Features
Trincomalee Oil Farm and Energy Hub: Sri Lanka’s Missed Opportunity Returns
The Trincomalee Oil Tank Farm stands today as one of the most strategically significant yet historically underutilized energy assets in South Asia. Located off the deep natural harbour of Trincomalee, the facility embodies a convergence of history, geopolitics, and economic potential. In the current global context—marked by energy insecurity, shifting geopolitical alliances, and regional competition—the Trincomalee oil farm offers Sri Lanka a renewed opportunity to transform itself into a regional energy hub. However, this transformation demands clarity of vision, political consistency, and strategic partnerships.
Origins and construction
The origins of the Trincomalee oil tank farm date back to the era of World War II, when the British Empire recognized the strategic importance of Trincomalee as a naval base in the Indian Ocean. Construction of the oil storage facility on 600 acres of land began in 1924 and continued into the late 1930s. The project was designed to support British naval operations in the Eastern theatre, particularly as Japanese expansion threatened Allied supply lines.
The facility originally comprised 101 large storage tanks, each constructed with a robust one inch thick steel sheet and surrounded by thick one foot thick concrete walls for protection against aerial attacks. These tanks were ingeniously built into the natural contours of the terrain, often partially buried, enhancing both structural stability and camouflage. Each tank had an approximate capacity of around 12,000 metric tons of fuel, giving the entire complex a total storage capacity of nearly 1.2 million metric tons—an immense reserve by regional standards even today. This dwarfs the Ceylon Petroleum Corporation’s (CPC) existing storage facility and even the new storage complex, built by the Chinese at Muthurajawela which has a capacity of 220,000 metric tons.
The fate of two oil tanks
Out of the 101 tanks, one was destroyed when a Royal Ceylon Air Force plane crashed in the early 1960’s. But the most famous is the destroyed tank number 91 lying on the far edge of the forest. During World War II, the strategic significance of Trincomalee attracted enemy attention. In April 1942, Japanese forces launched air raids on the harbour in what became part of the broader Indian Ocean campaign. One of the oil tanks—commonly referred to as Tank 91—was hit during these attacks and destroyed. This incident underscored both the vulnerability and the importance of the facility. While most of the tanks survived the bombardment, the destruction of Tank 91 remains a historical reminder of the oil farm’s wartime role.
Strategic location and infrastructure
The inclusion of China Bay within Trincomalee Harbour complex was not incidental. China Bay offered deep-water access, allowing large oil tankers to dock safely. The harbour itself is one of the finest natural deep-water harbours in the world, capable of accommodating large naval and commercial vessels with minimal dredging.
A sophisticated pipeline system was constructed to facilitate the transfer of oil from ships directly to the storage tanks. This network of pipelines minimized handling time and reduced vulnerability during wartime operations. The integration of maritime access with inland storage infrastructure made Trincomalee a logistical asset of immense value, capable of supporting sustained naval operations across the Indian Ocean.
Post-Independence neglect
Following Sri Lanka’s independence in 1948, the Trincomalee oil tank farm gradually fell into neglect. Successive governments failed to recognize or capitalize on its strategic and economic potential. The facility was largely abandoned, with many tanks left unused and the surrounding area overgrown with dense shrub jungle. Infrastructure deteriorated, pipelines corroded, and the once-critical installation became a symbol of missed opportunity.
This neglect was not merely administrative but also strategic. At a time when global energy demand was rising and regional economies were expanding, Sri Lanka failed to leverage a ready-made asset that could have positioned it as a key player in the Indian Ocean energy network.
It may be argued that if newly Independent Ceylon, hosting two British bases at Trincomalee and Katunayake, seized the opportunity of encouraging Western investment to optimize utilization to the existing tank farm asset, companies like Shell, Stanvac and Caltex already in the profitable oil distribution business here, would have looked positively of making Sri Lanka a regional oil hub – something Singapore enjoys today.
Early attempts at revitalization
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, President J. R. Jayewardene recognized the potential of the Trincomalee oil tank farm and proposed its development. However, these efforts were complicated by geopolitical considerations, particularly concerns from India regarding foreign involvement in a strategically sensitive location so close to its southern coastline.
As a result, the project faced diplomatic resistance and was ultimately abandoned. This marked another missed opportunity, driven by a combination of external pressure and internal indecision.
The Indo-Sri Lanka Accord and aftermath
The signing of the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord in 1987 brought renewed attention to Trincomalee. The accord included provisions recognizing Trincomalee’s strategic importance and implicitly acknowledged India’s security concerns regarding its use.
During the years of civil conflict in Sri Lanka, the oil tank farm remained largely inactive. Security concerns, lack of investment, and the broader instability of the region prevented any meaningful development. Even after the end of the war in 2009, progress remained slow.
The role of Trinco Petroleum Terminal – 2022
A significant development occurred in 2022 with the establishment of Trinco Petroleum Terminal (Pvt) Ltd (TPTL), a joint venture between the Ceylon Petroleum Corporation (CPC) and the Indian Oil Corporation (IOC), through its subsidiary Lanka Indian Oil Corporation (LIOC), which had been operating in Sri Lanka since 2003. Under this arrangement, CPC holds a 51% stake, while LIOC holds 49%, reflecting a collaborative approach to developing the Trincomalee Oil Tank Farm.
As part of the agreement, a portion of the oil storage tanks was leased to the Indian partner, while the remaining tanks came under Sri Lankan control, earmarked for phased renovation and redevelopment by TPTL, LIOC, and potential international partners. LIOC has since been utilizing approximately 14–15 tanks, primarily for fuel storage and distribution within Sri Lanka.
Although these steps marked meaningful progress, the majority of the tanks have remained underutilized, and the full strategic and commercial potential of the Trincomalee Oil Tank Farm continues to be unrealized.
Political opposition and geopolitical concerns
Efforts to expand Indian involvement in the development of the oil tank farm were met with strong resistance from nationalist political groups, particularly the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP). The opposition was rooted in concerns over sovereignty, national security, and perceived over-reliance on India. This political wrangling delayed decision-making and discouraged investment. The Trincomalee oil tank farm became entangled in broader debates about foreign policy and economic strategy, rather than being treated as a national asset requiring pragmatic management.
From geopolitics to geoeconomics
In recent years, there has been a shift in perspective—from viewing Trincomalee primarily through a geopolitical lens to recognizing its geoeconomic potential. The global energy landscape is changing, with increased emphasis on supply chain resilience, regional storage hubs, and diversification of energy sources.
Sri Lanka’s strategic location along major shipping routes in the Indian Ocean positions it ideally to serve as a regional energy hub. Trincomalee, with its natural harbour and existing infrastructure, is central to this vision.
The Tripartite Agreement- 2025
A major breakthrough came in 2025 with the signing of a tripartite agreement involving Sri Lanka, India, and the United Arab Emirates. This agreement aims to jointly develop the Trincomalee oil tank farm, combining Sri Lanka’s strategic location with India’s regional influence and the UAE’s financial and technical expertise. The activation of this agreement marks a turning point. It reflects a pragmatic approach that balances national interests with the need for foreign investment and collaboration.
Importance in the current global context
The importance of the Trincomalee oil tank farm has been heightened by recent global developments, including tensions and conflicts in the Middle East. Disruptions in oil supply chains have underscored the need for strategic reserves and regional storage facilities.
For Sri Lanka, expanding the storage capacity at Trincomalee could provide energy security by maintaining reserves sufficient for up to 60 days of consumption which at present is sufficient only for 30 days. Renovation of the existing tanks, along with modernization of infrastructure, would significantly enhance the country’s resilience to external shocks.
Moreover, the facility could serve as a storage and redistribution hub for other countries in the region, generating revenue and strengthening Sri Lanka’s economic position.
Vision for Trincomalee as a comprehensive energy hub
The transformation of Trincomalee into a dynamic and sustainable energy hub represents one of the most significant strategic opportunities for Sri Lanka in the coming decades. Anchored by its historic oil tank farm at China Bay and supported by one of the finest natural harbour’s in the world, Trincomalee possesses the rare combination of geography, infrastructure, and strategic location necessary to evolve into a major energy centre in the Indian Ocean region. However, realizing this potential requires a shift from a narrow focus on storage toward a broader, integrated, and forward-looking energy ecosystem.
At the heart of this vision lies the expansion and modernization of petroleum storage and distribution. The refurbishment of the existing oil tanks—many of which date back to the Second World War—along with the construction of new, technologically advanced facilities, will significantly enhance storage capacity, efficiency, and safety. With modern monitoring systems and international-standard operational practices, Trincomalee can function as a reliable regional energy reserve, capable of meeting domestic needs while also serving international markets.
Beyond storage, the development of refining and value-addition industries is essential. Establishing a modern refinery would reduce dependence on imported refined petroleum products and create opportunities for producing lubricants, petrochemicals, and other high-value derivatives. These downstream industries would stimulate industrial growth, generate employment, and encourage the emergence of ancillary sectors, thereby contributing to broader economic development.
Trincomalee’s geographic advantages also extend to the aviation sector. Its proximity to China Bay Airport provides an opportunity to develop a dedicated aviation fuel supply chain, catering to both civilian and military requirements. This would enable the region to function as a refuelling and logistics hub within the Indian Ocean network, strengthening connectivity and enhancing operational efficiency for regional air traffic.
Equally significant is the potential of Trincomalee Harbour to emerge as a major centre for maritime services. Located along key east–west shipping routes, the harbour is ideally positioned to provide bunkering, maintenance, and logistical support to passing vessels. Developing competitive bunkering facilities would increase port revenues and enhance Sri Lanka’s standing in global maritime trade, while integrating energy services with port operations.
In keeping with global trends, the integration of renewable energy sources must form a key component of this vision. Trincomalee’s climatic conditions are conducive to both solar and wind energy generation, allowing for the development of hybrid energy systems that complement traditional fossil fuel infrastructure. Incorporating renewable energy will not only reduce carbon emissions but also align with international sustainability goals, ensuring that the hub remains relevant in a rapidly evolving global energy landscape.
Another dimension that warrants reflection in the development of Trincomalee as an energy hub is the story of Sampur—an example of both missed opportunity and emerging renewal. Strategically located in close proximity to China Bay, Sampur was once envisaged as a key site for a coal power project, later evolving into proposals for a liquefied natural gas (LNG) facility. However, a combination of political opposition, environmental concerns, and shifting policy priorities led to the abandonment of these initiatives. This not only delayed potential gains in energy generation and regional development but also underscored the need for policy consistency and long-term planning in national energy strategy.
Yet, Sampur’s relevance has not diminished. Its transformation into a ground mounted solar power facility, commissioned in 2025, marks a significant shift towards sustainable energy development. While its contribution to the national grid when fully operational may be modest (120 MW in two phases) compared to the scale of earlier proposals, it represents an important step in diversifying Sri Lanka’s energy mix and reducing dependence on fossil fuels. More importantly, Sampur’s evolution highlights the potential for integrating renewable energy into the broader vision for Trincomalee. As the energy hub concept matures, Sampur could serve as a model for balancing economic ambition with environmental responsibility, reinforcing Trincomalee’s role in a resilient and forward-looking energy future.
The realization of the energy hub vision depends heavily on robust infrastructure development and enhanced connectivity. Modernizing port facilities, expanding pipeline networks, and improving road and rail links to the rest of the country are essential steps. In addition, ambitious proposals such as undersea pipelines linking Trincomalee with regional partners could further strengthen its role as a critical node in South Asia’s energy network, facilitating cross-border energy trade and cooperation.
Strategic partnerships will play a crucial role in this transformation. Given the scale of investment and technical expertise required, collaboration with international stakeholders is both necessary and beneficial. However, such partnerships must be carefully structured to ensure transparency, equitable benefit-sharing, and the protection of national interests. Drawing on global best practices while maintaining sovereignty over strategic assets will be key to long-term success.
Equally important is the establishment of a stable and consistent policy environment. Investor confidence depends on clear, predictable policies governing taxation, pricing, and operations. A well-defined national energy policy, supported by a strong regulatory framework, will provide the foundation for sustained investment and long-term planning. Regulations must also ensure strict adherence to environmental standards, safeguarding the ecological integrity of the Trincomalee region while enabling responsible development.
Human resource development is another critical pillar. The successful operation of a modern energy hub requires a skilled and knowledgeable workforce. Investment in education, technical training, and capacity-building programs will be essential to equip local professionals with the expertise needed to manage advanced infrastructure and complex operations.
Finally, regional integration offers a powerful pathway for growth. By strengthening energy and economic ties with neighbouring countries, Trincomalee can position itself as a reliable and efficient hub within the wider Indian Ocean region. This will not only enhance energy security but also elevate Sri Lanka’s role in regional and global energy networks.
In essence, the vision for Trincomalee is one of transformation—from a historically significant but underutilized asset into a vibrant, multifaceted energy hub that drives national development, fosters regional cooperation, and secures a sustainable energy future
Lessons from past failures
Sri Lanka’s history with the Trincomalee oil tank farm and the projects in Sampur for power generation is marked by missed opportunities, often due to political indecision, opposition by nationalist political parties and short-term thinking. Repeated changes in policy, lack of continuity, and politicization of strategic assets have hindered progress.
To avoid repeating these mistakes, there must be a clear, long-term national strategy agreed by the parties concerned. Transparent governance, professional management, and accountability are essential.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the future of Trincomalee stands at a decisive crossroads, shaped by both its historic legacy and its untapped potential. What was once conceived as a strategic wartime asset now presents itself as an opportunity of national significance especially during a time of energy crisis in the world brought about by the present war in the Middle East. The convergence of geography, infrastructure, and global energy demand places Trincomalee in a uniquely advantageous position within the Indian Ocean region.
Realizing this vision demands more than ambition—it calls for disciplined planning, policy consistency, and a commitment to national interest above short-term considerations. Investment in modern infrastructure, technological advancement, and human capital must proceed alongside transparent governance and environmental responsibility. Equally important is the cultivation of strategic partnerships that enhance capacity while preserving sovereignty.
If approached with foresight and unity, Trincomalee can evolve into a resilient, multifaceted energy hub that not only secures Sri Lanka’s energy future but also stimulates trade, industry, and regional collaboration. It is an opportunity to convert past delays and failures into present momentum and future success.
The time has come to act decisively. The foundations are already in place; what is needed now is the will to build upon them.
Trincomalee Oil Farm and Energy Hub: A Strategic Asset Sri Lanka Can No Longer Ignore
At a time when Sri Lanka continues to grapple with energy insecurity, volatile global oil prices, and the economic aftershocks of recent crises, one national asset stands out—vast, historic, and still underused. The Trincomalee Oil Tank Farm, located within the deep natural harbour of Trincomalee, is no longer merely a relic of the past. It has re-emerged as a critical national asset with the potential to reshape Sri Lanka’s energy security and economic future. In the context of an ongoing global energy crisis, the question is not whether Trincomalee matters, but whether Sri Lanka is finally prepared to act decisively.
The origins of the Trincomalee oil tank farm date back to the strategic imperatives of the British Empire during the Second World War. Recognising the unmatched value of Trincomalee’s harbour—one of the finest natural deep-water harbours in the world—the British constructed a vast oil storage complex across approximately 600 acres at China Bay. Built between the 1920s and late 1930s, the facility comprised 101 massive storage tanks, each capable of holding around 12,000 metric tons of fuel. With a total capacity of nearly 1.2 million metric tons, the complex was designed to support sustained naval operations in the Indian Ocean theatre. The tanks were ingeniously embedded into the natural contours of the terrain and reinforced with thick concrete, offering both protection and structural stability. A sophisticated pipeline network enabled the efficient transfer of oil from ships directly into storage, making Trincomalee a logistical asset of exceptional value.
Despite this remarkable beginning, the decades following independence in 1948 saw the gradual neglect of the facility. Successive governments failed to incorporate the oil tank farm into a coherent national energy strategy. As global demand for energy expanded and regional economies strengthened, Sri Lanka allowed one of its most valuable assets to deteriorate. Infrastructure decayed, pipelines corroded, and many of the tanks fell into disuse, eventually becoming overgrown by jungle. What should have been a cornerstone of national energy security instead became a symbol of indecision and missed opportunity.
There were intermittent attempts to revive interest in Trincomalee. In the late 1970s, President J. R. Jayewardene recognised the strategic and economic potential of the facility and proposed its development. However, these efforts were constrained by geopolitical realities, particularly concerns from India regarding foreign involvement in a strategically sensitive location close to its southern coastline. The Indo-Sri Lanka Accord once again highlighted Trincomalee’s strategic importance, but the ensuing years of civil conflict and persistent policy inconsistency prevented any meaningful progress. Even after the end of the war in 2009, development remained slow and fragmented.
A more structured effort emerged in 2022 with the establishment of the Trinco Petroleum Terminal (Pvt) Ltd, a joint venture between the Ceylon Petroleum Corporation and the Indian Oil Corporation. Under this arrangement, Sri Lanka retained a 51 percent stake, while the Indian partner held 49 percent. A number of tanks were allocated for immediate use, while others were designated for phased development. Although this marked a positive step forward, the majority of the facility remains underutilised. Political opposition, particularly from groups such as the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna, continued to slow progress, often framing the issue in terms of sovereignty rather than economic necessity.
The urgency of developing Trincomalee has been amplified by the current global energy crisis, driven in part by instability in the Middle East and disruptions to global supply chains. These developments have exposed the vulnerability of countries with limited strategic reserves. Sri Lanka, at present, maintains fuel reserves sufficient for roughly 30 days. With full development of the Trincomalee oil tank farm, this capacity could be extended to 60 days or more, providing a vital buffer against external shocks. Such an expansion would not only enhance national energy security but also reduce the risk of recurring fuel shortages and economic instability.
A significant breakthrough came in 2025 with the signing of a tripartite agreement involving Sri Lanka, India, and the United Arab Emirates. This partnership represents a pragmatic alignment of interests, combining Sri Lanka’s strategic location with India’s regional presence and the UAE’s financial and technical capabilities. More importantly, it reflects a shift in thinking—from viewing Trincomalee purely through a geopolitical lens to recognising its broader geoeconomic potential. In an era where energy infrastructure and regional cooperation are increasingly interconnected, Trincomalee has the capacity to emerge as a key node in the Indian Ocean energy network.
However, the true potential of Trincomalee extends far beyond oil storage. To fully realise its value, Sri Lanka must adopt a more integrated and forward-looking approach, transforming the region into a comprehensive energy hub. This would involve modernising storage facilities, expanding distribution networks, and developing refining capacity to reduce dependence on imported petroleum products. The establishment of petrochemical industries could further enhance value addition and create new avenues for export and employment.
Trincomalee’s geographic advantages also position it well for the development of aviation fuel supply chains, particularly given its proximity to China Bay. In addition, the harbour’s location along major east–west shipping routes offers significant potential for bunkering and maritime services. By integrating energy infrastructure with port operations, Sri Lanka could enhance its role in global maritime trade while generating substantial revenue.
Equally important is the integration of renewable energy into this vision. The nearby area of Sampur, once the site of abandoned coal and LNG projects, has now been repurposed as a solar power facility commissioned in 2025, with a planned capacity of 120 MW. While modest in scale, this development represents a meaningful shift towards sustainability and highlights the potential for combining traditional and renewable energy sources within a unified framework. Sampur’s evolution serves as both a lesson in missed opportunity and a model for a more balanced and forward-looking energy strategy.
The transformation of Trincomalee into a functioning energy hub will depend on several critical factors. Foremost among these is the need for policy consistency and long-term planning. Investor confidence cannot be sustained in an environment of shifting regulations and political uncertainty. Transparent governance, clear regulatory frameworks, and a commitment to protecting national interests are essential. At the same time, strategic partnerships with international stakeholders must be carefully managed to ensure that Sri Lanka benefits fully from its assets while maintaining sovereignty.
Infrastructure development will also play a central role. Upgrading port facilities, expanding pipeline networks, and improving road and rail connectivity are necessary to support increased activity. Investment in human capital is equally important, as the operation of a modern energy hub requires a skilled and technically proficient workforce.
Sri Lanka’s experience with the Trincomalee oil tank farm and related projects, including those in Sampur, underscores a recurring pattern of missed opportunities driven by political indecision and short-term thinking. To break this cycle, there must be a clear national consensus on the strategic importance of Trincomalee, supported by consistent policy and professional management.
In conclusion, the future of Trincomalee stands at a decisive crossroads. What was once conceived as a strategic wartime asset now represents an opportunity of immense national importance, particularly in the context of a global energy crisis. The convergence of geography, infrastructure, and rising global demand places Trincomalee in a uniquely advantageous position within the Indian Ocean region. Realising this potential will require disciplined planning, sustained commitment, and a willingness to act in the national interest. If approached with foresight and unity, Trincomalee can evolve into a resilient and dynamic energy hub, securing Sri Lanka’s energy future while driving economic growth and regional cooperation. The foundations are already in place; what is needed now is the resolve to build upon them.
(Dr. Gamini Goonetilleke, FRCS, is a senior consultant surgeon in Sri Lanka with over four decades of distinguished service, including extensive work in conflict-affected regions during the civil war, where he managed complex trauma cases. He is the author of three acclaimed books—In the Line of Duty, The Extra Mile, and The Healing Cut. Transitioning from medicine to intellectual inquiry, he is now a researcher, writer, and commentator on national issues. In this article, he brings a critical perspective to Sri Lanka’s energy challenges, highlighting missed opportunities and the urgent need for strategic vision.)
by Gamini Goonetilleke
Features
Aligning graduate output with labour market needs:Why national policy intervention essential
The lack of a committed and competent workforce is no longer a routine managerial complaint in Sri Lanka; it has become a defining national problem. Recent widely reported malpractices, in leading public institutions, have exposed the depth of this challenge. From a macro-economic perspective, large and persistent gaps exist between the competencies required to perform jobs effectively and the competency profiles of the existing workforce. The consequences are visible across the economy; we witness the key economic drivers, such as agriculture, energy, tourism, finance, and education, continue to underperform. This chronic condition is not a result of insufficient and incapable human capital, but of its persistent misalignment and misutilisation.
Economic development in any country is ultimately driven by the quality and relevance of human capital deployed within its key industries. In Sri Lanka, however, the education sector, particularly higher education, has been repeatedly criticised for its limited role in producing graduates, aligned with economic needs. This misalignment is often justified by higher education institutions on the grounds that their role is not to train graduates for specific jobs, but to produce broadly capable individuals who can perform in any work context. This position appears defensible in principle. Nevertheless, it remains problematic in practice, when economic sectors continue to underperform, and graduates struggle to find productive and relevant employment.
We were surprised to see a large number of university graduates appear at a recruitment interview for post of office labourer. Their intention was to secure a public sector job as a career path, nothing else. Alas, in another job placement interview, to select office clerks, several candidates presented degree qualifications, in statistics, and degree programmes, like archeology and geography, although a degree was not an entry requirement. When questioned, the common response was the difficulty of finding jobs, relevant to their degrees. Does this mean university degrees are worthless? Certainly not, if strategically channelled into relevant economic drivers, they could have contribute meaningfully to national development. For instance, an archeology degrees can be directed to tourism, heritage management, city planning, or spatial development. The tragedy is neither the policymakers, nor the university authorities bother about the time and money spent on graduates, which go in vein in an inappropriate job. No one bothers to assess the value of having such graduates directly channelled to relevant economic sectors. The graduates also may not be bothered to question the value they dilute in generic jobs.
Periodically, state university graduates, particularly those qualified through external degree programmes, flock to the streets, demanding government employment. In response, successive governments absorbed large numbers of graduates as school teachers and development officers. Whether such recruitment exercises were grounded in a systematic analysis of labour market demand, and sector-specific competency requirements, is dubious. The persistent deterioration in productivity and service quality, across key economic sectors, therefore, raises a fundamental question: Does strategic alignment between graduate output and labour market demand exist?
Systemic Weaknesses across Economic Sectors
We see deep structural weaknesses in nearly all segments of the Sri Lankan economy. Persistent deficiencies in public sector management; outdated agriculture management systems, relying on raw exports, weak preservation and production practices; structurally underdeveloped, unattractive tourism sector slow to adopt modern global approaches; an education system, from early childhood to higher education, showing more decline than progress; and digitalisation and e-governance initiatives repeatedly undermined by implementation failures, are some lapses to mention here.
However, during the colonial period, Sri Lanka was a prosperous country in terms of agro-economy and infrastructure development. During this period, conscious alignment between education and economic priorities was clearly visible. Schools taught subjects relevant to employment and livelihood opportunities, within the prevailing economic structure. Universities were primarily producing personnel to meet the clerical needs of the administration. University enrolment remained limited and targeted, ensuring graduate output remained broadly commensurate with labour market demand. The clarity of policies and orderly execution resulted in comparatively high employee–job fit, highly competent workforce, and better service and minimal graduate unemployment. Nevertheless, during the 76 years of post-independence, Sri Lanka has fallen from its economic stability and administrative orderliness, with rising problems in every sphere of economic, cultural, social, political and environmental segments.
Decoupling of Higher Education and Economic Needs
As we see with the expansion of higher education, graduate–job fit has gradually weakened. Both public and private higher education providers continue to offer academic programmes that are decoupled from economic development priorities. If I may bring an example, one of the most critical constraints to development in Sri Lanka is the persistent absence of timely and accurate data. Decisions, policies, and reforms frequently encounter implementation difficulties due to judgments based on outdated or inaccurate data. Organisations continue to operate in the absence of reliable information systems, admitting failures and presenting excuses. Notwithstanding the need, limited attention has been given to producing competent graduates, specialised in statistics, data analytics, and information management. National-level interventions to address this gap remain minimal, despite the urgent need for such expertise, within key government institutions, and the overall industry. A large number of agriculture degree holders pass out every year from state universities, but insufficient progress has been made in modernising agricultural products and value chains, although the agricultural sector is a key economic driver in the country. We often meet agricultural graduates holding general administrative positions, which are supposed to be handled by the management graduates. Agricultural specialised knowledge is underutilised, despite the potential to deploy this expertise in promoting agricultural development. It is noteworthy to consider that when graduates, trained in specific disciplines, enter irrelevant job markets, their competencies gradually erode, organisational performance declines, and additional costs are imposed on both organisations and the wider economy.
Misalignment of human capital constitutes a significant negative externality to national development. The government invests substantial public funds, generated through taxation, to provide free education with the expectation that graduates will contribute meaningfully to economic and social development. When graduates are misaligned in the job market, the resulting costs are borne by the economy and society at large. Consequently, the economy suffers from an absence of appropriate competencies, skills, and work attitudes. Poor judgments arising from capacity deficiencies, performance inefficiencies, and a lack of specialised human capital, generate externalities.
Why Strategic Alignment Matters
A clear and coherent national human capital development policy is required, to ensure strategic alignment with national economic drivers. Such a policy should be formulated by the government, through structured consultation with government institutions, public and private higher education providers, industry representatives across key economic sectors, as well as stakeholders from social groups, and environmental authorities. Universities should ensure that degree programmes are explicitly linked to sector-specific labour market demand, based on objective and systematic analysis rather than ad hoc decision-making. National competency frameworks, for major job categories, should be developed to guide curriculum design and enrolment planning. Of course, there are competency frameworks developed as initiatives of the governments time to time, but the issue is although policies were made, they were displaced, and still to search for.
Countries that have achieved rapid economic development consistently demonstrate strong strategic alignment between human capital development and policy initiatives, underscoring the importance of coordinated planning between education systems and national economic objectives. Singapore, for example, closely aligns higher education planning with labour market demand through initiatives, such as graduate employment surveys and industry-focused programmes. Universities, like the National University of Singapore and Nanyang Technological University, play a vital role in such initiatives.
It is important for us to explore the strategies of the other countries and benchmark best practices, adopting to the local context. If we, at least, take this need seriously, and plan, in the long term, strategic alignment between graduate output and labour market demand could fundamentally change Sri Lanka’s development outcomes. Where alignment exists, productivity improves, service delivery strengthens, and institutional accountability becomes unavoidable. Effective utilisation of discipline-specific graduates would curb skill erosion and reduce the recurring fiscal cost of graduate underemployment, misallocation and ad hoc public sector recruitment.
The Role of the Government and Policymakers
Policymakers must treat human capital development as a strategic mechanism, maintaining explicit alignment between higher education planning, economic development priorities, and labour market absorption capacity. Fragmented policy stewardship across ministries and agencies should be reduced through coordinated human capital governance mechanisms. Public administration, including sector-level managers, must actively articulate medium and long-term competency requirements of key economic drivers, and feed these requirements into higher education policy processes. Governments should shift from ad hoc graduate absorption practices towards planned workforce deployment strategies, ensuring that graduate output is absorbed into sectors where national productivity, innovation, and service delivery gains are most needed. In this effort, continuous policy dialogue, between education authorities, economic planners, and industry stakeholders, is essential to prevent symbolic alignment of graduate outputs while functional mismatches persist, if we aim for a prosperous nation.
Dr. Chani Imbulgoda (PhD) is a Senior Education Administrator, author, researcher, and lecturer with extensive experience in higher education governance and quality
assurance. She can be reached at cv5imbulgoda@gmail.com.
By Dr. Chani Imbulgoda
Features
The hidden world of wild elephants
… Young photographer captures rare moments of love, survival and intelligence in Udawalawe National Park’s Wilderness
In the silent heart of the Udawalawe National Park’s wilderness, where dust rises gently beneath giant footsteps, and the afternoon sun burns across dry landscapes, young wildlife photographer Hashan Navodya waits patiently behind his camera lens.
For the 25-year-old final-year undergraduate student at the University of Jaffna, wildlife photography is not merely a hobby. It is a lifelong passion, a spiritual connection with nature, and a journey into the hidden emotional world of wild animals — especially elephants.
Originally from Gampaha District, Hashan’s fascination with wildlife began during childhood. While many children admired animals from afar, he spent countless hours observing them closely, studying their movements, behaviour and relationships.
“From a young age, I loved watching animals and understanding how they behave,” Hashan said. “At first, I visited zoos because that was the only way I could see wildlife. But later I realised that animals are most beautiful when they are free in their natural habitats.”
That realisation transformed his life.
- A joyful young elephant bathing beside its family in the muddy waters of the wild
- A playful young elephant resting in the cool water on a hot afternoon
His photography journey officially began in 2019, while studying at Bandaranayake College Gampaha, where he served as a photographer for the school media unit. Initially, he covered school functions and events before gradually moving into engagement shoots and event photography to improve his technical skills and earn money.
“Wildlife photography equipment is extremely expensive,” he explained. “I worked hard to save money for camera bodies and lenses because I knew this was what I truly wanted to do.”
Armed with determination and patience, Hashan eventually turned fully toward wildlife and nature photography.
His journey has since taken him deep into some of Sri Lanka’s most celebrated natural sanctuaries, including Yala National Park, Wilpattu National Park, Bundala National Park, Udawalawe National Park and Horton Plains National Park.
Among the countless wildlife encounters he has documented, elephants remain closest to his heart.
One of the most remarkable moments he captured unfolded during a harsh dry spell inside the wilderness.
A mother elephant, sensing water hidden beneath the cracked earth, carefully dug into the ground using her powerful trunk. Slowly, fresh underground water, rich in minerals and nutrients, emerged from beneath the dry soil.
Nearby stood her calf, patiently waiting.
“As the water appeared, the baby elephant quietly moved closer and drank beside its mother,” Hashan recalled.
“It was such a powerful moment. It showed survival, intelligence, trust and the deep bond between them.”
The scene revealed more than instinct. It reflected generations of inherited knowledge passed from mother to calf — wisdom essential for survival in difficult conditions.
“These mineral-rich water sources are very important for young elephants, especially during dry periods,” he said. “Watching the mother carefully search and dig for water showed how intelligent elephants truly are.”
Another unforgettable moment, captured through his lens, revealed the softer, deeply emotional side of elephant life.
In a quiet corner of the forest, a baby elephant stood beneath its mother, gently drinking milk, while remaining sheltered under her protective body. The tenderness of the scene reflected unconditional care and the inseparable bond between mother and child.
“You can truly feel the love and protection in moments like that,” Hashan said. “In the wild, survival depends on the herd and, especially, on the mother’s care.”
His photographs also highlight the playful and emotional behaviour of elephants, particularly around water.
Inside the cooling waters of the Udawalawe National Park, Hashan observed a herd gathering together beneath the tropical heat. Young elephants splashed water joyfully over their bodies, using their trunks, while others sprayed water behind their ears to cool themselves.
“One young elephant was playing happily in the water while another carefully sprayed water around its ears as if enjoying a relaxing bath,” he said with a smile. “You can clearly see that elephants experience joy, comfort and emotion.”
The scenes reflected the social nature of elephants and their strong family bonds. Water is not simply essential for survival; it also becomes a place for interaction, play, relaxation and emotional connection within the herd.
- A baby elephant feeds safely beside its mother
- A playful elephant splashing water and enjoying a peaceful bath with its family
For Hashan, wildlife photography offers far more than beautiful images.
“Wildlife gives me peace and happiness,” he said. “It reminds me that humans are also part of nature. Animals deserve freedom, respect and protection.”
His love for animals has even shaped his lifestyle choices.
“Because of my respect for wildlife, I avoid eating meat and fish,” he explained. “I want to live in a way that causes less harm to animals.”
Through every photograph, Hashan hopes to inspire others to appreciate Sri Lanka’s rich biodiversity and understand the importance of conservation.
“Wildlife is one of nature’s greatest treasures,” he said.
“Every animal plays an important role in maintaining the balance of nature. We must protect them and their habitats for future generations.”
His words carry the quiet conviction of someone who has spent long hours observing the rhythms of the wild — moments of struggle, affection, intelligence and harmony often unseen by the outside world.
As the golden light fades across Sri Lanka’s forests and grasslands, Hashan continues his search for nature’s untold stories, waiting patiently for another fleeting moment that reveals the extraordinary lives hidden within the wild.
“Nature still holds many beautiful stories waiting to be discovered,” he reflected. “Stories of survival, love, strength and harmony. Through my photographs, I hope people will understand why wildlife conservation matters so much.”
By Ifham Nizam
Features
Citizenship, Devolution, Land and Language: The Vicarious Legacies of SJV Chelvanayakam
SJV Chelvanayakam, the founder leader of the Ilankai Thamil Arasu Kadchi, aka Ceylon Tamil Federal Party, passed away 49 years ago on 26 April 1977. There were events in Sri Lanka and other parts of the world where Tamils live, to commemorate his memory and his contributions to Tamil society and politics. His legacy is most remembered for his espousal of the cause of federalism and his commitment to pursuing it solely through non-violent politics. Chelvanayakam’s political life spanned a full 30 years from his first election as MP for Kankesanthurai in 1947 until his death in 1977.
Under the rubric of federalism, Chelvanayakam formulated what he called the four basic demands of the Tamil speaking people, a political appellation he coined to encompass – the Sri Lankan Tamils, Sri Lankan Muslims and the hill country Tamils (Malaiyaka Tamils). The four demands included the restoration of the citizenship rights of the hill country Tamils; cessation of state sponsored land colonisation in the North and East; parity of status for the Sinhala and Tamil languages; and a system of regional autonomy to devolve power to the northern and eastern provinces.
High-minded Politics
Although the four basic demands that Chelvanayakam articulated were not directly delivered upon during his lifetime, they became part of the country’s political discourse and dynamic to such an extent that they had to be dealt with, one way or another, even after his death. So, we can call these posthumous developments as Chelvanayakam’s vicarious legacies. There is more to his legacy. He belonged to a category of Sri Lankans, Sinhalese, Tamils and Muslims, who took to politics, public life, public service, and even private business with a measure of high-mindedness that was almost temperamental and not at all contrived. Chelvanayakam personified high-minded politics. But he was not the only one. There were quite a few others in the 20th century. There have not been many since.
Born on 31 March 1898, Chelvanayakam was 49 years old when he entered parliament. He was not an upstart school dropout dashing into politics or coming straight out of the university, or even a hereditary claimant, but a self-made man, an accomplished lawyer, a King’s Counsel, later Queen’s Counsel, and was widely regarded as one of the finest civil lawyers of his generation. He was a serious man who took to politics seriously. Howard Wriggins, in his classic 1960 book, “Ceylon: Dilemmas of a New Nation”, called Chelvanayakam “the earnest Christian lawyer.”
Chelvanayakam’s professional standing, calm demeanour, his personal qualities of sincerity and honesty, and his friendships with men of the calibre of Sir Edward Jayatilleke KC (Chief Justice, 1950-52), H.V. Perera QC, P. Navaratnarajah, QC, and K.C. Thangarajah, were integral to his politics. The four of them were also mutual friends of Prime Minister SWRD Bandaranaike and they played a part in the celebrated consociational achievement in 1957, called the B-C Pact.
Chelvanayakam effortlessly combined elite consociationalism with grass roots politics and mass movements. He led the Federal Party both as a democratic organization and an open movement. Chelvanayakam and the Federal Party used parliament as their forum to present their case, the courts to fight for their rights, and took to organizing non-violent protests, political pilgrimages and satyagraha campaigns. He was imprisoned in Batticaloa, detained in Panagoda, and was placed under house arrest several times. His Alfred House Gardens neighbours in Colombo used to wonder why the government and the police were after him, of all people, and why wouldn’t they do something about his four boisterous, but studious, sons!
He was a rare politician who filed his own election petition when he was defeated in the 1952 election, his first as the leader of the Federal Party, and was rewarded with punitive damages by an exacting judge. He had to borrow money from Sir Edward Jayatilleke to pay damages. The common practice for losing candidates was to file vexatious petitions in the name of one of their supporters with no asset to pay legal costs. Chelvanayakam was too much of a principled man for that. As a matter of a different principle, the two old Left parties never challenged election losses in court, but Dr. Colvin R de Silva singled out Chelvanayakam’s uniqueness for praise in parliament, in the course of a debate on amendments to the country’s election laws in 1968.
Disenfranchisement & Disintegration
Although he became an MP in 1947, Chelvanayakam had been associated with GG Ponnambalam and the Tamil Congress Party for a number of years. GG was the flamboyant frontliner, SJV the quiet mainstay behind. Tamil politics at that time was all about representation. In fact, all politics in Sri Lanka has been all about representation all the time. It started when British colonial rulers began nominating local (Sinhala, Tamil, Muslim) representatives to quasi legislative bodies, and it became a contentious political matter after the introduction of universal franchise in 1931.
Communal representation was conveniently made to look ugly by those who themselves were politically communal. Indeed, under colonial rule, if not later too, Sri Lankans were a schizophrenic society where most Sinhalese, Tamils and Muslims were socially friendly, but politically communal. The underlying premise to the fight over representation was that British colonialists were not leaving in a hurry and they were there to stay and rule for a long time. Hence the jostling for positions under a foreign master. It was in this context that Ponnambalam made his celebrated 50-50 pitch for balanced representation between the Sinhalese, on the one hand, and all the others – Tamils, Muslims, Indian Tamils – combined on the other. It was a perfectly rational proposition, but it was also perfectly poor politics.
But independence came far sooner than expected. The Soulbury Constitution was set up not for a continuing colonial state, but as the constitution for an independent new Ceylon. So, the argument for balanced representation became irrelevant in the new circumstances. The new Soulbury Constitution was enacted in 1945, general elections were held in 1947, a new parliament was elected, and Ceylon became independent in 1948. SJV Chelvanayakam was among the seven Tamil Congress MPs elected to the first parliament led by GG Ponnambalam.
The Tamil Congress campaigned in the 1947 election against accepting the Soulbury Constitution and for a vaguely formulated mandate “to cooperate with any progressive Sinhalese party which would grant the Tamil their due rights.” But what these rights are was not specified. In a Feb. 5, 1946 speech in Jaffna, Ponnambalam specifically proposed “responsive cooperation between the communities” – not parties – and advocated “a social welfare policy” to benefit not only the poor masses of Tamils but also the large masses of the Sinhalese.
So, when Ponnambalam and four of the seven Tamil Congress MPs decided to join the government of DS Senanayake with Ponnambalam accepting the portfolio of the Minister of Industries, Industrial Research and Fisheries, they were opposed by Chelvanayakam and two other Tamil Congress MPs. The immediate context for this split was the Citizenship question that arose soon after independence when DS Senanayake’s UNP government introduced the Ceylon Citizenship Bill in parliament. The purpose and effect of the bill was to deprive the estate Tamils of Indian origin (then numbering about 780,000) of their citizenship. Previously the government had got parliament to enact the Elections Act to stipulate that only citizens can vote in national elections. In one stroke, the whole working population of the plantations was disenfranchised.
GG Ponnambalam and all seven Tamil Congress MPs voted against the two bills. Joining them in opposition were the six MPs from the Ceylon Indian Congress representing the Malaiyaka Tamils and 18 Sinhalese MPs from the Left Parties. The Citizenship Bill was passed in Parliament on 20 August 1948. Ponnambalam called it a dark day for Ceylon and accused Senanayake of racism. But less than a month later, on September 3, 1948, he joined the Senanayake cabinet as a prominent minister and the government’s principal defender in parliamentary debates. Dr. NM Perera once called Ponnambalam “the devil’s advocate from Jaffna.”
Chelvanayakam remained in the opposition with two of his Congress colleagues. A little over an year later, on December 18, 1949, Chelvanayakam founded the Ilankai Tamil Arasu Kadchi, Federal Party in English. Not long after, joining Chelvanayakam in the opposition was SWRD Bandaranaike, who broke away from the UNP government over succession differences and went on to form another new political party, the Sri Lanka Freedom Party. As was his wont as a Marxist to see trends and patterns in politics, Hector Abhayavardhana saw the breakaways of Chelvanayakam and Bandaranaike, as well as the emergence of Thondaman as the leader of the disenfranchised hill country Tamils, as symptoms of a disintegrating society as it was transitioning from colonial rule to independence.
Abhayavardhana saw the Citizenship Act as the political trigger of this disintegration in the course of which “what was set up for the purpose of a future nation ended in caricature as a Sinhalese state.” Chelvanayakam may have agreed with this assessment even though he was located at the right end of the ideological continuum. “Ideologically, SJV is to the right of JR,” was part of political gossip in the old days. He saw “seeds of communism” in Philip Gunawardena’s Paddy Lands Act. For all their differences, Chelvanayakam and Ponnambalam were united in one respect – as unrepentant opponents of Marxism.
The Four Demands
Chelvanayakam had his work cut out as the leader of a new political party and pitting himself against a formidable political foe like Ponnambalam with all the ministerial resources at his disposal. Chelvanayakam may not have quite seen it that way. Rather, he saw his role as a matter of moral duty to fill the vacuum created by what he believed to be Ponnambalam’s betrayal, and to provide new leadership to a people who were at the crossroads of uncertainty after the unexpectedly early arrival of independence.
He set about his work by expanding his political constituency to include not only the island’s indigenous Tamils, but also the Muslims and the Tamil plantation workers from South India – as the island’s Tamil speaking people. It was he who vigorously introduced the disenfranchised Indian Tamils as hill country Tamils. In the aftermath of the Citizenship Act and disenfranchisement, restoring their citizenship rights became an obvious first demand for the new Party.
Having learnt the lesson from Ponnambalam’s failed 50-50 demand, Chelvanayakam territorialized the representation question by identifying the northern and eastern provinces as “traditional Tamil homelands,” and adding a measure regional autonomy to make up for the shortfall in representation at the national level in Colombo. To territorialization and autonomy, he added the cessation of state sponsored land colonization especially in the eastern province. Chelvanayakam and the Federal Party painstakingly explained that they were by no means opposed to Sinhalese voluntarily living in Tamil areas, either as a matter of choice, pursuing business or as government and private sector employees, but the nuancing was quite easily lost in the political shouting match.
The fourth demand, after citizenship, regional autonomy, and land, was about language. Language was not an issue when Chelvanayakam started the Federal Party. But he pessimistically predicted that sooner or later the then prevailing consensus, based on a State Council resolution, over equality between the two languages would be broken. He was proved right, sooner than later, and language became the explosive question in the 1956 election. As it turned out, the UNP government was thrown out, SWRD Bandaranaike led a coalition of parties to victory and government in the south, while SJV Chelvanayakam won a majority of the seats in the North and East, including two Muslims from Kalmunai and Pottuvil.
After the passage of the Sinhala Only Act on June 5, 1956, the Federal Party launched a political pilgrimage and mobilized a convention that was held in Trincomalee in the month of August. The four basic demands were concretized at the convention, viz., citizenship restoration for the hill country Tamils, parity of status for the Sinhala and Tamil languages, the cessation of state sponsored land colonization, and a system of regional autonomy in the Northern and Eastern Provinces.
The four demands became the basis for the Bandaranaike-Chelvanayakam agreement – the B-C Pact of 1957, and again the agreement between SJV Chelvanayakam and Dudley Senanayake in 1965. The former was abrogated by Prime Minister Bandaranaike under political duress but was not abandoned by him. The latter has been implemented in fits and starts.
The two agreements which should have been constitutionally enshrined, were severely ignored in the making of the 1972 Constitution and the 1978 Constitution – with the latter learning nothing and forgetting everything that its predecessor had inadvertently precipitated. The political precipitation was the rise of Tamil separatism and its companion, Tamil political violence. Ironically, Tamil separatism and violence created the incentive to resolve what Chelvanayakam had formulated and non-violently pursued as the four basic demands of the Tamils.
After his death in 1977, the citizenship question has finally been resolved. The 13th Amendment to the 1978 Constitution that was enacted in 1987 resolved the language question both in law and to an appreciable measure in practice. The same amendment also brought about the system of provincial councils, substantially fulfilling the regional autonomy demand of SJV Chelvanayakam. The land question, however, has taken a different turn with state sponsored land colonisation in the east giving way to government security forces sequestering private residential properties of Tamil families in the north, especially in the Jaffna Peninsula.
Further, the future of the Provincial Council system has become uncertain with the extended postponement of provincial elections by four Presidents and their governments, including the current incumbents. The provinces are now being administered by the President through handpicked governors without the elected provincial councils as mandated by the constitution. Imagine a Sri Lanka where there is only an Executive President and no parliament – not even a nameboard one. “What horror!”, you would say. But that is the microcosmic reality today in the country’s nine provinces.
by Rajan Philips
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