in July 2022 to take over the presidency after the elected President was toppled by protesters, but many believe that it was a joint effort by the Indian HC and the ‘Viceroy’ who just left, after an overstay! It is an illegal act as pointed out in the editorial “Conspiracy to subvert constitutional order” (The Island, 22 January) and may be investigated by a future government, if elections are not postponed forever!
We seem to be watching a puppet show where many puppeteers outside are pulling the strings! Are we paying the price for electing a bunch of inexperienced politicians?
By Dr Upul Wijayawardhana ✍️
Opinion
Remembering Cedric, who helped neutralise LTTE terrorism
Salute to a brave father-son
Cedric Martenstyn was a very affluent man. He owned a house in Colombo 7, valuable properties throughout the country, vehicles / speed boats and ran the lucrative business of importing Johnson and Evinrude Outboard Motors (OBM) and sold them to local fishermen and businessmen.
Cedric was the local agent for the OBMs, which were known for reliability and after-sales service, and among his customers were humble fishermen. He was fondly known as Sudu Mahattaya “(white Gentleman) by humble fishermen and he would often travel in his double cab across the country to meet his customers and solve their problems.
He had a loving wife and children. He was an excellent scuba diver, member of Sri Lanka Navy Practical Pistol Firing team and his knowledge of wildlife and reptiles was amazing.
A member of the Dutch Burgher community of Sri Lanka, he was a true patriot, who volunteered to protect country and people from terrorists. An old boy of S. Thomas’ College, Mount Lavinia, he was an excellent sportsman.
The founding father of Sri Lanka Army Commando Unit, Colonel Sunil Peris, was his classmate at S.Thomas’.
I first met Cedric when I was a very junior officer at Pistol Firing Range at Naval Base, Welisara. I helped him catch a poisonous snake in the Range. I think he carried that snake home in a bottle! That was the type of person Cedric was!
We became very close friends as we both loved “guns and fishing rods”. His experience and tactics in angling helped me catch much bigger Paraw (Trevallies) in the Elephant Rock area at the Trincomalee harbour. He was a dangerous man to live with at Trincomalee Naval Base wardroom (officers’ mess), because he had various live snakes kept in bottles and fed them with little frogs!
Even though he was a keen angler, he was keen to conserve endangered species both on land and in water. He spent days in Horton Plains and the Knuckles Mountain Range streams to identify freshwater species in Sri Lanka. Did you know there is an endangered freshwater fish species he found in Horton Plains and Knuckles Mountain Range has been named after him?
Feeding of snakes was an amusement to all our stewards at the wardroom at that time! They all gathered and watched carefully what Cedric was doing, keeping a safe distance to run away if the snake escaped. Our Navy stewards dare to enter Cedric’s cabin (room) at Trincomalee wardroom (officers’ mess), even keeping his tea on a stool outside his cabin door. One day pandemonium broke in the officers’ mess when Cedric announced that one snake escaped! We never found that snake, and that was the end of his hobby as the Commander Eastern Naval Area, at that time, ordered him to ” get rid of all snakes! Sadly, Cedric released all snakes to Sober Island that afternoon.
Cedric was a volunteer Navy officer, but still joined me (he was 47 years old then) to help SBS trainees (first and second batch) on boat handling and OBM maintenance in 1993, when I raised SBS. It was exactly 31 years ago!
The Arrow Boat
Being an excellent speed boat race driver and boat designer, he prepared the blueprint of the first “18-foot Arrow Boat” and supervised building it at a private Boat Yard in 1993. This 18- foot Arrow Boat was especially designed to be used in the shallow waters of the Jaffna lagoon, fitted 115 HP OBMs, and with two weapons he recommended; 40mm Automatic Grenade Launcher (AGL) and 7.62×51 mm General Purpose Machine Guns (GPMGs). In no time, we had highly trained and highly motivated four SBS men on board each Arrow Boat at Jaffna lagoon, and they were very effective.
Same hull (deep V hull) developed during the tenure of Admiral of the Fleet Wasantha Karannagoda, as Commander of the Navy, by Naval architects, with knowledge-gained through captured LTTE Sea Tiger boats, designed 23- foot Arrow Boats and implemented the “Lanchester Theory” (theory of battle of attrition at sea in littoral sea battles) to completely nullify LTTE’s superiority which it had gained with small craft and deadly suicide boats.
Thank you, the Admiral of the Fleet for understanding the importance of Arrow Boat design and mass production at our own boatyard at Welisara. Karannagoda, under whom I was fortunate to serve as Director Naval Operations, Director Maritime Surveillance and Director Naval Special Forces during the last stages (2006/7) of the Humanitarian Operations, always used to tell us “You cannot buy a Navy- you have to build one”! Thank you, Sir!

Cedric craft display at Naval Museum, Trincomalee
The Hero he was
When I was selected for my Naval War Course (Staff Course) conducted by the Pakistan Navy Staff College at Karachi, Pakistan, (now known as Pakistan Navy War College relocated at Lahore), Cedric took over the command (even though he was a VNF officer) as Commanding Officer of SBS.
Being one of the co-founders of this elite unit, he was the most suitable person to take over as CO SBS. He was loved by SBS officers and sailors. They were extremely happy to see him at Kilali or Elephant Pass, where SBS was deployed during a very difficult time of our recent history – fighting against terrorists during the 1996-97 period.
Motivated by father’s patriotism, his younger son, Jayson, who was a pilot working in the UK at that time, came back to Sri Lanka and joined the SLAF as an volunteer pilot to fly transport aircraft to keep an uninterrupted air link between Palaly (Jaffna) and Ratmalana (Colombo). Sometimes Jayson flew his beloved father on board from Palaly to Ratmalana. Cedric was extremely happy and proud of his son.
Tragically, young Jayson was killed in action in a suspected LTTE Surface-to-Air missile attack on his aircraft. Cedric was sad, but more determined to continue the fight against LTTE terrorists. He would also lead the rescue and salvage operation to identify the aircraft wreckage his son flew in. The then Navy Commander advised him to demobilise from VNF and look after his grieving family or join Naval Operations Directorate and work from Colombo which he vehemently refused. When I called him from Pakistan to convey my deepest condolences, he said, he would look after the “SBS boys”, he had no intention of leaving them alone at that difficult hour of our nation. That was Cedric. He was such a hero—a hero very few knew about!
The young officers, and sailors in SBS were of his sons’ age, and Cedric would not leave them even when he was facing a personal tragedy. He was a dedicated and courageous person.

Scientific name: Systomus Martenstyni
English name : Martenstyn’s Barb
Local name: Dumbara Pethiya
Sadly, like many who served our nation and stood against terrorists, Cedric would go on to be considered Missing In Action (MIA) following a helicopter crash off the seas of Vettalikani with Lt. Palihena (another brave SBS officer- KDU intake). He was returning to Point Pedro after visiting the SBS boys at Elephant Pass, Jaffna.
Cedric and his son, Jayson, will go down in history as a brave father-son duo who paid the supreme sacrifice for the motherland. MAY THEY REST IN PEACE ! Salute!
Commander Martenstyn was considered missing in action (MIA) on 22 January 1996 in the sea off Vettalaikerni, while returning to Palaly Air Force Base in an SLAF helicopter when it was lost to enemy fire. He was returning from visiting an SBS detachment in Elephant Pass near the Jaffna Lagoon. Considering his contribution to the war effort, his gallentry and valour in fighting the enemy, and his steadfast service to the Sri Lanka Navy in manufacturing Arrow Boats, and training the SBS, all SLN Arrow Boats were renamed ‘Cedric’ on his 70th Birthday.
(The writer is former Chief of Defence Staff and Commander of The Navy, and former Chairman of the Trincomalee Petroleum Terminals Ltd.)
By Admiral Ravindra
C Wijegunaratne
(Retired from Sri Lanka Navy)
Former Chief of Defence Staff and Commander of the Sri Lanka Navy,
Former Sri Lanka High Commissioner to Pakistan
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