Opinion

Reimagining International Relations from a Global South Perspective

Published

2 months ago

2026/03/5

I wish to congratulate Prof. Keerawella, for having undertaken this mammoth task of seeking to capture, from ‘a global south perspective’, the multiple facets of scholarship of International Relations. He has, as always, been meticulous in his research, and also lucid in conveying to the reader, complex ideas and their interconnections, in an uncomplicated way. I am not in the habit of encouraging taking shortcuts, particularly with my students around – but if pressed, here is a book, with references to every major scholar in the 7 areas identified, in 440 pages, at a modest price.

We are honoured that the Prime Minister graced this occasion, and thankful for her inspiring words. She has left much food for thought – which I am hopeful our students will consider engaging with, as they proceed with their presentations and dissertations.

This is the 7^th book, in fact the 3^rd authored or co-authored by Prof. Keerawella, published under the auspices of the BCIS, over the past couple of years. It is a reflection of BCIS’s continuing commitment to bring into the public domain, quality academic literature that benefits both scholars and Sri Lankan students who pass through these halls and beyond. I want to commend President Kumaratunga, for through the BCIS, continuing to support the publication of such texts, at a time individually doing so is prohibitive and also more costly to the buyer, and the Bandaranaike Memorial National Foundation (BMNF) for making this possible.

Turning to the volume launched today (24 Feb), in ‘Reimagining International Relations from a Global South Perspective’, at the outset, Prof. Keerawella makes clear that a Global South perspective is not simply a matter of geographical focus; it is an epistemic stance that seeks to recover marginalised voices, experiences, and knowledge that have long been silenced or subordinated in mainstream discourse. He goes on to emphasise that, the choice of the phrase “a Global South Perspective” is deliberate. It signals an awareness that there is no single, homogeneous standpoint from which the Global South speaks’. To speak of a perspective, then, is to situate this volume’s argument within that broader, evolving mosaic—to offer one possible articulation among many, without claiming representational authority over them. Prof. Keerawella emphasises, it is an invitation to dialogue, not a declaration of orthodoxy.

As is customary by a reviewer, I intend to take up Prof. Keerawella’s ‘invitation to dialogue’ and commencsation in the latter part of this presentation, but first let me outline the valuable insights contained in this Book, as an appetiser.

The first chapter on IR Theory, points out – in each of the ‘isms’, ingredients as it were, that could contribute to a better understanding of the ‘Global South’. Here he highlights Raúl Prebisch and Andre Gunder Frank’s ‘dependency theory’, Neta Crawford’s ‘normative constructivism’, Sanjay Seth’s ‘Decolonial Critique’ and Amitav Acharya’s concept of ‘Global IR’ as having advanced a reformist, yet transformative agenda for the discipline. He observes that, “Collectively, their respective projects of rethinking, decolonizing, and globalizing International Relations illuminate how the Global South can contribute to the field not merely as a repository of empirical cases, but as a source of conceptual reflection and theoretical innovation”.

The second chapter which examines the transformation of International Security Studies, by foregrounding the lived insecurities of the Global South—ranging from poverty and structural violence to environmental vulnerability and social fragility, demonstrates why concepts such as human security gained salience as corrective and complementary frameworks, concerning the global south.

The third chapter pays analytical attention to the dynamics of regionalism with special focus on South Asia and the experience of the SAARC. It calls for reimagining regional cooperation in South Asia beyond rigid institutional templates, advocating for inclusive, flexible, and people-centered modalities rooted in the specific political and social realities of the Global South.

The fourth chapter addresses international organisations and international regimes as central pillars of contemporary global governance, with particular attention to their implications for the Global South. The chapter reveals how Global South states have simultaneously been constrained by inherited governance structures and mobilized collective strategies to contest inequities and assert greater voice.

The fifth chapter which focuses on Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA), situates it within a rapidly evolving global environment shaped by globalisation, technological transformation, and the Fourth Industrial Revolution, paying particular attention to the strategic choices made by Global South states.

The sixth chapter traces the long historical arc of diplomatic practice, demonstrating how modes of representation, negotiation, and cooperation have evolved in response to changing political, social, and technological contexts. From a Global South perspective, the chapter underscores both the opportunities and constraints of particularly science diplomacy.

In the final chapter, Prof. Keerawella discusses the notion of national self-determination.
He underscores its contradictions in theory, and its praxis in the post-Cold War context, tracing the ways in which self-determination has been invoked and contested in modern international relations.

Besides joining a very small league of international scholars (some already referred to) who have dared to challenge Western theoretical approaches in the study of IR and sub-fields and emphasised the need for an alternative ‘Global South’ reading, Prof. Keerawella becomes the first Sri Lankan to do so in any considered manner. His volume is also rare, in that in general, few Sri Lankans have sought to engage with and contribute to the theoretical literature of International Relations and Foreign Policy. His book has the additional advantage of being released at a time ‘International Relations’ – as we have been taught it and understood it, is under severe strain to explain contemporary developments in a conceptual and theoretical manner, and there is a serious vacuum to be filled, not just in understanding, but in order to change the currentpredicament.

While the book reaffirms the ‘global south’ as a certain collective sentiment, assembling many of the conceptual building blocks and empirical insights necessary for its articulation, what it leaves to us is the task of synthesising these elements into a coherent and operational set of principles that can foster a unified front amongst the Global South, despite the vast diversity of the actors and states involved.

While I have no disagreement with Prof. Keerawella’s starting premise and end goal of the desirability of having ‘a Global South Perspective’ in the areas under study, however, as an observer and practitioner of international relations for most of my professional life since 1980
– 9 years as a journalist, 33 years as a diplomat, and post-retirement, and over 4 years from the vantage point of running IR and Strategic Studies focused institutions, while also teaching, and engaging in my own research, I do encounter some difficulty, and lament that operationally little has or is being done, to evolve a strategy that addresses the shortcomings so carefully pointed out in Prof. Keerawella’s book.

Looking back, I do not see a single cohesive ‘Global South’ consistently in play. Rather, I see a multitude of ‘Global Souths’ –depending on the issue, competing opportunistically and often working at cross purposes, and all eventually getting played out by the continuing structural heft of the ‘Global North’.

This is no fault of Prof. Keerawella, or of the rich ingredients he brings together in this volume. Rather, it reflects the political reality that the‘Global South’ recipe has not yet been fully translated into an appetising dish.

I am no chef, and time does not permit me to elaborate from the different vantagespoints
I have experienced it from – but I do believe there is a compelling case that could be made for action, which needs serious reflection and attention.

To put it another way, without making value judgements on the rights and wrongs of the respective action, I wish to pose two sets of questions, confining myself to events of the past 4 years or so;

First, what did the ‘Global South’ do in the cases of Ukraine since 2022, of Gaza since 2023, of Sudan since 2023, on actions in the South-China Sea in recent times, following the imposition of ‘Reciprocal Tariffs’ throughout 2025, or in the case of Venezuela last month?

* Did they speak together?

* Did they vote together?

* Did they fight together?

Similarly, second, what will the ‘Global South’ do, God forbid, if there is to be a conflict on Iran, Cuba, the Panama Canal, Morocco-Algeria, DRC-Rwanda, or Taiwan, tomorrow?

* Will they speak together?

* Will they vote together?

* Will they fight together?

If I were to play devil’s advocate, I would be tempted to ask: if these coalitions neither speak, vote, nor act together, what kind of analytical and normative work can the category ‘Global South’ realistically achieve? Rather than assuming a unity that does not yet exist, how might we need to refine it?

To this end, I wish to posit, that the category of ‘Global South’ could be analytically more useful, if, as Max Weber suggested, it be used as an ‘ideal type’ – that might not be realized, but must be sought to be approximated.’Global South’ functions best as a Max Weber-inspired ‘ideal type’: an abstract model used not as a description of an existing state, but as a heuristic tool to clarify the degree to which specific regions approximate or diverge from its core characteristics.

Such an approximation cannot merely be imagined; it has at least to be attempted in practice.

What I am suggesting is not utopian. Historically, there is precedent that has been realized by the Non-Aligned group of countries – which by no means perfect, but was effective in its heyday duringthe 1960s, 1970s, and early 1980s. Unfortunately, rather than being reformed and modified at the end of the Cold War, it has been tossed away.

Admittedly, those were different times, but for purposes of encouraging the dialogue and debateProf. Keerawella wanted us to have stemming from his book, and in order to draw inspiration, let me suggest 4 factors that made Non-Alignment work as an operational strategy, while it did;

* There was a clearer ‘Framework of Operation’ – the Non-Aligned MOVEMENT, which incidentally in this year we commemorate the 50th anniversary of the hosting of the 5^th Summit in Sri Lanka in 1976 at this very venue the BMICH.

* There was also a clear ‘Other’ – the cold War driven Western alliance on the one hand, and the Warsaw pact countries, which had competing ideologies–and which broadly Non-Aligned countries preferred not to emulate in toto.

* There was further an alternate Politico-Economic and Legally grounded Agenda – which saw expression through the UN Special Session on Disarmament, an operationally stronger UNCTAD, and a international legal regimethe UN Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), inwhich NAM countries played crucial roles.

* There was also ‘a like-minded collective leadership’ – which, spare a few, more often than not, dared to demonstrate objectivity between the West and the East – and resisted being unquestioning followers. Though they might not have been loved by the ‘West’, or for that matter by the ‘East’, but they were broadly respected by both.

While newer formations such as the G77, the BRICS, the SCO, alongside regional groupings such as the RCEP, the ASEAN, the AU, the GCC, and BIMSTEC have sought to fill this space, they remain, at best, partial substitutes, lacking the normative coherence and political solidarity that characterized the early NAM efforts that resulted in effective collective action demands.

It is ironic, that at a time when the ‘Global North’ is in disarray, and some its own constituents have made bold to say that this is not a “transition” but a “rupture” of the US-led rules-based international order, that there is no cohesive ‘Global South’ alternative.

The real question before the ‘Global South’ today should be, as to what conditions and mechanism could lead us to position ourselves better, to consolidate such a collective, and most importantly whether there is the political will to do so?

If not, we must at least be honest about current limits – that many states with even some capacity, are compelled to hedge, while those without meaningful leverage remain largely ‘bystanders’ in the global order.

However, if we recognize that this situation is not tenable and that we wish to serve a higher cause, we should do something about it and try to create ‘sufficient conditions’ that could more actively and tangibly approximate ‘a Global South’- which can ‘bracket’ its differences, find unity in what is most important, and avoid the temptation of flirting for temporary gain or glory.

This is the thought I wish to leave you with today in the hope that, as envisaged by Prof. Keerawella, this volume will not be the last word on ‘a Global South perspective’, but a starting point for precisely the kind of critical, self-reflective conversation that can turn it into a more grounded, plural, and effective practical programme and call to action.

Speech delivered by
by Ambassador (Retd.)
Ravinatha Aryasinha,

former Foreign Secretary and Executive Director, Regional Centre for Strategic Studies (RCSS), at the launch of

Prof. Gamini Keerawella’s book ‘Reimagining International Relations from a Global South Perspective’,

at the Bandaranaike Centre for International Studies (BCIS), Colombo on 24 February 2026)

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Opinion

The pointer who showed the moon: Professor Y. Karunadasa (1934–2026)

Published

18 hours ago

2026/04/30

Sahan Weerasooriya

Prof. Karunadasa

On 27 April 2026, Sri Lanka lost a quiet giant. Professor Y. Karunadasa, one of the world’s foremost scholars of Abhidhamma and Buddhist philosophy, passed away in Colombo. He was 92.

For those who never sat in his classroom, the name might sound distant. But for anyone who has ever wondered what the Buddha really meant by anatta (no‑self) or sabhāva (intrinsic nature), Karunadasa’s work was a lantern in the dark. He did not write to impress other academics. He wrote to make the Dhamma clear.

Born in 1934, he graduated with First Class Honours in Pali from the University of Ceylon in 1958. A decade later, his PhD thesis from the University of London became his landmark book, The Buddhist Analysis of Matter. One reviewer called it “the final word on the subject for many years to come.” He later served as Dean of Arts at the University of Kelaniya and founded its Postgraduate Institute of Pali and Buddhist Studies. The nation honoured him with Sri Lanka Sikhamani in 2005.

Yet his true gift was teaching. He once said he loved students who knew nothing about Buddhism. “It’s more adventurous,” he explained. “For those already exposed, it’s not so fascinating. In a way, it’s easier because they carry no prejudices.” He taught at SOAS, Toronto, Calgary, and Hong Kong, but he always returned to Sri Lanka – because, he said, “the Dhamma lives best where the language of the texts is still spoken.”

What exactly made his scholarship so special? Before Karunadasa, Western, and even some Asian scholars, often dismissed Abhidhamma as dry scholasticism – a medieval invention far from the Buddha’s original words. Karunadasa spent four decades proving otherwise. He showed that Abhidhamma is not a later corruption but a natural extension of the early suttas. His analysis of sabhāva (intrinsic nature) was revolutionary: he demonstrated that the Abhidhamma schools never posited eternal substances, only conditioned, momentary realities. In doing so, he rescued the entire Abhidhamma tradition from the charge of being “proto‑Hindu” or essentialist. Philosophers in London and Chicago began citing him alongside Western phenomenologists. Yet he never lost his Sri Lankan accent or his habit of drinking plain black tea while discussing citta and cetasika.

His most profound contribution was to Abhidhamma, the analytical heart of the Buddha’s teaching. Western scholars often dismissed Abhidhamma as dry scholasticism. Karunadasa showed it was a living philosophy of mind and matter, free from eternalism and nihilism. He argued that the Buddha’s refusal to posit a permanent self was not a mere negation but an invitation to see reality as a process – a stream of conditioned moments, luminous and awake.

What made him rare was his humility. He never claimed to be a meditation master or a saint. He was a reader of texts, a lover of words, a man who believed that truth shines brightest when pointed at, not possessed. “I present what I find,” he said. “Whether one decides to accept it is an individual matter.”

I recall a small story that students often told. Once, a young monk asked him after a lecture, “Venerable Professor, after all this analysis, does the self exist or not?” Karunadasa smiled. “That question,” he said, “is like asking whether the flame in this oil lamp is the same as the flame a moment ago. The Buddha’s answer is neither ‘yes’ nor ‘no’ but ‘it is not proper to say so.’ Learn to live with the question, and you will be freer than any philosopher who claims to have an answer.”

Students remember him not for grand speeches but for small kindnesses – a patient explanation of a Pali compound, a gentle nod when a young scholar stammered through a seminar. He never raised his voice. He never needed to.

The Buddha once said that the Dhamma is like a finger pointing to the moon. Do not stare at the finger, he warned. Professor Karunadasa spent a lifetime perfecting that finger – polishing it, straightening it, making sure it pointed true. We may now look at the moon and remember the hand that showed us where to turn.

May his passing be his final lesson: that even the greatest scholar must one day let go. And in that letting go, become the silence from which all teaching first arose.

May he attain the supreme bliss of Nibbana!

Dedicated to the memory of a teacher who never stopped learning.

K.L. Senarath Dayathilake

Opinion

Fiscal discipline, institutional accountability, and contemporary governance challenges

Published

18 hours ago

2026/04/30

Sahan Weerasooriya

Central Bank of Sri Lanka / Ministry of Finance

Sri Lanka is currently facing a complex set of interrelated economic, social, and governance challenges that cannot be attributed to a single policy failure or institutional weakness. Rather, these challenges reflect deeper structural issues that have evolved over time and now manifest as systemic constraints on economic stability and effective governance.

The key issues at the centre the current debate include fiscal discipline, the role of the Central Bank and the Ministry of Finance, governance challenges, the experience of public administration, and the capacity for effective policy implementation.

This short paper aims to lay the foundation for this discussion by initiating a focused and structured dialogue on these critical issues.

Fiscal Discipline: Current Status and Core Challenges

Fiscal discipline refers to the government’s ability to maintain a balance between its revenue and expenditure. It is a fundamental requirement for macroeconomic stability. However, an assessment of Sri Lanka’s current situation indicates that this balance remains significantly weakened.

Over the past three decades, government revenue as a share of GDP has steadily declined. From approximately 18–20 percent in the 1990s, it fell to nearly 9 percent in the early 2020s. While recent tax reforms have contributed to a gradual recovery, government expenditure has remained persistently high at around 20–25 percent of GDP. This imbalance has resulted in sustained budget deficits and a significant accumulation of public debt.

Within this context, constrained revenue growth and structural weaknesses in expenditure management have emerged as key factors shaping the country’s long-term fiscal outlook.

In 2024, tax revenue increased to 12.4 percent of GDP, up from 9.9 percent in 2023, and is projected to reach 14.8 percent in 2025. While this reflects a positive trend, it remains insufficient to ensure fiscal sustainability.

Expanding the tax base, strengthening tax compliance, and rationalising tax exemptions remain critical priorities. However, these efforts are constrained by structural factors, including the large size of the informal economy, weak income reporting mechanisms, and low levels of formalsation among small and medium-sized enterprises.

In addition, the heavy reliance on indirect taxation represents a structural imbalance. Currently, around 70–75 percent of total tax revenue is derived from indirect taxes, while direct taxes account for only about 25–30 percent. Among these, Value Added Tax (VAT) contributes a disproportionately large share, whereas income and corporate taxes remain relatively limited. Such a structure has implications not only for revenue stability but also for income distribution.

Tax administration continues to face operational challenges, including limited administrative capacity, technological constraints, weak enforcement, and persistent issues of tax evasion and avoidance.

Therefore, despite recent improvements in revenue performance, deeper structural reforms in the tax system are essential—particularly increasing the share of direct taxation and broadening the overall tax base.

The expenditure side presents equally significant challenges. According to the 2025 budget, government expenditure is estimated at around 21.8 percent of GDP, while revenue stands at approximately 15.1 percent. This reflects a substantial and persistent fiscal gap, the closure of which requires difficult and often politically sensitive policy choices, including borrowing, revenue enhancement, or expenditure rationalisation.

A particularly pressing concern is debt servicing. According to the World Bank, nearly half of government revenue between 2024 and 2027 may be absorbed by interest payments. This represents a significant fiscal risk. If a large share of public revenue is allocated to debt servicing, the fiscal space available for education, healthcare, social protection, and productive investment becomes severely constrained.

Public debt management therefore remains highly vulnerable. Although debt restructuring efforts have been undertaken, their long-term success depends critically on sustained fiscal discipline. Without this, debt sustainability risks re-emerging as a major macroeconomic concern.

The financial performance of state-owned enterprises further compounds these challenges. In 2024, 52 major state institutions reported combined losses exceeding LKR 150 billion. Key entities such as the Ceylon Electricity Board, Ceylon Petroleum Corporation, SriLankan Airlines, and the Sri Lanka Transport Board continue to exert pressure on public finances. Notably, in the first half of 2025 alone, the Ceylon Electricity Board recorded a loss of LKR 13.2 billion.

Taken together, the challenge of fiscal discipline is not isolated. It reflects a broader structural imbalance arising from weak revenue performance, ineffective expenditure control, high debt burdens, rising debt servicing obligations, and persistent losses in state-owned enterprises.

Accordingly, addressing these challenges requires more than incremental adjustments. It calls for a comprehensive and sustained restructuring of public financial management to restore long-term fiscal stability.

The Central Bank and the Ministry of Finance: Roles and Performance

Against this fiscal backdrop, the role and effectiveness of key economic institutions become critically important. The Central Bank and the Ministry of Finance are the two principal institutions responsible for macroeconomic management in Sri Lanka. The Central Bank is tasked with maintaining price stability and financial system stability through monetary policy, while the Ministry of Finance is responsible for the design and implementation of fiscal policy.

In recent years, the Central Bank has adopted a tight monetary policy stance to contain inflation. This represents a necessary and positive adjustment. However, a key concern lies in the clarity, consistency, and credibility of policy communication. When markets, investors, and the public do not receive clear and predictable signals regarding the future direction of policy, an uncertain environment emerges. Under such conditions, investment decisions are often delayed, market volatility increases, and overall economic confidence weakens.

With regard to the Ministry of Finance, the central issue is the gap between policy intent and effective implementation. While targets have been set to increase tax revenue, progress in broadening the tax base and strengthening compliance remains limited. This reflects not only technical challenges but also deeper institutional constraints.

Another critical area is the reform of state-owned enterprises. Although policy intentions and reform frameworks have been articulated, implementation has been slow and uneven. This delay imposes an additional burden on fiscal discipline, as continued losses in these institutions ultimately translate into increased public expenditure and fiscal pressure.

At the same time, the International Monetary Fund has emphasised, particularly in the context of the 2026 budget, the need for stronger revenue mobilization, disciplined expenditure management, improved tax compliance, and enhanced public financial management. These recommendations reinforce the urgency of institutional strengthening.

It would be overly simplistic to conclude that these institutions have entirely failed in their mandates. However, it is evident that they have not yet achieved the expected levels of efficiency, coordination, and transparency required under current economic conditions.

A key structural weakness lies in the limited coordination between monetary and fiscal policy. When these two policy domains are not aligned, their outcomes can be mutually undermining. For example, while the Central Bank may pursue tight monetary policy to control inflation, expansionary fiscal policies or excessive government spending can offset these efforts.

Going forward, strengthening institutional effectiveness requires more than clarifying mandates. It demands improved policy coordination, stronger implementation capacity, and more transparent and credible communication. These elements are essential to restoring confidence among markets, investors, and the public.

Governance Challenges and the Experience Gap: Reality and Limits

Beyond institutional performance, governance capacity itself remains a central concern. One of the most prominent criticisms directed at the current administration is the perceived lack of experience in public governance. This concern cannot be entirely dismissed. A governing team with limited experience may face significant challenges in managing the complexity of the state apparatus, fiscal risks, international commitments, and institutional processes.

However, it is insufficient to interpret this issue solely as an individual limitation. It must also be understood as a systemic challenge. In the presence of a strong advisory framework, data-driven decision-making processes, and effective coordination within a professional public service, the impact of limited experience can be mitigated to a considerable extent.

Conversely, when such institutional mechanisms are weak, the absence of experience can have more pronounced consequences. These may include delays in decision-making, misalignment of policy priorities, and increased policy instability. In such an environment, governance becomes more uncertain, and institutional trust tends to erode.

Therefore, the issue cannot be adequately captured by simply referring to a “lack of experience.” The more fundamental challenge lies in the interaction between limited experience, institutional weaknesses, and deficiencies in decision-making frameworks.

This perspective is reinforced by an observation shared in response to this discussion:

“The appointment of underqualified individuals and political appointees to senior positions in the Treasury and the Ministry of Finance can significantly contribute to such challenges. In the past, many of these roles were held by experienced senior public servants and capable economists, who possessed a deep understanding of public financial policy and governance.

It is not sufficient to characterise such issues merely as a ‘cyber incident.’ They should also be understood as manifestations of deeper systemic gaps. Accordingly, the government must identify and decisively address these gaps. However, there is limited evidence of such preparedness at present.”

This view underscores the need to assess governance challenges not only at the level of individuals, but also at the institutional and systemic levels.

Accordingly, a sustainable long-term response requires strengthening professionalism within the public sector, ensuring greater transparency and meritocracy in appointments, and institutionalizing more structured and evidence-based decision-making processes.

Priority Reforms for Immediate Action

Addressing the challenges outlined above requires a set of coordinated and decisive reforms. These actions are not optional; they are essential to restoring fiscal stability and rebuilding public confidence.

First, public expenditure must be realigned based on clear strategic priorities. Resources should be redirected away from politically popular but low-impact spending toward areas that support economic growth, strengthen human capital, and enhance social protection.

Second, the tax system must be simplified, made more equitable, and significantly broadened. Rather than increasing the burden on a narrow base of existing taxpayers, policy efforts should focus on expanding the tax base, strengthening compliance, and improving the efficiency of tax administration.

Third, reforms of state-owned enterprises must be accelerated without delay. The continued reliance on public funds to sustain loss-making institutions is fiscally unsustainable. Comprehensive restructuring is required, including improvements in governance, pricing mechanisms, operational efficiency, and accountability frameworks.

Fourth, transparency must be strengthened as a core principle of public financial management. Timely and credible disclosure of fiscal data—including debt positions, the financial performance of state-owned enterprises, and progress on reform implementation—is essential to building trust and ensuring accountability.

Finally, accountability mechanisms must be reinforced. Clear responsibility must be assigned for policy decisions, and outcomes must be systematically monitored and evaluated. Sustainable improvements in governance depend on the consistent application of accountability.

In conclusion, Sri Lanka’s current economic and governance challenges cannot be attributed to a single cause. They reflect a broader systemic imbalance arising from weak fiscal discipline, institutional limitations, communication gaps, shortcomings in policy implementation, and constraints in governance capacity.

An economy is not merely a collection of numbers; it is fundamentally a system built on trust. Rebuilding that trust is not optional—it is essential. It requires immediate and credible action to strengthen fiscal discipline, institutional accountability, transparency, and policy consistency.

This remains the defining challenge facing the current administration.

by Prof. Ranjith Bandara

Opinion

Drug crisis: A national security threat warranting a concerted response

Published

2 days ago

2026/04/29

Sahan Weerasooriya

What has happened to our beloved nation, its loving people, and our once high-esteemed culture? At a time when the country has become the cynosure of many through the peace walk led by the Buddhist clergy together with Aloka, with people from all walks of life gathering in support, it clearly shows how deeply our people are yearning for peace, unity, and harmony.

Yet, while this noble message unfolds, an incident of the opposite nature at the very gateway of our nation has brought shame and concern. Allegations involving clergy linked to narcotics raise painful questions about morality, manipulation, and the misuse of trust. If they were trapped knowingly or unknowingly by interested parties, it is even more tragic.

Sri Lanka deserves better. Our people deserve better. Let truth prevail, justice be done, and may our nation return to dignity, wisdom, and peace.

These painful contradictions reveal a deeper truth: Sri Lanka today is confronting not merely isolated scandals, but a growing national crisis. The drug menace has become a direct threat to the nation’s social harmony, economic stability, political order, and long-term security. What was once seen as only a law-enforcement matter must now be understood as a strategic national challenge.

National security is not limited to borders, weapons, or military preparedness. True national security rests on three pillars: social stability, economic resilience, and political confidence. When drugs infiltrate communities, corrupt institutions, destroy youth potential, and empower organised crime, all three pillars begin to weaken. That is the danger Sri Lanka faces today.

Recent large-scale detections by the Sri Lanka Navy, law-enforcement agencies, and intelligence services indicate the seriousness of the threat. If reported seizure figures have sharply increased, it may reflect stronger enforcement as well as the scale of trafficking attempts. Either way, it sends a clear warning: criminal syndicates see Sri Lanka as fertile ground for their operations.

A central question many citizens ask is whether Sri Lanka has become only a transit point, or whether domestic demand itself is driving these operations. Increasingly, observers note that local consumption cannot be ignored. Drug traffickers do not repeatedly risk sophisticated smuggling methods unless profits justify the danger. Where there is sustained demand, supply networks become more determined, more creative, and more ruthless.

This means Sri Lanka is not only confronting traffickers at sea or airports it is confronting an internal market. That market is built through addiction, peer pressure, targeted recruitment, nightlife culture, workplace social circles, and the normalisation of substance use among sections of society. Dealers identify vulnerable youth, socially isolated individuals, thrill-seekers, and stressed professionals. Dependency becomes their business model because dependency guarantees recurring revenue.

The criminal economy behind narcotics has no religion, ethnicity, caste, or political loyalty. These syndicates recognise only profit. They exploit any route, corrupt any system, intimidate any rival, and manipulate any weakness. They may finance violence, use debt bondage, recruit couriers, infiltrate businesses, or exploit social divisions if it protects revenue streams. This is why the drug menace must never be communalised or politicised. Crime has no creed.

Equally dangerous is the corruption ecosystem that narcotics can generate. Where drug money grows, bribery follows. Where bribery spreads, public trust declines. Where trust declines, institutions weaken. Thus, the narcotics problem becomes not only a criminal issue but a governance issue. If left unchecked, it can distort markets, compromise officials, and create parallel power structures.

Sri Lanka therefore stands at a defining moment. The government’s recent emphasis on confronting organised crime and narcotics can become meaningful, but only if it evolves into a sustained national mission rather than a temporary campaign. Raids and arrests are necessary, but seizures alone do not win this war. Every intercepted shipment is a tactical success; it is not yet a strategic victory.

To prevail, Sri Lanka requires three simultaneous lines of effort:

1. Cut Supply

Border security must remain relentless. Agencies such as the Sri Lanka Navy, Sri Lanka Customs, police narcotics units, and intelligence services need modern surveillance, financial investigation tools, and stronger coordination. Maritime interdiction, container screening, asset seizure, and anti-money-laundering action are essential.

2. Reduce Demand

Supply exists because demand exists. This is where schools, families, mosques, temples, churches, kovils, youth clubs, and employers become national security stakeholders. Prevention must begin early. Children need resilience education. Parents need awareness tools. Communities need courage to report suspicious activity. Religious institutions can restore moral clarity and social accountability. Sports, arts, skills training, and employment pathways can redirect vulnerable youth toward dignity and purpose.

3. Rehabilitate Victims

Addiction should not be treated only as crime; it is also a health and social challenge. Many users are trapped, manipulated, or psychologically dependent. Rehabilitation must include counseling, medical support, vocational reintegration, and family healing. A person recovered from addiction is one less customer for traffickers and one more citizen restored to society.

The most successful anti-drug societies combine enforcement with community ownership. Sri Lanka must do the same. Villages, neighborhoods, apartment communities, and workplaces should become protective ecosystems where dealers cannot hide and vulnerable people are not abandoned. When faith leaders, teachers, parents, and police cooperate, traffickers lose anonymity.

There is also an urgent communication battle. Drug culture is often marketed through glamour, rebellion, or status. That false narrative must be defeated. Society must expose the truth: drugs destroy ambition, fracture families, damage mental health, fuel crime, and enrich predators. Prevention messaging must be modern, digital, youth-oriented, and continuous.

Political Will Must Replace Political Theater

Political leadership is equally important. This issue cannot be seasonal, symbolic, or used for partisan point-scoring. A national consensus is needed. Governments may change, but anti-narcotics strategy must remain professional, consistent, and insulated from political interference.

Sri Lanka has overcome terrorism, disaster, and economic hardship through resilience. It can overcome this menace too, obut only through unity, discipline, and moral seriousness. Every parent, teacher, religious leader, police officer, sailor, customs officer, doctor, journalist, and young citizen has a role.

This Is Not Just a Drug War, It Is a Fight for the Soul of the Nation

This is not merely a campaign against drugs. It is a campaign for the soul of the nation. It is about protecting our children, preserving our communities, defending our institutions, and securing our future.

Sri Lanka has awakened to the danger. The moment must not be wasted. If faith, family, and state walk together, drugs will have no place to hide.

Mahil Dole is a former senior law enforcement officer and national security analyst, with over four decades of experience in policing and intelligence, including serving as Head of Counter-Intelligence at the State Intelligence Service of Sri Lanka and a graduate of the Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies in Hawai, USA.

By Mahil Dole