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Sri Lanka’s Foreign Policy amid Geopolitical Transformations: 1990-2024 – Part VIII

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President Gotabaya Rajapaksa

(Part VII of this article appeared on 18 April, 2025)

President Gotabaya Rajapaksa: Glamorous Entry and Ignominious Exit

After Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s victory in the November 2019 presidential election and the Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna’s (SLPP) landslide win in the August 2020 parliamentary elections, Sri Lanka’s political landscape underwent another drastic shift. President Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s popularity peaked during the parliamentary elections, helping the SLPP secure nearly a two-thirds majority. However, in a dramatic volte-face of events within just two years, ‘Gota-mania’ had turned into a ‘Gota-phobia’. The five-year period from the 2019 presidential election to the landmark 2024 presidential election, which brought the National People’s Power (NPP) to power, was marked by a series of dramatic political events, including the Aragalaya—intense popular agitations that signified an unprecedented shift in the country’s political culture.

From the outset, President Gotabaya Rajapaksa had to face the challenge of the COVID-19 pandemic, which led to the postponement of parliamentary elections. Without parliamentary oversight, he implemented health measures to manage the health crisis, resulting in excessive executive aggrandizement. In October 2020, Parliament passed the 20th Amendment, reversing the democratic reforms of the 19th Amendment. As the country grappled with the economic fallout of the global pandemic, certain decisions taken by President Gotabaya Rajapaksa further deepened the crisis, pushing the economy to the brink of collapse.

After 2019, Sri Lanka’s domestic and international political environment began to change significantly. The previously cordial atmosphere of dialogue and accommodation with the UNHRC was reversed. In February 2020, President Gotabaya Rajapaksa announced Sri Lanka’s decision to withdraw its co-sponsorship of the UNHRC resolutions previously agreed upon by the former administration. This move drew strong international criticism, particularly from Western nations. Despite this, Sri Lanka assured the UNHRC that it remained committed to achieving sustainable peace through an inclusive, domestically led reconciliation and accountability process. The shifting political climate was reflected in UNHRC Resolution 46/1, adopted in March 2021, which, for the first time, acknowledged the need to preserve, analyse, and consolidate evidence of human rights violations and abuses in Sri Lanka for potential future prosecutions. On February 14, 2020, the U.S. State Department announced a travel ban on Sri Lankan Army Commander Lieutenant General Shavendra Silva, his immediate family, and several other military officers. The ban was imposed on the grounds of command responsibility for “gross violations of human rights,” specifically extrajudicial killings at the end of Sri Lanka’s civil war.

Foreign policy under President Gotabaya Rajapaksa was largely shaped by the pressing domestic challenges his administration faced, particularly the COVID-19 pandemic and the worsening economic crisis. As the country grappled with severe financial instability, mounting debt, and declining foreign reserves, Rajapaksa’s government sought closer ties with nations that could provide economic relief, including China and India. Growing public dissatisfaction and protests over economic mismanagement influenced foreign policy decisions. Finally, Sri Lanka’s foreign policy under President Gotabaya Rajapaksa was driven more by necessity than strategic vision, reflecting the urgent need to address domestic crises.

President Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s decisions, driven by domestic political pressure from his Sinhala nationalist clientele, undermined Sri Lanka’s credibility with key international partners. His rejection of the US Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) grant and the Japan-funded Light Railway Transit (LRT) project exemplify this trend. By rejecting the MCC grant, the President prioritised political narratives over economic benefits. His government framed the MCC as a threat to sovereignty, aligning with nationalist sentiments, even though it was a no-strings-attached grant. The unilateral cancellation of the JICA-funded LRT project without prior consultation with Japan further strained relations. Japan is one of Sri Lanka’s biggest development partners, and scrapping such a significant project without negotiation damaged diplomatic and economic ties. This decision not only led to the loss of a beneficial urban transport system but also risked future funding from Japan. It signaled to international donors that Sri Lanka was an unreliable partner. These actions reflected short-term political maneuvering rather than a strategic approach to economic development and foreign policy.

Since January 2022, all major economic indicators declined sharply, triggering a new wave of public protests. People from all walks of life took to the streets in tendon to protest the rising cost of living, prolonged power cuts, fuel shortages that led to days-long queues, exploding gas cylinders, and the scarcity of essential goods such as milk powder, food, and medicine. Alongside these grievances, the protests also brought unprecedented attention to longstanding issues of economic mismanagement. It took a new turn with the setting up of Gota-Go-Gamga in front of the Presidential Secretariat on April 9th. With no viable alternatives, the Sri Lankan government declared its first-ever sovereign default on April 12, 2022—marking the country’s first default since gaining independence in 1948. It was too late to prevent the deepening economic and political crisis from reaching total collapse. Nevertheless, the Aragalaya cannot be understood merely as a spontaneous uprising driven by economic hardship. From a broader perspective, it marked the beginning of a new phase in the crisis of the post-war Sri Lankan state

The Aragalaya and Ranil Wickremesinghe’s Interlude as interim President

The Aragalaya that forced President Gotabaya Rajapaksa to flee the country in disgrace and send his resignation from overseas on 14 July 2022 was arguably the most consequential political phenomenon in post-war Sri Lanka. It effectively ended the Rajapaksa family’s dominance in national politics and set in motion political dynamics that will shape the country’s trajectory for years to come. As a complex and multifaceted movement, its true impact cannot be measured by immediate outcomes alone; a long-term perspective is essential to fully understand its significance. One of its most striking effects was the unprecedented rise of the JVP/NPP, which, having previously secured only 3% of the popular vote, achieved a historic victory in the 2024 presidential and parliamentary elections.

In the aftermath of President Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s Resignation, Ranil Wickremesinghe was elected as interim President by a Parliament still dominated by the SLPP led by Mahinda Rajapaksa. By the time President Ranil Wickremesinghe mobilised heavy military forces to decisively crack down on Gota-Go-Gama on July 22, 2022 and prevent a section of protesting youths moving towards parliament, the protesters were debating on how to end their protest. By orchestrating a dramatic show of power, Wickremesinghe positioned himself as the saviour of the nation, claiming credit for restoring stability and preventing Sri Lanka from descending into anarchy and economic collapse. However, this narrative allowed him to consolidate power while the Rajapaksa political establishment remained intact in the background. After four months long dramatic events, the country seemed to have returned to the status quo ante.

The international community was stunned by the magnitude and intensity of the protest. All the key international actors were concerned about the direction of Aragalaya. As there were many actors and dispersed leadership to Aragalaya, it was not possible for any external power to influence the outcome single handedly. The protest movement itself decided its course on its own. However, Ranil Wickremesinghe’s modus operandi raises the question of whether he leveraged the Aragalaya to secure his own political future. History is full of sudden twists and turns, but in the long run, one twist often negates another.

The Aragalaya brought the ‘people’ factor to the forefront of international relations, emphasizing that global governance is no longer solely about diplomacy among political elites but increasingly about responding to popular demands. It challenged traditional diplomatic narratives that prioritize state stability over public welfare. As a result, foreign governments, international financial institutions, and regional organisations were compelled to engage with the concerns of the people. India extended emergency credit lines to Sri Lanka, international media amplified the voices of protesters, and global financial institutions like the IMF considered public sentiment in bailout negotiations. This demonstrates how grassroots movements can influence international discourse and shape policy decisions.

The impact of Aragalaya was further amplified by digital platforms, transforming it into a global phenomenon. Social media enabled real-time updates, mobilisation, and international awareness, drawing attention from human rights organisations, foreign governments, and diaspora communities. This digital interconnectedness highlights the growing role of ordinary people—not just governments—in shaping international relations. The Aragalaya serves as a powerful reminder that citizens are not passive subjects of global affairs but active agents capable of influencing political and economic decisions worldwide.

The Aragalaya brought global attention to corruption and economic mismanagement, emphasising their direct impact on governance, human rights, and international relations. Corruption, once seen as a domestic issue managed within national legal frameworks, is now increasingly recognised as a fundamental governance failure with far-reaching consequences. This shift was evident in the comprehensive report submitted by United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Michelle Bachelet, to the 51st session of the Human Rights Council in September 2022. In her report, she addressed the link between economic crimes and Sri Lanka’s economic crisis, expressing hope that the new administration would respond to public demands for accountability, particularly for corruption and abuses of power, with a renewed commitment to ending impunity.

After Sri Lanka withdrew from co-sponsoring the UNHRC resolution in 2020, its relations with Western powers deteriorated—a trend continued under President Ranil Wickremesinghe too. In October 2022, the UNHRC adopted Resolution 51/1, which, for the first time, established the Sri Lanka Accountability Project (SLAP) under the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights to collect evidence of alleged violations. In November 2022, a group of British parliamentarians called for measures beyond UNHRC resolutions, urging sanctions—including asset freezes and travel bans—against alleged Sri Lankan war criminals and their referral to the International Criminal Court. Even before UNHRC Resolution 51/1, on February 14, 2020, under President Gotabaya Rajapaksa, the U.S. blacklisted General Shavendra Silva and imposed a travel ban on him. In January 2023, Canada imposed sanctions on former presidents Mahinda Rajapaksa and Gotabaya Rajapaksa for their involvement in “gross and systematic violations of human rights” during the armed conflict. In September 2023, twelve bipartisan members of the U.S. Congress urged the State Department to hold Sri Lanka legally accountable under the ‘UN Convention against Torture’. On March 25, 2025, Britain also imposed a travel ban on three Sri Lankan ex-generals, including General Shavendra Silva, and a former LTTE commander from the east, who later switched loyalties and supported the Sri Lankan Army.

The primary focus of foreign policy under President Ranil Wickremesinghe was guiding Sri Lanka out of its default status. As Acting President on July 18, 2022, Wickremesinghe turned to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and initiated negotiations for a bailout package. Under his leadership, Sri Lanka reached a staff-level agreement with the IMF for an Extended Fund Facility (EFF) program. This effort culminated in March 2023, when the country successfully secured a board-level agreement, marking a significant step toward economic recovery. After intense negotiations with the Official Creditor Committee (OCC)—which includes major bilateral lenders such as Japan, India, and France—along with the China Exim Bank, Sri Lanka finalized debt restructuring agreements on June 26, 2024. These agreements, totaling USD 10 billion, were reached with key bilateral creditors, including the OCC and China Exim Bank.

One of the other key priorities of President Ranil Wickremesinghe’s foreign policy has been attracting Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) to boost Sri Lanka’s economic recovery. India was the first country to come forward to help Sri Lanka in early 2022 and provided extensive assistance totaling approximately USD 4 billion, encompassing various forms of support such as multiple credit lines and currency assistance, notably an agreement to supply petroleum worth USD 700 million through a Line of Credit. Additionally, export credit facilities totaling USD 1.5 billion were extended for the import of essential commodities, facilitated by India’s EXIM Bank and the State Bank of India.

Since then, India’s involvement in Sri Lanka’s economy has surged, solidifying its position as the main trading partner. In August 2022, the Indian Rupee (INR) was designated as an international currency in Sri Lanka. The deepening engagement of India was particularly evident in the power and renewable energy sectors.

In February 2023, Adani Green Energy received approval to invest $442 million in developing 484 megawatts of wind power capacity in Mannar town and Pooneryn village in northern Sri Lanka. This investment, along with a 20-year power purchase agreement with India’s Adani Green, further cements India’s influence over Sri Lanka’s energy sector. In March 2024, Sri Lanka signed an agreement with U Solar Clean Energy Solutions of India to construct hybrid renewable energy systems on three northern coastal islands—Delft, Analativu, and Nainativu. This project is backed by an $11 million grant from India, reinforcing its commitment to Sri Lanka’s renewable energy development.

At a time when Sri Lanka desperately needed foreign investment, the India-China rivalry became evident in the country’s plans to develop container terminals at the Colombo harbor. China had already built the Colombo International Container Terminal (CICT) with a $500 million investment and held an 85% stake in its operations. Meanwhile, India and the United States were increasingly concerned about China’s growing presence in both the Hambantota port and Colombo harbor. In response, the Wickremesinghe government offered the West Container Terminal to India instead of the East Container Terminal. This move was seen as an attempt to balance strategic competition between India and China in the Indian Ocean. However, rather than a well-calibrated foreign policy, it appears more like strategic promiscuity —leveraging Sri Lanka’s strategic assets solely to attract foreign investment.

When the National People’s Power (NPP) Government assumed power following Anura Kumara Dissanayake’s victory in the presidential elections on 21 September 2024 and secured a two-thirds majority in the parliamentary elections on 14 November 2024, the country’s foreign policy was in total disarray, lacking clear direction. Given the strategic importance of foreign relations in statecraft—particularly in the context of regional dynamics, Indian Ocean geopolitics, and evolving global power shifts—it became imperative for the new administration to redefine Sri Lanka’s foreign policy. It is a formidable challenge that requires accurately identifying foreign policy priorities, selecting viable strategies as a small island state, and advancing them prudently while carefully assessing critical strategic developments in regional and global political spheres.

by Gamini Keerawella

(To be concluded)



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Role of identity in the making and breaking of West Asian peace

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Negotiators at the Pakistani-negotiated preliminary peace talks. BBC

The West Asian peace effort continues waveringly amid uncertainties. The world could be considered as having ‘some breathing space’ currently in this tangled situation on account of a dip in oil prices but whether such relief would be of a long term nature is left to be seen.

Meanwhile, some vital ‘details’ in the peace process are continuing to hobble it. One such factor is the nuclear issue. While US President Donald Trump is on record that Iran’s purported nuclear programme from now on will be monitored by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), this assertion is being denied by the Iranian authorities who indicate that Iran will be coming under no such regime. That is, Iran will be answerable to no one with regard to its legitimate right to defend itself.

Accordingly, an early closure to the nuclear question could not be expected and the furthering of peace in the region hinges on the principal sides being of one mind on the issue. Moreover, toll-free shipping through the Strait of Hormuz is proving to be a bone of contention between the warring sides.

However, perhaps going largely unnoticed in the Middle East region are identity questions of considerable magnitude that have stood in the way of the region making some headway towards a peace settlement and which would continue to undermine such a process going forward. Identity, or a group’s self conception, is by far the most intractable of the factors in the conflict and the main sides would do well to manage it effectively before long.

US Vice President J.D. Vance, as pointed out in this column last week, fired one of the first salvos in this regard in the current peace effort. He reportedly said: ‘Regional peace and stability includes stopping the funding of “terrorist organizations” .’ He probably had in mind the Hezbollah organization which is funded and armed by Iran but, needless to say, the latter would reject this statement out of hand because it does not see the Hezbollah as terroristic in orientation.

Accordingly, the tangled issue of ‘who is a terrorist?’ would recur to hamper the West Asian peace bid. An important corollary to this matter is that Middle Eastern militants would be branding US administrations as terroristic considering the humanly costly military interventions undertaken by the latter over the decades in the world’s war zones.

It is difficult to see the main sides taking up the issue of terror and arriving at a common understanding on the problem over the next couple of months in their peace deliberations but the unresolved question could be expected to be the proverbial ‘elephant in the room’ that could even wear the sides down. Accordingly, ‘quick fixes’ to the Middle East imbroglio would need to be ruled out.

However, paring down terror to its essentials, it needs to be found that in contemporary times it is identity and issues growing out of it that keep the question alive and render it intractable. In fact the problem should be seen as igniting and sustaining a multiplicity of conflicts world wide.

So pervasive are identity questions that they are seen by some as having played a role in leading to the recent resignation of Keir Starmer as UK Prime Minister. Among other things, the latter is seen as having been incapable of managing migration related issues besides falling short in strengthening domestic social cohesion.

Identity issues came to a head in the UK in the form of the recent anti-immigrant riots in Northern Ireland. Clearly, some immigrants continue to be seen as aliens and parasitic in nature in some parts of the UK by jingoistic elements. Thus is ignited anti-foreigner violence.

That said, some of the most laudable measures for the promotion of peaceful race relations are found in the UK today. The latter’s race relations legislation could be seen as constituting a model for the rest of the world and needs to be studied and adopted by particularly the global South where identity conflicts are rampant.

Unfortunately, racial amity is not being considered a priority by the Trump administration. Under the latter immigrants are being seen by supremacist whites as the archetypal ‘Other’ who should be violently shunned. Accordingly, social cohesion in the US too is being steadily undermined and stepped-up race hate in the country shouldn’t come as a surprise.

In the West Asian region, archetypal ‘Othering’ could prove particularly pernicious and destructive. It could lead to the unraveling of the current peace talks between the adversaries and needs to be addressed by them if the negotiations are to prove productive.

For far too long the West and Israel have been viewed as archetypal enemies by Iran and its supporters. On the other hand, Palestinian militants have been habitually seen by the Far Right in the US and by hard line Israelis as sworn enemies who are best eliminated. These seemingly unresolvable divides in the Middle East could bring down the present negotiatory process.

Even if the present round of mediated negotiations between the US and Iran lead to a substantive cessation of hostilities in West Asia, the divisive mindsets of the prime antagonists, that is, the US and its ally Israel on the one side and Iran and its supportive militant groups on the other, would need to be changed for the better if enduring peace is to be given a chance. That is, mindsets would need to be transformed on both sides of the divide from mutual hostility to mutual amicability. No doubt, a long-gestation process.

It cannot be stressed enough that those mediating in this long-running conflict, themselves need to approach peace-making with unbiased minds. It needs to be realized, for example, that Israel too has been ‘hurting’ badly in this conflict over the decades to the degree to which the Palestinian side has been victimized cruelly, dispossessed and divested of dignity.

Any negotiated peaceful settlement should seek to address this persistent mindset malaise as well and turn enmity into amicability. An equitable solution that addresses the lingering grievances of both sides could lay the basis for this process of ‘Turning Spears into Ploughshares.’

‘Land and Bread’ have been at the heart of the Middle East conflict over the decades or even centuries. An equitable solution should provide these assets in equal measure for both sides. There is no getting away from the ‘Two State Solution’.

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Central bankers live on Short End Street; Economic planners live on Long End Street

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Long End Street is not a summation of Short End Streets. Eighteen short-term crises and no long-term growth in sight!

For quite some time, there has been no agency of government dealing with long-term economic and social policy questions. Nor have universities been of any help. There has been a National Planning Department in the Ministry of Finance but we have not seen any worthwhile reports from them. M. D. H. Jayawardena, in 1956, presented in Parliament the Six-Year Programme of Investment. Soloman Bandaranaike established a National Planning Council and a Planning Department, with Princy Siriwardena as its Director. They wrote the Ten-Year Plan, better known for its readability than its depth of analysis or policy content. Ten years or so later Dudley Senanayake established a Ministry of Planning and Employment with Gamani Corea (later of high international repute) as its Permanent Secretary. The Ministry was responsible for some useful analytical work and the development of a bureaucracy responsible for plan implementation. The latter was the work of a brilliant member of the Ceylon Civil Service, Godfrey Gunatilleke, who also worked in the Ministry. The major pre-occupation of the Ministry turned out to be the annual government budget and the management of direly scarce foreign exchange, all short term considerations. They set up a bureaucratic mechanism to evaluate capital expenditure in the government budget. The Ministry won plaudits for its Foreign Exchange Budget, some analytical wok on the economy, including population projections as well as education, in both schools and universities. As the 1970s wore on, planning earned a bad press and the new government of 1971 disbanded most of that and created a Department of National Planning in the Ministry of Finance, which survives to date.

A part of the purpose of this narrative has been to bring out that, all along, government has had no outfit of economists and sociologists whose job was to study long term changes in our society and the economy and in the rest of the world and propose solutions for consideration by governments. (A brilliant exception was the work on education, that was directed by Jinapala Alles, who had graduated in chemistry and was a fast learner and was at great ease with numbers. He was also an effortless leader of a small team of self-selected competent and enthusiastic public servants.) The government depended on the Central Bank for advice on long term development of the economy. Princy Siriwardena was seconded for service in the Planning Secretariat; similarly, Gamani Corea was from the Bank. Later, he was replaced with H.A.de S. Gunasekera, likely the most brilliant economics teacher in the University of Ceylon. He taught monetary economics, essentially short term. (His favourite economist Keynes famously wrote, “In the long run we are all dead”.)

When the Ministry of Planning and Employment was established in 1965, government plundered the Central Bank to staff it: Gamani Corea, R. M. Seneviratne, N. Ramachandran, Nihal Kappagoda and G. Usvatte-aratchi. Later, W. M. Tillekeratne and A. S. Jayawardena both long term employees of the Central Bank, were appointed as the chief economist of government. Jayawardena still later became the Governor of the Bank. Several other employees of the Bank, including J. B. Kelegama, P. B. Karandawela, P. B. Jayasundera worked at high levels in successive governments and that practice continued when Mahinda Siriwardena became the Secretary to the Ministry of Finance when Anura Dissanayake became the Minister of Finance. It is mysterious that the government saw no need for specialist advisers who would identify long term economic and social problems and solutions therefor, look out for markets and technology and warn of impending pitfalls, in contrast to our mighty neighbour which had a Planning Commission that handled long term problems and a Central Bank which had learnt to handle masterly, monetary problems.

Pitambar Pant, Montek Singh Ahluwalia, Manmohan Singh, I. G. Patel and Raghu Ram Rajan were most distinguished economics policymakers and central bankers. Japan benefited greatly from the work of MITI. So did Korea from its counterpart. This is not to argue that had there been an outfit of that sort, Sri Lanka would now be rich but to warn that the Central Bank is neither equipped nor fit to fight those battles. If you scan the Central Bank Act of 2023, you will find stabilisation the most frequently recurring theme. Clause 6 reads ‘The primary object (objective?) of the Central Bank shall be to achieve and maintain domestic price stability.’ The most generous reading that the Bank may have anything to do with economic development is in Clause 6 (4) ‘In pursuing the primary object (objective?), the Central Bank shall take into account, inter alia, the stabilisation of output towards its potential level.’ Lawyers may have a field day with that and economists may beg for its meaning.

Amarananda Jayawardena was the last Governor of the Central Bank who had understood that the central bank was equipped to handle short term problems and that not always valiantly, and that it had neither the tools nor the resources to plan and engineer long term development. As Governor, he did not speak for the government on long term economic and social problems, although prior to assuming duties as Governor of the Bank, he had been the chief economist of the government. Jayawardena knew all too well the nature of the tools and the resources he had and how far he could confidently aim and shoot. It was simply silly to produce a Five-year Road Map (no matter how colourful the accompanying graphics), when a central bank mainly used transactions in the short-term financial assets market to move interest rates and the demand for money. The Bank of England, for most of the 20th century, used Commercial Paper with two ‘good names’ at its Discount Window. Short-term and long-term rates of interest, normally, behave in a predictable relationship, although occasionally, and in volatile times, that relationship may become inverted. (I am not well read on recent Fed and the Riks Bank market operations.)

The economists at the Central Bank are experts in monetary policy and are rarely knowledgeable about economic growth. An exception was S. B. D. de Silva and he found writing a half page note to the Centra Bank Bulletin (monthly) stultifying. He left the Bank quite young and continued studying economics until the very end of his life. As undergraduates they may have read on economic growth and development but as professionals in the central bank, it is unlikely that they kept working on problems in that area. They may also have learned, some time, that there has been no central bank credited with spearheading economic development in any country. Therefore, to pretend that they can advise the government on economic planning, is a hobby which they would be wise to desist from.

We did a splendid job of saving our new born children and their mothers as indicated in low infant mortality and maternal mortality rates. We scored an even more resounding victory in educating all our children. If we have any claim to any civilizing missions in the 20th century, these two stand out. Beside them, we have been mostly failures. The economy has advanced only laggardly. It has miserably failed to exploit excellent opportunities to sell in burgeoning markets, output employing a healthy and educated labour force. Japan, South Korea, China, Vietnam, south India, Ethiopia, Rwanda and several other countries, all (except Japan) late comers to the game compared to Sri Lanka, succeeded in doing just that. It is wrong to blame governments alone for poor economic growth, as many do. Most economic activity in this country is run by the private sector and leaders there have made poor use of opportunities.

When ministers of government and its employers collect bribes, private sector persons pay bribes. The markedly rapid economic growth in Andhra Pradesh, Telangana, Karnataka, Tamil Nadu and Keralam and poor growth in Madhya Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh, Bihar and many others in the north east are under the same central government dispensation, sharply pointing to differences in the quality of business leadership in the two groups. ‘Big business’ here run betting shops, supermarkets, hospitals, import and market household equipment, banks and insurance companies and, most ambitiously maintain construction companies. (In the widely watched IPL cricket matches 2026, Sri Lanka advertised regularly a Betting Centre!) Tourism in this country is the business of small-scale enterprises with low productivity. The ubiquitous kade with a stock-in-trade of less than one hundred thousand rupees, borrowed from a relative or a friend, is a sign of rampant unemployment and not of budding entrepreneurship. When you go to consult a doctor in a private hospital in Colombo and wait endless hours, count the number of men and women employees idling, supervised by a proportionately large number of idling supervisors. Where are the large-scale manufacturing and service companies, selling the world over, where economies of scale abound in the 21st century? So far as I recall, there has been no Initial Public Offering (IPO) of shares in the Colombo Stock Market during the last 7 years. Nor have multinational companies established here any large factories or offices.

Is the air we breathe deathly to enterprise?

by Usvatte-aratchi

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A Requiem for Keir Starmer rule

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Starmer

By the time Sir Keir Rodney Starmer resigned, polls showed that he had become the least popular Labour Prime Minister in living memory. His fall was all the more striking because his political beginnings had once suggested a very different trajectory. As a teenager in the Labour Party Young Socialists, and later as editor of the Marxist journal Socialist Alternatives, he had stood firmly on the radical left. As a human rights lawyer he opposed the illegal invasion of Iraq, earning a reputation for principle and moral clarity.

It was this early radicalism that his supporters later weaponised, presenting him as a unifying leftwing figure in the aftermath of the coup against the Labour Party leader Jeremy Corbyn. The right-wing of Labour, having spent years undermining Corbyn (including through a coordinated campaign that framed him, falsely, as anti-Semitic) found in Starmer a vessel through which they could reclaim the party while reassuring the membership that continuity with the Corbyn surge remained intact.

In his resignation speech, Starmer claimed to have inherited a politically, morally and financially bankrupt Labour Party. Yet the record shows that Corbyn had revived the party’s grassroots, drawing tens of thousands of new members back to a party embodying the tradition of Keir Hardie. The oligarchy closed ranks against this leftist heavyweight, using Starmer and the Labour right wing as their weapon. Starmer’s “Changed Labour” was not a renewal but a repudiation, embracing the very Thatcherite revisionism that had hollowed Labour out in the first place.

A Britain battered by decades of neoliberal restructuring formed the backdrop to Starmer’s rise. The cumulative effects of Maggie “milk-snatcher” Thatcher’s programme, deepened by Blair, Cameron, May, and Johnson, combined with the convulsions of Brexit to produce a profound economic, social, and political crisis. The Conservative Party imploded under the weight of its own contradictions. Starmer, offering managerial calm, an a Corbyn-lite manifesto, rode the wave of Tory collapse to a landslide victory.

But once in office, he revealed himself as a Blairite in sombre tones: a Thatcherite in Labour clothing. Within weeks he slashed winter fuel payments for pensioners, inaugurating a harsh antiworkingclass agenda. He embraced the Israeli government even as it carried out genocide in Gaza. The former human rights lawyer now used antiterror legislation to suppress dissent, particularly protests against the genocide. His immigration rhetoric, invoking an “island of strangers,” echoed the poisonous cadences of Enoch Powell.

Throughout his premiership he remained pofaced, showing little emotion even when forced into humiliating Uturns by public outrage. He displayed no visible sorrow at the mass killing of children in Gaza. Only at the prospect of losing office did he appear moved. He was, in the words of Saki, a man with “the soul of a meringue,” a mediocrity whose obedience to the oligarchic class and to Zionist backers embodied what Hannah Arendt called the banality of evil. His legacy – and that of the Tories who preceded him – is a nation distrustful of politicians of whatever hue, open to the pseudo-anti-elite, deception of the billionaire-backed racist far-right

His resignation leaves Britain at a crossroads – will it follow the fascistic path of Nigel Farage’s Reform Party, or will it go down the green-red road of Zach Polanski and Corbyn? Even replacing Starmer with the newly-elected Andy Burnham will only provide more-of-the-same Tory policies – Burnham went on record saying his first foreign visit as Prime Minister would be to Israel. These are the same policies that created a visceral hatred of Starmer and opened the gates for Reform’s surge.

When news of his resignation broke, a friend told this writer that the one who had engineered the exit of Jeremy Corbyn had been unable to complete two years in office. He added, ‘Rajakam kalath kalakam palade”-– even if you reign, your deeds will bear consequences.

And, so ends the Starmer era, not with the dignity of a statesman, but with the hollow thud of a project built on betrayal, opportunism, and the abandonment of the very principles he once claimed to uphold.

by Vinod Moonesinghe

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