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The Dutch Burghers and English; Voices of Survivors

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Continued from last week

From the beginning of British colonial rule, primary and secondary education in the Sinhalese and Tamil medium was free from the kindergarten to the Senior School Certificate level (equivalent to today’s GCE ‘O’ in Grade 11) . But the English medium schools constituting about 10 -15 percent of the schools in Sri Lanka charged fees. The best the children educated in the native languages, namely Sinhalese or Tamil, could reach was the teaching profession or becoming notaries, village headmen or ayurvedic physicians. The better jobs and access to tertiary education and the learned professions of law and western medicine, judicial positions, executive appointments in the public service as well as the better private sector jobs were only to those who attended the fee levying English medium schools. The official language of the government was English till 1956.

In 1928,the British government appointed a Royal Commission headed by Lord Donoughmore to inquire into further reforms to the constitutions to meet Sri Lankan aspirations. The Donoughmore Commission which consisted of progressive British politicians of the day, was fully convinced that the grant of universal adult franchise should be introduced in order to enable the ordinary people to elect representatives of their choice in order to speak on their behalf in the legislature. The Donoughmore Commission’s recommendations were incorporated to a new constitution, promulgated in 1931. By this constitution, whilst Sri Lanka was still under the British, universal adult franchise was granted to Lankans to elect their own representatives to the legislature which became known as the State Council. In the newly elected legislature, a Board of Ministers were elected. The State Council appointed a Special Committee on Education headed by C.W.W .Kannangara which introduced the free education from the kindergarten to university level in 1942, also by a majority recommended that the medium of instruction in all schools should be the mother tongue in the primary classes.

Having had the privilege of primary, secondary and tertiary education in English, he was one of the most persuasive advocates of native language education known as ‘ Swabhasha’ education. Sir Ivor Jennings records in his autobiography that the politicians’ views prevailed on this policy over the educationists’ opinions. Kannangara proposed that a child should receive education in his or her mother tongue and this triggered a debate in the Special Committee on what ought to be considered the mother tongue of a child. There were some Sinhalese and Tamil children whose mother tongue was English as that language was what was spoken in their homes. According to Sir Ivor, the politicians including Kannangara proposed a legal formula called ‘racial or ethnic mother tongue’. According to this formula, if the language of the progenitors of the ethnic group of the child’s father is Sinhalese, it should be irrefutably presumed that the Sinhalese language was the child’s mother tongue which should then be his or her medium of instruction in primary school even if his mother tongue was in fact English at home. This legal formula was proposed in respect of Tamil children too.

When it came to Muslims, Burghers and Malays, the Special Committee could not recommend applying this principle. If the legal formula of racial mother tongue was applied to these ethnic groups, the mother tongues of Muslim, Burgher and Malay children would respectively be Arabic, Portuguese/ Dutch/English and Malay. In order to overcome this difficulty, Muslims, Burghers and Malays were permitted to receive education in the English medium till the 1970s. Thereafter, the English medium education completely disappeared from the schools and the Dutch Burghers, Muslims and Malays were compelled to study either in Sinhala medium or Tamil medium in the national school system. The Kannangara Committees’ recommendations were adopted after Independence. Sinhalese and Tamil children in the English medium schools were required to study in the Sinhalese and Tamil mediums. The English medium schools were allowed to teach only the Muslim, Burgher and Malay children in English. Kannangara was in fact the father of abolition of English medium education although S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike who was responsible for the enactment of Sinhala Only Act of 1956 is often wrongly blamed for Swabasha education. It was in the Bandaranaike’s tenure and his widow’s terms in power that the English medium was abolished in the secondary school level and in the tertiary level in universities except in Science, Engineering and Medicine courses.

Within two years of the Free Education Ordinance passed in 1942, as many as 44 Central Colleges were established throughout the country, mainly in the rural areas, with well equipped buildings, laboratories and hostels. These schools initially taught rural children in the English medium and some rural children entered the University of Ceylon from them in the early fifties. It certainly was a great revolution. However, the subsequent language policies adopted by successive governments deprived these rural children and others from established English medium schools the benefit of English medium education.

When Singapore gained independence in 1965, only 10 percent of the schools in that country used English as the medium of instruction whilst 80 per cent taught in Chinese and the rest in either Tamil or Malay. Lee Kuan Yew did not abolish English medium education but converted all non- English medium schools to English within a decade giving all Singaporean children, regardless of ethnicity, an equal opportunity to be taught in the English medium. He retained English as the working language of the country making English, Chinese, Tamil and Malay as official languages. Lee did this in a country where 80 percent of the population is ethnic Chinese. If Sri Lanka’s post Independence leaders had adopted this policy, we would not have had ethnic conflicts, tension, communal riots and a 30-year civil war immensely benefiting our development with an ethnically all inclusive public sector, private sector and governance in a unitary state. The Dutch Burghers and Tamils and educated Sinhalese would not have left these shores for more secure and greener pastures in the western countries.

 

Dutch Burghers of today speak out

In an evening, after the sun set, I paid a visit to Frederick van Buuren, 88,a Dutch Burgher who lives with four Dachshund pet dogs in a small house at Mattegoda, a Colombo suburb. On my arrival, his four dogs started barking at me. Welcoming me Mr. van Buuren said, “They won’t bite” telling the dogs kindly, “Don’t bark. He is a friend.” After their barking subsided, I started my conversation. He said: “My first paternal Dutch ancestor was Willem Regenereus van Buuren. He married Anna Catherina Verwyk. The first European paternal ancestor of my mother’s family, who arrived in Sri Lanka in 1772 was Daniel Meerwald. His hometown was Neusol in Hungary. I was an automobile technician . I studied at Wesley College, Colombo. There were only two Dutch Burghers in my class, myself and another child with the Dutch family name Van Twest. I was born in Trincomalee on September 23, 1932 when my father worked at the Public Works Department as an engineer there.

My Dutch Burgher identity and consciousness within the family I grew up in was very significant in terms of conversations, traditions, customs, perceptions, moral, social, religious and political ideas etc.. My father was very conservative, and he insisted that we should maintain our identity. On the Christmas table we always had Dutch delicacies like Breudher and Poffertjes (Dutch Mini Pancakes) etc. We are a closed community. We moved only with the educated Sinhalese and Tamils. I was a Methodist. My wife, Angela Jansz, was a Catholic. A few months after my marriage I became Catholic by conviction. The Dutch Burghers have always been conservative and right wing politically. Only exception was Pieter Keuneman, a Cambridge educated son of a Dutch Burgher Supreme Court Judge. He was the leader of country’s communist party.”

Asked what the major cause for migration of thousands of Dutch Burghers to Australia, Canada and the United Kingdom,he opined: ” The exodus of Dutch Burghers to these western countries was due to Sinhalese Only policy introduced by Prime Minister Bandaranaike in 1956 and the communal tensions that erupted in its aftermath.” He had migrated to Canada in 1966 with his Dutch Burgher wife and three daughters. His wife passed away in 2006.I obtained my duel citizenship in 2008. Since 2008, I have lived in Sri Lanka because I feel lonely in Canada and love the climate and warmth of people here. I don’t suffer any discrimination on the basis of my Dutch Burgher identity. My Sinhalese neighbours treat me well.”

 

Frederick van Buuren

Mrs. Anne-Marie Scharenguivel, 65

, when asked what she thought, had been the major grievance of the Dutch Burgher community in post-independence Sri Lanka, said: “Our major grievance has always been our inability to be educated in our mother tongue, English, as the medium of instruction in the schools and the fact that all Govt departments function in Sinhala. I was forced to educate my sons in International Schools at great cost due to this. Sinhala is a language, not spoken anywhere else in the world! Thankfully the English stream is being reintroduced in schools but there are no proper teachers now competent to teach in English.”

I asked her: “When thousands of Dutch Burghers have migrated to Australia, Canada and the UK, why did your parents and you opt to live in Sri Lanka? She replied: “My father was well established here as Deputy Chief Waterworks Engineer in the Colombo Municipal Council. He later became the Head of the Waterworks Dept (which was absorbed by the Water Board later) and also Acting Municipal Commissioner. I never wanted to leave either, and neither do my sons! But now the future seems to be bleak for the Dutch Burgher community in particular and for the other ethnic minorities in Sri Lanka. This is the first time in our lives that my sons and I have felt like immigrating “

Mrs.Scharenguivel, a born Catholic, schooled at St.Bridget’s Convent and lives in Dehiwela, a suburb of Colombo.

 

Anne-Marie Scharenguivel

Mrs.Doreen van der Hoeven, 64

, is a mother of two sons. She is a Dutch Burgher who lives in Kalutara, a coastal town 40 km south of Colombo. “My father was a guard in the Ceylon Government Railway. In those days, A lot of Dutch Burghers worked in the Ceylon Government Railway as engine drivers and train guards,” she said adding “My mother who is 94-years old is a Scharenguivel. My parents were Dutch Burghers. I was educated at Methodist College, Colombo. We are Methodists by religion. I am the only child in my family. I became aware of my Dutch Burgher identity when I was a child. I used to ask my parents why we were different from others in language, family name and complexion. Then my parents would tell me about my Dutch Burgher ancestry. I am a nurse by profession. I still remember having Dutch Breudher on our family Christmas table in my childhood. Most of my Dutch Burgher cousins, relatives and friends have migrated to Canada, Australia and the United Kingdom. Our community was affected by the Sinhala Only language policy which did away with English as a medium of instruction in the schools and as an official language. That was the reason for Dutch Burgher migration.”

 

Doreen van der Hoeven

Voices of the Young

 

Miss Andriana Melder, 23, is a young Dutch Burgher lady with a Bachelor of Laws degree from the University of London. She is now studying for the Bar examinations A Catholic and old pupil of Holy Family Convent, Colombo 4, she lives in Nugegoda, in the suburbs of Colombo.

 

Andriana Melder

“My first paternal Dutch ancestor was Reverend Willem Melder who had come from Holland to serve as a minister of the Dutch Reformed Church of Sri Lanka (founded by the Dutch in 1642 and now known as Christian Reformed Church of Sri Lanka). He had married Madalena Petronella Perera at the Wolvendaal Church in Colombo. The initial ancestors of the Melder clan in Sri Lanka worked as Dutch Civil servants and the later as planters and spice traders. At one point in my paternal family tree, my ancestors had become Catholic leaving their Protestant faith for some reasons, she said.

Speaking of the significance of her Dutch Burgher identity ,culture, religious and moral values , Andriana opined: “My Dutch Burgher identity played a pivotal role in my upbringing. My father was very proud of this identity and his heritage. He would often point out old buildings and vast portions of land In Melder Place and Pietersz Place in Nugegoda now mostly sold off or occupied by other communities due to the migration of our relatives to Australia, New Zealand, Canada and the UK. Claiming that these lands once belonged to our ancestors, he had fond memories of playing cricket in the vast fields, fishing and even hunting with my late grandfather with a double barrel gun slung over his shoulder.

“We were brought up to value our culture, the elders set the example by maintaining records and journals for the younger generations to refer. Many articles too have been preserved to generate knowledge of the yesteryears of the Melder clan. My late paternal grandmother and my grand aunts and uncles on my father’s side, used to relate stories from the good old days in the times of Ceylon, about the great big dances and parties they used to throw on various occasions. The carefree, happy- go-lucky attitude passed down through the generations is visible even in the youth in my family today. There is no pressure as to marriage, sense of fashion or lifestyle. The freedom to make up one’s own choices have been ingrained even in our young minds. Learning to play a musical instrument, singing and dancing is an essential aspect of our life. This has resulted in many Burgher youth becoming fond of the arts. My extended family is very religiously and not racially inclusive as many of my relatives have inter married into various faiths and races. Education takes centre stage in our family as most of my ancestors are well educated and rounded individuals who have achieved much in their respective professions. The general perception among the other ethnic communities that most Dutch Burgher youth lack morals and religious affiliation is profoundly untrue. Many of us are staunch practicing Christians (Catholic and Protestant) whose morals have been intertwined with religion. The Dutch Burgher families are a closely knit community and they value familial aspects in their relationships.

Asked what in her opinion, have been the legitimate grievances of the Dutch Burgher community since Independence, Andriana said, “It is the lack of recognition even as a minority. The language and cultural barriers are pertinent to date and the lack of an inclusive system for all races is still present. The Dutch Burgher community has contributed much in terms of construction, law and the judicial system, religion, hybrid culture and cuisines. They are a unique community.

 

“The post 1956 migration of many Burgher families from the island was a result of their not

seeing a future for their children in the new Ceylon. Most migrated to Australia because

Australians had a life style close to theirs. Others moved to Canada, the UK and New Zealand.

Many Burgher migrants held very senior positions in the Mercantile, Banking, Medical, Academic

and Public sectors abroad. Most of them still consider the island known to them as

Ceylon, as their beloved home that nurtured them as a community for about four centuries.

We decided to remain in SL as my father was well established in his profession and because

of my grandparents from both sides of the family. I would like to leave SL once I complete my studies as many of my friends and relatives are already abroad and seeing how their lifestyle seem much better and their future more promising, I too would like to migrate one day.”

Speaking of the future of the Dutch Burgher Community, Andriana said: “The Dutch Burgher community is dwindling at present with the vast increase in migration and inter marriages taking place. Further, with racist ideologies rising once more, the future for the minorities seem bleak.”

 

My last interview for this article was with a young Dutch Burgher Fabian Schokman, 24. A graduate in Theology he now reading for a Bachelor of Laws degree of the University of London. A Catholic by faith, Fabian is very outspoken. “My first paternal Dutch ancestor was Jan Arentsz Schokman who had come to Sri Lanka from Amsterdam in 1697 who was a ship’s carpenter’, said Fabian. When asked how significant was his Dutch Burgher identity and consciousness within the family he grew up in the conversations, traditions, customs, perceptions, moral, social, religious and political ideas , Fabian said: “It had a strong bearing on my upbringing, especially in terms of perceptions and to a greater level, openness to liberal ideologies. Tradition has always being a closely guarded and cherished part of my upbringing, especially by the elder generation. It varies starkly across a spectrum. Identity is a matter of self perception and this self perception would vary widely among a single family, multiple families that comprise of a unit and most certainly in the community in general.

“As I mentioned, there is and has always being the ultra-conservative and ultra-liberal ends of the community and every shade in-between. As with the other questions, this must be analyzed from within the spectrum. Of course the more traditional Dutch Burgher families are undeniably facing the extinction of cultural identity as assimilation means more and more of the individualistic aspects of the community are fading off to give way to a more conforming cultural identity. The days of a monolinguistic, starkly distinct community are fast fading, yet in a more general perspective, the community in my opinion, because of its minute size faces a number of issues stemming from lack of political representation. I believe that one’s identity is and should be a part of everyday life. As a lesser minority, even in the context of school and community in general, I have found the Dutch Burgher community to be rather close-knit, not least on account of the vast inter-connection between each other. That being said, this identity is in no way antithetical to centrist Sri Lankan values.

 

Fabian Schokman

Fabian seems to think that the future for the Dutch Burgher community in Sri Lanka seems less bleak than what other members of his community believe. He opined: “The Dutch Burgher community has always had a spirit of endurance and survival imbued deep within itself and as a result the community will survive, perhaps more intact than other lesser non-monogamous minorities. At present the community has found prominence in the private sector and I particularly don’t see a return to the age of civil service dominance. There is also a deep sense of pride and cultural revival in the younger generation and this does make the future seem less bleak. However in comparison to the larger minorities with considerable communal and political representation, a stable lineal prediction is difficult to project.”



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The Digital Underground

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Illegal Foreign Exchange, Undiyal, Hawala and Money Laundering, A Four-Part Investigative Series

Forex Platforms, Cryptocurrency, AI and the New Financial Battlefield

THE INVISIBLE FINANCIAL EMPIRE – PART III

The Boyfriend Who Was Never Real

Priya, a 34-year-old professional in Colombo, met “David” on LinkedIn. He claimed to work in fintech in Singapore. For six weeks they exchanged messages daily, about work, about life, about a recent trip he had taken to the Maldives. Eventually, the conversation turned, gently and naturally, to money.

“I’ve been trading on this platform, let me show you,” he said, sharing a screenshot of a sleek trading dashboard showing consistent, impressive returns.

Priya invested a small amount first, $500. Within days, her dashboard showed it had grown to $650. She withdrew $100 successfully, just to test it. It worked. Encouraged, she invested more. Then more. Over two months, she transferred a total of $42,000 into the platform.

When she tried to withdraw her full balance, the platform demanded a “regulatory release fee” of $8,000 before funds could be unlocked. She paid it. Then another fee appeared. Then the platform stopped responding altogether. “David” vanished. The trading dashboard, the customer support chat, the entire brokerage, all of it had never been real.

This is what investigators now call “pig butchering”, and, in 2026, the most disturbing development is not the scam itself, which has existed for years, but what now powers it: artificial intelligence has industrialised the entire operation.

From Manual Fraud to Machine-Generated Deception

For most of the past decade, romance-and-investment scams, like the one that targeted Priya, required enormous manual labour. Scam operations, many of them staffed by trafficked workers held against their will in compounds across Myanmar, Cambodia, and Laos, needed real humans to build relationships with victims over weeks, manage fake trading platforms, and respond convincingly to questions.

That labour-intensive model has now been substantially automated. According to financial-crime researchers tracking this shift through 2026, threat actors are standing up entire AI-generated “brokerage” experiences end-to-end, complete with KYC onboarding, branded customer-service chat, animated portfolio dashboards, and falsified live market data feeds, and operating them at industrial scale against multiple victims simultaneously. Generative-AI relationship managers now front the WhatsApp and Telegram conversations that once required real human scammers. AI-cloned regulator letters are generated on demand to justify the fake “release fees” that drain victims a final time before the platform disappears.

What has changed is not the deception itself, it is the production economics. The cost of running a credible synthetic brokerage against one additional victim has collapsed, meaning a single criminal network can now run hundreds of “Davids” simultaneously, each one indistinguishable from a genuine fintech professional until it is too late. (Figure 01)

Sri Lanka: From Victim Pool to Operating Base

Sri Lanka’s relationship to this global scam economy has shifted in an alarming direction over the past two years. The country is no longer only a source of victims, it has become an operating base for the criminal networks themselves.

In April, 2026, Sri Lankan police raided a five-star hotel property, in Ambakandavila, and arrested 150 individuals, including 133 Chinese nationals, 13 Vietnamese nationals, and one Malaysian national, allegedly running a cyber fraud centre with links to international criminal syndicates, based in Myanmar and Cambodia. Investigators say the operation followed a now-familiar regional pattern: recruiters advertise “online marketing” or “data entry” jobs on social media to lure foreign workers to Sri Lanka, confiscate their passports on arrival, and force them to operate scam campaigns under threat.

The Central Bank of Sri Lanka has formally flagged pig-butchering scams as a “developing threat,” warning that foreign scam networks are increasingly targeting overseas nationals through scam farms operating from Sri Lankan soil. A 2026 United Nations report estimated that at least 300,000 people have been trafficked into scam centres across Southeast Asia.

This is not an abstract international problem. It is unfolding in hotels and rented properties across the country, exploiting the same infrastructure, high-speed internet, affordable accommodation, accessible tourist visas, that Sri Lanka has built to attract legitimate digital businesses and tourists.

Where the Money Actually Goes: The Stablecoin Pipeline

Behind every successful pig-butchering scam sits a laundering pipeline that has been transformed almost as dramatically as the scams themselves, and the transformation has a single dominant feature: stablecoins.

According to the Financial Action Task Force’s March 2026, report, drawing on analysis from blockchain intelligence firms Chainalysis and TRM Labs, stablecoins accounted for 84% of the USD 154 billion in illicit virtual asset transaction volume recorded in 2025, the highest share ever observed, and a dramatic jump from just 15% only a few years earlier. TRM Labs separately found that illicit entities received USD 141 billion in stablecoins, in 2025 alone, the highest level observed in five years. (See Table 01)

The scale of state-level abuse is striking. A Russian sanctions-evasion network built around the ruble-pegged stablecoin A7A5 processed more than USD 72 billion in total volume in 2025.

Fighting Fire with Fire: AI on the Defensive Side

The same artificial intelligence reshaping financial crime is also, out of necessity, reshaping the defence against it. Legacy anti-money laundering systems, built on static, rule-based thresholds, have proven badly outmatched by AI-generated fraud operating at machine speed. Research cited by compliance technology analysts suggests that between 90% and 95% of alerts generated by legacy AML systems are false positives, consuming enormous investigator time while genuinely suspicious activity slips through.

This is not a frictionless transition. AI models are notoriously difficult to explain to regulators and examiners in the way traditional rule-based systems are. The practical compromise emerging across the industry is a hybrid model: AI handles the initial scoring and prioritisation of risk, while documented rule-based logic still governs the final decision that must be defensible to a regulator.

The Regulatory Response: Catching Up to the Digital Frontier

Regulators worldwide have begun moving to close the most dangerous gaps exposed by this digital transformation of financial crime. (See Table 02)

What Comes Next

We have now traced this investigation from the centuries-old mechanics of Hawala and Undiyal, through the three-stage architecture that turns criminal proceeds into apparently legitimate wealth, to the AI-generated frontier of digital financial crime reshaping all of it at machine speed.

In our concluding instalment, Part IV: “Sri Lanka at the Crossroads: Economic Consequences, Organised Crime and the Road Ahead”, we bring this series home. We examine precisely what all of this costs Sri Lanka in hard economic terms: lost remittances, exchange rate pressure, tax revenue forgone, and the 2026 FATF evaluation that will determine whether the country’s institutions can demonstrate, with evidence rather than legislation alone, that they are equal to this challenge. We close with a practical policy roadmap.

(The writer, a senior Chartered Accountant and professional banker, is Professor at SLIIT, Malabe.
Views expressed in this article are personal.)

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‘There are no private universities in Sri Lanka’ – some considerations for higher education reform

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Academics involved in education policy like to say that there is no such thing as a private university in Sri Lanka. The only ‘universities’ in the country are state universities; anything else offering degrees is a private higher education institution (HEI). This position is technically accurate. Yet, in the discourse and imagination of the public, private universities are very real – people teach in them, students register in them, families pay fees, and such degree holders enter job markets in Sri Lanka and outside.

For decades, activists concerned for public higher education have ignored or resisted looking at private HEIs, as if such scrutiny would taint them. Others have worked in both types of institutions, carrying practices from each to the other. The apex body governing state universities, the UGC, has, meanwhile, ignored the concept of conflict of interest and appointed individuals in private higher education in committees and leadership positions. It is unsurprising then that some of the ideologies informing private higher education appear in reform agendas in the state sector.

This is a good time then to consider the varying types of private HEIs around us, and to take a look at some of the issues within them in the hope that higher education reform agendas will include private, as well as state higher education.

What is a ‘private university’?

First, some clarifications. In the public imaginary, a ‘private university’ is typically an institution that provides a foreign or local degree for which the student makes a payment. But this broad classification encompasses a host of diverse institutions and types of degrees which I detail below.

The Non-State Higher Education Division (NSHE) of the Ministry of Education has recognised 295 degrees by 32 institutions. Most of these are private companies and include a handful of established, well-known private HEIs that are ‘university like’. The degrees are local degrees conferred by the institutions accredited by the NSHE Division. While private HEIs conferring local degrees must be accredited by the NSHE Division, there appears to be no legal consequence for not doing so. In addition, there are several permutations of the private degree that miss the net of this Division and the Standing Committee on Accreditation and Quality Assurance (SCAQA) that assists this Division.

For one, degrees conferred by foreign universities offered, via these same private HEIs, are not vetted by the NSHE Division. Secondly, there is a growing plethora of private HEIs which have either no physical presence locally or only a dubious presence. The University Grants Commission has notified the public, through their website, that foreign universities listed in the Commonwealth Universities Yearbook and the World Higher Education Database are recognised, but refrained from giving any other details – which degrees? Offered by what modes? These details are not known. Some of the foreign universities in the lists may be legitimate entities in their own land but the degrees conferred locally, in their name, may not adhere to curriculum or teaching specifications of the NSHE Division or the UGC.

Another troubling phenomenon is the ‘top up degree’, which appears to work on the same principle as that of a pre-paid mobile connection: if I have a Diploma or an HND of a sort, I am eligible to complete a course of study which provides me with a degree, usually from a foreign university. The idea that someone who does not initially qualify for a degree programme should be able to work their way towards one is a progressive notion. This is the concept that open and distance learning (ODL) was based on initially, but which is now sadly exploited. ODL models are expected to provide opportunity for learning for those who may be excluded from traditional learning institutions. In Sri Lanka, however, we have seen ODL become a marketplace offering easy to obtain, for-fee qualifications by institutions with little commitment to superior teaching and learning.

Finally, a perusal of the many types of private HEIs and their varied degrees bring to mind another question – how should the private degrees, provided by state institutions (that are not educational institutions), be regulated? Who should do so?

All of these create a host of problems for the public – for hopeful students and parents and trusting employers. For the higher education sector, recruitment of academic staff, too, has become difficult due to this plethora of ambiguous higher education qualifications, as I discussed in a previous Kuppi article (‘Recruiting academics to state universities’).

Some issues in private HEIs – a bellwether for change in state universities

In this second part of this article, I will discuss some aspects of work in private HEIs – albeit the more established institutions – given that such issues may appear in reform agendas in future.

Across state universities, all permanent staff of a specific category are paid according to the same criteria. The picture is not so clear when it comes to private HEIs since they are different entities legally, typically companies. Private HEIs have salary scales and financial incentives that are different to each other. The more established private HEIs reportedly have attractive renumeration packages, possibly a reason for academics of state universities migrating eagerly to such institutions during sabbatical years and on retirement. This may not of course be the case with other less established, or improperly registered HEIs of which we know little. Academic staff of these more accepted private HEIs seem to value the high financial remuneration they receive (in comparison to state universities) as something that makes their work rewarding.

Attractive remuneration is important to sustain the good life and is at times seen as the institution’s way of encouraging good work. Yet, this has implications for the future of the institution: to continue to deliver on promised financial packages, institutions must continue to have large profit margins. One strategy has been to enroll multiple cohorts of students per year, even up to three or four intakes per year. This can result in exploitative work conditions, since staff must cater to all these cohorts in that same year. If there is inadequate staff, employees are further burdened. On the other hand, if there is a sudden drop in enrolments (degrees can go out of fashion) unexpected layoffs occur. Similar to other sectors that employ short-term contract staff – including state universities – in private HEIs, too, individual teachers, who are on short term contracts that need regular renewal, can feel pressured to work under difficult or exploitative conditions.

At the same time, even in the more established private HEIs, work norms differ from those of state universities in that they include promotional work that keeps the institution’s name in the eye of the public. The Marketing (or similarly named) unit comes up in conversations as one of the most important departments. It appears to weigh in on decision-making related to the number of staff, the amount of re-sits per exams, and other pedagogically important matters. This is a worrying example of how financial rationales interfere with pedagogically or academically sound processes, resulting in problematic results in the classroom. On the plus side, junior colleagues, who had experience in both state and private HEIs, also felt that they faced less harassment in private HEIs – primarily due to the private HEIs ability to take swift action in reported cases of harassment. This is a real indictment on state institutions and their reluctance to address chronic issues of harassment in our universities.

Yet, while we hear much about problems in state universities, we hardly hear of problems that staff in private HEIs face. One rationale for a lack of public expressions by staff is that expressions of discontent might lead to trouble given the importance of reputation for private HEIs. The worry about reputational damage is a growing concern in state universities, too, as evidenced by social media policies and internal conversations on reputational damage, consequent to negative publicity. Institutional worries of reputational damage are harmful in the long run since these impact not only freedom of expression by student and staff, but also research that is possible in and about the education sector.

Some thoughts at the end…


A close look at the private higher education sector is important given its strong presence in the country. Impending reform needs to regulate this diverse array of higher education offerings in the private sector, as well as the state institutions that offer privately-funded options of higher education (a topic for a separate Kuppi on its own). It is time we carefully considered how to build a whole system of higher education out of this broken mess.

Kaushalya Perera is a senior lecturer at the University of Colombo.

Kuppi is a politics and pedagogy happening on the margins of the lecture hall that parodies, subverts, and simultaneously reaffirms social hierarchies.

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Ready for solo spotlight

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Nish Peiris: Excited about future plans

Singer Nish Peiris is set to take the next big step in her music journey.

The talented vocalist, who has been seen and heard in the scene here for a short while, and was also featured with the now-defunct band, Inner Vision, has announced that she will be fully committing to her solo career, after completing her degree this year.

“I’m finishing my degree this year, and after that I’ll be fully committing to my solo music career,” Nish told The Island.

“I’ve already got a few tours lined up for next year, so I’m really excited for what’s ahead.”

Fans, no doubt, will remember Nish for her smooth voice and stage presence, and the good news is that she is now ready to chart her own path and bring new music to audiences at home and abroad.

With tours already planned for 2027, the year 2026 promises to be an exciting year for the young artiste as she steps into the spotlight on her own.

We wish Nish every success in this new chapter!

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