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Sri Lanka’s Foreign Policy amid Geopolitical Transformations: 1990-2024 – Part VIII

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President Gotabaya Rajapaksa

(Part VII of this article appeared on 18 April, 2025)

President Gotabaya Rajapaksa: Glamorous Entry and Ignominious Exit

After Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s victory in the November 2019 presidential election and the Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna’s (SLPP) landslide win in the August 2020 parliamentary elections, Sri Lanka’s political landscape underwent another drastic shift. President Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s popularity peaked during the parliamentary elections, helping the SLPP secure nearly a two-thirds majority. However, in a dramatic volte-face of events within just two years, ‘Gota-mania’ had turned into a ‘Gota-phobia’. The five-year period from the 2019 presidential election to the landmark 2024 presidential election, which brought the National People’s Power (NPP) to power, was marked by a series of dramatic political events, including the Aragalaya—intense popular agitations that signified an unprecedented shift in the country’s political culture.

From the outset, President Gotabaya Rajapaksa had to face the challenge of the COVID-19 pandemic, which led to the postponement of parliamentary elections. Without parliamentary oversight, he implemented health measures to manage the health crisis, resulting in excessive executive aggrandizement. In October 2020, Parliament passed the 20th Amendment, reversing the democratic reforms of the 19th Amendment. As the country grappled with the economic fallout of the global pandemic, certain decisions taken by President Gotabaya Rajapaksa further deepened the crisis, pushing the economy to the brink of collapse.

After 2019, Sri Lanka’s domestic and international political environment began to change significantly. The previously cordial atmosphere of dialogue and accommodation with the UNHRC was reversed. In February 2020, President Gotabaya Rajapaksa announced Sri Lanka’s decision to withdraw its co-sponsorship of the UNHRC resolutions previously agreed upon by the former administration. This move drew strong international criticism, particularly from Western nations. Despite this, Sri Lanka assured the UNHRC that it remained committed to achieving sustainable peace through an inclusive, domestically led reconciliation and accountability process. The shifting political climate was reflected in UNHRC Resolution 46/1, adopted in March 2021, which, for the first time, acknowledged the need to preserve, analyse, and consolidate evidence of human rights violations and abuses in Sri Lanka for potential future prosecutions. On February 14, 2020, the U.S. State Department announced a travel ban on Sri Lankan Army Commander Lieutenant General Shavendra Silva, his immediate family, and several other military officers. The ban was imposed on the grounds of command responsibility for “gross violations of human rights,” specifically extrajudicial killings at the end of Sri Lanka’s civil war.

Foreign policy under President Gotabaya Rajapaksa was largely shaped by the pressing domestic challenges his administration faced, particularly the COVID-19 pandemic and the worsening economic crisis. As the country grappled with severe financial instability, mounting debt, and declining foreign reserves, Rajapaksa’s government sought closer ties with nations that could provide economic relief, including China and India. Growing public dissatisfaction and protests over economic mismanagement influenced foreign policy decisions. Finally, Sri Lanka’s foreign policy under President Gotabaya Rajapaksa was driven more by necessity than strategic vision, reflecting the urgent need to address domestic crises.

President Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s decisions, driven by domestic political pressure from his Sinhala nationalist clientele, undermined Sri Lanka’s credibility with key international partners. His rejection of the US Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) grant and the Japan-funded Light Railway Transit (LRT) project exemplify this trend. By rejecting the MCC grant, the President prioritised political narratives over economic benefits. His government framed the MCC as a threat to sovereignty, aligning with nationalist sentiments, even though it was a no-strings-attached grant. The unilateral cancellation of the JICA-funded LRT project without prior consultation with Japan further strained relations. Japan is one of Sri Lanka’s biggest development partners, and scrapping such a significant project without negotiation damaged diplomatic and economic ties. This decision not only led to the loss of a beneficial urban transport system but also risked future funding from Japan. It signaled to international donors that Sri Lanka was an unreliable partner. These actions reflected short-term political maneuvering rather than a strategic approach to economic development and foreign policy.

Since January 2022, all major economic indicators declined sharply, triggering a new wave of public protests. People from all walks of life took to the streets in tendon to protest the rising cost of living, prolonged power cuts, fuel shortages that led to days-long queues, exploding gas cylinders, and the scarcity of essential goods such as milk powder, food, and medicine. Alongside these grievances, the protests also brought unprecedented attention to longstanding issues of economic mismanagement. It took a new turn with the setting up of Gota-Go-Gamga in front of the Presidential Secretariat on April 9th. With no viable alternatives, the Sri Lankan government declared its first-ever sovereign default on April 12, 2022—marking the country’s first default since gaining independence in 1948. It was too late to prevent the deepening economic and political crisis from reaching total collapse. Nevertheless, the Aragalaya cannot be understood merely as a spontaneous uprising driven by economic hardship. From a broader perspective, it marked the beginning of a new phase in the crisis of the post-war Sri Lankan state

The Aragalaya and Ranil Wickremesinghe’s Interlude as interim President

The Aragalaya that forced President Gotabaya Rajapaksa to flee the country in disgrace and send his resignation from overseas on 14 July 2022 was arguably the most consequential political phenomenon in post-war Sri Lanka. It effectively ended the Rajapaksa family’s dominance in national politics and set in motion political dynamics that will shape the country’s trajectory for years to come. As a complex and multifaceted movement, its true impact cannot be measured by immediate outcomes alone; a long-term perspective is essential to fully understand its significance. One of its most striking effects was the unprecedented rise of the JVP/NPP, which, having previously secured only 3% of the popular vote, achieved a historic victory in the 2024 presidential and parliamentary elections.

In the aftermath of President Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s Resignation, Ranil Wickremesinghe was elected as interim President by a Parliament still dominated by the SLPP led by Mahinda Rajapaksa. By the time President Ranil Wickremesinghe mobilised heavy military forces to decisively crack down on Gota-Go-Gama on July 22, 2022 and prevent a section of protesting youths moving towards parliament, the protesters were debating on how to end their protest. By orchestrating a dramatic show of power, Wickremesinghe positioned himself as the saviour of the nation, claiming credit for restoring stability and preventing Sri Lanka from descending into anarchy and economic collapse. However, this narrative allowed him to consolidate power while the Rajapaksa political establishment remained intact in the background. After four months long dramatic events, the country seemed to have returned to the status quo ante.

The international community was stunned by the magnitude and intensity of the protest. All the key international actors were concerned about the direction of Aragalaya. As there were many actors and dispersed leadership to Aragalaya, it was not possible for any external power to influence the outcome single handedly. The protest movement itself decided its course on its own. However, Ranil Wickremesinghe’s modus operandi raises the question of whether he leveraged the Aragalaya to secure his own political future. History is full of sudden twists and turns, but in the long run, one twist often negates another.

The Aragalaya brought the ‘people’ factor to the forefront of international relations, emphasizing that global governance is no longer solely about diplomacy among political elites but increasingly about responding to popular demands. It challenged traditional diplomatic narratives that prioritize state stability over public welfare. As a result, foreign governments, international financial institutions, and regional organisations were compelled to engage with the concerns of the people. India extended emergency credit lines to Sri Lanka, international media amplified the voices of protesters, and global financial institutions like the IMF considered public sentiment in bailout negotiations. This demonstrates how grassroots movements can influence international discourse and shape policy decisions.

The impact of Aragalaya was further amplified by digital platforms, transforming it into a global phenomenon. Social media enabled real-time updates, mobilisation, and international awareness, drawing attention from human rights organisations, foreign governments, and diaspora communities. This digital interconnectedness highlights the growing role of ordinary people—not just governments—in shaping international relations. The Aragalaya serves as a powerful reminder that citizens are not passive subjects of global affairs but active agents capable of influencing political and economic decisions worldwide.

The Aragalaya brought global attention to corruption and economic mismanagement, emphasising their direct impact on governance, human rights, and international relations. Corruption, once seen as a domestic issue managed within national legal frameworks, is now increasingly recognised as a fundamental governance failure with far-reaching consequences. This shift was evident in the comprehensive report submitted by United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Michelle Bachelet, to the 51st session of the Human Rights Council in September 2022. In her report, she addressed the link between economic crimes and Sri Lanka’s economic crisis, expressing hope that the new administration would respond to public demands for accountability, particularly for corruption and abuses of power, with a renewed commitment to ending impunity.

After Sri Lanka withdrew from co-sponsoring the UNHRC resolution in 2020, its relations with Western powers deteriorated—a trend continued under President Ranil Wickremesinghe too. In October 2022, the UNHRC adopted Resolution 51/1, which, for the first time, established the Sri Lanka Accountability Project (SLAP) under the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights to collect evidence of alleged violations. In November 2022, a group of British parliamentarians called for measures beyond UNHRC resolutions, urging sanctions—including asset freezes and travel bans—against alleged Sri Lankan war criminals and their referral to the International Criminal Court. Even before UNHRC Resolution 51/1, on February 14, 2020, under President Gotabaya Rajapaksa, the U.S. blacklisted General Shavendra Silva and imposed a travel ban on him. In January 2023, Canada imposed sanctions on former presidents Mahinda Rajapaksa and Gotabaya Rajapaksa for their involvement in “gross and systematic violations of human rights” during the armed conflict. In September 2023, twelve bipartisan members of the U.S. Congress urged the State Department to hold Sri Lanka legally accountable under the ‘UN Convention against Torture’. On March 25, 2025, Britain also imposed a travel ban on three Sri Lankan ex-generals, including General Shavendra Silva, and a former LTTE commander from the east, who later switched loyalties and supported the Sri Lankan Army.

The primary focus of foreign policy under President Ranil Wickremesinghe was guiding Sri Lanka out of its default status. As Acting President on July 18, 2022, Wickremesinghe turned to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and initiated negotiations for a bailout package. Under his leadership, Sri Lanka reached a staff-level agreement with the IMF for an Extended Fund Facility (EFF) program. This effort culminated in March 2023, when the country successfully secured a board-level agreement, marking a significant step toward economic recovery. After intense negotiations with the Official Creditor Committee (OCC)—which includes major bilateral lenders such as Japan, India, and France—along with the China Exim Bank, Sri Lanka finalized debt restructuring agreements on June 26, 2024. These agreements, totaling USD 10 billion, were reached with key bilateral creditors, including the OCC and China Exim Bank.

One of the other key priorities of President Ranil Wickremesinghe’s foreign policy has been attracting Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) to boost Sri Lanka’s economic recovery. India was the first country to come forward to help Sri Lanka in early 2022 and provided extensive assistance totaling approximately USD 4 billion, encompassing various forms of support such as multiple credit lines and currency assistance, notably an agreement to supply petroleum worth USD 700 million through a Line of Credit. Additionally, export credit facilities totaling USD 1.5 billion were extended for the import of essential commodities, facilitated by India’s EXIM Bank and the State Bank of India.

Since then, India’s involvement in Sri Lanka’s economy has surged, solidifying its position as the main trading partner. In August 2022, the Indian Rupee (INR) was designated as an international currency in Sri Lanka. The deepening engagement of India was particularly evident in the power and renewable energy sectors.

In February 2023, Adani Green Energy received approval to invest $442 million in developing 484 megawatts of wind power capacity in Mannar town and Pooneryn village in northern Sri Lanka. This investment, along with a 20-year power purchase agreement with India’s Adani Green, further cements India’s influence over Sri Lanka’s energy sector. In March 2024, Sri Lanka signed an agreement with U Solar Clean Energy Solutions of India to construct hybrid renewable energy systems on three northern coastal islands—Delft, Analativu, and Nainativu. This project is backed by an $11 million grant from India, reinforcing its commitment to Sri Lanka’s renewable energy development.

At a time when Sri Lanka desperately needed foreign investment, the India-China rivalry became evident in the country’s plans to develop container terminals at the Colombo harbor. China had already built the Colombo International Container Terminal (CICT) with a $500 million investment and held an 85% stake in its operations. Meanwhile, India and the United States were increasingly concerned about China’s growing presence in both the Hambantota port and Colombo harbor. In response, the Wickremesinghe government offered the West Container Terminal to India instead of the East Container Terminal. This move was seen as an attempt to balance strategic competition between India and China in the Indian Ocean. However, rather than a well-calibrated foreign policy, it appears more like strategic promiscuity —leveraging Sri Lanka’s strategic assets solely to attract foreign investment.

When the National People’s Power (NPP) Government assumed power following Anura Kumara Dissanayake’s victory in the presidential elections on 21 September 2024 and secured a two-thirds majority in the parliamentary elections on 14 November 2024, the country’s foreign policy was in total disarray, lacking clear direction. Given the strategic importance of foreign relations in statecraft—particularly in the context of regional dynamics, Indian Ocean geopolitics, and evolving global power shifts—it became imperative for the new administration to redefine Sri Lanka’s foreign policy. It is a formidable challenge that requires accurately identifying foreign policy priorities, selecting viable strategies as a small island state, and advancing them prudently while carefully assessing critical strategic developments in regional and global political spheres.

by Gamini Keerawella

(To be concluded)



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Revolt in the Temple: Poverty as Structural Control

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The underlying issue in Anuradhapura is a struggle between a few families who, for years, have waged a quiet cold war over control of the Udamaluwa. Similar situations exist in Mihintale as well. These places, among others, are treated as treasures of Buddhism but, in practice, function as tightly controlled economic centres. The same pattern repeats in Kandy around the Temple of the Sacred Tooth Relic and in Kataragama at the shrine of God Kataragama. Variations of it exist across religious spaces of Islam, Catholicism, and Hinduism too, where institutional authority becomes indistinguishable from localised power networks. What is presented as sacred order often operates as inherited control.

It is indeed devastating to see situations where parents have no alternative but to expose their children to predators in robes for survival. This has nothing to do with religion itself, but with human pathology in the context of survival. These are the questions that demand answers, not superficial responses that treat symptoms while ignoring the conditions that produce them. What is more shocking and disturbing is not the tragedy itself, but the reactions to it. Social media has overwhelmed us, not towards understanding, but towards a fragmented cognitive state with no exit route.

A friend of mine in Nairobi used to keep all his electronic devices at home and go into the forest once a month, spending days there before returning. He called it “detoxification”, but in reality it was an escape from a system that no longer allows uninterrupted thought. Daily life is now saturated with unnecessary content, and attention itself has become a commodity extracted, processed, and sold back to us. This is where we have become unable to understand what really drives certain tragedies we endlessly react to, while remaining blind to the systems that quietly manufacture them.

Multi-dimensional poverty

Poverty is structural, poverty is political, and poverty is functional; it is a tool and a manoeuvring force of power. The question is no longer whether poverty exists, but who benefits from its persistence, and who is forced to survive within it. From education to medicine to basic food supply chains, countries like Sri Lanka are not simply mismanaged; they are structurally captured by a small number of actors who remain stable regardless of who is formally in power. Small-scale enterprises and NGO circuits that circulate foreign funding to “solve structural issues” often operate as hollow administrative performances, producing reports rather than transformation.

Poverty is not merely the absence of money. It is the absence of bandwidth, absence of protection, absence of time, and absence of cognitive stability. As Sendhil Mullainathan and Eldar Shafir state, “Scarcity captures the mind. Just as the starving subjects had food on their mind, when we experience scarcity of any kind, we become absorbed by it.” This is a description of how human cognition is structurally reorganized under constraint. Scarcity does not sit outside the person; it occupies them.

They also state, “Scarcity leads us to borrow and pushes us deeper into scarcity.” That is the mechanism that must be confronted without euphemism. Poverty is not only deprivation; it is a self-reinforcing trap in which survival decisions generate the next layer of crisis. Once a society crosses a certain threshold of scarcity, it stops producing long-term reasoning as a default condition. It produces short-term survival logic, often mistaken by outsiders for irrationality.

It is precisely here that public discourse becomes intellectually dishonest. Everything is translated into moral language because moral language is easier than structural analysis. But morality without structure becomes theatre. It produces outrage, not understanding, and repetition, not reform.

It is indeed brutal when an individual wearing religious insignia—whether robe, symbol, or institutional identity—is accused of acts that fundamentally contradict the moral authority attached to that position. It is equally brutal when institutions that depend entirely on trust begin to function as shields rather than safeguards. But the deeper question is not shock. The deeper question is what kind of social condition produces families who see placement within such institutions not only as devotion, but as a survival strategy under constraint.

Ethical decision-making

That is where the argument collapses into its most uncomfortable form. Poverty does not produce ethical decision-making environments. It produces constrained optimization under pressure. When food insecurity, debt, and social instability converge, institutional spaces that appear stable become transactional destinations for survival rather than moral choices. To interpret this as purely cultural failure is to deliberately ignore the structural compression of options.

Mullainathan and Shafir describe this clearly: “Instead of saying that scarcity ‘focuses,’ we could just as easily say that scarcity causes us to tunnel: to focus single-mindedly on managing the scarcity at hand.” That tunnelling effect is not abstract. It is visible wherever long-term planning collapses under immediate pressure. Systems then misread this as irresponsibility, when it is in fact cognitive overload produced by structure.

What is rarely acknowledged is how deeply this extends into governance itself. Institutions increasingly operate as if they are managing rational, unconstrained individuals. In reality, they are interacting with populations whose cognitive bandwidth is already structurally taxed. The result is policy failure interpreted as public non-compliance, enforcement interpreted as moral correction, and reform interpreted as communication failure rather than design failure.

Social media has intensified this distortion. It does not merely spread information; it destroys sequencing. Structural problems require temporal depth. Social media removes that depth and replaces it with instantaneous judgment. Every event becomes a surface object, detached from causality. The outcome is a society permanently reacting and never diagnosing.

Poverty, in this environment, becomes invisible in its real form. It is not seen as a continuous structural condition but as episodic failure. A scandal appears, is consumed, and disappears. Another replaces it. Nothing accumulates into understanding because attention itself is exhausted before synthesis can occur.

Modern Condition

The modern condition reflects a reversal of earlier social organization, where human relationships are embedded within abstract systems of finance, law, and administration that often fail to recognize the lived constraints of those they govern. In this disembedded state, institutions increasingly misinterpret human behaviour as their capacity for structural understanding weakens. At the same time, attempts to resolve systemic failures through expanding administrative complexity produce diminishing returns: more regulation, oversight, and reporting generate less coherence. Over time, institutions shift from functional effectiveness to symbolic performance, maintaining the appearance of control rather than achieving it.

This is why public outrage repeatedly fails to translate into structural change. Outrage is not a tool of reconstruction. It is a signal of system fatigue. It circulates, intensifies, and dissipates without altering the underlying architecture. Meanwhile, the conditions that produce repetition remain intact.

The most persistent illusion is that these are separate problems: poverty here, institutional misuse there, media distortion elsewhere. They are not separate. They are expressions of a single condition in which scarcity, complexity, symbolic authority, and fragmented enforcement interact without coordination. The system does not fail in one place; it fails in the gaps between these layers.

Symbolic systems

What makes this condition more severe is that symbolic systems continue to operate at full strength even when structural systems degrade. Religious identity remains powerful. Political rhetoric remains strong. Cultural symbolism remains intact. But enforcement capacity, institutional coherence, and social trust degrade beneath them. That gap is where instability grows. Until that gap is addressed at the level of structure rather than sentiment, repetition remains inevitable. New scandals will emerge, new interpretations will circulate, and new cycles of outrage will follow. Nothing resolves because nothing is being reconstructed beneath the surface of reaction.

This is no longer repairable through adjustment or rhetoric. It is a form of decay that persists until it exhausts itself, because the mechanisms meant to correct it are now part of the same failure. It continues until rupture, not reform. At that point, instability ceases to be episodic and becomes structural. Pressure will accumulate into breakdown, and what follows will not be managed transition but forced reversal. The responsibility lies with those who govern these institutions to prevent that trajectory, not through language, but through change. The drama is ending; farce is over; what we are witnessing is tragedy unfolding with unprecedented consequences.

by Nilantha Ilangamuwa

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Are threats to Buddha Sasana external or from within?

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As Sri Lanka celebrates the birth, Enlightenment and the Parinibbana of the Buddha, almost a month after the rest of the Buddhist-world did so, there is widespread discussion about threats to Buddha Sasana provoked by some recent incidents. Regarding the views expressed about postponing Vesak celebrations in my article ‘May Day and postponement Vesak 2026’ (The Island, 25 May), my very good friend Dr Upali Abeysiri has sent me the following comments: “The Mahanayakas have a good reason to postpone Vesak. The dawning of the full moon has to be on the same constellation (nekatha) as when the Buddha was born and attained enlightenment. Although Adhi Poya is reckoned as the second full moon arising in the same calendar month, this is supposed to be an odd exception.” Though it would have been ideal if a consensus could have been reached prior to the split of celebrations, perhaps, it does not matter very much as celebrations occur on a symbolic rather than an actual date, there being no historical or archaeological evidence confirming exact dates.

Whilst there are no direct threats to Buddha Dhamma, as the expanding horizons of science continue to confirm the fundamentals of Buddha Dhamma, there is no doubt whatsoever that there are threats to Buddha Sasana. However, these threats become important as the Buddha Sasana performs the pivotal role in protecting and propagating the Dhamma and, hence, become an indirect threat to Dhamma itself. Therefore, it should be the concern of all Buddhists and it is in this spirit I am making some comments which some may interpret as disrespectful to the Maha Sangha. I can reassure that my intentions are entirely directed towards the preservation of the Buddha Dhamma and Sasana. Though the Buddha proclaimed that the Sasana consists of Bhikkhu, Bhikkhuni, Upasaka and Upasika, for all practical purposes Sasana had been led by Bhikkhus, often at the expense of others.

There is hardly any doubt that there are external forces at play in Sri Lanka and even some Buddhists seem to object to Sri Lanka being called a Buddhist country. Interestingly, no one seems to object to countries like the UK and the USA being called Christian counties. I

There is no registration or baptism in Buddhism and there are no rewards for Buddhists for conversions. As I pointed out in a previous article, ‘How does the Buddha differ’ (The Island, 1 May) unlike most other religions, Buddhism is not a ‘high-demand’ religion, nor ‘law-based’ religion and is not exclusivist. Perhaps, it is this liberalism, pacifism and gentleness, which are the real strengths, that are being exploited as weaknesses by others.

There will always be external threats and the Buddha too faced many during his lifetime. Before addressing those, is it not more important to address the threats within? One of the most important problems seems to be the breakdown of discipline. Bhikkhus are bound by Vinaya rules, laid down by the Buddha and some recent incidents highlight total deviations. Though there were many previous incidents like unsubstantiated claims of Arahanthood, Bhikkhus attacking each other on YouTube and Bhikkhus conducting YouTube channels, not for the propagation of the Dhamma but for the accumulation of rupees, attention was focused after the detection of 22 young monks carrying narcotic drugs.

Though many commentators were quick to condemn the Sangha on this account, we need to go deeper. Narcotic menace has become a huge problem in Sri Lanka and it looks as if the drug lords would resort to anything to achieve their objectives. Though it looks as if some gullible young monks had been duped by drug lords, we need to question why it was possible. Is it due to the lack of supervision of these novices by their seniors that allowed them to accept a request in a WhatsApp group? Should there be checks and balances on foreign travel by Bhikkhus?

What shocked Buddhists was what followed next; the arrest of the Nayaka of Atamasthana for allegedly having sex with a minor. Anuradhapura was our first capital and Sri Maha Bodhi is the longest surviving authenticated tree in the world. Ruwanweliseya and Jetawanaramaya were among the ten tallest man-made structures in the ancient world, Jetawanaramaya still holding the Guiness record for the largest stupa in the world. Cyberspace is full of theories. Whilst some have condemned the Nayaka Thero even before the conclusion of inquiries whilst others claim that this was a coup by another Nayaka Thera in an attempt of succession.

I was intrigued, reading in a Sri Lankan newspaper about the 80th birthday celebrations of a Nayaka priest, who was convicted in London in 2012 of historical child sex abuse and sentenced to seven years in prison. I remember the case very well as he was the head of the Vihara, we had our first contact on relocating to the UK. I also remember his devotees, who believed that he was wrongly accused, collecting over £50,000 for an appeal. In spite of being represented by one of the top Barristers in the UK, the conviction was upheld but the jail-term was reduced by a year. His name is still on the sex-offenders register in the UK and he is permanently prevented from association with children. One can argue that as he has served the sentence and not reoffended, this should not be held against him but what baffled me is that he is still being referred to as the Chief Sangha Nayaka. Should a person on the sex-offenders register be the Chief Sangha Nayaka?

It is high time we put our own house in order before fighting the external enemies. It is reported that the former president CBK has written to the Mahanayakas requesting urgent reform and we should be obliged to her for taking the lead.

There are many aspects that need urgent reform, the first being removal of caste barriers practiced by some Nikayas, which is the greatest insult to the Buddha who promoted equality. The second is the active encouragement of Bhikkhuni Sasana which has not happened in spite of the landmark ruling by the supreme court. The third is the establishment of proper disciplinary processes under a single Adhikarana Sangha Nayaka with powers and support than allowing the government to take over the control of even non-criminal Vinaya matters.

There are many other issues that need settlement like the controversy of the land of Buddha’s birth which seems to linger on. An expert committee should hear all evidence and settle this issue once and for all.

As I have pointed out on many occasions in these columns, it is high time a Dhamma Sangayana was held, as the last one was 70 years ago. Ideally, it should be different with active participation of lay experts as well. It is the duty of us Buddhists to ensure that the words of wisdom of the Buddha continue to enlighten generations to come.

By Dr Upul Wijayawardhana

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Vijaya Kumar: Academic, Activist & Genial Fellow-Traveller

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Professor Vijaya Kumar

The University of Ceylon, Peradeniya, was in our time, a less-crowded residential university, where everybody knew everybody else or at least knew of everybody else.

I knew of Emeritus Professor Vijaya Kumar of the Department of Chemistry at Peradeniya, or Kumar, as we referred to him fondly, before I got to know him. His dear wife Savitri, also a member of the academic staff of the Department of Chemistry, was nicknamed Kumee, by some of their students (of which vintage is unknown to me) and the duo were thereafter referred to affectionately as Kumar and Kumee.

The Faculty of Science became a regular haunt of mine as I would go there in the company of my batchmates to attend lectures on Basic Mathematics given by Professor Maheswaran, as it was a requirement for our General Arts Qualifying Examinations. I would also go there to listen to some excellent talks under a programme that was held in the auditorium of the Science Faculty referred to as “Popular Science Gossip”. The “gossip” at these talks were not confined solely to science but were broad enough to include Literature, History and other branches of knowledge as well. I would often spot Kumar in the audience at these talks or bump into him in the corridors of the Science Faculty. But I got to know him personally only after he became the Warden of Arunachalam, my hall of residence, during my undergraduate years initially, and later, as a member of the academic staff of the Department of English.

Our Science Faculty undergraduate contemporaries, especially those at Arunachalam Hall and its immediate neighbour, Jayatilaka Hall, both within a stone’s throw away from the Science Faculty, shared many an anecdote about Kumar and their other lecturers. One of these anecdotes, had to do with a spectacular (motor car) driving feat of Kumar’s. Legend has it that he drove from his university bungalow-home to the Faculty of Science deploying only the reverse gear of his car! Kumar, on hearing of this, had told certain of his student friends, including some who became his colleagues later on, that this story is one of the biggest yarns he had heard in his life!

Some of his one-time younger colleagues, now in retirement like Kumar, tell me that Kumar exuded warmth and friendliness in all of his professional and administrative interactions with others in the wider university community. But there was no warmth or mercy for those who indulged in the unsavoury pastime of student ‘ragging’. He was a very strong proponent of the need to ensure to all freshers an environment free of the menace of ‘ragging’. He remained ever-vigilant during the ‘ragging’ season. There are stories of his chasing ‘raggers’ and catching them. Professor Maheswaran, who later became an intimate friend and remains so after more than half a century, was another who was fiercely opposed to ‘ragging’. I was a personal witness to Mahes chasing a ‘ragger’ up and down the stairs of the main library to nab him. Yet another of his students has noted that Kumar’s office room in the Faculty was a total mess at all times. It had tables, piled so high with books and documents that one could not easily spot Kumar at his desk. He, however, had the knack of pulling out from amidst the clutter, any document that he needed at any given time. If anybody were to volunteer to help tidy his desk, Kumar would respond firmly with “Don’t you touch my desk!”.

Kumar, like several of his colleagues in the other faculties as well, had his own eccentricities. According to information received from reliable sources, Kumar who taught Organic Chemistry used to carry his lecture notes in his shirt or trouser pocket with ‘the entire lecture condensed in point form on a half-sheet or half of a half-sheet of paper’. The way he rummaged through his sling bag filled to the brim with stuff to find an item that he needed was another ritual that amused onlookers.

Kumar, interestingly enough is a Royal-cum-Thomian product, in that he had his primary education at S.Thomas’ Prep School, Kollupitiya and the entirety of his secondary education at Royal College, which he entered in 1953. In a note written by Kumar himself, he notes that despite having had excellent teachers at Royal, his was not a notable school career. He goes on to say that “the only achievement I could boast of was my being the joint-winner of the school General Knowledge Prize”. However, he had been active in a Scout Group outside of school (1st Port of Colombo, Sea Scouts) where he “was Queen’s Scout, Patrol leader, and later, Assistant Scout Master”.

Kumar entered the Faculty of Science of the University of Ceylon in 1961 and secured from it an honours degree in Chemistry in 1965. He joined the academic staff of the Department of Chemistry in the Faculty of Science, University of Ceylon, Peradeniya in 1965 and left the following year for Magdalen College at Oxford University, from which institution he obtained his doctorate in Chemistry. His entire teaching career was at Peradeniya, where in the period 2003-2006 he served as the Dean of the Faculty of Science, a position that his late father-in-law had held a few decades earlier.

Among the other highlights of his career are: Chairman of the Industrial Technology Institute (formerly the Ceylon Institute of Scientific and Industrial Research, CISIR); Member (representing Sri Lanka) of the Geneva-based UN Commission on Science and Technology from 1999 to 2007 and its President from 2001-2003; President of the Sri Lanka Estate Workers Union from 1989 onwards; Member of the Politburo of the Lanka Sama Samaja Party from 1988 to 2014 and currently, a member of the Executive Committee of the National People’s Power (NPP).

Vijaya and Savitri Kumar are parents of daughters Shamala and Ramya, who are following in the footsteps of their parents: with the former teaching in the Department of Agricultural Economics in the Faculty of Agriculture, University of Peradeniya and the latter, in the Department of Community Medicine at the University of Jaffna.

(I wish to thank the following who assisted me in the writing of this brief essay: Mr. Bandula Warnakulasuriya, Emeritus Professor Ratnayake Bandara, Professor Mahinda Wickramaratne, Professor Swarna Wimalasiri and Mr. Manik de Silva).

*Editor’s note: Prof. Vijaya Kumar, a member of the NPP’s National Executive Committee and is still active in politics turns 84 today. This article by Tissa Jayatilaka, former Executive Director of the United States – Sri Lanka Fulbright Commission for Mutual Academic Exchange, was written for an upcoming collection of essays on Kumar’s life by his friends.

(Colombo Telegraph)

By Tissa Jayatilaka

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